Africom Aff

1AC

1AC TerrorismThe installation of AFRICOM has spurred an overwhelming increase in terror attacksTurse 13 (Nick, associate editor of TomDispatch.com and winner of Ridenhour Prize for Reportorial Distinction & James Aronson Award for Social Justice Journalism, “The US Military and the Unraveling of Africa,” Mother Jones, June 18th, 2013) BR

A careful examination of the security situation in Africa suggests that it is in the process of becoming Ground Zero for a veritable terror diaspora set in motion in the wake of 9/11 that has only accelerated in the Obama years.

Recent history indicates that as US "stability" operations in Africa have increased, militancy

has spread, insurgent groups have proliferated, allies have faltered or committed abuses,

terrorism has increased, the number of failed states has risen, and the continent has become

more unsettled . The signal event in this tsunami of blowback was the US participation in a war to fell Libyan autocrat

Muammar Qaddafi that helped send neighboring Mali, a US-supported bulwark against regional terrorism, into a downward spiral,

prompting the intervention of the French military with US backing. The situation could still worsen as the US armed forces grow ever more involved. They are already expanding air operations across the continent, engaging in spy missions for the French military, and utilizing other previously undisclosed sites in Africa. The Terror Diaspora In 2000, a report prepared under the auspices of the US Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute examined the "African security environment." While it touched on "internal separatist or rebel movements" in "weak states," as well as non-state actors like militias and "warlord

armies," it made no mention of Islamic extremism or major transnational terrorist threats. In fact, prior to 2001, the United States did not recognize any terrorist organizations in sub-Saharan Africa. Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, a senior Pentagon official claimed that the US invasion of Afghanistan might drive "terrorists" out of that country and into African nations. "Terrorists associated with al Qaeda and indigenous terrorist groups have been and continue to be a presence in this region," he said. "These terrorists will, of course, threaten US personnel and facilities." When pressed about actual transnational dangers, the official pointed to Somali militants but eventually admitted that even the most extreme Islamists there "really have not engaged in acts of terrorism outside Somalia." Similarly, when questioned about connections between Osama bin Laden's core al-Qaeda group and African extremists, he offered only the most tenuous links, like bin Laden's "salute" to Somali

militants who killed US troops during the infamous 1993 "Black Hawk Down" incident. Despite this, the US dispatched personnel to Africa as part of Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in 2002. The next year, CJTF-HOA took up residence at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, where it resides to this day on the only officially avowed US base in Africa. As CJTF-HOA was starting up, the State Department launched a multi-million-dollar counterterrorism program, known as the Pan-Sahel Initiative, to bolster the militaries of Mali, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania. In 2004, for example, Special Forces training teams were sent to Mali as part of the effort. In 2005, the program expanded to include Nigeria, Senegal, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia and was renamed the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership. Writing in the New York Times Magazine, Nicholas Schmidle noted that the program saw year-round deployments of Special Forces personnel "to train local armies at battling insurgencies and rebellions and to prevent bin Laden and his allies from expanding into the region." The Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership and its Defense Department companion program, then known as Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans-Sahara, were, in turn, folded into US Africa Command when it took over military

responsibility for the continent in 2008. As Schmidle noted, the effects of US efforts in the region seemed at odds with AFRICOM's stated goals. "Al Qaeda established sanctuaries in the Sahel, and in 2006 it acquired a North

African franchise [Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb]," he wrote. "Terrorist attacks in the region increased in both number and lethality." In fact, a look at the official State Department list of terrorist organizations indicates a steady increase in Islamic radical groups in Africa alongside the

growth of US counterterrorism efforts there —with the addition of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group in 2004,

Somalia's al-Shabaab in 2008, and Mali's Ansar al-Dine in 2013. In 2012, General Carter Ham, then AFRICOM's chief, added the Islamist militants of Boko Haram in Nigeria to his own list of extremist threats.

AFRICOM military presence causes increased terrorist recruitmentFancher ’15 [Mark, “Has Terrorism Stepped into Africa’s Political Void?,” Global Research, March 25, 2015, http://www.globalresearch.ca/has-terrorism-stepped-into-africas-political-void/5438695]QL

As AFRICOM, the U.S. military command, wraps its tentacles around the continent and jihadist organizations spread mayhem and massacre, Africa sometimes seems to have lost its internal political compass. “In the absence of sustained revolutionary organizing, desperate, confused, oppressed individuals have unfortunately responded to terrorists’ calls to arms.” The African Union characterized a recent armed attack that killed more than twenty foreign tourists and others at a Tunisian museum as “heinous and cowardly.” A

connection between the five gunmen who staged the raid and terrorist groups has not been confirmed, but a link is suspected. The continuing escalation of terrorist activity is in no way beneficial to Africans, but it is marginally helpful to western countries because it provides a convenient excuse for their military forces to not only maintain, but increase their presence on the continent. While western countries may have some concern about the

innocent people harmed by terrorist activities, it is reasonable to believe the real purpose of the build-up of U.S. and European military troops and installations in Africa is to maintain or gain access to oil fields, mines and other natural resources through intimidation, and if necessary, the use of force against anyone who gets in the way. For those who regard the elimination of foreign military operations from Africa as essential to the continent’s ongoing struggle for genuine independence and liberation, the role and capacity of the African Union in the fight against terrorism is a matter of great concern. This is because it is all too easy for western militaries to say: “If not us, who?” in response to questions about how Africa will deal with its terrorism problem. Many Africans want very much to respond that Africans can and will address this challenge on their own and that the African Union is the most logical organization to take on the task. However, while the continent-wide body has already deployed 7,500 troops to Nigeria to combat Boko Haram, it has expressed frustration about the ineffectiveness of the effort to date. Hopefully, a lesson can be learned from that

experience. Although western countries have relied heavily on the use of military force in their purported war against terrorism, some experts have suggested that the root causes of the proliferation of terrorist activity will not be addressed solely by military means. They point to social, political and economic conditions as factors that account for the success of terrorist organizations in recruiting new members.

Specifically Yemen – Drone strikes in Yemen bolster support for AQAP and increase anti-American resentment. Human Rights Watch ’13 [Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda, Human Rights Watch Report 2013, October 22, 2013, https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/10/22/between-drone-and-al-qaeda/civilian-cost-us-targeted-killings-yemen]QL

Popular discontent with the US airstrikes—evidenced by demonstrations, roadblocks, and confirmed in interviews with scores

of Yemeni citizens as well as security analysts, diplomats, and journalists—has generated hostility toward the United States and undermined public confidence in the Yemeni government. Security analysts believe this significantly bolsters the ranks of AQAP.[67] Gregory Johnsen, a Yemen scholar and AQAP expert, estimates that the number of rank-and-file may have tripled since the United States resumed targeted killings in 2009, from 300 to more than 1,000.[68] AQAP analysts say the growth may stem from several factors that include a security vacuum in Yemen during the 2011 uprising. And US officials contend that the

numbers would be higher if the United States was not actively carrying out attacks. But the backlash against US killings beyond AQAP’s inner circle is most frequently cited as the primary cause of opposition to the strikes. The New York Times reported in 2012 that the United States was focused on killing or capturing about “two dozen” AQAP operative leaders in Yemen, not an entire domestic insurgency.[69] Johnsen said that the number of primary US targets may now be down to 10 or 15. On August 5, 2013, the Yemeni authorities released a list of its “most wanted terrorists” that contained 25 names.[70]A Yemen official said that of those, three had since been detained and two had been killed in drone strikes, reducing the number to 20. According to Johnsen: A lot of people are dying in those strikes. Yet the head of AQAP is still alive, his military commander is still alive, and its top bomb-maker is still alive. The fallout from all of these deaths is something the US doesn’t seem to quite take into account.[71] Some if not many of those killed by the United States outside AQAP’s core membership may have been

fighters in the domestic insurgency against the Yemeni government.[72] But as a policy matter, such killings risk doing the United

States more harm than good by alienating large segments of the Yemeni population.[73] Any backlash in Yemen is compounded because even when strikes hit AQAP fighters who may be lawfully targeted in an armed conflict situation, they are usually killing members of tightly knit families and tribes, not fighters from outside their communities. “The United States can target and kill someone as a terrorist, only to have Yemenis take up arms to defend him as a tribesman,” Johnsen said.[74] Despite President Hadi’s embrace of the strikes,

many Yemenis consider them a violation of national sovereignty and note that the Yemeni parliament has never authorized US armed intervention in Yemen.[75] In July 2013 Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference, tasked with drafting the country’s new political and constitutional roadmap, called for “criminalizing” under Yemeni law any drone strikes and other killings during counterterrorism operations that violate international law.[76]That language is multiple steps from being translated into action and would in any case duplicate legal standards already in effect on the international level. Nevertheless, its approval by the conference, which represents a broad spectrum of Yemeni society, suggests the extent of domestic opposition to targeted killings. AQAP has also been quick to capitalize on that anger. In a 2013 issue of Inspire magazine the group wrote that the “real” target of US drones is not terrorism but Islam: In Yemen, they roam over Muslim houses, terrorizing children, women and the weak. Moreover they bombard “suspected” targets in villages, towns and cities … without the need to identify the real identity of the target, whether Al-Qaeda or not. … Obama is declaring a crusade! These missiles have no eyes and their

launchers are more blind [sic]. They kill civilians more than mujahideen.[77] Another factor contributing to backlash is that many Yemenis seem to fear the US airstrikes and Yemeni military and police forces more than they fear AQAP.[78] During the country’s 2011 uprising, Yemen’s military and police forces killed numerous protesters or otherwise used excessive lethal force against largely peaceful protests. This does not discount the many serious abuses committed against civilians by AQAP and Ansar al-Sharia. But the available evidence suggests that the vast majority of the hundreds of people killed by AQAP since its inception are members of the Yemeni security forces.[79]

Al-Qaeda is the biggest security threat facing the US – Terrorism goes nuclear and globalGraham Allison, 2010 (professor at Queens university Belfast “Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction

Threat: Hype or Reality?” http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/al-qaeda-wmd-threat.pdf)

How serious is the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism? When asked,

“What is the single most serious threat to American national security?” President George W. Bush answered: nuclear terrorism. On this issue, President Obama agrees with his predecessor. In his words,

“The single most important national security threat we face is nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists.” The only Secretary of Defense to have served under both Republican and Democratic presidents,

Secretary Robert Gates, was asked recently, “What keeps you awake at night?” He responded: “It’s the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear.” Skeptics, however, abound. They say that WMD terrorism is far beyond the capability, and even the intent of terrorist groups such as al Qaeda. Some claim that the likelihood of a non-state actor acquiring such weapons is virtually zero. The individual in the U.S. intelligence community who is widely recognized as the leading analyst of WMD terrorism is Rolf Mowatt-Larssen. After more than three decades in public service in CIA operations, and most recently Director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the U.S.

Department of Energy, he retired in January 2009. Mowatt-Larssen has now compiled a comprehensive chronology that addresses the skeptics head-on, by presenting, in unclassified form, al Qaeda’s roughly 15-year quest to acquire WMD. By assembling the best publically- available evidence in an authoritative, readable account, he offers a must-read advance in our understanding of the threat. This record provides an essential grounding for serious thought about how to combat a defining threat of the 21st Century. This chronology teaches us four important lessons. First,

al Qaeda’s top leadership has demonstrated a sustained commitment to buy, steal or construct WMD. In 1998, Osama bin Laden declared that “acquiring WMD for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty.” In December 2001, bin Laden’s Deputy Ayman Zawahiri stated, “If you have $30 million, go to the black market in the central Asia, contact any disgruntled Soviet scientist and a lot of dozens of smart briefcase bombs are

available.” A few months later, al Qaeda announced its goal to “kill four million Americans.” Second, al Qaeda was prepared to expend significant resources to cultivate a WMD capability even during the planning phases of 9/11. In the years leading up to September 2001, we see that bin Laden’s organization never lost its focus on WMD, even while coordinating the 9/11 attacks, orchestrating the simultaneous bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998, and successfully striking the U.S. warship (USS Cole) in 2000. Third, a clear hallmark of al

Qaeda’s WMD approach is to pursue parallel paths to procure these deadly materials. Multiple nodes of the network were assigned to different tasks of the overall WMD effort, acting and reporting independently, ensuring that failure in one cell did not jeopardize the entire operation. By taking into account possible operational

set-backs and intelligence breaches, al Qaeda has displayed deliberate, shrewd planning to acquire WMD. Fourth, al Qaeda has taken part in joint development of WMD with other terrorist groups. This collaboration between the most senior members of separate organizations demonstrates that interest in and

motivation to possess WMD are not limited to a single group. Notably, this chronology is merely a snapshot of al Qaeda’s long-term hunt for the world’s most destructive weapons. Due to the sensitive nature of the subject, understandably much has been omitted. The bottom line, however, is clear: al Qaeda and its network of affiliates have been determined to acquire WMD. President Obama recently said that al Qaeda remains the greatest threat to the United States. In his words, “If an organization like al Qaeda got a weapon of mass destruction on its hands—a nuclear or a chemical or a biological weapon—and they used it in a city, whether it’s in Shanghai or New York, just a few individuals could potentially kill tens of thousands of people, maybe hundreds of thousands.” Organizing a coherent strategy to prevent this nightmare from occurring begins with a clear recognition that WMD terrorism is a real and imminent threat.

1AC Regional StabilityAFRICOM destabilizes the Horn Fancher 12 [Mark, An attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union: Bad News for Africa: 3,000 More U.S. Soldiers are on the Way, http://www.globalresearch.ca/bad-news-for-africa-3000-more-u-s-soldiers-are-on-the-way]JMS

The United States plans to permanently station a U.S. Army brigade on African soil, beginning next year. Is this the start of something big – and ominous – or “only a benign creeping U.S. military presence in Africa?” “The obvious mission is to lock down the entire continent.” When President Obama deployed 100 U.S. troops to Uganda a year ago to conduct a mythical search for Joseph Kony, leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army, it is likely that many people shrugged. After all, how much damage could a mere 100 soldiers cause while wandering aimlessly through the bush purportedly in search of an accused terrorist? But as with the proverbial observer who can’t see the forest for the trees, a broader view reveals the deadly implications of what many incorrectly perceive as only a benign creeping U.S. military presence in Africa. Army Times news service reported that the U.S. is expected to deploy more than 3,000 soldiers to Africa in 2013. They will be assigned to every part of the continent. Major General David R. Hogg mused: “As far as our mission goes, it’s uncharted territory.” But the presence of U.S. soldiers in Africa is nothing new, and even though Hogg is

unwilling to admit it, the obvious mission is to lock down the entire continent . The U.S. military has at least a dozen

ongoing major operations in Africa that require hands-on involvement by U.S. troops. By

ensuring that U.S. troops will be found in every corner of Africa, there will be little risk that

any regions where U.S. interests are threatened will be left uncovered. For example, Mali has

oil reserves and is strategically located, but it has been destabilized by a growing secessionist

movement in the north. Conveniently, Mali has also been the site of a U.S. military exercise

called “Atlas Accord 12” which provided training to Mali’s military in aerial delivery. During

this year, there have been other operations in other parts of the continent that were

comparable in scale if not in substance. *“ Cutlass Express” was a U.S. naval exercise that focused

on what is purported to be “piracy” in the Somali Basin region. *“Africa Endeavor 2012” was

based in Cameroon and involved coordination and training in military communications.

*“Obangame Express 2012” was a naval exercise designed to ensure a presence in the Gulf of

Guinea, an area that is in the heart of West Africa’s oil operations. *“Southern Accord 12”

was based in Botswana and its objective was to establish a military working relationship

between southern African military forces and the U.S. *“Western Accord 2012” was an

exercise in Senegal that involved every type of military operation from live fire exercises to

intelligence gathering to combat marksmanship. There have been a number of other comparable exercises with

names like: “African Lion,” “Flintlock,” and “Phoenix Express.” In addition, U.S. National Guard units from around the country have been rotating in and out of countries that include, among others: South Africa, Morocco, Ghana, Tunisia, Nigeria and Liberia. Press statements issued by U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) suggest that these operations are as beneficial to Africa as they are to the United States. AFRICOM’s central message is that the U.S. and African militaries are partners in a war against terrorism and other forms of unrest. It is, however an error for any African country to swallow the notion that Africa and the U.S. are in some way interdependent. The true nature of the relationship was explained by A.M. Babu, a central figure in the formation of the country of

Tanzania. He said: “ The alleged ‘interdependence’ can only be of the kind in which we (Africans)

are permanently dependent on the West’s massive exploitation of our human and material

resources.” U.S. plans for exploitation are revealed by a Congressional Research Service

report made available by WikiLeaks. It says: “In spite of conflict in the Niger Delta and other

oil producing areas, the potential for deep water drilling in the Gulf of Guinea is high, and

analysts estimate that Africa may supply as much as 25 percent of all U.S. oil imports by

2015.” The document quotes a U.S. Defense Department official as saying: “…a key mission

for U.S. forces (in Africa) would be to ensure that Nigeria’s oil fields…are secure. ”

Consequently, the U.S. would be pleased if there were African military operations that target

militants who sabotage foreign oil operations in West Africa. At the same time, because of

plans for increased oil imports, the U.S. would vigorously oppose efforts by an African

military to exclude western companies from Niger Delta oil fields even though these

companies’ leaking pipelines have ruined countless acres of African farm land and fishing

waters . The true interests of Africa and the U.S. are in perpetual conflict and the relationships between the U.S. and African

countries must therefore be far from interdependent. Africans are well advised to react to the presence of U.S. soldiers in their

countries as they would to termites in their own homes. There might be no immediate observable harm, but over time the

structure will be irreparably damaged and may even collapse.

Scenerio 1 : SomaliaU.S. involvement is bad for multilateral ventures, destabilizes the region itself, and provides the impetus for future conflict. Howard, Business Day, 2009 [Anthony, Business Day (South Africa) August 12, 2009 “Yankees go home” SECTION: OPINION & EDITORIAL, Lexis, 7/15/15, ECD II]

Hillary Clinton's visit to SA has put US foreign policy in the spotlight once more. Despite a lot of messages of hope from US President Barack Obama, there has been little change in US military action in major theatres of war. The Americans' overt and covert involvement in the Horn of Africa and the presence of Africom in Djibouti continue to destabilise the region, with no commitment evident to withdraw their troops from Ethiopia. And yet Ms Clinton would like to tell the Kenyan and South African governments how to run their affairs and lobby for military support in the Somali conflict. The African Union (AU) has already told the US to withdraw its troops from Africa, but to date they continue to covertly support conflict, on a continent where they have a very bad track record in military terms. And now the US secretary of state attempts to justify the establishment of US military bases on African soil. Any development of this nature has to be opposed by the AU at all costs. America's only interest in the African continent is the control of oil supplies, hence their involvement in the Sudan. No US president has visited any African country in the past 10 years that was not an oil or gas producer and supplier. The role of the US government and the CIA in the Angolan, Congolese and Somali wars has wreaked untold havoc on the lives of millions of African civilians. And yet the US continues to pursue with force its disastrous policies on a continent where it has no business or mandate from the United Nations to be at all. Since the US has proven itself to be a morally bankrupt nation with its illegal wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, perhaps it should think seriously about getting its own house in order, before prescribing to

African countries and lobbying support for their indefensible wars of aggression. The message of our government to Ms Clinton should be: "Yanks go home and take your troops with you."

Specifically Al Shabaab, Somalia - Government legitimacy is down too- only alignment with the dangerous muslim brotherhood gives the government credibility Felbab-Brown is Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institution, 15 [Vanda, June 23, 2015 “Saving Somalia (again) and How Reconstruction Stalled—And What to do About It” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/somalia/2015-06-23/saving-somalia-again , 7/15/15, ECD II]

It is not just security that has been sliding in Somalia for the past year and half. Equally, the sense of political momentum has dissipated. In 2013, there was a great deal of optimism among the Somalis whom I interviewed that Somalia hit rock bottom in 2011 and that the pernicious clan politics that plagued the country for the past three decades have ended. They placed a great deal of hope in their President, Mohamoud. A Somali professor and member of the country’s civil society, he was not a former warlord nor a member of the diaspora parachuted in. And although he was elected by a parliament of appointed (or self-appointed) clan elders and former warlords, he was not seen as beholden to any particular clan. The international community, including the United Kingdom and the United States, also embraced him. But that was then. With little control over the country’s armed forces and budget, and unable to tackle pervasive and extensive corruption, the president fell back on one source of support: his Hawiye clan. And so the cycle of exclusionary politics began again, privileging access to business deals for his supporters and promoting clan backers for government positions. Mohamoud’s government was soon paralyzed by the infighting between him and his prime ministers (a familiar story in Somalia over the past decade), whom he would repeatedly seek to replace. The Somali constitution makes the president the symbol of authority, but his role and relationship with the prime minister is not clearly defined. Ultimately, the constitution is generally interpreted as mandating a Hawiye president and a Darod prime minister. That design is meant to encourage inclusiveness. In truth, however, it mostly led to a struggle between the president and prime minister, mimicking the power fights between the two main clans. The constant turnover of government officials at the federal and subnational levels is another major problem: With appointments often lasting only a few weeks, officials have far more interest in quickly making money and placing allies in other public sector positions than in governing effectively and building equitable and accountable state institutions—or any institutions for that matter. To give itself legitimacy, the government has embraced a brand of conservative Islam that is not as far from al Shabab’s teachings as many would like. The president is reputed to have admiration for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and is said to consider Mohamad Morsi, the imprisoned former Muslim Brotherhood–affiliated president of Egypt, a personal friend.

High risk conflict in Somalia will spill over to the region– humanitarian crisis, economic interests, and regional security prioritiesMuhammed, 14 (Hassan Yussuf, Department of Global Political Studies, Faculty of Culture and Society, Malmo University, Spring 2014, “The Role of External Actors in the Somali Conflict A Post 2000 Study of Kenya and Ethiopia’s Involvement In the Conflict of Somalia”, https://dspace.mah.se/bitstream/handle/2043/17781/Hassen's%20Thesis%20latest%20version.pdf?sequence=2)ZB

b) Although Brown suggests that “regional dimensions of internal conflicts also need to be examined more closely on a case by case

basis” (Brown, 1996: 601), internal conflicts often have regional impacts in several aspects. Internal wars may pose serious threats against other neighboring states provoking them to be involved in the internal conflicts of others. These types of threats include security threats, refugee

problems, economic problems, military problems and others that can provoke neighboring

states to involve in local conflicts (Brown, 1996: 591). To start with the refugee problems, Brown explains that

refugees are the result of internal conflicts. Conflict parties do not consider civilian casualties often and thus people get displaced from their homes, often to neighboring countries where they can get security (Brown, 1996: 592). Almost all post-Cold War conflicts have displaced a minimum of one million people each. Therefore, refugees pose security, economic and social consequences in the hosting countries. With the status of refugee, identity groups such as terror organizations operating in neighbor countries create insecurity in hosting countries in many ways. They recruit refugees who lived in host countries in order to carry out terrorist activities which in turn forces neighbor states to intervene in an internal conflicts of other states (Brown, 1996: 592).

Similarly, it is obvious that local conflicts have a “spill over” potential in creating military problems for neighboring states. In this case arms can be shipped to rebel groups in neighboring states. Moreover, rebel groups can use territories of neighboring states for operation or sanctuary and use this opportunity to strike their adversaries or else use it to attract international attentions to their cause. This is a clear indication of how an internal conflict can generate

instability in another state further creating political instability in the conflict region. However, Brown

also states that “although neighboring states can be innocent victims of turmoil in their regions; they are often active contributors to violence, escalation and regional instability” (Brown, 1996: 599, 600). In such situations the threatened state launches attacks in pursuit of defending its national security. c) The third important issue that Brown (1996: 590, 603) discusses is the international efforts to address problems posed by internal conflicts. The fact that almost all internal conflicts involve neighboring states in one way or the other, and that internal conflicts have implications for regional stability means that, there needs to be an international response to prevent, manage and resolve the problems a through variety of policy instruments. On intervention, Brown (1996) gives four types of examples of interventions of neighboring states in others’ internal conflicts. First, humanitarian intervention: this is when neighboring states are motivated only by humanitarian situations in internal conflicts. The other is defensive intervention; an intervention, which is borne out of insecurity of cross border infiltrations of refugee and other problems. The motive of this type of intervention is therefore not to end the conflict holistically but to stop it from spreading to own borders by intervening in an internal conflict of others in the pretext of defending national security. For instance, Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 to eliminate Palestinian elements operating in Lebanon’s territory (Brown, 1996: 579). Third, protective intervention: this is an intervention of states in an internal conflict with objectives of backing up of different identity groups to secure a certain agenda. This action is often justified by national security concerns. The fourth type of intervention is opportunistic intervention. This type intervention takes place when neighboring states take advantage of internal weaknesses and turmoil. Such internal weaknesses have the potential to create windows of opportunities for other states which have strategist interest and make them vulnerable for invasion and manipulation. Neighboring states usually support friendly rebel groups as well as engage in proxy wars with other rival states while trying to mask their actions with innocence. This type of intervention includes the sending of formal forces in others’ conflicts in the context of peace intervention (Brown, 1996: 5898ff). When conflicts break out in countries, the international community has a responsibility to intervene and help the people in that country to overcome the problems posed by the conflict. One important way of helping them to overcome those problems is to help them resolve the

conflict. Brown (1996: 620) suggests that the international community needs to take strong decision in resolving the conflicts. He argues that conflicts may not be ready for resolution at times, but the willingness of international community to help should be in place when conflicting parts need to resolve the conflict. Since peace processes and conflict resolution methods need large resources, Brown suggests the international community to accumulate their efforts and resources in resolution approaches when conflicts are ripened for resolution. In this way, there is a lot that the international community can do to resolve the conflict and bring peace. Here, Brown suggests steps such humanitarian assistance for needy people, a fact finding and mediation mission and traditional peacekeeping forces. Furthermore, during conflict resolutions, Brown underlines multifunctional peacekeeping operation. This operation helps with the reconstruction, economic and political systems building (Brown, 1996: 2). However, all conflicts are not either ready or not ready for resolution, there are conflicts where the majority of the actors wish to resolve their conflicts peacefully but need help from the outside world, while some militants and radical elements in the conflict are unwilling to compromise and settle for anything less than securing their goals. Examples of such conflicts happened in Sirilanka, Israel and Palestine and Northern Ireland. According to Brown, there is no simple solution for this, but if the majority of the people and top leaders in the relevant communities want peace and accept the provisions of peace processes, then the international community can help and support them to deal with the militants even forcefully if so is needed (Brown, 1996: 622). While doing so, Brown argues that a two track strategy is important. The first one is co-optation: In this strategy popular support for militants should be undercut through implementation of political and economic reforms to address broad-based societal problem and marginalizing the militants by bringing more of them in the mainstream process through offering their leaders political and economic instruments. The second strategy that Brown suggests is an aggressive campaign of neutralization. In this strategy it includes the cutting off of arms and logistical sources from the militants and search-and-capture or search-and-destroy missions. This is mainly the responsibility of national leaders, but there are roles that international actors can play here as well with the blessing of the local actors (Brown, 1996: 622). In this case, both Kaldor’s notion of ‘new wars’ and Brown’s approach of international intervention in an internal conflict are relevant for the Somali conflict. Because of the multiplicity of internal and external actors in the conflict and the fact that these conflicting actors are also using transnational connections, it can be described as ‘new wars’. And as Brown (1996, 571-601) described it, political and elite-level contradictions are the most important factors in creating and sustaining conflict. In this perspective, internal conflicts have regional dimensions posing serious threats to neighboring states further provoking them to involve in the local conflict in the context of insecurity. This is what exactly happened in the Somali conflict and attracted great deal of attention from the international community. Accordingly, the international community, mainly, the neighboring states, IGAD, AU and UNSC have for many years involved in resolving the conflict by engaging different actors within the conflict. Therefore, it is appropriate to examine the Somali conflict from these two perspectives in order to gain better insights. 3.2. Literature Review This section presents a literature review on the topic in questions, which is the role of external actors in an internal conflict in general

and in the Somali conflict in particular. Many scholars agree that there are conditions under which third parties choose to intervene in an internal conflict. Pearson et al (see in Regan, 1998: 2) identified geography, geopolitical motives and the level of conflict are the most important factors directly associated with military

interventions of third parties in an intrastate conflict. According to Pearson, states are most likely to intervene when the level of the conflict is high, or have cross-boundary or ethnic affinity with the targeted state, or else when the intervener have ‘transactional’ interest, i.e. economic, military, educational and political linkage with the target country (Regan: 1998: 3). In a similar issue, Hans Morgenthau notes that interventions take place

when national interests are at stake (Regan, 1998: 3). In other words, internal conflicts negatively affect

international security in general and neighbouring states in particular and this triggers

external interventions . A good example of this realist view is that the United Nations intervened several internal conflicts

after perceiving them as threats against international peace and security as well as humanitarian crises. Similarly, individual states intervene in conflicts in other regions or in an intrastate conflict often with concerns of national interest even if they are geographically far away from them (Geib, 2009: 129). For example, the piracy problem in Somalia’s coast affected negatively most countries in the world as the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden are important passages of most transnational vessels transporting goods. It threatens the global transaction of goods and transport system for it directly and indirectly affects the global economy. For this reason, many Western countries sent naval forces to the coast of Somalia to fight piracy (Harper, 2012: 145) Moreover, researchers like Gleditsch et al (2008, 5, 8) have argued that civil wars and internal conflicts have strong ties with interstate disputes

elsewhere in the world. States interfere in internal conflicts of other countries to counteract other external states as proxy. And when more external actors of different behaviour and interest involve in an internal conflict of others, the ‘spill over’ increases and conflict grows to an international level. States often collaborate with friendly local actors in order to advance their own interest. They are also involved in the conflict resolution process and strive to

produce a solution of their favour while the counterpart states also act in the same manner (Gleditsch et al, 2008: 5, 8.) Although conflicts can affect countries and states that have no geographical relation with it, it is obvious that conflicts have negative impacts on the socio-economic, security and development aspects in their regions in producing refugee spill over, decreased trade and investment as well as communal confrontations since arms may fall in the hands of civilians (Oxford Anlytica, 26 Jan. 2011). Some researchers have proven that stability in nearby countries is a key factor for development and economic growth while instability in one country affects neighbouring states negatively. In other words, both peace and conflicts in one country has an

impact on other countries in that region. Conflicts, instability and violence are not geographically sealed

(The World Economy, V.34: 9). As internal conflicts spill over impacts in their region is obvious, the regional involvement in the conflict is also obvious. The dimensions and issues of the conflict might as well change due to increased actors. Regional states cannot stand with nearby conflicts where transnational criminal units and conflicting elements operate. Therefore, states get involved into conflicts in other countries because of their national and regional security (Geib, 2009: 131). In Somalia’s conflict almost all scholarly research has similarly proven insecurity spill over as the most significant reason for regional interferences in the internal conflict of Somalia. The vacuum created by the downfall of the Somali state generated a large scale of criminal and terrorist

activities in Somalia and the region. The spill over effect of this conflict has further become an international problem. However, it has tremendously affected peace, security and development in the east African region. Al-Shabaab, as Al-Qaeda’s wing in the region, operates in Somalia where they recruit even nationals of other regional states to spread violence in the region while the regional counties are engaged in tackling the problem of spill over into their territories (Mulugetta, 2009:13)

Scenerio 2: US military intervention in South Sudan triggered civil war - South Sudan is on the brink of collapseO’Connor ‘13 [Patrick, “US Africom and the South Sudan Crisis,” The Herald, December 25, 2013, http://www.herald.co.zw/us-africom-and-the-south-sudan-crisis/]QL

The Obama administration has transferred about 150 Marines from Spain to Djibouti’s Camp Lemonnier base, home to the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) amid continued fighting between rival political factions and armed groups in oil rich South Sudan . The steppedup Marine deployment to the Horn of Africa follows a letter sent by President Barack Obama to the leaders of the House of Representatives and Senate on Sunday foreshadowing possible “further action to support the security of US citizens, personnel and property, including our embassy, in South Sudan.” The previous day, the US military aborted an attempted evacuation of American citizens from central Jonglei State after three planes came under fire, with four troops wounded. The New York Times reported that the rapidresponse Marine force could be sent into South Sudan from Djibouti with six hours’ notice. Fortyfive US troops have already been deployed to the country’s capital, Juba, to secure the US embassy and assist evacuations. An AFRICOM statement recalled the attack on the US CIA centre and diplomatic office in Benghazi, Libya in September last year: “By positioning these forces forward, we are able to more quickly respond to crisis in the region, if required. “One of the lessons learned from the tragic events in Benghazi was that we needed to be better postured, in order to respond to developing or crisis situations, if needed.” The United Nations is preparing to authorise a wider intervention force. Secretary General Ban Kimoon reportedly asked the UN Security Council to add 5 500 police and military personnel, as well as attack helicopters and transport planes, to the 7 500strong UN multinational operation in South Sudan. Three peacekeepers from India were killed last week when armed young people stormed a UN mission in the eastern town of Akobo. Unnamed American officials told the New York Times that US involvement in a wider UN mission

“was currently under review within the Obama administration.” South Sudan remains on the brink of civil war. A long - running power struggle within the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) appears to intersect with ethnic and tribal divisions within the impoverished country, triggering a humanitarian crisis. In its latest update, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported on Sunday that five of South Sudan’s ten states were affected by the violence, with an estimated 62 000 people displaced. About 42 000

have sought refuge in UN bases. President Salva Kiir is from the Dinka ethnic group, the country’s largest, while Kiir’s rival, Riek Machar is from its second biggest ethnic group, the Nuer. Tensions between Kiir and Machar, the former vice president, predate South Sudan’s official separation from Sudan in 2011. They escalated this year after Machar declared his intention to win the leadership of the SPLM ahead of presidential elections due in 2015. Kiir sacked Machar and his cabinet in July, at the same time

moving to bolster his control of the military. The president accused Machar of attempting a coup on December 15–16 and ordered the arrest of opposition figures, including former cabinet members.

Machar’s forces have claimed control over parts of the country, notably the northern towns of Bor and Bentiu, capital of the crucial oil producing Unity state. Washington has backed the government, while urging a negotiated resolution.

AFRICOM’s lack of understanding of socio-cultural norms in the region leads to military coups and regime collapse – Mali provesTurse ’13 [Nick, winner of a 2009 Ridenhour Prize for Reportorial Distinction as well as a James Aronson Award for Social Justice Journalism, “The US Military and the Unraveling of Africa,” Mother Jones, June 18 2013, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/06/africom-africa-unstable-us?page=2]QL

As the US-backed war in Libya was taking down Qaddafi, nomadic Tuareg fighters in his service looted the regime's extensive weapons caches, crossed the border into their native Mali, and began to take over the northern part of that country. Anger within the country's armed forces over the democratically elected government's ineffective response to the rebellion resulted in a military coup. It was led by Amadou Sanogo, an officer who had received extensive training in the US between 2004 and 2010 as part of the Pan-Sahel Initiative. Having overthrown Malian democracy, he and his fellow officers proved even less effective in dealing with events in the north. With the country in turmoil, the Tuareg

fighters declared an independent state. Soon, however, heavily-armed Islamist rebels from homegrown Ansar al-Dine as well as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Libya's Ansar al-Sharia, and Nigeria's Boko Haram, among others, pushed out the Tuaregs, took over much of the north, instituted a harsh brand of Shariah law, and created a humanitarian crisis that caused widespread suffering, sending refugees streaming from their homes. These developments raised serious questions about the

efficacy of US counterterrorism efforts. "This spectacular failure reveals that the US probably underestimated the complex socio-cultural peculiarities of the region, and misread the realities of the terrain ,"

Berny Sèbe, an expert on North and West Africa at the University of Birmingham in the United Kingdom, told me. "This led them to being grossly manipulated by local interests over which they had, in the end, very limited control."

An instability induced African war goes globalGlick 7, Middle East fellow at the Center for Security Policy, Condi’s African holiday,http://www.carolineglick.com/e/2007/12/condis-african-holiday.php?pf=yes

The Horn of Africa is a dangerous and strategically vital place . Small wars, which rage continuously, can

easily escalate into big wars. Local conflicts have regional and global aspects. All of the

conflicts in this tinderbox, which controls shipping lanes from the Indian Ocean into the Red Sea, can

potentially give rise to regional, and indeed global conflagrations between competing regional actors

and global powers

1AC Solvency Africa Does Not Need AfricomWoods 2007 (Woods E. Emira, Woods is the co-director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, DC, born in Liberia “AFRICOM: Wrong for Liberia, Disastrous for Africa”, Foreign Policy In Focus, July 26th, 2007) http://fpif.org/africom_wrong_for_liberia_disastrous_for_africa/

What Africa needs least is U.S. military expansion on the continent (and elsewhere in the world). What Africa needs most is its own mechanism to respond to peacemaking priorities. Fifty years ago, Kwame Nkrumah sounded the clarion call for a “United States of Africa.” One central feature of his call was for an Africa Military High Command. Today, as the African Union deliberates continental governance, there couldn’t be a better time to reject U.S. military expansion and push forward African responses to Africa’s priorities. Long suffering the effects of militaristic “assistance” from the United States, Liberia would be the worst possible base for AFRICOM. But there are no good locations for such a poorly conceived project. Africa does not need AFRICOM.

Removal of AFRICOM allows for USAID to fill in any gaps that might be left. AFRICOM undermines USAID and State Department – funding trade-off and overstepping boundsFalconer 8 (Bruce, editor at multiple online and physical magazines such as The American Scholar, “AFRICOM: State Dept., USAID Concerned About "Militarization" of Foreign Aid,” Mother Jones, Jul. 18, 2008, http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2008/07/africom-state-dept-usaid-concerned-about-militarization-foreign-aid) BR

The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), an organizational construct intended to unify the entire African continent (except Egypt) under a single U.S. commander, is due to become fully operational September 30. As described by the Pentagon, it will be a new sort of animal, a combatant command "plus," that will have the ability to mount military operations, but which will rely primarily on "soft power." AFRICOM "will support, not shape, U.S. foreign policy on the continent," Theresa Whelan, the Pentagon's deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs, told a House subcommittee on Wednesday. But despite official assurances, concern is

mounting that AFRICOM could stray from its "supporting" role to become the new center of power for U.S. activities in Africa. The issue is central to the ongoing debate over the new command's proper place. At this week's hearing of the House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, the first of two scheduled hearings on AFRICOM, General Michael Snodgrass and Ambassador Mary Yates, both members of the command's nascent leadership, assured lawmakers that AFRICOM is "a listening, growing, and developing organization dedicated to partnering with African governments, African security organizations, and the international community to achieve U.S. security goals by helping the people of Africa achieve the goals they have set for themselves." And to its credit, AFRICOM has gone out of its way to calm fears that it represents a new imperial push into the Dark Continent. (It even hosts a blog to keep the public informed of its progress.) AFRICOM's primary purpose, say proponents, will be to coordinate with the State Department and USAID in the pursuit of "stability operations"—one of the Pentagon's latest enthusiasms, encoded in Directive 3000.05, which places humanitarian and relief

operations on a level plane with combat missions. (You can read my earlier piece on the subject here.) But even AFRICOM's good intentions cannot disguise the geopolitical realities that compelled its creation. It's not about doing good works in impoverished countries for their own sake; It's about national interest. Countering China's growing military and economic influence in Africa and assuring access to some of the world's last remaining oil reserves top the list. (The United States now

imports just as much oil from Africa as it does from the Middle East.) Terrorism also figures into the equation—primarily the elimination of ungoverned spaces terrorists might call home.

Not that these are unreasonable goals. On one level, the U.S. military's ability to adapt is impressive. But problems could arise if AFRICOM begins to lead policy rather than follow it. A report released yesterday by Refugees

International shows that, in the years since 9/11, the Pentagon's slice of the nation's foreign aid

budget has ballooned at the expense of more traditional providers, like USAID . From the report:

Although several high-level task forces and commissions have emphasized the urgne need to modernize our aid infrastructure and increase sustainable development activities, such assistance is increasingly being overseen by military institutions whose policies are driven by the Global War on Terror, not by the war against poverty. Between 1998 and 2005, the percentage of Official Development Assistance the Pentagon has controlled exploded from 3.5% to nearly 22%, while the percentage controlled by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) shrunk from 65% to 40%. As for foreign military financing, the Pentagon's bread and butter, "more than half of the FY09 budget request... is for just two countries—Djibouti and Ethiopia—considered key partners in the continental War on Terror." AFRICOM has countered criticism of its "militarization" of foreign aid with reminders that its command structure will include representatives of other federal agencies, such as State and USAID, to ensure that policy is still guided by civilian authorities. This, for example, explains

Ambassador Yates' appointment as "deputy to the commander for civil-military activities." But though the Pentagon had planned for 25 percent of AFRICOM's headquarters staff to come from federal civilian agencies, it recently revised the requirement down to just 4 percent, citing difficulty on the part of partner agencies to spare staff for inter-agency assignments. As the GAO's John Pendleton told

the House subcommittee: Although DOD has often stated that AFRICOM is intended to support, not lead, U.S. diplomatic and development efforts in Africa, State Department officials expressed concern that AFRICOM would become the lead for all U.S. government activities in Africa, even though the U.S. embassy leads decision-making on U.S. government non-combat activities in that country. Other State and USAID officials noted that the creation of AFRICOM could blur traditional boundaries among diplomacy, development, and defense, thereby militarizing U.S. foreign policy... Nongovernmental organizations are concerned that this would put their aid workers at greater risk if their activities are confused or associated with U.S. military activities.

US solves terrorism - investigating fraud and providing foreign assistanceTrujillo 15 (Catherine M. acting Deputy Inspector General of USAID, “Significant Activities” Office of Inspector General, January 2015, http://oig.usaid.gov/node/260) BR

Overseas Contingency Operations To assist Overseas Contingency Operations, OIG Investigations became an active participant on three Department of Justice (DOJ) task forces, the National Procurement Fraud Task Force (NPFTF), the International Contract and

Corruption Fraud Task Force (ICCTF), and the DOJ National Security Division (NSD), Non-governmental Task Force. The mission of the three task forces is to 1) promote the early detection, prevention, and prosecution of procurement and grant fraud; 2) conduct proactive activities of organizations receiving USAID funds for indications of fraud related to possible terrorist financing; and 3) stop the flow of funds to organizations that support terrorist activities. Investigations Intro Protecting foreign assistance programs and operations from fraud, waste, and abuse is a priority for Investigations. Thus, our focus is prioritize high-impact investigations involving program and employee integrity investigations, issues of Congressional interest, and matters involving threats to national security.

USAID solves regional stability and Al Shabaab through youth empowerment, education and skills training. Local forces resolves conflict and push Al Shabaab outOPS 14 (8/6/14, office of the press secretary, the white house. “FACT SHEET: partnering to counter terrorism in Africa” https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/06/fact-sheet-partnering-counter-terrorism-africa accessed 8/1/15)

As the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania underscored, Africa-based terrorists threaten the interests of the United States in addition to those of our African partners. The United States government has no higher priority than protecting U.S. citizens from attack by terrorists and violent extremists. But our efforts at countering terrorism in Africa are motivated as well by a recognition that extremist groups are tearing apart communities in many parts of the continent, robbing young people of their futures, constraining economic growth, and denying people the opportunity to reach their full potential. African terrorist groups, such as al-Shabaab, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, and Ansar Bayt Al-Maqdis (ABM), threaten the security and prosperity of Africans across the continent.¶

We are committed to working with our African partners to address immediate threats and build durable and professional security sector institutions required to achieve our long-term counterterrorism objectives.¶ A Comprehensive Approach¶ The United States and our African partners are committed to countering terrorism in Africa through counterterrorism partnerships that draw on all of our tools: military, diplomacy, financial action, intelligence, law enforcement, and development alike. Our partnerships are building African partner capacities in the security and justice sectors to counter terrorism in a way that is consistent with the rule of law, and building the capacity of African governments and civil society in countering violent extremism (CVE) to neutralize violent ideologies before they spread.¶ Enhancing military capacity. U.S. military personnel work hand-in-hand with their African counterparts to increase military capacity in countries threatened by terrorism. The Department of Defense (DoD) provides much needed equipment to empower African partners’ ability to halt terrorism. U.S. military personnel provide specialized training that includes instruction on planning, battlefield tactics, civil-military relations, best practices in counter-insurgency, and respect for the rule of law. The United States also sponsors multinational exercises to increase collaboration and strengthen bonds among African partners. The 2014 Flintlock Exercise, hosted by Niger, brought together more than 1,000 troops from 18 countries, including eight African nations.¶ Enhancing law enforcement capacity: Strengthening our African partners’ civilian security and law enforcement capacity is another key priority of our counterterrorism strategy in Africa. In FY2013, we trained 2,584 participants in 19 African countries on how to prevent, detect, and investigate terrorism threats; secure their borders; bolster legal frameworks to effectively prosecute terrorists within the rule of law; and manage responses to terrorist incidents in a rule-of-law framework that respects human rights, as part of the U.S. Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program. The ATA program provides training on a wide range of disciplines, from bomb detection to crime scene investigation. We have a longstanding ATA partnership with Tanzania, for example, which has helped institutionalize its counterterrorism training and stand-up a special marine police unit. On the sidelines of the U.S.-Africa Leaders

Summit, the United States and Kenya signed a Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement (CMAA). This agreement provides the legal framework to allow for the exchange of information and evidence to assist countries in the prevention, detection, and investigation of customs offenses – including those associated with terrorism-related activities. ¶ Restricting travel and stemming access to resources: With our African partners, we work to restrict terrorists’ and terrorist organizations’ travel and their ability to raise, move, and store money. The Terrorist Interdiction Program/Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System provides partner countries in Africa border security assistance to identify, disrupt, and deter terrorist travel. The Counterterrorism Finance (CTF) program, run by the Department of State, provides training to partner governments that will better enable them to restrict terrorists’ and terrorist organizations’ ability to raise, move, and store money. CTF provides African nations with internal and cross-border financial investigations training to work effectively with counterparts in neighboring countries and assists these countries in strengthening their laws and regulations. We have three CTF-funded Resident Legal Advisors (RLA) and two Department of Homeland Security advisors in Africa who provide mentoring and training to judges and prosecutors so they are better able to adjudicate and prosecute these cases. ¶ Drying up potential sources of recruits: We also seek to stop terrorism before it begins by strengthening community resilience and creating environments that are inhospitable for terrorist recruitment. In Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso, for example, USAID is leading efforts to support youth empowerment through education, skills training, strengthening local governance capacity, and improving access to information via community radio, targeting groups most vulnerable to extremist ideologies.¶ Building global partnerships: We have also worked in the multilateral arena to build international architecture to combat today’s terrorist threats. In 2011 the United States co-founded the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), which includes participation from African countries. The GCTF focuses on identifying critical civilian counterterrorism needs, mobilizing the necessary expertise and resources to address such needs, and enhancing global cooperation. ¶ Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund: President Obama has asked Congress to create a new, $5 billion counterterrorism partnerships fund that will help build the capacity of our international partners to respond effectively to the terrorist threat. If approved, this fund would allow the United States to provide additional training, equipment, and operational support for partner states in our shared fight against al-Shabaab, AQIM, Boko Haram and others. It would also support targeted efforts to address the underlying conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, including by supporting partner efforts to combat terrorist safe havens.¶ Providing support to partners on the front lines¶ The United States is building strong partnerships with countries to address critical terrorist threats on the front lines in order to confront the threat at its roots.¶ Confronting Boko Haram: We are deeply concerned by Boko Haram’s ongoing attacks against Nigeria’s citizens, civil institutions, and infrastructure, including the group’s April 2014 kidnapping of hundreds of schoolgirls. To support the Nigerian-led efforts to combat Boko Haram, we are providing an array of military, law enforcement, and intelligence support, such as counter-Improvised Explosive Device training and forensics training. We are also supporting the efforts of Nigeria and its neighbors to increase regional cooperation to combat Boko Haram. Because the specter of terrorism requires more than just a security response, we have also worked to encourage and support the Nigerian government’s efforts to promote development in northern Nigeria, including by boosting health, education, and social service delivery. Our

security cooperation also supports the professionalization of key military units and underscores that effective counterterrorism policies and practices are those that respect human rights and are underpinned by the rule of law.¶ Working to Degrade Al-Shabaab: In Somalia, we continue to support the Somali National Army and the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in their efforts to push al-Shabaab out of its strongholds. The Department of State has invested more than $170 million to recruit and train forces to help protect Somalia’s institutions and citizens. Since 2007 we have contributed more than half a billion dollars in training, equipment, and logistical support to AMISOM. While these efforts have weakened al-Shabaab and pushed it out of a number of cities, the group remains the most significant threat to peace and security in Somalia and the region. Our counterterrorism support for Somalia is embedded in an overarching policy of support for policies and reforms to eliminate the underlying sources of violence and increase national and regional stability. A stable, peaceful Somalia and Horn of Africa are the best long-term deterrents to a resurgence of al-Shabaab. Our Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism, has helped build the capacity and resilience of East African governments to contain the spread of, and counter the threat posed by, al-Qa’ida, al-Shabaab, and other terrorist organizations.

USAID has several programs in the Horn to increase safety nets and provide development aidKnopf 12 (Kate Almquist, formervisiting policy fellow at the Center for Global Development, “Africa Doesn't Need the Pentagon's Charity - Why I'm Grumpy About DOD's Development Programs in Africa,” Center for Global Development: Ideas to Action, 8/28/12, http://www.cgdev.org/blog/africa-doesnt-need-pentagons-charity-why-im-grumpy-about-dods-development-programs-africa) BR

The U.S. State Department has said that it is focusing not only on a response to address shortterm needs and save lives, but also to build capacity to reduce the cycles of famine and failure that occur repeatedly in the Horn region. In the past year, in coordination with the international

community, the U.S. government has worked to preposition food stocks in the region, increase funding for early warning systems, and strengthen assistance in other sectors, such as health, water, and sanitation. On July 6, 2011, through its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), USAID activated a regional Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) in Nairobi, Kenya, and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It also set up an interagency task force to coordinate and facilitate the humanitarian response to the drought crisis through the Washington, DC-based Response Management Team (RMT). In addition, the U.S. government reissued or renewed a number of U.S. disaster declarations in countries in the Horn in response to the ongoing complex emergencies. The United States is the largest bilateral donor of emergency assistance to the eastern Horn of Africa. As of December 22, 2011, USAID reported that the United States had provided $650.5 million of humanitarian assistance in FY2011, of which $435.2 million (67%) was emergency food aid.47 Thus far in FY2012, USAID estimates that total humanitarian assistance to the Horn amounts to nearly $220 million of which $194 million is for food

aid.48 Those funds financed the provision of 492,530 metric tons of food in FY2011 distributed by WFP throughout the region and by Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in Ethiopia. In FY2012, 144,880

metric tons of food have so far been distributed. U.S. food aid has been made available primarily through

Food for Peace Title II (Emergency Assistance) or from International Disaster Assistance (IDA)-funded Emergency Food Assistance for Drought-Affected Areas. In the longer term, the United States is focusing its aid on helping countries in the Horn build safety net programs and develop their agricultural sectors. For example, Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) provides food and cash to an estimated 7.5 million Ethiopians in exchange for work building community assets such as roads, schools, and clinics. The main U.S. input into this multi-donor

financed project is commodity food aid provided as Food for Peace Act Title II nonemergency food aid.49 USAID’s Feed the Future (FtF) program, initiated in 2009 as a major foreign aid initiative, is developing approaches to agriculture in the Horn that address hunger and food insecurity.50 In Kenya, for example, the United States is assisting in a multi-year agricultural development program under FtF that aims to support Kenyan investment in staple food value chain development, including livestock and livestock products; rural finance; policy analysis, advocacy, and capacity-building; agricultural research and technology transfer; and water and sanitation.51

Terror Recruitment

UniquenessTerror in Africa is on the riseSimeone 14 (Nick, American Forces Press Service, “Africom Commander: Terror Threat Remains Across Africa,” Department of Defense: DoD News, March 6, 2014, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121787) BR

WASHINGTON, March 6, 2014 – Helped by the Arab Spring, terrorist groups in North and West Africa have expanded their operations, increasing threats to the United States and its interests, the commander of U.S. Africa Command told Congress today. “These revolutions, coupled with the

fragility of neighboring states, continue to destabilize the region,” Army Gen. David M. Rodriguez told the Senate Armed

Services Committee in prepared testimony. “The spillover effects of revolutions include the return of fighters and flow of weapons from Libya to neighboring countries following the fall of the Gadhafi regime and the export of foreign fighters from North Africa to the Syrian conflict,” the general said. Rodriguez described the security situation in Libya -- where a NATO-backed air campaign in 2011 aimed at protecting civilians from pro-Gadhafi forces

eventually led to the leader’s overthrow -- as volatile and tenuous, especially in the east and southwest. “Militia groups control significant areas of territory and continue to exert pressure on the Libyan government,” he said.

Africom, he said, is working to help build Libyan security forces, but in the meantime, terrorist groups including those affiliated with al-Qaida have taken root in vast, lawless areas of the country and are using the region as a base to extend their reach across northwest Africa.

The installation of AFRICOM has spurred an overwhelming increase in terror attacksTurse 13 (Nick, associate editor of TomDispatch.com and winner of Ridenhour Prize for Reportorial Distinction & James Aronson Award for Social Justice Journalism, “The US Military and the Unraveling of Africa,” Mother Jones, June 18th, 2013) BR

A careful examination of the security situation in Africa suggests that it is in the process of becoming Ground Zero for a veritable terror diaspora set in motion in the wake of 9/11 that has only accelerated in the Obama years.

Recent history indicates that as US "stability" operations in Africa have increased, militancy

has spread, insurgent groups have proliferated, allies have faltered or committed abuses,

terrorism has increased, the number of failed states has risen, and the continent has become

more unsettled . The signal event in this tsunami of blowback was the US participation in a war to fell Libyan autocrat

Muammar Qaddafi that helped send neighboring Mali, a US-supported bulwark against regional terrorism, into a downward spiral,

prompting the intervention of the French military with US backing. The situation could still worsen as the US armed forces grow ever more involved. They are already expanding air operations across the continent, engaging in spy missions for the French military, and utilizing other previously undisclosed sites in Africa. The Terror Diaspora In 2000, a report prepared under the auspices of the US Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute examined the "African security environment." While it touched on "internal separatist or rebel movements" in "weak states," as well as non-state actors like militias and "warlord

armies," it made no mention of Islamic extremism or major transnational terrorist threats. In fact, prior to 2001, the United States did not recognize any terrorist organizations in sub-Saharan Africa. Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, a senior Pentagon official claimed that the US invasion of Afghanistan might drive "terrorists" out of that country and into African nations. "Terrorists associated with al Qaeda and indigenous terrorist groups have been and continue to be a presence in this region," he said. "These terrorists will, of course, threaten US personnel and facilities." When pressed about actual

transnational dangers, the official pointed to Somali militants but eventually admitted that even the most extreme Islamists there "really have not engaged in acts of terrorism outside Somalia." Similarly, when questioned about connections between Osama bin Laden's core al-Qaeda group and African extremists, he offered only the most tenuous links, like bin Laden's "salute" to Somali

militants who killed US troops during the infamous 1993 "Black Hawk Down" incident. Despite this, the US dispatched personnel to Africa as part of Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in 2002. The next year, CJTF-HOA took up residence at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, where it resides to this day on the only officially avowed US base in Africa. As CJTF-HOA was starting up, the State Department launched a multi-million-dollar counterterrorism program, known as the Pan-Sahel Initiative, to bolster the militaries of Mali, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania. In 2004, for example, Special Forces training teams were sent to Mali as part of the effort. In 2005, the program expanded to include Nigeria, Senegal, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia and was renamed the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership. Writing in the New York Times Magazine, Nicholas Schmidle noted that the program saw year-round deployments of Special Forces personnel "to train local armies at battling insurgencies and rebellions and to prevent bin Laden and his allies from expanding into the region." The Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership and its Defense Department companion program, then known as Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans-Sahara, were, in turn, folded into US Africa Command when it took over military

responsibility for the continent in 2008. As Schmidle noted, the effects of US efforts in the region seemed at odds with AFRICOM's stated goals. "Al Qaeda established sanctuaries in the Sahel, and in 2006 it acquired a North

African franchise [Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb]," he wrote. "Terrorist attacks in the region increased in both number and lethality." In fact, a look at the official State Department list of terrorist organizations indicates a steady increase in Islamic radical groups in Africa alongside the

growth of US counterterrorism efforts there —with the addition of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group in 2004,

Somalia's al-Shabaab in 2008, and Mali's Ansar al-Dine in 2013. In 2012, General Carter Ham, then AFRICOM's chief, added the Islamist militants of Boko Haram in Nigeria to his own list of extremist threats.

L2 Recruitment - AFRICOMAFRICOM military presence causes increased terrorist recruitmentFancher ’15 [Mark, “Has Terrorism Stepped into Africa’s Political Void?,” Global Research, March 25, 2015, http://www.globalresearch.ca/has-terrorism-stepped-into-africas-political-void/5438695]QL

As AFRICOM, the U.S. military command, wraps its tentacles around the continent and jihadist organizations spread mayhem and massacre, Africa sometimes seems to have lost its internal political compass. “In the absence of sustained revolutionary organizing, desperate, confused, oppressed individuals have unfortunately responded to terrorists’ calls to arms.” The African Union characterized a recent armed attack that killed more than twenty foreign tourists and others at a Tunisian museum as “heinous and cowardly.” A

connection between the five gunmen who staged the raid and terrorist groups has not been confirmed, but a link is suspected. The continuing escalation of terrorist activity is in no way beneficial to Africans, but it is marginally helpful to western countries because it provides a convenient excuse for their military forces to not only maintain, but increase their presence on the continent. While western countries may have some concern about the

innocent people harmed by terrorist activities, it is reasonable to believe the real purpose of the build-up of U.S. and European military troops and installations in Africa is to maintain or gain access to oil fields, mines and other natural resources through intimidation, and if necessary, the use of force against anyone who gets in the way. For those who regard the elimination of foreign military operations from Africa as essential to the continent’s ongoing struggle for genuine independence and liberation, the role and capacity of the African Union in the fight against terrorism is a matter of great concern. This is because it is all too easy for western militaries to say: “If not us, who?” in response to questions about how Africa will deal with its terrorism problem. Many Africans want very much to respond that Africans can and will address this challenge on their own and that the African Union is the most logical organization to take on the task. However, while the continent-wide body has already deployed 7,500 troops to Nigeria to combat Boko Haram, it has expressed frustration about the ineffectiveness of the effort to date. Hopefully, a lesson can be learned from that

experience. Although western countries have relied heavily on the use of military force in their purported war against terrorism, some experts have suggested that the root causes of the proliferation of terrorist activity will not be addressed solely by military means. They point to social, political and economic conditions as factors that account for the success of terrorist organizations in recruiting new members.

AFRICOM wrecks US credibility – correlation to insecurity breeds terror recruitment and ethnic conflictNsia-Pepra, 14 (Kofi, assistant professor of political science at Ohio Northern University, Ph.D. in political science from Wayne State University, “Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy in Africa: Strategic Gain or Backlash?”, Military Review, January-February 2014, p. 50-59)ZB

No single issue or event in recent decades in Africa has provoked so much controversy and unified hostility and opposition as the AFRICOM. The intensity and sheer scale of the unprecedented unity of

opposition to AFRICOM across Africa surprised many experts. African nations have been repeatedly opposed to the hosting of U.S. bases on the African continent and the militarization of their relations with the United States. Because of this dissent, AFRICOM is located in Stuttgart, Germany. Civil society leaders and journalists in Africa have objected that AFRICOM will pursue narrowly defined U.S. interests at the expense of both the sovereignty and welfare of the African nations.37 Regional organizations have been most vocal in their critique of AFRICOM. The Southern African Development Community, including U.S. ally South Africa, stated that “it is better if the United States were involved with Africa from a distance rather than be present on the continent.” The Southern African Development Community defense and security ministers urged other states not to host AFRICOM since it would have a negative effect.38 The economic community of West African states

(including Nigeria, a strong U.S. ally), opposed AFRICOM. African citizens and civil societies also objected to AFRICOM. Ezekiel Pajino of the Center for Empowerment in Liberia calls AFRICOM “a deadly plan of U.S. military expansion on African soil.” Pajino states “AFRICOM will be the legacy of Bush’s failed foreign policy that threatens future generations of the continents.”39 Ikechukwa Eze

states, “Apprehension exists about the extent to which AFRICOM may violate rules of sovereignty and its attempt to replace the African Union.”40 These observations raise concerns about sovereignty, Africa’s welfare, the role of private military contractors, U.S. military administered development assistance, and U.S.-controlled African resources at the expense of ordinary Africans, especially in the face of China’s presence in Africa for energy sources. America’s Africa Command, in conceptual terms and actual implementation, is not intended to serve Africa’s best interests. It just happens that Africa has grown in geopolitical and geo-economic importance to America and her allies. Africa has been there all along, but the United States with the notable exception of the Cold War era, always had a hands-off policy

toward Africa. Severine Rugumamu, Professor of Development Studies at the University of Dar es Salaam,

Tanzania, understandably observes that “a consistent axiom guiding U.S. foreign policy toward Africa is permanency of interests and not friends or enemies,”41 implying shifts in engagements in Africa in accordance with shifts in its strategic interests.42 U.S. military covert operations with strategic allies have adversely affected U.S. credibility and reputation on the continent. The U.S. military, Ugandan, and Rwandan forces covertly invaded Zaire (now Congo) in 2007. On 5 September 2007, U.S. covert military forces, Ugandan troops, and rebels aligned with chief rebel Jean-Pierre Bemba and occupied Congo’s oil- and gold-rich Semliki

Basin.43 U.S. military involvement indirectly correlates with the protractedness and structural

linkages of the conflicts in the region, creating an environment of insecurity and instability

prone to terrorist recruitment and crimes such as piracy and money laundering that are detrimental to America’s geostrategic interests on the continent. Countries militarily allied to the United States are involved in the Congolese and Sudanese/Darfur conflicts. Rwandan and Ugandan troops invaded Congo in 1998 and triggered ongoing cross-border fighting that persists to this day. Rwanda and Uganda

are both U.S. and British military client states. Uganda military forces occupied the Congo oil- and mineral-rich towns of eastern Congo. It internally fights the Lord’s Resistant Army rebels, and has been accused of “genocide” against the Acholi people. Rwanda is fighting in eastern Congo, meddling in Burundi, and has some 2,000 forces in Darfur. Ethiopia is at war with Somalia and poised to reinvade Eritrea. Ethiopia, Uganda, and Chad are the

“frontline” states militarily disturbing Sudan. Sudan in turn backs guerrilla armies in Uganda, Chad, and Congo. U.S. support for factions and shifting loyalties with parties in the Darfur and Sudan conflicts have affected Sudan’s insecurity and instability. The United States seems to replicate the Cold War strategic mistakes with high risks of getting deeply into African conflicts, supporting repressive regimes, excusing human rights abuses, diverting scarce budget resources, building resentment, and undermining long-term U.S. interests in Africa.44 Oxfam and other charitable groups signed a report called “Nowhere to Turn” that was very critical of the militarization of aid because it puts civilians at greater risk.45 Elsewhere, in Afghanistan, the Taliban targets schools and hospitals erected by the U.S. Army or associated private contractors, but those erected

by civilian or nongovernmental organizations are rarely harassed.46 Counterinsurgency analyst David Kilcullen has warned that heavy-handed military action, such as air strikes that kill civilians and collaboration with counterinsurgency efforts by incumbent regimes, far from diminishing the threat of terrorism, helps it grow.47 Undoubtedly, we witness increasing terrorism in Africa

despite U.S. military presence . These conditions of insecurity and instability threaten America’s geo-strategic interests in Africa, demanding strategic change in its dealings with Africa.

AFRICOM militancy increases terror recruitment amongst destitute youth – exacerbates already dire conditionsIfeka 10 (Caroline, Honorary Research Fellow, Dept of Anthropology, University College London, “War on ‘terror’: Africom, the kleptocratic state and under-class militancy in West Africa-Nigeria,” Concerned Africa Scholars 85, Spring 2010, p. 30-49) BR

The principal cause of growing youth militancy mobilizing around ethnicity and Islamic reformism is the ruling class’s failure to ‘share’ the ‘dividends of democracy’ — e.g. rental incomes

from ‘traditional’ community owned strategic resources as oil, gas, gold, bauxite, uranium, water — according to subaltern clients’ expectations. So the under-class experiences as ‘bad’ the ‘democratic’ West African State’s governance. Failed expectations are reflected in some radical elements’ readiness to sacrifice their lives in fighting the war machine — sheer force — of the repressive State.2 ‘Bad’ governance is the consequence not of corruption but of clientelism, that is informal political relations greased by money between patrons/‘big men’ and clients/‘small boys’; this largely illegal system of power and patronage

generates venality and violence, but not as yet real terrorism (Obi 2006).3 Ironically, Islamic militants (northern Nigeria) and

ethnic sovereignty movements (southern Nigeria, northern Niger, northern Mali) drawing on subaltern discontent share with international donors the same objective of securing ‘good’ (i.e. just, efficient, clean)

governance, though under-class devout Muslim youth define good governance not in donors’ secular terms but in regard to

Quranic precepts. The US military command for Africa (AFRICOM) and international aid practitioners target corruption as the cause of ‘dangerous’ underdevelopment; they strengthen security agencies and hand out anti-corruption funds that the ruling classes mis-appropriate. The militarization

of ‘development’ will succeed only, as elsewhere (e.g., Afghanistan), in nourishing the growth

of real terrorism among, for example, Nigeria’s estimated 40-60 million largely unemployed youth and ethnic minorities.

As military involvement via AFRICOM grows, so does subaltern violence.Ifeka 10 (Caroline, Honorary Research Fellow, Dept of Anthropology, University College London, “War on ‘terror’: Africom, the kleptocratic state and under-class militancy in West Africa-Nigeria,” Concerned Africa Scholars 85, Spring 2010, p. 30-49) BR

Donor governments and AFRICOM should consider, in the light of the Niger Delta’s militant struggle and its proven capacity to reduce oil output, whether militarization in partnership with kleptocratic ruling oligarchies will secure US-EU MNCs’ priority access to strategic natural resources to which communities have strong traditional claims. Or whether, as in the Niger Delta, the

more force used by the State the more subaltern violence grows . An alternative fifteen year

strategy for peace would, first, strengthen community land management, especially in settlements close to areas with strategic resources as uranium, oil, diamonds, gold and bauxite so as to build in these regional hubs the basis of a politics of growth and equitable accumulation as against ‘big’ men’s ‘selfish’ control of distribution and patronage. Second, it would improve community,

NGO and West African government capacity to promote transparent competition between Asian and Western dominated MNCs. Such a strategy could sustain at the community and local government levels institutional capacity building for resource conflict resolution (UNDP 2009) that

erases subaltern resistance currently used by the US-EU to justify the ‘War on Terror’; this would reduce US-EU defence costs.12

L2 Recruitment – Anti-AmericanismUS policy leads to multiple inefficiencies in enforcement that exacerbate Muslim alienation and violate international law – Kenya provesPrestholdt, 11 (Jeremy, Assistant Professor History at the University of California, San Diego Summer 2011, “Kenya, the United States, and Counterterrorism”, Africa Today 57(4), p. 2-27)ZB

Unlike in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States generally pursues its interests by proxy in Africa, depending on aid to partner nations more than on direct American force. This strategy has created a conundrum reminiscent of America’s cold war–era engagements. Though the United States provides funding, training, and military hardware to its allies, success in the war on terrorism is largely determined by the priorities and internal sociopolitical dynamics of

African partner states. In many instances, American security aid has entailed a more intimate linking of geopolitics and contentious domestic relationships while instituting little or no oversight of

African states’ counterterrorism operations (Keenan 2009; Mills 2007). In Kenya, security training and assistance have empowered domestic antiterrorism forces to address the problem of violent extremism more aggressively, but Kenyan authorities regularly act on minimal evidence and violate domestic and international law. Thus, the government of Kenya’s antiterrorism initiatives have compounded an already deep sense of alienation among those most severely affected by the new measures: Kenyan Muslims, particularly those of Arab and Somali ancestry.1 Overview This essay outlines the effects of U.S. policies toward Kenya in the context of the war on terrorism. It addresses how Kenya, a majority Christian nation, has responded to American pressure to intensify counterterrorism activities and how the actions of the state have both reflected and aggravated tensions between the central government and Muslim minority

communities, particularly those at the coast. Kenya offers a valuable case study of U.S. foreign policy in the age of counterterrorism because it is regarded as both a frontline state in the global war on

terrorism and America’s most important ally in the greater Horn of Africa (Davis 2007c; Wallis

2009). Moreover, it exemplifies the evolving multipronged U.S. security directive in Africa. It has been the focus of security funding, targeted aid to Muslim communities, and direct military engagement, particularly in the field of military-provided development assistance. The recent history of counterterrorism in Kenya thus presents a balance sheet to assess America’s

counterterrorism initiatives on the African continent. Kenya has suffered two major al-Qaeda attacks, shares

a porous border with Somalia, and has long been a close ally of the United States. These factors make it a logical and necessary focus for American counterterrorism aid. Since the 1998 embassy bombings, Kenyan authorities have apprehended a number of terrorists—including one of the embassy bombers—and thwarted at least two attacks. As an attempted bus bombing in December 2010

suggests, terrorism continues to pose a threat in Kenya. However, U.S. security related assistance and pressure on the Kenyan government to identify and convict terrorists have produced a series of unintended effects. Most notably, the Kenyan government has pursued the domestic war on terrorism by means that are often heavy handed and ineffective. Instead of addressing the ease with which terrorists enter Kenya or the limitations of Kenya’s intelligence apparatus, authorities have often articulated the problem of terrorism narrowly, as one nurtured by Kenya’s Muslim minority. Kenya has convicted only one of its citizens on charges related to recent terrorist activities, but many Kenyans have been delivered to foreign security forces without due process. Thousands more Kenyan Muslims have been harassed and illegally

detained . Kenyan authorities’ disregard for domestic and international law is not a new

development, but recent counterterrorism efforts are unique in that Kenyan forces receive training and direct funding from the United States to support these operations. American emphasis on counterterrorism and the increasing volume and diversity of U.S. security aid to Kenya has engendered a correlation between American criticisms of Kenyan authorities, Kenyan leaders’ high-profile meetings with American officials, and on-the-ground operations in Kenya. As evidence of the inorganic nature of many counterterrorism efforts in Kenya, below I demonstrate how operations and terrorism-

related indictments in Kenya have coincided with American criticisms or promises of increased aid. I argue that U.S. diplomatic pressure and promises of aid have encouraged Kenyan authorities to fight a sometimes spurious war, which paints dramatic pictures of authorities’ efforts, but does less to address tangible security threats. Though the problem of international terrorism was thrust upon Kenya, counterterrorism has become an economic instrument for Kenya’s security forces and a tool that the Kenyan government uses to leverage its diplomatic relationship with the United States. At the same time, counterterrorism has alienated Muslim communities who for nearly three have decades voiced feelings of economic and political marginalization.

Anti-Americanism results from counterterrorism effortsSantos 98, [Lorena, 8-7-1998, "The Terrorist Threat in Africa," No Publication, http://sites.stedwards.edu/apsmg434701-group1/2013/04/24/the-terrorist-threat-in-afri ca/ ]SC

On August 7, 1998, two massive bombs exploded outside of the U.S. embassies in Dar

es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, killing 224 people — including 12 Americans

— and injuring 5,000. Responsibility was quickly traced to al Qaeda. Four years later, al Qaeda

operatives struck again, killing 15 people in an Israeli-owned hotel near Mombasa,

Kenya, and simultaneously firing missiles at an Israeli passenger jet taking off from

Mombasa’s airport. An alarmed United States responded to these attacks with conviction. In addition to proposing significant increases in development assistance and a major initiative on HIV/AIDS, the Bush administration

has designated the greater Horn of Africa a front-line region in its global war against terrorism and has worked to dismantle al Qaeda

infrastructure there. At the same time, however, the United States has failed to recognize the existence of other, less visible,

terrorist threats elsewhere on the African continent. Countering the rise of grass-roots extremism has

been a central part of U.S. strategy in the Middle East, but the same has not generally

been true for Africa. In Nigeria, for example, a potent mix of communal tensions, radical

Islamism, and anti-Americanism has produced a fertile breeding ground for militancy

and threatens to tear the country apart. South Africa has seen the emergence of a violent Islamist group. And

in West and Central Africa, criminal networks launder cash from illicit trade in diamonds, joining forces with corrupt local leaders to

form lawless bazaars that are increasingly exploited by al Qaeda to shelter its assets. As the war on terrorism intensifies in Kenya and

elsewhere, radicals might migrate to more accessible, war-ravaged venues across the continent.

Yemen Scenerio

Drone strikes in Yemen bolster support for AQAP and increase anti-American resentment. Human Rights Watch ’13 [Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda, Human Rights Watch Report 2013, October 22, 2013, https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/10/22/between-drone-and-al-qaeda/civilian-cost-us-targeted-killings-yemen]QL

Popular discontent with the US airstrikes—evidenced by demonstrations, roadblocks, and confirmed in interviews with scores

of Yemeni citizens as well as security analysts, diplomats, and journalists—has generated hostility toward the United States and undermined public confidence in the Yemeni government. Security analysts believe this significantly bolsters the ranks of AQAP.[67] Gregory Johnsen, a Yemen scholar and AQAP expert, estimates that the number of rank-and-file may have tripled since the United States resumed targeted killings in 2009, from 300 to more than 1,000.[68] AQAP analysts say the growth may stem from several factors that include a security vacuum in Yemen during the 2011 uprising. And US officials contend that the

numbers would be higher if the United States was not actively carrying out attacks. But the backlash against US killings beyond AQAP’s inner circle is most frequently cited as the primary cause of opposition to the strikes. The New York Times reported in 2012 that the United States was focused on killing or capturing about “two dozen” AQAP operative leaders in Yemen, not an entire domestic insurgency.[69] Johnsen said that the number of primary US targets may now be down to 10 or 15. On August 5, 2013, the Yemeni authorities released a list of its “most wanted terrorists” that contained 25 names.[70]A Yemen official said that of those, three had since been detained and two had been killed in drone strikes, reducing the number to 20. According to Johnsen: A lot of people are dying in those strikes. Yet the head of AQAP is still alive, his military commander is still alive, and its top bomb-maker is still alive. The fallout from all of these deaths is something the US doesn’t seem to quite take into account.[71] Some if not many of those killed by the United States outside AQAP’s core membership may have been

fighters in the domestic insurgency against the Yemeni government.[72] But as a policy matter, such killings risk doing the United States more harm than good by alienating large segments of the Yemeni population.[73] Any backlash in Yemen is compounded because even when strikes hit AQAP fighters who may be lawfully targeted in an armed conflict situation, they are usually killing members of tightly knit families and tribes, not fighters from outside their communities. “The United States can target and kill someone as a terrorist, only to have Yemenis take up arms to defend him as a tribesman,” Johnsen said.[74] Despite President Hadi’s embrace of the strikes,

many Yemenis consider them a violation of national sovereignty and note that the Yemeni parliament has never authorized US armed intervention in Yemen.[75] In July 2013 Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference, tasked with drafting the country’s new political and constitutional roadmap, called for “criminalizing” under Yemeni law any drone strikes and other killings during counterterrorism operations that violate international law.[76]That language is multiple steps from being translated into action and would in any case duplicate legal standards already in effect on the international level. Nevertheless, its approval by the conference, which represents a broad spectrum of Yemeni society, suggests the extent of domestic opposition to targeted killings. AQAP has also been quick to capitalize on that anger. In a 2013 issue of Inspire magazine the group wrote that the “real” target of US drones is not terrorism but Islam: In Yemen, they roam over Muslim houses, terrorizing children, women and the weak. Moreover they bombard “suspected” targets in villages, towns and cities … without the need to identify the real identity of the target, whether Al-Qaeda or not. … Obama is declaring a crusade! These missiles have no eyes and their

launchers are more blind [sic]. They kill civilians more than mujahideen.[77] Another factor contributing to backlash is that many Yemenis seem to fear the US airstrikes and Yemeni military and police forces more than they fear AQAP.[78] During the country’s 2011 uprising, Yemen’s military and police forces killed numerous protesters or otherwise used excessive lethal force against largely peaceful protests. This does not discount the many serious abuses committed against civilians by AQAP and Ansar al-Sharia. But the available evidence suggests that the vast majority of the hundreds of people killed by AQAP since its inception are members of the Yemeni security forces.[79]

Drone strikes in Yemen are an unnecessary exercise of US military force that causes significant collateral damage and strengthens AQAP. Singh 4-27-15 [Amrit, Senior Legal Officer for national security and counterterrorism at the Open Society Justice Initiative, “Did US Drone Strikes Lose Yemen?,” Project Syndicate, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/yemen-drone-strikes-by-amrit-singh-2015-04]QL

NEW YORK – Recent revelations that the US killed an innocent American in a drone strike in Pakistan confirm

what a new study, “Death by Drone,” of civilian harm caused by US drone strikes in Yemen shows – that claims about the precision of drone strikes are overstated. The revelations also underscore the stark asymmetry between how the US treats drone strikes that kill

its own citizens and those that kill others. While the Obama administration has now publicly acknowledged that it has recently killed

three US citizens in drone strikes, it has refused to acknowledge countless other drone strikes around the world which have killed non-US civilians. In Yemen, the US has been conducting drone strikes since at least 2002, with

estimates of the total number of strikes ranging from 91 to 203. While the American and Yemeni governments have lauded the drones’ precise targeting, they have refused to meaningfully disclose key details about the strikes, including how many have been conducted, who has been targeted, or, crucially, the number and identities of civilians killed. In a May 2013 speech at the National Defense University,

Obama offered assurances that, outside the Afghan war theater, no drone strike would be carried out unless there was “near-certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured.” Obama also claimed that the US targets only “terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people,” and that it does not launch drone strikes when it has “the

ability to capture individual terrorists.” “Death by Drone,” which includes first-hand testimony from eyewitnesses and

survivors of drone strikes in Yemen, tells a different story. The nine case studies documented in the report, four of which

cover attacks that came after the 2013 speech, provide credible evidence that US drone strikes have killed and injured Yemeni civilians, suggesting that the “near-certainty” standard is not being effectively implemented. The report also casts doubt

on Obama’s other claims, with evidence indicating that targets of drone strikes, though perhaps posing a threat to Yemen, may not have posed a direct threat to the US, and that their capture may have been possible . In other

words , Yemeni civilians have suffered and died from drone strikes that may not have been

necessary . More generally, the report provides a window into the experiences of Yemeni civilians directly affected by US drone strikes. The

testimonies of these individuals, vital for assessing the US drone program, are all too easy to overlook because these individuals are poor and have no political influence, and because the strikes are conducted in secret, far away from the US. As Yaslem Saeed bin Ishaq, whose son was killed in a US drone strike in Wadi Sir on August 1, 2013, observed, “They just kill. They do not know what havoc their missiles have caused. They are unaware of the suffering they create for our families.” Indeed, if the US never acknowledges the specific strikes, how can ordinary Americans possibly know that Rasilah al-Faqih, a pregnant Yemeni woman, was killed in Walad Rabei’, along with her husband and ten-year-old daughter, as they headed home from a visit to the doctor? Or that Abdoh Mohammed al-Jarraah’s house in Silat al-Jarraah had 19 people, including women and children, inside when it was hit by

a US drone strike? The US’ refusal to acknowledge drone strikes that kill foreigners is sending a damaging message in Yemen and beyond. As Moqbel Abdullah Ali al-Jarraah, a villager from Silat al-Jarraah, put it: “I believe that

America is testing its lethal inventions in our poor villages, because [it] cannot afford to do so

at any place where human life has value . Here, we are without value .” In every incident recorded in this

report, the families of Yemeni civilians killed in US strikes want to know why they were targeted. As the father of Nasser Mohammed Nasser, one of four innocent civilians killed in a US drone strike on April 19, 2014, lamented: “My son and those who were with him had nothing to do with Al Qaeda. They were simply on their way to earn a living. Why, then, did the American aircraft strike them?” But the US has given Nasser no answers. It has not even acknowledged that it killed his son. In February 2013, then-White House counterterrorism chief John Brennan testified at his Senate confirmation

hearing to become CIA Director that, “in the interest of transparency,” the US must acknowledge mistaken killings publicly. Later that month, he recognized that the US government “should make public the overall numbers of civilian deaths resulting from US strikes targeting Al Qaeda.” The US has done neither. It should come as no surprise, then, that civilians like Nasser, who have lost mothers, fathers, sons, and daughters in US strikes,

are outraged not only at the US, but also at the Yemeni government, which consented to the attacks. They believe that instead of making

Yemen and the US safer, drone strikes only strengthen support for Al Qaeda . Earlier this year, the US

announced a new policy for drone exports, purportedly part of a broader effort to work with other countries to “shape international standards” on the

use of drones and compel recipient states “to use these systems in accordance with international law.” But, as “Death by Drone” shows, the US

drone program is fundamentally flawed and should not be perpetuated. The Obama administration’s

recent admissions that its drone strikes killed its own citizens only underscore this fact.

Drones result in massive collateral damage – latest studies proveAckerman ’14 [Spencer, national security editor for Guardian US, “41 men targeted but 1,147 people killed: US drone strikes – the facts on the ground,” November 24, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/nov/24/-sp-us-drone-strikes-kill-1147]QL

A new analysis of the data available to the public about drone strikes, conducted by the human-rights group Reprieve, indicates that even when operators target specific individuals –

the most focused effort of what Barack Obama calls “targeted killing” – they kill vastly more people than their targets, often

needing to strike multiple times. Attempts to kill 41 men resulted in the deaths of an estimated 1,147

people , as of 24 November. Reprieve, sifting through reports compiled by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, examined cases in which specific

people were targeted by drones multiple times. Their data, shared with the Guardian, raises questions about the accuracy of US intelligence guiding strikes that US officials describe using words like “clinical” and “precise.” The analysis is a partial estimate of the damage wrought by Obama’s favored weapon of war, a tool he and his administration describe as far more precise than more familiar instruments of land or air power. “Drone strikes have

been sold to the American public on the claim that they’re ‘precise’. But they are only as precise as the intelligence that feeds them. There is nothing precise about intelligence that results in the deaths of 28 unknown people, including women and children, for every ‘bad guy’ the US goes after,” said Reprieve’s Jennifer Gibson, who spearheaded the group’s study. Some 24 men specifically targeted in Pakistan resulted in the death of 874 people. All were reported in the press as “killed” on multiple occasions, meaning that numerous strikes were aimed at each of them. The vast majority of those strikes were unsuccessful. An estimated 142 children

were killed in the course of pursuing those 24 men, only six of whom died in the course of drone strikes that killed their intended targets. In Yemen, 17 named men were targeted multiple times. Strikes on them killed 273 people, at least seven of them children. At least four of the targets are still alive. Available data for the 41 men targeted for drone strikes across both countries indicate that each of them was reported killed multiple times. Seven of them are believed to still be alive. The status of another, Haji Omar, is unknown. Abu Ubaidah al-Masri, whom drones targeted three times, later died from natural causes, believed to be hepatitis.

Drone strikes in Yemen create 40 to 60 new enemies for every AQAP operative killedSledge ’13 [Matt Sledge, “Every Yemen Drone Strike Creates 40 To 60 New Enemies, Former U.S. Official Says,” Huffington Post, October 23rd, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/23/yemen-drones_n_4152159.html]QL

NEW YORK -- A former State Department official in Yemen says every U.S. drone killing there of an al Qaeda operative creates 40 to 60 new enemies of America. In an article for the Cairo Review posted Wednesday,

Nabeel Khoury, the deputy chief of mission in Yemen from 2004 to 2007, writes, "Drone strikes take out a few bad guys to be sure, but they also kill a large number of innocent civilians. Given Yemen’s tribal structure, the U.S. generates roughly forty to sixty new enemies for every AQAP [al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula]

operative killed by drones." Khoury says in the article that drones cannot substitute for coherent foreign policy in Yemen. Khoury, now retired from State and working as a fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, told HuffPost, "My former colleagues are probably going to get upset with me, because the policy now is to do this." U.S. drone strikes in Yemen have intensified in the years since he left his post there. Khoury said his estimate, while not "scientifically drawn," was based on his knowledge of the tribal nature of Yemeni society. His concern over drone strikes is based more than anything else, he said, on the pragmatic question: Should the U.S. be creating this many future enemies?

A report released on Tuesday by Human Rights Watch found that the U.S. policy of not acknowledging drone strikes means innocent victims' families are without the ability to seek U.S. compensation -- further fueling anti-American anger. "I'm not absolutely against the use of drones," said Khoury. But, he added, in "any country where we're not at war, then it has the complications of sovereignty, of popular opinion. In the end, I'm not talking about international law. I'm talking about cost-benefits."

Drone strikes in Yemen bolster support for AQAP and increase anti-American resentment. Schuster ’13 [Alexandra, Graduated UPenn with Urban Studies, Associate Producer for Huffington Post, “Farea al-Muslimi, Yemeni Journalist: Yemen Drone Strikes Harm U.S. Security And 'Do Good' For Al Qaeda,” August 12, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/12/yemen-drone-strikes_n_3745090.html]QL

Drone strikes continue to rock Yemen as the U.S. embassy remains closed due to terrorist threats. And yet it seems the United States' anti-terrorist efforts might be having the opposite effect on some of the region's citizens. Yemeni journalist and youth activist Farea al-Muslimi joined HuffPost Live's Ahmed Shihab-Eldin to discuss how this version of air warfare is driving ordinary citizens in Yemen toward extremism. In his latest article in Al-Monitor "America Loses Yemeni People To Drone Strikes," al-Muslimi explains the Yemeni

public's "frenzy" over the "rapid-fire" drone strikes. Given the seemingly stable situation on the ground, ordinary civilians were unaware of the heightened security measures until they saw planes flying overhead and drones hit the capital city of Sanaa. "[We are] pointing fingers at these very unthoughtful policies being

implemented in Yemen. [It is] really harming, as we see it on the ground, Yemeni security, the United States security, and doing a lot of good for al Qaeda," al-Muslimi told Shihab-Eldin. Telling HuffPost Live that the U.S. drone strikes come "at the expense of Yemeni stability," al-Muslimi noted the public's confusion due to the disconnect between the situation on the ground and the international media's "exaggerated" portrayal of the country. "[This is] an effort to explain the gap between the Yemen we see in the international media and the other absurdly different Yemen you see locally," he said. Watch their full discussion

above. Last week, American journalist and editor of the Yemen Post Hakim Almasmari told Shihab-Eldin that Yemenis fear U.S. drone strikes more than they do Al Qaeda. "The Yemeni people are not afraid of Al Qaeda, because Al Qaeda will always fight and attack soldiers and troops and militants. They will never attack civilians. Whereas the drones at times will attack civilians -- like in the last 10 days, out of the 13 who were killed, three were civilians," Almasmari said.

A2: Solves Terrorism in the Region

USG counterterrorism efforts highlights inadequacies in tacticsConley 14, [Michael, United States Air Force, Journal of National Security Studies, https://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/-Luce-nt-/Archives/2014/Special-Edition/Conely_Intervention-Through-Counterterrorism-Final.aspx]SC

Without a doubt, CT (counterterrorism) is a vital national interest for the United States. However, widespread poverty, rampant corruption, and religious and tribal divisions throughout the Trans-Sahara cannot be improved overnight or with a CT-focused strategy . Despite the initiative and efforts of the TSCTP (Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership), along will tens of millions of dollars in aid and equipment, progress has been continually plagued by setbacks and shifting military and political relationships. Additionally, the number of countries that need support is daunting and impossible to address bilaterally. In short, the current USG approach of dumping money and training into CT capabilities is inadequate and impractical. Many scholars and diplomats that have offered suggestions for addressing the problems in the Trans-Sahara and many of their

recommendations are similar calling for the long-view rather than small tactical engagements. Andre Le Sage sums up the recommendations succinctly, albeit idealistically: “There must be substantial, sustained, and continent-wide investment in capacity building for intelligence, law enforcement, military, prosecutorial, judicial, and penal systems,

not to mention their parliamentary, media, and civil society counterparts.” In essence, as Le Sage suggests, African society needs to be built anew—a task well beyond the capacity of the TSCTP. Taking all of the

available information into consideration, it is readily apparent that the current, CT-led approach is insufficient and possibly degenerative.

A2: US Increases piracy

Pirates Not a ThreatSomali Pirates Are Not A Threat Guardian 2013 (The Guardian, “No Somali pirate hijacking in nearly a year, says UN”, May 3rd, 2013) http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/03/somali-pirate-hijacking

The fight against Somali pirates has been so effective that they have not been able to mount a successful hijacking in nearly a year, the chair of the global group trying to combat the pirates has said. American diplomat Donna Leigh Hopkins credited the combined efforts of international naval forces and increased security on ships, including the use of armed guards. But she also pointed to the jailing of 1,140 Somali pirates in 21 countries, "which started de-glamorising piracy". Somali pirates hijacked 46 ships in 2009, 47 in 2010, but only 25 in 2011, an indication that new on-board defences were working. In 2012, there were 75 attacks reported off Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden – down from 237 in 2011 – and only 14 ships were hijacked, according to the International Maritime Bureau. "Pirate attacks are down by at least 75%," Hopkins said. "There are still pirate attacks being attempted but there has not been a successful hijacking since May 2012," she said. "12 May will be the one-year anniversary of no successful hijacking off the coast of Somalia."

Somali Pirate Threat Has Mostly Been Neutralized Insurance Journal 2014 (Insurance Journal, “Somali Pirates Driven Off in First Attack of 2014”, January 21st, 2014) http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2014/01/21/317710.htm

A bulletin from Dryad Maritime Intelligence confirms the first piracy attack of 2014, which it described as “audacious and

determined,” although it was ultimately unsuccessful. The attack was launched by Somali pirates south of Salalah in the late hours on Friday, January 17th. The news follows the latest International Maritime Bureau (IMB) annual report on piracy and maritime crime, which welcomed a decrease in Somali piracy in 2013. Dryad’s bulletin described the attack: “In the incident on

Friday, a Mothership-enabled PAG attacked a transiting vessel with small arms fire. The on board security team took appropriate action and repelled the attack with a graduated response, culminating in an exchange of fire. “The pirates ignored deterrence, and continued their approach, firing at the ship. A robust response from the embarked team was eventually enough to encourage the pirate skiff to return to the safety of its dhow mother vessel, allowing the merchant vessel to continue safely on its transit, reporting the incident to relevant authorities. Ian Millen, Director of Intelligence at Dryad Maritime Intelligence, commented: “This incident shows that, despite the very clear decline in the scope and scale of Somali

piracy, as evidenced by the IMB’s latest report and Dryad Maritime Intelligence’s own figures, the threat remains very real. “There has been a clear reversal of fortune for Somali pirates in the last two years; the combined effects of proactive naval operations, compliance with anti-piracy BMP 4 measures and the embarkation of armed security guards have made life more difficult for maritime criminals , but the problem is only broadly contained and is unlikely to be totally eradicated until a solution is found on the ground in Somalia.”

Somalia’s Pirate Kingpin Has “Fallen”Bridger 2013 ( James M. Bridger is a maritime security consultant and piracy specialist with Delex Systems Inc. in Washington, DC, Foreign Policy, “The Rise and Fall of Somalia’s Pirate King”, November 4th 2013) http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/11/04/the-rise-and-fall-of-somalias-pirate-king/?wp_login_redirect=0

While some 1,000 Somali pirate foot soldiers have been jailed in over a dozen countries, Afweyne –whose sobriquet means "big

mouth" or "crybaby" — will be the first pirate leader to be prosecuted by the international community when his criminal trial opens in Belgium. Afweyne, more than any other pirate, is responsible for making Somali piracy into an organized, multi-million–dollar industry. According to a recent World Bank report, Somali piracy raked in an estimated $339 million to $413 million in ransom spoils between 2005 and 2013. Like many of his comrades, Afweyne asserts that he not a "kidnapper," but the leader of a "legitimate self-defense movement" dedicated to protecting Somalia’s marine resources. While some of Somalia’s first pirates operating from the autonomous region of Puntland

could claim — for a time — to be "coastguards" levying a taxes on illegal foreign fishing, Afweyne was not one of them. Rather,

he was shrewd businessman who sought to replicate Puntland’s cottage pirate industry on a commercial scale, based out of his native Harardhere in central Somalia…Afweyne’s arrest should serve as a "warning shot across the bows" for other pirate leaders and organizers, said the head of INTERPOL’s Maritime Security Unit, Pierre St. Hilaire.

Somali Pirate Attacks Have Decreased Rayman 2014 (Noah Rayman is a NY based, TIME Magazine writer who has a B.A. in Social Studies and Middle Eastern from Harvard Univ, “Did 2013 Mark the End of Somali Piracy?”, Jan 6th, 2014) http://world.time.com/2014/01/06/did-2013-mark-the-end-of-somali-piracy/

It’s a testament to the success of recent antipiracy measures that hijackings of major shipments off the coast of Somalia plummeted to zero in 2013, according to the final numbers compiled by the U.S. Navy and released last week.

The pirates are also trying less often: there were nine suspected attempts in 2013 in the shipping

lanes that pass between Yemen and Somalia, down from seven hijackings and 25 attempts a year earlier. In 2009, there were 51 hijackings and 130 attempts, according to the Navy, including the failed attempt to take the Maersk Alabama that formed the basis of the Hollywood film Captain Phillips. A handful of factors have helped deter Somali pirates since the

international community woke up to the threat in 2008. International naval patrols spearheaded by NATO and the E.U. have boosted security by deploying up to 20 warships to the area at one time, according to Michael Frodl, founder of C-LEVEL Maritime Risks, a private intelligence and consulting firm. The ships aim to provide a secure

corridor through the region — the “I-95 between Yemen and Somalia,” says Frodl — and go after suspected pirates, with U.S. surveillance drones over the coast of Somalia warning when pirates appear to be setting off.

Meanwhile, the shipping industry’s Best Management Practices, a set of antipiracy recommendations for

captains sailing at-risk areas off Somalia’s coast, provides seemingly simple but often crucial advice: for example, to lift the ship’s ladders and travel at higher speeds (the BMP says pirates have never successfully taken a ship traveling faster than 34 km/h). And shipping companies reluctant to depend on warships that might be days away are hiring security teams — usually armed groups of roughly four former U.S. or British marines — to stand guard on the most dangerous legs of the journey.

Somali Pirate Activity LowStratfor 2012 (Stratfor Global Intelligence is a geopolitical intelligence firm that provides strategic analysis and forecasting to individuals and organizations around the world, “The Expensive, Diminishing Threat of Somali Piracy”, Nov 8th, 2012) https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/expensive-diminishing-threat-somali-piracy

Piracy off the coast of Somalia has dropped off dramatically in 2012. Successful ship hijackings have decreased from 31 in 2011 (and 49 in 2010) to only four so far in 2012. Attacks against ships have also decreased, falling from 199 reported attacks in the first nine months of 2011 to 70 attacks over the same span in 2012 — a 65 percent drop. However, diminished activity does not necessarily mean

a decrease in the cost of sailing around the Horn of Africa…Many factors have contributed to the decrease in pirate hijackings in 2012. One factor is that shipping companies have begun equipping their ships with more countermeasures, namely armed guards. For several years, commercial ships sailing in the Indian Ocean have used other countermeasures, such as fences, water cannons and adjusted tactics like disabling the ship. But the widespread deployment of armed guards beginning in 2011 (guards had been used sparingly as far back as 2008) has a very close correlation to the recent decrease in hijackings. In late 2009, only about 10-20 percent of commercial ships sailing through waters where Somali pirates

operate carried guards; today, some estimates put the percentage as high as 70 percent. To date, pirates have never successfully hijacked a ship that had armed guards. But it should be noted that, even though the use of armed guards appears to be the most effective countermeasure against piracy, there are other factors at work. For instance,

government officials also attribute the drop-off in attacks and hijackings to better coordination between foreign naval patrols, which have made the waters off the Somali coast a less permissive environment for pirate operations. With several years of practice, sailors from international missions such as the U.S.-backed Combined Task Force 151 and the EU-backed Atalanta mission as well as from the unilateral missions of China, Russia, Iran and others have had time to study pirate activity and become more efficient at stopping attacks. Several dozen foreign naval ships are deployed to secure the waters for commercial shipping at any given time. Their focus is escorting ships through the Gulf of Aden, but the area of pirate activity is much larger than that, reaching across the Arabian Sea to India and Madagascar. Effectively patrolling such a large area requires intelligence and the development of a counterpiracy doctrine that includes going after the larger pirate vessels, called mother ships, that extend pirates' range and allow them to operate in rougher seas during the

monsoon. Taken together, the increased use of armed guards aboard commercial ships and the growing effectiveness of foreign naval patrols have contributed to undermining the pirates' control over the seas. Three years ago pirates were largely uncontested, but now they face a more coordinated defense. They hijacked commercial ships because they were relatively soft targets — which could be taken by four people with AK-47s, a fishing boat and a ladder — making the millions of dollars in profit from a ransom payment very attractive. The armed guards and naval patrols have not eliminated piracy, but they have increased the costs of attacking and seizing a commercial ship. Because pirates are motivated more by profit than by any ideology, a decrease in profitability will deter them from engaging in the practice.

No Uniqueness to the DA- people are starving in the squo regardless- U.S. presence is not key and has marginal if any effect- and Turn aid is a problem Goodspeed 11

National Post (f/k/a The Financial Post) (Canada) July 23, 2011 Saturday All but Toronto Edition Famine returns to Africa; After 60 years and us$1-trillion in aid, the continent has become steadily poorer BYLINE: Peter Goodspeed, National Post http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.umw.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/

In 1991-93, as Somalia slipped into a civil war that still rages on, another 300,000 starved to death. This was in spite of the interventions of a U.S.-led peacekeeping force that ultimately withdrew after 19 U.S. troops and more than 1,000 Somalis were killed in the infamous Black Hawk Down raid of October 1993. Now, the entire Horn of Africa is facing its worst drought in 60 years and enduring the hunger that comes with apocalyptic certainty in Africa when nature turns mean. The UN estimates 12 million people are threatened in Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti and Uganda. Tens of thousands have already died in Somalia. Nearly 3,000 starving Somalis are staggering into refugee camps in Ethiopia and Kenya in search of help every day. Africa's

latest tragedy is bound to renew a debate over why, despite decades of foreign aid, it remains a cursed continent, wracked with famine, malnutrition, disease, corruption and war. Over the past 60 years, at least US$1-trillion of development-related aid has been spent on Africa. Yet it has become steadily poorer and is now home to 75% of the world's most impoverished countries. Somalia and other nations in

the Horn of Africa remain among the continent's poorest and the most problem-plagued. Drought is a fact of life in the region, but climate experts say dry seasons there are becoming longer and harsher, and affect a much wider area. "Whether or not the drought ravaging the Horn of Africa can be attributed to the effects of climate change, Somalia serves as an

example of the deadly effects of a pernicious cocktail of severe and prolonged drought, ballooning food and water prices, poor governance and ongoing conflict," says Elizabeth Ferris of Washington's Brookings Institution. The latest famine has been a long time

coming, with experts warning of its approach for two years. Yet little was done to prepare for it. Last year, when the UN World Food Program (WFP) asked rich countries for US$500-million to combat hunger in the Horn of Africa, it was unable to raise even half that figure. Now faced with widespread famine, UN agencies say they will need US$1-billion. But by the time the famine was declared, donor states had committed less than US$200-million. "The crisis has been building for several months, but the response from international donors and regional governments has been mostly slow, inadequate and complacent," says Fran Equiza, regional director of Oxfam International in Kenya. "There has been a catastrophic breakdown of the world's collective responsibility to act." Others, like Dambisa Moyo,

a Zambian-born, Oxford University-trained economist, argue traditional patterns of foreign aid have actually

contributed to Africa's problems. She says foreign aid regularly supports tyrannical governments and perpetuates cycles of poverty. It also fuels and intensifies civil wars as combatants frequently have nothing to fight over but access to foreign aid. "The problem is that aid is not benign -- it's malignant," she says in her book, Dead Aid. "No longer part of the potential solution, it's part of the problem --in fact aid IS the problem." She wants donors to taper off financial aid to Africa and replace it with trade and direct investment. But for now, the Horn of Africa faces a humanitarian crisis that overshadows debates on development models. At its heart is Somalia, whose tragedy is stained by the growing indifference of a world numbed by the country's endless string of crises. Two decades of being a failed state without a

functioning central government have left a void that is being filled by death. So far the only corner of the drought-stricken Horn of Africa to be officially plunged into famine, Somalia is a disaster. It is plagued by failed peace talks, violence, refugees, pirates, poverty, chronic underdevelopment, proxy wars, foreign invasions, clan conflicts, warlords, Islamic extremism and a growing terror threat from al-Qaeda-linked radicals. Throw in two years of drought, and you have a lethal cocktail of factors that lead to

hunger and displacement. Many Somalis have no access to food, clean water, basic health care or even hope."What has happened is a systemic systems failure, akin to what happened in Japan's recent nuclear crisis," says Ms. McCarney. "The whole system is just overwhelmed by wave after wave of

disaster.”You have the multiple, consecutive years of drought and crop failures, so that over the last couple of years people have

had to kill their livestock and eat it," she adds. "You have had food prices go through the roof, so the stockpiling of local

governments wasn't taking place because the prices were too high. You've got the cumulative effect of two decades of conflict. "The confluence and convergence of so many things has just knocked the system off." At the same time, foreign aid has plummeted, mainly because the al-Qaeda-linked Al-Shabaab, which controls large swaths of south and central Somalia, declared

it would no longer tolerate foreign-aid agencies operating in its territories. The insurgents accuse foreign-aid workers of being spies and claim some groups are "promulgating Christianity and Western ideology." As a result, the jihadists have regularly kidnapped, killed, threatened and robbed them. Somalia is now the most dangerous country in the world for aid workers. Last year, 14 relief workers with WFP were killed, forcing the agency to withdraw, after Al-Shabaab began a campaign to

assassinate Somalis working for Western aid agencies. Islamist insurgents also threw up thousands of roadblocks to "tax" relief

convoys as much as US$500 a stop for each truckload of food being brought into their territory. In April 2010, Barack Obama, the U.S. President, issued an executive order branding Al-Shabaab a terrorist organization and banning all U.S. aid from going into areas

under the group's control. U.S. humanitarian aid, which had been flowing into Somalia at the rate of US$237-million in 2008, fell to just US$29-million last year. Foreign aid from other countries was also dramatically reduced because of the recession. "It is very easy to put Somalia in the 'difficult to deal with' basket and let it drop off the agenda," says Mark Bowden, the UN's humanitarian co-ordination in Somalia. "That's been a major factor."

Impact D- No external impact- the U.S. will still drone strike any operative posing an external threatOdle 13

2013 Emory University School of Law Emory International Law Review 2013 Emory International Law Review 27 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 603 John Odle* BIO: * Executive Managing Editor, Emory International Law Review; J.D. Candidate, Emory University School of Law (2013); M.A., George Washington University (2007); B.A., Johns Hopkins University (2003).

While Brennan distinguishes between the operational/leadership level and those who facilitate and carry out the attacks, he does not say that the United States cannot or will not target terrorists on the lower level. Instead, he states [*611] the United States will "take actions to mitigate those threats that ... terrorist groups and these individuals who are associated with Al Qaeda pose to [the United States]." n27 Thus, the assessment of which elements pose a threat to the United

States is an important key to understanding whom the United States believes it is legally justified in targeting. The United States also appears to distinguish between the elements of terrorist organizations that seek to commit international terrorism and those who have more local concerns. Brennan, in the same speech,

made a distinction between the international-oriented and local elements of AQAP, saying: [AQAP] is a group that carries out terrorist attacks, [and is also] involved in insurgency in the southern portion of Yemen. It has attacked our interests. It has tried to attack us here in the homeland, as well as [elsewhere]. There are elements of AQAP that are part-time members, some are tribal members who have aligned themselves with Al Qaeda for a particular period of time and for a particular purpose. Their agendas may be very local. n28 Brennan also made the same point with Al-Shabab:

Similarly, in Somalia, you have al-Shabab. There is a portion of al-Shabab that is trying to carry out attacks like they did in Uganda, against foreign interests, against Western interests, including against the United States. This is an element within Al-Shabab, which is a large collection of different tribal elements, warlords, groups that are engaged in an insurgency inside Somalia, which is basically a land that is ungoverned. n29 On May 23, 2013, the White House released a summary of the newly approved U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities that stated "there must be a legal basis for using lethal force, whether it is against a senior operational leader of a terrorist organization or the forces that organization is using or intends to use to conduct terrorist attacks." n30 This language clearly illustrates the distinction between the [*612] operational level, referred to as senior operational leaders, and the tactical level, which is limited to "forces that organization is using or intends to use to conduct terrorist attacks."

n31 Members of a terrorist organization that are being used to conduct terrorist attacks are specifically able to be targeted with lethal force. Thus, by inference, members of the organization not being used to conduct terrorist attacks are not targetable. It was reported in 2011 that the United States determined n32 it will not target fighters acting on a regional level n33 - who are elements of a larger terrorist organization, but who are not engaged in international terrorism. This is likely because the United States does not consider those elements of the terrorist organizations as a part of its armed conflict with Al Qaeda.

Impact – US Strike

Al-Shabaab is a global threat – Greater Horn terrorism escalates into Strikes on US SoilJeff Moore, 2013 ( Ph.D., is the chief executive officer of Muir Analytics, which assesses threats from insurgent and terror groups, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Analysis/Outside-View/2013/10/18/Outside-View-The-al-Shabaab-Westgate-raid-A-forewarning/80641382069100/)

What does it all mean? First, it means al-Shabaab has strengthened. While the group lost ground in Somalia, on the surface indicating weakness, in reality, al-Shabaab has adapted to new realities and taken on a more vicious cause and adopted more heinous tactics. Al-Shabaab's newly found will and blood lust demonstrate fervent non-capitulation in the name of Islamist jihad. Second, it means Islamist

jihadism has expanded in Africa. Aside from Somalia and Kenya, al-Qaida-related groups are increasingly active in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Mali, Nigeria and Tanzania. Al-Qaida isn't the least bit "on the run" as the White House has asserted. This was U.S. President Barack Obama's "mission

accomplished" gaffe. Al-Qaida continues to morph, attract recruits and become more deadly. Third, al-Shabaab has become a more serious threat to Africa and the international community. The Westgate raid demonstrates al-Shabaab has the ideological will to strike anywhere it has a clandestine

network and it is good at setting up and running such networks. For example, in the 2007 timeframe, al-Shabaab set up a clandestine cell in Minneapolis, reportedly run out of the Abubakar As-Saddique Islamic Center. This cell covertly recruited, indoctrinated and deployed at least 20 Somali-American youth from Minneapolis for combat missions in Somalia, which demonstrated considerable tradecraft prowess. One, 27-year-old Shirwa Ahmed, blew himself up in a terror attack in Somalia in

October 2008. He is generally known as "America's first suicide bomber." On Sept. 26, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder asserted al-Shabaab didn't have the "capacity" to stage an attack in America. The good sir is well-meaning but wrong. Al-Shabaab has dedicated ideologues and an effective clandestine network in America, so it can strike in the United States. The same goes for the United Kingdom,

Europe and certainly greater Africa. Al-Shabaab has adapted to new realities. So must Washington. The increased threat profile demands it.

Al-Shabaab is highly trained and capable of attacking US SoilOmar Jamal, 9-30-13 (first secretary to the Friends of Somalia U.N.http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/09/30/does-al-shabab-pose-a-threat-on-american-soil/the-question-now-is-when-and-where-in-the-us-the-shabab-will-attack)

It is not a matter of whether Al Shabab is a terrorist threat to the United States, but rather when and where it will attack. The group has already declared an allegiance to Al Qaeda and vowed repeatedly to harm American citizens. Al Shabab controls a large area mostly in the southern parts of Somalia, and has imposed a strict interpretation of Shariah law in those areas. Although it started as a militia court to

settle disputes among Somali citizens, Al Shabab has become a commanding voice with highly trained leaders in Afghanistan, according the National Counterterrorism Center and capable of carrying out large scale acts of violence that have targeted the U.S. and its allies in East Africa and the region. What's more, Al Shabab now has a web of followers and informants imbedded in Afghanistan, East Africa and even in the U.S. where it has

sought financial support from the Somali diaspora. Some of these followers have carried out suicide bombings, and some are now suspects in the recent terror attack in Kenya, where more than 60 civilians were killed and many more were wounded. The fact that Al Shabab claimed responsibility for that attack shows how serious a threat the group poses not only to Kenya, but also to the rest of

the world. With Al Shabab now dispersed and blended into the mainstream with smaller cells, distant from the central command but capable of carrying out autonomous acts of terrorism, there is no question that Al Shabab is very much a threat to the U.S., including on American soil.

Impact – Global Stability

African terrorism risks global instability – spills overDaniel Donovan, 12-5-12 (Executive Director of African Community Advancement Initiative, “The Greatest U.S. National Security Threat May Come From Africa in the Future” http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/12/05/the-greatest-u-s-national-security-threat-may-come-from-africa-in-the-future/)

These two situations are just the latest in the growing trend of Islamic extremists in Africa. Until recently much of southern Somalia was controlled by the al-Qaeda affiliated group al-Shabaab. Although an African Union force recently derailed the organization and

seized control of much of the country — which has been controlled by militants for over two decades — al-Shabaab remains a threat to the Horn of Africa, especially neighboring Kenya. At a speech last week at George Washington

University, General Carter Ham — leader of the U.S. African Command — told a forum that he was concerned about cooperation among the extremist Islamic groups that continue to populate the continent. He noted that intelligence has already shown a level of unification between organizations in Mali, such as Ansar Dine, and Boko Haram of Nigeria. He urged the promotion of an African solution, as was the case in Somalia, to quell the emergence of these threats throughout the continent. Whether the U.S. will take a

backseat to any African coalition over the long-term is unclear. What is clear is that an alarming number of Islamic extremist groups are arising all across Africa. This poses a major security threat to both Africa and the West. These groups must not be allowed to carve out a base of operations anywhere on the continent. Any functioning safe haven for a terrorist cell can provide the means to carry out attacks on an international scale, threatening the peace of the global environment. It has become common practice for

al-Qaeda and other Islamic extremist groups to migrate to regions that provide the most instability. With the problems occurring in Mali, Nigeria, Libya and Somalia, as well as a number of fragile, adolescent or

nonexistent democracies present in Africa, the threat of the continent turning into a hotbed for Islamic extremism is very real. While the West focuses their interests on the Middle East, they must also keep a close eye on this

alarming rise of extremists in Africa and recognize this as the potential new threat to the global community.

Impact – Nuclear Escalation

Regional instability boosts the risk of terrorist strikes – those go nuclearLisa Saenz, 2013 (master's degree in Intelligence and National Security Studies University of Texas El Paso, “WMD TERRORISM AND THE AL QAEDA NETWORK: AN ANALYSIS OF AQIM AND AL SHABAAB” http://academics.utep.edu/Portals/4302/Lisa%20Saenz%20(Capstone).pdf)

The level of instability in North Africa is heightened by the number of operational research reactors, the possibility of nuclear terrorism, and the trafficking of illicit materials. According to Senator Jeanne Shaheen, the countries in the Middle East and North Africa present a large proliferation challenge to the U.S. due to

the ongoing political instability and “deeply-rooted violent extremism.” Nearly one-third of the states in this region possess some type of CBRN capability, and many are suspected of having related research programs. This region is particularly challenging due to the violent nature of its climate, along with its complex ethnic differences, and inexperienced and unstable governments recently brought into power. 16 The recent confirmation of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile and the discovery of Iran’s nuclear program, its development and ongoing negotiations, are

examples demonstrating the proliferation issues that are known to be occurring. These materials and expertise may trickle down to the Al Qaeda network, whose direct ties to the Iranian and Syrian regimes amplify the threat of potential trafficking of illicit materials. There may be additional clandestine activities and programs that have yet to be discovered, such as the A.Q. Khan nuclear trade network that was not discovered until 2004. 17

There is also the possibility of terrorists obtaining uranium or plutonium for use in an improvised nuclear device (IND). 18 The geographical location of North Africa and the nuclear research reactors and facilities located in this region presents this opportunity to the inhabiting terrorist groups. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, Ghana, Democratic Republic of Congo, and South Africa all currently possess operational nuclear research reactors. The nuclear material would be implemented as an alternative energy source to be developed into nuclear power plants to generate electricity. The countries of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Kenya, Nigeria, and Tunisia, are all considering the possibility of nuclear energy and are currently

receiving research assistance from the IAEA. 19 Many of these research reactors are located in highly populated cities. Most of them contain a much smaller amount of radioactive materials than nuclear power stations,

hence lower security measures. Research reactors in the U.S. have lower security measures for this reason. It can be inferred that security at a majority of these sites in North Africa is rather limited, and may present an attractive target to terrorist groups. 20 The fissile materials contained at these sites are low enough that it is too small to be used to produce an explosive device.

However, two or three thefts of such a material could yield enough to potentially create an IND.

21 The material contained in the nuclear power plants that may be built in this area in the future : enriched uranium, low-level radioactive waste, and spent nuclear fuel all present the potential to be used in an IND.22 The

concern over the development of future nuclear power plants in this region presents a large step that could very well lead the world closer to the potential for nuclear terrorism.

Regime Stability

Horn of Africa

Unstable NowGreater Horn is on the Brink, water shortages and climate change have created the conditions for state collapseFreedman 7-30 [Andrew, is Mashable's Science Editor. Prior to working at Mashable, Freedman was a Senior Science writer for Climate Central. He holds a Masters in Climate and Society from Columbia University, and a Masters in Law and Diplomacy from The Fletcher School at Tufts University: Defense Department to Congress: Global warming is a 'present security threat, http://mashable.com/2015/07/29/pentagon-global-warming-present-threat/] JMS

According to the Pentagon, climate-related stress can also create new vulnerabilities, such as

water scarcity, that can lead to instability and conflict. Studies published in June found that

humanity is rapidly depleting a third of the world's largest groundwater aquifers, with the

top three most stressed groundwater basins in the political hotspots of the Middle East, the

border region between India and Pakistan, and the Murzuk-Djado Basin in northern Africa . Making matters worse, researchers found that we don't know how much water is left in these massive aquifers — which water resources scientists often refer to as Earth's water savings accounts. The fact that the majority of the world's groundwater accounts “are past sustainability tipping points” was not known before, according to James Famiglietti, an author of both studies and a professor of Earth system science at the University of California, Irvine and senior water scientist at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Not surprisingly , U.S. Africa Command, or

AFRICOM, ranks humanitarian crises as the most likely climate change-related risk under its

purview, given the tendency for drought to trigger famine in Sub-Saharan Africa. The report

states that climate change could interact with fragile governance and other challenges to "tip

states toward systemic breakdowns."

US Involvement = BlowbackUnited States interference insights backlash

Balogun 14, [Jumoke, 5-7-2014, "Dear Americans, Your Hashtags Won’t #BringBackOurGirls.

You Might Actually Be Making Things Worse.," Compare Afrique,

http://www.compareafrique.com/dear-americans-hashtags-wont-bringbackourgirls-might-

actually-making-things-worse/]SC

Simple question. Are you Nigerian? Do you have constitutional rights accorded to Nigerians to participate in their

democratic process? If not, I have news you. You can’t do anything about the girls missing in Nigeria. You can’t. Your

insistence on urging American power, specifically American military power, to address

this issue will ultimately hurt the people of Nigeria. It heartens me that you’ve taken up the mantle of

spreading “awareness” about the 200+ girls who were abducted from their school in Chibok; it heartens me that you’ve heard the

cries of mothers and fathers who go yet another day without their child. It’s nice that you care. Here’s the thing though, when

you pressure Western powers, particularly the American government to get involved

in African affairs and when you champion military intervention, you become part of a

much larger problem. You become a complicit participant in a military expansionist

agenda on the continent of Africa. This is not good. You might not know this, but the United States

military loves your hashtags because it gives them legitimacy to encroach and grow their military presence in Africa. AFRICOM

(United States Africa Command), the military body that is responsible for overseeing US military operations across Africa, gained

much from #KONY2012 and will now gain even more from #BringBackOurGirls. Last year, before President Obama visited several

countries in Africa, I wrote about how the U.S. military is expanding its role in Africa. In 2013 alone, AFRICOM carried out a total of

546 “military activities,” which is an average of one and half military missions a day. While we don’t know much about the purpose

of these activities, keep in mind that AFRICOM’s mission is to “ advance U.S. national security

interests .” And advancing they are. According to one report, in 2013, American troops entered

and advanced American interests in Niger, Uganda, Ghana, Malawi, Burundi, Mauritania, South Africa, Chad,

Togo, Cameroon, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Lesotho, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and South Sudan. The U.S.

military conducted 128 separate “military activities” in 28 African countries between June and December of 2013. These are

in conjunction to U.S. led drone operations which are occurring in Northern Nigeria and

Somalia. There are also counter-terrorism outposts in Djibouti and Niger and covert bases in

Ethiopia and the Seychelles which are serving as launching pads for the U.S. military to carry

out surveillance and armed drone strikes. Although most of these activities are covert, we do know that the

U.S. military has had a destabilizing effect in a few countries. For example, a New York Times article confirmed that the man who

overthrew the elected Malian government in 2012 was trained and mentored by the United States between 2004 and 2010. Further,

a U.S. trained battalion in the Democratic Republic of Congo was denounced by the United Nations for committing mass rapes.

Now the United States is gaining more ground in Africa by sending military advisors

and more drones, sorry, I mean security personnel and assets to Nigeria to assist the

Nigerian military, who by the way, have a history of committing mass atrocities

against the Nigerian people. Knowing this, you can understand my apprehension for President Obama’s decision. As

the Nigerian-American writer Teju Cole said yesterday, the involvement of the U.S. government and

military will only lead to more militarism, less oversight, and less democracy . Also, the last

time military advisors were sent to Africa, they didn’t do much good. Remember #KONY2012? When President Obama sent 100

combat-equipped troops to capture or kill Lord’s Resistance Army leader Joseph Kony in Central Africa? Well, they haven’t found

him and although they momentarily stopped looking, President Obama sent more troops in March 2014 who now roam Uganda,

Central African Republic, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Consequently, your calls for the United

States to get involved in this crisis undermines the democratic process in Nigeria and co-opts

the growing movement against the inept and kleptocratic Jonathan administration. It

was Nigerians who took their good for nothing President to task and challenged him to address the plight of the missing girls. It is in

their hands to seek justice for these girls and to ensure that the Nigerian government is held accountable. Your emphasis on U.S.

action does more harm to the people you are supposedly trying to help and it only expands and sustain U.S. military might. If you

must do something, learn more about the amazing activists and journalists like this one, this one, and this one just to name a few,

who have risked arrests and their lives as they challenge the Nigerian government to do better for its people within the democratic

process. If you must tweet, tweet to support and embolden them, don’t direct your calls to action to the

United States government who seeks to only embolden American militarism. Don’t join the

American government and military in co-opting this movement started and sustained by Nigerians.

United States military engagement in GOA creates blowbackHermann 13, [Burkely, an activist who writes numerous blogs to educate the populace about international, local and national issues, 1-12-2013, "AFRICOM's Imperialist Quest," No Publication, http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article33597.htm]SC

One hint at answering this question comes from the director of the AFRICOM office of public affairs, Colonel Tom Davis said a revealing statement. After saying that the amount of troops in the continent wasn’t fast

growing, he admitted that “ We also conduct some type of military training or military-to- military engagement or activity with nearly every country on the African continent. This is part of our effort to enable African nations to increase their defense capabilities.” This statement is very telling of US intentions to come. Nick Turse conveys this clearly, a process which seems to have sped up since Obama has been in office. Turse writes that since 2003, the modern American ‘scramble for Africa,’ has begun, as “…in quiet and largely unnoticed ways, the Pentagon and the CIA have been spreading their forces across the continent. Today…the U.S. maintains a surprising number of bases in Africa…Under President Obama, in fact, operations in Africa have accelerated far beyond the more limited interventions of the

Bush years…To support these mushrooming missions, near-constant training operations, and alliance-building joint exercises,

outposts of all sorts are sprouting continent-wide, connected by a sprawling shadow logistics network…The U.S. is now involved, directly and by proxy, in military and surveillance operations against an expanding list of regional enemies [in the continent]…U.S. special operations forces are stationed at a string of even more shadowy forward operating posts on the continent…U.S. troops are also working at bases inside Uganda…They now supply the majority of the troops to the African Union Mission protecting the U.S.-supported government in the Somali capital, Mogadishu…the U.S. is conducting counterterrorism training and equipping

militaries in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, Niger, and Tunisia…[recently] AFRICOM Commander General Carter Ham explained the reasoning behind U.S. operations on the continent: “The absolute imperative for the United States military [is] to protect America, Americans, and American interests; in our case, in my case, [to] protect us from threats that may emerge from the African continent…With the Obama administration clearly engaged in a twenty-first century scramble for Africa, the possibility of successive waves of overlapping blowback grows exponentially.”

United States Foreign intervention leads to violent internal conflicts and

proxy wars

Turse 13, [Nick, 6-18-2013, "Tomgram: Nick Turse, Blowback Central," No Publication,

http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175714/tomgram:_nick_turse,_blowback_central

/]SC

The U.S.-backed French intervention in Mali also led to a January revenge terror attack

on the Amenas gas plant in Algeria. Carried out by the al-Mulathameen brigade, one of various

new al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb-linked militant groups emerging in the region, it led to the deaths of close to

40 hostages, including three Americans. Planned by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a veteran of the U.S.-backed war

against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, it was only the first in a series of blowback responses

to U.S. and Western interventions in Northern Africa that may have far-reaching

implications. Last month, Belmokhtar’s forces also teamed up with fighters from the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West

Africa -- yet another Islamist militant group of recent vintage -- to carry out coordinated attacks on a French-run uranium mine and a

nearby military base in Agadez, Niger, that killed at least 25 people. A recent attack on the French embassy in Libya by local militants

is also seen as a reprisal for the French war in Mali. According to the Carnegie Endowment’s Wehrey, the French military’s push

there has had the additional effect of reversing the flow of militants, sending many back into Libya to recuperate and seek additional

training. Nigerian Islamist fighters driven from Mali have returned to their native land with fresh training and innovative tactics as

well as heavy weapons from Libya. Increasingly battle-hardened, extremist Islamist insurgents from two Nigerian groups, Boko

Haram and the newer, even more radical Ansaru, have escalated a long simmering conflict in that West African oil giant. For years,

Nigerian forces have been trained and supported by the U.S. through the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance

program. The country has also been a beneficiary of U.S. Foreign Military Financing, which provides grants and loans to purchase

U.S.-produced weaponry and equipment and funds military training. In recent years, however, brutal responses by Nigerian forces

to what had been a fringe Islamist sect have transformed Boko Haram into a regional terrorist force. The situation has grown so

serious that President Goodluck Jonathan recently declared a state of emergency in northern Nigeria. Last month, Secretary of State

John Kerry spoke out about “credible allegations that Nigerian security forces are committing gross human rights violations, which,

in turn, only escalate the violence and fuel extremism.” After a Boko Haram militant killed a soldier in the town of Baga, for

example, Nigerian troops attacked the town, destroying more than 2,000 homes and killing an estimated 183 people. Similarly,

according to a recent United Nations report, the Congolese army’s 391st Commando Battalion, formed with U.S. support and trained

for eight months by U.S. Special Operations forces, later took part in mass rapes and other atrocities. Fleeing the advance of a

recently formed, brutal (non-Islamic) rebel group known as M23, its troops joined with other Congolese soldiers in raping close to

100 women and more than 30 girls in November 2012. “This magnificent battalion will set a new mark in this nation's continuing

transformation of an army dedicated and committed to professionalism, accountability, sustainability, and meaningful security," said

Brigadier General Christopher Haas, the head of U.S. Special Operations Command Africa at the time of the battalion’s graduation

from training in 2010. Earlier this year, incoming AFRICOM commander General David Rodriguez told the Senate Armed Services

Committee that a review of the unit found its “officers and enlisted soldiers appear motivated, organized, and trained in small unit

maneuver and tactics” even if there were “limited metrics to measure the battalion’s combat effectiveness and performance in

protecting civilians.” The U.N. report tells a different story. For example, it describes “a 14 year old boy… shot dead on 25

November 2012 in the village of Kalungu, Kalehe territory, by a soldier of the 391 Battalion. The boy was returning from the fields

when two soldiers tried to steal his goat. As he tried to resist and flee, one of the soldiers shot him.” Despite years of U.S. military

aid to the Democratic Republic of Congo, M23 has dealt its army heavy blows and, according to AFRICOM’s Rodriguez, is now

destabilizing the region. But they haven’t done it alone. According to Rodriguez, M23 “would not be the threat it is today without

external support including evidence of support from the Rwandan government.” For years, the U.S. aided Rwanda through various

programs, including the International Military Education and Training initiative and Foreign Military Financing. Last year, the U.S.

cut $200,000 in military assistance to Rwanda -- a signal of its disapproval of that government’s support for M23. Still, as AFRICOM’s

Rodriguez admitted to the Senate earlier this year, the U.S. continues to “support Rwanda’s participation in United Nations

peacekeeping missions in Africa.” After years of U.S. assistance, including support from Special Operations forces advisors, the

Central African Republic’s military was recently defeated and the country’s president ousted by another newly formed (non-Islamist)

rebel group known as Seleka. In short order, that country’s army chiefs pledged their allegiance to the leader of the coup, while

hostility on the part of the rebels forcedthe U.S. and its allies to suspend their hunt for Joseph Kony. A strategic partner

and bulwark of U.S. counterterrorism efforts, Kenya receives around $1 billion in U.S.

aid annually and elements of its military have been trained by U.S. Special Operations

forces. But last September, Foreign Policy ’s Jonathan Horowitz reported on

allegations of “Kenyan counterterrorism death squads... killing and disappearing

people.” Later, Human Rights Watch drew attention to the Kenyan military’s response

to a November attack by an unknown gunman that killed three soldiers in the

northern town of Garissa. The “Kenyan army surrounded the town, preventing anyone from leaving or entering, and

started attacking residents and traders,” the group reported. “The witnesses said that the military shot at

people, raped women, and assaulted anyone in sight.” Another longtime recipient of

U.S. support, the Ethiopian military, was also involved in abuses last year, following an

attack by gunmen on a commercial farm. In response, according to Human Rights Watch, members of

Ethiopia’s army raped, arbitrarily arrested, and assaulted local villagers. The Ugandan military has been the

primary U.S. proxy when it comes to policing Somalia. Its members were, however,

implicated in the beating and even killing of citizens during domestic unrest in 2011.

Burundi has also received significant U.S. military support and high-ranking officers in its army

have recently been linked to the illegal mineral trade, according to a report by the

environmental watchdog group Global Witness. Despite years of cooperation with the U.S. military,

Senegal now appears more vulnerable to extremism and increasingly unstable,according to a report by the Institute of Security

Studies. And so it goes across the continent.

AFRICOM bad - BlowbackAFRICOM destabilizes the Horn Fancher 12 [Mark, An attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union: Bad News for Africa: 3,000 More U.S. Soldiers are on the Way, http://www.globalresearch.ca/bad-news-for-africa-3000-more-u-s-soldiers-are-on-the-way]JMS

The United States plans to permanently station a U.S. Army brigade on African soil, beginning next year. Is this the start of something big – and ominous – or “only a benign creeping U.S. military presence in Africa?” “The obvious mission is to lock down the entire continent.” When President Obama deployed 100 U.S. troops to Uganda a year ago to conduct a mythical search for Joseph Kony, leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army, it is likely that many people shrugged. After all, how much damage could a mere 100 soldiers cause while wandering aimlessly through the bush purportedly in search of an accused terrorist? But as with the proverbial observer who can’t see the forest for the trees, a broader view reveals the deadly implications of what many incorrectly perceive as only a benign creeping U.S. military presence in Africa. Army Times news service reported that the U.S. is expected to deploy more than 3,000 soldiers to Africa in 2013. They will be assigned to every part of the continent. Major General David R. Hogg mused: “As far as our mission goes, it’s uncharted territory.” But the presence of U.S. soldiers in Africa is nothing new, and even though Hogg is

unwilling to admit it, the obvious mission is to lock down the entire continent . The U.S. military has at least a dozen

ongoing major operations in Africa that require hands-on involvement by U.S. troops. By

ensuring that U.S. troops will be found in every corner of Africa, there will be little risk that

any regions where U.S. interests are threatened will be left uncovered. For example, Mali has

oil reserves and is strategically located, but it has been destabilized by a growing secessionist

movement in the north. Conveniently, Mali has also been the site of a U.S. military exercise

called “Atlas Accord 12” which provided training to Mali’s military in aerial delivery. During

this year, there have been other operations in other parts of the continent that were

comparable in scale if not in substance. *“ Cutlass Express” was a U.S. naval exercise that focused

on what is purported to be “piracy” in the Somali Basin region. *“Africa Endeavor 2012” was

based in Cameroon and involved coordination and training in military communications.

*“Obangame Express 2012” was a naval exercise designed to ensure a presence in the Gulf of

Guinea, an area that is in the heart of West Africa’s oil operations. *“Southern Accord 12”

was based in Botswana and its objective was to establish a military working relationship

between southern African military forces and the U.S. *“Western Accord 2012” was an

exercise in Senegal that involved every type of military operation from live fire exercises to

intelligence gathering to combat marksmanship. There have been a number of other comparable exercises with

names like: “African Lion,” “Flintlock,” and “Phoenix Express.” In addition, U.S. National Guard units from around the country have been rotating in and out of countries that include, among others: South Africa, Morocco, Ghana, Tunisia, Nigeria and Liberia. Press statements issued by U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) suggest that these operations are as beneficial to Africa as they are to the United States. AFRICOM’s central message is that the U.S. and African militaries are partners in a war against terrorism and other forms of unrest. It is, however an error for any African country to swallow the notion that Africa and the U.S. are in some way interdependent. The true nature of the relationship was explained by A.M. Babu, a central figure in the formation of the country of

Tanzania. He said: “ The alleged ‘interdependence’ can only be of the kind in which we (Africans)

are permanently dependent on the West’s massive exploitation of our human and material

resources.” U.S. plans for exploitation are revealed by a Congressional Research Service

report made available by WikiLeaks. It says: “In spite of conflict in the Niger Delta and other

oil producing areas, the potential for deep water drilling in the Gulf of Guinea is high, and

analysts estimate that Africa may supply as much as 25 percent of all U.S. oil imports by

2015.” The document quotes a U.S. Defense Department official as saying: “…a key mission

for U.S. forces (in Africa) would be to ensure that Nigeria’s oil fields…are secure. ”

Consequently, the U.S. would be pleased if there were African military operations that target

militants who sabotage foreign oil operations in West Africa. At the same time, because of

plans for increased oil imports, the U.S. would vigorously oppose efforts by an African

military to exclude western companies from Niger Delta oil fields even though these

companies’ leaking pipelines have ruined countless acres of African farm land and fishing

waters . The true interests of Africa and the U.S. are in perpetual conflict and the relationships between the U.S. and African

countries must therefore be far from interdependent. Africans are well advised to react to the presence of U.S. soldiers in their

countries as they would to termites in their own homes. There might be no immediate observable harm, but over time the

structure will be irreparably damaged and may even collapse.

US caused Coups lead to state destabilizationAAPRP No Date [All African’s People Revolutionary Party:The Militarization of Africa, http://www.aaprp-intl.org/militarization_africa.html#.VbhHpLNViko

Why do coups happen? It’s easy to be misled. In his book, “Class Struggle in Africa,” Nkrumah noted that: “All manner of reasons have been given by bourgeois observers to explain the causes of the succession of coups which have taken place in Africa in recent years. In some cases, coups have been attributed to tribalism and regionalism. Others are said to have occurred because of the disgust of elements among the armed forces and police with the ineptitude and corruption of politicians and the ‘economic chaos’ they have caused. Not one of these explanations accords with the true facts.” Nkrumah goes on to provide an explanation that still

holds true. He said: “ At present, there is in Africa an intensification of struggles and conflicts

between imperialism and its class allies on the one hand, and the vast mass of the African

peoples on the other. Imperialist aggression has expressed itself not only in coups d’état, but

in the assassination of revolutionary leaders and the setting up of new intelligence

organizations.” Soldier Imperialist intelligence organizations have been known to coerce or

co-opt individuals in African militaries. These unwitting (or sometimes knowing) dupes have

accepted imperialist money, arms and advice and they have proceeded to dislodge African

leaders who have enjoyed the support of the masses. In the midst of the ensuing chaos,

imperialists set to work gaining and securing the country’s wealth. There is only one way to

maintain imperialism, and that is by force. From the 1961 torture and assassination of Patrice Lumumba of the

Congo to the violent overthrow and murder of Libya’s Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, the U.S. along with its western European

allies and the support of the United Nations have historically been heavily involved in coups in Africa. Coups are a

destabilizing force, usually sparked, financed and armed by external forces. These external

forces benefit from keeping Africa in a state of perpetual instability. When a government in

Africa falls to a coup, the civil institutions, the media, the constitutional government, the

judicial system, and the financial structure are all compromised if not destroyed. What

remains constant are numerous de facto, government-like structures from outside of Africa,

including the powerful multi-national corporations (especially in the oil and mining

industries); international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International

Monetary Fund (IMF); U.S. and European funded Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs);

and finally, the omnipresent U.S. military/NATO operations. To secure their dominance in the

region, the United States established U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), which joins,

CENTCOM in the Middle East, EUCOM in Europe, PACOM in the Pacific, and SOUTHCOM in

Latin America. AFRICOM does not exist to protect or assist Africa, it exists to dominate and

exploit Africa . Therefore, coup d'état will continue, under AFRICOM’s watchful eye and imperialism’s generous bankroll.

Soldier All foreign military bases, armies and mercenaries must be purged from Africa, and the people must be allowed to provide solutions to Africa’s civil conflicts. Africa must vigorously reject AFRICOM. The presence of foreign troops on African soil threatens Africans’ sovereignty and independence. The end of war in Africa will decrease violence against women and children who suffer the most from civil conflicts, through, displacement, kidnapping, and forced labor and rape. The end of military conflict in Africa will free

up resources for fighting hunger, disease, and illiteracy . The end of military conflicts in Africa will allow

uninterrupted economic development and a new era without external interference. It will

diminish the cycle of dependency, allowing Africa to solve its own problems.

Proxy Wars put on by the US have purposefully set nations into turmoil and chaos MUHAMMAD 13 [Jehron, Writer for the Final Call who focuses on Africa and U.S relations: U.S. Gov't Destabilizing Africa through AFRICOM, http://www.finalcall.com/artman/publish/World_News_3/article_100866.shtml] JMS

Thanks to the U.S. and its proxy-led interventions, instability in North Africa and the Middle

East has spread to the African continent . Violence, including the longstanding conflict (you might remember “Black

Hawk Down”) in Somalia has spread to include Ethiopia, Uganda and most recent victim Kenya. While global concern

focuses on poison gas attacks in Syria, Iran’s alleged creation of nuclear weapons, and the

coup of the first democratically- elected Egyptian president, “Libya has plunged unnoticed

into its worst political and economic crisis since the defeat of Gadhafi two years ago,”

according to The Independent, a UK based newspaper. Not only have militias taken over the

Libyan countryside and Libyan crude output gone down to a trickle, The Independent

reported, “government authority is disintegrating in all parts of the country putting in doubt

claims by American, British and French politicians that NATO’s military action in Libya in 2011

was an outstanding example of a successful foreign military intervention, which should be

repeated in Syria.” Caught off guard by America’s regime change initiative in Libya and

instability it caused in places like Mali, the continent-wide African Union has yet to confront

the growing footprint of AFRICOM, the U.S. Africa Command . Why? It may have to do with AFRICOM’s

ability to hide the real purpose of its presence in Africa. According to TomDispatch.com, America’s military command

“has been slipping, sneaking, creeping into Africa, deploying ever more facilities in ever more

countries—and in a fashion so quiet, so covert, that just about no American (and African for

that matter) has any idea this is going on .” It could also be that the AU voice is muzzled since external donors (U.S.

and European) funded African Union program costs in 2013 to the tune of $155.3 million or 56 percent of the total AU budget. The AU member states, according to Pambazuka.org, fund mostly operational costs, $122.8 million or 44 percent of the budget. Of this only $5.3 million “goes toward programs of the AU while 96 percent goes to operational costs,” said authors Janah Ncube and Achieng Maureen Akena. Outgoing AU chairman Dr. Ping, during his last address to the executive council in 2012, said the AU has “little legitimacy in claiming marginalization in global politics when it is unable to be self-sustaining and depends on donors to

support its programs,” reported Pambazuka. Col. Muamar Gadhafi ‘The late President Gadhafi utilized

Libya’s oil wealth to block the spread of AFRICOM. With no deterrent equal to Gadhafi , the

increased instability on the continent will continue.’ With the winding down of U.S.

involvement in Afghanistan, ending the war in Iraq, and President Obama’s visit to Asia

suggesting a rebalancing of U.S. military resources, AFRICOM’s increasing military presence,

“out of the public earshot,” suggests “Africa is the battlefield of tomorrow, today ,” wrote

TomDispatch’s managing editor Nick Turse. The increasing instability that is in the Middle East and North Africa is destined to plague the continent. The African Union, this author feels, should raise its voice wherever U.S. and European forces or proxies have intervened militarily. The interventions are deepening problems in nations and regions, creating refugees, increasing militia groups

and creating more areas awash in weapons . In the post 9/11 era and in the wake of U.S. “stability”

operations in Africa which only accelerated during the Obama years, “militancy has spread,

insurgent groups have proliferated, allies have faltered or committed abuses, terrorism has

increased, the number of failed states has risen, and the continent has become more

unsettled ,” wrote Turse. The recent massacre in a Kenyan suburb, inside an upscale shopping mall in Nairobi’s affluent

Westlands area, is a case in point. Hooded gunmen claiming to be members of Al-Shaabab took responsibility for the attack in retaliation for Kenya’s role in the war against militants in Somalia. At least 72 people were killed. The Somali group Al-Shaabab, according to news reports, “vowed in late 2011 to carry out a large-scale attack in Nairobi in retaliation for Kenya’s sending of troops into Somalia to fight” Islamic insurgents. AMISOM, the U.S. and European funded African Union Mission in Somalia, is to a large extent responsible for Kenya’s search and destroy incursions inside Somalia. AMISOM has also used Ugandan troops. In 2010 over 60 persons, in three different suicide bomb attacks, were killed while watching the World Cup in Uganda. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility. Yusef Sheikh Issa, an Al Shabaab commander in Somalia told the Associated Press, “Uganda is one of our enemies. Whatever makes them cry, makes us happy.” If one looks deeply into what brought about the rise of Al-Shabaab you discover a U.S.-supported invasion by Ethiopia. Ethiopia—following in the footsteps of the U.S.-sponsored Joint Operations Command that included the CIA—invaded Somalia under the cover of hunting for persons responsible for the bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. This invasion was the final nail in the coffin of the Islamic Courts Union, which was responsible for the closest Somalia has come to a stable government in recent history. If a picture is worth a thousand words, what’s a map worth? Take the one created by TomDispatch that documents U.S. military outposts, construction, security cooperation, and deployments in Africa. “It looks,” according to Turse, “like a field of mushrooms after a monsoon.” U.S. current military involvement is found in “no fewer than 49 African nations,” he said. President George W. Bush announced in 2007, the establishment of AFRICOM, a unified command for U.S. military forces in Africa. He said AFRICOM was being launched for purely peaceful reasons. “Military aid and questionable trade”

have always been the “the twin pillars” of America’s involvement in Africa. “ Imperial acquisition (or the acquisition

of natural resources),” according to Crossedcrocodiles.com, “masquerades as humanitarian

aid and manifests as the militarization of the continent through the U.S. Africa Command,

AFRICOM.” The late President Gadhafi utilized Libya’s oil wealth to block the spread of

AFRICOM. With no deterrent equal to Gadhafi , the increased instability on the continent will

continue.

Empirics prove that AFRICOM and US military presence in the Greater Horn causes instability Turse 14 [ Nick Turse is the managing editor of TomDispatch.com and a fellow at The Nation Institute. A 2014 Izzy Award winner, he has reported from the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Africa, and his pieces have appeared in The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, The Nation and regularly at TomDispatch. Turse's New York Times bestseller Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam received a 2014 American Book Award: America’s other foreign policy disaster: Why blowback in Africa is all but inevitable, http://www.salon.com/2014/11/23/americas_other_foreign_policy_disaster_why_were_headed_for_more_blowback_in_africa_partner/] JMS

In recent years, the U.S. military has been involved in a continual process of expanding its

presence in Africa . Out of public earshot, officials have talkedabout setting up a string of small

bases across the northern tier of the continent. Indeed, over the last years, U.S. staging areas,

mini-bases, and outposts have popped up in the contiguous nations of Senegal, Mali, Burkina

Faso, Niger, and, skipping Chad, in the Central African Republic, followed by South Sudan,

Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. A staunch American ally with a frequent and perhaps enduring American troop presence, Chad seems like the natural spot for still another military compound — the only missing link in a long chain of countries stretching from west to east, from one edge of the continent to the other — even if AFRICOM continues to insist that there’s no American “base” in the works. Even without a base, the United States has for more than a

decade poured copious amounts of money, time, and effort into making Chad a stable

regional counterterrorism partner , sending troops there, training and equipping its army, counseling its military leaders, providing tens of millions of dollars in aid, funding its military expeditions, supplying its army with equipment ranging from tents to trucks, donating additional equipment for its domestic security forces, providing a surveillance and security system for its border security agents, and looking the other way when its military employedchild soldiers. The

results ? A flight from the fight in Mali, a massacre in the Central African Republic, hundreds

of schoolgirls still in the clutches of Boko Haram, and a U.S. alliance with a regime whose

“most significant human rights problems,”according to the most recent country report by the

State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “were security force

abuse, including torture; harsh prison conditions; and discrimination and violence against

women and children,” not to mention the restriction of freedom of speech, press, assembly,

and movement, as well as arbitrary arrest and detention, denial of fair public trial, executive

influence on the judiciary, property seizures, child labor and forced labor (that also includes

children) , among other abuses. Amnesty International further found that human rights violations “are committed with almost total impunity by members of the Chadian military, the Presidential Guard, and the state intelligence bureau, the Agence Nationale de Securité.” With Chad, the United States finds itself more deeply involved with yet another authoritarian government and another atrocity-prone proxy force. In this, it continues a long series of

mistakes, missteps, and mishaps across Africa. These include an intervention in Libya that

transformed the country from an autocracy into a near-failed state, training efforts that

produced coup leaders in Mali and Burkina Faso, American nation-building that led to a failed

state in South Sudan, anti-piracy measures that flopped in the Gulf of Guinea, the many

fiascos of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, the training of an elite Congolese

unit that committed mass rapes and other atrocities, problem-plagued humanitarian efforts

in Djibouti and Ethiopia, and the steady rise of terror groups in U.S.-backed countries like

Nigeria andTunisia. In other words, in its shadowy “pivot” to Africa, the U.S. military has compiled a record remarkably low on successes and high on blowback. Is it time to add Chad to this growing list?

Whether the coup succeeds or not, US objectives are met when African Nations fall into turmoil, securing US military presence Turse 14 [Nick, Nick Turse is the managing editor of TomDispatch.com and a fellow at The Nation Institute. A 2014 Izzy Award winner, he has reported from the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Africa, and his pieces have appeared in The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, The Nation and regularly at TomDispatch. Turse's New York Times bestseller Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam received a 2014 American Book Award: America’s Proxy Wars in Africa Almost every move Washington has made in the region has helped spread conflict and chaos, while contributing to African destabilization, http://www.thenation.com/article/americas-proxy-wars-africa/]JMS

Lion Forward Teams? Echo Casemate? Juniper Micron? You could be forgiven if this jumble of words looks like nonsense to you. It isn’t. It’s the language of the US military’s simmering African interventions; the patois that goes with a set of missions carried out in countries most Americans couldn’t locate on a map; the argot of conflicts now primarily fought by proxies and a former colonial power on a continent that the US military views as a hotbed of instability and that hawkish pundits increasingly see as a growth area for future armed interventions. Since 9/11, the US military has been making inroads in Africa, building alliances, facilities and a sophisticated logistics network. Despite repeated assurances by US Africa Command (AFRICOM) that military activities on the continent were minuscule, a 2013 investigation by TomDispatch exposed surprisingly large and expanding US operations—including

recent military involvement with no fewer than forty-nine of the fifty-four nations on the continent . Washington’s goal

continues to be building these nations into stable partners with robust, capable militaries, as

well as creating regional bulwarks favorable to its strategic interests in Africa. Yet over the

last years, the results have often confounded the planning—with American operations

serving as a catalyst for blowback (to use a term of CIA tradecraft). A US-backed uprising in

Libya, for instance, helped spawn hundreds of militias that have increasingly caused chaos in

that country, leading to repeated attacks on Western interests and the killing of the US

ambassador and three other Americans. Tunisia has become ever more destabilized,

according to a top US commander in the region. Kenya and Algeria were hit by spectacular,

large-scale terrorist attacks that left Americans dead or wounded. South Sudan, a fledgling

nation Washington recently midwifed into being that has been slipping into civil war, now

has more than 870,000 displaced persons, is facing an imminent hunger crisis, and has

recently been the site of mass atrocities, including rapes and killings. Meanwhile, the US-

backed military of Mali was repeatedly defeated by insurgent forces after managing to

overthrow the elected government, and the US-supported forces of the Central African

Republic (CAR) failed to stop a ragtag rebel group from ousting the president . IT’S NOT A NUCLEAR-

ARMED IRAN THAT ISRAEL AND SAUDI ARABIA REALLY FEAR In an effort to staunch the bleeding in those two countries, the United States has been developing a back-to-the-future military policy in Africa—making common cause with one of the continent’s former European colonial powers in a set of wars that seem to be spreading, not staunching violence and instability in the region. The French Connection After establishing a trading post in present-day Senegal in 1659, France gradually undertook a conquest of West Africa that, by the early twentieth century, left it with a vast colonial domain encompassing present-day Burkina Faso, Benin, Chad, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger and Senegal, among other places. In the process, the French used Foreign Legionnaires from Algeria, Goumiers from Morocco and Tirailleurs from Senegal, among other African troops, to bolster its ranks. Today, the United States is pioneering a twenty-first-century brand of expeditionary warfare that involves backing both France and the armies of its former colonial charges as Washington tries to accomplish its policy aims in Africa with a limited expenditure of blood and treasure. In a recent op-ed for The Washington Post, President Barack Obama and French President François Hollande outlined their efforts in glowing terms: In Mali, French and African Union forces—with US logistical and information support—have pushed back al-Qaeda-linked insurgents, allowing the people of Mali to pursue a democratic future. Across the Sahel, we are partnering with countries to prevent al-Qaeda from gaining new footholds. In the Central African Republic, French and African Union soldiers—backed by American airlift and support—are working to stem violence and create space for dialogue, reconciliation, and swift progress to transitional elections. Missing from their joint piece, however, was any hint of the Western failures that helped facilitate the debacles in Mali and the Central African Republic, the continued crises plaguing those nations, or the potential for mission creep,

unintended consequences and future blowback from this new brand of coalition warfare. The US military, for its part,

isn’t saying much about current efforts in these two African nations, but official documents

obtained by TomDispatch through the Freedom of Information Act offer telling details, while

experts are sounding alarms about the ways in which these military interventions have

already fallen short or failed . Operation Juniper Micron After 9/11, through programs like the Pan-Sahel Initiative and

the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership, the United States has pumped hundreds of millions of

dollars into training and arming the militaries of Mali, Niger, Chad, Mauritania, Nigeria,

Senegal, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia in order to promote “stability.” In 2013, Captain J.

Dane Thorleifson, the outgoing commander of an elite, quick-response force known as Naval

Special Warfare Unit 10, described such efforts as training “proxy” forces in order to build

“critical host nation security capacity; enabling, advising, and assisting our African CT

[counterterror] partner forces so they can swiftly counter and destroy al-Shabab, AQIM [Al

Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb], and Boko Haram.” In other words, the US military is in the

business of training African armies as the primary tactical forces combatting local Islamic

militant groups. The first returns on Washington’s new and developing form of “light

footprint” warfare in Africa have hardly been stellar. After US and French forces helped to

topple Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, neighboring Mali went from bulwark to

basket case. Nomadic Tuareg fighters looted the weapons stores of the Gaddafi regime they

had previously served, crossed the border and began taking over northern Mali. This, in turn,

prompted a US-trained officer—a product of the Pan-Sahel Initiative—to stage a military

coup in the Malian capital, Bamako, and oust the democratically elected president of that

country. Soon after, the Tuareg rebels were muscled aside by heavily-armed Islamist rebels

from the homegrown Ansar al-Dine movement as well as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,

Libya’s Ansar al-Shariah and Nigeria’s Boko Haram, who instituted a harsh brand of Shariah

law, creating a humanitarian crisis that caused widespread suffering and sent refugees

streaming from their homes ..

U.S. involvement is bad for multilateral ventures, destabilizes the region itself, and provides the impetus for future conflict. Howard, Business Day, 2009 [Anthony, Business Day (South Africa) August 12, 2009 “Yankees go home” SECTION: OPINION & EDITORIAL, Lexis, 7/15/15, ECD II]

Hillary Clinton's visit to SA has put US foreign policy in the spotlight once more. Despite a lot of messages of hope from US President Barack Obama, there has been little change in US military action in major theatres of war. The Americans' overt and covert involvement in the Horn of Africa and the presence of Africom in Djibouti continue to destabilise the region, with no commitment evident to withdraw their troops from Ethiopia. And yet Ms Clinton would like to tell the Kenyan and South African governments how to run their affairs and lobby for military support in the Somali conflict. The African Union (AU) has already told the US to withdraw its troops from Africa, but to date they continue to covertly support conflict, on a continent where they have a very bad track record in military terms. And now the US secretary of state attempts to justify the establishment of US military bases on African soil. Any development of this nature has to be opposed by the AU at all costs. America's only interest in the African continent is the control of oil supplies, hence their involvement in the Sudan. No US president has visited any African country in the past 10 years that was not an oil or gas producer and supplier. The role of the US government and the CIA in the Angolan, Congolese and Somali wars has wreaked untold havoc on the lives of millions of African civilians. And yet the US continues to pursue with force its disastrous policies on a continent where it has no business or mandate from the United Nations to be at all. Since the US has proven itself to be a morally bankrupt nation with its illegal wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, perhaps it should think seriously about getting its own house in order, before prescribing to African countries and lobbying support for their indefensible wars of aggression. The message of our government to Ms Clinton should be: "Yanks go home and take your troops with you."

AFRICOM bad - USAID USAID is the best program for development aid in the Horn; only militarism prevents its successKnopf 12 (Kate Almquist, formervisiting policy fellow at the Center for Global Development, “Africa Doesn't Need the Pentagon's Charity - Why I'm Grumpy About DOD's Development Programs in Africa,” Center for Global Development: Ideas to Action, 8/28/12, http://www.cgdev.org/blog/africa-doesnt-need-pentagons-charity-why-im-grumpy-about-dods-development-programs-africa) BR

What I found irksome about the discussion at the time AFRICOM stood up--and I still find irksome today--is the suggestion that USAID's initial grumpiness at spending staff time and program resources to help AFRICOM do work that it had minimal resources and no competency or experience to do was somehow a sign of being unreasonable, short-sighted, and turf conscious. The real root of

this grumpiness came from understanding that "development is more than improvements in people's well-being: it also describes the capacity of the system to provide the circumstances for that well-being," to borrow some words from my colleague, Owen Barder. Development is not simply providing an input (digging a well or handing out used clothes) that improves a person's well-being for only as long as the assistance is provided. Yet there is still little evidence that the Defense Department grasps that development is more than temporary fixes, much less that it understands how security and development intersect in specific situations. Introducing any resource into a resource-scarce environment is an inherently political act, affecting the haves and have-nots. The non-security sector programs DOD conducts are largely ad hoc and without regard for a broader development strategy or plan to support lasting change. In fact, they are explicitly intended to increase the visibility, access, and influence of DOD above all else. While USAID is not

a perfect agency when it comes to fostering development around the world, it is a serious professional institution with more than 50 years of development experience, lessons learned, expert staff, resources, and credibility with the peoples and governments where it works. In Africa, security is a pre-requisite for development; AFRICOM's role in helping to professionalize African militaries is vitally important to achieving US governance and

development objectives there. DOD and USAID should be informed of the other's priorities and coordinate strategies and efforts where it makes sense; some organizational integration can help this. But that does not mean either should attempt to do the other's job. Development done badly is not only a waste of taxpayer resources; it's harmful to the societies we're trying to assist and detrimental to the rest of the US government's development efforts--and, by extension, to our broader national interests. If development progress in Africa is important to our national security, then it's too important to leave it in the hands of newcomers without the

knowledge, expertise, mandate, or resources to help promote it effectively . If that's what whole-of-

government means, then we should expect outcomes that fall far short of our goals.

AFRICOM and USAID butting heads makes crisis response & conflict prevention ineffectiveAnderson 14 (G. Wiliam, Visiting Professor of Practice at Virginia Tech, USAID Representative to the European Union, and former USAID Senior Foreign Service Officer, “Bridging the Divide: How Can USAID and DoD Integrate Security and Development More Effectively in Africa?” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs Vol.38:1 Winter 2014 p. 101-126, http://www.fletcherforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/38-1_Anderson1.pdf) BR

Given the potential, the level of effective cooperation between USAID and DoD at the regional level (through AFRICOM) and at country levels is surprisingly limited. Most effective DoD/USAID collaboration occurs in specific areas like disaster and pandemic preparedness and HIV/AIDS prevention. Outside of these specific areas, none of the characteristics of effective USAID/DoD

collaboration discussed in the preceding section are present to any significant degree. The causes of this minimal cooperation are both general and specific. As former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote, “in general, the United States’ interagency tool kit is still a hodgepodge of jury-rigged arrangements constrained by a dated and complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources, and unwieldy processes.”16 Although the 2010 National Security Strategy emphasizes the “integration of skills and capabilities

within our military and civilian institutions, so they complement each other and operate seamlessly,” multiple obstacles and perceived risks have impeded DoD/USAID collaboration in Africa.17 Although both DoD and USAID

plan at multiple levels—global, regional, and country—little coordinated or joint planning takes place. Minimal mutual understanding of each other’s programs and operations exists, and differences in language, style, and culture complicate communication. Senior leaders in both agencies have failed to emphasize the necessity of expanded cooperation or to change agency incentive structures to reward such efforts or interagency assignments. In several African countries, no long term DoD security cooperation, staff exist to maintain effective

working relationships with their USAID counterparts. The government has moved slower than glacially to shift its emphasis from crisis response to conflict prevention, in which USAID and State Department have clear comparative advantages. Further, the continuing lack of experienced personnel in USAID and other civilian

foreign affairs agencies since the end of the Cold War hampers expanded cooperation. Finally, perceived risks of closer DoD/USAID cooperation, such as apprehension by the NGO and wider development communities that DoD will take over a greater share of U.S. foreign assistance, limit efforts to work together in both strategic and more practical ways.

AFRICOM was basically designed to get in USAID’s way - DoD wouldn’t let USAID furbish a hospital bc of bureaucracyAnderson 14 (G. Wiliam, Visiting Professor of Practice at Virginia Tech, USAID Representative to the European Union, and former USAID Senior Foreign Service Officer, “Bridging the Divide: How Can USAID and DoD Integrate Security and Development More Effectively in Africa?” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs Vol.38:1 Winter 2014 p. 101-126, http://www.fletcherforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/38-1_Anderson1.pdf) BR

Difficulties reported by USAID officers in the field refer primarily to DoD’s ponderous bureaucracy and to challenges with community-level projects funded under DoD’s Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP). The huge difference in scale between DoD’s $100,000 to $200,000 village projects versus USAID’s national health or education programs totaling tens of millions of dollars raises questions about the

usefulness of working with DoD community project teams. Often, OSC civil affairs teams developing a community project rotate with little notice and fail to brief the incoming DoD team who takes over. One senior USAID officer described a ribbon-cutting ceremony for an intensive care unit (ICU) in a major city refurbished by DoD. Because the USAID health staff in-country had not been engaged in project planning, the ICU was completely empty with no medical equipment, supplies or personnel. It thus amounted to an embarrassing, unsustainable white elephant in a major urban hospital.18

AFRICOM doesn’t solve conflictsAFRICOM’s lack of understanding of socio-cultural norms in the region leads to military coups and regime collapse – Mali provesTurse ’13 [Nick, winner of a 2009 Ridenhour Prize for Reportorial Distinction as well as a James Aronson Award for Social Justice Journalism, “The US Military and the Unraveling of Africa,” Mother Jones, June 18 2013, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/06/africom-africa-unstable-us?page=2]QL

As the US-backed war in Libya was taking down Qaddafi, nomadic Tuareg fighters in his service looted the regime's extensive weapons caches, crossed the border into their native Mali, and began to take over the northern part of that country. Anger within the country's armed forces over the democratically elected government's ineffective response to the rebellion resulted in a military coup. It was led by Amadou Sanogo, an officer who had received extensive training in the US between 2004 and 2010 as part of the Pan-Sahel Initiative. Having overthrown Malian democracy, he and his fellow officers proved even less effective in dealing with events in the north. With the country in turmoil, the Tuareg

fighters declared an independent state. Soon, however, heavily-armed Islamist rebels from homegrown Ansar al-Dine as well as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Libya's Ansar al-Sharia, and Nigeria's Boko Haram, among others, pushed out the Tuaregs, took over much of the north, instituted a harsh brand of Shariah law, and created a humanitarian crisis that caused widespread suffering, sending refugees streaming from their homes. These developments raised serious questions about the

efficacy of US counterterrorism efforts. "This spectacular failure reveals that the US probably underestimated the complex socio-cultural peculiarities of the region, and misread the realities of the terrain ,"

Berny Sèbe, an expert on North and West Africa at the University of Birmingham in the United Kingdom, told me. "This led them to being grossly manipulated by local interests over which they had, in the end, very limited control."

Africom is no help they’re too big, ill equipped, untrained and not motivated to finish the job properly Felbab-Brown is Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institution, 15 [Vanda, June 23, 2015 “Saving Somalia (again) and How Reconstruction Stalled—And What to do About It” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/somalia/2015-06-23/saving-somalia-again , 7/15/15, ECD II]

On the other side of the fighting, AMISOM nominally numbers 22,000 soldiers from Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. It could and should be much more efficient in its fight against al Shabab. But it is not clear how many soldiers are actually on the ground at any one point. The capacity and training of the AMISOM deployments varies widely across the countries. Some of the forces, such as those from Burundi, do not speak English and have little training overall. Many of these militaries were built during their country’s own political revolutions and have had little deployment or battle experience since. Very few of the deployed troops have had any counterinsurgency training and they lack logistics, medevac, and intelligence and reconnaissance support. AMISOM was to be equipped with ten helicopters, with Uganda promising to provide four and the other United Nations member states the rest. Three,

however, crashed into Mt. Kenya as they were flying from Uganda to Somalia, and Uganda is now in dispute with the international community over who will pay for the destroyed aircraft. Moreover, the original expectation that a United Nations force would eventually replace AMISOM has long since died. Nor do the AMISOM forces necessarily want to get out of Somalia (or fully defeat al Shabab): The international funding they receive for their effort makes for good living for their soldiers and a substantial financial boost for their military institutions. Moreover, their presence in Somalia allows them to pursue their regional interests and enhance their importance with the broader international community.

AMISOM has weak headquarters to which few member countries pass on any information, let alone intelligence, or bother to coordinate. Some AMISOM commanders maintain highly personalized and sometimes outright subversive agendas: There are credible rumors that AMISOM units have sold fuel and arms to al Shabab or looted humanitarian convoys.

Disorganization lack of training and divisive identities devestates Africom’s effectiveness- especially at establishing security- and foreigners aren’t welcome Felbab-Brown is Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institution, 15 [Vanda, June 23, 2015 “Saving Somalia (again) and How Reconstruction Stalled—And What to do About It” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/somalia/2015-06-23/saving-somalia-again , 7/15/15, ECD II]

The fact that AMISOM is organized into five sectors operated mostly by one of the AMISOM member countries does not help with coordination and planning. The division of the sectors reflects the strategic interests of the intervening forces. Kenya and Ethiopia, although they have suspended some of their mutual rivalries, still mostly cultivate proxies in their sectors to create buffer areas, prevent the leakage of terrorism into their countries, disrupt support for separatists within their own countries, and project land and sea power. Offensive operations are decided mostly on a sector basis, with the forces in each area reporting and taking orders from their own capitals. Whether captured weapons are handed over to Somali forces varies by sector. So does how al Shabab terrorists are dealt with. There is little coordination among the sectors and little planning at AMISOM headquarters; in fact, they are generally only interested in working together when headquarters has something to offer to them, such as logistical support via the United Nations. Not surprisingly, it has been hard for AMISOM to hold and build a “cleared” territory. At first, AMISOM forces exhibited little interest in providing any governance functions or even conducting stabilization operations, such as repairing bridges or providing clean water systems. They expected the Somali security forces and government to do so. But Somalia hasn’t been able to because local governance structures are frequently destroyed, blocked off by al Shabab, dominated by problematic powerbrokers, or lack resources. And so AMISOM has come under pressure from the United States and the international community to take over these stabilization functions.

Pushing AMISOM into stabilization operations is a difficult call. On the one hand, it should be the responsibility of the local and national government to administer its territory, and the credit for doing so should accrue to the Somali government, not to foreign forces. On the

other hand, local communities are frustrated by the lack of security and services after AMISOM clears a territory. In either case, it isn’t clear that AMISOM militaries could do much better at governance, since they, too, lack resources and training. And the political sensitivities abound. Somalis do not see themselves as African, but rather as Arab; and al Shabab can easily label Burundi, Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia as Christian invaders. Although Somalis are deeply divided along scores of clan divisions, they also identify as nationalists, opposing foreign intervention.

AFRICOM Destabalizes Region

US military intervention spills over to regional destabilizationAAPRP No Date [All African’s People Revolutionary Party: Imperialism Uses Coups to Rob and Destabilize Africa,http://www.aaprp-intl.org/coup_d_etats.html#.Vbj75bNViko]JMS

A coup d’état (or “coup”) is an effort to seize political power. Kwame Nkrumah explained that coups often occur when “…imperialism and its internal allies, being unable to defeat the socialist revolution by traditional methods, have resorted to the use of arms.” In the case of Guinea Bissau, plotters targeted the African Party of Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) and sought to prevent run-off special presidential elections that were scheduled for April 29, 2012. In response, Guinea Bissau’s trade unions, women’s organizations, youth organizations and social organizations defied the military’s orders to terminate all strikes and public and private radio broadcasts. The people persisted with strikes and took to the airwaves and the streets in mass

demonstrations. Even though the people’s struggle against the coup has been unrelenting, unfortunately, with the

assistance of U.S. imperialism and neo-colonial forces in Africa, the coup leaders have not

only maintained their control, but they have also carried out a campaign of repression

against the democratically-elected leadership of the PAIGC and the party’s supporters,

friends and allies. The Impact The effects of a coup like this one are far-reaching. In Guinea

Bissau itself, the democratic process has been interrupted, and in the absence of a peaceful,

orderly, government transition, there is both tremendous uncertainty and a destabilization of

civil society . In the wake of a coup, neighboring countries also become very nervous because

of concerns that protracted instability will result in a flood of refugees and cross-border

armed conflicts that will in turn wreak havoc throughout the region. The impact of a coup is

not limited to the country and the region where it occurs. The entire African continent

suffers . In an effort to make Africa autonomous and powerful, there is an ongoing struggle to integrate the continent’s political

structures and economies. This can only happen when there is mass democratic engagement in the continent’s governance. A

coup is inherently undemocratic, and when one occurs it becomes a crippling infection that

stifles Africa’s healthy political development. A coup can also cause unnecessary economic

devastation. The far-reaching impact of a coup can also be seen in Mali where a military

takeover not only triggered chaos in the country’s northern regions but also the Economic

Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the governments of neighboring Algeria

and Mauritania expressed worries about regional destabilization . Just weeks before Mali’s national

elections, military personnel announced their control of the country over state television. Fighting broke out in the capital, Bamako, and several governmental ministers were arrested along with the country's president, Amadou Toumani Toure. In the meantime, rebel soldiers loyal to the coup leaders, wasted no time in looting the capital.

Fractured external interference threatens Peacemaking in the Greater HornNdiku 15 , [Kisuke is based at PRECISE, a regional agency involved in organizational development, strategic management of change, leadership development and planning in Africa. "What is inhibiting peace in the Greater Horn of Africa?," TransConflict,

http://www.transconflict.com/2015/07/what-is-inhibiting-peace-in-the-greater-horn-of-africa-107/] SC

“the problem is that peacemaking has become highly commercialized in our locality, just like the conflicts. The government, NGOs and foreigners (meaning local external persons

including non citizens as well), and also some of our own local respected people come to us with few short-term activity projects that only focus spending money for peace and this spoils our peace. But if they leave us alone, we can deal with this (conflict) and there will be peace you will see but they don’t want to leave until their money is finished!” (Council Elder speaking to author in an interview Mandera County, 2013). This was very instructive in that it underscores what undermines peacemaking in the Greater Horn of Africa. It is local steps towards peace that would assure sustainable peace (Thich Nhat Hanh, 1991), and it is local peace that shall ensure a strengthened culture of peace based on definitive knowledge, values, beliefs, attitudes, behaviours and choices (Adams D. (2000) pg.

1). The diversity of root causes of conflict in the Greater Horn of Africa is widely reported on.

What seems not to have been fully-explored, however, are the key factors inhibiting peace in communities in the region, which can be clustered into several inter-related categories. A central factor is an over-emphasis on community diversities, its manipulation and exploitation by incumbent leaders, external peace dealers (e.g. law enforcement agencies as outsiders to a community setting), and compromised internal peace makers (UNDP (2011) Draft Discussion

Paper pg. 3-5; 8-9;15-17). Interactive peace dialogues and the real peace makers are hindered from creating socio-environmental contexts capable of fostering resilient means for sustainable peace. The result has been fractured local relations due to externally-structured peace processes that ignore local wisdom and techniques. This seems to have

contributed to the inappropriate use of proper means for peacemaking t hat negate the functions and roles of the most-affected persons to address the real issues towards forgiveness, healing and restorative justice. The

continued existence of unresolved historical injustices – beginning with pre- and post-colonial factors related to land, politics and inadequate access to justice – has been persistently raised by community groups. Closely-linked to this is institutional and policy marginalization, where the state deliberately ignores or withdraws the delivery of services to particular communities and locations, fueling discontent. Socio-politically exclusive dimensions, meanwhile, hinder inclusive representation by gender and marginalized groups (indigenous minorities, youth, women, ethnic, etc) (ACHPR & IWGIA, (2012) pg 37- ff & pg. 50 also UNDRIP RA #8371). Dispossession of land and local productive assets materialises through exclusive acquisition of land by governments, extractive-based conglomerates, multinational corporations, private sector entities, wealthy individuals and

politicians. Vested interests of external governments – operating through formal and informal structures – from time-to-time enforce regimes that favour instability to create opportunities for the exploitation of natural resources. The impact of economic projects on communities and the local environment – whether for infrastructure,

reforestation or other public goods – have caused communities to lose their productive resources, leading to deeper levels poverty. Radicalization and easy access to arms (cultural, political or sectarian),

meanwhile, has become a significant threat (Ncube & Jones, (2013). Africa Economic Brief Vol. 4, Issue 5, pg. 4-5 ). The fact that strategies of externally-supported peace actions tend to have inadequate local links and often lack legitimate institutional foundations meant such efforts had a short-term impact. The short-term nature and narrowness of externally-supported peace initiatives carry the hallmarks of shallow ownership and limited scope to deal with peace needs and priorities, ultimately leaving the local context in a vacuum.

AFRICOM’s intervention leads to regime collapse – Mali proves.Lando 13 [Barry, Writer for LA Times, “Mali -- A Double Tale of Unintended Consequences,” Huffington Post, January 15, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/barry-lando/malita-double-tale-of-uni_b_2481132.html]QL

With hundreds of French troops in Mali and hundreds more headed that way, the U.S., among other countries, has also pledged some limited support: intelligence, communication, logistics, unarmed drones. But Washington obviously would like to keep a low profile. The U.S. in fact, had been militating against just such a move, fearing that another Western intervention in an Arab land would provide another ideal recruiting target for erstwhile jihadis

across the Muslim world, not to mention provoking a spate of terrorist attacks in Europe. In fact, though, it turns out that the U.S. has already played a disastrous role in the crisis. It's a devastating lesson of plans gone awry, another dreary footnote to the law

of unintended consequences. According to an excellent New York Times account, for the past several years the United States has spent more than half a billion dollars in West Africa to counter the threat of radical Islam, America's "most

ambitious counterterrorism program ever across these vast, turbulent stretches of the Sahara." The aim of the program was that, rather than rely on the U.S. and its allies to combat Islamic terrorism in the region, the United States would train African troops to deal with the threat themselves. To that end, for five years U.S. Special Forces trained Malian troops in a host of vital combat and counterterrorism skills. The outcome was considered by the Pentagon to be exemplary That is, until the training program ran into another unintended consequence -- of the French-led intervention in Libya.

After the fall of Gaddafi, droves of battle-hardened, well-armed Islamic fighters and Tuareg tribesmen, who had been fighting in Libya, swarmed into Northern Mali. Joined by other more radical Islamist forces, some linked to al Qaeda, they had no trouble defeating the Malian army. Why? Because of the defection to the rebels of several key Malian officers, who had been trained by the Americans. Turns out that those

officers, who were supposed to battle the rebels, were ethnic Tuaregs, the same nomads who were part of the rebellion. According to the Times, at the height of the battle the Tuareg commanders of three of the four Malian units in the north decided to change sides and join the insurrection, taking weapons, valuable equipment and their American training with them. They were also followed by 1,600 additional army defectors, demolishing the government's hope of resisting the rebel attack. In other words, it's very likely that the French and their allies-to-come in Mali will be battling rebel troops trained by the U.S. Special Forces. Caught totally by surprise by the whole ghastly mess, the American officials involved with the training

program were reportedly flabbergasted. There are obvious questions: How was it possible for the Special Forces and their Pentagon bosses and the CIA to have had such a total lack of understanding of the Malian officers they'd trained and the country they'd been operating in for over five years? But you could ask that same question about U.S. military actions in any number of countries over the past few decades, from Lebanon to Iraq to Afghanistan, where the most apt comparison might be to releasing elephants into a porcelain shop. Which leads to a more fundamental question: how is the U.S. to avoid similar catastrophic mistakes down the road in Africa? The Pentagon has recently announced that some 3,000 troops, no longer needed in Afghanistan, have been reassigned to work with the local military in 35 countries across Africa -- to deal with the threat of al Qaeda-linked terrorism. Sounds just like what was going on in Mali. But does anyone really think the U.S. and its military will have a better understanding of the myriad forces, tribes, religions, governments, legal and illicit financial interests struggling for power and influence in those countries than it did in Mali? Or Iraq, or Afghanistan or Iran or Somalia or Lebanon, or Vietnam, or Cambodia? And has France now embarked down the same tragic path?

IL - Yemen Scenerio

Brink NowForeign intervention has put Yemen on the brink of collapse and made it a site for proxy wars and terrorist basing.Lister 3-30-15 [Tim, award-winning reporter for BBC and CNN, “Yemen in freefall: How chaos could spiral into all-out regional war,” CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/30/middleeast/yemen-freefall-lister/]QL

Foreign intervention in Yemen's chaos has dramatically raised the stakes in the Arabian Peninsula, threatening to expand what is already a civil war into a conflict pitting Iran against Saudi Arabia and an Arab coalition. The Saudis launched Operation "Decisive Storm" last Wednesday with dozens of airstrikes in an effort to blunt the advance of Houthi militia and allied army units on the port of Aden -- and to protect the last bastion of Yemen's internationally-recognized President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi. There were also strikes in and around the capital, Sanaa, which resumed early Monday. Many

analysts were surprised at the speed and scale of the Saudi air campaign, which the Kingdom said would continue until the Houthis -- a Shia minority that has swept across the country in the last six months -- retreated and laid down their arms. Essentially

the Saudis are trying to bomb the Houthis to the negotiating table. Who are the Houthis? The Houthis have responded by threatening a campaign of suicide bomb attacks inside Saudi Arabia. Iran, which has

supported the Houthis as fellow Shia, described the Saudi offensive as a "dangerous move that would kill any chance at peaceful resolution of the crisis." Yemen is becoming the latest battleground in a contest for regional superiority between Saudi Arabia and Iran that goes back to the overthrow of the Shah during Iran's Islamic Revolution in 1979. It now resembles Syria, or Bosnia 20 years ago: a patchwork of shifting fiefdoms where force is the only means

of influence. Yemen on verge of collapse? There is a real risk that Yemen will collapse as a state, with a revived independence movement in the south, the Houthis in the north, and the Sunni heartland in between. Adam Baron, a visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and expert on Yemen's tortured recent history, says, "It's not difficult to divine Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners' motivations for taking this action." The Houthis were on the verge of overrunning Aden, a strategic port that overlooks straits through which 20,000 merchant ships pass every year. According to the U.S. Energy Information Agency, 3.8 million barrels of oil a day passed through the Bab el Mandab Straits in 2013. But Baron believes the Kingdom's "decision to launch a full-scale military action truly risks inflaming the situation further. It will be seen

as an act of aggression by most Yemenis and risks taking the situation to a place that no-one will be able to control." As in Afghanistan, factions in Yemen do not respond well to foreign intervention. In 2009 the Saudis took military action against the Houthis in

support of then President Ali Abdullah Saleh, using airstrikes and special forces, but were unable to subdue them. Now the Houthis have at least some of the $500 million in military equipment provided by the U.S. to Yemen since 2010, and they have proved to be capable fighters. They staged a lightning invasion of the capital, Sanaa, last September, taking advantage of popular discontent and an unwillingness among many army units to resist them. Since then they have moved on the Red Sea port of Hodeida and surged south toward Aden. They have also grafted themselves onto parts of the army in the battle against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) that is now raging in central and southern Yemen. Whether Saudi and Egyptian ground forces will become involved in the conflict is the big unknown. An Arab League summit in Egypt at the weekend agreed to form a joint military force, but that will take months at least to build. In the meantime, Saudi tanks and armor have been moved closer to the Yemeni border, but Saudi officials say there are no immediate plans to launch a ground offensive. Graveyard for invaders Yemen has history as a graveyard of foreign forces. In the 1960s Egypt intervened in Yemen's civil war on behalf of the anti-royalists -- an operation that sapped the Egyptian army and contributed to its failure against the Israelis in the 1967 war. The extent of the Houthis' backing from Iran is hotly disputed. President Hadi said at the weekend that Iran was behind Yemen's turmoil and the Houthis were no more than its stooges. The Houthis deny receiving help from Iran, but as the conflict worsens, they may indeed turn to Tehran for the sort of military advice that the

Iranian Revolutionary Guards are providing in Iraq -- and for funding and oil. Saudi and Iranian involvement in Yemen threatens to deepen sectarian distrust in a country where Sunni and Shia have historically not been enemies. This would suit both AQAP and ISIS (Islamic State in Syria and Iraq) which announced its sudden and murderous arrival in Yemen this month with massive suicide bombings at two Houthi mosques in Sanaa, killing at least 150 people. Threat of ground incursion looms over Yemen As the International Crisis Group puts it, a "long history of coexistence is beginning to break down" in Yemen. Baron says one critical question is whether ISIS and AQAP will now go head-to-head in trying to kill as many Houthis as possible. For the United States, which worked hard to "stand up" the Hadi government and encourage its campaign to eradicate AQAP, recent events have been a disaster. There will be less actionable intelligence against one of al Qaeda's most potent affiliates, and its Sunni allies in the Middle East (and especially the Gulf) will have even less interest than before in dialogue with Iran on issues from its nuclear program to Iraq. U.S. options have also diminished with the hurried withdrawal of some 100 military personnel from al-Anad airbase in the south of Yemen hours before it was seized by the Houthis. Drone operations from the base had at least blunted AQAP's freedom of action, even if they failed to eradicate the group. Yemen's invisible hand The unseen hand in Yemen's collapse is former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was badly injured in a bomb attack in 2011, and eventually (very eventually) persuaded to cede office to Hadi after 33 years in power. But he was allowed to remain in the country and has not given up his political ambitions. Last fall, he was sanctioned by both the United Nations and the U.S. for undermining efforts to forge a new political

settlement in Yemen. Baron believes Saleh is biding his time -- waiting for an opportunity to inject his son, Ahmed Ali, into Yemen's complex political equation. Ahmed Ali was formerly commander of Yemen's Republican Guard, and parts of the armed forces are still regarded as loyal to the Saleh clan. For now, Saleh has a marriage of convenience with the Houthis, but few expect it to survive. When he was President, Saleh launched a series of brief wars against the Houthis between 2004 and 2010. "Neither trusts the other; their recent cooperation notwithstanding, they are competing for political dominance, especially in the northern tribal highlands and the military," says the International Crisis Group. Human rights "in free-fall" For the people of Yemen, the brief flash of hope that came with the Arab Spring is now a distant memory. Last week, at least nine protesters were killed in the central city of Taiz and more than 100 injured by Houthi militia. Aden has been rocked by looting and score-settling among rival clans. "Human rights in Yemen are in free-fall as even peaceful protest becomes a life-threatening activity," according to Said Boumedouha of Amnesty International. For the past three years, different parties and factions have fought over the state's few assets while the standard of living of ordinary Yemenis has continued to plummet. A U.N.-led effort to agree on a new constitution has been mired in squabbling, with all parties failing to honor commitments. "Even more

damaging, those with most influence -- the Saudis and Iranians in particular -- are taking steps to undercut the negotiations," says the International Crisis Group. "This combination of proxy wars, sectarian violence, state collapse and militia rule has become sadly familiar in the region. Nobody is likely to win such a fight," the ICG says. But for now, such a fight seems destined to continue.

Yemen is on the brink of collapse.Craig 1-23-15 [Iona Craig, journalist for the Yemen correspondent for The Times of London, awarded the Martha Gellhorn Prize for Journalism in 2014, “Hailed as U.S. Counterterrorism Model in Middle East, Yemen Teeters on the Brink of Collapse,” Democracy Now, http://www.democracynow.org/2015/1/23/hailed_as_us_counterterrorism_model_in]QL

Yemen is facing political collapse following the mass resignations of President Abdu Rabbu

Mansour Hadi, his prime minister and entire cabinet. Thursday’s exodus came just hours after Shia Houthi rebels stormed the presidential compound in the capital city of Sana’a. Hadi said he could not continue in office after Houthis allegedly broke a peace deal to retreat from key positions in return for increased political power. The Houthis appear to have major backing

from longtime former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was ousted in a popular uprising in 2011. The Obama administration had praised the Yemeni government as being a model for "successful" counterterrorism partnerships, but on Thursday the United States announced it was pulling more staff out of its embassy in Yemen. Some experts warn the developments in Yemen could result in civil war and help al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) gain more power. Meanwhile, Oxfam is warning more than half of Yemen’s population

needs aid, and a humanitarian crisis of extreme proportions is at risk of unfolding in the country if instability continues. We are joined by Iona Craig, a journalist who was based in Sana’a for four years as the Yemen correspondent for The Times of London. TRANSCRIPT This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form. JUAN GONZÁLEZ: We begin in Yemen, which is teetering on the brink of collapse after the U.S.-backed president, Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, his prime minister and entire cabinet resigned on Thursday. The exodus came just 24 hours after Shia Houthi rebels stormed the presidential compound in the capital city of Sana’a. Hadi said he could not continue ruling after Houthis allegedly broke a peace deal to retreat from key positions in return for increased political power. The Houthis appear to have major backing from longtime president Ali Abdullah Saleh, the ousted leader who was forced from office in a popular uprising in 2011. AMY GOODMAN: The Obama administration had praised the Yemeni government as being a model for "successful" counterterrorism partnerships, but on Thursday the U.S.

announced it was pulling more staff out of its embassy in Yemen. Some experts warn the developments in Yemen could result in civil war and help al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula gain more power. Meanwhile, Oxfam is warning

more than half of Yemen’s population needs aid, and a humanitarian crisis of extreme proportions is at risk of unfolding in the country if instability continues. Ten million Yemenis do not have enough to eat, including 850,000 acutely malnourished children. For more, we go to London, where we’re joined by Iona Craig. She’s a journalist who was based in Sana’a, Yemen, for four years as the Yemen correspondent for The Times of London, was awarded the Martha Gellhorn Prize for Journalism in 2014. Iona, welcome back to Democracy Now! Talk about what has taken place. IONA CRAIG: I think what we’ve seen in the last few days is pretty unprecedented in terms of Yemen, and I think what’s happened now with Hadi handing in his resignation, the prime minister and the cabinet, is really probably the smartest thing they could have done. They were backed into a corner by the Houthis, and quite literally, the Houthis had surrounded Hadi’s house. They obviously couldn’t and hadn’t taken them on militarily, in a fight that they were unlikely to be able to win. And so this was the only way for them to turn around to the Houthis and say, "No, this is enough." And now we have the prospect of an emergency meeting of the Parliament on Sunday, when Hadi’s resignation will be put forward. Now, they have the option to reject that resignation, which means that Hadi would still be president after that, unless he then hands his resignation in again within three months. So it may

actually be that Hadi stays and manages to survive all of this. JUAN GONZÁLEZ: And, Iona, given the constant turbulence within the country, what’s the impact on some of the regional powers—obviously, Iran and the United States and Saudi Arabia? IONA CRAIG: Well, really, you know, the reason why the international community has been

promoting and supporting Hadi is because, for them, there wasn’t another option. They’ve been backing this transition deal from the beginning. It was created initially as Ali Abdullah Saleh signed the deal at the end of 2011 in order to step down, this deal called the GCC deal. But it really originated—and it’s an open secret in Sana’a—from the American Embassy. And the reason we know that is that the politicians in Yemen that first saw it could tell that it was translated from English. So, that transition deal is what the international community have been backing. And that transition deal is really what has brought this to this place today, because it never truly addressed the underlying problems in Yemen. It was all about reshuffling power in order to concentrate on the security issues within Yemen, without actually making the changes that Yemenis have been demanding. So, issues like the Houthis, who were a marginalized group and persecuted under Ali Abdullah Saleh, the issue of southern secession, they were never truly addressed throughout this period. And now this has come to a head now with the Houthis taking their own action to get what they want. So the international community is partly responsible for the situation that Yemen is now in. But, of course, their focus still remains on the security issues in Yemen. AMY GOODMAN: I want to turn to comments President Obama made last summer when he announced additional U.S. military support to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. In response to a question, President Obama invoked U.S. policy in Yemen as a

possible model for Iraq and Syria. This is part of what he said. PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA: You look at a country like

Yemen, a very impoverished country and one that has its own sectarian or ethnic divisions,

there’s—we do have a committed partner in President Hadi and his government, and we have been able to help to develop their capacities without putting large numbers of U.S. troops on the ground, at the same time as we’ve got enough CT, or counterterrorism, capabilities that we’re able to go after folks that might try to hit our embassy or might be trying to export terrorism into Europe or the United States. AMY GOODMAN: That was President Obama over the summer. Your response, Iona Craig? IONA CRAIG: Well, I think this really kind of goes back to what I just mentioned. The international focus has always been about security in Yemen. So, even when Ali Abdullah Saleh was in power, they backed him because they could work with him and, you know, to carry out the operations that they wanted, to use drone strikes in Yemen. And there was no plan B. There was no "What will we do if Ali Abdullah Saleh is not there?" And similarly, then, with Hadi. They knew Hadi had been vice president under Ali Abdullah Saleh. It was someone they knew they could work with. They built on the partnership. And again, now, there is—there is no plan B. So if Hadi goes, this leaves them in a position—you know, in a really bad position of who now are they dealing with. As for

the issue of the Yemen model, clearly now that’s something of a joke, really. The Yemen model has all but collapsed. The fighting against al-Qaeda on the ground has actually been done now by the Houthis, but it’s actually made the issue and the problem of al-Qaeda worse in Yemen, anyway. The violence being carried out by al-Qaeda has increased hugely since the Houthis took Sana’a in September. But, you know—and again, looking at those Oxfam figures, the underlying problems in Yemen, you have—now those figures have gone to 16 million people in need of humanitarian aid. The last figures that came out said 14.7 million, out of a population of 25. So, whilst the international community focuses on the security issues, you’ve got an economy that’s collapsing, you’ve got a rising humanitarian crisis and political issues that haven’t been dealt with. So, this kind of short-term thinking about the security situation in Yemen is really never going to get to the bottom of the political problems, the economic problems and the humanitarian issues that all feed into this in the end.

IL - South Sudan Scenerio

Brink NowUS military intervention in South Sudan caused a civil war.Dumo ’15 [Denis, “South Sudan, Another US Intervention Resulting in Violent Chaos,” Reuters, February 21, 2015, http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/South-Sudan-Another-US-Intervention-Resulting-in-Violent-Chaos-20150221-0010.html]QL

Conflict has been rife in South Sudan since December 2013 when fighting erupted in capital Juba between soldiers

allied to President Salva Kiir and those loyal to his former deputy, Riek Machar. The war there is the result of yet another Washington intervention in a foreign country, with the same results obtained everywhere else, which is destruction, violence, chaos and the victimization of the people. Washington ignores once

and again that the people only want peace. (Photo: AFP) “Washington was more interested in weakening the Republic in Sudan and encouraged the Republic of South Sudan to break away, but the looming civil war will damage U.S. interests in the region,” Abayomi Azikiwe, editor of Pan-African news wire, told RT a few days after violence erupted in the country. “The U.S. has a lot invested politically in the Republic of South Sudan and they were the main forces behind encouraging the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement to break away from the Republic of Sudan in the north of the country. Therefore, they have a lot to say about developments that are going

on right now in this troubled nation,” the expert said in an interview with RT. He also explained that the motives of the U.S. intervention in Sudan are linked to their interest, as always, in oil, as the country was producing over 500,000 barrels per day, which were held by China, therefore, the subsequent motive in causing destabilization in the nation was to weaken the anti-U.S. government of Khartoum, Republic of Sudan, and lessen the influence of China. The result of Washington's intervention has been the country's deterioration into a civil war, which threatens to spread to other countries throughout Central and East Africa, and the despair of the people who now face potential famine.

US military intervention in South Sudan triggered civil war - South Sudan is on the brink of collapseO’Connor ‘13 [Patrick, “US Africom and the South Sudan Crisis,” The Herald, December 25, 2013, http://www.herald.co.zw/us-africom-and-the-south-sudan-crisis/]QL

The Obama administration has transferred about 150 Marines from Spain to Djibouti’s Camp Lemonnier base, home to the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) amid continued fighting between rival political factions and armed groups in oil rich South Sudan . The steppedup Marine deployment to the Horn of Africa follows a letter sent by President Barack Obama to the leaders of the House of Representatives and Senate on Sunday foreshadowing possible “further action to support the security of US citizens, personnel and property, including our embassy, in South Sudan.” The previous day, the US military aborted an attempted evacuation of American citizens from central Jonglei State after three planes came under fire, with four troops wounded. The New York Times reported that the rapidresponse Marine force could be sent into South Sudan from Djibouti with six hours’ notice. Fortyfive US troops have already been deployed to the country’s capital, Juba, to secure the US embassy and assist evacuations. An AFRICOM statement recalled the attack on the US CIA centre and diplomatic office in Benghazi, Libya in September last year: “By positioning these forces forward, we are able to more quickly respond to crisis in the region, if required. “One of the lessons learned from the tragic events in Benghazi was that we needed to be better postured, in order to respond to developing or crisis situations, if needed.” The United Nations is preparing to authorise a wider intervention force. Secretary General Ban Kimoon reportedly asked the UN Security Council to add 5 500 police and military personnel, as well as attack helicopters and transport planes, to the 7 500strong UN multinational operation in South Sudan. Three peacekeepers from India were killed last week when armed young people stormed a UN mission in the eastern town of Akobo. Unnamed American officials told the New York Times that US involvement in a wider UN mission

“was currently under review within the Obama administration.” South Sudan remains on the brink of civil war. A long - running power struggle within the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) appears to intersect with ethnic and tribal divisions within the impoverished country, triggering a humanitarian crisis. In its latest update, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported on Sunday that five of South Sudan’s ten states were affected by the violence, with an estimated 62 000 people displaced. About 42 000

have sought refuge in UN bases. President Salva Kiir is from the Dinka ethnic group, the country’s largest, while Kiir’s rival, Riek Machar is from its second biggest ethnic group, the Nuer. Tensions between Kiir and Machar, the former vice president, predate South Sudan’s official separation from Sudan in 2011. They escalated this year after Machar declared his intention to win the leadership of the SPLM ahead of presidential elections due in 2015. Kiir sacked Machar and his cabinet in July, at the same time

moving to bolster his control of the military. The president accused Machar of attempting a coup on December 15–16 and ordered the arrest of opposition figures, including former cabinet members. Machar’s forces have claimed control over parts of the country, notably the northern towns of Bor and Bentiu, capital of the crucial oil producing Unity state. Washington has backed the government, while urging a negotiated resolution.

South Sudan is on the brink of collapseBergo ’15 [Havard, Masters Degree in International Relations, “South Sudan faces impending economic collapse,” Global Risk Insights, May 2, 2015, http://globalriskinsights.com/2015/05/south-sudan-faces-impending-economic-collapse/]QL

Oil production has been slashed and oil revenues hurt by falling prices, depriving the government in Juba of most of the money it desperately needs.

The UN warns that South Sudan’s economy is edging towards a complete collapse, as authorities begin printing

money to fund state services. The power struggle between President Salva Kiir and former Vice President Riek Machar has caused tens of thousands of civilians deaths and displaced nearly 2 million people, all but destroying any progress made in South Sudan, the world’s youngest nation. The struggle started as a political conflict within the SPLM, the liberation movement-cum-main political party, stemming from serious dissatisfaction over Kiir’s governance and

disagreement over party leadership. The war has since largely been fought along ethnic lines – Kiir being Dinka and Machar being Nuer – and has seen ethnic cleansing and civilian massacres on a large scale. South Sudan is now facing a complete economic collapse, with the Juba government reportedly printing money to cover their expenses. Toby Lanzer, the top UN humanitarian official in the country, recently warned of the financial dangers of this practice, emphasizing that “printing money when there is nothing to back the value of that currency usually leads to hyperinflation.” Oil revenues are down 75%, partially from output reductions due to the ongoing violence and as a result of the sharp drop in global prices. This has made it increasingly difficult for the government in Juba to fund their bills and pay their salaries, the large majority of which goes to the army and the police.

IL - Al Shabaab Scenerio

Unstable NowAl Shabab has been able to terrorize and regularly assassinate political rivals Felbab-Brown is Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institution, 15 [Vanda, June 23, 2015 “Saving Somalia (again) and How Reconstruction Stalled—And What to do About It” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/somalia/2015-06-23/saving-somalia-again , 7/15/15, ECD II]

That said, al Shabab is hardly defeated—even if its membership is thought to be down to around 6,000, with the most potent and hardcore Amniyat branch down to perhaps 1,500. (Such estimates, given by Somali government officials and international military advisors, need to be taken with a grain of salt, since the capacity of insurgent groups to replenish their ranks often outpaces the capacity of counterinsurgent forces to kill or arrest the groups’ members.) The group’s spectacular terrorist attacks in Kenya and Uganda, such as the one on Nairobi’s Westgate Mall in September 2013 and on a teaching college in the city of Garissa in April 2015, don’t necessarily mean that al Shabab has lost the capacity to operate in Somalia. In fact, if anything, al Shabab’s operations have become more targeted and more effective, and generate more casualties with the militant group losing fewer fighters. The fact that the group has deeply infiltrated Somali military and police forces helps it in that regard. Although AMISOM still holds the major cities that it won back from al Shabab as part of the 2014 Operation Eagle and Operation Indian Ocean, al Shabab’s presence in supposedly liberated cities is often robust. The group extorts shopkeepers and intimidates the local population with threatening night letters that regularly appear in public spaces. People routinely receive cell phone texts such as “You forgot to pay your zakat (religious tax); tomorrow we cannot guarantee your security.” Such intimidation is prevalent even in Kismayo, a strategic port in the southern region of Juba that used to be a key source of revenue for al Shabab from customs and smuggling items like charcoal. Kismayo, and the newly-formed state of Jubaland, are controlled by Ahmed Madobe, who defected from his role as al Shabab commander several years ago and, with the support of Kenyan forces, took control of the area and declared himself president of the state. Over the past year, al Shabab attacks have also escalated in Mogadishu. Assassinations are a daily occurrence. Many government officials have to live and work (often in the same room) in hotels close to the Mogadishu airport, a palpable symptom of the decline in confidence and sense of security since 2013. The fact that some assassinations are actually perpetrated by rival politicians, warlords, and businessmen, with al Shabab happily taking the credit, does not lessen the sense of insecurity.

Putanland and Somalialand are divided too Felbab-Brown is Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institution, 15 [Vanda, June 23, 2015 “Saving Somalia (again) and How Reconstruction Stalled—And What to do About It” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/somalia/2015-06-23/saving-somalia-again , 7/15/15, ECD II]

The security forces of the semi-autonomous state of Puntland are somewhat more capable, but insecurity in Puntland, too, has been increasing since al Shabab was pushed into the state from central Somalia. Numbering perhaps about 4,000, the forces include a state-armed

militia/police force known as darawish as well as other police forces and custodial forces. Many other unofficial entities also operate in Puntland, including the Puntland Security Force, which is paid by the United States to fight al Shabab and presumably reports to the Puntland president, and the Puntland Maritime Police Force, which is paid for by the United Arab Emirates. The latter was originally created to fight pirates, although recently it has also apparently been dispatched to fight al Shabab in the Galgadud area. The Puntland government has little interest in integrating these forces into the Somali national armed forces. Somaliland remains the most secure part of Somalia with the best functioning government — although, of course, the local leadership there continues to want to secede from the country and establish independence. Mediation talks in Ankara facilitated by Turkey collapsed in the spring of 2015. Since then, Somaliland has been preoccupied by presidential and parliamentary elections for the state government, which were to be held on June 26, 2015. But despite popular demand and strong pressure from international donors, the elections were delayed by at least 17 months due to a lack of preparedness, (as they had previously been in Puntland). This delay undermines governance and accountability in the state.

Al-Shabab attacks AU base- kicking foriegners out World Bulletin/News Desk, June 2015 [26 June 2015 Friday, “Al-Shabaab attacks AU peacekeepers' base The AU peacekeepers were attacked by Al Shabaab group, at least 35 soldiers dead” http://www.worldbulletin.net/haber/161232/al-shabaab-attacks-au-peacekeepers-base, 7/15/15, ECD II]

Al Shabaab group fought a gunbattle with African Union peacekeeping troops in Somalia after ramming a car laden with explosives into their base south of Mogadishu early on Friday, military officials and a spokesman for the group said. The dawn attack in Leego - some 130 km south of the Somali capital, on the main road connecting the capital and the city of Baidoa - came as residents gathered for morning prayers. "A car bomb rammed into the AU base in Leego and this was followed by heavy exchange of gunfire," Major Nur Olow, told a military officer. "First, AU forces opened fire at the speeding car bomb. The car forced its way in." The fighting was still raging three hours after the assault began, a second official said. "There is still heavy fighting between Burundian forces and al Shabaab at the Burundi base in Leego town," said Abdikadir Mohamed Sidi, the governor of the Lower Shabelle region, adding it was "too early to know casualties." The peacekeeping force, known as AMISOM, is made up of troops mainly from Kenya, Uganda and Burundi. Sheikh Abdiasis Abu Musab, a spokesman for the al Qaeda-aligned group, said their group members had rammed the car bomb into the base and that "heavy fighting goes on inside the base." He said 35 soldiers were killed. The group often gives higher death tolls than officials. An African Union spokesman could not be reached for comment.

Foreigners and government officials targeted World Bulletin/ News Desk, july 2015 [11 July 2015 Saturday, “Five people dead in Al-Shabaab attacks Five people dead in Al-Shabaab attacks Clashes between government forces

and Al-Shabaab fighters are reportedly ongoing at the scene of attack, http://www.worldbulletin.net/haber/162009/five-people-dead-in-al-shabaab-attacks, ECD II]

At least five civilians have been killed and several others have been injured in simultaneous gun-and-bomb attacks on two hotels in the Somali capital of Mogadishu, security sources said Friday.

The attacks were allegedly carried out by Al-Shabaab fighters, who detonated a bomb-laden car around the hotels ahead of their armed attack. The hotels are located on a road that connects the International Mogadishu Airport with the country's presidential palace. An unidentified parliamentarian was reportedly among the injured, the sources said. The clashes between government forces and the armed group are said to be ongoing at the scene. The Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attacks, according to a website said to be linked to the group. On June 24, seven people were killed and 10 others injured in a suicide attack that targeted a United Arab Emirates convoy in Mogadishu.

Officials targeted in restaurant bombing World Bulletin/News Desk , April 2015 [21 April 2015 Tuesday “Shabaab claims responsibility for restaurant attack Al Shabaab claims responsibility for restaurant attack The Banooda restaurant in central Mogadishu is popular with government officials” [http://www.worldbulletin.net/haber/158190/al-shabaab-claims-responsibility-for-restaurant-attack, ECD II]

Somali armed group al Shabaab claimed responsibility for a car bomb attack on a restaurant in the Somali capital Mogadishu which killed at least 10 people on Tuesday."We are behind the attack," Sheikh Abdiasis Abu Musab, al Shabaab's military operations spokesman, told. Musab said the lunch-time attack was targeted at officials from government ministries and the presidential palace who eat at the restaurant.

Somalia forces making progress in the squo now World Bulletin/News Desk, July 2015 [23 July 2015 Thursday, “Somali troops take southern city from Al-Shabaab Somali troops take southern city from Al-Shabaab Backed up by AU forces, Somali army drives Al-Shabaab fighters from southern city of Bardera”, http://www.worldbulletin.net/haber/162351/somali-troops-take-southern-city-from-al-shabaab, 7/25/15, ECD II]

Somali troops have seized the southern city of Bardera from the Al-Shabaab armed group following more than four days of fighting, military officials said Wednesday. According to Major Abdullahi Mohamed, Al-Shabaab militants withdrew from Bardera – an important agricultural center in Somalia’s Gedo region – after Somali troops entered the city. Numerous Bardera residents had fled the flashpoint city earlier amid ongoing fighting between the two sides. Somali troops are supported in the fight against Al-Shabaab by African Union (AU) forces, which include personnel from Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, Burundi and Djibouti. In recent months,

Al-Shabaab has suffered several significant blows, losing most of its strongholds in southern and central Somalia to government and AU forces. Established in 2004 and ideologically aligned with Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab is an armed movement that calls for the application of Islamic Law in Somalia.

Targeted strikes World Bulletin / News Desk, March 2015 [9 March 2015 Thursday, “U.S airstrike killed senior al-Shabaab leader U.S airstrike killed senior al-Shabaab leader Pentagon says senior al-Shabaab leader in Somalia, Adan Garar was killed in March 12 attack in southern Somalia”, http://www.worldbulletin.net/haber/156749/us-airstrike-killed-senior-al-shabaab-leader, 7/15/15, ECD II]

The Defense Department confirmed Wednesday that a U.S. airstrike earlier this month killed a senior al-Shabaab leader in Somalia. "The attack was a success and resulted in the death of Adan Garar," the Pentagon said of the March 12 attack. A local Somalian security official last week told that Garar, the group’s head of external operations, was targeted by an aerial drone while travelling between the towns of Dinsor and Baradheere in southern Somalia. Garar was appointed head of external operations, which is under the intelligence wing of al-Shabaab, by group leader Abu Ubeydah after Yusuf Dheeq was killed in a U.S. airstrike in February. Several senior al-Shabaab members have been killed in previous U.S. drone strikes.

Senior Somali officials targeted for corruption World Bulletin/News Desk, May 2015 [06 May 2015 Wednesday “Al Shabaab kills senior Somali official Shabaab kills senior Somali official file photo The Shabaab have shot dead the deputy commissioner of Wadajir and his driver in a drive by shooting in Mogadishu”, http://www.worldbulletin.net/haber/158792/shabaab-kills-senior-somali-official, 7/15/15, ECD II]

Al-Shabaab forces on Wednesday shot dead the deputy commissioner of Wadajir, a district in the capital Mogadishu, and his driver. "He had been tracked down by the gunmen. He was shot several times and died minutes later," Mohamed Shire, an official of the Wadajir district, told The Anadolu Agency in a phone interview. Deputy Commissioner Abdifatah Baare and his driver were both killed in the drive-by shooting. According to the official, the Somali police have mounted a manhunt for the attackers. Al-Shabaab has immediately claimed responsibility for the attack through its Radio Andalus and affiliated website. The Al-Qaeda-linked group, which is waging a years-long war against the Somali government, had for years controlled much of central and southern Somalia. Recently, however, the group has ground to the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) working in coordination with Somali army troops. Nevertheless, the group has continued to stage regular attacks on government officials and security personnel. The fractious Horn of Africa country has remained in relative turmoil since the 1991 ouster of Siad Barre, a military dictator who had ruled the country since 1969.

Strikes and officials spur suicide bombings in capital city World Bulletin/News Desk, Feb 2015 [20 February 2015 Friday “Suicide attack targets Somali officials in hotel Suicide attack targets Somali officials in hotel A car bomb detonated at the entrance of a hotel in the Somali capital on Friday and then stormed inside where politicians had gathered, killing at least 10 people including a lawmaker and lightly wounding two ministers,” http://www.worldbulletin.net/haber/155393/suicide-attack-targets-somali-officials-in-hotel”

Death toll from a twin suicide blast that targeted a hotel in Mogadishu has risen to ten people, including the two perpetrators, according to a security source. Two suicide bombers, seconds apart, have driven into Mogadishu's Central Hotel, before detonating their explosive-packed vehicles, eyewitnesses have told. Mohamed Adam, the first deputy of Mogadishu's mayor, was among the victims of the blast, the security source told. He added that Seaports Minister Nur Hersi and Mohamed Mohamud Saney, the mayor of Balad district, were also injured in the bombings and that Saney was hospitalized in a critical condition. Lawmaker Abdel-Qader Ali Omar was also injured in the attacks, according to the source. The hotel has also sustained major material damage. A radio station that is associated with Al-Shabaab militant group had quoted a senior group member as saying that the group was behind Friday's "major operation." Al-Shabaab, which has launched an insurgency against Mogadishu in recent years, has recently suffered several significant blows, losing most of its strongholds in southern and central Somalia to government and African Union troops. Several group members have also recently been killed in U.S. drone strikes. However, the group has continued to launch deadly attacks on government officials and security troops.

US intervention = Radical Muslim alliancesSomalia - Government legitimacy is down too- only alignment with the dangerous muslim brotherhood gives the government credibility Felbab-Brown is Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institution, 15 [Vanda, June 23, 2015 “Saving Somalia (again) and How Reconstruction Stalled—And What to do About It” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/somalia/2015-06-23/saving-somalia-again , 7/15/15, ECD II]

It is not just security that has been sliding in Somalia for the past year and half. Equally, the sense of political momentum has dissipated. In 2013, there was a great deal of optimism among the Somalis whom I interviewed that Somalia hit rock bottom in 2011 and that the pernicious clan politics that plagued the country for the past three decades have ended. They placed a great deal of hope in their President, Mohamoud. A Somali professor and member of the country’s civil society, he was not a former warlord nor a member of the diaspora parachuted in. And although he was elected by a parliament of appointed (or self-appointed) clan elders and former warlords, he was not seen as beholden to any particular clan. The international community, including the United Kingdom and the United States, also embraced him. But that was then. With little control over the country’s armed forces and budget, and unable to tackle pervasive and extensive corruption, the president fell back on one source of support: his Hawiye clan. And so the cycle of exclusionary politics began again, privileging access to business deals for his supporters and promoting clan backers for government positions.

Mohamoud’s government was soon paralyzed by the infighting between him and his prime ministers (a familiar story in Somalia over the past decade), whom he would repeatedly seek to replace. The Somali constitution makes the president the symbol of authority, but his role and relationship with the prime minister is not clearly defined. Ultimately, the constitution is generally interpreted as mandating a Hawiye president and a Darod prime minister. That design is meant to encourage inclusiveness. In truth, however, it mostly led to a struggle between the president and prime minister, mimicking the power fights between the two main clans. The constant turnover of government officials at the federal and subnational levels is another major problem: With appointments often lasting only a few weeks, officials have far more interest in quickly making money and placing allies in other public sector positions than in governing effectively and building equitable and accountable state institutions—or any institutions for that matter. To give itself legitimacy, the government has embraced a brand of conservative Islam that is not as far from al Shabab’s teachings as many would like. The president is reputed to have admiration for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and is said to consider Mohamad Morsi, the imprisoned former Muslim Brotherhood–affiliated president of Egypt, a personal friend.

US Military Doesn’t solveUS intervention does not solve for Al Shabaab violence. Only strong local and regional governments can solve.Young 15 (Joseph, associate professor at American University, Al-Shabab poses no threat to U.S. interests: Targets, like Kenya university, are chosen because of easy access and symbolic value, USA today, http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/04/04/al-shabab-kenya-garissa-young-beehner/25266181/)

The grisly siege last week at Garissa University in Kenya, where Christian students were singled out, has a familiar ring to it: Over 140 students slain and hundreds more missing. An extremist Somali group, al-Shabab, with ties to al-Qaeda, claimed responsibility. We've seen this horrific movie before. Yet,

is this another example of religiously motivated terrorism that threatens U.S. interests? Or is this a more local or regional problem? Popular accounts of terrorist attacks such as this one suggest they have international causes and thus require international solutions. In fact, Thursday's attack — much like terrorist massacres at Nairobi's Westgate Mall in 2013 or the Beslan school in Russia in 2004 — have much more local causes. Recent terrorism research suggests that two big factors explain where attacks occur. First, vulnerable targets — schools, malls and such — are more attractive to militants because they will likely be easy to hit, and they are plentiful. Second, valuable locations, such as a glitzy mall or a glassy skyscraper, provide symbolic value. While militants may not be

able to reach the seat of power, they can destroy a symbol. These attacks communicate these groups' strength and signal resolve to cajole their enemies — typically the government— to meet their demands or else. Vulnerability and value are more useful to explain where attacks occur rather than factors like religion or ethnicity. This has important implications for U.S. counterterrorism policy, which at the moment resembles a whack-a-mole strategy that reacts to crises. About every year or so we read about a top al-Shabab commander or bomb specialist liquidated by a U.S. airstrike in

Somalia. But the group shows little signs of weakening, even if it has not captured Americans' attention the way Boko Haram or the Islamic State has . There is no Somalia equivalent of the

#BringBackOurGirls campaign on social media demanding greater action. Al-Shabab's attacks are both strategic and local. Beyond Somalia's borders, the group has mainly targeted soft targets in Kenya . They resent Kenyan "meddling" in Somali affairs — a few years ago Kenyan forces carried out cross-border operations against al-Shabab bases —

yet they have not shown capacity or a willingness to strike beyond the Horn of Africa. Al-Shabab seeks to rule Somalia with a reactionary interpretation of Islamic law. But ascribing this conflict to religion misses the point. Yes, it's been reported that militants may have released Muslim students in the Garissa attack, much like they did during the siege of the Westgate mall. But al-Shabab has not restrained itself from killing anyone it felt was interfering with its primary goal of creating a state in Somalia. Even Muslim foreign recruits, such as the American

jihadist Omar Hammami, were eliminated when they clashed with leaders of the group. Another concern is foreign recruits from the U.S. fighting in Somalia, and then returning home. But unlike theaters in Iraq or Syria, foreign fighters number in the dozens at most. They are primarily used as cannon fodder to carry out jihad locally, and so are unlikely to come back alive. The U.S. should be supportive of Kenya, but understand this is a local or regional problem with local or regional solutions. No amount of drone strikes will solve what ails Somalia. According to a recent International Crisis Group report, "military campaigns with little emphasis on encouraging political settlements in liberated areas is handing the initiative back to the insurgents.” While U.S. policy throughout Africa nominally supports the idea of bolstering weak states, some observers suggest that this focus on failing states as security threats is misguided. External

funding of weak rulers and an occasional aerial bombardment provide a case in point. Building capable states takes time, patience, and resolving political and clan-based divisions at the local level. In Somalia, this means building a capable state that ends the economic misery that indirectly allows groups like al-Shabab to thrive. We highly doubt Americans have the stomach or patience for this kind of campaign, given our nation-building credentials elsewhere. Nor is our own track record in Somalia remarkable (Remember Black Hawk Down?). Instead, we should engage and support a capable state that, at a minimum, can prevent al-Shabab from carrying out terrorist attacks across its border and enable Kenya to better defend itself from such attacks. But to realize this requires local and regional solutions to these awful attacks, not to lump al-Shabab in the same counterterrorism basket as the Islamic State and Boko Haram.

IL - Somalia

UQ – On Brink Now

Government confidence low now- President said to be impeached, multiple trials for government official corruption and Uluso, is a senior Somali political analyst. He was a former minister and governor of the Central Bank of Somalia. He is a Somalicurrent Blogger and is an author who writes extensively on Somali politics. [Mohamud M. , July 12, 2015, Somalia suffers from Machiavellian politics”, http://www.somalicurrent.com/author/culusow/, 7/15/15, ECD II]

In different light, persistent leaks alert that about 139 members of the federal parliament are planning to impeach President Hassan for abuse of power, breach of the constitution, and failure to defend the sovereignty, unity, and interests of the Somali people. During a surprise visit to the parliament, President Hassan did not address directly the leaks but implored the members of parliament to work with him for moving the country forward. The Federal Parliament grilled the Minister of Finance on budget maladministration and the lack of salary payments to the security forces and civil servants for months despite increased collection of domestic revenue. Members of parliament claim that the Minister did not provide explanation about the use of 22 million dollars considered as unaccounted. The media, replete with claims of widespread financial embezzlements, published official government letters showing the diversion of $ 1,476,900 allocated to the payments of arrears due to former members of parliament. The Minister refused to tell the purpose used for that amount and to disclose the foreign and domestic travel expenses of top government leaders. The Federal Parliament also called the Foreign Minister Dr. Abdisalam Hadliye Omer to question him about recent revelation by the Foreign Affairs Secretary of Kenya, Amina Mohamed concerning agreement between Somalia and Kenya for out of court settlement of the maritime boundary dispute Somalia filed with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Hague. The Somali Government denied Kenya claim. But, In consideration of the ill-timed proclamation letter of President Hassan dated June 30, 2014 on the limits of the Somali territorial Sea (Exclusive Economic Zone) to UN Commission on the Law of the Sea (UNCLS), the revelation has provoked strong public anger for suspected mishandling of the case. Close to 1,000 Somali activists signed a petition for the defense of Somali Territorial Sea as per Law 37 of 1972. The ICJ will start hearing the case on July 13, 2015. Another scary development is the retreat of AMISOM and Somali National Forces from many areas in the Lawer Shabelle region after Al Shabab attacked ferociously Burundi forces at Leego base and killed between 50 and 70 soldiers. The local population is dumbfounded by the explanation of the government and African Union that the retreat was a military strategy. Many had to flee the vacated area for fear from Al Shabab.

US involvement destabilizes Somalia

U.S. involvement is bad for multilateral ventures, destabilizes the region itself, and provides the impetus for future conflict. Howard, Business Day, 2009 [Anthony, Business Day (South Africa) August 12, 2009 “Yankees go home” SECTION: OPINION & EDITORIAL, Lexis, 7/15/15, ECD II]

Hillary Clinton's visit to SA has put US foreign policy in the spotlight once more. Despite a lot of messages of hope from US President Barack Obama, there has been little change in US military action in major theatres of war. The Americans' overt and covert involvement in the Horn of Africa and the presence of Africom in Djibouti continue to destabilise the region, with no commitment evident to withdraw their troops from Ethiopia. And yet Ms Clinton would like to tell the Kenyan and South African governments how to run their affairs and lobby for military support in the Somali conflict. The African Union (AU) has already told the US to withdraw its troops from Africa, but to date they continue to covertly support conflict, on a continent where they have a very bad track record in military terms. And now the US secretary of state attempts to justify the establishment of US military bases on African soil. Any development of this nature has to be opposed by the AU at all costs. America's only interest in the African continent is the control of oil supplies, hence their involvement in the Sudan. No US president has visited any African country in the past 10 years that was not an oil or gas producer and supplier. The role of the US government and the CIA in the Angolan, Congolese and Somali wars has wreaked untold havoc on the lives of millions of African civilians. And yet the US continues to pursue with force its disastrous policies on a continent where it has no business or mandate from the United Nations to be at all. Since the US has proven itself to be a morally bankrupt nation with its illegal wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, perhaps it should think seriously about getting its own house in order, before prescribing to African countries and lobbying support for their indefensible wars of aggression. The message of our government to Ms Clinton should be: "Yanks go home and take your troops with you."

A Somali government collapse would spread throughout the Horn of Africa BBC, 2010 [Monitoring Africa – Political May 21, 2010 Friday ,“Djibouti leader cautions over collapse of Somali government”, Lexis, 7/15/15, ECD II]

The President of Djibouti, Ismail Umar Guelleh, while speaking at a United Nations Security Council meeting in New York, has said the situation in Somalia seems to be getting out of hand. The Djibouti leader said it is possible that the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia [TFG] might collapse due to the conflict between its topmost officials in addition to the paralysing financial constraints they face. Ismail Umar Guelleh accused the international community of having failed to address the situation in Somalia and warned that unless sincere efforts to resolve the situation in made, it likely to affect the wider horn of Africa region. The Djibouti leader said the dangers posed by Somalia will not be confined to the Horn of Africa regions but will spread to the rest of the continent and even, to Asia, Europe and North America. President Ismail said armed opposition groups are getting stronger by the day and are now almost ousting the government, adding that they might take advantage of this latest

conflict between top TFG officials to further push the government out. He appealed to the United Nations and the wider international community to treat the situation in Somalia with the seriousness it deserves. He also said the United Nations and the international community will take the blame if the TFG is ousted having failed to give it the necessary support. He said the African Union by itself is unable to restore peace and security in Somalia and that the United Nations intervention is quite necessary.

I/L – Somalia Regional SpilloverHigh risk conflict in Somalia will spill over to the region– humanitarian crisis, economic interests, and regional security prioritiesMuhammed, 14 (Hassan Yussuf, Department of Global Political Studies, Faculty of Culture and Society, Malmo University, Spring 2014, “The Role of External Actors in the Somali Conflict A Post 2000 Study of Kenya and Ethiopia’s Involvement In the Conflict of Somalia”, https://dspace.mah.se/bitstream/handle/2043/17781/Hassen's%20Thesis%20latest%20version.pdf?sequence=2)ZB

b) Although Brown suggests that “regional dimensions of internal conflicts also need to be examined more closely on a case by case

basis” (Brown, 1996: 601), internal conflicts often have regional impacts in several aspects. Internal wars may pose serious threats against other neighboring states provoking them to be involved in the internal conflicts of others. These types of threats include security threats, refugee

problems, economic problems, military problems and others that can provoke neighboring

states to involve in local conflicts (Brown, 1996: 591). To start with the refugee problems, Brown explains that

refugees are the result of internal conflicts. Conflict parties do not consider civilian casualties often and thus people get displaced from their homes, often to neighboring countries where they can get security (Brown, 1996: 592). Almost all post-Cold War conflicts have displaced a minimum of one million people each. Therefore, refugees pose security, economic and social consequences in the hosting countries. With the status of refugee, identity groups such as terror organizations operating in neighbor countries create insecurity in hosting countries in many ways. They recruit refugees who lived in host countries in order to carry out terrorist activities which in turn forces neighbor states to intervene in an internal conflicts of other states (Brown, 1996: 592).

Similarly, it is obvious that local conflicts have a “spill over” potential in creating military problems for neighboring states. In this case arms can be shipped to rebel groups in neighboring states. Moreover, rebel groups can use territories of neighboring states for operation or sanctuary and use this opportunity to strike their adversaries or else use it to attract international attentions to their cause. This is a clear indication of how an internal conflict can generate

instability in another state further creating political instability in the conflict region. However, Brown

also states that “although neighboring states can be innocent victims of turmoil in their regions; they are often active contributors to violence, escalation and regional instability” (Brown, 1996: 599, 600). In such situations the threatened state launches attacks in pursuit of defending its national security. c) The third important issue that Brown (1996: 590, 603) discusses is the international efforts to address problems posed by internal conflicts. The fact that almost all internal conflicts involve neighboring states in one way or the other, and that internal conflicts have implications for regional stability means that, there needs to be an international response to prevent, manage and resolve the problems a through variety of policy instruments. On intervention, Brown (1996) gives four types of examples of interventions of neighboring states in others’ internal conflicts. First, humanitarian intervention: this is when neighboring states are motivated only by humanitarian situations in internal conflicts. The other is defensive intervention; an intervention, which is borne out of insecurity of cross border infiltrations of refugee and other problems. The motive of this type of intervention is therefore not to end the conflict holistically but to stop it from spreading to own borders by intervening in an internal conflict of others in the pretext of defending national security. For instance, Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 to eliminate Palestinian elements operating in Lebanon’s territory (Brown, 1996: 579). Third, protective intervention: this is an intervention of states in an internal conflict with objectives of backing up of different identity groups to secure a certain agenda. This action is often justified by national security concerns. The fourth type of intervention is opportunistic intervention. This type intervention takes place when neighboring states take advantage of internal weaknesses and turmoil. Such internal weaknesses have the potential to create windows of opportunities for other states which have strategist interest and make them vulnerable for invasion and manipulation. Neighboring states usually support friendly rebel groups as well as engage in proxy wars with other rival states while trying to mask their actions with innocence. This type of intervention includes

the sending of formal forces in others’ conflicts in the context of peace intervention (Brown, 1996: 5898ff). When conflicts break out in countries, the international community has a responsibility to intervene and help the people in that country to overcome the problems posed by the conflict. One important way of helping them to overcome those problems is to help them resolve the conflict. Brown (1996: 620) suggests that the international community needs to take strong decision in resolving the conflicts. He argues that conflicts may not be ready for resolution at times, but the willingness of international community to help should be in place when conflicting parts need to resolve the conflict. Since peace processes and conflict resolution methods need large resources, Brown suggests the international community to accumulate their efforts and resources in resolution approaches when conflicts are ripened for resolution. In this way, there is a lot that the international community can do to resolve the conflict and bring peace. Here, Brown suggests steps such humanitarian assistance for needy people, a fact finding and mediation mission and traditional peacekeeping forces. Furthermore, during conflict resolutions, Brown underlines multifunctional peacekeeping operation. This operation helps with the reconstruction, economic and political systems building (Brown, 1996: 2). However, all conflicts are not either ready or not ready for resolution, there are conflicts where the majority of the actors wish to resolve their conflicts peacefully but need help from the outside world, while some militants and radical elements in the conflict are unwilling to compromise and settle for anything less than securing their goals. Examples of such conflicts happened in Sirilanka, Israel and Palestine and Northern Ireland. According to Brown, there is no simple solution for this, but if the majority of the people and top leaders in the relevant communities want peace and accept the provisions of peace processes, then the international community can help and support them to deal with the militants even forcefully if so is needed (Brown, 1996: 622). While doing so, Brown argues that a two track strategy is important. The first one is co-optation: In this strategy popular support for militants should be undercut through implementation of political and economic reforms to address broad-based societal problem and marginalizing the militants by bringing more of them in the mainstream process through offering their leaders political and economic instruments. The second strategy that Brown suggests is an aggressive campaign of neutralization. In this strategy it includes the cutting off of arms and logistical sources from the militants and search-and-capture or search-and-destroy missions. This is mainly the responsibility of national leaders, but there are roles that international actors can play here as well with the blessing of the local actors (Brown, 1996: 622). In this case, both Kaldor’s notion of ‘new wars’ and Brown’s approach of international intervention in an internal conflict are relevant for the Somali conflict. Because of the multiplicity of internal and external actors in the conflict and the fact that these conflicting actors are also using transnational connections, it can be described as ‘new wars’. And as Brown (1996, 571-601) described it, political and elite-level contradictions are the most important factors in creating and sustaining conflict. In this perspective, internal conflicts have regional dimensions posing serious threats to neighboring states further provoking them to involve in the local conflict in the context of insecurity. This is what exactly happened in the Somali conflict and attracted great deal of attention from the international community. Accordingly, the international community, mainly, the neighboring states, IGAD, AU and UNSC have for many years involved in resolving the conflict by engaging different actors within the conflict. Therefore, it is appropriate to examine the Somali conflict from these two perspectives in order to gain better insights. 3.2. Literature Review This section presents a literature review on the topic in questions, which is the role of external actors in an internal conflict in general

and in the Somali conflict in particular. Many scholars agree that there are conditions under which third parties choose to intervene in an internal conflict. Pearson et al (see in Regan, 1998: 2) identified geography, geopolitical motives and the level of conflict are the most important factors directly associated with military

interventions of third parties in an intrastate conflict. According to Pearson, states are most likely to intervene when the level of the conflict is high, or have cross-boundary or ethnic affinity with the targeted state, or else when the intervener have ‘transactional’ interest, i.e. economic, military, educational and political linkage with the target country (Regan: 1998: 3). In a similar issue, Hans Morgenthau notes that interventions take place

when national interests are at stake (Regan, 1998: 3). In other words, internal conflicts negatively affect

international security in general and neighbouring states in particular and this triggers

external interventions . A good example of this realist view is that the United Nations intervened several internal conflicts

after perceiving them as threats against international peace and security as well as humanitarian crises. Similarly, individual states intervene in conflicts in other regions or in an intrastate conflict often with concerns of national interest even if they are geographically far away from them (Geib, 2009: 129). For example, the piracy problem in Somalia’s coast affected negatively most countries in the world as the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden are important passages of most transnational vessels transporting goods. It threatens the global transaction of goods and transport system for it directly and indirectly affects the global economy. For this reason, many Western countries sent naval forces to the coast of Somalia to fight piracy (Harper, 2012: 145) Moreover, researchers like Gleditsch et al (2008, 5, 8) have argued that civil wars and internal conflicts have strong ties with interstate disputes

elsewhere in the world. States interfere in internal conflicts of other countries to counteract other external states as proxy. And

when more external actors of different behaviour and interest involve in an internal conflict of others, the ‘spill over’ increases and conflict grows to an international level. States often collaborate with friendly local actors in order to advance their own interest. They are also involved in the conflict resolution process and strive to

produce a solution of their favour while the counterpart states also act in the same manner (Gleditsch et al, 2008: 5, 8.) Although conflicts can affect countries and states that have no geographical relation with it, it is obvious that conflicts have negative impacts on the socio-economic, security and development aspects in their regions in producing refugee spill over, decreased trade and investment as well as communal confrontations since arms may fall in the hands of civilians (Oxford Anlytica, 26 Jan. 2011). Some researchers have proven that stability in nearby countries is a key factor for development and economic growth while instability in one country affects neighbouring states negatively. In other words, both peace and conflicts in one country has an

impact on other countries in that region. Conflicts, instability and violence are not geographically sealed

(The World Economy, V.34: 9). As internal conflicts spill over impacts in their region is obvious, the regional involvement in the conflict is also obvious. The dimensions and issues of the conflict might as well change due to increased actors. Regional states cannot stand with nearby conflicts where transnational criminal units and conflicting elements operate. Therefore, states get involved into conflicts in other countries because of their national and regional security (Geib, 2009: 131). In Somalia’s conflict almost all scholarly research has similarly proven insecurity spill over as the most significant reason for regional interferences in the internal conflict of Somalia. The vacuum created by the downfall of the Somali state generated a large scale of criminal and terrorist

activities in Somalia and the region. The spill over effect of this conflict has further become an international problem. However, it has tremendously affected peace, security and development in the east African region. Al-Shabaab, as Al-Qaeda’s wing in the region, operates in Somalia where they recruit even nationals of other regional states to spread violence in the region while the regional counties are engaged in tackling the problem of spill over into their territories (Mulugetta, 2009:13)

! - African War goes globalAn instability induced African war goes globalGlick 7, Middle East fellow at the Center for Security Policy, Condi’s African holiday,http://www.carolineglick.com/e/2007/12/condis-african-holiday.php?pf=yes

The Horn of Africa is a dangerous and strategically vital place . Small wars, which rage continuously, can

easily escalate into big wars. Local conflicts have regional and global aspects. All of the

conflicts in this tinderbox, which controls shipping lanes from the Indian Ocean into the Red Sea, can

potentially give rise to regional, and indeed global conflagrations between competing regional actors

and global powers

Large-scale African conflict will draw in outside powers and escalate to nuclear warDeutsch 02 (Political Risk Consulting and Research Firm focusing on Russia and∂ Eastern Europe)∂ [Jeffrey, Founder of Rabid Tiger Project “SETTING THE STAGE FOR WORLD WAR III,†� Rabid Tiger Newsletter, Nov 18, http://www.rabidtigers.com/rtn/newsletterv2n9.html]

The Rabid Tiger Project believes that a nuc lear war is most likely to start in Africa. Civil wars in the Congo (the country formerly known as Zaire), Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone, and dom estic instability in Zimbabwe, Sudan and other countries, as we ll as occasional brushfire and other wars (thanks in part to "national" borders that cut across tribal ones) turn in to a really nasty stew. We've

got all too many rabid tigers and potential rabid tigers, who are willing to push the button rather than risk being seen as wishy-washy in the face of a mortal threat and overthrown. Geopolitically sp eaking, Africa is open range. Very few countries in Africa are beholden to any particular power. South Africa is a major exception in this respect - not to mention in that she also probably already has the Bomb. Thus, outside powers can more easily find client states there than, say, in Europe where the political lines have long since been drawn, or Asia where many of the countries (China, India, Japan) are powers unto themselves and don't need any "help," thank you. Thus, a n African war can attract outside involvement very quickly. Of course, a proxy war alone may not induce the Great Powers to fight each other. But an Af rican nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration , if the other powers are interested in a fight. Certainly, such a s trike wo uld in the first place have been facilitated by out side help - financial, scientific, engineering, etc. Africa is a n ocean of troubled waters, and some peo ple love to go fishing.

USAID Solves

UniquenessHumanitarian crisis continues in the Horn, especially in Somalia; long term response keyMargesson et al 12 (Rhoda, study coordinator, Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy; Ted Dagne, Specialist in African Affairs; Charles E. Hanrahan, Senior Specialist in Agricultural Policy; Lauren Ploch, Specialist in African Affairs; Dianne E. Rennack, Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation; Marjorie Ann Browne, Specialist in International Relations; Susan G. Chesser, Information Research Specialist; “Horn of Africa Region: The Humanitarian Crisis and International Response,” Congressional Research Service, January 6, 2012, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42046.pdf) BR

As a result of the worst drought in 60 years, regional conflicts, and conflict within states, a humanitarian emergency of massive proportion has unfolded over the past year in the Horn of Africa region. Current estimates suggest that more than 13.3 million people are currently affected, 250,000 of whom need food assistance in the near term to avoid death. Somalia has been hardest hit so far, creating population displacement within its borders and a refugee crisis of nearly 1 million people in the region, primarily in Kenya and Ethiopia. The international community continues to respond

with a massive humanitarian operation that reached full strength in mid 2011. Although food security has begun to improve, the situation remains very fragile, particularly in southern Somalia, where conditions are considered among the worst in the world. Humanitarian needs are expected to demand sustained attention

well into 2012. While life-saving assistance is the current priority, long-term responses may be needed to break the disaster cycle in the Horn. Though triggered by drought, the humanitarian emergency is complicated by political and security pressures within, between, and among the various countries in the region. The recent deterioration of security conditions along the Kenya-Somali border, security incidents within the Dadaab refugee camp complex in northeast Kenya, and increasing restrictions by Al Shabaab, an Islamist insurgency led by an Al Qaeda affiliate, on humanitarian access in Somalia all have had an impact on the relief effort.

The situation in the Horn is dire, despite attempts at aidMargesson et al 12 (Rhoda, study coordinator, Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy; Ted Dagne, Specialist in African Affairs; Charles E. Hanrahan, Senior Specialist in Agricultural Policy; Lauren Ploch, Specialist in African Affairs; Dianne E. Rennack, Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation; Marjorie Ann Browne, Specialist in International Relations; Susan G. Chesser, Information Research Specialist; “Horn of Africa Region: The Humanitarian Crisis and International Response,” Congressional Research Service, January 6, 2012, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42046.pdf) BR

All these factors add to the development challenges facing the region. The countries in the Horn are among the world’s poorest, with low human development indicators. Many of their people rely largely on rain-fed subsistence farming, leaving them particularly vulnerable to drought and erratic rainfall patterns. With the exception of Djibouti, which has almost no arable land, over three-quarters of these countries’ populations earn their living through agriculture or nomadic pastoralism. Parts of the region are chronically food insecure. Aid groups contend that while poor weather conditions have contributed to the scope of the current disaster, the humanitarian crisis also results from poor planning and policies that have made populations more vulnerable to drought. In addition to providing emergency relief, the international community

has responded to previous droughts by establishing early warning systems and “safety nets” to mitigate the types of impact poor climate conditions are having on the region. Without these mechanisms in place, experts say the current crisis would have been worse. And yet, rapidly rising food and fuel prices in the past year have left many families struggling to cope, and poor infrastructure and insecurity continue to limit humanitarian access in some areas.

Somalia is doing the worst of allMargesson et al 12 (Rhoda, study coordinator, Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy; Ted Dagne, Specialist in African Affairs; Charles E. Hanrahan, Senior Specialist in Agricultural Policy; Lauren Ploch, Specialist in African Affairs; Dianne E. Rennack, Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation; Marjorie Ann Browne, Specialist in International Relations; Susan G. Chesser, Information Research Specialist; “Horn of Africa Region: The Humanitarian Crisis and International Response,” Congressional Research Service, January 6, 2012, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42046.pdf) BR

Continuing insecurity and drought have had a disproportionate impact on Somalia, a country already dealing with a protracted humanitarian emergency. Somalia’s population is estimated to be

approximately 9 million. According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) roughly 4 million people inside Somalia are negatively impacted by continuing insecurity and drought and are in need of food, water, vaccinations and health care. Of those, three million are in conflict zones and areas difficult to reach. These figures includes nearly 1.5 million Somali IDPs. Mogadishu reportedly has over 300 IDP camps with at least 370,000

IDPs. An Islamist insurgency led by an Al Qaeda affiliate, Al Shabaab, complicates the delivery of international aid to famine-struck areas, an issue examined in greater detail later in this report. As the effects of the drought worsened

in 2011, many aid agencies, including the World Food Program (WFP), have been unable to reach populations in parts of southern Somalia due to restricted access imposed by Al Shabaab. Dire conditions have forced many to flee their in search of aid at increasingly crowded refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia and in IDP camps in and around Mogadishu.

While famine conditions have decreased since the height of the crisis, the affected populations remain extremely vulnerable and a return to famine is quite possible, particularly if relief efforts are interrupted.

USAID is weak in SomaliaShinn 11 (David H, former U.S. ambassador to Burkina Faso and Ethiopia, “U.S. Policy towards the Horn of Africa” International Policy Digest 10/13/11 http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2011/10/13/u-s-policy-towards-the-horn-of-africa/) BR

The immediate problem for the United States is the crisis in Somalia. Washington strongly opposes al-Shabaab but is increasingly concerned about the ability of the TFG to establish a viable government in Somalia. It has cordial relations with Somaliland, which in 1991 declared its unilateral declaration of independence. On the other hand, the United States is not prepared to recognize Somaliland’s independence until the African Union does so. In the fall of 2010, Washington announced a new “dual track” policy for Somalia whereby it said it would continue to support the TFG while providing more assistance to Somaliland, semi-autonomous Puntland and even try to work with anti-Shabaab groups in south and central Somalia. While some additional funding has gone to Somaliland and Puntland, the amounts have been modest and the leaders of both entities are disappointed with the results so far. It has not been possible to

put development assistance into those parts of Somalia under al-Shabaab control. It has even been difficult to respond to the severe famine in those areas.

Aid in the Horn PossibleIt is possible to deliver aid to Somalia despite difficultiesMargesson et al 12 (Rhoda, study coordinator, Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy; Ted Dagne, Specialist in African Affairs; Charles E. Hanrahan, Senior Specialist in Agricultural Policy; Lauren Ploch, Specialist in African Affairs; Dianne E. Rennack, Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation; Marjorie Ann Browne, Specialist in International Relations; Susan G. Chesser, Information Research Specialist; “Horn of Africa Region: The Humanitarian Crisis and International Response,” Congressional Research Service, January 6, 2012, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42046.pdf) BR

Since July, WFP has scaled up assistance in Somalia and has begun to open new routes by land and air to serve famine-stricken areas, although it remains restricted from operating in Al Shabaab

territory. WFP began food aid airlifts to Mogadishu in late July,35 and reports suggest that it has opened up a new logistics corridor to transport food supplies from Somaliland, through Ethiopia, to the Ethiopian border town of Dollo Ado. From there, food supplies can be transported across the border to people in accessible areas of southern Somalia.36 Other relief organizations have been able to continue operations in Al Shabaab-controlled areas, including multiple Islamic aid organizations and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which operates through the Somali Red Crescent Society.

Given the restricted access of WFP and other relief agencies, ICRC has significantly increased its delivery of food aid, feeding an additional 1.1 million southern Somalis affected by drought and conflict. Other international aid groups

assert that they have been able to continue operations through local partners, “if those delivering the aid

are accepted by the local communities and if the aid is not linked to political or military agendas.”37 The United States and other donors have also increasingly provided support for cash-for-work and voucher programs in areas where access is limited.

USAID has several programs in the Horn to increase safety nets and provide development aidKnopf 12 (Kate Almquist, formervisiting policy fellow at the Center for Global Development, “Africa Doesn't Need the Pentagon's Charity - Why I'm Grumpy About DOD's Development Programs in Africa,” Center for Global Development: Ideas to Action, 8/28/12, http://www.cgdev.org/blog/africa-doesnt-need-pentagons-charity-why-im-grumpy-about-dods-development-programs-africa) BR

The U.S. State Department has said that it is focusing not only on a response to address shortterm needs and save lives, but also to build capacity to reduce the cycles of famine and failure that occur repeatedly in the Horn region. In the past year, in coordination with the international

community, the U.S. government has worked to preposition food stocks in the region, increase funding for early warning systems, and strengthen assistance in other sectors, such as health, water, and sanitation. On July 6, 2011, through its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), USAID activated a regional Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) in Nairobi, Kenya, and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It also set up an interagency task force to coordinate and facilitate the humanitarian response to the drought crisis through the Washington, DC-based Response Management Team (RMT). In addition, the U.S. government reissued or renewed a number of U.S. disaster

declarations in countries in the Horn in response to the ongoing complex emergencies. The United States is the largest bilateral donor of emergency assistance to the eastern Horn of Africa. As of December 22, 2011, USAID reported that the United States had provided $650.5 million of humanitarian assistance in FY2011, of which $435.2 million (67%) was emergency food aid.47 Thus far in FY2012, USAID estimates that total humanitarian assistance to the Horn amounts to nearly $220 million of which $194 million is for food

aid.48 Those funds financed the provision of 492,530 metric tons of food in FY2011 distributed by WFP throughout the region and by Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in Ethiopia. In FY2012, 144,880

metric tons of food have so far been distributed. U.S. food aid has been made available primarily through Food for Peace Title II (Emergency Assistance) or from International Disaster Assistance (IDA)-funded Emergency Food Assistance for Drought-Affected Areas. In the longer term, the United States is focusing its aid on helping countries in the Horn build safety net programs and develop their agricultural sectors. For example, Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) provides food and cash to an estimated 7.5 million Ethiopians in exchange for work building community assets such as roads, schools, and clinics. The main U.S. input into this multi-donor

financed project is commodity food aid provided as Food for Peace Act Title II nonemergency food aid.49 USAID’s Feed the Future (FtF) program, initiated in 2009 as a major foreign aid initiative, is developing approaches to agriculture in the Horn that address hunger and food insecurity.50 In Kenya, for example, the United States is assisting in a multi-year agricultural development program under FtF that aims to support Kenyan investment in staple food value chain development, including livestock and livestock products; rural finance; policy analysis, advocacy, and capacity-building; agricultural research and technology transfer; and water and sanitation.51

AFRICOM undermines USAIDAFRICOM undermines USAID and State Department – funding trade-off and overstepping boundsFalconer 8 (Bruce, editor at multiple online and physical magazines such as The American Scholar, “AFRICOM: State Dept., USAID Concerned About "Militarization" of Foreign Aid,” Mother Jones, Jul. 18, 2008, http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2008/07/africom-state-dept-usaid-concerned-about-militarization-foreign-aid) BR

The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), an organizational construct intended to unify the entire African continent (except Egypt) under a single U.S. commander, is due to become fully operational September 30. As described by the Pentagon, it will be a new sort of animal, a combatant command "plus," that will have the ability to mount military operations, but which will rely primarily on "soft power." AFRICOM "will support, not shape, U.S. foreign policy on the continent," Theresa Whelan, the Pentagon's deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs, told a House subcommittee on Wednesday. But despite official assurances, concern is

mounting that AFRICOM could stray from its "supporting" role to become the new center of power for U.S. activities in Africa. The issue is central to the ongoing debate over the new command's proper place. At this week's hearing of the House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, the first of two scheduled hearings on AFRICOM, General Michael Snodgrass and Ambassador Mary Yates, both members of the command's nascent leadership, assured lawmakers that AFRICOM is "a listening, growing, and developing organization dedicated to partnering with African governments, African security organizations, and the international community to achieve U.S. security goals by helping the people of Africa achieve the goals they have set for themselves." And to its credit, AFRICOM has gone out of its way to calm fears that it represents a new imperial push into the Dark Continent. (It even hosts a blog to keep the public informed of its progress.) AFRICOM's primary purpose, say proponents, will be to coordinate with the State Department and USAID in the pursuit of "stability operations"—one of the Pentagon's latest enthusiasms, encoded in Directive 3000.05, which places humanitarian and relief

operations on a level plane with combat missions. (You can read my earlier piece on the subject here.) But even AFRICOM's good intentions cannot disguise the geopolitical realities that compelled its creation. It's not about doing good works in impoverished countries for their own sake; It's about national interest. Countering China's growing military and economic influence in Africa and assuring access to some of the world's last remaining oil reserves top the list. (The United States now imports just as much oil from Africa as it does from the Middle East.) Terrorism also figures into the equation—primarily the elimination of ungoverned spaces terrorists might call home.

Not that these are unreasonable goals. On one level, the U.S. military's ability to adapt is impressive. But problems could arise if AFRICOM begins to lead policy rather than follow it. A report released yesterday by Refugees

International shows that, in the years since 9/11, the Pentagon's slice of the nation's foreign aid

budget has ballooned at the expense of more traditional providers, like USAID . From the report:

Although several high-level task forces and commissions have emphasized the urgne need to modernize our aid infrastructure and increase sustainable development activities, such assistance is increasingly being overseen by military institutions whose policies are driven by the Global War on Terror, not by the war against poverty. Between 1998 and 2005, the percentage of Official Development Assistance the Pentagon has controlled exploded from 3.5% to nearly 22%, while the percentage controlled by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) shrunk from 65% to 40%. As for foreign military financing, the Pentagon's bread and butter, "more than half of the FY09 budget request... is for just two countries—Djibouti and Ethiopia—considered key partners in the continental War on Terror." AFRICOM has countered criticism of its "militarization" of foreign aid with reminders that its command structure will include representatives of other federal agencies, such as State and USAID, to ensure that policy is still guided by civilian authorities. This, for example, explains

Ambassador Yates' appointment as "deputy to the commander for civil-military activities." But though the Pentagon had planned for 25 percent of AFRICOM's headquarters staff to come from federal civilian agencies, it recently revised the requirement down to just 4 percent, citing difficulty on the

part of partner agencies to spare staff for inter-agency assignments. As the GAO's John Pendleton told

the House subcommittee: Although DOD has often stated that AFRICOM is intended to support, not lead, U.S. diplomatic and development efforts in Africa, State Department officials expressed concern that AFRICOM would become the lead for all U.S. government activities in Africa, even though the U.S. embassy leads decision-making on U.S. government non-combat activities in that country. Other State and USAID officials noted that the creation of AFRICOM could blur traditional boundaries among diplomacy, development, and defense, thereby militarizing U.S. foreign policy... Nongovernmental organizations are concerned that this would put their aid workers at greater risk if their activities are confused or associated with U.S. military activities.

Africom hurts USAID and DoS credibilityBrown 13 (David E., Senior Foreign Service member and Senior Diplomatic Advisor for Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “AFRICOM AT 5 YEARS: THE MATURATION OF A NEW U.S. COMBATANT COMMAND,” Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, The Letort Papers, August 2013 http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1164.pdf) BR

Has AFRICOM Done Development Work Badly? A second U.S. Government internal criticism of AFRICOM, and a subset of the first

criticism that AFRICOM is taking over the DoS lead in U.S. national security/foreign policy, is that the Command is: carrying out development work when it should not; and, 2) doing so badly. In

terms of 1), these critics believe the United States should restrict the activities of its military personnel to

training and equipping programs, and instead implement all development projects through USAID,

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations, and private development firms.92

Beyond AFRICOM “getting out of its (bureaucratic) lane,” officials at USAID have also been concerned that humanitarian and development projects could be “stigmatized” by links to the military,93 waste taxpayers’ money,94 and do more harm than good in the recipient countries, thereby undermining U.S. national security/foreign policy. These observers complain that AFRICOM’s development activities are largely ad hoc, without a plan to support lasting change, and without regard for a broader development strategy.95

AFRICOM hurts USAID by blurring the Civilian-Military divide.Ortiz 8 (Milady, writer at AUSA Institute of Land Warfare, “U.S. Africa Command: A New Way of Thinking,” National Security Watch 08-1, 13 March 2008, http://www.ausa.org/publications/ilw/ilw_pubs/nationalsecuritywatch/Documents/AFRICOMdraft11Mar08.pdf) BR

Blurring the Civilian-Military Divide. A matter of general concern is how the new structure of AFRICOM will affect traditional aid structures in both the United States and Africa. Domestically, while the State Department

and USAID welcome additional resources and aid from DoD for complex operations, there is a concern that the U.S. military may “overestimate its capabilities . . . [and] its diplomatic role in Africa.” Concern over the possibility of U.S. military efforts overshadowing diplomatic initiatives was expressed in a 2006

Congressional Research Service report, which observed that the blurring of civilian-military lines could “risk weakening the Secretary of State’s primacy in setting the agenda for U.S. relations with foreign countries and the Secretary of Defense’s focus on warfighting.”42 The increasingly vague line between aid and military development has the potential to adversely affect efforts

on the African continent. Officials at USAID, for example, are concerned that development programs could be “stigmatized” by links to the military, and that the authority of diplomats could be “confused” or “usurped.”43 In recent congressional testimony, Michael E. Hess, a senior official at USAID, noted that the growing DoD presence in Africa has the potential of “blurring the lines between diplomacy, defense and development.”44 A director at the Africa advocacy center TransAfrica Forum observed that African democracies are uncomfortable with the concept of DoD coordinating humanitarian aid.45

USAID Weak - Eritrea

USAID is specifically weak in Eritrea – Gayle Smith <3s EthiopiaSafran 6/15 (Chris, Staff writer at the Washington Free Beacon, “Obama Nominee for USAID Chief Criticized for Supporting Repressive African Regimes” 6/15/15 http://freebeacon.com/politics/obama-nominee-for-usaid-chief-criticized-for-supporting-repressive-african-regimes/) BR

Critics have come forward against President Obama’s nominee for USAID Chief, Gayle Smith, citing her support and relationships with oppressive regimes in Ethiopia, Uganda, and other African

countries. Smith, who is currently special assistant to the president and senior director at the National Security Council, was nominated for the position by the President on April 30. “There were major Africa policy blunders under the Clinton and Obama administrations that she should be asked about,” former U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Herman Cohen, told International

Business Times. Smith, along with her colleague Susan Rice, assistant secretary of state for African affairs at the time and now White House national security adviser, presided over failed talks to reduce political tension between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The two countries engaged in a two-year war from 1998 to 2000, and relations between the U.S. and Eritrea have suffered as a result of sanctions levied on the country based on unsubstantiated claims from the State Department.

Eritrean-USAID relations are bad and will get worse – Gayle Smith’s appointment provesWinsor 15 (Morgan, Breaking News Reporter for International Business Times covering Africa and the Middle East, “Amid Ethiopia Elections 2015, Obama's USAID Nominee Gayle Smith Slammed For Supporting Africa's Repressive Regimes” International Business Times May 20 2015 http://www.ibtimes.com/amid-ethiopia-elections-2015-obamas-usaid-nominee-gayle-smith-slammed-supporting-1927748) BR

While serving under former President Bill Clinton, Smith, along with her colleague Susan Rice, assistant secretary of state for African affairs at the time and now the White House national security adviser, were mediators in an ultimately failed attempt to reduce tensions between rivals Eritrea and Ethiopia. Shortly after Eritrea gained its independence from Ethiopia, the two countries returned to war in 1998. “They totally failed in the mediation and during the process they won the hatred of the president of Eritrea [Isaias Afwerki] because he accused them of plagiarizing the Ethiopian side,” Cohen said in a telephone interview. The two-year war led to massive causalities and internal displacement in both countries. Ethiopia deported tens of thousands of Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean descent from the country, which compounded Eritrea’s refugee crisis. The two countries remain bitter foes, and U.S.-Eritrean relations have since soured. The State Department has accused the Eritrean government of detaining dissidents, shutting down the independent press, stifling civil liberties and being controlled entirely by Afwerki, who has been

president since 1991 and heads Eritrea’s sole political party. Under both the Clinton and Obama administration, Smith and Rice have ordered tough sanctions against Eritrea for allegedly aiding Somali-based terror group al Shabaab – a claim which experts said was never proven. “As of now, everyone agreed there was nothing going on between

Eritrea and al Shabaab. But the U.S. didn’t want to lift sanctions,” said Cohen, a former U.S. ambassador to Gambia and Senegal. “I

contend that this was just because of Gayle’s personal animosity [with Eritrea].” Meanwhile, the United

States has maintained cozy relations with Ethiopia -- a country that has also been accused of human rights abuses, silencing political opposition and cracking down on independent journalism. Ethiopia has jailed 19 journalists, more than any other African country, and ranked fourth on the 2015 list of the top 10 most censored nations in the world by the Committee to Protect Journalists. Eritrea ranked first. Smith's friendly rapport with the Ethiopian government and other authoritarian regimes in Africa, including Rwanda and Uganda, has struck controversy among experts. Howard French, an author and longtime journalist who reported from Africa for many years, posted on Twitter last month

that Smith was "a disasterbacle in Africa policy” whose “long [and] cozy relationship [with] Ethiopia’s highly repressive regime should be cause for concern.”

USAID solves terror threatUSAID food security stops terror recruitmentNull 10 (Schuyler, editor of New Security Beat and writer/editor for the Wilson Center’s Environmental Change and Security Program, “Can Food Security Stop Terrorism?” New Security Beat, May 28 2010 http://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2010/05/can-food-security-stop-terrorism) BR

USAID’s “Feed the Future” initiative is being touted for its potential to help stabilize failing states and dampen simmering civil conflicts. Speaking at a packed symposium on food security hosted by the

Chicago Council last week, USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah called food security “the foundation for peace and opportunity – and therefore a foundation for our own national security.” “Famine and starvation create the conditions for extremism around the world, the same extremism our men and women in the armed forces are fighting right now in Afghanistan and Iraq and elsewhere,” said U.S. Representative Rosa DeLauro in a fiery

speech. “We fight hunger and poverty and we undercut the recruiting base for those that would threaten our families.”

USAID’s top priorities include stopping terror through investigating fraud and providing foreign assistanceTrujillo 15 (Catherine M. acting Deputy Inspector General of USAID, “Significant Activities” Office of Inspector General, January 2015, http://oig.usaid.gov/node/260) BR

Overseas Contingency Operations To assist Overseas Contingency Operations, OIG Investigations became an active participant on three Department of Justice (DOJ) task forces, the National Procurement Fraud Task Force (NPFTF), the International Contract and

Corruption Fraud Task Force (ICCTF), and the DOJ National Security Division (NSD), Non-governmental Task Force. The mission of the three task forces is to 1) promote the early detection, prevention, and prosecution of procurement and grant fraud; 2) conduct proactive activities of organizations receiving USAID funds for indications of fraud related to possible terrorist financing; and 3) stop the flow of funds to organizations that support terrorist activities. Investigations Intro Protecting foreign assistance programs and operations from fraud, waste, and abuse is a priority for Investigations. Thus, our focus is prioritize high-impact investigations involving program and employee integrity investigations, issues of Congressional interest, and matters involving threats to national security.

USAID stops conflict in “ungoverned spaces”Griswold 14 (Eliza, former fellow at the New America Foundation who won some journalistic awards, “Can General Linder’s Special Operations Forces Stop the Next Terrorist Threat?” New York Times Magazine, June 13 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/15/magazine/can-general-linders-special-operations-forces-stop-the-next-terrorist-threat.html)

Linder points out that the “art” of balancing security and development in weak states is the essence of Special Operations training. “U.S.A.I.D. is capitalizing on every tool in their tool kit, including using the

military to leverage the places where their programs are out there to reach,” Linder said. Nancy Lindborg

of U.S.A.I.D. says the last five years has shown that to help countries emerge from conflict and keep them from backsliding into chaos, “we’ve got to look at jobs, justice and security, and advance all three at once.” Linder and his team describe the vulnerable communities they are serving as

“ungoverned spaces,” not because they have no government but because their government institutions are weak at best, rapacious at worst. “Ungoverned spaces” is a bit of a shibboleth in the world of

counterterrorism post-2001, but the conditions it describes are real. “When I see ungoverned space,” says Corinne

Dufka, a senior researcher at Human Rights Watch, “I see failing rule-of-law institutions and predatory, criminal behavior by those — soldiers, police, politicians — mandated to protect instead of exploit their people. It is these factors that undermine rights and drive people into the hands of rebel, criminal and extremist groups. We should all be very worried.”

Eritrea supports Al-ShabaabEritrea explicitly supports al-Shabaab – money, armsPham TODAY, JULY 30TH WOW (J. Peter, Director of the Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs and a Research Fellow of the Institute for Infrastructure and Information Assurance at James Madison University, “Eritrea: The Horn of Africa’s Rogue Regime” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 7/30/15 http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/eritrea-the-horn-of-africas-rogue-regime/) BR

The shuttering of the consulate and the progress of the interagency evaluation of Eritrea's links to terrorism come none too soon. From halcyon days of the 1990s when President Bill Clinton hailed the newly independent country as on of the successes of the much-hyped, but elusive "African Renaissance" and First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton arrived at Asmara International Airport to find

the terminal draped with a gigantic banner proclaiming Yes, it takes a village, U.S. relations with the Eritrean People's Revolutionary Front (EPRF) regime have cooled considerably as the latter turned increasingly despotic (Isaias received his political and military training in Maoist China at the height of the Cultural

Revolution), fought a 1998-2000 war that claimed over 100,000 lives over a near-worthless strip of desert around the town of Badme (pre-war population, 1,500), and, worst of all, supported terrorism throughout the Horn of Africa. I warned in a column published at the beginning of the year, while the Ethiopian intervention against Somalia's Islamic Courts Union (ICU) radicals was still underway, that "while the Islamists have apparently abandoned concentrations in urban centers, they are not yet eliminated as a force" since "it is certainly conceivable that, having been beaten in conventional fighting but not quite destroyed, the Islamists and their foreign supporters could adopt the same non-conventional tactics that foreign jihadis and Sunni Arab insurgents have used to great effect in Iraq." Barely two months later, I concluded that the Somali Islamists were indeed "repeating

almost step-by-step the tactical and strategic evolution of the Iraqi insurgency." Last month, I reported: Spearheading the insurgency is al-Shabaab ("the Youth"), an extremist group which I reported last year emerged within the ICU's armed forces and is led by a kinsman and protégé of ICU council leader Sheikh Hassan Dahir 'Aweys, Adan Hashi 'Ayro, who trained in

Afghanistan with al-Qaeda before returning to Somalia after 9/11. Recent intelligence indicates that Shabaab efforts have been coordinated by Fazul Abdullah Muhammad, the reputed leader of al-Qaeda in East Africa who is on the FBI's "Most Wanted Terrorists" list with a $5 million bounty on his head for his role in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. Fazul, who is said to have been the target of the guided-missile destroyer USS Chafee's shelling of a stretch of the Somali coast [in June 2007], is reportedly working directly as intelligence chief for the

Shabaab campaign. And who is enabling the ICU/al-Shabaab radicals to carry out their murderous rampage? The June 27, 2007, report to the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee by the Monitoring Group on Somalia which Dr. Frazier referred to in her briefing was, rather uncharacteristically for the international body,

direct: "Huge quantities of arms have been provided to the Shabaab by and through Eritrea."

The report went on to state that: The Monitoring Group has observed a clear pattern of involvement by the Government of Eritrea in arms embargo violations. The Monitoring Group also concludes that the Government of Eritrea has made deliberate attempts to hide its activities and mislead the international community about its involvement. Giving the lie to denials by Eritrean officials, the UN monitors obtained a copy of the sales contract for a Russian-built Ilyushin-76 cargo plane used to transport arms and foreign fighters into Somalia to a front company for the EPLF regime, whose diplomats "based in a Gulf country" delivered the $200,000 down payment for the aircraft. The Eritreans also apparently chartered a Boeing 707 which made at least thirteen trips from Asmara to Mogadishu between November 2006 and June 2007, delivering an unknown quantity of surface-to-air missiles, suicide belts, explosives with timers and detonators, and other armaments to the Islamists and other insurgents fighting the

internationally-recognized, but weak "Transitional Federal Government" (TFG) of Somalia and its Ethiopian allies.

Eritrea maintains political and economic links with Al-ShabaabEthiopian Herald 15 (distributed by African Global Media, “Ethiopia: 'The Role of Finance in Defeating Al-Shabaab'” 2 March 2015) BR

One other supporter of Al-Shabaab has been Eritrea. The report notes that the Government of Eritrea acknowledged that it maintained political links with Somali armed groups, including Al-Shabaab. It

quotes the Monitoring Group which believed that this support, which included financial and military assistance, "at times amounted to as much as $40-60,000 per month", funneled "via Eritrean embassies in neighboring countries and carried into Somalia via couriers". The report suggests that the increased international scrutiny of Eritrea's actions has led to a decline in the relative importance of Eritrea as source of military

and financial support for al-Shabaab, but it adds that Eritrea appears to be looking for more subtle means of interfering in Somalia by building relationships with others as well as with 'spoiler groups". It quotes the Monitoring Group to the effect that Eritrea is likely to remain a "small but troubling part of the overall [security] equation" in Somalia for the foreseeable future.

Eritrea’s funding of al-Shabaab is ruining its already weak economy usaid could probably help idk (also a2 eritrea is too poor)Ashine 11 (Agraw, staff writer for Africa Review, “How does 'poor' Eritrea afford to fund Al-Shabaab?” Nation Media Group, Kenya, November 8 2011, http://www.africareview.com/Analysis/How-does-poor-Eritrea-afford-to-fund-Al-Shabaab/-/979190/1269140/-/m07jln/-/index.html) BR

Reports that three shipments of arms had been delivered by Eritrea to the Al-Qaeda-allied Al-Shabaab rebels that Kenya is battling inside Somalia were hotly refuted, but recent international investigations have cited Asmara for sponsoring terrorist activities in the region. But how does Eritrea, whose economy is currently worth less than $3 billion and is one of the poorest countries in the world, manage to finance Al-Shabaab and other Islamist groups in the Horn of Africa, as alleged by a UN report? The United Nation Development Programme's (UNDP) annual Human Development Index ranked Eritrea 177th out of 187 countries this year, while the country was not ranked at all in 2009 and 2010 due to a lack of data attributed to the country's secretive nature. It has been a wobbly path for the country of 5.4 million (according to the UN) which earned independence from arch-foe Ethiopia in 1993. President Isaias Afewerki, who has led a provisional government since, set out a vision of creating an "African Singapore" within ten years of independence. Solid backing Then, Eritreans were solidly united following years of bloody nationalistic conflict with Ethiopia, but the dream was to slowly peter out as the new country struggled to repair a war economy and its traditional subsistence

agriculture and fishing industries failed to bring in hard currency from exports. Mining since then has held hope for the economy, with a recent big find of the Bisha Gold concession expected to bring in some much-needed foreign currency. However the mine only became fully operational this year and is years from being a steady revenue stream. However, remittances from its sizeable diaspora have been a major cash cow. There are an estimated 1.6 million Eritreans--25 per cent of the population--living abroad. Each Eritrean in the diaspora must by law pay two per cent "tax" on their earnings to the government, in addition to a raft of other voluntary contributions. President

Isaias: Tight grip. More than 85 per cent of the diaspora pay this money, channelled through embassies and other government organisations. The Eritrean government has justified this cash through its stated policy of self-reliance meant to reduce its dependence on foreign aid from the West. But one decade after a border war with Ethiopia that claimed a conservative

estimate of 70,000 lives, the Eritrean government is still collecting a contribution to "defend against the Ethiopian invasion". While this money runs into the hundreds of millions of dollars, it still would not be enough to arm

and fund rebels in the Horn of Africa. Security analysts and a UN report claimed that other nations are also involved in financing rebel movements. Remains unclear The rich Middle East nation of Qatar is a key ally of President Isaias. His presidential jet was reportedly a gift from Qatar, while Doha is said to provide the biggest portion of

financial aid to Eritrea. Asmara and Doha also have a wider military cooperation agreement but it remains extremely unclear if this finds its way into Eritrea's regional activities. The embattled nation

of Iran also holds geopolitical interest in Eritrea, and has been accused of having a secret deal to set up a military base in the Red Sea port city of Assab to install long range missiles which it could use to target Israel. The Theran-Asmara military base deal remains a secret as the two nations have denied the report. However a group of Iranian experts were recently sighted in

Assab: Eritrea said the technicians were there to maintain an oil refinery. Individual tycoons from other Arab nations are also said to be channel money through Asmara to Al-Shabaab, while the UN Monitoring Group on Eritrea and Somalia report cited former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi as also sending arms and money to Eritrea. The

UN report said that Eritrea has built a massive network of arms smuggling across Africa and the Middle East. Eritrea is not a multiparty country and the ruling People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) plays a key role in daily government activities including in sectors such as banking.

USAID Weak in SomaliaUSAID is weak and understaffed in Somalia, which is increasingly unstableDevelopment Solutions for Africa 1 (UNICEF Health and Nutrition Programmes in Somalia: Final Report of an Evaluation Funded by UNICEF & USAID June 2001 http://www.unicef.org/evaldatabase/files/SOM_00-004.pdf) BR

UNICEF’s programme in Somalia was last evaluated in 1995. USAID, the major funding agency for UNICEF/Somalia,

requested an external evaluation of the programme as a part of the 1999 – 2000 contract. In

January 2001, Development Solutions for Africa was contracted by UNICEF Somalia to perform this evaluation. The evaluation of programmes in Somalia must be conducted with the understanding that there are severe constraints on effectiveness and accountability specific to Somalia. The major constraints are security, staffing, and lack of basic demographic data. The scale and depth of these constraints makes issues of supervision and accountability dramatically different in Somalia as compared to most other countries. The issue of security does not need to be reviewed in this report, except to say that lack of

security is evident everywhere in varying degrees in different regions at different times. The lack of security makes it difficult for UN and other international organizations to recruit and retain qualified staff. Even during field work for this evaluation, time was lost when a former guard, recently fired for theft, threw a live hand grenade into an INGO (international nongovernmental organisation) compound. This is but one example of the dangers of supervision and critical review of performance in Somalia. Large numbers of Somali health professionals have emigrated during the past 15 years. The few who are left completed their professional training in the 1980s. The vast majority of staff in the health facilities do not have any official certification and their technical and professional qualifications are based on “self-reported competence.” All nurses were trained between 1979 and 1986 as enrolled nurses and midwives. Auxiliary nurses, those with little or no formal training, perform most routine MCH services such as weighing mothers and children, maintaining the cold chain, and dispensing drugs and registering patients. […]

Staffing deficiencies also cause problems for donors. USAID states that reports are sometimes delayed, causing problems for their own reporting and monitoring requirements. Institutional memory is lost when positions go unfilled and there is often no overlap between those leaving and their replacements. Recently UNICEF filled the vacant positions, and positive steps have already been taken to resolve problems caused by the shortage of staff. Some of the management and coordination problems have been addressed. In the SACB UNICEF chairs, the Nutrition working group and is the vice chair for the Health Coordination Committee.

USAID pulled $50 mil from Somalia, which is at the mercy of al-ShabaabShephard 14 (Michelle, National Security reporter, “SOMALIA: Where famine is a crime,” The Star, June 2014 http://somalia.thestar.com/) BR

It was during this war that Al Shabab (meaning “the youth”) rose to power. The group’s popularity soared, as Somalis rallied in a patriotic battle against its longtime rival neighbour. By the time Ethiopia withdrew in 2009, the Shabab was a fighting force, imposing its strict Al Qaeda-influenced doctrine. When Abdisalam was born on his father’s maize farm, counterterrorism officials in Washington listed the group as a foreign terrorist organization. It would have devastating consequences in Somalia. Two years of war had displaced thousands but as the humanitarian crisis worsened, the U.S., Somalia’s number one donor, suspended $50 million in USAID funding, concerned it may benefit the Shabab. Aid groups trying to operate in Somalia had always been

forced to pay “taxes” to warlords or clan leaders to ensure their safe operation. But after the war, it was the Shabab who controlled the south and most of Mogadishu. The U.S. terrorism sanctions meant aid workers could be charged if support — inadvertently or not — went to the Shabab.

USAID Solves Al-Shabaab

USAID could stop al-Shabaab in Somalia by creating jobs, solves root cause of terrorPeacock 15 (Steve, staff writer for WND, “U.S. plan: Fight terror with green energy projects,” Whistleblower Magazine online, 5/3/15, http://www.wnd.com/2015/05/u-s-plan-fight-terror-with-green-energy-projects/) BR

The Obama administration’s interest in stabilizing the Horn of Africa region continues to heighten in the wake of Somalia-based jihadist group al-Shabaab’s recent cross-border massacre of Christians at Kenya’s Garissa University College. So, the Obama plan is to encouragement investment in Somalia’s renewable energy

sector. The “Economic Growth Activity” project being pursued by the Obama administration will hire contractors to advise the Somalian government in building an “economic foundation” in green infrastructure as well as in the agriculture and fisheries sectors, according to a planning document WND

discovered through routine database research. The project’s goals include the expansion of opportunities for Somalian small- and medium-sized businesses by bringing about systemic, regulatory changes in the nation, the notice says. Priority will be given to ventures that are “likely to attract women and youth who have been marginalized from pursuing economic opportunities.” The project aligns with

State Department spokeswoman Marie Harf’s assertion that creating jobs would help address the root causes

of terrorism . The initial cost of the U.S. Agency for International Development, or USAID, program is “not expected to exceed

$74 million” over five years. The document, known as a “presolicitation” notice, likewise acknowledges the administration’s goal of improving “production, employment, and incomes” in Somalia. Al-Shabaab has waged terror attacks against the national Somali government and its citizens as well as those of neighboring nations,

most notably Kenya. The terror organization has vowed vengeance in retaliation for Kenya’s military incursions against the Islamist group within Somalia.

USAID is committed to improving educationUSAID 11 (comprehensive/peer-reviewed assessment of USAID’s education strategy, “Opportunity Through Learning: USAID EDUCATION STRATEGY,” February 2011, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacq946.pdf) BR

In late 2010, USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah commissioned a new Agency wide Education Strategy to ensure that USAID’s global education investments would be informed by recent Presidential

policy guidance; grounded in the most current evidencebased analysis of educational effectiveness; and aimed at maximizing the impact and sustainability of development results. This 20112015 Education Strategy was

created to reflect these core principles. This Education Strategy is premised on the development hypothesis that education is both foundational to human development and critically linked to broad based economic growth and democratic governance. Research has demonstrated that education raises individual incomes and, in an enabling environment, can contribute significantly to economic growth. Education helps ensure that growth is broad based and reaches the poorest. Through its impact on economic growth, education helps catalyze transitions to democracy and

helps preserve robust democratic governance. Education also helps improve health outcomes. Access to education is a crucial precondition to educational impact, but what matters most thereafter is the quality of education.

Because of these important links to other powerful drivers of development, educational investments should be understood as dynamic and transformational levers of change. Embracing the President’s 2010 U.S. Global

Development Policy principles,USAID will invest education resources strategically to achieve measurable and sustainable educational outcomes through enhanced selectivity, focus, countryled

programming, division of labor and innovation. Additionally, critical priorities such as improved evaluation practices, gender integration and sustainability will undergird all of our investments. We will look for opportunities to achieve greater impact and scale, based on a country’s commitment to reform, potential to achieve rapid results, and relative educational need. We will also encourage phasing out of programs that are very small or nonstrategic, unless they can demonstrate a very high marginal impact on policy reform,system strengthening, program integration or innovation

piloting. As a result,USAID’s future global education footprint is expected to evolve in shape and size, and to be more closely coordinated with partner governments, civil society, other donors and the private sector.

Al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia is driven by counter-terror ops like AFRICOM and social conditions that USAID could alleviateBotha and Abdile 14 (Anneli, senior researcher on terrorism at the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria, and Madhi, Right to Peace Theme coordinator at Finn Church Aid, “Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia” Institute for Security Studies paper 266, September 2014 https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper266.pdf) BR

The Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy identifies ‘conducive conditions’ to terrorism. These ‘push factors’ or enabling

circumstances include political circumstances, including poor governance, political exclusion, lack of civil liberties and human rights abuses; economic circumstances; sociological circumstances,

e.g. religious and ethnic discrimination; counter-terrorism operations and their impact; and perceived injustice and international circumstances. Although a basic understanding of these conditions provides an insight into radicalisation, without pressure from domestic and personal circumstances individuals might support the ideas of extremists (nonviolent extremism) without becoming actively involved in acts of terrorism (violent extremism). Secondly, not all people faced with the same set of circumstances will become radicalised, while not all of those who are radicalised will join a terrorist organisation or commit acts of violence and terrorism.

Root Cause of al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia is socio-economic conditions like unemployment – USAID solvesBotha and Abdile 14 (Anneli, senior researcher on terrorism at the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria, and Madhi, Right to Peace Theme coordinator at Finn Church Aid, “Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia” Institute for Security Studies paper 266, September 2014 https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper266.pdf) BR

Interviewees were asked to identify their most important reasons for joining al-Shabaab. While the majority referred to religion (see above), 25% combined religion with economic reasons, while a further 1% referred to economic reasons and the desire for

adventure. These interviewees thought that al-Shabaab membership would become a career, which casts doubt on their ideological commitment to the organisation’s aims. One can possibly conclude,

therefore, that if most interviewees had been given access to other employment opportunities,

they would not have joined al-Shabaab. Education Education is identified as crucial to preparing young

people to obtain employment. Education can also counter later radicalisation, because better-educated people tend to participate in conventional politics, for various reasons: • They feel that they can influence the political process more than less educated people because they can articulate their opinions better • They are more aware of the impact of government on their lives • They generally have opinions on a wider range of political topics. They are also more likely to engage in political discussions with a wide range of people, while the less educated are more likely to avoid such

discussions • Educated people are more likely to have confidence in the political process and be an active member of a legitimate

political organisation19 The unfortunate reality in Somalia is that the formal education system came to a standstill when the Somali state collapsed in 1991, leaving an entire generation uneducated: 40% of interviewees received no education, while the remaining 60% received only limited education (Figure 10). The majority of interviewees who received a religious education or attended a madrassa recalled the level

of focus on the Qur’an. Of those who received some form of education, the majority left school between the ages of 10 and 14 (Figure 11). Interviewees also identified education and employment as two central

components of attempts to find a solution to Somalia’s problems , together with peace, stability,

reconciliation, etc. (Without these latter attributes, education and sustainable development will remain an illusive dream.) Higher

levels of education also decrease individuals’ propensity to engage in civil strife.20 Ultimately, the solution to radicalisation is not education as such, but the quality and type of education provided. Students need to learn from other disciplines, such as the social sciences, history and philosophy, that can equip them to be open to other opinions, to argue intelligently, and to understand domestic and international realities. Unemployment Lack of education adversely affects

employment opportunities. Selfemployment is an option when formal employment opportunities are limited, but lack of education is a limiting factor here too. In a study conducted in Uganda, Tushambomwe-

Kazooba showed that the majority of new business owners were not properly trained, leading to poor business planning and management decisions.21 In an attempt to assess the potential role unemployment plays in

radicalisation, interviewees’ employment levels are summarised in Figure 12. All those who were employed had low-income jobs, largely because they did not have the education needed to obtain better jobs. It was therefore not surprising that interviewees who defined adverse economic circumstances as a recruitment factor saw al-Shabaab as a potential employer, claiming that they were paid between $150 and $500 per month.

Solvency-

Africa doesn’t need Assistance Africa Does Not Need AfricomWoods 2007 (Woods E. Emira, Woods is the co-director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, DC, born in Liberia “AFRICOM: Wrong for Liberia, Disastrous for Africa”, Foreign Policy In Focus, July 26th, 2007) http://fpif.org/africom_wrong_for_liberia_disastrous_for_africa/

What Africa needs least is U.S. military expansion on the continent (and elsewhere in the world). What Africa needs most is its own mechanism to respond to peacemaking priorities. Fifty years ago, Kwame Nkrumah sounded the clarion call for a “United States of Africa.” One central feature of his call was for an Africa Military High Command. Today, as the African Union deliberates continental governance, there couldn’t be a better time to reject U.S. military expansion and push forward African responses to Africa’s priorities. Long suffering the effects of militaristic “assistance” from the United States, Liberia would be the worst possible base for AFRICOM. But there are no good locations for such a poorly conceived project. Africa does not need AFRICOM.

Africom Is Using a Humanitarian Aid As A FrontRock 2014 (Rock. Joeva, Joeva Rock is a graduate student in the Department of Anthropology at American University in Washington, DC focusing on colonial legacies in West Africa, “Militarized Humanitarianism in Africa”, May 14th, 2014)

http://fpif.org/militarized-humanitarianism-africa/

Rather than the “shock and awe” of Iraq, the military has attempted to put a friendly face on its expedition to Africa. This past March, writing in the New York Times, Eric Schmitt marveled at AFRICOM’s Operation Flintlock, a multinational and multiagency training operation in Niger. Schmitt wrote glowingly about fighting terrorism with mosquito nets: “Instead of launching American airstrikes or commando raids on militants,” he wrote, “the latest joint mission between the nations involves something else entirely: American boxes of donated vitamins, prenatal medicines, and mosquito netting to combat malaria.” Humanitarian and development missions like the ones outlined in Schmitt’s article are at the forefront of AFRICOM’s public relations campaign. But promoting AFRICOM as a humanitarian outfit is misleading at best. To put it simply, these projects are more like a Trojan Horse: dressed up as gifts, they establish points of entry on the continent when and where they may be needed.

AFRICOM and The Re-Colonization of AfricaPress TV.com 2013 (Unknown, “AFRICOM and The Re-Colonization of Africa”, March 7th, 2013)

http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/03/07/292298/africom-and-the-recolonization-of-africa/

While humanitarian aid facades play well on the American home front, in truth, and contrary to the words of its previous commander General Kip Ward, AFRICOM is all about oil, containing China, global domination and related US self-interested policy goals. One might ask why so much US attention is being focused on Africa. AFRICOM commander General Ham explained that Africa has “six or seven of the fastest growing economies in the world.” Vice Admiral Robert Moeller bluntly stated that AFRICOM was about preserving “the free flow of natural resources from Africa to the global market.” In other words, AFRICOM is tasked with the mission of maximizing profit opportunities for US multi-national corporations. And exploiting the fear of terrorism to further justify AFRICOM’s ever-tightening grip on Africa… Later on in the same AFRICOM press conference, Ambassador Dell let slip a secret of the US plan for the re-colonization of Africa. Couching his words in the diplomatic rhetoric of partnership when referring to AFRICOM-sponsored joint military training, the ambassador said, “An American captain, a Nigerian captain going through a course together, they develop lifelong relationships and friendships.” After lauding the values of the “culture of the American military,” he disclosed the intent of the plan: cultivating an African colonial officer corps loyal to the US and American values, which “these educational experiences can impart to officers who join us from other countries and that they bring back to their own military culture.” This is precisely what happened in the case of Mali coup leader Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, who was selected for training by the US State Department. And by pitting AFRICOM-trained military officers against CIA-supplied “al-Qaida” terrorists, the US achieves domination over African countries by maintaining predetermined levels of internal violence.

A2: Disads

Asia Pivot

No LinkAfricom Forces Extremely Limited, Would Not be Significant in Asia Pivot Warner ‘13 (Feb. 5th, 2013. World politics Review. “Capacity-Building Key to Africom's Mission.” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12689/capacity-building-key-to-africoms-mission GH)

Africom’s efforts to promote military professionalism extend to defense sector reform in post-conflict countries. Part of Africom’s engagement in these countries entails mentoring and advising defense ministries that tend to be either nascent institutions, as in South Sudan, or ones that have been weakened by conflict, as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Liberia. Institutional reform in these countries is directed toward addressing capacity gaps in areas like budgeting and human resource management to ensure that defense ministries are capable of managing, sustaining and employing the countries’ armed forces. Such engagement also seeks to increase the accountability of the armed forces to civilian authority and make it more likely that Africom’s investments in security cooperation are eventually supported by sound institutions in the long term. Until the current fiscal year, Africom’s service component commands -- U.S. Marine Forces Africa, U.S. Army Africa, U.S. Navy Africa and U.S. Air Force Africa -- had no assigned forces. Requests for forces for theater security cooperation engagements were thus made through the Global Force Management process, and had to compete with requests from other combatant commands. The absence of a reliable source of manpower was a constraint to Africom’s efforts to foster strong military-to-military relationships in Africa and expand partner capacity-building activities. In fiscal year 2013, however, U.S. Army Africa has been assigned a regionally aligned brigade that will deploy to the continent in small teams to conduct 96 security cooperation engagements in 35 countries. This new concept of operations for security cooperation in Africom’s area of responsibility is consistent with the Department of Defense’s vision articulated in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (.pdf) to build partner military capabilities through low-cost, small-footprint approaches that rely on rotational presence and bilateral or multilateral training exercises.

Africom Forces Practically Inoperably LeanMaj Jason Greenleaf ‘13(April 2013. USAF. “The Air War in Libya.” http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/digital/pdf/articles/Mar-Apr-2013/F-greenleaf.pdf GH)

US Africa Command (AFRICOM), tasked as the lead command for the operation, found itself beset with organizational deficiencies from the beginning. Secretary Gates unknowingly highlighted these inadequacies during activation of the command in 2008, noting that “AFRICOM’s mission is not to wage war, but to prevent it.” Initially tasked with a noncombatant evacuation operation and then reoriented toward a kinetic operation, the newest geographic combatant command had difficulty executing a mission it was never intended to carry out. The lean staff (300 personnel) had never practiced joint task force operations with its component commands; neither could its air operations center (AOC) serve as anything other than “a transportation command to support personnel and material transfers within the (theater).” Instead, AFRICOM had to rely heavily on European Command’s personnel, facilities, and

expertise to execute the mission successfully. Organized, trained, and equipped only to conduct theater engagement, AFRICOM struggled to put together a last-minute air campaign. The rapidly developing strategic direction and shortfall in resources complicated the command’s ability to carry out the mission, but external constraints also impeded progress. General Woodward quickly recognized the shortfalls and limitations that she faced with the organic capability at her disposal. As the mission evolved from a noncombatant evacuation operation, to a no-fly zone, to a mandate to protect civilians, the scope and sense of urgency grew as well. Unable to keep up with this sense of urgency, however, were the global force management / request for forces processes that the services use to apportion, assign, and allocate forces and “obtain required support not already assigned or allocated to the command.” Even though the first and only request for forces was submitted early and “almost immediately validated by AFRICOM and the Joint Staff, the approval for these resources simply did not occur in time for operations.”12 This want of resources proved the most challenging constraint in the development of strategy for the air campaign.13 Particularly detrimental was the absence of critical aircraft such as the E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), the E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), and additional tankers that arguably should have been there first but did not arrive until after combat operations began.14 Additionally, because intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets possessing full-motion video were not available until after NATO took over the mission, pilots found it difficult to distinguish the rebels from the forces loyal to Mu’ammar Gadhafi and to identify time-sensitive targets. Indeed, after the proGadhafi forces abandoned their conventional equipment, differentiating between the two forces without persistent ISR assets that could develop pattern-of-life information proved nearly impossible. Coupled with UNSCR 1973, which restricted the employment of NATO ground forces, the lack of ISR inhibited accurate battle damage assessment and led to additional strikes on “targets that might have already been neutralized.”15 The uncertainty about availability of assets and their arrival in-theater also affected the planners’ efficient use of aircraft. The decision regarding the basing of all airplanes coming into the theater appeared haphazard and did not effectively use the limited number of air-refueling assets available.16 The vastness of Libya, roughly the size of Alaska, and the lack of suitable airfields close to the no-fly zone increased the transit time and made nearly all assets reliant on air-to-air refueling. Basing decisions resulted in placing fighter assets closer to the conflict at the expense of the heavy aircraft. Consequently, to remain on station, the latter needed a tanker for each sortie. A classic Catch-22 dilemma followed as the planners had to choose between fueling the heavy command and control (C2)/ISR platforms or the strike assets. The relatively few ISR assets, preplanned targets, and moral necessity of minimizing collateral damage meant that most attacks had to use dynamic targeting as well as strike coordination and reconnaissance tactics to seek out and destroy pro-Gadhafi forces.17 By their very nature, these two missions make strike assets dependent upon air battle managers aboard the heavy C2 platforms.18 Planners often had enough gas for aircraft that could pair shooters with targets or for the shooters themselves—but seldom both. Once a deliberate planning effort began, liaison officers and planners made changes that maximized the effectiveness of constrained resources. Clearly, this operation underscored the importance of aerial refueling and gaining access to bases. The tyranny of distance and the associated complexity of basing decisions in this theater were not new phenomena, however. Planners should have identified and mitigated these issues much earlier.19

DOD has no plans for significant troop presence Ploch ’11 (Lauren is an Analyst in African Affairs. July 22, 2011. Congressional Research Service. “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa.” https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34003.pdf GH)

DOD signaled its intention to locate AFRICOM’s headquarters on the continent early in the planning process, but such a move is unlikely to take place for several years, if at all. The command will operate from Stuttgart, Germany, for the foreseeable future. DOD has stressed that there are no plans to have a significant troop presence on the continent. The East African country of Djibouti, home to the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) at Camp Lemonnier, provides the U.S. military’s only enduring infrastructure in Africa. As envisioned by the Department of Defense (DOD), AFRICOM aims to promote U.S. strategic objectives and protect U.S. interests in the region by working with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen their defense capabilities so that they are better able to contribute to regional stability and security. AFRICOM also has a mandate to conduct military operations, if so directed by national command authorities. In March 2011, for example, AFRICOM commenced Operation Odyssey Dawn to protect civilians in Libya as part of multinational military operations authorized by the U.N. Security Council under Resolution 1973.

Facilities are bare-bones, occupying troops relatively tiny Ploch ’11 (Lauren is an Analyst in African Affairs. July 22, 2011. Congressional Research Service. “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa.” https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34003.pdf GH)

At present, DOD’s Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) has a semipermanent troop presence at an enduring Forward Operating Site, Camp Lemonnier, in Djibouti with more than 2,000 U.S. military and civilian personnel in residence. The facility provides support for U.S. military operations in the Gulf of Aden area and supports DOD objectives in Yemen.30 The U.S. military is currently in a five-year lease with the Djiboutian government for Lemonnier, with the option to extend the lease through 2020. AFRICOM’s other Forward Operating Site is on the United Kingdom’s Ascension Island in the south Atlantic. U.S. military facilities in Rota, Spain; Sigonella, Italy; Aruba, Lesser Antilles; Souda Bay, Greece; and Ramstein, Germany, serve as logistic support facilities. The U.S. military also has access to a number of foreign air bases and ports in Africa and has established “bare-bones” facilities maintained by local troops in several locations. The U.S. military used facilities in Kenya in the 1990s to support its intervention in Somalia and continues to use them today to support counterterrorism activities. DOD refers to these facilities as “lily pads,” or Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs), and has access to locations in Algeria, Botswana, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia.

PoliticsAfrican analystst and policy makers hate AFRICOM in the squo, but are completely FOR the planMakinda 07 [ Samuel, the Chair of Security, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies at Murdoch University in Perth, Australia, writes a weekly column in the Nairobi-based Business Daily: Why AFRICOM Has Not Won Over Africans, http://csis.org/publication/why-africom-has-not-won-over-africans]JMS

The Bush Administration announced the creation of the long-discussed U.S. Command for Africa (AFRICOM) on February 6, 2007. For months before the announcement, policy makers and

policy analysts in Africa had been divided over this new unified command, and the debate

has not subsided . Nonetheless, AFRICOM was formally established on October 1, 2007, with its temporary headquarters at Stuttgart, Germany, for an initial 12 months. AFRICOM’s commander, General William E. Ward, the highest ranking African-American soldier, visited the African Union (AU) headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on November 8, 2007 in an attempt to obtain more African support for the command, but the AU remains divided over the

desirability of the force . AFRICOM is the sixth U.S. geographic combatant command to be established. The others are the European Command (EUCOM), the Central Command (CENTCOM), the Pacific Command (PACOM), the Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). Prior to creating AFRICOM, the Pentagon’s presence in Africa involved three geographic commands. EUCOM had responsibility for 42 states, stretching from Morocco in the north to South Africa; CENTCOM covered the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region, stretching from Kenya to Egypt; and PACOM monitored strategic developments in the Indian Ocean islands of Madagascar, Comoros and Seychelles. Thus, before AFRICOM, the United States had complete military coverage of Africa, but the entire continent did not come under a single command. Even with AFRICOM, the entire continent is not under one command because Egypt remains within CENTCOM’s area of responsibility. Most U.S. officials regard Egypt as a non-African country, which is wrong. Egypt is a founding member of the AU and its predecessor the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and it has the potential to influence significantly strategic outcomes in Africa. Former Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser claimed that Egypt belonged to three circles: African, Arab, and Islamic. The fact that Egypt participates in the UN as a member of the African group and has been seeking a Security Council seat as an African state, suggests that it takes its African identity seriously. If, before the creation of AFRICOM, the U.S. military already had Africa “covered” in the sense that it was under the purview of three U.S. commands, why have many African analysts and policy makers taken such a negative view of

the shift to AFRICOM? Answers to this question vary widely among African sub-regions and

states, and among individuals within the same state. Based on a review of the growing

literature on AFRICOM and on my recent discussions with various observers in East Africa,

Egypt, Ghana, and South Africa, I have found that the answer to this question has three parts.

The first is that U.S. government officials have not sufficiently explained the case for a new

command and its nearly continent-wide mandate . Some well-informed Africans, who are not necessarily against AFRICOM, believe that the failure of U.S. officials to provide a rationale for AFRICOM has indirectly fueled myths and speculation about the U.S. Government’s motives. They believe the U.S. officials who have testified on AFRICOM before congressional committees, such as Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Christopher Ryan Henry and Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Stephen Mull, among others, have not offered a clear and positive vision of how AFRICOM might actually contribute to African security. The African Union has important new security institutions, most notably the Peace and Security Council, which is charged with monitoring and preventing conflicts around the continent. In 2004, African leaders agreed to a Common Defense and Security Policy in order to enhance defense cooperation and ensure a collective response to threats to Africa and African states. Perhaps AFRICOM has a contribution to make in helping Africa achieve these objectives, but if so, this has not been explained by American officials. Rather than a clear vision , U.S.

officials have painted a confusing picture of an organization that seemingly plans to mix

economic development and governance promotion activities, heretofore the responsibility of

civilian agencies, with military activities . Africans, given the history of military coups that

once plagued the continent, tend to regard this militarization of civilian space with great

misgivings . Yet spokespeople for AFRICOM continue to speak of the inclusion of experts from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and other civilian agencies in AFRICOM as if it were a virtue. Why have U.S. officials insisted that the command’s role would include addressing such issues as political instability, human rights abuses, good governance, poverty alleviation, the building of health clinics and schools, and the digging of wells? These issues represent serious challenges in Africa, but a cross-section of people believe the military should

be used to tackle them only in cases of emergency . Proposing them as long-term goals of the

new combatant command has given the impression that the United States does not fully

understand the concerns of Africans . It has also opened the way for critics to suggest that

the American government’s good governance, development, and security rationales for a

military command are a smokescreen intended to hide other and possibly nefarious

objectives for AFRICOM . Africans know that the militarization of political and economic space by African military leaders has been one of the factors that has held Africa back for decades. While African states are trying to put the culture of military rule behind them, the United States appears determined to demonstrate that most civilian activities in Africa should be undertaken by armed forces . To some African policy makers, this suggests that the U.S. Government

lacks sympathy for what Africans so deeply want today, namely democratic systems in which

the armed forces remain in the barracks. Had AFRICOM backers in Washington restricted the

new command’s agenda to counter-terrorism, the training of African military forces, military

intervention for humanitarian purposes, the protection of oil and other energy sources and

related strategic matters, their arguments would have been regarded as more credible . This is not to suggest that advancing credible arguments would have made AFRICOM acceptable to all African observers, but it would have made Africans feel they were participating in an honest

debate . The second part of my answer to the question of African reactions to AFRICOM

revolves around the lack of transparency with which the initiative has been presented . U.S. officials claim that AFRICOM will help improve transparency and strengthen democracy in Africa, but African analysts and policy makers point out that in Africa today there is little or no

transparency in discussions of AFRICOM or of U.S. military relations with African states

generally. They note that while AFRICOM has been debated extensively in the U.S. Congress,

it has not been freely and openly discussed by the legislatures of the African states, even in

countries that have been mentioned as possible sites for AFRICOM’s headquarters . This prompts the question: what governance ethos would AFRICOM foster in the future if its current relationships with African governments are shrouded in secrecy? The contradiction between claims about AFRICOM’s role in governance and its actual relationship with Africa became obvious after General Ward’s visit to the African Union headquarters in November. Afterward, it was claimed that 23 African ambassadors to the AU had pledged overwhelming support for the command. But Africans still don’t know which African states have offered this support, apart from Liberia, whose President, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf has said that AFRICOM “would undoubtedly have a most beneficial effect”. While the need for secrecy is imperative in some military matters, it is in the interest of the U.S. Government and its African partners to let the African people, civil society organizations, and parliaments know as much about AFRICOM as their American counterparts do. As Dr. Wafula Okumu, head of the security analysis program at the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria, South Africa, argued in his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health on August 3, 2007: “ AFRICOM will not be accepted

in Africa if it does not take into account the desires and aspirations of the African people for

peace, security, and development” . The third part of my answer as to why Africans have not

embraced AFRICOM revolves around the perception that the architects of AFRICOM disparage

or fail to recognize the advances Africa has made with respect to its own security through the

African Union. African analysts and policy makers believe that the Americans are taking the

AU for granted and neglected consultation with AU officials before its announcement. They claim that one of AFRICOM’s Achilles heels is that it has no plans to cooperate with the AU’s Peace and Security Council and that AFRICOM has the potential to undermine the Common Defense and Security Policy, which prohibits the establishment of foreign military bases on the continent. If AFRICOM has no mechanisms for dealing with the AU, it also has no way of

cooperating with the regional security mechanisms based on organizations such as the

Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on

Development (IGAD), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which have

played significant roles in conflict prevention and managemen t. Belatedly, in his November visit to the AU, General Ward expressed an interest in listening to what the AU had to say. It is possible that AFRICOM could cooperate with the AU on African peace and security problems. However, since AFRICOM was constructed by planners who did not pay attention to the interests, mechanisms, and sensitivities of the AU, effective cooperation between the two is going to be difficult. This reality underlines the point made by many of AFRICOM’s African critics: the main reasons for Africa’s generally negative reaction to AFRICOM lie in Washington, not in Africa.

AFRICOM’s HQ location means it’s already controversialChwalisz 13 [ Natalie, Is a writer for the Security Assistance Monitor: “U.S. AFRICA COMMAND UNDER BUDGET-SCRUTINY?”, https://securityassistancemonitor.wordpress.com/2013/09/13/u-s-africa-command-under-budget-scrutiny/comment-page-1/] JMS

When created in 2007, the United States’ Africa Command (AFRICOM) was temporarily headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany, until an official home could be found for the new command. Six years and several analyses later, the Department of Defense announced (in February 2013) that AFRICOM would keep its Stuttgart headquarters. According to the Pentagon, the decision was based on the conclusion that “the current location serves the operational needs of AFRICOM better than a location in the continental United States.” This Monday the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a report (PDF) critical of DOD’s rationale to keep U.S. Africa Command’s (AFRICOM) headquarters permanently in Stuttgart, Germany. The House Armed Services Committee report on the FY 2013 National

Defense Authorization Act mandated GAO to “conduct a comprehensive analysis of options

for the permanent placement of the U.S. Africa Command headquarter . . The study should

consider locations both in the United States and overseas, or a combination thereof .” DoD’s

announcement came before the GAO report was finished, so its scope changed to look at

whether the decision to keep AFRICOM in Stuttgart was based on a well-documented, cost-

benefit analysis. GAO’s review found that DOD’s decision was not based on a comprehensive

and well-documented economic analysis assessing the operational benefits versus economic

cost. In fact, GAO found that moving the headquarters to the United States would save $60

million to $70 million per year. This finding led Virginia’s two Democratic senators to

immediately start lobbying DOD to relocate U.S. Africa Command to Hampton Roads, VA.

According to AFRICOM, critical operational concerns outweigh economic savings: such as the

proximity to both Africa and the U.S. European Command (EUCOM). GAO disagreed, arguing that forward operations bases could address such concerns, as demonstrated by U.S. Central and Southern Commands, which are both headquartered in the United States.

A2: CPs

USAID & DOD Collaboration

No solvency – no collaborationAFRICOM undermines USAID and State Department – collaborating wouldn’t resolve funding trade-off and overstepping boundsFalconer 8 (Bruce, editor at multiple online and physical magazines such as The American Scholar, “AFRICOM: State Dept., USAID Concerned About "Militarization" of Foreign Aid,” Mother Jones, Jul. 18, 2008, http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2008/07/africom-state-dept-usaid-concerned-about-militarization-foreign-aid) BR

The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), an organizational construct intended to unify the entire African continent (except Egypt) under a single U.S. commander, is due to become fully operational September 30. As described by the Pentagon, it will be a new sort of animal, a combatant command "plus," that will have the ability to mount military operations, but which will rely primarily on "soft power." AFRICOM "will support, not shape, U.S. foreign policy on the continent," Theresa Whelan, the Pentagon's deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs, told a House subcommittee on Wednesday. But despite official assurances, concern is

mounting that AFRICOM could stray from its "supporting" role to become the new center of power for U.S. activities in Africa. The issue is central to the ongoing debate over the new command's proper place. At this week's hearing of the House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, the first of two scheduled hearings on AFRICOM, General Michael Snodgrass and Ambassador Mary Yates, both members of the command's nascent leadership, assured lawmakers that AFRICOM is "a listening, growing, and developing organization dedicated to partnering with African governments, African security organizations, and the international community to achieve U.S. security goals by helping the people of Africa achieve the goals they have set for themselves." And to its credit, AFRICOM has gone out of its way to calm fears that it represents a new imperial push into the Dark Continent. (It even hosts a blog to keep the public informed of its progress.) AFRICOM's primary purpose, say proponents, will be to coordinate with the State Department and USAID in the pursuit of "stability operations"—one of the Pentagon's latest enthusiasms, encoded in Directive 3000.05, which places humanitarian and relief

operations on a level plane with combat missions. (You can read my earlier piece on the subject here.) But even AFRICOM's good intentions cannot disguise the geopolitical realities that compelled its creation. It's not about doing good works in impoverished countries for their own sake; It's about national interest. Countering China's growing military and economic influence in Africa and assuring access to some of the world's last remaining oil reserves top the list. (The United States now imports just as much oil from Africa as it does from the Middle East.) Terrorism also figures into the equation—primarily the elimination of ungoverned spaces terrorists might call home.

Not that these are unreasonable goals. On one level, the U.S. military's ability to adapt is impressive. But problems could arise if AFRICOM begins to lead policy rather than follow it. A report released yesterday by Refugees

International shows that, in the years since 9/11, the Pentagon's slice of the nation's foreign aid

budget has ballooned at the expense of more traditional providers, like USAID . From the report:

Although several high-level task forces and commissions have emphasized the urgne need to modernize our aid infrastructure and increase sustainable development activities, such assistance is increasingly being overseen by military institutions whose policies are driven by the Global War on Terror, not by the war against poverty. Between 1998 and 2005, the percentage of Official Development Assistance the Pentagon has controlled exploded from 3.5% to nearly 22%, while the percentage controlled by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) shrunk from 65% to 40%. As for foreign military financing, the Pentagon's bread and butter, "more than half of the FY09 budget request... is for just two countries—Djibouti and Ethiopia—considered key partners in the continental War on Terror." AFRICOM has countered criticism of its "militarization" of foreign aid with reminders that its command structure will include representatives of other federal agencies, such as State and USAID, to ensure that policy is still guided by civilian authorities. This, for example, explains

Ambassador Yates' appointment as "deputy to the commander for civil-military activities." But though the Pentagon had planned for 25 percent of AFRICOM's headquarters staff to come from federal civilian agencies, it recently revised the requirement down to just 4 percent, citing difficulty on the

part of partner agencies to spare staff for inter-agency assignments. As the GAO's John Pendleton told

the House subcommittee: Although DOD has often stated that AFRICOM is intended to support, not lead, U.S. diplomatic and development efforts in Africa, State Department officials expressed concern that AFRICOM would become the lead for all U.S. government activities in Africa, even though the U.S. embassy leads decision-making on U.S. government non-combat activities in that country. Other State and USAID officials noted that the creation of AFRICOM could blur traditional boundaries among diplomacy, development, and defense, thereby militarizing U.S. foreign policy... Nongovernmental organizations are concerned that this would put their aid workers at greater risk if their activities are confused or associated with U.S. military activities.

Africom hurts USAID and DoS credibility – bureaucracy makes both ineffective Brown 13 (David E., Senior Foreign Service member and Senior Diplomatic Advisor for Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “AFRICOM AT 5 YEARS: THE MATURATION OF A NEW U.S. COMBATANT COMMAND,” Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, The Letort Papers, August 2013 http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1164.pdf) BR

Has AFRICOM Done Development Work Badly? A second U.S. Government internal criticism of AFRICOM, and a subset of the first

criticism that AFRICOM is taking over the DoS lead in U.S. national security/foreign policy, is that the Command is: carrying out development work when it should not; and, 2) doing so badly. In

terms of 1), these critics believe the United States should restrict the activities of its military personnel to

training and equipping programs, and instead implement all development projects through USAID,

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations, and private development firms.92

Beyond AFRICOM “getting out of its (bureaucratic) lane,” officials at USAID have also been concerned that humanitarian and development projects could be “stigmatized” by links to the military,93 waste taxpayers’ money,94 and do more harm than good in the recipient countries, thereby undermining U.S. national security/foreign policy. These observers complain that AFRICOM’s development activities are largely ad hoc, without a plan to support lasting change, and without regard for a broader development strategy.95

AFRICOM hurts USAID by blurring the Civilian-Military divide – counterplan can’t solve perception of US manipulation which leads to instability in the regionOrtiz 8 (Milady, writer at AUSA Institute of Land Warfare, “U.S. Africa Command: A New Way of Thinking,” National Security Watch 08-1, 13 March 2008, http://www.ausa.org/publications/ilw/ilw_pubs/nationalsecuritywatch/Documents/AFRICOMdraft11Mar08.pdf) BR

Blurring the Civilian-Military Divide. A matter of general concern is how the new structure of AFRICOM will affect traditional aid structures in both the United States and Africa. Domestically, while the State Department

and USAID welcome additional resources and aid from DoD for complex operations, there is a concern that the U.S. military may “overestimate its capabilities . . . [and] its diplomatic role in Africa.” Concern over the possibility of U.S. military efforts overshadowing diplomatic initiatives was expressed in a 2006

Congressional Research Service report, which observed that the blurring of civilian-military lines could “risk

weakening the Secretary of State’s primacy in setting the agenda for U.S. relations with foreign countries and the Secretary of Defense’s focus on warfighting.”42 The increasingly vague line between aid and military development has the potential to adversely affect efforts on the African continent. Officials at USAID, for example, are concerned that development programs could be “stigmatized” by links to the military, and that the authority of diplomats could be “confused” or “usurped.”43 In recent congressional testimony, Michael E. Hess, a senior official at USAID, noted that the growing DoD presence in Africa has the potential of “blurring the lines between diplomacy, defense and development.”44 A director at the Africa advocacy center TransAfrica Forum observed that African democracies are uncomfortable with the concept of DoD coordinating humanitarian aid.45

A2: Ks

Epistemology GoodMilitary presence in Africa directly prevents good epistemologyCampbell 12 (Horace G, international peace and justice scholar and Professor of African American Studies and Political Science at Syracuse University, “Dismantle AFRICOM! General Carter Ham makes the case?” Pambazuka issue 610, 2012-12-13, http://www.pambazuka.net/en/category.php/features/85780) BR

Numerous writers have drawn attention to the criminal activities of the financiers and the banks in promoting insecurity globally. These financiers have now moved to control private military firms and are busy planning to expand their activities in Africa. Many of these financiers are integrated into the military-industrial complex. Charles Ferguson in his book, Predator Nation: Corporate Criminals, Political

Corruption, and the Hijacking of America, spelt out how the Ivory Tower and the academic establishment has been corrupted by the predators. The Association of Concerned Africans has joined in the critique of the US military in Africa drawing attention to the increased funding for the military and the diminished resources for established Title VI centers. Through the financing of programs such as the

Minerva Research Initiative and the Human Terrain System (HTS), millions of dollars have been diverted from genuine scholarly research to priorities determined by the military. David Wiley in his critical analysis of

how the study of Africa has been corrupted by the millions of dollars routed through the Pentagon noted, “Now, for the first time in twenty-nine years, as U.S. military activities expand all across Africa — much of it hidden from public view and inaccessible to African and U.S. researchers — Africanist scholars can no longer say to their African hosts that the U.S. Africanist

community stands together in not taking military or intelligence funding that could affect

their choice of research topics, how their results will be used, and how they and their

students will be viewed in Africa .” What has emerged from an examination of the research projects financed by the Pentagon and routed through entities such as the National Defense University is the intellectual shallowness of the enterprise . It is difficult for the researchers to

start from any serious historical background because from the moment there is serious engagement with the history and culture of Africa it can be understood that the U. S Military has always been on the wrong side of history in Africa. Whether it was the placing of Nelson Mandela on the

list of terrorists or the collusion for the assassination of Patrice Lumumba , the experience of the US military has

been to lay the basis for genocidal violence and the plunder of resources in Africa . Patricia Daley

brought out the reality that Africans have to learn from the protracted processes for peace such as that which was guided by Julius Nyerere and Nelson Mandela in Burundi. Participants in the Achebe colloquium heard of the importance of the elders in Africa and how these social forces are necessary for building peace.

AFRICOM uniquely prevents good African knowledge production; the end of the war on terror necessitates the affCampbell 12 (Horace G, international peace and justice scholar and Professor of African American Studies and Political Science at Syracuse University, “Dismantle AFRICOM! General Carter Ham makes the case?” Pambazuka issue 610, 2012-12-13, http://www.pambazuka.net/en/category.php/features/85780) BR

Drawing from the short five years of the existence of this Africa Command, the paper will agree with those

African policy makers who have argued that the US military is one of the principal obstacles to peace and stability in Africa. Added to this destabilization of Africa is the ways in which the militarizing of the study of Africa has affected genuine academic research about Africa in US universities. The conclusion will join with the small group that in the past organized to resist Africom and the present peacemakers who call for an end to the

militarization of African politics. This paper will argue that the current phase of the end of the war on terror provides the context for the dismantling of the US Africa Command. Carter Ham has argued that the largest disbursements to Africa are in the areas of health education and agriculture. The

establishment of AFRICOM has not served the best interest of the African peoples, and the argument that the deployment of this military command is fuelled principally by humanitarianism has proved to be faulty. In the past five years there have been a number of false claims about the dangers of groups such as the Lord’s Resistance Army with the hype about violence presented by an organization called Invisible Children. Kony 2012 film exposed the need to educate the society about the realities of what is happening in Africa in order to rise above the ‘saviour’ syndrome.’

Zach – HoA heg

Horn not key to hegHegemonic intervention in the Horn of Africa turns instability – empiricsHassan, 15 (Hamdy A., “Contending hegemony and the new security systems in Africa”, African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, Vol. 9(5), pp. 159-169, May 2015, http://www.academicjournals.org/AJPSIR)ZB

There has been vital transformation in the global geostrategic scene after the end of the cold war, leading to a renewed international focus on governance and security affairs. The main drivers for the shift in focus are perhaps due to the international community's growing security concerns paired with unprecedented complications that have shaped recent global affairs. Such focus is embodied with the ongoing controversy regarding the importance

of reforming the United Nations and redefining the international system. Under such global transformation scenario, there is a big question about the role and status of Africa in the light of rising global powers, such as China, India, and Brazil. The remarks made by the South African President Jacob Zuma have indicated that Africa can make effective contributions to global security affairs in the context of a changing global power structure (WEF, 2013). Such contributions would not only lead to renewed interest in Africa, but also to the existence of social, environmental, and security issues in global level with significant implications on the

international sphere. The rise of violence and religious extremism in North and West Africa, accompanied by the border security dilemmas involving illicit arms trade and organized crime in west Africa and the Sahel region, as well as the ongoing piracy of the African horn, have not only constituted a priority issue on the global agenda, but have also dictated the African strategic planning. The international hegemonic policies, which have long scrambled for African resources, have shown that it is quite unlikely for an African nation to rise as a

strategy imposing superpower in the current transformative postcold war era. That mixed with the

well-rooted stereotypes regarding the continent has placed it in a position of inherent poverty, backwardness, and conflict, for

which Africans are themselves to blame. The western view of Africa is still characterized by the Hagel perspective, which dictates “Africa proper has no historical interest of its own, for we find its inhabitants living in barbarism and savagery in a land which has not furnished them with any integral ingredient of culture. From the earliest historical times, Africa has remained cut off from all contacts with the rest of the world; it is the land of gold, forever pressing in upon itself, and the land of childhood, removed from the light of self-conscious history and wrapped in the dark mantle of night (Bayart, 2000, p.217). " Africa was evidently geopolitically reshaped during the Berlin conference in 1884-1885, which according to Rodney et al. (1981) has incurred Africans the burden of western

development. The Hegemonic Approach of International Relations is very useful in analyzing the dynamics of the global postcold war scramble for Africa, and its implications on security and conflict within the region. The term ‘Hegemony’ here acquires two meanings: the first relates to the global power paradigm, while the second pertains to the dominance of certain ideas or assumptions, such as Neo-liberalism and Globalization (Waltz , 2009, p.31; Brooks and Wohlforth, 2008). Both the definitions will form the scope and basis of investigation in this paper.

Within this hegemonic discourse, dominant powers use their sources of soft and hard power to influence and limit the decision making capabilities of less abled countries. This does not happen under a legal framework; rather it is enforced through practical considerations. The global power paradigm, in this light, has been challenged by a no-longer-withstanding

Hegemonic stability theory. This is embodied in the post-cold war African experience, where the scuffle between

dominant players and less abled countries has turned many political conflicts into violent endeavors.