11itssess.llell' of f~f~tivf~~lili'i.v .' .~o,~e•.llllu~lit

NIGERIA"'S RETURN TOt:IVILIAN IIIJL.:

1\11itssess.llell' of .'O ••••f~f~tivf~~lili'I".v .~o,~e•.llllu~lIt.'

• :.11 .~. II. 1.1•••do.~*

One reason why there is 'always something new out of Africa' is that there are so few old,all-embracing and extensive institutions capable either of denying or of even moderatingchange. Africa is a most exciting continent, in part because of its potential for change. This is insharp contrast to the cultural and religious limitations on change characteristic of much of LatinAmerica, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. New ideologies, new politics, new constitutionsand procedures, are to be expected out of Africa. (p. 18)

Burke, F. G. Public Administration in AfricaSyracuse: Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship

and Public Affairs, 1967.

Introduction

While our attentions in recent months havenaturally been occupied by events on ourborders and those in the Persian Gulf region, anevent of momentous proportions has taken placein Africa's most populous country and arguablyone of the continent's most influential,

From the very first military take-over in January1966, subsequent Nigerian military governmentsrepeatedly asserted their commitment to anddesire for a return to legitimate civilian rule,Observers of the military in Africa all too oftenconsider these pronouncements mere rhetoricsustaining illegitimate regimes, But in contrast tomany other African states under military rule,Nigeria and its leaders appeared genuinely tofavour a return to civilian rule, Their commitmentwas not only apparent from their frequentspeeches but by concrete programs im-plemented for the realisation of this goal,

In addition, there was never any doubt aboutwhere the Nigerian masses stood in the debate,Clearly, they themselves wanted civilian rule, It

28

was, as we shall see later, this feel ing thatresulted in the ousting of the former Head ofState, General Yakubu Gowon, after he hadpostponed the date for a return to civiliangovernment His fellow officers understood themood of the people and thus initiated the nowsuccessful process, in 1975,

After many years of pol itical and mil itary turmoil,the Nigerian military handed over power on 1October 1979 to a democratically electedgovernment 'Never', wrote the influential news-paper WestAfrica, 'in the historyof Africa have somany people been consulted so thoroughlyabout how they wish to be governed," Nigeria'snew President, Shehu Shagari, speaking at aState Banquet arranged in honour of hisincoming administration by the outgoing militaryregime of General Obasanjo, reflected on thehistorical importance of the hand-over by saying:'In any other country, the military would havebeen scheming and plotting reasons andexcuses to prolong their stay in power, '2 He wenton to say that it was indeed rare in developingcountries for those in power to organise their ownretirement from government and to welcome, andindeed entertain, their successors3

Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 10, Nr 3, 1980. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za

The official handing over ceremony: General Obasanjo bids farewell to 13 years of military rule while President Shagariushers in a new era of civilian government.

Much has been written on the military in Africa4

However, the majority of authors have tended toconcentrate on the origins of the inherentinstability of African political institutions result-ing in coups and military intervention as well ason the internal cleavages within the armedforces.5 Recently, authors have concernedthemselves with the relationship of the military toeconomic development. The present studyadopts none of these approaches. The eventsleading up to the various coups are treated verybriefly, merely to provide some degree ofcontinuity. Those wishing to study the coups ingreater detai I are referred to the attachedbi bl iography.

Imbued by the events of 1979,6 this paper is anattempt to consider the four military regimes inNigeria from 1966-1979 in the light of theircommitment to a return to civilian rule. As wehave already noted, all these regimes at somestage or other professed a desire for civilian.government. We wi II thus concentrate on whetherthese utterances were motivated by a genuinewish on the part of the military or whether theywere used merely for cheap political capital.Finally, we will consider the actual transferenceof power, its impl ications for the future of Nigeria,and the position of the military, now confined, forthe first time in more than a decade, to the

29

barracks. But first, it would seem necessary, asan introduction, to provide a short theoreticalnote on the military in power.

Corrective Military Government

Before considering the various options open tothe military when in power, it is important toremember that terms such as 'military rule','milit.gry government' and 'military regime' do notnecessarily denote martial law or army rule. AsSarkesian in Simon points out: 'In any politicalsystem, even those in which the military actuallyrules, there is a civilian-military intermix.'? Hecontinues by quoting Feit on this point:

One of the most patent misconceptionsabout military rule is to think of it only as ruleby mi Iitary officers. Rule by officers alone isboth brief and rare. . Armies that takepower can seldom hold it on their own forlong; they soon seek allies among thecivilian administrators and form with themwhat may be termed a 'm i I itary-administrative regime'B

It should be noted that the all iances spoken ofabove never consist of the whole of the army9 andthe whole of the civil service, but merely factions


of these two service groups. Thus Bienen notesthat,

it is not. themilitarywhichrules, buta group, or groups within the military, whichcan always be challenged by differentfactions. Thus for particular mil itary leadersin any military government, civilian coopera-tion is not with the military at large, althoughthe issue is often stated in that fashion, butcooperation is between sets of el ites. Lackof el ite support and mass apathy may not bedangerous for military rule, but for the rule ofa particular group within the military. Thus,from the military leaders' own perspectives,the finding of a successful formula forcivilian-military cooperation is a politicalnecessity. 10

Having thus clarified what we precisely mean bymil itary rule, we can continue by showing that theintervention of the military in Nigerian politicalIife resulted in a general expectation on the partof the civilians that the military' ... would fulfilan ameliorative role of a limited duration for thesake of an improved civilian polity'.ll We shallsee later on that it was really only after BrigadierMohammed had replaced General Gowon thatany measure of success was achieved in thisfield.

The term used most frequently in the literature todescribe the military's 'ameliorative role' isCorrective Military Government.12 This form ofgovernment would appear to be a distinctcategory lying midway between the two extremesof Caretaker Military Government and Revolutio-nary Military Government.

Caretaker Mi Iitary Government, as the termimplies, has as its mandate the mere mainte-nance of the existing government ensuring thatthe essential processes for a return to civi Iianrule are executed as peacefully as possible. Anexample of this type of Military Government isthat which followed Ghana's first coup when theNational Li beration Counci I sought to publ iclyinvestigate the alleged corrupt practices of theoverthrown Nkrumah government and to ensure areturn to civi Iian rule. The NLC did not attempt tocorrect any institutional imbalances withinGhanaian society nor did it intend to disciplineany sectors of that society. However, it did seekprofound changes in the economic field, in manyinstances reversing changes effected during theNkrumah period. It is interesting to speculatewhether civilian rule might have lasted longer,had the NLC adopted a more correctiveapproach. 13

30

Dent14 notes thet Oliver Cromwell is a classicexample of a caretaker of law and order. From1649 to 1658, he repeatedly sought but wasunsuccessful in setting up a new and stableequilibrium for English Government. Indeed, atthe end of his Iife, Cromwell concluded that hehad been 'I ike the good constable of the parish'. 15

While Caretaker. Military Government's mandateis to change as little as possible, RevolutionaryMilitary Government, at the other extreme, aimsat fundamental change of social and pol iticalinstitutions install ing in positions of power thosegroups sympathetic to its policies and ideals.This approach is founded on 'an exaggeratedbelief. in their (the military's) unique qualifi-cations to put right fundamental defects in thebody pol itic'. 16 A large degree of coercion iscarried out, and in many cases much brutalityresults, all in the name of the revolution. Anoutstanding example of this type of regime is theDergue -the Amharic name for Ethiopia's rulingmilitary council - which overthrew EmperorHaile Selassie in September 1974.

Between the two extremes mentioned above, wefind that type of military government that hasbeen the working model for the Nigerian rulerssince the first coup - Corrective MilitaryGovernment. Here the regime does not bel ieve itnecessary for the pol itical order to be radicallychanged, and for the economic and socialstructure to be turned upside down. However, itdoes take as its starting point the belief, usuallyfairly obvious to all at the time, that the civilianorder as constituted is unable to operateeffectively. The object of the Nigerian military,under such circumstances, was to

... develop Nigeria economically, sociallyand pol itically but to develop withoutdestroying its previous identity. Their taskwas in their own eyes partly one ofrestoration of the Nigerian pol ity to theproper path of development form which ithad begun to stray since 1960.17

The military, although it might be inexperiencedin the art of governing, is in many instancesideally placed to execute change which might betemporarily unpopular but which in the long runmight prove to be exceptionally beneficial. Thisis by virtue of the fact that it usually tends to be inpower for a short time and has no constituency towhich it must report and which it must to a certainextent appease. In addition, when the militaryplans to be in power for only a short time, it can


afford to act with the promptness and precisionwhich are the very characteristics of CorrectiveMilitary Government. It is useful here to quoteDent who notes that,

Even in a liberal democratic system thiselement is used for certain limited purposesto produce this kind of corrective change.When a British Government, for instance,wants to close down uneconomic butsocially popular railway branch lines, itcommissions a non-representative figuresuch as Beeching to produce a report. Manyan unpopular but necessary reform will bepreceded by a Royal Commission report; notmerely because the Commission is thoughtto be expert but because being non-political, temporary and without a constitu-ency, it can afford to be ruthless in a waywhich is more difficult for the Minister. Thesecret of this kind of action is that theunpopular authority is outside the systemand, having no permanent position tomaintain, does not have to worry aboutmaking friends and avoiding enemies. Butonce let him have a permanent position inthe system to maintain and he will normallybecome far less ruthless in correctiveaction.18

General Olusegun Obasanjo - Nigeria's outgoingmilitary leader.

31

We can therefore conclude this section by notingthat the Nigerian mil itary, by 'adopting theCorrective Military Government approach from1966, under different Heads of State, clearly hadas its goal the development of social andpol itical structures within Nigeria to prepare forits return to civilian rule. Having the necessarytheoretical knowledge, we can now consider thevarious military regimes individually in so far asthey attempted to hand over the reins of power toa civil ian government and the degree of successthey had in their efforts.

The Military in Power

1. Ironsi (.January 1966 - .July 1966)

On 16 January 1966, General Ironsi emerged asHead of State after the civilian government of SirAbubakar Tafawa Balewa had been overthrown.Thirteen years of uninterrupted military rule hadthus begun. lronsi wasted no time in preparingfor a return to civi Iian government - as early asJanuary, he had spoken about the military'sintervention as 'interim'19 and had set up studygroups to consider a new constitution. Hispersonal preference, apparent from his actionsas well as from numerous speeches, was for aunitary state. This preference can be traced backto his military training with its emphasis onsimple, uncomplicated, hierarchical systemsbased on merit with a gradation of responsibili-ties. In addition, he might have been influencedby the disputes already apparent within the mainregions of Nigeria concerning the form ofgovernment that would best protect the interestsof individual states.

In March, General lronsi elaborated on what wasexpected from the Constitutional Review StudyGroup whose task clearly involved puttingNigeria back on the path to civilian rule. Heurged the Group to isolate constitutionalproblems in the 'context of One Nigeria',20 andcontinued by saying that,

... in the new order of things, there shouldbe no place for regionalism and tribalconscience, subjugation of publ ic service topersonal aggrandisement, nepotism andcorruption.21

For the purposes of our study of CorrectiveMilitary Government, it is useful here to quotefairly extensively from the Constitutional Group'sbrief which was,


To identify those faults in the formerConstitution of Nigeria which militatedagainst national unity and against theemergence of a strong Central Government;to ascertain how far the powers of the formerRegional Governments fostered regional ismand weakened the Central Government; toconsider the merits and demerits of (a) aUnitary form of Government, (b) a Federalform of Government, as a system ofGovernment best suited to the demands of adeveloping country like Nigeria ... withouthampering the emergence of a strong,united, democratic Nigeria. The Group is tosuggest possible territorial divisions of thecountry; to examine voting system(s), (the)electoral act and revision of (the) voters'register. It is to consider the merits anddemerits of (1) One-Party System, (2)Multi-Party System, as a system best suitedto Nigeria, and the extent to which partypol itics fostered tribal consciousness, ne-potism and abuse of office; to determine theextent to which professional pol itics contri-buted to the deficiencies of the past regime,and the extent to which regional ism andparty politics tended to violate traditionalchieftaincies and institutions and to suggestpossible safeguards.22

After four months in office, the Nigerian MilitaryGovernment announced in May that it had setitself a three-year limit on its stay in office. Thisannouncement cast doubt in the minds of manywho had expected a far shorter period and whonow questioned whether the officers' reluctanceto govern was in fact genuine. Their doubts werereinforced by the simultaneous proscribing of alleighty-one listed political parties in the countryand those tribal organisations which had strongpolitical links.

The coup of 29 July 1966 which overthrew Ironsiwas inspired by Northerners who feareddomination by a single ethnic group -Ironsi wasan Ibo from the Eastern Region -under a unitaryconstitution. Thus, Nigeria's first MiIitary Govern-ment had ended in failure, primarily because itsleadership, inexperienced in the art of govern-ment, had not sufficiently appreciated Nigeria'spolitical realities and, in addition, had post-poned the date for a return to civilian rule. Itsdecree23 vesting all executive and legislativepower in a National Military Government and theremoval of distinctions between the Federal andRegional civil service was, according toLuckham, 'a major political miscalculation'.24

32

Major pol itical miscalculations are indeed the lotthat befall even the most highly educated andexperienced politicians, but little in theirBritish-style military training had prepared lronsiand his advisors for governing. Welch and Smithsuccintly spell out this aspect in their analysis ofthe Ironsi Government's failure:

As a silent force outside politics, theNigerian army had (before entering thepolitical arena) followed commands, notquestioned them, nor had it commandedothers.25

Clearly, then, the military still had a great deal tolearn about governing, and particularly govern-ing in multi-ethnic Nigeria. Its problems werecompounded by the fact that it intervenedbecause of generalised political discontent andnot because it had something positive to offer inthe form, for example, of a concrete politicalprogram which would hasten a return to thebarracks.

2. Gowon (July 1966 - July 1975) - CivilWar (July 1967 - January 1970f6

Lt Col Gowon assumed office in much the sameway as lronsi had, six months previously. As aresult of the collapse of the establ ishedgovernment, there was a leadership vacuum andthus Gowon, as the most senior non-Ibo officer,took control. His leadership elicited greatsupport for, being a member of a minority ethnicgroup, he was acceptable to the Northern Regionand, secondly, having released the jailedWestern leader, Chief Awolowo, he found favourin the Western Region. But, he quite obviouslyangered the lbo-dominated Eastern Region.They regarded Gowon's moves with gravesuspicion and, following so shortly after themassacre of Ironsi and many of his Ibo advisors,there was no option for them but to secede.

Gowon's solution to the failure of Ironsi'sproposed unitary state was for a return toNigeria's former status as a federation. Thus, witheffect from 1September 1966, Nigeria reverted toa federation of four Regions. The NationalMilitary Government and the National ExecutiveCouncil became the Federal Military Govern-ment and the Federal Executive Councilrespectively; Lagos became Federal, not 'Capi-tal' Territory; Northern, Eastern, Western andMid-Western Nigeria became Regions notGroups of Provinces; and for the words'Republic' and 'National', 'Federation' and


'Federal' were substituted. In addition, thecentral public service was abolished andseparate federal and regional publ ic serviceswere revived .

. In May 1967, Gowon announced the creation of12 states, having consulted with political leadersand bureaucrats. For Odetola, this move,

... underscores the direct action of themilitary style of politics, as opposed to theprevarication of the party system, in solvingnational problems. The mil itary's directness,swiftness, and assured lack of oppositionhad an electrifying effect on operationalefficiencies. It got things done and in sharpcontrast to the party system style ofleadership.27

It is interesting to note that Gowon's increasingexperience and confidence in governmentenabled him to form some sort of tacit alliancewith civi Iians. Ironsi had excl uded pol iticiansfrom participating in Federal decisions but withthe war in Biafra imminent, Gowon appointedChief Awolowo vice-chairman of the FederalExecutive Counci I. This move furtherstrengthened the Western Region's support forGowon's policies - if such support had beenlacking, no successful war could have beenwaged against Biafra in the East. Awolowo'sappointment together with that of eleven otherprominent civilians should not be seen as part ofa plan for restoring civilian control but merely abrilliant tactical ploy on the part of Gowon toassist the military in its war effort.

Indeed, during Gowon's period in office, nothingsignificant was achieved towards full civilianrule. A great deal of this inactivity wasundoubtedly due to the civil war, for, prior to itsoutbreak, the Supreme Military Council hadspoken of restoring civilian rule by early 1969.28In April 1967, the Supreme Military Council hadpresented a detailed timetable which wouldamong other things, establ ish a specialcommission on new states and create aconstitution-drafting committee. In 1968, accord-ing to the timetable, a Constituent Assemblywould draft a new constitution to be promulgatedby the Supreme Military Council while atransitional government would be installed andthe ban on pol itical parties would be Iifted. Inearly 1969, elections would be held for Federaland State governments culminating in the formalhand-over to civilians. From this timetable -which was never implemented -we can see that

33

the military saw itself playing a caretaker role:restoring public order, ensuring that democraticelections took place, and then returning to thebarracks.

The expectation of the pol iticians, that themilitary would quickly withdraw from public lifeonce the war was over, received a severe blowwhen Gowon announced on 1 October 1970 (thetenth anniversary of independence) that thearmed forces might return to the barracks by1976. In add ition, the ban on pol itical partiesinitially imposed by the Ironsi government wasmaintained. Gowon gave his reasons in thefollowing words:

If we were to return to partisan pol itics beforethe country consolidates its unity andnational purpose we would be going back tothe old days of permanent crisis and mutualblackmail ... When the time comes, brand-new parties founded on the widest possiblenational basis will arise.29

According to Campbell,30 until 1973, militarywithdrawal was still considered with a greatdegree of scepticism. He shows that when thetarget date of 1976 was originally announced byGowon in 1970, pressures for militarywithdrawalwere minimal. However, the situation changed as1976 drew nearer. Gone were the memories ofthe military's victory in the civil war: this glorywas replaced by the harsh realities of themilitary's own inept administration.

The problems associated with military withdraw-al soon came to be appreciated by soldiers andcivilians alike, and indeed military withdrawalvery rapidly became the topic of discussion forNigerians. On 27 October 1972, a formerPresident of Nigeria, Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe,suggested the establishment of a military-civilian government for a period of five years. Heargued that for effective and democraticgovernment, the military needed the knowledgeand experience of civilians while the civilians, inturn, depended on the military for the mainte-nance of law and order. However, the majority ofthe miIitary leaders did not respond favourably tohis proposals and the press were openly hostile.They feared that any discussion of a mixedsystem would give the military an excuse toprolong its stay in power.

While, undoubtedly, pressure could be exertedon the military to withdraw, the general feelingamong politicians was that the military could not


be forced out. It was thus hoped that the mil itarymight perceive that it would be in its owninterests to effect a transfer of power. With themil itary government's authority and prestigecontinuing to decl ine, a return to barracks offeredthe only opportunity for the army to restore itsreputation. Brigadier Yakubu Danjuma is quotedearly in 1974 as looking forward to civilian rule as'a means of insulating the army from the divisiveeffects of the continuing debate'.31

However, in the light of increasing controversyover a new census and subsequent pol iticalinstability, General Gowon announced on 1October 1974 the Mi Iitary Government's intentionto stay in office beyond 1976. No new date wasgiven for disengagement. Gowon's announce-ment required a certain amount of justificationand rational isation as it involved such a radical(albeit not totally unexpected) policy change. Itis therfore useful to quote from his broadcastedspeech at length:

A large number of well-meaning andresponsible Nigerians from all walks of lifeand from all parts of this country, as well aswell-wishers of Nigeria at horne and abroadhave called attention to the lack of wisdomand danger inherent in ad heri ng to the targetdate previously announced. Our ownassessment of the situation as of now is thatit will be utterly irresponsible to leave thenation in the lurch by a precipitatewithdrawal which will certainly throw thenation back into confusion ...

Four years ago when I gave 1976 as thetarget date for returning the country tonormal constitutional government, bothmyself and the military hierarchy honestlybelieved that by that date, especially after acivil war for which there had been a greatdeal of human and material sacrifice and forwhich we had expected that every Nigerianwould have learnt a lesson, there would havedeveloped an atmosphere of sufficientstability ... Regrettably from all the infor-mation at our disposal, from the generalattitude, utterances and manoeuvres ofsome individuals and groups and from somepublications during the past months, it isclear that those who aspire to lead the nationon the return to civilian rule have not learntany lesson from our past experiences.32

He went on to say that there had alreadyemerged,

34

. . . such a high degree of sectionalpol iticking, intemperate utterances andwritings which were deliberately designedto whip up ill-feelings within the country tothe benefit of the pol itical aspirations of afew.34

He stressed that the military had,

. the responsi bi Iity to lay the foundation ofa self-sustaining political system which canstand the test of time in such a manner thateach national political crisis does notbecome a threat to the nation's continuedexistence as a single entity and which willensure a smooth and orderly transition fromone government to another.34

Clearly, in the light of this announcement, achange in tactics was necessary by thosefavouring military withdrawal. Gowon's criticscould no longer think in terms of gentlypersuading him to withdraw - more drasticsteps were needed. The peaceful manner inwhich the change of leadership took place tenmonths later was indicative of the loss of supportof the Gowon Government. During this time, thepress played an important part in not onlyreporting the views of the government's critics,but also voicing its own disapproval. Indeed, onthe day of the coup that toppled Gowon, the NewNigerian carried an editorial insisting that a'military system of government is an aberrationwhich should be endorsed only in anemergency'.35

Those most prominently involved in the coup of29 July 1975, when Gowon was out of the countryattending an OAU meeting,36 were the divisionalcommanders, the director of military intelli-gence, the commander of the Brigade of Guardsstationed at Lagos and a small number of middleranking officers. However, the success of thecoup was assured only after the support ofofficers in command of the main combat troopshad been obtained.

To summarise Gowon's nine years in office, wecan do no better than to quote Dent:

During the Gowon regime the record was, ingeneral, one of a doctor of the body pol iticthat would neither proceed with the cure ofthe patient nor let him out of the enforcedstay in the hospital of military government. Itwas small wonder that, at the end of theperiod of Gowan government, a general


mood of revolt had spread, taking occasionfrom individual cases and grievances tochallenge impl icitly the government itself.37

3. Mohammed (July 1975 - February1976)

The coup that had ousted Gowon and broughtBrigadier Murtala Mohammed to power also sawthe removal of all officers of the rank of General,the twelve State Governors and most of theFederal and State Commissioners. Within weeks,Mohammed's Government had proclaimed itscommitment to civilian rule and had presented adetailed program for its implementation, with1979 as the new target date. In addition,Mohammed had put in motion the creation of anew Constitution - which was only tabled afterhe was assassinated. While the transition fromthe Gowon administration was fairly smooth,there was a marked change in the style and spiritof government. Programs were seen to beimplemented and the new government appearedto be sincere in the execution of its statedpolicies and aims.

In October 1975, Mohammed announced hisintention to eradicate official corruption inNigerian life by carrying out a purge in themilitary, the civil service and publicly ownedcorporations. Already over four hundred Federalofficials had been dismissed and by mid-October close to 600 civil servants had lost theirjobs. In addition, past and present civil servantswere asked to declare their assets. According toBienen,38 no African military regime had everretired or dismissed so many high-leveladministrative officers. By the time GeneralMohammed was assassinated in February 1976,as many as 11 000 civi I servants were reported tohave been axed.39

An entertaining anecdote reflecting Moham-med's style of government appeared in Africamagazine.40 Twenty-four hours after he hadseized power on 29 July 1975, he reportedcompletely unannounced at the offices of aNigerian publ ic corporation known for grossinefficiency. Visiting the offices of the topexecutives of the Corporation, the new Head ofState arrived at the office of the CorporationSecretary. On being told by trembling middle-level officials that their boss had not reported forduty - one and a half hours after official startingtime - Mohammed drew a chair, a blank sheet ofpaper and wrote out a dismissal order for the topofficial. According to the report, when the

35

Secretary ambled in an hour later, he scoffed atthe dismissal note believing that no person hadthe power to fire him summarily - he mistakenlythought the whole thing was a belated April Foolprank. Taking a second look at the signature, theSecretary was reported to have suffered cardiacarrest.

The most pressing problem faced by Moham-med's Government was, nevertheless, thereorganisation of the armed forces particularly asthe new administration had now committed itselfto a return to civilian rule by 1979. The exactstrength of the army at this stage is uncertain, butmost figures put it around 200 000, while itseemed to be the firm intention of theGovernment to reduce this figure to some100 000. Clearly, Nigeria could not afford to keepher army at its present size, for to arm and equip itwith sophisticated weapons would have ab-sorbed 60% of the country's national income.41Ithad grown more by accident than any formaldesign and was 'completely immobile, withoutthe right equipment and without shelter'42 Inaddition, it was 'almost the only army in the worldwhere serving soldiers died of old age'.43

With increasing opposition mounting in the armyto the proposed reorganisation, Obasanjo, whowas then Chief of Staff, called a press conferencein October 1975 He maintained that provideddemobilisation was carried out in a planned andstaggered way, the social problems thusincurred would be minimised and might beavoided altogether. The government, clearly,had nowish to create additional unemployment.

It was not only among junior officers and otherranks that the reorganisation took place. Indeed,the positions of the more senior officers oftencame under close scrutiny and particularly thosewho had been hastily commissioned during thecivil war and had not attended the requiredcourses. Thus a conversion exercise wasintroduced which entailed a re-assessment ofeach officer's ability and potential on the basis ofa series of written examinations and practicaltests.

The coup of 13 February 1976 which resulted inthe assassination of Mohammed was promptedby fears among a small group of officersregarding their individual career prospects in thelight of the 'conversion' exercise. Together withthe threat of demobilisation and fear of theprofessional approach of the new army comman-ders, they regarded their positions in the Armed


Forces as tenuous. The coup itself, however, wasbadly planned, ineptly co-ordinated and hardlycoherent in its execution.

Mohammed's assassination precipitated nation-wide mourning on a scale never beforewitnessed in Nigeria - the cause of CorrectiveMilitary Government in Nigeria had, it wouldseem, acquired a 'martyr to set the seal upon itsreform'44 There was now no going back on thetarget date of 1 October 1979 in veneration forMohammed, if for nothing else.

4. Obasanjo (February 1976 - October1979)

General Obasanjo, who succeeded Mohammedas Head of State, assured Nigerians that therewould be no change in policy and thatMohammed's inspiration and enterprise wouldguide the new Government in its program for areturn to civilian rule.

However, the importance of demobilisation as afactor in the coup that overthrew Mohammed wasreflected in an announcement towards the end ofJuly 1976 stating that 'there would be no outrightdemobil isation in the popular sense'45 Neverthe-less, on several occasions during the year,troops had to be reassured that their deploymentin the Operation Feed the Nation campaign wasin no way connected with demobilisation. A farmore modest re-organisation program wasimplemented. Disabled veterans were dis-charged and a scheme for voluntary retirementwith generous financial incentives was effected.Thus in July 1979, Maj-Gen Emmanuel Abisoye,the General Officer Commanding the 2ndInfantry Division, was able to report that thedemobilisation exercise in the army wasprogressing well. He disclosed that already40 000 willing or disabled soldiers had beendischarged, adding that the army now had astrength of 160 000.46

The vital role that are-organised army would playin Nigerian politics after the military had returnedto the barracks was emphasised by the NewNigerian when it warned its readers that themilitary, having been in power for 13 years, had,, ... to a very large extent shaped the nation'sdestiny and wielded a lot of influence'. Itcontinued by pointing out that,

To assume, therefore, as some are apt to do,that the influence of the military will simplypeter out immediately they quit the stage for

36

a popularly-elected government, is simplyto live in a cloud-cuckoo land. Theimplication of a prolonged military rule isthat demilitarisation becomes highlyproblematic.47

The Draft Constitution, drawn up by popularlyelected representatives to a Constituent Assem-bly and put forward in October 1976, hardlymentions the military. No special right or duty isconferred on the armed forces to guarantee theConstitution: their role is merely to defendNigeria from external aggression, to maintainterritorial integrity, and to suppress insurrection.The Defence Council consists of the President ofthe Republic as Chairman, and the Vice-President, Minister of Defence and Heads of theArmed Forces as members. As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the President has thesole right to appoint the Heads of the Army, Navyand the Air Force and the Inspector-General ofPolice as well as the power to determine theoperational use of the Armed Forces. TheConstitution provides a safeguard against anypossible abuse of power by the military in theform of stringent conditions under which it couldbe deployed or under which a state of emergencycould be declared.

The new Nigerian Constitution bears a strikingresemblance to the U.S. Constitution, providingfor a popularly elected executive Presidenttogether with a bicameral legislature, anindependent judiciary and stringent separationof powers. State governors and legislators are tobe elected separately. How exactly the Presidentwill exercise his wide powers and how he willcope with the Iimitations that the constitutionplaces on him, are questions that will becomeclearer with practice. The strongest limitationwould appear to be his dependence on thelegislature for the passing of any laws he mightwish to enact. Similarly, he is unable to vetopermanently any legislative acts with which hemay disagree -the most he can do is to delay aBill, and cause it to be passed in the House ofRepresentatives and the Senate by a two-thirdsmajority.

Another of the 'checks and balances' which havebeen taken over from the American Constitutionis that the President is bound to act inaccordance with the Constitution, whi Ie theSupreme Court has the power to rule on disputesthat might arise on the interpretation orappl ication of the Constitution.

The Presidential election held on 11 August 1979was a tribute to the military rulers. It was the


culmination of much preparation starting with there-organisation of the states, local governmentelections, indirect elections of a ConstituentAssembly, debates on the Constitution, theregistration of 47 million voters and the thoroughscreening of the Presidential candidates. It hadthus become apparent to the nation that themilitary was sincere in its desire to hand overpower to the civilians and return to the barracks.The elections of 1979 were the first held inNigeria since the Federal elections of 1964, inwhich a coalition government was installedunder the leadership of Prime Minister SirAbubakar Tafawa Balewa. With the lifting of theban on pol itical activities in September 1978,thefive pol itical groupings which fought theelections injected much political excitement intothe country.

President Shehu Shagari - Nigeria's first elected Headof State in 13 years.

The Presidential election was the last of fivenational polls to choose a 95-man Senate, a449-member House of Representatives, 19 StateGovernors and 1 347 members for the StateAssemblies. The NPN - National Party ofNigeria - under Shehu Shagari, one of thecountry's most experienced political leaders,won the largest number of votes in all fourprevious ballots but did not secure an overallmajority in the State Assemblies or the NationalLegislature. However, a co-operation agreementsigned between the NPN and the NigeriaPeople's Party (NPP), which took effect from 1October 1979, secured the necessary majoritiesfor Shagari, but not the necessary two-thirds

37

majority needed to have certain legislationpassed.

General Obasanjo, while still Head of State,emphasised that it was the responsibility of thecivilian politicians to govern in such a way thatthere would never be another military coup inNigeria48 This realistic recognition of the grimconsequences of failure was no doubt upper-most in the minds of the leaders of the NPNattheimpressive handing-over ceremony in Lagos on1 October 1979. Clearly, the huge andsuccessful electoral effort so ably managed bythe military deserves to bring Nigeria lastingdemocracy.

Although most of the top echelon of the militaryretired in October -Obasanjo himself has gonefarming - the new civilian rulers would indeedbe foolish to think thatthese men, and the mil itarynow confined to barracks, will not watch the newGovernment with more than just interest. Themil itary, after all, were responsible for the civil iangovernment's very conception and they are sureto consider themselves trustees of a commitmentto honesty in government, justice, fair-play,equal ity and the concept of 'one-nation'. Indeed,as we have seen, the only deterrent to apower-seeking military is a fair and just civiliangovernment - and, clearly, the Armed Forcesexpect nothing less from their protege.

ConclusionThe overriding question, therefore, iswhethertheNigerian Armed Forces will be satisfied that theconditions which prompted them to assumecontrol in 1966 will not recur in the new era ofcivilian government. It is interesting to quoteGeneral Obasanjo on this point:

It must be realised that the Armed Forces donot take over successfully in any countryunless the conditions are right for such atake-over. And many things can bring aboutsuch conditions - bad government, corrup-tion, unfair and unjust distribution of nationalresources and insensitivity of government tothe yearnings of the majority of the people.Where any or all of these cond itions arepresent the risk of military take-over will bethere. However, in the case of Nigeria Ibel ieve that if the lessons of the past 13years are absorbed and the lessons ofpost-independence Nigeria are not forgot-ten by the civilian government, the chancesof the Armed Forces taking over power willbe very remote.49


It should be clear that, within the framework ofCorrective Military Government, as discussedearlier, the Armed Forces should not find itnecessary to intervene once again. Theirrationale for 13 years in office was the need to'correct' social and pol itical institutions whichhad fai led to keep the country together under theprevious civi Iian government.

Indeed, if the Armed Forces do find it necessaryto intervene again in the Nigerian polity, thisintervention should be seen as a real isation thatthei r previous attempt at Corrective MiIitaryGovernment (1966-1979) had been a failure.

We can therefore conclude by echoing the wordsof Dent quoted earl ier on page 34: the 'doctor ofthe body politic' having attempted a cure andhaving released the patient from its enforced stayin the 'hospital' of military government can nowretire to the sidelines having completed its task.However, if any of the previous symptoms shouldre-occur, the 'doctor of the body politic' will nothesitate to intervene and once more attempt acure. And this scenario is certainlyonewhichthevast majority of Nigerians would not like to seerepeated.* Cpl G R. Pardoe, BA is a National Serviceman attached to the

Documentation Service of the SA OF.

Footnotes

1 West Africa, No. 3229, 13 August 1979, p. 14472 Africa, No. 99, November 1979, p. 28.3 Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 16, No. 10, 1-31 October 1979, p.

5434B4. For a selection of this literature, see the attached bibliography.5. Japhet, M. 'Military Coups and Military Regimes in Africa' Militaria

8/4, 1978, adopts this approach in his discussion of events inNigeria.

6 1979 also witnessed the Ghanaian military hand over power to anelected civilian government which provides a most interestingparallel to the present study, although the Ghanaian examplewould appear to be somewhat more tenuous and fraught withmany imponderables absent in the Nigerian case. It shouldperhaps be noted here that 1979 was not the first time that theGhanaian military had handed over the reins of power to anelected civi Iian government. The previous experiment lastedbarely 2 years, before the military intervened once again inJanuary 1972.

7. Sarkesian. S. C 'African Military Regimes: InstitutionalizedInstability or Coercive Development?' in Simon. S. W The Militaryand Security in the Third World, p. 19.

8. Feit. E. 'The Rule of the 'Iron Surgeons': Military Government inSpain and Ghana' Comparative Politics 1,4, July 1969. Quoted bySarkesian, S C. in Simon, S. W loc.cit

9. The term 'army' is used throughout in its broadest sense - as it isused in much of the literature - meaning the whole armed forcesand not just one branch thereof.

10. Bienen, H. Armies and Parties in Africa p. 209.11. Dent, M. J. 'Corrective Government: Military Rule in Perspective'

in Panter-Brick, K. Soldiers and Oil p 101.12. The followi ng discuss ion on Corrective Mi Iitary Government owes

much to Dent's analysis in Panter-Brick, K. Soldiers and Oilpp101-133.

13 Civilian rule lasted from October 1969 to January 1972.14. Dent, M. J. in Panter-Brick, K. op.cil. p. 103.15. Loccit.16 Loc.cit.17. Ibid, P 10518 Ibid., p. 10919 Bienen, H. op.cit.. p. 264

38

20. Quoted by Gutteridge, W The Military in African Politics p. 81.21. Loccit.22 Ibid, p. 82.23 Decree 34 of May 1966.24. Luckham, R. The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of

Authority and Revolt 1960-67 p. 265.25 Welch, C. E. Jr. and Smitn, A. K. Military Role and Rule p. 12726. Although the 'sovereign and independent' state of Biafra was

declared on 30 May 1967, it was only on 6 July when Federaltroops crossed into the Eastern Region, that civil war broke out.

27. Odetola, T. O. Military Politics in Nigeria p. 5928. Welch, C. E Jr and Smith, A. K. op.cit. p. 137.29 Africa Research Bulletin Vol. 7, No. 10, 1-31 October 1970, pp.

1898C - 1899A.30. Campbell, I. 'Army Reorganisation and Military Withdrawal' in

Panter-Brick, K. op,cit. p. 58.31 Ibid, p. 68.32. Quoted by Dare, L O. 'The Patterns of Military Entrenchment in

Ghana and Nigeria' pp. 35-36.33. Loc. cit.34 Quoted by Bennett, V. P. and Kirk-Greene, A. H. M. 'Back to the

Barracks: A Decade of Marking Time' in Panter-Brick, K. op.cit. p.23.

35. New Nigerian, 29 July 1975. Quoted by Campbell, I. inPanter-Brick, K. opcit. p. 78.

36. Gowon - persona non grata in Nigeria - subsequently left forGreat Britain where he studied political science at WarwickUniversity.

37. Dent, M. J. in Panter-Brick, K. op.cil. p. 11038. Bienen, H. opcit p. 23539. Ibid, p. 248.40. Africa. No. 98, October 1979, p. 14.41. Campbell, I. in Panter-Brick, K. op.cit. p. 84.42. New Nigerian, 13 January, 1976. Quoted by Campbell, I. in

Panter-Brick, K. loc.cil.43. Loc.cil.44. Dent, M. J. in Panter-Brick. K. op.cit. p. 13045 New Nigerian, 13 July 1976 Quoted by Campbell, I. in

Panter-Brick, K. op.cit. p. 90.46. West Africa, No. 3237, 30 July 1979, p. 1390.47. New Nigerian, 15 October 1976. Quoted by Campbell, I. in

Panter-Brick, K. op.cil. p. 94.48 West Africa. No. 3239, 13 August 1979, p. 144749. Africa. No. 98, October 1979, p. 29.

Bibliography

Books

1. Austin, D. and Luckham, R. Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana,1966-1972 London: Frank Cass, 1975.

2. Bienen, H. Armies and Parties in Africa New York: AfricanaPublishing Company, 1978.

3 Bienen, H. (ed.) The Military Intervenes: case studies in politicaldevelopment New York: Russell Sage, 1968.

4. Bienen. H. (ed) The Military and Modernisation Chicago: AldineAtherton, 1971.

5. Bienen, H. and Morell, D. (eds) Political Participation underMilitary Regimes Beverley Hills: Sage, 1976

6. Burke, F. G. Public Administration in Africa: the legacy of inheritedcolonial institutions Syracuse: Maxwell Graduate School ofCitizenship and Public Affairs, 1967.

7. Cochran, C. L. Civil-Military Relations London: The Free Press,1974.

8. Decalo, S. Coups and Army Rule in Africa' studies in military styleNew Haven: Yale University Press, 1976

9 Feit, E The Armed Bureaucrats: military-administrative regimesand political development Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973.

10 Gutteridge, W F The Military in African Politics London:Methuen, 1969.

11 Gutteridge, W F. Military Regimes in Africa London: Methuen,1975.

12. Kelleher, C M. (ed.) Political-Military Systems: comparativeperspectives Beverley Hills: Sage, 1974.

13. Kennedy, G The Military and the Third World London:Duckworth, 1974.

14. Luckham, R. The Nigerian Military: A sociological analysis ofauthority and revolt 1960-67 London: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1971.

15. Nordlinger, E A. Soldiers in Politics: military coups andgovernments Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. 1977

16. Odetola, T. O. Military Politics in Nigeria: economic developmentand political stability New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1978.


17. Olorunsola, V. A. Soldiers and Power: the developmentperformance of the Nigerian military regime Stanford: HooverInstitution Press, 1977.

18. Panter-Brick, K. (ed,) Soldiers and Oil: thepoliticaltransformationof Nigeria London: Frank Cass, 1978.

19, Schmidt, S, W. and Dorfman, G, A. (eds,) Soldiers in Politics LosAltos: Geron-X, 1974,

20. Simon, S, W. (ed,) TheMilitary and Security in the Third World:domestic and international impacts Boulder: Westview Press,1978.

21, Uwechue, R, Reflections on the Nigerian Civil War: facing thefuture New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1971,

22, Van Doorn, J, (ed.) Armed Forcesand SocietyTheHague: Mouton,1968

23, Welch, C, E, Jr, and Smith, A. K, Military Role and Rule:perspectives on civil-military relations North Scituate: DuxburyPress, 1974,

24, Woddis, J, Armies and Politics London: Lawrence and Wishart,1977.

39

II .Journal Articles1, Akinsanya, A. 'The Machinery of Government during the Military

Regime in Nigeria' International Review of AdministrativeSciences, 1976,

2, Dare, L. 0, The Patterns of Military Entrenchment in Ghana andNigeria' Africa Quarterly XVI, 3,

3, Feit, E. 'Military Coups and Political Development: some lessonsfrom Ghana and Nigeria' World Politics 20, 2, January 1968,

III Reference Works, Magazines, Newspapers

1. Africa2, Africa Confidential3, Africa Contemporary Record4, Africa Research Bulletin5, Militaria6, New African7, West Africa


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