+

On the Origins of Warand the Preservation of PeaceWorld War 2The Fall of the Weimar Republic and the Policy of Appeasement

+Effects Of The Great Depression

U.S. set up tariffs & recalled loans Deemed necessary because of financial collapse These devastated Germans

Gave new strength to Communists & Nazis in Germany Fought one another in the streets Republic seemed unable to govern

German Army leaders kept distance in governing Tried to use influence through politicians Push for a cabinet in favor of military & use authority of

President Hindenburg Heinrich Brüning becomes chancellor - 1930

+Brüning as Chancellor

Goal - Restoring Germany to power and political independence Even at cost of suffering of people in pursuit of goal

Calls for 1930 elections hoping to get Reichstag favorable to his policies – a political misjudgment Comms and Nazis increase seats

Brüning viewed by U.S. & Britain as a force of moderation But he used opposition at home – even welcomed it – as a

leverage point in foreign policy Foreign powers should grant concessions to Germany or deal

with extremists later

+Brüning

Poor economy fed move to extremesGrowth of Nazis helped convince Western powers to

make concessions on reparations, etc.Contrary to belief that this occurred only when the

Nazis were in powerWas appeasement a policy of the West regardless

of who was in pwr in Germany?

Military leaders sought most effective force possible with intention “to use war as an instrument of policy”Would need a chancellor who would achieve those

goals – in some way ending restrictions of Versailles

+Kagan on German Foreign Policy“Well before Hitler came to power,

therefore, Germany had thrown off some of the most crucial restraints imposed by the Versailles Treaty: occupation of the Rhineland, reparations, and disarmament. When rearmament had been achieved it would be far more difficult to prevent the rejection of what remained.”

Britain & US believed Germany learned lesson after WWI & wanted only disarmament of others for sake of GER securityGermans did not want war & had no

significant military power

+What could be done?

France could not act alone because of treaty obligations

US disinclined to become involved because of Depression

What about Britain? Memories of WWI Weakness of British economy & greater demand for

social services Increased imperial responsibilities Idealism of making peace Faith placed in LoN

All of these strengthened forces in Britain who favored disarmament, uninvolvement, and appeasement

+Interwar Revisionism

Interwar revisionist histories of WWI depicted Germany in a different light War started by accident, not by German aggression Negotiating machinery would prevent this from

happening again OR

Armament manufacturers & capitalism led to war

Responsibility of peacemakers to prevent these things from leading to future war Thus policies were geared toward disarmament and

conciliation with Germany

+Britain’s Military

Labour government of 1929-31 focused in “peace, freedom and justice” Eliminate root causes of previous war Renounce war as an instrument of policy Place faith in disarmament & LoN

Even at cost of strength of Royal Navy – Britain’s ultimate line of defense

Scaled back Royal Navy even in face of growing evidence of Japanese expansionism

British military Chiefs of Staff warned that their entire military was unprepared in case of war

British evaluation of Japanese invasion of Manchuria revealed lack of desire to “further provoke” Japan

Japan not even labeled as an aggressor

+The Rising Menace of Japan

Japanese actions revealed British weaknessWould not be able to protect interest in Asia –

let alone actually fight JapanU.S. Stimson Doctrine – U.S. would not

recognize treaties between China & Japan if they violated American treaty rights, impaired Chinese sovereignty or gained territory by force

This showed a lack of will by U.S. to use force & meant that Britain would be on her own

Sir Robert Vansittart (Undersec. Of Foreign Office) – Britain would be “done for in the Far East” unless U.S. prepared to use force

+Hitler in Power – 1/30/1933 People in Germany thought Hitler could be controlled but

he maneuvered himself into a dictatorship

Western Govts’ assessment – Hitler really no different from previous German leaders Misjudgment – failed to pay attention to Hitler’s own professed

goals and policies as stated in speeches & Mein Kampf

One core goal – Lebensraum – land for expansion of Aryan Race Land would come from East but would need to defeat France to

clear the way for victory in Russia Hitler hoped for alliance with Britain – he admired them Also hoped for alliance with Mussolini – in part b/c of admiration

but also for strategic value against FR

While most disagreed with some part of Hitler’s agenda, most could find some reason to rally around him in the beginning

Focused in first few years on solidifying control at home

+Hitler’s Maneuvers

Would test the reactions by the democratic Western states while preparing for rearmament

Called for Britain & France to disarm down to German level at arms conference in Geneva – knew that GB & FR would refuse Gave him excuse to pull out of conference & withdraw

from LoN in Oct. of 1933 Promised to abide by previous agreements if Germany

were treated equally British believed that if Hitler were handled carefully he

would return to conference & the LoN

Hitler removed GER entirely from disarmament process while Britain held out hope that he could be conciliated

+Appeasement & Avoidance

1935 – Hitler begins announcing rearmament, military conscription Ramsay MacDonald (GB), Pierre Laval (FR), and

Mussolini met in Stresa, IT – denounced Hitler’s actions The “Stresa Front” They would stand together in face of future

violations of TofV– Mussolini intentionally added IN EUROPE Leaves him clear to conquer Ethiopia (Abyssinia)

later

British agreement to negotiate a naval treaty with Germany without approval of other powers destroyed the “Stresa Front” and shook confidence of the French in Britain

+The Abyssinian Crisis – 1934-35

Mussolini looking to restore Roman imperial glory and avenge defeat of Italy in Battle of Adowa (1896) by Abyssinia Also distract Italian people from economic troubles

of Fascist regime

Italy used excuse of skirmish between Ethiopian & Italian troops to act Diplomatic moves in the intl. community were

ineffective Laval (FR) & Mussolini – Franco-Italian Agreement

1/35 Italy given free hand w/ Ethiopia in exchange for

Italian support against German aggression in Europe

Ethiopian leader Haile Selassie appealed to LoN Ultimately the LoN did nothing but threaten

sanctions

+Abyssinian Crisis Britain concerned about inadequacy of its own

ability to fight Italy Therefore tread lightly in confronting Italy

Italians began build-up of troops in her neighboring colonies – transporting them through Suez Canal Britain refused to close canal or place embargo on

oil to Italy Did not want to provoke Italy & chose to focus on

the German situation in Europe

GB Foreign Sec. Samuel Hoare & Laval secretly made deal with Mussolini to grant Ethiopian land to IT in return for end of war Causes outcry against rewarding aggression that

ends with resignation of Hoare & Laval

+Outcome of Abyssinian Crisis By May 1936 – Selassie fled to London & Ethiopian

capital of Addis Ababa fell – Italy wins

Collective security dead as an ideal – LoN a joke

Britain’s prestige damaged

Italy alienated & eventually joins with Hitler

Gives further courage to aggressors

British fears of Italian strength unfounded According to Kagan – had Britain taken action, it may

prompted others (FR) to follow their lead If no others followed – still no reason to fear the

outcome Closing the Suez would have worked – Hitler knew that Emboldens Hitler to move on Rhineland

+Remilitarization of the RhinelandClear violation of TofV and Locarno

Demilitarized Rhineland the heart of defense of FR Created by TofV to protect FR & countries Opened Germany to attack from West A guarantee for Central & Eastern Europe

because Germany would face two-front war Well-being of FR relied on credibility of threat

Hitler needed rearmament to further his plans Distraction of Abyssinian affair, friction among

Stresa Front powers, and hesitation & weakness of FR & GB allowed him to act

+French Response

In spite of political & military intelligence – no prepared plan to respond

Unlike pre-WWI offensive mindset (Elan) – FR developed a “cult of defensiveness” Symbolized by Maginot Line

Hitler’s excuse - Franco-Soviet Pact 1935 Mutual assistance agreement against German

aggression Hitler called it a violation of Locarno treaty that

nullified demilitarization of Rhineland

In event of such an act, French had no intention beyond appealing to the League Meant that France considered violation nonflagrant Unilateral countermeasures not justified

+British ResponsePrior to Hitler’s move into the Rhineland &

armed with forewarning – Anthony Eden preferred negotiation Urged FR “not to make the situation more

difficult” But Hitler moved before Rhineland was used as a

bargaining chip

Hitler’s assurances of no further territorial demands positively received British mood – “Anything to keep us out of war” Public opinion – Germany had right to do what it

wanted with its own land

Kagan – British people did not understand strategic significance of what had happened

+The RealityFrench overestimated German force

General Gamelin claimed 265,000 GermansActually only 22K troops and 14K local

policeCombined French & Belgian forces far

greater than GermansWestern powers had advantage at seaLuftwaffe not yet strongCzechs and Rumanians pledged help &

Poland offered to activate alliance with FR

If France had moved & all promises of help were kept – Germany would have faced overwhelming odds

+A Display of Weakness Emboldens Hitler Hitler was convinced France would not attack without British

help And that Britain would not fight to save Austria or Czechoslovakia

Germany had unfettered access to its industrial resources

French inaction led Belgium to break off alliance with FR & move to neutrality Maginot Line stopped at the Franco-Belgian border – a large gap

in French security

Rhineland event also helped persuade Mussolini to enter into the Rome-Berlin Axis (10/1936) Further weakens France & removes Italian protection from Austria

Kagan – “The great misfortune of the Western powers was that they lacked the leaders at this moment of crisis wise enough to understand the situation and strong enough to move against the current.”

+The Axis Powers

Italy & Germany drew closer together during Abyssinian Crisis – occupation of Rhineland diverted Western attention

Spanish Civil War – both Italy & Germany assisted Fascist dictator Francisco Franco War provided Mussolini with chance to flex Italian muscles Provided Hitler with potential economic advantages and a

diversion of attention from Austria

Declaration of common interests in foreign policy known as the Rome-Berlin Axis When Germany signs Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan and Italy

signs on a year later – the three leave the League of Nations and stand united as the Axis Powers