© irea 2007 urban dynamics in metropolitan areas the case of barcelona (economics, planning and...

© IREA 2007

Urban dynamics in metropolitan areas

The case of Barcelona

(Economics, planning and corruption)

Vicente Royuela (AQR-IREA, UB)BarcelonaDecember 17th 2007

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For many people corruption equals economic speculation:

too much market on the housing market

What can we say as economists?

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Outline:

1. Economics

2. Planning

3. Corruption

Several examples on the province of Barcelona and

Catalonia will arise

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Economics

1. Individual behaviour

2. Space segmentation

3. Non homogeneity in space

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Economics

1. Individual behaviour

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Economics

1. Individual behaviour (Duglas, 1997, Wall, 2001)

Where:

U: Utility of individual k in location i

A: Amenities in location I

E: Economic factors in location I

ik: Idionyncratic factors of individual k in location i

Finally, people migrate from i to j if Uj>Ui, after considering a

list of costs

kiii

ki EAuU ,

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Economics


Housing market area determination. Two usual choices:

- TTWA (Coombes et al 1997) – commuting data

- Jones (2002) – migration data

Usually these areas depend on the level of self-containment

(75%, 60%) and a minimum size threshold (3,500 workers,

20,000 inhabitants)

In Royuela and Vargas (2006), these procedures are combined

with the Cournot definition of a market area (uniform

price) in order to determine the right level of self-

containment.

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Economics


G

B

T

L L

T

B

G

MigrationCommuting

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Economics

3. Non homogeneity in space: it can arise as a consequence of:

urban-rural segmentation, urban hierarchies, residential

segregation, spatial disequilibrium

Figure A5a. Map of quality of life (ln CQLI) parameter. Model (b).

Figure A5b. Map of quality of life (ln CQLI) t-statistic. Model (b).

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Planning

1956: The law conceded instruments to municipalities to

develop local planning, but national policies prevailed, and

corruption was quite important.

1978-1997: The Constitution and several sentences conceded

policies to regions.

Regions develop territorial planning and municipalities urban

planning, supervised by the former.

Catalonia: the region holds, beside territorial planning,

sectoral planning, like Housing planning. The only obliged

territorial scope is administrative. Nowadays: new laws

concerning territory and urbanism.

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Corruption

Transparency International (2007) defines “Corruption”: abuse

of a public position for private benefits.

We understand that these benefits can “help” private persons,

political parties, or even one municipality in contrast to an

entire region.

For many people corruption equals economic speculation: too

much market on the housing market

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Corruption

Recently: Fundación Alternativas (2007) classified 1,339 denounced

cases of corruption related with urbanism in Spain between 2001

and 2006, and classified them by topic and region.

Clasificación del suelo Planeamiento

Convenios Urbanísticos

Gestión Urbanística

Disciplina Urbanística

Patrimonio Municipal del Suelo Otros Total

ANDALUCÍA 53; (12%) 122; (27%) 31; (7%) 17; (4%) 150; (33%) 28; (6%) 49; (11%) 450; (100%)ARAGÓN 9; (31%) 7; (24%) 0; (0%) 0; (0%) 3; (10%) 2; (7%) 8; (28%) 29; (100%)ASTURIAS 2; (8%) 7; (29%) 4; (17%) 0; (0%) 7; (29%) 1; (4%) 3; (13%) 24; (100%)BALEARES 2; (10%) 5; (24%) 0; (0%) 4; (19%) 8; (38%) 2; (10%) 0; (0%) 21; (100%)CANARIAS 2; (3%) 9; (12%) 11; (15%) 6; (8%) 24; (33%) 7; (10%) 14; (19%) 73; (100%)CANTABRIA 5; (45%) 2; (18%) 0; (0%) 1; (9%) 1; (9%) 0; (0%) 2; (18%) 11; (100%)CASTILLA Y LEON 17; (31%) 20; (37%) 4; (7%) 3; (6%) 7; (13%) 3; (6%) 0; (0%) 54; (100%)

CASTILLA-LA MANCHA 11; (20%) 3; (6%) 4; (7%) 7; (13%) 8; (15%) 9; (17%) 12; (22%) 54; (100%)CATALUÑA 3; (7%) 9; (21%) 2; (5%) 11; (26%) 7; (17%) 8; (19%) 2; (5%) 42; (100%)CEUTA-MELILLA 1; (25%) 1; (25%) 0; (0%) 0; (0%) 0; (0%) 2; (50%) 0; (0%) 4; (100%)

COMUNIDAD VALENCIANA 35; (22%) 75; (47%) 11; (7%) 10; (6%) 25; (16%) 0; (0%) 3; (2%) 159; (100%)EXTREMADURA 7; (16%) 3; (7%) 0; (0%) 6; (14%) 4; (9%) 13; (30%) 10; (23%) 43; (100%)GALICIA 5; (12%) 5; (12%) 4; (10%) 12; (29%) 12; (29%) 1; (2%) 2; (5%) 41; (100%)LA RIOJA 1; (5%) 3; (16%) 0; (0%) 4; (21%) 6; (32%) 0; (0%) 5; (26%) 19; (100%)MADRID 7; (8%) 14; (16%) 1; (1%) 1; (1%) 17; (20%) 0; (0%) 47; (54%) 87; (100%)MURCIA 19; (30%) 1; (2%) ; (0%) 4; (6%) 7; (11%) 3; (5%) 30; (47%) 64; (100%)NAVARRA 0; (0%) 3; (25%) 0; (0%) 4; (33%) 3; (25%) 0; (0%) 2; (17%) 12; (100%)PAÍS VASCO 14; (9%) 32; (21%) 6; (4%) 32; (21%) 41; (27%) 12; (8%) 15; (10%) 152; (100%)ESPAÑA 193; (14%) 321; (24%) 78; (6%) 122; (9%) 330; (25%) 91; (7%) 204; (15%) 1339; (100%)

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Conclusions

1. Many times, corruption comes as a consequence of a lack

of controls.

2. These controls would work much better if the are related

to the right territorial framework.

3. Economics may help to define and to evaluate urban and

territorial planning.

4. More economically efficient planning processes help to

reduce possibilities of corruption.

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