__________________________________ douglas mulhall terasem presentation july 20, 2008 cryonic...

__________________________________Douglas Mulhall Terasem Presentation

July 20, 2008

Cryonic Enabling Technologies And The Bioweapons Risk

What Happened to the

“Committee on Advances in Technology and the Prevention of the Application to Next Generation Bioterrorism and Biowarfare Threats?"

Presentation by Douglas Mulhall toTerasem Fourth annual virtual workshop

On Geoethical Nanotechnology


July 20, 2008

Background

1. Cryonic and related methods for preserving/ reviving humans and their memories require powerful nanotechnologies with “dual use” potential as bio-weapons.

2. Dual-use-potential technologies include: DNA & cellular repair, self-assembling structures, artificial blood, artificial or biological replacement parts, multi- dimensional memory, and strong AI.

3. The dual use debate has raged since Drexler explained it for nanotech in the 1980s and Joy and Kurzweil debated relinquishment. Despite the best minds working on it, no one has a workable solution.


July 20, 2008

The Dilemma

1. Conventional policing measures don’t work because nanotechnologies are easy for small numbers of people to manufacture and difficult to track.

2. For example, nuclear weapons require large infrastructures relatively easy to track remotely, while nanoweapons can be manufactured with a laptop and lab-on-a-chip.

3. Present weapons policing can “afford to fail” without immediate catastrophic results. For example, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is a slow-moving failure but no one has started a nuclear war…yet. One nuclear accident does not end the world. This might not be the case with nano bio-weapons.


July 20, 2008

There Is No Compelling Impetus

1. Some scientists understand the potential risks but have not been able to generate action, while the voting public is largely unaware or only mildly concerned.

2. A troubling example: Nanoparticles were put in products without adequate toxicity testing. New studies suggest some particles behave like asbestos in organisms.

3. Despite this, industry continues to call such studies alarmist and is pressing ahead. This bodes poorly for proactive molecular manufacturing risk management.


July 20, 2008

Role of The National Academy of Sciences

1. Recognizing such risks, the NAS formed a “Committee on Advances in Technology and the Prevention of the Application to Next Generation Bioterrorism and Biowarfare Threats.”

2. In 2006, the Committee issued “GLOBALIZATION, BIOSECURITY, AND THE FUTURE OF THE LIFE SCIENCES”.

3. Then the Committee disbanded hoping other organizations would take up its work. Let’s see what happened since…

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July 20, 2008

The Report’s Recommendations

OVERALL

“A wide range of actions is required to successfully manage the biological threats that face society.”

(Translation: Much money, time and effort required)


July 20, 2008

The Report’s Recommendations

• Support the Free and Open Exchange of Information

• Broaden the “Threat Spectrum”

• Strengthen and Enhance Scientific and Technical Expertise

• Adopt and Promote a Common Culture of Awareness and a Shared Sense of Responsibility

• Strengthen the Public Health Infrastructure


July 20, 2008

Individual Recommendations (1)

• Support the Free and Open Exchange of Information

“…restrictive regulations and constraints on the flow of information are not likely to reduce the risk that technologies will be used with harmful intent.” (i.e. relinquishment and suppression won’t work.)

“New developments in the life sciences and related technologies are essential to countering the future threat of bioterrorism; therefore, policies and practices that promote the free and open exchange of information in the life sciences should be supported.” (i.e. we’ve got a problem with secret weapons research.)


July 20, 2008


• Broaden the “Threat Spectrum”

“U.S. national biodefense programs currently focus on a relatively small number of chemicals, chosen because of their history of development as potential biological weapons”

“A broader perspective on the “threat spectrum”, or types of possible threats, is needed.” (i.e. wake up and smell the coffee ! Nanoweapons are here !)


July 20, 2008


• Strengthen and Enhance Scientific and Technical Expertise

“It is…. important to build a robust and sustained analytical capability within the national security community.”

(i.e. How to avoid bad analysis from Vietnam, Iran, collapse of the Soviet Union, Iraq, and 9/11 etc. etc.)


July 20, 2008


• Adopt and Promote a Common Culture of Awareness and a Shared Sense of Responsibility

“…globally distributed, decentralized, and adaptive approaches to monitor and address the misuse of technologies …should be developed.”

“Specifically, a network of scientists who can recognize when technologies are being misused should be created…and report such activities to national authorities when the risk seems high.” (How well does whistle blowing work in the military research community ?)


July 20, 2008


• Strengthen the Public Health Infrastructure

“An effective civil defense program requires a well-coordinated public health response, and this can only occur if there is strong integration of well-funded, well-staffed, and well-educated local, state, and federal public health authorities.” (The 2008 Midwest flooding showed little has changed since Katrina…)

“Despite substantial efforts since September 11, 2001, there is still no infrastructure in place to deal rapidly, effectively, and in a clearly coordinated manner when faced with a catastrophic event such as a large-scale bioterrorism attack.” (Needs a lot of money…)


July 20, 2008

Conclusion

“The global technology landscape is shifting so dramatically and rapidly that it was simply not possible for this committee—or any committee—to devise a formal risk assessment of the future threat horizon, based on the possible exploitation of dual-use technologies by state actors, nonstate actors, or individuals.”


July 20, 2008

Conclusion

• We’re disbanding now and hope someone else carries on our recommendations…

• Some of the group continue informal links through the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity

http://www.biosecurityboard.gov/

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July 20, 2008

What’s Happened Since…

• According to one of the report’s coordinators:

“Many of the recommendations are being considered by the National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity… though the board hasn't implanted them yet.”

"threat spectrum" -- is being actively considered by the diplomatic and intelligence communities... related to compliance and verification regimes under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention…”


July 20, 2008

What’s Happened Since…(2)

“security community to strengthen its S&T expertise -- have been acted on by the intelligence and national security communities…”

“common culture of awareness and shared responsibility among scientists -- has been incorporated in statements ranging from the Royal Society and the InterAcademy Council to other scientific and public policy organizations”


July 20, 2008

Contradictions

• Dictatorships don’t play by the rules and are already investing heavily in enabling technologies.

• “National security” and “scientific openness” don’t mix.

• Companies don’t like to be open or share information.

• The mad scientist in a garage usually isn’t very open.

• Technology outpaces regulation. An example is nuclear weapons where hundreds of open air tests occurred before stopping them. By comparison, the first “open air test” of a nano-bioweapon could be catastrophic.


July 20, 2008

The Inevitable Conclusions

1. Cryonic-enabled life extension won’t help us if billions get wiped out by a bioweapons catastrophe or the technology is hijacked by dictatorships, wealthy individuals or private companies. To prevent this, these technologies require a globalized management regime.

2. However, current weapons control mechanisms won’t work for advanced nanobiotech. Developing new mechanisms does not enjoy broad support.

3. There is no sense of urgency because the world is pre-occupied with food costs, fuel and climate changes, not nano-threats.


July 20, 2008

Are Nanotech or Green NGOs Working On A

Nanobiotech Management Regime?

Lots of talk, many published papers and some conferences. Issue addressed by CRN, Foresight, Singularity Institute. But not much effective action.

Regulatory regimes focus on nanoparticles not molecular assembly. e.g. thousands of web pages on “risks of nanotechnology” but very few on “risks of molecular nanotechnology.”


July 20, 2008

Has Anybody Proposed Something New?

Yes. Martine Rothblatt. Years ago.


July 20, 2008

The Strategy

“Alternative Models for Managing Self-Replicating Nanotechnology…Applied to Land, Sea & Space-Based Scenarios In Which Self-Replicating Nanotechnology Is Necessary”

Rothblatt 2005


July 20, 2008

Core Concepts “InterRep, International Self--Replicating Technology

Organization. Via treaty, to make this organization be exclusive, give it exclusive worldwide rights to self-replicator production rights.”

Every country and corporation can be a member. This organization would finance itself by selling to its members the products and the benefits of self-replicating technology for resale.

It would also, in turn, as part of the treaty, if you want to be part of InterRep, you have to agree that InterRep can monitor companies within your country that are doing molecular nanotechnology.”


July 20, 2008

Core Concepts (2)

“Labs… set up in Asian, American, and Euro-African land masses so there could actually be competitive juices flowing at the different labs within InterRep… would be set up to compete with each other, so that we could move the technology forward as much as possible, all under the InterRep umbrella.

Responsibilities if you sign up: you've got to enforce the InterRep self-replication exclusive nationally.”


July 20, 2008

Would It Work ?

1. Anybody have a better idea ?

2. Given the risks, contingencies for catastrophic failure are essential.


July 20, 2008

Next Steps ?

1. Develop the InterRep concept by reading Rothblatt’s presentation then establish a strategy to get it adopted in the globalized community.

2. Set up mechanism to distribute to every government, bioweapons treaty organization, and nanotech organization as a proposal.

3. Success requires leadership, infrastructure support and organization.

__________________________________ douglas mulhall terasem presentation july 20, 2008 cryonic...

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