wordpress.com...2015/12/12 · december12,2015 !! mr.michaelcoyne ! cityofsantee!...

December 12, 2015 Mr. Michael Coyne City of Santee 10601 Magnolia Avenue Santee, CA 92071 [email protected] RE: Cheyenne Project Recirculated Draft EIR (RDEIR), SCH #2005071037 Dear Mr. Coyne, We encourage selection of the No Project Alternative. Should the city council approve a project alternative, the Jurisdictional Drainage Avoidance Alternative is significantly superior to the project. We encourage the city staff report to adopt this No Project position for the following reasons. Significant Adverse Impacts The Cheyenne Project RDEIR underestimates significant impacts, does not disclose, avoid or adequately mitigate for significant adverse impacts of the project. Aesthetic impacts, biological impacts, public safety impacts and water supply impacts are significant. The project’s GHG emissions are significant and there are not conditions attached to the project to avoid or mitigate the impacts. How much energy will the project consume? How much GHGs will be emitted and why isn’t the installation of solar panels and Level 2 electrical vehicle chargers, which must be considered feasible in 2015, a condition of project approval? Our July 22, 2005 scope letter emphasized the importance of including solar systems. Why aren’t rainwater capture and grey-‐water systems conditions of project approval? Without fully offsetting the project’s energy consumption with solar power, the GHG emissions are a cumulatively significant adverse impact to climate.

__________________________________________________________________________________________ 9222 Lake Canyon Road, Santee, CA 92071 Tel/Fax (619) 258-‐7929 [email protected] I.D.#980429

Preserve Wild Santee

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All GHG impacts, aesthetic impacts, water supply impacts, biological impacts and public safety impacts should be disclosed and avoided when feasible and fully mitigated when not feasible. Significant Adverse Biological Impacts The project would impact 34.4 acres (RDEIR 4-‐65) of occupied Diegan coastal sage scrub (CSS). CSS is required to be avoided because Santee has exceeded its 5% “4d interim take allowance” of CSS when it approved the Sky Ranch Project in 2006. No additional CSS can be impacted until Santee completes its MSCP Subarea Plan. Santee first promised to finish its MSCP Subarea Plan in the 1990s and then again promised to complete it consistent with the approval of the General Plan Update in 2003 and did not. There has not been any meaningful progress – the “process” has been long stalled for years without the draft plan ever going through the CEQA process. Meanwhile projects impacting natural sites are repeatedly approved that foreclose conservation options under the guise of consistency with a non-‐existent plan in permanent draft form. Our July 22, 2005 scope letter stressed the importance of consistency with a “FINAL MSCP subarea Plan.” Under the present circumstance, all impacts to species and species natural habitats are significant and require analysis, disclosure, avoidance when feasible and adequate mitigation otherwise. Again, no additional take of CSS can be authorized under the present circumstances. The proposed project inappropriately impacts endangered species habitat and forecloses the habitats’ potential conservation within the Santee MSCP Subarea Plan preserve system. Although the project alleges consistency with a draft plan, it is not consistent with prior draft plans that planned 100% and 90% conservation of the site. The prior plans for the site are those that can reasonably be expected to pass scrutiny of the CEQA process. The present draft has significantly eroded original conservation targets and dodged vetting by the CEQA process. The project would impact two of the three Coastal California Gnatcatcher (CAGN) sites. It is feasible to avoid CAGN as demonstrated by the Jurisdictional Drainage Avoidance Alternative, thus avoidance is required. Edge effects have substantially reduced the on site population already. Further disruption is likely to eliminate CAGN from the site. Significant impacts to suitable habitat for San Diego thornmint, San Diego barrel cactus, Quino checkerspot butterfly, and Hermes copper butterfly should all be avoided.



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Significant Adverse Aesthetic Impacts The RDEIR acknowledges General Plan Policies intended to protect significant natural views on the site, but errantly concludes that the extreme amount of cut and fill and blasting proposed does not significantly impact aesthetics. The views of the site are prominent throughout most of the city and beyond as part of a regionally significant block of intact landscape that creates value and a sense of place. These views establish the scenic northern boundary of the city. Furthermore the views are prominent from two scenic highway eligible freeways, SR-‐125 and SR-‐52. The photos and photo-‐simulations in the RDEIR are not representative and misleading with regard to the significance of the visual impacts. The landscape simulation intended to camouflage the project that is depicted in Figures 4.93-‐495 is at a density that is not realistic. Landscaping at the density simulated would violate the specifications of the Fire Protection Plan and likely guarantee loss of structures during a Santa Ana wind driven firestorm. Thus, the RDEIR is not disclosing the true impacts in either aesthetics or wildland fire risk, or both. Furthermore, the plants depicted may include invasive non-‐native species with significant adverse impacts to adjacent biological habitat. Significant Adverse Impacts to Public Safety According to third party review of the blasting plan, “no guarantee can be given that rock fall will not occur.” [Padre Dam Engineering Memo and Geocon]. This leaves residents below blasting operations at significant risk. The blasting plan makes adjustments for lightning activity, but does not include any shutdown for Santa Ana winds or other low humidity conditions to reduce the risk of igniting catastrophic wildland fires in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone (VHFHSZ). Operations should be halted during Santa Ana wind conditions and during onshore winds above 10 mph under drought conditions. The Fire Protection Plan (FPP) is not sufficient to reduce hazards from wildland fire to a level of insignificance. The project would expose people and structures to a significant risk of loss, injury, or death involving wildland fires. The project proposes to completely embed 26 homes within heavy wildland fuels located in a northeast oriented canyon drainage capable of funneling Sana Ana winds. Another 13 homes would be located on steep slopes largely surrounded by wildland fuels in the southern portion of the site. The FPP disclaimer acknowledges, “It must be noted that during extreme fire conditions, there are no guarantees that a given structure will not burn.” (FPP page 25)



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The northern bubble of development does not have secondary access. A fire carried from the southwest up-‐canyon by an onshore flow would move upslope toward the development cutting off the single evacuation route. The “secondary/emergency access” that leads up to the water tower is completely impractical as an escape or evacuation route due to direct flame impingement, radiant and convective heat that would be transferred onto the road. Fuel modification zones modeled by the FPP generate 22 feet flames. Natural fuels were modeled at 45 feet flame lengths. A factor of 4x flame length (Butler & Cohen) is needed to provide a safe distance from radiant heat, but is not enough distance to assure safety from convective heat transfers. Street widths are 24 to 36 feet in the north and as narrow as 16 feet in the south plus “10 feet of clearance on either side of each fire apparatus access road and driveways.”

Cedar Fire victim perished in area of wide clearance. In the onshore wind fire scenario, a cluster-‐burn of structures originating at a “non-‐conforming” lot has the potential to result in lives and property lost at all 26 homes. The FPP fails to analyze and disclose this risk. Nor does the FPP discuss emergency preparedness for residents or provide any guidance as to whether residents would be expected to “shelter-‐in-‐place.” The FPP fails to provide guidance to residents in the absence of direction from emergency responders that may be unavailable due to multiple simultaneous incidents. The installation of sprinklers in all 26 structures and attic sprinklers in 2 structures with “non-‐conforming” lots is important, but is not enough to reduce risk to a level of insignificance. 1

1 Lots 17 and 26 have only 65 feet fuel modification zones instead of the 100 feet zones at other lots. Since 100 feet is “not achievable,” why aren’t these two lots just eliminated from the project to avoid the significant risk they add to the entire island bubble of 26 structures? Why aren’t attic sprinklers included in the 24 “conforming” lots? Other FPPs acknowledge the weakness of attics without



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An evacuation executed during a Santa Ana wind driven firestorm would have to be carefully timed without error because the single access route to Princess Joann Road would still be exposed to lethal levels of radiant heat during the passage of the fire front. The significant fire risk at the northern development bubble in heavy fuels can be avoided by selecting the Jurisdictional Drainage Avoidance Alternative.

Radiant and Convective Heat Can Rapidly Sever Exit Routes - 2007 Wildfire The FPP does not analyze or disclose the cumulatively significant amount of wild-‐land-‐interface that the project adds to the city’s total burden. Santee had 13 miles of WUI with development generally consolidated lower in the San Diego River Valley that allowed most of the homes to survive largely without fire response during the sprinklers. “Interior sprinklers may also protect a structure if a wildland fire enters the structure through a window or door. They will not protect against a fire in the attic unless attic sprinklers are installed as part of the system design.” [Otay Ranch FPP, page 45, bold emphasis added]



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2003 Cedar Fire. The Rattlesnake Mountain/Sky Ranch development added 5 miles of WUI to that total. How much WUI would be added by Cheyenne? How much WUI does the city fire department consider it can defend without adding additional brush engines and other wildland suppression resources? The addition of WUI by the Cheyenne project is a significant adverse impact. The FPP dos not consider or disclose the significant adverse impact to wildland fire suppression tactics created by locating an island bubble of development northeast of an existing WUI suppression anchor point. The island makes it infeasible to backfire from the existing anchor point to defend the homes at the existing WUI from a Santa Ana wind driven firestorm. It would violate backfiring safety guidelines to ignite a backfire that would burn over the only evacuation route and the island of development itself and merge with the Santa Ana wind driven flame front. The southern 13-‐unit development peninsula creates a similar adverse impact for the existing WUI at the western base of the mountain because the slope and ridge development would also be in the path of the backfire. Introduction of the 13-‐unit peninsula of development on a steep slope and ridge in a VHFHSZ is a significant adverse impact. The FPP underestimates fire intensity for worst-‐case scenario fires. Fuel models useful for determining fire intensity and flame length in fuel modification zones under moderate conditions can underestimate fire intensity and flame lengths during extended drought and extreme weather conditions. The FPP acknowledges that the Scott and Burgun 2005 fuel models used attempt to improve accuracy “outside of severe fire season conditions” (FPP D-‐2). The FPP should also run the original fuel models to gain better insight into how natural fuels (especially outside of the fuel modification zone) will burn under severe fire season conditions when fuels tend to behave more homogenously. The original 13 fire behavior fuel models are “for the severe period of the fire season when wildfires pose greater control problems” (Anderson 1982).2 For example, a duplication of the “97th percentile” inputs (FPP D-‐2) with substitution of Fuel Model 4 Brush (consistent with habitat at Cheyenne north) and no slope would produce 65 feet flame lengths (BehavePlus 5.0.5). That is flame lengths 20 feet greater than expected with SCAL 18, and equal to the length of the entire fuel modification zone for the “non-‐conforming” lots. Utilizing the same FM 4

2 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-‐GTR-‐153.2005. Joe H. Scott & Robert E. Burgan.



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inputs and doubling the midflame wind speed to 36 mph produces a flame length of 101.9 feet.3 Wind speeds can make a dramatic difference in fire intensity.

Cluster burn on Grass Valley Fire, 2007. Photo by Don Kelsen, LA Times Significant Risk of Cluster Burns is a Significant Adverse Impact to those that Cannot Evacuate “This significant reduction in fire intensity does not mitigate the effect of flying embers, which may travel a mile or more during wind driven fires.” [ Otay Ranch FPP, page 18] FPP acknowledges that control efforts at the fire head are probably ineffective for fires with flame lengths ranging from 8-‐11 feet and that for flame lengths over 11 feet “control efforts at the head of the fire are ineffective.” (FPP Table 2, D-‐6) The EIR further acknowledges that flame lengths for both Summer and Fall fires are expected to exceed eleven feet. Therefore, fires that ignite under extreme weather conditions are likely to spread rapidly and consume all continuous fuels in the path of the fire head. Under firestorm conditions, it is probable that people and 3 Rate of spread would increase to 2133.7 ch/h (26.67 mph) from 3.43 mph. 1 chain per hour = .0125 mph. 1 chain = 66 feet. 1 mile = 80 chains or 5,280 feet.



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structures in the vicinity of the wildland interface will face a significant threat of loss, injury or death (especially at the fire head). It is also important to recognize that standardized fuel modification zones generally sufficient to prevent structure ignition from direct flame impingement does not assure survival of the associated structures.4 Even though 189 structures were destroyed (with another 129 damaged) in the Freeway Complex Fire, the Orange County Fire Authority (OCFA) considered “…brush clearance to be adequate” based upon its inspections of fuel management zones prior to the fire.5 Wind driven embers are capable of penetrating the smallest of openings6 on structures and can ignite spot fires adjacent to structures in ignitable materials that can then damage or 4 "Fire officials believe that embers driven by raging winds through small openings or against exposed wood were responsible for igniting a majority of the 1,125 homes leveled by the Witch fire, the most destructive in California this year…An analysis of the Witch fire's pattern of destruction points to deficiencies in long-‐-‐-‐held beliefs about building in fire-‐-‐-‐prone areas. Fire-‐-‐-‐resistant walls and roofs are helpful, and brush clearance is essential. But alone they are insufficient in the face of millions of burning embers flying horizontally more than a mile ahead of the flames. Of 497 structures that burned in unincorporated areas of San Diego County during the Witch fire, more than half had fire-‐-‐-‐ resistant walls and roofs, a Times analysis of government data showed. Information on construction materials has not been compiled for neighborhoods inside the cities of San Diego and Poway, but senior fire officials estimate that well over 75% of the destroyed homes had fire-‐-‐-‐resistant exteriors.” “Lessons From the Fire” Joe Mozingo, Ted Rohrlich and Rong-‐-‐-‐gong Lin li, Los Angeles Times, December 23, 2007. 5 “In 2008, staff inspected 587 WUI parcels and found only 16 out of compliance with minimum requirements for defensible space. By July 22, all properties were in compliance. In addition, staff inspected approximately 790 of some 950 fuel modification parcels to ensure that they were in “substantial compliance” with provisions of the requirements and found 322 in need of some type of corrective action. As of the date of the fire, all but 25 had met minimum requirements. A preliminary assessment of homes destroyed or damaged in the freeway fire indicates that they were victim to ember intrusion rather than direct flame impingement indicating brush clearance was adequate.” Freeway Complex Preliminary Report to City of Yorba Linda, Orange County Fire Authority (OCFA), December 2, 2008, page 6. 6 Research data has been gathered regarding the ineffectiveness of current ventilation standards for preventing ember penetration. BFRL/NIST researchers tested ¼-‐-‐-‐inch or 6 mm (the recently adopted California WUI standard) 3 mm and 1.5 mm screens. “For all screen sizes tested, the firebrands were observed to penetrate the screen and produce a self-‐-‐-‐sustaining smoldering ignition inside the paper beds inside the structure.” Samuel L. Manzello, John R Shields, and Jiann C.



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ignite structures.7 Severe convective heat transfers through fire whirls/tornadoes can also bypass standard brush management zones.

“Extreme Wildfires can produce firebrand spot---ignitions at distances of a mile or more; however intense firebrand exposures within one--half to one-quarter mile often ignite numerous surface fires within a residential area that spread to contact and ignite homes and/or firebrands directly ignite homes.” US Forest Service Fire Scientist Jack Cohen, 4/23/2009

Homes with standard brush management zones still have the following significant vulnerabilities: Homes with standard brush management zones still have the following significant vulnerabilities: -‐ Vulnerability of structures to embers/firebrands due to extreme events, human error, or inadequate maintenance (i.e., fire tornados or fire whirls,8 broken windows

Yang, On the Use of a Firebrand Generator to Investigate the Ignition of Structures in Wildland-‐-‐-‐Urban Interface (WUI) Fires, Building and Fire Research Laboratory (BFRL), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 2007, p. 11. 7 The Fanita Ranch Fire Protection Plan acknowledged, “The Santa Ana winds with wind gusts of up to 60 mph blowing from the northeast/east pose significant threat from wind-‐-‐-‐blown embers to all structures within this project.” Page 14. 8 “Observed fire whirl behavior was both unexpected and extreme in these fires, catching many firefighters by surprise and significantly contributing to spotting up to 3/4 mile. 180-‐-‐-‐degree wind shifts proceeded fire whirls by 45 seconds to a minute.” [Firefighter] “Respondents reported unusual numbers of fire whirls that ranged from several yards wide up to a 1/2 mile wide. Destructive fire whirls, those causing structural damage unrelated to fire, also were reported. In addition to appearing suddenly, large fire whirls, characterized by a jet engine noise, took in debris such as large tumbleweeds and bushes from the bottom and ejected flaming debris from top— raining embers and violently showering sparks as much as 3/4 of a mile beyond the head of the fire. In one reported case, a fire whirl entered an area that had already burned clean down to three-‐-‐-‐inch stubble and whirled across several hundred feet of burned area into unburned fuel, carrying fire the whole way and igniting the unburned fuel. Another fire whirl crossed an eight-‐-‐-‐lane freeway. Small fire whirls merged into larger ones. Some reported fire whirls moving downhill.” “What we were expecting to see were fire whirls (4' to 6' tall), what we actually saw were true fire tornadoes. The fire researchers kept telling us what we were seeing was impossible and never seen before. After three days of discussion, the fire researchers started to understand that what they were expecting and what was happening was not jiving.



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from flying debris, drapes left over windows, open windows, open doors and garage doors, settlement cracks of structures built in landslide areas, wood piles, gas barbeques and motor-‐-‐-‐homes and other flammables stored too close to structures, delinquent or inadequate fuel treatments).

Wind-blown embers

-‐ Vulnerability of adjacent homes and the entire development from flame impingement and radiant heat once one or more homes are ignited from embers/extreme events or human error. There remains significant fire risk of structures within 30-‐feet of each other to cluster burn (especially those with north to east wildland interfaces).9

“”Division Supervisor” Southern California Firestorm 2003 Report for the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center, Mission Centered Solutions, December 8, 2003, page 6. 9 “As a type of fuel, involved structures emanated intense radiant heat. Heat levels in the street were unusually high.” Southern California Firestorm 2003 Report for the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center, Mission Centered Solutions, December 8, 2003, page 7.



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Attic vents are vulnerable to embers within a fire tornado.

Cluster burn example from 2003 Cedar fire. Photo by John Gibbins, SDUT.



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-‐ Vulnerability of people outside of structures to flame impingement, radiant heat and smoke. (Individuals on foot, on motorized and un-‐-‐-‐motorized vehicles, hikers and other individuals in natural lands, individuals attempting to evacuate or reach and secure their homes, or individuals simply locked out of vacant structures because they reside in another neighborhood or are children without keys; individuals at inadequate fuel buffers on sloped sections of emergency access routes; firefighters defending structures without adequate safety zones or escape routes). -‐ Vulnerability of elderly and weak individuals within structures to smoke, stress, or loss of power.

Cluster burn - San Diego County 2007



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The project site is susceptible to cluster burns and the evacuation route is subject to lethal levels of radiant heat. Clearly from a fire safety prospective, introducing residential development into this VHFHSZ is ill advised and creates a significant adverse impact. The project should be abandoned or at a minimum consolidated and reconfigured for more effective Santa Ana firestorm defense.

Rudy Reyes was severely burned attempting to evacuate from the Cedar fire in 2003.



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Significant Adverse Impacts to Firefighter Safety Evacuation can be treacherous even without gridlocked streets based upon when the order is given, visibility, the fires direction and rate of spread, distance from fuel loads, etc. and the timing of the decisions made to evacuate by people and authorities. Lingering residents located in topography that has higher risk can place firefighters in greater danger should they get in trouble and seek help. Fire authorities cannot force individuals to evacuate,10 which can put firefighters in greater jeopardy if lingering residents find themselves in trouble and request emergency assistance.

“Wildland urban interface fires present many challenges pertaining to evacuation. The fire spread rate is often so fast that emergency responders can only estimate the rate of spread and direction of travel. In this case, within minutes of the fire start, spotting was reported one mile down---wind from the head of the fire. Driven by winds of 40 MPH

10 Under certain circumstances evacuation may pose the greatest risk.



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and higher the rate of spread went from the usual estimate of acres per hour in a non wind driven fire to acres per minute.”11

“… law enforcement does not have the legal authority to force residents out of their homes; however, law enforcement may restrict the return of residents once they leave. Determining where and when to evacuate is often difficult. Each decision brings with it a new set of risks and benefits. The greatest risk by permitting residents to remain with their homes is the potential for loss of life.”12 “The Tea Fire in Montecito resulted in more than two dozen civilian injuries, two of which were critical burns received while trying to flee their residence. In 2006, in Cabazon, the Esperanza Fire resulted in four firefighter fatalities that occurred during structure protection efforts. The Cedar Fire that occurred in San Diego County in 2003 resulted in the death of fourteen civilians and a firefighter all while trying to flee or protect homes. Investigation into the citizen deaths and injuries identified one commonality: they all occurred because people decided to stay and protect their property or they evacuated too late and got caught in the fire front.”

When land use decisions can site development away from high-‐-‐-‐risk topography, (whether its fire, flood or landslide zones) what circumstances justify placing people and firefighters at greater risk of severe and life threatening injuries? The geography of the project site and vicinity argues for avoidance. The decision to build in multiple bubbles of development intermixed with wildlands maximizes edge and the hazards to firefighters. Firefighter fatality reports conclude that decisions to defend vulnerable structures located on high-‐-‐-‐risk topography were a primary factor in the fatalities of the Esperanza Fire and the Cedar Fire. The loss of a 19-‐-‐-‐person Granite Mountain crew in Arizona occurred when they were traveling though unburned fuel toward threatened structures at the town of Yarnell.13

11 Freeway Complex Preliminary Report to City of Yorba Linda, Orange County Fire Authority (OCFA), December 2, 2008, page 15. 12 Freeway Complex Preliminary Report to City of Yorba Linda, Orange County Fire Authority (OCFA), December 2, 2008, page 14.

13 Esperanza Fire Accident Investigation Factual Report, USDA-‐-‐-‐Forest Service, October 26, 2006. Novato Fire Protection District Cedar Fire Incident Recovery Report, May 26, 2004. Yarnell Hill Incident Reports, https://sites.google.com/site/yarnellreport/



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The Esperanza report identified “Causal” and “Contributing” factors for the firefighter fatalities. The root cause of the deaths was the decision to approve and build the home in a location destined to burn. While some consider this incident an accident, it may more readily be considered a high-‐-‐-‐risk gamble that was lost. The report identified these top factors:

“Contributing Factor 1. Organizational culture - The public (social and political) and firefighting communities expect and tolerate firefighters accepting a notably higher risk for structure protection on wildland fires, than when other resources/values are threatened by wildfire.” (Bold emphasis added)

“Causal Factor 2. The decision by command officers and engine supervisors to attempt structure protection at the head of a rapidly developing fire either underestimated, accepted, and/or misjudged the risk to firefighter safety.”

When faced with a Santa Ana wind driven fire head rapidly approaching project homes, will firefighters be expected to defend or decline to defend threatened homes directly in the path of the fire head?14 Poor Land Use Decisions Exacerbate the Impact of Expectations for Firefighter Performance by Adding Unnecessary Safety Risk Sites Considering that “no structure in the path of a wildfire is completely without need of protection,”15 more analysis needs to be provided with a focus upon firefighter safety. Firefighter escape routes and safety zones,16 and their potential decisions to defend structures for the worst Santa Ana wind driven fire points of origin, time periods and worst weather conditions require analysis. There have been at least 327 wildland firefighter fatalities in California since 1926.17 14 Reference Wildland Structure Protection Standard Operating Procedure, Novato Fire Protection District, Cedar Fire Recovery Report, May 26, 2004. 15 Incident Response Pocket Guide, National Wildfire Coordinating Group, PMS461 NFES 1077, January 2010, page 12. 16 Where are the safety zones on the project site? Butler and Cohen. Firefighter Safety Zones: A Theoretical Model Based Upon Radiative Heating. Firefighter Safety Zones: How Big Is Big Enough? 17 Wildland Fire Accidents by State, National Interagency Fire Center, page 2. Wildland firefighter fatalities nationwide exceed one thousand since 1910, page 24. http://www.nifc.gov/safety/safety_documents/State.pdf



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Because of the social and political climate associated with expectations for firefighters to defend property during wildfires, the Project’s configuration relative to topography should be analyzed and the conditions that firefighters are expected to engage, decline deployment or retreat from specific portions of the Project described.

“Wildland firefighters today are spending more hours fighting fires than ever before, and they are engaging fires of historic magnitude. The risk environment associated with wildland fire is being re-defined, and firefighters too have begun to redefine their own culture as a professional endeavor.” 18

After a review of wildland firefighter fatality incidents, the RDEIR should describe the conditions that would cause firefighters to reject assignment or retreat.19 The “Lesson Learned” analyses of fire behavior and firefighter fatality incidents are relevant and available.20

Convective Heat / Fire Whirls Pose Extreme Danger

18 Trends in Wildland Fire Entrapment Fatalities…Revisited, James R. Cook, National Wildland Firefighters Association, February 2013. 19 Reference Freeway Complex Fire Incident Narrative – Map 4 Corona Fire Engine 5—Near Miss Entrapment, Freeway Complex Fire After Action Report, OCFA, Pages 31 & 47. 20 http://www.youtube.com/user/WildlandFireLLC?feature=watch



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Significant Cumulative Adverse Climate Change Impacts The project as designed, would conflict with state regulations, plans and policies adopted to reduce GHG emissions. Furthermore, the project’s GHG emissions are cumulatively significant adverse impacts to climate change. The project misses feasible opportunities to avoid and mitigate significant cumulative climate impacts. The project should be designed with the goal of GHG neutrality or GHG negative through a net positive production of clean renewable energy, yet according to the RDEIR the project will generate approximately 744 MTCO2E per year (p. 7-‐5). At a minimum, the project needs to utilize the full productive capacity of each roof for PV Solar or commit to a minimum 8Kw system on each unit (approximately 28 panels) to mitigate for its GHG impacts with the goal of making the project net zero energy. Santee has not established significance thresholds. The City of San Diego’s 900 MTCO2 threshold has not been supported by substantial evidence and vetted through the CEQA process. 900 MTCO2 was adopted by San Diego as an interim measure with a 2010 memo. The “900 MTCO2E screening threshold” applied is outdated and inappropriate. Furthermore, the margin of error for the 744 MTCO2E calculated for the project means that the project likely exceeds “900 MTCO2E” even if the significance threshold was valid. However, even if credible evidence was provided that a 900 MTCO2E significance threshold is valid (which it was not), California has recently established new more aggressive requirements for reducing GHGs (SB 350 and Executive Order B-‐30-‐15). CEQA requires this significant new information to be disclosed and incorporated appropriately into the project. EO B-‐30-‐15 was issued April 29, 2015. The RDEIR has not considered the impacts of that order on the project design. Nor has it considered the requirements of SB 350. “SB 350 codifies goals Governor Brown laid out in his January 2015 inaugural address to double the rate of energy efficiency savings in California buildings and generate half of the state’s electricity from renewable resources by 2030” consistent with EO B-‐30-‐15.21 SB 375 requires local and regional planning agencies to be responsible for developing a “sustainable communities strategy”, however, Santee has not developed a plan to implement its “22 goals regarding GHGs and climate change” and SANDAG’s Regional Transportation Plan referenced by the RDEIR (p. 63) has

21 “Governor Brown Signs Landmark Climate Legislation,” Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown, 10-‐7-‐2015. https://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=19153



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been ruled to be deficient by the court. Regardless, there is not any apparent attempt to design the project with measures that consider SB 375 (and now SB 350 and EO B-‐30-‐15) requirements. The project is yet another auto-‐dependent subdivision without mitigating its significant adverse impacts. Furthermore, the project needs to incorporate measures to meet the 2030 and 2050 targets specified by SB 350 and Executive Order B-‐30-‐15 even if it includes enough measures to meet 2020 targets, which it does not. There is additional burden placed on new development now because disastrous methane leaks presently occurring were not anticipated and factored into actions required to meet state goals.22 Addressing Climate Change is Urgent and Must be Considered at the Level of Individual Projects The project emits GHGs directly and encourages the continued burning of fossil fuels indirectly that moves us collectively toward an inhabitable planet. Action to address climate change becomes ever more urgent with each passing day.23 Even meeting state mandates is not enough to avoid severe climatic impacts, which is why individual projects should be designed to be GHG neutral.24 Every avoidable emission increases the severity of the problem as we accelerate toward

22 SoCal Gas Aliso Canyon Leak a Disaster for Climate, 11/24/2015. http://www.kcet.org/news/redefine/rewire/commentary/porter-‐ranch-‐leak-‐a-‐disaster-‐for-‐climate.html 23 “Humanity today, collectively, must face the uncomfortable fact that industrial civilization itself has become the principal driver of global climate. If we stay our present course, using fossil fuels to feed a growing appetite for energy-‐intensive life styles, we will soon leave the climate of the Holocene, the world of prior human history. The eventual response to doubling pre-‐industrial atmospheric CO2 likely would be a nearly ice-‐free planet, preceded by a period of chaotic change with continually changing shorelines. Humanity’s task of moderating human-‐caused global climate change is urgent… Continued growth of greenhouse gas emissions, for just another decade, practically eliminates the possibility of near-‐term return of atmospheric composition beneath the tipping level for catastrophic effects…The stakes, for all life on the planet, surpass those of any previous crisis. The greatest danger is continued ignorance and denial, which could make tragic consequences unavoidable.” Hansen, James et al. “Target Atmospheric C02: Where Should Humanity Aim?” NASA/Goddard Institute for Space Studies, 2008 24 Hansen, James et al. “Target Atmospheric C02: Where Should Humanity Aim?” NASA/Goddard Institute for Space Studies, 2008. http://climate.nasa.gov/vital-‐signs/carbon-‐dioxide/ http://climate.nasa.gov/evidence/



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tipping points where the damage becomes increasingly severe, irreversible and uncontrollable. 25

In recent decades civilization has placed its foot to the floor of a sluggish climate accelerator. Now that strong collective adverse action is kicking in, but we are applying little more than a parking brake as government policy appears blinded to the cliff of unalterable climate forcing in the pipeline.26

“Many aspects of climate change and associated impacts will continue for centuries, even if anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are stopped. The risks of abrupt or irreversible changes increase as the magnitude of the warming increases.”27

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) confirmed that 2014 was the hottest year ever recorded. (NASA 2015.) 2015 is on pace to shatter the record set in 2014. In the National Climate Assessment released by the U.S. Global Change Research Program, experts make clear that “reduc[ing] the risks of some of the worst impacts of climate change” will require “aggressive and sustained greenhouse gas emission reductions” over the course of this century. (Melillo 2014.) Indeed, humanity is rapidly consuming the remaining “carbon budget” necessary to preserve a likely chance of holding the average global temperature increase to only 2°C above pre-‐industrial levels. According to the IPCC, when non-‐CO2 forcings are taken into

25 “Effects that scientists had predicted in the past would result from global climate change are now occurring: loss of sea ice, accelerated sea level rise and longer, more intense heat waves” (NASA Global Climate Change Vital Signs of the Planet). “…the net damage costs of climate change are likely to be significant and to increase over time.”-‐ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change http://climate.nasa.gov/effects/ 26 “Earth’s response to climate forcings is slowed by the inertia of the global ocean and the great ice sheets on Greenland and Antarctica, which require centuries, millennia or longer to approach their full response to a climate forcing. This long response time makes the task of avoiding dangerous human alteration of climate particularly difficult, because the human-‐made climate forcing is being imposed rapidly, with most of the current forcing having been added in just the past several decades. Thus, observed climate changes are only a partial response to the current climate forcing, with further response still ‘in the pipeline’.” Hansen, James et al. “Climate sensitivity, sea level and atmospheric carbon dioxide”, The Earth Institute, Columbia University, NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, 2013, p. 2. 27 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change , “Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report Summary for Policymakers,” page 16.



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account, total cumulative future anthropogenic emissions of CO2 must remain below about 1,000 gigatonnes (Gt) to achieve this goal.28 Leading scientists—characterizing the effects of even a 2°C increase in average global temperature as “disastrous”—have prescribed a far more stringent carbon budget for coming decades. (Hansen 2013.) Climate change will affect California’s climate, resulting in such impacts as increased temperatures and wildfires, and a reduction in snowpack and precipitation levels and water availability.

California has a mandate under AB 32 to reach 1990 levels of greenhouse gas emissions (“GHG”) by the year 2020, equivalent to approximately a 30 percent reduction from a business-‐as-‐usual projection. Health & Saf. Code § 38550. The state must also reduce emission levels to 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050. (Executive Order S-‐3-‐05 (2005).) In enacting SB 375, the state has also recognized the critical role that land use planning plays in achieving greenhouse gas emission reductions in California.29

In 2015, Governor Brown issued Executive Order B-‐30-‐15 requiring greenhouse gas emissions to be 40% below 1990 levels by 2030.30 The most recent legislative session passed SB 350, which requires widespread electrification of the transportation sector, half of all power generated to be from renewable sources, and a doubling of energy efficiency in buildings. The state Legislature has found that failure to achieve greenhouse gas reduction would be “detrimental” to the state’s economy. Health & Saf. Code § 38501(b). In his 2015 Inaugural Address, Governor Brown reiterated his commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions with three new goals for the next fifteen years:

28 IPCC 2013 (“Limiting the warming caused by anthropogenic CO2 emissions alone with a probability of >33%, >50%, and >66% to less than 2°C since the period 1861–1880, will require cumulative CO2 emissions from all anthropogenic sources to stay between 0 and about 1570 GtC (5760 GtCO2), 0 and about 1210 GtC (4440 GtCO2), and 0 and about 1000 GtC (3670 GtCO2) since that period, respectively. These upper amounts are reduced to about 900 GtC (3300 GtCO2), 820 GtC (3010 GtCO2), and 790 GtC (2900 GtCO2), respectively, when accounting for non-‐CO2 forcings as in RCP2.6. An amount of 515 [445 to 585] GtC (1890 [1630 to 2150] GtCO2), was already emitted by 2011.”). See also UNEP 2013 (describing emissions “pathways” consistent with meeting 2°C and 1.5°C targets). 29 See http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/sb375/sb375.htm. 30 Marin County has demonstrated the feasibility of state GHG reduction targets. Marin achieved a 15% below 1990 levels by 2012 – eight years ahead of schedule and set a new aggressive target of 30% below 1990 levels by 2020. http://www.marincounty.org/main/county-‐press-‐releases/press-‐releases/2015/cda-‐climateaction-‐111015



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• Increase electricity derived from renewable sources to 50 percent; • Reduce today’s petroleum use in cars and trucks by 50 percent; • Double the efficiency of existing buildings and make heating fuels cleaner. (Brown 2015 Address.)

Although some sources of GHG emissions may seem insignificant, climate change is a problem with cumulative impacts and effects. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., (9th Cir. 2008) 538 F.3d 1172, 1217 (“the impact of greenhouse gas emissions on climate change is precisely the kind of cumulative impacts analysis” that agencies must conduct). One source or one small project may not appear to have a significant effect on climate change, but the combined impacts of many sources can drastically damage California’s climate as a whole. Similarly, CEQA requires that an EIR consider both direct and indirect impacts of a project. CEQA Guidelines, § 15064. A BAU Analysis Would Improperly Discount the Project’s GHG Emissions To the extent the RDEIR would utilize a “Business As Usual” (BAU) comparison and a 900MTCO2E significance threshold, that fall-‐back position would be improper. An EIR should compare the capacity of the existing site to absorb CO2 to the post-‐project conditions, which will likely show that under existing conditions, the site has net negative GHG emissions. According to CEQA Guidelines § 15064.4, the “existing environmental setting” is the appropriate baseline against which to measure the significance of a project’s GHG impacts. GHG emissions from the thousands of discrete new sources, while small in comparison to global emissions, each contribute to the cumulative problem. Numerous state and local agencies have adopted quantitative criteria to determine whether an individual project’s emissions are cumulatively significant. The State Lands Commission, for example, has used a zero threshold of significance. Regardless of the precise quantitative threshold adopted, it is both feasible and informative to determine significance based on the project’s actual net emissions in comparison to the existing environment. The purpose of analyzing the significance of the project’s GHG impacts based on the actual environment, not in comparison to some hypothetical version of the project, is to disclose a significant impact and avoid and minimize it to the extent feasible. This objective, the core purpose of CEQA, is not possible under a BAU methodology comparison.



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Moreover, the RDEIR has not presented any substantial evidence that this approach is consistent with the goals of AB 32. The AB 32 Scoping Plan projected a “business as usual” scenario solely to quantify the emissions reductions across all sectors of the California economy necessary to achieve AB 32’s statewide emissions goals for the year 2020 goals. The Scoping Plan then identified dozens of measures from various economic sectors that could contribute to the necessary reductions. But absent some analysis of the project’s contributions to statewide emissions goals and inventories, which the RDEIR fails to provide, it is not possible to scale down the Scoping Plan’s business as usual assumptions to be used as significance criteria on a project level, nor would it be rational to conclude that the project is consistent with AB 32’s goals based on a comparison with a non-‐existent, hypothetical higher-‐emitting version of the project. Additional Mitigation is Needed to Address the Project’s Significant GHG Impacts California, (with the exception of Texas) leads the nation in GHG emissions.32 An EIR should consider additional mitigation measures during construction and operation of the project that would lower the project’s overall GHG emissions and contribution to climate change. The California Air Pollution Control Officers Association has identified existing and potential mitigation measures that could be applied to projects during the CEQA process to reduce a project’s GHG emissions. (CAPCOA 2010). The California Office of the Attorney General also has developed a list of reduction mechanisms to be incorporated through the CEQA process. (California Office of the Attorney General 2010). These resources provide a rich and varied array of mitigation measures that should be incorporated into the revised project. Potential mitigation measures during operation of the project include, but are not limited to:

• Analyzing and incorporating the U.S. Green Building Council’s LEED

(Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design) or comparable standards for energy and resource-‐efficient building during pre-‐design, design, construction, operations and management.

• Designing buildings for passive heating and cooling, and natural light, including building orientation, proper orientation and placement of windows, overhangs, skylights, etc.;

• Designing buildings for maximum energy efficiency including the maximum possible insulation, use of compact florescent or other low-‐energy lighting,

32 Magill, Bobby. “Texas, California Lead Nation in Carbon Emissions, Climate Central, October 29, 2015. http://www.climatecentral.org/news



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use of energy efficient appliances, etc. • Reducing the use of pavement and impermeable surfaces; • Requiring water reuse systems; • Installing light emitting diodes (LEDs) for traffic, street and other outdoor

lighting • Limiting the hours of operation of outdoor lighting • Maximizing water conservation measures in buildings and landscaping, using

drought-‐tolerant plants in lieu of turf, planting shade trees; • Ensure that the Project is fully served by full recycling and composting

services; • Ensure that the Project’s wastewater and solid waste will be treated in

facilities where greenhouse gas emissions are minimized and captured. • Installing the maximum possible photovoltaic array on the building roofs

and/or on the project site to generate all of the electricity required by the Project, and utilizing wind energy to the extent necessary and feasible;

• Installing solar water heating systems to generate all of the Project’s hot water requirements;

• Installing solar or wind powered electric vehicle and plug-‐in hybrid vehicle charging stations to reduce emissions from vehicle trips.

Mitigation measures related to Project construction could include:

• Utilize recycled, low-‐carbon, and otherwise climate-‐friendly building materials such as salvaged and recycled-‐content materials for building, hard surfaces, and non-‐plant landscaping materials;

• Minimize, reuse, and recycle construction-‐related waste; • Minimize grading, earth-‐moving, and other energy-‐intensive construction

practices; • Landscape to preserve natural vegetation and maintain watershed integrity; • Utilize alternative fuels in construction equipment and require construction

equipment to utilize the best available technology to reduce emissions. “Emissions Gap” and Importance of a Net Zero Energy Project Every GHG emission is a cumulatively significant impact to climate. Certainly this project that would generate approximately 744 MTCO2E per year is significant. One reason is because of the large “Emissions Gap” between the projected results of current GHG reduction pledges and policies33 versus the reductions required to hold

33 International GHG reduction commitments are termed Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC). These are largely unsecured pledges that may or may not be enacted to reduce GHG emissions.



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the increase in average global temperature to 2 degrees Celsius above pre-‐industrial levels. (Even a 2oC increase will have catastrophic impacts).34 The severity of the gap is illustrated in Figure ES1: Historical greenhouse (GHG) emissions and projections until 2050 and Figure ES2: The Emission Gap (next page). The current emission trend is illustrated in shaded gray, which corresponds to calamitous temperature increases. The shaded blue represents the substantial GHG reductions required to meet less severe temperature increases. The upward Current Policy Trajectory line appears in yellow/gold in Figure ES2: The Emission Gap (next 2 pages). The gap is sufficiently wide that the Department of Defense is preparing a “Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap”. The foreword to the plan states:

“Rising global temperatures, changing precipitation patterns, climbing sea levels, and more extreme weather events will intensify the challenges of global instability, hunger, poverty, and conflict. They will likely lead to food and water shortages, pandemic disease, disputes over refugees and resources, and destruction by natural disaster in regions across the globe. In our defense strategy, we refer to climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’ because it has the potential to exacerbate many of the challenges we are dealing with today – from infectious disease to terrorism…Climate change is a global problem. Its impacts do not respect national borders. No nation can deal with it alone. We must work together… Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, Department of Defense 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap

http://cait.wri.org/indc/ 34 “Temperature increases beyond 1.0°C may elicit rapid, unpredictable, and non-‐linear responses that could lead to extensive ecosystem damage” Stockholm Institute, “Targets and Indicators of Climate Change” 1990. Also, http://www.carbonbrief.org/two-‐degrees-‐the-‐history-‐of-‐climate-‐changes-‐speed-‐limit



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The severity of the gap is massive in both the size of emissions and in its consequences, which is why every GHG emission is a cumulatively significant adverse impact.



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Significant Ruling by the Supreme Court of California considering GHGs The Supreme Court of California issued a ruling November 30, 2015 that offers additional guidance for evaluation and processing of projects with GHG impacts. [Center for Biological Diversity v. California Department of Fish & Wildlife, S217763] Consistent with this decision, substantial evidence has been provided that the project has cumulatively significant adverse impacts to climate that are feasible to avoid or mitigate, but have not been. CEQA requires the lead agency to evaluate and apply feasible mitigation measures and then provide a statement of overriding considerations for any significant impacts that remain if the project is to be approved. [p. 28] The RDEIR fails in both regards. The RDEIR fails to provide substantial evidence to support the Finding of insignificance for GHG emissions [p. 7-‐4, 7-‐5]. The RDEIR fails to provide substantial evidence how emissions might be reduced beyond statewide programs and business as usual city policies that would apply to the project regardless of GHG emissions. The Court affirmed that local government carries the burden of evaluating projects’ climate impacts. [p. 26] Failure to provide substantial evidence to support a finding of no significance (which is the case here) deprives the public of information needed to determine the significance of the project’s GHG impacts. [p. 24] Furthermore, the Court affirmed that GHG impacts are global and should be considered in the context of the global problem. [p. 11] Meeting state goals depends upon increased efficiency and conservation measures applicable all the way down to the level of individuals. [p. 12] Substantial evidence must support the baseline / significance threshold. [p. 19] The RDEIR fails to provide supporting evidence for a BAU comparison and Santee has not established a significance threshold or Climate Action Plan supported by substantial evidence.



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Cumulatively Significant Adverse Impacts of Water Use Increasing demand and competition for water raises water rates. This in turn harms landscapes by causing the death of landscaping plants, especially trees. Tree mortality is on the rise as residents let lawns die or replace them with plastic turf.35 This in turn reduces carbon sequestration (dead plants do not sequester carbon) and also magnifies the heat island effect, speeds runoff and reduces infiltration rates throughout the city, thereby reducing groundwater recharge. This is a cumulatively significant adverse impact to climate from the project that is not analyzed, disclosed or mitigated. Furthermore, the RDEIR downplays the severity of the Level 2 drought and water demand impact. What we currently call drought appears to be the new normal for water availability. The PDMWD availability form is based on outdated assumptions in a water infrastructure that is at historically low levels. Without a minimum 20% cut in project demand, building the project is inconsistent with the 20% reduction ordered for the District. This is another significant adverse impact. Effective December 1, 2015, projects that exceed 500 square feet of landscaped area require submission of landscape plans consistent with emergency response to California’s prolonged drought conditions. Why haven’t landscape plans been submitted to show consistency? Plans should be provided with sufficient time for public review. Conclusion CEQA requires that public agencies not approve “projects as proposed if there are feasible alternatives or mitigation measures available which would substantially lessen the significant effects of such projects.” We encourage selection of the No Project Alternative. Should the city council approve a project alternative, the Jurisdictional Drainage Avoidance Alternative is significantly superior to the project. The project should be designed with the goal of GHG neutrality. The project should avoid significant adverse impacts and mitigate for significant adverse impacts that cannot be avoided. Thank you for considering our comments.

35 Maureen Cavanaugh, Amita Sharma, Neiko Will, “Drought Taking Heavy Toll On San Diego Trees”, KPBS, November 4, 2015. http://www.kpbs.org/news/2015/nov/04/droughts-‐heavy-‐toll-‐san-‐diego-‐trees/



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Van K. Collinsworth Geographer / Wildland Fire Expert / Director, Preserve Wild Santee Conservation Coordinator / California Chaparral Institute

Frank Landis Conservation Chair, California Native Plant Society San Diego

John Buse Senior Counsel, Center for Biological Diversity Cc: Santee City Council Attachments: -‐ Resumes -‐ Wildland Structure Protection Standard Operating Procedure -‐ Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report Summary for Policymakers -‐ Target C02: Where Should Humanity Aim? -‐ Climate sensitivity, sea level and atmospheric carbon dioxide -‐ Assessing “Dangerous Climate Change”: Required Reduction of Carbon Emissions to Protect Young People, Future generations and Nature -‐ The Emissions Gap Report 2015 -‐ Executive Summary -‐ Supervisors Approve Climate Action Plan Update -‐ County committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions ahead of state goals -‐ Department of Defense 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap -‐ UN on wrong track with plans to limit global warming to 2C, says top scientist -‐ Climate change is happening now – a carbon price must follow | James E Hansen | -‐ Global alteration of ocean ecosystem functioning due to increasing human CO2 emissions -‐ SoCal Gas' Aliso Canyon Leak a Disaster For Climate | Commentary | Rewire | KCET -‐ Huge Gas Leak In The Valley Boosted California's Methane Emissions By 25% -‐ Center for Biological Diversity v. California Department of Fish & Wildlife, S217763

Novato Fire Protection District Cedar Fire Incident Recovery Report

May 26, 2004 Page 73 of 90

Draft SO

P’sTitle: Wildland Structure Protection Standard Operating Procedure

Overview Structure protection is a dangerous task often performed at the most intense segments of the fire. Due to the inherent dangers of wildland firefighting in genera

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