______________________________ josé roberto r. afonso, geraldo biasoto e ana carolina freire

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1 ______________________________ José Roberto R. Afonso, Geraldo Biasoto e Ana Carolina Freire CEPAL, 31/01/2007 19ª Seminário Regional Política Fiscal Brazilian (Low) Public Investment

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Brazilian ( Low) Public Investment. ______________________________ José Roberto R. Afonso, Geraldo Biasoto e Ana Carolina Freire CEPAL, 31/01/2007 19ª Seminário Regional Política Fiscal. Index. Brazilian experience: an interesting case study International comparison - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: ______________________________ José Roberto R. Afonso,  Geraldo Biasoto e Ana Carolina Freire

1

______________________________

José Roberto R. Afonso,

Geraldo Biasoto e Ana Carolina Freire

CEPAL, 31/01/2007

19ª Seminário Regional Política Fiscal

Brazilian (Low) Public Investment

Page 2: ______________________________ José Roberto R. Afonso,  Geraldo Biasoto e Ana Carolina Freire

2

Index

Brazilian experience: an interesting case study International comparison Evolution of investment in Brazil

Reflections Different types of investment projects Alternatives

Page 3: ______________________________ José Roberto R. Afonso,  Geraldo Biasoto e Ana Carolina Freire

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The Brazillian problem: low growth

2003 2004 2005 2006¹ 2007²China 10,0 10,1 10,2 10,2 9,0 Transitions Economies 7,0 7,6 6,4 7,2 6,5 Developing Countries 5,2 6,9 6,4 6,5 6,0 África 4,7 4,8 5,4 5,6 5,0 Ásia Oriental (-China) 4,2 6,2 5,1 5,3 5,0 América Latina and Caribe 2,0 5,9 4,5 5,3 4,7 Brasil 0,5 4,9 2,3 3,5 3,7 World 2,7 4,0 3,5 3,8 3,3 Developed Countries 1,9 3,0 2,5 2,9 2,4 Souce: CEPAL, IMF ¹estimatives ²projections

Page 4: ______________________________ José Roberto R. Afonso,  Geraldo Biasoto e Ana Carolina Freire

4

Brazilian Experience: an Interesting Case Study

•One of the highest tax burden of the world (about 40% of GDP in 2006);

•All fiscal targets set by the IMF have been systematically met;

•Nevertheless, the public sector’s debt pile continues fairly high compared to that of

similarly sized emerging economies (about 49% of GDP)

•One of the highest tax burden of the world (about 40% of GDP in 2006);

•All fiscal targets set by the IMF have been systematically met;

•Nevertheless, the public sector’s debt pile continues fairly high compared to that of

similarly sized emerging economies (about 49% of GDP)

Page 5: ______________________________ José Roberto R. Afonso,  Geraldo Biasoto e Ana Carolina Freire

5

Brazilian Experience: an Interesting Case Study

In the new century, the public sector has been registering a historic low in

investment, even lower than the average levels seen elsewhere in Latin America;

An increasing, and already the major part of expenditure on capital formation by public sector authorities, has become

decentralized; Consequence: a low in public investment

in infraestructures.

Page 6: ______________________________ José Roberto R. Afonso,  Geraldo Biasoto e Ana Carolina Freire

6

Pubic Investiment - % of GDP

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

7%

8%

Thaila

nd

Mau

ritius

Japa

n

Korea

Turke

y

Luxe

mbo

urgM

alta

Estonia

Icelan

d

Greec

e

Hunga

ry

Irelan

d

Mex

ico

Portu

gal

Spain

Bulgar

ia

Czech

Rep

ublic

Poland

Norway

Franc

e

Switzer

land

Cypru

s

Finlan

d

Slovak

Rep

ublic

Sloven

ia

Sweden

Chile

South

Afri

ca

Lithu

ania

Austri

a

Nethe

rland

s

United

Sta

tes

Austra

lia

Canad

a

Irelan

dIta

ly

Germ

any

New Z

ealan

dBra

zil

Roman

ia

Denm

ark

Belgium

United

King

don

Latvi

a

Low public investment – international comparison See Afonso, Schuknecth e Tanzi, (2003) e (2006).

Page 7: ______________________________ José Roberto R. Afonso,  Geraldo Biasoto e Ana Carolina Freire

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Low public investment – international comparison

Investment in % of Total Expenditure

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

Thaila

nd

Mau

ritius

Korea

Japa

n

Mex

ico

Irelan

d

Estonia

Chile

Turke

y

South

Afri

ca

Luxe

mbo

urg

Icelan

dM

alta

Bulgar

ia

Czech

Rep

ublic

Spain

Switzer

land

Portu

gal

Greec

e

Lithu

ania

Poland

Hunga

ry

United

Sta

tes

Cypru

s

Sloven

ia

Austra

lia

Norway

Irelan

d

Slovak

Rep

ublic

Franc

e

Roman

ia

Canad

a

Finlan

d

Nethe

rland

s

New Z

ealan

d

Austri

aIta

ly

Germ

any

Sweden

Brazil

United

King

don

Latvi

a

Denm

ark

Belgium

Page 8: ______________________________ José Roberto R. Afonso,  Geraldo Biasoto e Ana Carolina Freire

8

Low public investment – international comparison

% GDP: Public Investment versus Interest Payments

1,9

3,4

2,7

3

3,4

4,1

3,8

3,8

3,8

1,3

2,6

4,4 7,5

3,8

3,33,7

1,9

2,9

2,9

2,73,7

0

2

4

6

8

10

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Public Investment

Inte

rest

Pay

men

ts

Out of the chart: Turkey (Interest Payments = 22% of GDP)

Mauritius

Brazil

Average - Developing Countries

South Africa

Greece

Malta

Romania

Latvia

Ireland

(The explicit values correspond to the Public Investment as % of GDP)

Page 9: ______________________________ José Roberto R. Afonso,  Geraldo Biasoto e Ana Carolina Freire

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National Investment Tax% of GDP

1995 20,541996 19,261997 19,861998 19,691999 18,902000 19,292001 19,472002 18,322003 17,782004 19,582005 19,932006¹ 19,70

Page 10: ______________________________ José Roberto R. Afonso,  Geraldo Biasoto e Ana Carolina Freire

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Real Investment Rate - Gross Fixed Capital Formation as percent of GDP : 1995/2003(at constant prices)

Public Sector and Private Sector

0,0

5,5

11,0

16,5

22,0

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Private Sector Public Sector

Public Sector

0,0

1,3

2,5

3,8

5,0

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Public Companies

Public Administration

Page 11: ______________________________ José Roberto R. Afonso,  Geraldo Biasoto e Ana Carolina Freire

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Public Sector Borrowing Requirement – 1995/2003

Public Sector Borrowing Requirement - 1995/ 2003In percent of GDP

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

PRIMARY SURPLUS 0.36% -0.10% -0.97% 0.01% 3.19% 3.47% 3.63% 3.89% 4.25%

OVERALL SURPLUS (PSBR) -7.24% -5.90% -6.07% -7.46% -5.78% -3.61% -3.58% -4.59% -5.08%

EXPENDITURE - SELECTED ITENS

Interest 7.60% 5.80% 5.10% 7.47% 8.97% 7.08% 7.21% 8.48% 9.33%

Gross Fixed Capital Formation 4.75% 4.61% 4.49% 4.38% 3.02% 2.90% 3.49% 3.81% 2.96%

of which: infrastructure investment 2.68% 2.85% 2.72% 2.17% 1.41% 1.20% 1.38% 1.42% 1.11%

Prepared by the authors. Primary Sources: GFCF - IBGE (Brazilian National Accounts - 2003); and results and interest - Bacen (Central Bank).

Infrastructure investment - public GFCF in energy, comunications, transport and sanitation / public services (estimated in public administration).

Coverage: nonfinancial public sector (public administration plus public enterprises).

Page 12: ______________________________ José Roberto R. Afonso,  Geraldo Biasoto e Ana Carolina Freire

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Public Administration Borrowing Requirement – 1995/2003

Public Administration Borrowing Requirement - 1995/2003In percent of GDP

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

CURRENT REVENUES 34.43% 34.25% 34.10% 35.90% 37.78% 38.64% 40.28% 42.37% 42.35%

CURRENT EXPENDITURE 39.91% 37.31% 36.35% 41.65% 42.79% 41.24% 41.64% 44.07% 45.31%

Consumption 19.60% 18.49% 18.20% 19.13% 19.08% 19.06% 19.25% 19.93% 19.72%

Interest 6.30% 5.10% 4.60% 7.31% 8.39% 6.76% 6.84% 7.74% 9.11%

Other Transfers and Subsidies 14.01% 13.72% 13.55% 15.22% 15.32% 15.42% 15.56% 16.39% 16.48%

GROSS SURPLUS -5.48% -3.07% -2.25% -5.75% -5.01% -2.60% -1.36% -1.70% -2.96%

CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 2.92% 2.25% 1.94% 1.93% 1.32% 1.69% 1.89% 2.00% 1.50%

Gross Fixed Capital Formation 2.54% 2.31% 1.98% 2.80% 1.73% 1.90% 2.20% 2.20% 1.70%

of which: infrastructure investment 0.93% 1.08% 0.84% 1.09% 0.52% 0.61% 0.68% 0.52% 0.43%

Net Acquisition Of Nonfinancial Assets 0.00% 0.00% -0.17% -1.02% -0.47% -0.47% -0.36% -0.14% -0.05%

Net Transfers 0.38% -0.06% 0.14% 0.16% 0.07% 0.27% 0.05% -0.06% -0.14%

Float, Errors and Omissions 2.51% 0.01% -1.45% 0.74% 0.48% -0.06% -0.89% -0.88% -1.27%

PRIMARY SURPLUS 0.41% -0.20% -1.04% 0.36% 2.54% 2.41% 2.70% 3.16% 3.38%

OVERALL SURPLUS (PABR) -5.89% -5.30% -5.64% -6.95% -5.85% -4.35% -4.14% -4.58% -5.73%

Prepared by the authors. Primary Sources: IBGE (Brazilian National Accounts - 2003); primary and gross balance and interest expenditure, Bacen (Central Bank).

Infrastructure investment - own estimating about GFCF expenditure in energy, comunications, transport and sanitation, by central plus subnational governments.

Coverage: (only) public administration (excludes public enterprises).

Page 13: ______________________________ José Roberto R. Afonso,  Geraldo Biasoto e Ana Carolina Freire

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Public Administration in Gross Fixed Capital Formation (1901-2003): Low during the last fifteen years

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

1901

1907

1913

1919

1925

1931

1937

1943

1949

1955

1961

1967

1973

1979

1985

1991

1997

2003

% of GDP

% o

f G

DP

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

% o

f Tota

l FG

CF

Public Adm.GFCF-RatioGDP Public Adm/Total - GFCF

Page 14: ______________________________ José Roberto R. Afonso,  Geraldo Biasoto e Ana Carolina Freire

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Decentralization of Public Administration Gross Fixed Capital Formation (1947/2003)

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

1947

1951

1955

1959

1963

196

7

1971

1975

1979

1983

1987

1991

199

5

1999

2003

Year

% o

f G

DP

Federal State Local

Page 15: ______________________________ José Roberto R. Afonso,  Geraldo Biasoto e Ana Carolina Freire

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Public Administration: Low in the Share of National Capital Stock (1950/2003)

15%

17%

19%

21%

23%

25%

27%

29%

31%

33%

1950

1953

1956

1959

1962

1965

1968

1971

1974

1977

1980

1983

1986

1989

1992

1995

1998

2001

Year

% o

f N

ati

onal Sto

ck

Global Buildings

Page 16: ______________________________ José Roberto R. Afonso,  Geraldo Biasoto e Ana Carolina Freire

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Low in Public Sector Gross Fixed Capital Formation in Infraestructure (estimated): 1995/2003 (as percent of GDP at constant prices)

Public Sector

0,0

0,5

1,0

1,5

2,0

2,5

3,0

3,5

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Public Administration Public Companies

Public Administration

0,0

0,2

0,4

0,6

0,8

1,0

1,2

1,4

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Central State Local

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Public Sector: Gross Fixed Capital Formation in Infrastructure (estimated): 1995/2003

As percent of Total GFCF Public Sector

0,0

3,8

7,5

11,3

15,0

19

95

19

96

19

97

19

98

19

99

20

00

20

01

20

02

20

03

Public Administration Public Companies

Public Administration

0,0

1,5

3,0

4,5

6,0

19

95

19

96

19

97

19

98

19

99

20

00

20

01

20

02

20

03

Central State Local

Page 18: ______________________________ José Roberto R. Afonso,  Geraldo Biasoto e Ana Carolina Freire

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Public Sector: Gross Fixed Capital Formation in Infrastructure 1995/2003

As percent of GDP (at constant prices)

0,0

0,8

1,6

2,4

3,2

19

95

19

96

19

97

19

98

19

99

20

00

20

01

20

02

20

03

CommunicationTransportEnergySanitation/ Service

Page 19: ______________________________ José Roberto R. Afonso,  Geraldo Biasoto e Ana Carolina Freire

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Reflections Management of fiscal crises:

Fiscal adjustments combining strong tax burden increases and intense low in public investments

Restrictions to public debt for all purposes (capital os current expenses)

Privatization restricted to some sectors

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Reflections The management with foreign capital flows

needs a government intervention that implies in fiscal costs to Treasury

The efforts to decrease the internal debt-GDP are sterilized by the level of interest rate

Demand restricted by tax and low real expenses (high level of interest payments)

Private investment decisions against low public investment in infrastructure

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Reflections

The adjustment shape lead us to a trap: it’s impossible to enlarge the public investment tax with out a decrease in primary surplus or a new fiscal configuration

The relation between the public and the private sectors in Brazil are complex: there are not easy solutions

The Brazilian case is hard to compare to other international experiences = state presence at the birth of most sectors, regulation questions, federative issues

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Opening a Fiscal Space to the Investment in Infrastructure

Brazil – the public financing profile is still a problem.

Inefficiency of government efforts on partnerships (PPP) or project exclusions from fiscal targets (PPI)

Need to carry on profitable projects and those with positive externalities

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The questions How increase public investment with

out deterioration in private expectations on public deficit?

Is there a manner to increase the allocation efficiency instead a high level of public investment?

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Three types could be treated differently:- The 1st type would be the project with an adequate

internal rate of return, as compared to the placement of notes in the market

- The 2nd type would be that which has, in its initial stages, an internal rate of return inferior to the cost of raising funds in the market, but that IIR reaches a normal rate during the operation period

- The 3rd type would be that project which really could not be expected to provide an internal rate of return demanded by the market over the course of its lifetime, but there are positive externalities (in social or economic sense)

Different types of investment projects

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In all cases: private management and resources borrowed from market (specific bonds for each project)

In 2nd and 3rd cases: the gap against the IRR would be consider a disbursement; the Treasury would response by the equalization (accounting like deficit)

The deviation of projects from the parameters initially drawn up would be treated specifically: increase deficit, annually added to PSBR

Different types of investment projects

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Different types of investment projects Enforcement on the administration

by goals More transparency in fundamental

projects Examination by financial market Credibility in public accounting

measures Rebuild the public debt in other

foundation

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Different types of investment projects

One is not looking to merely mobilize resources for investment - the idea is also to develop actions that are managerially efficient and worthy of financing for the market

The differential should not however be given by the governmental structure but rather by the market

The financing of such projects should involve specific resources, raised directly from the market

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Alternatives

a) division line in the balance sheets: current x investments

b) OECD proposals: to deduce investment expenditures related to capital depreciation

c) anti-ciclical fiscal policy- monitoring exceeding resources destined to public investment.

- Risk of a anti-cyclical fiscal policy: lack of public investments during the cycle´s ascension can not be on to the responsibility of the private sector.

d) separating public spending between public enterprises and public administration

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Alternatives

Exclusion of public enterprises from the PSBR and NPSD;

PSBR and NPSD concepts;

Revenue earmarking for investments;

Tax treatment of capital goods.