© posbase 2004 1 frequency estimates of lethal events the study of lichtenstein et al....

6
© POSbase 2004 1 Frequency estimates of lethal events The study of Lichtenstein et al. (1978): Many people are afraid of becoming a victim of a crime, maybe more than is justified by official crime statistics. One possibility is that more crimes are committed than revealed in official statistics. An alternative possibility is that people overestimate the prevalence of

Upload: heather-leonard

Post on 16-Dec-2015

213 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: © POSbase 2004 1 Frequency estimates of lethal events The study of Lichtenstein et al. (1978):Lichtenstein et al. (1978): Many people are afraid of becoming

© POSbase 2004 1

Frequency estimates of lethal events

The study of Lichtenstein et al. (1978):

Many people are afraid of becoming a victim of a

crime, maybe more than is justified by official crime

statistics. One possibility is that more crimes are

committed than revealed in official statistics.

An alternative possibility is that people overestimate

the prevalence of violent crime because these are

exhaustively covered and sensationalized by the

media.

Page 2: © POSbase 2004 1 Frequency estimates of lethal events The study of Lichtenstein et al. (1978):Lichtenstein et al. (1978): Many people are afraid of becoming

© POSbase 2004 2

Frequency estimates of lethal events

Due to high media coverage, violent crimes

become more available in memory, and

their frequency is thus overestimated.

Lichtenstein et al. examined this assumption

in a study about judging the frequency of

lethal events.

Page 3: © POSbase 2004 1 Frequency estimates of lethal events The study of Lichtenstein et al. (1978):Lichtenstein et al. (1978): Many people are afraid of becoming

© POSbase 2004 3

Frequency estimates of lethal events

The authors chose 41 causes of death that varied

widely in frequency. It is very uncommon to die from

botulism, whereas stroke is one of the more

frequent causes of death. Some causes were

natural, for example, stomach cancer, whereas

others were unnatural, such as homicide. The

authors predicted that unnatural causes with high

media coverage were judged to be more frequent

than quiet killers like stomach cancer.

Page 4: © POSbase 2004 1 Frequency estimates of lethal events The study of Lichtenstein et al. (1978):Lichtenstein et al. (1978): Many people are afraid of becoming

© POSbase 2004 4

Frequency estimates of lethal events

Their findings matched their predictions: Although

stomach cancer is more than five times more

frequent than homicide, participants estimated that

homicide is about 1.6 times more frequent than

stomach cancer. Moreover, media coverage was

high for homicides, but zero for stomach cancer,

and media coverage predicted the frequency

estimates of causes of death.

Page 5: © POSbase 2004 1 Frequency estimates of lethal events The study of Lichtenstein et al. (1978):Lichtenstein et al. (1978): Many people are afraid of becoming

© POSbase 2004 5

Frequency estimates of lethal events

The authors concluded that estimates of frequency

of lethal events are based on high availability of

vivid or sensational events. Indeed, among the

most overestimated causes were sensational

events like tornado, flood, homicide, and motor

vehicle accidents. Most causes of death that were

underestimated were those not much covered by

the media, like asthma, tuberculosis, diabetes,

stomach cancer, and heart disease.

Page 6: © POSbase 2004 1 Frequency estimates of lethal events The study of Lichtenstein et al. (1978):Lichtenstein et al. (1978): Many people are afraid of becoming

© POSbase 2004 6

Frequency estimates of lethal events

There are many applications of the availability heuristic in the

literature:

Frequency estimates (Tversky & Kahneman., 1973)

Estimates of temporal distance of events (Brown et al., 1985).

Spontaneous generation of numbers (Kubovy, 1977)

Stereotype formation (Rothbart et al., 1978)

Estimates of one’s share of group work (Ross & Sicoly, 1979)

Weighing of evidence (Reyes et al., 1980)

Sex Typing (Bem, 1981)

Unrealistic optimism (Weinstein, 1980)

The fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977)