Podcast no. 1 1815 – Why Start Here?

1815 is an important year in our course, and indeed in modern European History. It's important because 1815 saw the end of the era of Napoleon I, and in Italy, the 'restoration' of various 'states'.

In today's podcast we're going to look briefly at the importance of Napoleon’s occupation of Italy, and, when it was over, what ideas were driving the 'restoration', the settlement that Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia brought to Italy in 1815.

The story of 1815 begins with the French Revolution in 1789, when the French king was overthrown. The revolution soon sank into a dark period known as “The Terror” in which factions of revolutionaries in France executed at least 18,000 (and possibly as many as 40,000) of their opponents (and in many cases their followers too).

Following the initial revolution, and then the execution of the French King, Louis XVI in 1793, the surrounding monarchies of Prussia, Austria, Spain, Britain and Portugal became increasingly concerned as to the effect of a French republic and eventually formed an alliance to fight France. It was during the ‘Revolutionary Wars’ that followed, that Napoleon Bonaparte, a young officer in the French Army made a name for himself, especially after a successful campaign led to France invading (and eventually conquering) Italy in 1796. Napoleon's popularity and power within the French army allowed him to become ruler of France in a coup in 1799, and to his crowning as French Emperor in 1804.

It could be argued that the process of unification of Italy started with the French invasion of 1796.

Although Napoleon ran an empire, and not a republic, the places he conquered were re-organised under 'rational' lines. For instance, the French system of civil laws, the 'code Napoleon', concerning such modern ideas as divorce by agreement, and an end to feudal rights, was imposed across the territories that Napoleon conquered. Duchies, Kingdoms and Papal rule across northern Italy were brought to an end.

For instance, according to Stiles, the power of the Catholic Church was ‘greatly reduced’. Temporal power was brought to an end by the French. With this loss of political power there came a loss of economic wealth. Monasteries and the land owned by the Church was sold off.

Whilst the Church suffered much of the Urban middle classes (lawyers, bankers, merchants) did very well. They worked in the governments installed by the French, and purchased much of the land confiscated from the Church, often at a good price. We are reminded by Stiles that Cavour’s family did well out of the purchase of Church land. Don’t worry if you don’t know who Cavour is right now, you certainly will by the end of the course!

Other people living in towns also did well – shopkeepers, artisans and craftsmen profited from the higher standards of living brought in by the French.

Businesses in general did well – they found it easier to buy and sell goods across Italy because customs duties between the states were abolished, and new roads were built.

French rule also encouraged the idea of Italy. In 1796 Napoleon launched a essay competition in Milan, to encourage writers to suggest the best way of ruling Italy.

As you can see, Napoleon had a ‘modernising’ and improving agenda – he wanted to make his empire efficient, and rational. Many Italians appreciated the effect of this modernisation and ‘absorbed French ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity’ as Stiles puts it. Other Italians joined the wars that the French Empire fought around Europe and were trained in modern military methods of war, as well as learning leadership skills.

Indeed the constant wars that Napoleon fought during the empire took their toll on Italy. In 1812, when Napoleon invaded Russia, 27,000 Italian soldiers took part, but after the defeat and march home only 1000 badly wounded or very sick soldiers returned. Conscription by France of Italian men, to fight and die for the French Empire was hated by Italian Nationalists. Italians also hated the high taxes placed on Italy to pay for these wars – 60% of the tax raised in Italy was spent on the military.

Napoleon's European Empire was finally ended after a seventh coalition of European powers formed against him, managed to defeat France in a series of battles and campaigns, ending with the battle of Waterloo in 1815.

The European Powers of Great Britain, Russia, Prussia and Austria met in Vienna in 1815 to decide what Europe after Napoleon should be like. They restored the Bourbons in France (not the biscuits, but the Royal Family who had ruled there before the Revolution in1789), and in Italy, 'restored' the states that Napoleon had conquered in 1797. The final effect that Napoleonic rule had on the likelihood of Italian unification was that it made the great powers very suspicious of reform and of new fangled ideas like nationalism and republicanism. For almost a generation, until after the 1848 revolutions, it was in the interests of almost all the great powers to stop any attempt to change the way that Italy was ruled.

In today’s podcast we have been trying to explain why the Italian Unification course starts 55 years before Italy became Italy, in 1815. We discovered that France, under Consul then Emperor Napoleon had ruled Italy as part of a greater French Empire. We learned that French rule brought some changes that might be said to have encouraged the later process of unification. We also saw that the same period saw events and changes that made unification more difficult to attain.

Something to do

Read pages xx and xx of {} list the ways that the French rule of Italy between 1796 and 1815 advanced and held back the process of unification, the ways that unification was made more or less likely.

Podcast no 2 – the idea of Italy?

In today’s podcast we’re going to take a look at the ‘idea’ of italy in 1815, what people living in the peninsula might have said if they’d been asked ‘what is Italy?’. We’re also going to be finding out about how this idea of ‘italy’ was changed by Napoleonic rule.

Those living in Italy might not have seen Italy was we do now. When Napoleon first invaded, he announced an essay competition. Writers entered their ideas for how to rule “Italy”. Even those who wrote essays about her often assumed that ‘Italy’ meant only the northern part of the peninsula.

In some ways French rule continued the idea that Italy was a collection of states, rather than something that might become one country. For example, Italy was never unified under the French, it was split into an often changing group of states, all of which were ruled either directly or indirectly by France itself. For instance. When he first invaded, Napoleon created the Cisalpine republic, made up of bits of Lombardy, and the Papal States, eventually Napoleon added other parts of Italy to this ‘republic’ and it became the Kingdom of Northern Italy, ruled by Napoleon himself, as King.

Although, as we have seen, some Italians did very well from Napoleonic rule, not all of them benefitted, and French modernising challenged some very deep seated ideas held by those living across the peninsula. The Catholic Church did especially badly – its monasteries were closed and the land sold, often cheaply, to the middle class and middle ranking aristocrats we mentioned earlier. Priests lost jobs that they had held in the governments of various Italian states, and the Pope’s temporal power, his right to rule like a king, in the Papal States, was brought to an end. This meant that later on, when unification became a possibility, the Church was much more afraid of change. Indeed the Church resisted unification, in case such change again damaged its wealth and power, as reform had during Napoleonic rule.

For ordinary, peasant, Italians the church was important; it heavily influenced their ideas and helped them when times were difficult. Life for the peasantry was probably not very much improved by French rule – they remained often very poor, unable to read, and much more concerned with their own survival and with very local concerns, rather than with ideas of Italy, reform or rebellion. To that extent French rule made Italian peasants probably suspicious of change, rather than hoping for a unified Italian state.

So, thinking about what we’ve learned in the last two podcasts, how can we summarise the effect of Napoleonic rule on the chances for unification.

On the one hand the French put in place ideas and laws that might have encouraged unification. They removed trade barriers, introduced a criminal law right across the peninsula and put in place modern government. Civil servants and tax collectors made the states of Italy run well. They made it easier for ideas to spread by relaxing press laws. Even the hatred created by French rule in some Italians might have encouraged unification. Many Italians were united in their hatred of French taxes, French conscription and French rule.

This hatred had created many secret groups and societies that were working to kick-out the French. These societies, and those that followed on would go on to play a part in the unification process.

On the other hand the French deliberately kept Italy split into different countries. The states changed frequently, so that people didn’t become loyal to them. Finally, as Pearce and Stiles point out ‘for most Italians life was a constant struggle for survival, and politics seemed entirely irrelevant’ French rule hadn’t really done anything to improve the lives of most ordinary Italians, living as peasants. The idea of a ‘united’ Italy mattered little to most people.

In any event, Napoleon’s defeat in 1815, at the battle of Waterloo, saw the end of French rule in Italy, and across Europe. The great powers, gathered in Vienna in Austria to work out how Europe would work now that Napoleon was gone. In the next podcast we’ll look in some detail at the kind of Italy that the great powers, Britain, Prussia, Austria and Russia had in mind, as part of this greater European settlement.

Something to do?

Read pages 16 – 19 of Derby’s Textbook and make notes on the different states of Italy. You could download the map document and use this to make your notes on.

Podcast 3 – The restoration of Italy in 1815.

In the last podcast we looked at Napoleon’s rule in Italy, which ended with defeat in 1815. In today’s podcast we’re covering what happened after the French were driven from Italy. We are going to learn about the decisions that were made for Italy at the Vienna Congress in 1815. At this important meeting between the Great Powers of Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia, important ideas were discussed, borders between countries settled, and Kings and Dukes put back on thrones that had been toppled by French armies in the previous wars. This plan, to turn back the clock in Italian affairs, is called the ‘restoration’, because so many rulers were restored, or brought back to power.

Before we look at what this meant for Italy it is important for us to realise that one of the important aims of the Vienna Congress and Treaty was the ‘containment’ of France – the hope that France’s power could be limited so that another French Empire could not arise. A related idea was that of ‘balance of power’ that none of the powers of Europe should be much much more powerful than the others. It was hoped that this balance would lead to peace.

Let's look in more detail at the kind of Italian restoration the Great Powers had in mind. Before 1797 Italy was made up of many different states, although many were dominated by Austria. Crucially some of these states were republics such as that of Genoa, or of Venice, in which rich and powerful citizens voted for their leaders.

The 'restoration' of 1815 did not see the restoration of these republics – these were definitely out of fashion. Dukes and kings were restored, and the old

republics were absorbed into these restored monarchies and duchies. Austria's domination over Italy was restored, and strengthened with its acquisition of Venice, and its family connections with the rulers in many other parts of the peninsula.

The Italy of 1815 was very much Austria's back-yard, a divided collection of weak states. The gentleman in the picture is Metternich, the man who represented Austria at the Congress of Vienna, and who oversaw his countries' domination of Italy under the Treaty of Vienna that followed the Congress. It was Metternich who described Italy as being nothing more than a 'geographical expression', rather than a nation in waiting. We'll find out more about why he believed this later on in the course. As we will see, even if Austria didn’t rule an Italian state directly, often treaties or even marriage or blood relations between the Austrian royal family and Italian Dukes meant that it could indirectly influence the rulers of most of the peninsula.

Let’s take a quick tour of Italy in 1815, to find out what some of the states that were ‘restored’ were like. You might find it useful to look at a map of Itlay in 1858 whilst you listen to this part of the discussion. You’ll find one on page 35 of Pearce and Stiles, page 2 of Collier or page 7 of Derby. You can find amazon links to these books on the website.

The northern most states were Piedmont, Lombardy and Venetia. Piedmont was restored to its King, who had been taking refuge on the island of Sardinia, the other half of his Kingdom. You’ll sometimes see Piedmont referred to as “Piedmont-Sardinia” in some textbooks. Victor Emmanuel I was, as Pearce and Stiles tell us determined to ‘turn the clock back to pre-Napoleonic days’. He set about literally ripping up the changes that the French had brought, including parks and street lights (run by gas) that they had built. Victor Emmanuel brought back the feudal taxes, church privileges, dug up roads, cancelled the Code Napoleon, discriminated against Jews and Protestants and sacked all those appointed to government jobs. In short, Victor Emmanuel wanted things to be just like they were in 1796, before the French invaded.

Some things did change in Piedmont; the City State of Genoa was absorbed into the restored Kingdom. Genoa (which is where my branch of the Podestà family come from by the way) had been a republic before 1796. Many of the laws and ideas of the French had been welcomed there. The Piedmontese had a hard time changing the minds of the Genoese – who were therefore allowed to keep some of the changes the French had brought.

The other two states in the far North of Italy also saw changes in 1815. Venetia had been a republic (not as we’d understand it though. Not everyone had the vote, only the rich could have a say in the rule of the state). After 1815 it was ruled directly by the Austrian Emperor as part of the Kingdom of Lombardy Venetia. The Austrian Emperor ruled without a constitution and the, quite wealthy, area became an important source of tax income for the Austrian Empire – according to Derby the Austrians got one third of their tax income from Lombardy Venetia, even though it only contained one sixth of the Empire’s population. Rich aristocrats probably welcomed the Austrians, but the middle class and lesser aristocrats who had held positions in the French government in Lombardy and Venetia, or who had been in important positions

in the Army quickly felt that they had been left out of important jobs, and began to press for change, for reform.

A similar grievance came up in the Papal States, especially in the important cities of the Romagna, Ferrara and Bologna. During French rule, across the Papal States, priests, bishops and cardinals had been thrown out of important jobs, and replaced with middle class professionals, lawyers and bankers, businessmen and university graduates. When the Pope was returned to power he, in turn, sacked these professional men and replaced them with the priests and cardinals that the French had removed. This caused a lot of resentment, especially in the Romagna and its capital of Bologna; as we will see this area became a hot-spot of trouble. The Pope ruled the Papal states from Rome, as an absolute monarch, without a constitution to limit his rule. In this way the Pope had ‘temporal’ power on earth as a king as well as the ‘spiritual’ power he got from being God’s representative on earth. The power of Austria to dominate the peninsula was partly ensured by its role in propping up the Pope’s rule: The Austrians were entitled by treaty to place armies across the Papal States, from here they could strike across Italy to make sure that nothing threatened a change to the status quo.

The smaller dukedoms of Tuscany, Parma and Modena were also strongly under Austrian influence. These places are sometimes referred to as the ‘central Duchies, because they lay in the middle of the peninsula. All three were ruled by relations of the Austrian Emperor. Despite this there were real differences in the way that each duchy was ruled following the Restoration.

In the south, the Kingdom of Naples has gained a bad press in Britain. An absolutist monarch there presided over a country where extreme poverty, high levels of conscription (forcing people to join the army), and a rebellious Sicily made the kingdom a byword for repressive rule. Ferdinand I brought back many of the powers of the Church in his kingdom, hoping that religion would help keep his subjects quiet.

In this podcast we've learned why 1815 is the year in which we begin our study of Italy – it's the year in which Austria's domination of the peninsula is confirmed. We've also learned that the states that made up Italy in 1815 had just been 'restored' after the end of an era in which Italy was ruled from France, and under 'modern' French lines.

Something to do:

Read the following extract from Duggan (pge 77 “the masses were certainly a worry for the Restoration governments…

Podcast 4 – The revolutions of 1821

We ended the last podcast by looking at an excerpt from Christopher Duggan’s The Force of Destiny, where Duggan argued that ‘the real problem [for the Austrians and the Restoration governments of Italy] lay with the educated classes’. In this podcast we’ll certainly see that this was true, that educated, graduates of Italian universities, young men qualified in law, in medicine,

working in the armies of the Italian states or in their governments, found that they were pushed aside in the restoration. However, until 1848, and perhaps until after that date, these middle class trouble makers didn’t have the power or the will to loosen Austria’s grip on the Italian Peninsula.

Many of the members of the middle class (or the lesser-aristocracy) who found that they were unhappy with the state of affairs after the restoration became active members of the secret societies. These societies had started during the Napoleonic era, as a way of resisting rule from France. They continued after 1815 as a way of resisting the Austrian domination of Italy. They attracted thousands of members and were widespread across the peninsula.

However, there were many different types of secret society, with widely differing beliefs. The members of the Adelfi, in the north, for instance were highly suspicious of ideas of liberalism and democracy. They favoured rule by monarchs, but without interference from Austria. This was not surprising, given that many of them were minor members of the aristocracies of Piedmont, Lombardia and Venetia.

The Carbonari are probably the most well known of the secret societies, and were certainly the biggest. There were active Carbonari groups across Italy in the years after the Restoration of 1815. The Carbonari did have a great many members. Pearce and Stiles estimate their numbers at 60,000 in Naples alone.

However, Mack Smith rightly describes them as ‘loosely organized’ and a ‘focus of discontent’ with the Restoration monarchies, rather than being an effective group with a positive plan for change. Their members did not have a common set of ideas about how things should change. Some held quite radical views, thinking that Italy ought to be a united country, with a democratic system of government in which ordinary people could vote. However, most Carbonari would have preferred their own Kings and Dukes to remain in power, as constitutional monarchs.

So, after 1815 there were many people who were unhappy with the way things were in Restoration Italy. However they also had very widely different ideas about how things should be put right, who should rule, whether Italy should be one country and even whether it should be democratic or not. These differences are shown very strongly in the events of 1820 and 1821, when two revolutions broke out in Italy, both of which were quickly put down by Italian monarchs, with the help of the Austrians.

The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, which was made up of Naples and the island of Siciliy, in the south of Italy was, as we’ve heard, a place with a lot of Carbonari. The King of Naples (as this kingdom is often called) was unpopular with the middle classes, having imposed high taxes, conscription and censorship of the press. The Sicilian part of the kingdom had its own reasons to be unhappy. It had not been conquered by Napoleon’s forces, and in 1812 the King (who then became the King of Naples as well in 1815) had granted a constitution to the island. After 1815 the king went back on this grant, cancelled the constitution and ruled Sicily directly.

So, a simmering discontent amongst some of the middle classes in Naples and

Sicily, large numbers of Carbonari, poverty, corruption and an unpopular monarch made Naples a likely place for revolution. A revolution needs a spark, something to light the fuse. In 1820 the spark came in the shape of another revolt, this time in Spain, which was ruled by a member of the Bourbon family. The bourbon King of Spain had been forced, by this revolution, to grant a constitution.

Across the Mediterranean, in the southern Italian Kingdom of Naples, several army officers (who were also Carbonari) thought to force King Ferdinand of Naples (another bourbon) to grant a constitution too. These rebelling army officers were joined by General Pepe, a high ranking officer, and his troops. This small revolution was not resisted by the King, who promised to bring in a constitution, to end the power of the Church and to introduce the vote for all male subjects of his Kingdom.

A new government was formed, Pepe was given control of the Army and it looked liked the revolt had been successful. However, by the end of 1821, just a year later, things had gone badly wrong. Ferdinand had gone back on his promise, Pepe was exiled and the rebels defeated.

When the news of the rebellion in Naples reached the major powers, Austria called a ‘congress’ a meeting between them. The congress took place in 1820 in Troppau. At that meeting an agreement, the Troppau protocol, was signed. This agreement held that the great powers should intervene, should act to stop rebellions from being successful. The agreement was signed by Austria, Prussia and by Russia, the three countries who had the most power on the continent. Britain and France did not sign, but France was still unable (after the defeat of 1815) to try to push for more influence, and Britain saw its best interests in ‘maintaining the balance of power’ so that one great power didn’t get overly powerful.

The Troppau protocol gave Austria the green light to actively end the ‘constitution’ in Naples, as it had been granted as the result of a rebellion. This green light was made especially bright when, in 1821, King Ferdinand arrived in the Austrian city of Laibach and asked the Emperor for help in squashing the rebellion.

The Troppau protocol also gave the Austrian’s the excuse to end a very messy rebellion in Piedmont in the same year as the defeat of the Neopolitan rebellion, 1821. In that year Santarosa, a Piedmontese Army office (and minor aristocrat) led a group of soldiers in rebellion, demanding a constitution. The King, Victor Emmanuel I, very bravely immediately abdicated, in favour of Charles Felix, who was out of the country at the time. Victor Emmanuel named Charles Albert, his nephew, as regent (sort of temporary king). Charles Albert made a few vague promises about a constitution, made Santarosa chief of the army, but fled when the Austrians invaded Piedmont. The Austrians defeated Santarosa’s men, and confirmed Charles Felix as the absolute monarch of Piedmont.

Looking at these two rebellions together it is obvious that Austria’s military might, and its interest in keeping things the same in Italy, in maintaining the status quo were an important reason why the rebellions failed.

It is also clear that the leaders of the rebellions did not have the skill to fend off the Austrians. They did not try to co-ordinate rebellions in Piedmont and Naples, in fact often the leaders had different aims. Charles Albert was not prepared to give up his life, whilst Santarosa was almost desparate to sacrifice himself. The leaders of the revolution in the kingdom of Naples were divided. On the island of Sicily the leaders wanted Sicilian independence, they didn’t want to be ruled by Naples. In Naples the leaders of the revolution were not prepared to let Sicily go it alone. So, at a time when they should have been working together, preparing for the invasion that might (and did) come from Austria, Naples and Sicily fought each other. There was also the fact that the King, Ferdinand went back on his promise to uphold the new constitution, and as soon as he could escape from the rebels, begged the Austrian Emperor to help him restore his absolute rule.

The most important reason though was that Austria was able to act with the support of the other major powers, or at least without their objection. The Troppau doctrine, the weakness of France and the disinterest of Britain gave Austria a free hand to act in the Italian peninsula in 1821.

Something to do:

Listen again to this podcast, and read your notes on the rebellions of 1821. What sort of things did the rebels in Piedmont and in Naples have in common? What was different between them? Write at least two PEE (or PEGEX) paragraphs; each of these should explain ONE reason why the rebellions of 1821 failed in their aims.Why did Italian monarchs run away when faced with rebellions? (The events of the French revolution might help you figure out why kings were afraid of rebels).

Podcast 5 – the Rebellions of 1831/2.

In the last podcast we thought carefully about how the rebellions of 1821 were brought to an end by Austria’s military might, and the dis-interest of the great powers.

10 years later another set of rebellions broke out. These were much more geographically spread out over more of the Italian peninsula. However, they came to a sticky end, just like the earlier rebellions, at the hands of Austria’s army. It is really useful to look at this second wave of rebellions because they help confirm the factors that were preventing the independence or unification of Italy. After we have looked at the 1831 revolts, we’ll spend some time comparing them to the 1821 revolutions, to make sure we understand why both failed to bring change to Italy.

Just like 1821, it was events outside Italy that inspired new attempts to change things in the peninsula. In 1830 the Bourbon King of France was overthrown, and in his place King Louis Phillipe was installed. This new king had the reputation of a liberal, of a reformer. It was hoped by some in Italy that this might mean that France would support attempts to change things in Italy.

In 1831 it was the states of Modena, Parma and the Romagna (the northern part of the Papal States) where trouble took hold. The places which saw revolts in 1821 remained quiet. However, the same sorts of people were the ones hoping to bring change.

In Modena in February 1831, Enrico Misley, a lawyer and son of a university professor, at the head of a group of Carbonari revolutionaries, approached Duke Francesco of Modena with the idea of causing a revolution in Modena, and in Piedmont. Misley tried to persude the Duke that he could, in the confusion, take the throne of Piedmont. Francesco liked the sound of the idea, but realised that the Austrians wouldn’t stand for it. Francesco arrested Misley, whose followers rebelled anyway. In the confusion Francesco fled (as did the Duchess of Parma, the state next door, Marie Louise).

Across the border in the northern Papal States, middle class liberals in the cities of Bologna, Perugia and Ancona decided to throw off the rule of the Pope. During the Napoleonic era these middle class men had enjoyed quite a lot of power in their cities. In 1815 when the Pope’s rule had been restored they lost this power. They resented the rule of the Cardinals appointed by the Pope. 1831 looked, to these liberal reformers, like an opportunity to claim independence from the Papacy in Rome.

Here’s an extract from a declaration made by the rebels in Bologna on February 8th 1831:

Article 1 – The TEMPORAL power of the Roman Pontiff over this city and province is legally at an end for ever.

Article 2 – A general assembly of the people is summoned to choose deputies who will form a new government

Article 3 – This will soon be explained in more detail when other nearby cities have joined us and we know how many deputies are to be elected. A legal national representation will then come into existence.

At first sight this might seem like a pretty powerful call to arms to create a new Italy, especially when we hear words like ‘a legal national representation will then come into existence’. However, what this declaration actually shows is the local nature of this revolt. You can see that the Bologna rebels are waiting for news from other cities in the Romagna, and when they speak of a national representation they’re thinking of a state that might come to be in the Romagna not an Italian state. Added to this is the fact that the rebels in Bologna decided not to send troops or aid to those in Modena, which they referred to as a ‘foreign’ city.

So, what we see in 1831 is two separate revolts. One in Modena, one in The Romagna, both with different leaders, different aims and different ideas. What united them was their utter defeat at the hands of the Austrian army. The Pope, and the Duke of Modena asked for help from the Austrian Emperor. Austria’s interest in maintaining control over Italy, and in defeating nationalist ideas (there’ll be more about these in next week’s podcast) meant that they

were only too pleased to crush both rebellions.

So, why did Italian rebels fail so dismally to bring about any lasting changes in the years 1815-48? What made Italy such a volatile, but ultimately an un-changed political situation in those years? Listen on for the top three reasons for failure in these revolts.

At number three is the limited aims and support of the rebels. We’ve seen how the average Italian peasant was absorbed in the everyday necessities of growing food, finding work, looking after their families and un-interested in ideas like “Italy”. When peasants did get involved in revolutions, as in Sicily in 1821, they were crushed by other middle class revolutionaries. It was the middle classes who were revolting in the years after 1815. These middle class revolutionaries also had their own concerns, and many were not active supporters of the idea of Italian unity. The revolutionaries of Naples in 1821 and of Bologna in 1831 wanted the kind of influence they had enjoyed in the Napoleonic era. In 1821 the Piedmontese rebels wanted a constitution, not a united Italy. It’s not surprising that the rebels in Bologna refused to support the foreigners in the neighbouring state of Modena, they had a different language, different customs, and they were ruled by a different Duke.

The second reason why the revolutions of 1821 and 31 failed to win any kinds of change was that of foreign indifference or impotence. The 1815 Vienna settlement meant that Italy was Austria’s back yard. Britain didn’t want to intervene, in case France got more influence at Austria’s expense. Britain’s policy was called ‘maintaining the balance of power’ and what was bad for Austria might be good for France, their old enemy.

France wanted more influence, but after the Napoleonic era had to act in ways that didn’t seem too threatening to the other powers. After Louis Phillipe came to the throne he was scared that Britain, France, Prussia or Austria might try to restore the Bourbons, the ‘rightful’ kings of France. He couldn’t therefore afford to try to gain influence in Italy by helping the rebels.

At number one though, is the strength of Austria. We’ve already heard how Italy was officially Austria’s back yard, according to the 1815 treaty of Vienna. We’ve also heard about the reasons why other countries couldn’t intervene in Italian affairs. The events of the revolts in 1821 and 1831 should also convince us that Austria had the military might to prevent the success of any revolutions in Italy. Indeed the threat of Austria’s intervention was such that Aristocrats like Charles Albert, and Francesco of Modena, who otherwise might have attempted to use revolutions to their advantage, were too scared to attempt this.

So, there you have it – three big reasons why it was very hard to bring about political change in the Italian states in the years after 1815, and right up to 1848.

Something to do

Read the following source:

“A decade of Napoleonic rule in the Romagna had accustomed the educated

classes to efficient modern government, progressive in outlook and secular in character. The Restoration of 1815 had replaced this with an outdated an inefficient administration, an antiquated legal system and the rule of the church, which ousted laymen from the government.”

Adapted from Historian Alan R Rainerman’s explanation for the 1831 revolts (1983)

It’s really important that you understand some of the words that are used in the course. What do the words ‘progressive’, ‘secular’ and ‘laymen’ mean? If you don’t know, look them up in a dictionary.

What evidence is there in the podcast to support Rainerman’s point that the middle classes wanted to end the power of the pope?

Podcast number 6 – New ideas about “Italy” 1831 – 1848

Imagine we could travel back in time to Italy in 1815. Suppose we spent twenty years from 1815 to 1835 travelling Italy, joining secret societies and revolutionary cells. Lets say we were able to talk to three ‘revolutionaries’; say Charles Albert, who ummed and arred about leading a revolt against Austria in 1821; Enrico Misley who led the revolt in Modena in 1831 and General Pepe who persuaded the King of Naples to grant a constitution in 1821. Each one would have very different reasons for wanting change. Misley wanted Francesco to take over Piedmont and grant a constitution. Charles Albert fancied himself as King of Piedmont (and he wanted Piedmont totake over Lombardy). Pepe wanted a liberal constitution in Neapolitan Italy. It’s obvious that they all wanted different things, but what isn’t so clear is the thing that they didn’t have – an idea of what ‘Italy’ meant.

The period after 1831 did see other, small revolts. None of these made any real impact. However, some people did continue to think about and plan for change in Italy. Three different ideas for a united Italy were developed, the first by the revolutionary Giuseppe Mazzini, the second by a Piedmontese Aristocrat, Cesare Balbo and the third by Vincenzo Gioberti, a Catholic priest, exiled after his radical activities in the 1830s. What made these ideas different from those that had gone before was that they had three clear views about what Italy might be like as a unified country. These ideas were very different from each other, but they were all clear that they wanted some sort of united Italy.

Before we move on to look at what these ideas were, we should be clear that most “Italians” would have been blissfully unaware of them. When we say that these ideas became clear and became discussed by Italians, what we mean is that the political classes, the middle class educated liberals, the aristocrats, and the important members of the priesthood would have been aware of them. Most ordinary peasant Italians were still getting on with the job of providing for their families, and did not take part in these debates and movements.

Mazzini.

Let’s take a look first at the ideas of Guiseppe Mazzini.

More than any other of these writers and thinkers, Mazzini believed in Italy.

Where others saw Neapolitans, Sicilians, Romagni, Piedmontese and Romans, Mazzini saw Italians. He believed in an Italian character, an Italian spirit, one that would one day rise up, and in the heat of a national revolution, throw off the Austrian domination of Italy and forge a new, unified Italian state.

“I believe the whole problem to consist in appealing to the true instincts and tendencies of the Italian heart”

In October 1831, inspired by the failure of the revolutions in Romagna and in Modena that year, Mazzini formed “Young Italy” a secret society dedicated to revolution and to the founding of a republican, democratic Italian state. From the start Mazzini wanted Young Italy to be a ‘mass’ political movement, which meant that he wanted ordinary Italians to take part. He wanted peasants to be persuaded of their Italian nationality and to play a part in a national revolution, which would get rid of the Austrians, and the rulers of the different states in Italy. Only working together as Italians could they hope to destroy Austria’s power over Italy, and to make this new country.

Mazzini’s ideas inspired a certain type of Italian patriot to launch brave and risky attempts at revolutions. A good example of this is that of the Bandera Brothers’ attempt to start a revolution in Calabria in 1844. These two minor aristocrats from Venice gathered a group of revolutionaries on the island of Corfu. In spring 1844 they set off with just over 20 men, hoping that when they landed in Calabria, the locals would rise up alongside them and start a revolution. Instead they were attacked by a local mob, several were shot and the survivors (including the Banderas) arrested, put on trial by King Ferdinand and executed by firing squad.

Mazzini’s reputation might have remained as a bit of a revolutionary hothead, an inspirer of brave and foolish expeditions, had it not been for the part he played in the 1848 revolutions and the defence of the Roman Republic, which we’ll cover in a later podcast.

Cesare Balbo came from an aristocratic Piedmontese family. His view was that Italy could not be forced to become one country, that the differences between the states were too great. Instead his idea was that there should be a federation between the Italian states. Each state would retain its rulers, and have its own laws and customs for most things. At the head of this federation would be the Piedmontese King, who would lead “Italy”, especially in teaching them how to fight, so that independece from foreigners could be assured. Balbo’s ideas were much less radical than Mazzini’s. Under a federation the local rulers would keep most of their powers, and Italy’s states could remain proud of the differences. Balbo saw a crucial role for Piedmont as military example for the rest of the Italians because Piedmont had a fairly modern army (with about 150,000 soldiers), and a strong monarchy.

So far we’ve looked at two very different ideas. Mazzini hoped that a revolution would unite the different peoples of Italy, whereas Balbo thought

that it was impossible to unite Italy, and that differences between the states should remain, so long as Piedmont could become the leading state on the Peninsula.

The third set of ideas that we’re covering today belonged to Vincezno Gioberti, a catholic priest. Gioberti’s book “the moral primacy of the Italians’ set out his hopes of a re-born Italy, free from the control of foreigners. Like Balbo Gioberti saw a federation as the way forward. Unlike Balbo he hoped the Papacy, the Pope would lead the states of Italy out of foreign domination. Gioberti agreed that the Italians had many differences, but he also saw that they had a very important thing in common – the catholic faith. He argued therefore that the Pope and the Papacy was the only force capable of bring Italians together and inspiring them to throw off foreign domination.

In some ways this was convincing – the catholic church was one of the few things that people had in common across the peninsula, and the Pope’s religious leadership meant that he had the respect of many Italians.

There were two problems with this idea though. The first was that the church was not popular with many liberals. The popes had ruled their states as an ‘absolute’ monarch – you’ll remembemor that it was this that lead some members of the middle classes in Bologna to rebel against the popes in 1831. This meant that many of the people who were pressing for change were unlikely to accept the leadership of the pope.

The second problem was that although Gioberti saw a great future where the pope was the head of a united Italy, he had no idea of how to get to that future. Gioberti made no mention of the Austrians and didn’t say how Italians were to persuade the rulers of the other states to accept the leadership of the pope.

The new ideas that were floating around Italy about how things might change there were important. They were important because they showed that there was still a desire for change amongst some Italians. They were important because they inspired other people – Garibaldi for instance became involved in the struggle for unification as a result of meeting Mazzinin. Finally they were important because they showed how the people who wanted change couldn’t agree on what that change should be, or even how to get it.

A final point to make is that these weren’t the only ideas about Italy that were changing and growing. One more idea about Italy is worth mentioning – this one from outside – the idea that other powers could attempt to influence things happening in Italy. After the failed revolutions of 1831 Britain, France, Austria and Prussia held a conference in Rome, with the intention of making future revolts less likely. One of the things they worried about was the need for reform in the Papal states. They saw that ‘laymen’ (people who weren’t members of the clergy) wanted to have more say in the government of the papal states – they urged the Pope to give them more influence. The Pope ignored them, but what’s important is that France, Britain, Prussia and Russia as well as Austria were trying to change things. Italy was still Austria’s back yard, but other powers were attempting to wield more influence there too.

Podcast No.7 – What lay behind the revolutions of 1848?

We saw in the last podcast how new ideas about how Italy might free herself from Austrian domination had arisen. In today’s podcast we’re going to see how the ideas of Gioberti seemed to be on the verge of coming true, so that many people thought the papacy was about to take up the leadership of the peninsula.

The peasants and workers of the peninsula were even more hungry, poor and desperate than usual, and this added to the tensions before 1848. Enclosure of common land by the rich took fertile land for grazing away from the poor in the years leading up to 1848. The harvests of 1846 and 7 had been ‘catastrophic’ according to Duggan, and as a result prices of food and grain had risen dramatically. Duggan also explains that industrial workers in the cities of the north had been laid off due to over production. The towns and cities were full of unemployed and unhappy workers from the countryside, chasing the same jobs as those laid off from the cities. Duggan sums it up well – ‘everywhere public order was under threat, there were frequent riots and demonstrations’.

In 1846 a new person had arrived on the scene – Pius IX, and his entry seemed to suggest that things might change in Italy.

New popes are elected when the previous pope dies. Popes are voted for by important bishops known as cardinals. Pius IX was elected in 1846. He was a compromise between those who wanted to modernize (reformers) the papacy and those who wanted to keep it the way it was (conservatives). The cardinals needed to reach a compromise quickly because they were afraid of more revolts like those of 1831 breaking out in parts of the Papal States.

So they picked Pius IX, because he’d kept his head down as a cardinal, didn’t seem to extreme to the modernizers or to the conservatives, and because they each thought they could influence him. So far so boring. There had been dull popes before, without causing rebellion. However, as we know the atmosphere in Italy was quite unusual, poltical reformers were agitating and hunger made many people, especially ordinary people, desperate. In this excited atmosphere Pope Pius the IX celebrated his election by releasing political prisoners, something that every pope had done almost without comment.

In the hot summer of 1846 Pius IX’s granting of amnesty to these political prisoners seemed like a message that he wanted change. Metternich said of him that ‘I had expected everything buy a liberal pope”, and crowds in Rome chanted “O Sommo Pio (oh, supreme Pius)”. Some historians have argued that Pius liked the adoration and took things further because of it. Others have said that the reforms he introduced were designed to keep modernizers happy without actually changing much.

Whatever his motive, Pius’s next moves were seen by radicals and reformers as evidence that the Pope wanted more, perhaps even to take on the role as leader of a free, unified Italy that Gioberti saw for him. Pius granted commissions to look into the justice system, and created a council of ‘laymen’ (non-priests) to advise him. Near the end of 1846 the Papacy entered a customs union with Piedmont and Tuscany.

The Papacy wasn’t the only government in Italy that was making tentative reforms. In 1847 Charles Albert was the King of Piedmont – you’ll remember him as the young man who in 1821 had almost led a liberal revolution in Piedmont but had then changed his mind. When he came to the throne in 1831 he showed himself to be a cautious reformer, but one who didn’t really want real change in Piedmont. So, although he reformed the legal system and decided to join the customs union with Tuscany and the Papal states, he stopped short of more important changes until 1847.

In 1847, like the Pope and other rulers in Italy, Charles Albert was under pressure from protests and riots in the largest cities in Piedmont, Genoa and Turin, to grant a constitution. This he agreed to do in 1847 (though it wasn’t put in place until the following year). Charles Albert couldn’t bring himself to call it a ‘constitution’ though – instead it was called a ‘statute’. The ‘Statuto’ had an important impact after 1849 – but for now all you need to know is that changes took place in Piedmont, Tuscany and the Papal states that gave ground to liberals and reformers.

Austria grew alarmed by these changes and ideas, and sent troops to garrison the city of Ferrara, in the Papal States. This wasn’t an invasion; the Austrians were entitled to send the soldiers. It was a warning to the States of Italy, a reminder that Austria was in charge (it would also have been useful to Austria to have these troops in Italy, in case they were needed to put down any revolutions as in 1821 and 1831). Many Italians reacted furiously, and when Pius IX sent a formal complaint to the Austrians, this was seized upon by the radicals and reformers as a further sign that Pius might be the one to lead Italy out of Austrian domination.

So, we have a very tense situation, a mix of new ideas and hopes of the reformers and radicals, desperation and hunger from peasants and workers, but that’s not the whole picture. Because this was Italy in the 1840s, each different state also had its own different grievances and problems which came together to start off revolts in different cities.

In Sicily for instance hatred of rule from Naples had been increasing. You’ll remember that the local aristocrats wanted to rule Sicily themselves, as an independent state. Many of them, and many radicals and reformers wanted to see Sicily’s constitution of 1812 put back in place. In 1836 there had been a massive outbreak of Cholera which had killed 65,000 people, which Martin Collier puts at 1 tenth of the population.

In Milan, the capital of Lombardy, you’ll remember that the Austrians ruled directly as part of the their empire. The lack of influence for Italians in ruling the duchy was an important source of tension. Lombardy and Venetia was really important for the Austrians, as both states were wealthy. The Austrian Empire received one third of its tax revenues from these two states. In January 1848 in protest at Austrian rule and high taxes, the Milanese stopped smoking. This wasn’t just a symbolic protest, or a health drive. The tobacco tax brought in a lot of money for the Austrians, and if the Milanese stopped smoking the Austrians couldn’t collect taxes on the tobacco!

As the year 1848 opens we can see Italy as being an accident waiting to happen, or a pile of wood, tinder dry, waiting to go up in flames. All that’s needed is a spark. In the next podcast we’ll see how a series of small sparks started revolts in different parts of Italy, causing a brief period when it looked like Italy might ‘make itself’ free.

Something to do – build a set of notes profiling Charles Albert, Pius IX

Podcast No. 8 How close did the revolutions of 1848 come to unifying Italy?

Historians sometimes like to classify causes into different types. History textbooks certainly love that sort of thing. Often they’re quite certain about splitting causes up into long term or short term causes, and sometimes you might find them referring to ‘trigger causes’ – the spark that lights the flame that causes the explosion. Well the revolutions and riots of Italy in 1848 didn’t really have one single trigger. Because this was divided and fractious Italy they couldn’t even be unified in what started the revolts!

We know from our last podcast that Italy was ‘tinder dry’, a situation that had the potential to go up in flames. What happened to start the revolutions was a series of events in the different kingdoms and duchies, which fed off and reacted to each other, and to events outside the peninsula. What developed was a group of different revolts which became linked, but which were then extinguished one by one. In this podcast we’ll look at the different triggers and tell the story of the revolts, and next time we’ll be asking how close Italy came to unification in 1848. If you get lost, Derby has a really clear set of timelines on pages 31 and 32 which might help you keep up!

In Sicily in January 1848 revolutionaries demanded the restoration of the 1812 constitution and independence for Sicily from Naples. Despite 5000 soldiers being sent from the mainland, and the shelling of Palermo, the capital of the Island by the Neapolitan navy, the revolutionaries successfully took over most of the Island by April. They then set about electing a parliament which declared Sicily’s independence – as Pearce and Stiles put it ‘They were not concerned with national unity – quite the opposite. Theirs was a separatist movement with the aim of breaking away from Naples’. (p.33)

At the same time as the revolts in Sicily there were riots in Milan, in Lombardy. You’ll remember that the Milanese had stopped smoking – they were boycotting tobacco in protest at rule from Austria so that the Austrians couldn’t collect taxes on it. The revolutions in Sicily were spreading to the mainland and King Ferdinand of Naples was forced to grant a constitution. Although this constitution was very conservative and saved much of the power to decide things and make laws for the King, it did raise expectations elsewhere and in Piedmont in February Charles Albert finally granted the ‘Statuto’ that he’d been promising since the year before. When Austria attempted to move troops south to help Ferdinand of Naples to put down the revolts in his Kingdom, the Pope refused to let them pass over his territory. According to Collier this sent nationalists ‘into a frenzy of excitement and adulation’ – p44.

So far so good – we have seen revolts and declarations of independence in Sicily, riots in Milan and Naples and the granting of constitutions. We’ve seen the pope stand up to the Austrians, but Italy was not yet in flames.

Then the situation seemed to be ‘transformed’ (as Derby puts it), by two events outside of the Italian peninsula, or as Duggan writes ‘then the initiative passed to the rest of Europe’ (p.170). There was a revolution in Paris, which toppled Louise Phillipe, the last king of France. Following this riots in Vienna forced the resignation of Metternich – the prime minister who had done so much to keep Austria’s position as the leading power in Europe. The situation was indeed transformed. How might Louis Napoleon, the President of the new French Republic lend help to those wanting change in Italy? Would the Austrians be unable to control Italy now that Metternich was gone? Many saw opportunities for change and tried to take them.

In Milan between 17th and 22nd of March five days of furious fighting in the streets led to the defeat and withdrawal of the Austrian army (led by a General Radetsky), who wrote ‘It is the most frightful decision of my life, but I can no longer hold Milan. The whole country is in revolt. I am pressed in the rear by the Piedmontese’ (Radetsky in dispatch to Vienna March 22 1848). After some argument between moderates led by Count Gabrio Cassati, the podesta of Milan (who feared a republic of Lombardy) and the radicals led by Carlo Cattaneo (who wanted a republic of Lombardy) the provisional government asked Charles Albert to defend them against the Austrians. Also on the 22nd of March a Venetian republic was declared with Daniel Manin, a radical, at its head. They too asked Charles Albert for help. Charles declared war on the 22nd, with the cry that Italy would ‘make herself’, and marched troops into Lombardy. Other troops, from Naples, under the control of Pepe, and from the Papal States under the control of Durando marched north to help Piedmont, Lombardy and Venice in a war that seemed to offer independence from Austria.

Austria was on the back foot. It had lost the leadership of Metternich, its troops were withdrawn to fortresses on the border with Lombardy, and almost all the large states of Italy were in open revolt against Austrian rule. To add insult to injury the Papacy that seemed to be encouraging hopes of Italian liberation. Yet by July 1848 Piedmont had been defeated in the battle of Custoza (and then again the following year in March at the battle of Novara), and by August Lombardy had been recaptured, and the republic of Venice put under siege. By August 1849 absolute rule had been restored in Naples, Sicily, the Papal States and the central duchies and Austria had regained direct control of Lombardy and Venetia. What went wrong? Why did such a seemingly promising situation not bear fruit? That’s the focus of the next podcast.

Podcast no 9 – How close did the revolutions of 1848 come to unifying Italy?

The revolutions were still local, even though the froth of the liberal papacy and Charles Albert’s war made them look ‘Italian’. In Sicily the revolution renewed the call for independence. In Milan and Venice the revolutionaries were divided between those who wanted a republic, and those who feared republicanism. Charles Albert wanted to expand Piedmont, and to be a great leader. As Derby puts it ‘hatred of the Austrians only went so far’.

Not only were the revolutionaries divided, Charles Albert, who attempted to lead the revolutions, in order to expand Piedmont, was not up to the job.

As the revolution started in Milan on the 17th March, its leaders asked Charles Albert for help in fighting the Austrians. In the words of Denis Mack Smith Charles ‘waited for four vital days until he was satisfied that the war was likely to succeed and to be in Piedmontese interests’ (p.145). In Piedmontese interests meant that it should be able to take control of Lombardy, and that the war should be won without the help of the new Republic of France (that was what ‘Italy will make itself’ meant, that they didn’t need help from France). Charles was afraid of a republic being formed in Lombardy, and possibly of republican revolution in his own country. So Charles troops didn’t cross into Lombardy until the 22nd of March, by which time Radetsky had escaped to the safety of the fortresses of the Quaderilatera on the border with Austria.

Charles saw himself as a great military leader, and the liberator of Italy. However, his expectations of himself didn’t match up with his abilities. He did not take bold moves, such as entering the war earlier, which might have forced Radetsky to withdraw altogether. His army was underprepared and much weaker than the Austrians’. His soldiers didn’t even have maps of Lombardy. Once inside Lombardy he did not seek to challenge Radetsky’s troops but spent time holding plebiscites to ensure that Lombardy and Venetia would be annexed to Piedmont.

Charles overestimated not only his own military prowess, but also the military power of his army. Instead of welcoming revolutionary soldiers and armies he relied on Piedmontese troops, and ignored the need to keep the support of all sides in the fight against Austria. He made this overestimation not only once, but twice when in March 1849 he attempted to re-start the war, only to have his army smashed before taking one step into Austrian territory by Radetsky at the battle of Novara.

Finally, Charles was clearly out to expand Piedmont, and for Mack Smith ‘Piedmontese insistence on [Piedmontese Expansion] was the main reason for the failure [of the 1848 revolutions]’. It meant that the Piedmontese couldn’t fight alongside the republicans, that the ‘neo guelphists’ who wanted the Pope to rule an Italian Federation couldn’t support the war.

So we have Charles’ overconfidence in himself, his insistence on Piedmontese expansion and his fear of revolution and of French intervention, which was quite a mixture, one which helped end the revolutions of 1848. Historians don’t have many good words to say about Charles:

Derby - ‘Charles Albert was inadequate to the task, an incompetent general and a poor leader’, and for Mack Smith – ‘his abilities in this field [military] were negligible.’

The third reason for the failures of the 1848 revolutions was the Papal Allocution, which Duggan describes as a ‘body blow’ to the national movement. Clark describes how the allocution made moderates and liberals choose between Church and state, whilst Mack Smith describes it as a ‘bombshell’.

The Pope decided to issue the allocution (a declaration against the war with Austria) after his hand was forced by Durando, his own General, who took troops north to help fight the Austrians. In it the Pope made clear that he didn’t want to lead an Italian Federation, that the Austrians were the rightful rulers of Lombardy and Venetia, and that rightful rulers should be obeyed in their Kingdoms and Duchies. Mack Smith makes a convincing argument that the Pope hadn’t worked out that Liberal Pope couldn’t be an absolute ruler of the Papal States, and that when he did, Pius IX had to take a U – turn.

When forced to choose between Church and State, many of the revolutionaries chose state, and fought on for their political beliefs, however the Allocution did remove the papal seal of approval from the war, and no doubt many soldiers did return home as instructed. However, by April 1848, after a month of inactivity by Piedmontese soldiers in Lombardy, the die was already cast. Radetsky’s army was re-building itself with re-enforcements from Austria and the tide was beginning to turn against the revolutions in Northern Italy.

We now turn to the fourth reason why the revolutions of 1848 didn’t unite Italy. Austria’s Might and Radetsky’s leadership. As Derby puts it ‘Italy’s window of opportunity was open only as long as Austrian paralysis lasted’ (p36). Whilst Radetsky was on the back foot in the 5 days of March 1848, Charles Albert wobbled. Radetsky was able to build his army up to 70,000 by the summer of 1848, compared to Piedmont’s 20-30,000. When Austria had got her breath back, she set about defeating Piedmont (twice) and regaining Lombardy and Venetia, before turning to the rebellions in the Papal States (which we’ll discuss in the next podcast).

Finally, Martin Collier claims that a lack of foreign support hampered the revolutions, that the threat from republican France, and its refusal to help in 1849 when Charles tried to re-start the war with Austria, meant that Italy didn’t have the strength to win independence from Austrian domination. This is not a realistic analysis. We need to remember that only 35 years before France had been defeated by a coalition of European powers. Louis Napoleon, the nephew of Bonaparte, couldn’t afford to intervene against Austria in case the very new republic was similarly crushed by a coalition. Italy couldn’t be helped from abroad without a challenge to Austria, which was too strong in 1848 for any other state to contemplate. In fact, as we’ll hear next time, France played a very clever game in taking a chance to intervene in Italy, but againts the revolutions. This meant that France was back in the game, but in such a way that Austria was not directly threatened.

In this podcast we’ve looked at five potential reasons why the 1848 revolutions failed to either liberate or to unite Italy – divisions amongst the revolutionaries, the weakness of Charles Albert, the Papal Allocution, the strength of the Austrians and the lack of foreign intervention to help the revolutions. We’ll take a look next time at the immediate impact of the failure of these ‘moderate’ revolutions, and in the following podcast at the impact of the tumultuous years of 1848 and 1849.

Podcast No 10 – the Roman Republic and the lessons of 1848 - 9

In the last podcast we followed the story of the revolutions of 1848, and the attempt by Charles Albert to use the revolts in Milan and Venice to expand the borders of Piedmont. We heard how the Pope’s Allocution and Charles Albert’s caution had led to the revolts failing, and how Radetsky, the Austrian General (despite calls to return home from Austria) had held his nerve and re-taken Lombardy and most of Vienna.

In 1848 the moderates, Charles Albert of Piedmont, Cassati the podesta of Milan had been at the head of the attempt to liberate Italy from Austrian rule. As their attempts failed more radical revolutionaries made the attempt. In Venice, as Charles Albert was defeated at Custoza, and even in the face of the Austrian Army re-taking most of the state of Venetia, Daniel Manin declared a new republic, which held out until August 1849.

The Pope had become increasingly hated by radicals, following what they saw as his betrayal in publishing the Allocution against the war with Austria. The Pope Rome in fear of his life in November 1848, following the assassination of his prime minister. In February 1849, the parliament elected to draw up a new constitution for Rome declared a republic, and that the Pope’s Temporal Power (that is his power to rule as a king in this world, not his spiritual power) had been ended.

The Pope didn’t take his removal from power lying down. He called on the Catholic states of Spain, France, and Naples to help restore his rule. France, despite, indeed perhaps because of being a new republic itself responded by sending 20,000 troops to crush the Roman Republic and restore the Pope.

The French had recently deposed their last king and declared a republic. Louis Napoleon, the leader of this republic had to have a cautious foreign policy. This Napoleon was the nephew of the great Bonaparte, who had been defeated by a coalition of European powers, including Britain and Austria. Louis Napoloen therefore didn’t want to raise fears that France was about to start trying to re-build an empire by invading its neighbours. We heard in the last podcasts that the French did not want to support Piedmont in the 1848 or 1849. The Pope’s invitation to intervene in Italy was very different. It meant that Louis Napoleon could get influence in Italy and Europe, without directly threatening the Austrians. He took this opportunity, and as we have said, sent 20,000 troops to achieve the end of the Republic of Rome.

After the pope fled Rome, the city was led by Guiseppi Galletti, and after the republic was declared in February 1849, but a triumvirate (a group of three), the most memorable of which was Mazzini himself. The revolutionary government introduced a number of laws which although they only lasted as long as the republic did, really showed how radical it was. They abolished the macinato, the tax on grinding corn, which the peasants hated paying. Press Censorship was also brought to an end, and land that had been owned by the Church was also re-distributed.

In April 1829 the French landed their 20,000 troops near Rome. Their fight to the city itself was not easy. The defence of Rome was led by Garibaldi, and it took until the end of July 1849 for the city itself to fall to the French Army.

Garibaldi earned himself the status of hero in the defence, and in the march out of Rome and across the Appenine mountains, during which his wife died.

Both the Roman and Venitian republics lasted a relatively short time. The Venetian Republic ended in August 1849. Their impact was in the way that they created a legend, an example to those who wanted change, and in the way that the Roman republic in particular was brought to an end.

So, what were the lessons of 1848, when the ‘moderates’ under royal and aristocratic leadership, and 1849 when the ‘democratic’ revolutionaries each took a turn in attempting to remove Austria from Italy and to change the status-quo? Why did the fail to make any immediate impact on the situation in Italy.

For Martin Clark, the revolutions were ‘local’, and not ‘national’ in character – that is, apart from Mazzinians, what most wanted were local changes. Piedmont wanted to expand, the Milanese wanted the Austrians out, the Venetians wanted a new Republic of St Mark, and the Sicilians wanted independence. Mazzini alone was agitating for a united Italy.

Clark also points out how difficult it was to get the peasants involved. Where they had taken part in 1848 ‘they were usually inspired by purely local issues’. “They wanted land near their own villages, not a united Italy” (60).

But for Clark the most important lesson was that “Italy could not in fact go it alone” (61) – Piedmont had tried to defeat the Austrians not once, but twice. The Roman Republic had been defeated by a coalition of French and Austrian forces. This meant that change in Italy could only come as part of a wider shift in the balance of power in Europe – and that would only happen if Austria was no-longer the super power it was in 1815 and continued to be in 1849.

What were the effects of the failure of the 1848 and 1849 revolutions? You’ll remember that before 1848 there were lots of ideas being floated in Italy about how liberation from Austria and some form of unification might be achieved. Gioberti proposed a federation with the Pope at its head. Balbo said that only Piedmont had the military might to lead an Italian federation. Mazzini and his followers predicted that the peasants would rise and throw off the Austrian yoke, and lead to a united Italy. None of these things had happened.

In fact the Pope had declared that he wanted nothing to do with a United Italy and had earned the hatred of the revolutionaries for his Allocution. This hatred increased, and those struggling for independence and unity for Italy became much more ‘anti-clerical’, that is anti Church, after 1849

Mazzini had shown himself to be a clever and inspiring political leader, but he didn’t get the peasants to rise, and even with the help of heroes like Garibaldi couldn’t defend the Roman Republic in the face of the Great Powers of Europe.

Piedmont’s military might had been defeated twice, and the second time the King had had to abdicate. Piedmont had been allowed to keep its constitution. Indeed Austria had insisted that she keep her constitution because the Monarchy was seen as such a failure by some in Piedmont that without the

constitution being there to make government look a bit fairer, Austria was afraid that there would be more revolutions in Piedmont.

So the biggest effect of 1848 is that the fancy ideas for Italian liberation that had been floating about before hand were shown to be unrealistic. After 1848 the progress towards unification was at first based on gains, even very small gains, made in the real world, rather than hair brained schemes. However, just to make things really interesting, the hair brained schemes of Garibaldi did then make things move at an amazing pace, as we’ll discover in the weeks to come.

Podcast No 11 – The Development of Piedmont after 1849, part 1 - Politics, Money and Industry.

Sardinia - Piedmont – the geopolitical cat with 9 lives. The King of Piedmont Sardinia spent the years of Napoleonic occupation on the Island part of his kingdom and was able to return in 1814.

In 1821 Charles Albert made a half hearted attempt to rebel against the Austrians, but decided against it before he really got started. In 1848 and 1849, Piedmont, this time with Charles Albert as king, twice declared war on Austria and was twice defeated by Austria’s superior armies and superior leadership.

With this long catalogue of defeats and set-backs, how can we explain the fact that after 1848, Piedmont came to dominate the Italian peninsula, came to be accepted as the leading Italian state, and came to be a haven for liberal and sometimes radical politicians seeking change in Italy?

One reason why Piedmont could develop in this way was the Statuto. Christopher Duggan writes that, after 1849 ‘everywhere in Italy, except Piedmont, the clocks were turned back’. In other words, the rulers of Italy tore down the constitutions and closed the assemblies that they’d granted during the build up to the revolts of 1848. Censorship was re-introduced in most places. Other harsh measures were taken to prevent further rebellion. In Lombardy for instance there was a 20million Lire fine placed collectively on the leading families that had taken part. Hundreds of peasants were sentenced to death, and police surveillance was increased.

In Piedmont the new King Victor Emmanuelle II was just as keen to get rid of the Statuto, the constitution that Charles Albert had granted in 1848. However, the Austrians were afraid that if he did it, he’d be so unpopular with many people in Piedmont that there would be further rebellion, so they insisted he keep it.

The Austrians probably read the Statuto and decided that they didn’t have much to fear from it. Duggan calls it ‘remarkably backward looking’. It was hardly Mazzinian. It protected the King’s power, giving him the right to appoint the prime-minister, impose justice, declare war, command the army, make laws and dismiss parliament at will. However, it was the only constitution in the whole peninsula, and compared with much of the rest of Italy it gave Piedmontese thinkers more freedom. The Statuto, and the parliament that was

part of the new arrangements in Piedmont, enabled the Aristocracy and moderate reformers to work together in Piedmont to bring about developments and changes, without revolution. As an idea, revolution had lost its sheen after 1848, and many former radicals were prepared to work with Piedmont. As we’ll see, these changes became very important.

After 1849 Piedmont went through a period of development along three lines, political (the laws governing the way that it was run), economic (they way that it rasied, spent and earned money) and diplomatic, by which I mean its place in the world, and its relations with other countries.

One man can take a good deal of the credit for these three developments. Though he worked with others, Count Camillo Benso di Cavour was responsible for much of Piedmont’s success. Cavour was the member of an aristocratic family which had done well out of the Napoleonic occupation. As a young man he had studied engineering and economics and had travelled in France and England, which he particularly admired. Cavour was elected to the Piedmontese Parliament (which was created as part of the Statuto) in 1848 and became Prime Minister in 1851.

So, we’ve looked at the background to Piedmont’s development, the Statuto, the state of the rest of Italy, and Cavour. Let’s cover the changes, the developments that Cavour and his friends and allies actually completed in Piedmont.

Cavours political work was along two lines. The first development was the way that he enabled politicians of the left, the more democratic, to work with more traditional right wing politicians. As prime minister he was the head of ‘the Connubio’, a coalition of centre left and centre right members of Parliament which worked together to change Piedmont. This shows us part of the impact of the Statuto, in other Italian states there was no similar way for politically active people to influence things.

The second line of political development steered by Cavour was to decrease the amount of influence that the Church had in Piedmont. Before he became Prime Minister, Cavour helped to get the ‘Siccardi’ laws through parliament. These laws did things like ending Church Courts, and prevented criminals from hiding from justice in Churches. As Prime Minister he closed many monasteries. These changes show how ‘anti clerical’ reformers had become after the Allocution. However, their real importance was that they made Piedmont look more modern, in fact they helped Piedmont look like the leading state in Italy, along with some of these other changes.

Cavour was also responsible for changing Piedmontese government finances. He saw that Piedmont would have to raise lots of money to build railways, canals and factories. During his visits to England he’d seen how the Bank of England, the central bank, allowed the government to borrow money on long term loans. He created a Piedmontese Central Bank, and used it to borrow money to help develop Piedmont. At the same time Cavour also raised taxes in Piedmont, to help pay for these loans. As we’ll see, these loans did help Piedmont develop, but they had a downside. By 1859 the Piedmontese

government owed 725 million lire to foreign lenders. These debts were to cause problems after 1862.

These loans did have a positive effect, and industry did develop. By 1858 Piedmont had 850 km of railways, which was one third of all the rail in Italy. There was a railway that connected Turin with France, and a telegraph from Turin to Paris by 1853. Piedmont’s silk and cotton industries use the railways to export goods and to obtain raw materials.

In today’s podcast we’ve looked at the way that the Cavour and his allies used the opportunities created by the Statuto to bring about changes and developments in Piedmont. We’ve looked at the way the Statuto enabled politicians to work with the King and aristocracy, the way that Cavour used politics to take changes through parliament, and the actual changes that Cavour and his friends made.

We’ve also seen how much of the money that paid for these changes came from outside Piedmont. Indeed the effect on the way that Piedmont looked to outsiders was just as important as the effect the changes had inside. Piedmont looked more and more like a modern state. The loans from and the railways to France tied her into a relationship with that country. In the next podcast we’re going to learn about how Piedmont looked enabled her to pick up support from Italians, and enabled Cavour, under some prodding from Victor Emmanuelle to develop Piedmont’s ties with France and Britain.

Podcast No 12 – The Development of Piedmont after 1849, part 2 – The National Society, and the Crimean War

In the last podcast we learned about Cavour’s part in the political, financial and economic development of Piedmont in the 1850s’. In this second podcast about the development of Piedmont we’re going to look at how the political and economic changes helped Piedmont to win friends and followers inside and outside of Italy.

We’ve already heard how the statuto, even despite it’s conservative nature, made Piedmont the most liberal state in Italy and how press and other civil freedoms attracted liberal exiles from the rest of the peninsula. It is estimated that as many as 30,000 such liberals moved to Piedmont in the decade following 1848. They helped Turin to become a centre of debate about Italy’s future. At the same time, many who had been followers of Mazzini saw that the rebellions and revolts set up by him had led only to the death or exile of those involved. Veterans of past republican revolutions, like Daniele Manin, Giuseppe La Farina and Giorgio Pallavicino took a more moderate stance. In 1857 they formed the National Society.

The National Society’s aims were for a united Italy, free from the control of Austria. Unlike Mazzini’s Young Italy however, they were open to working with Piedmont (‘for it has a warlike army, money, credit, reputation and an organised administration’ – The Political Creed of the National Society 1858). Cavour met Garibadli and PAllavicino in 1856 and Manin in 1857, Cavour hinted that he would support the work of the National Society, and Manin offered his support to the king of Piedmont.

Both sides were wary of each other (Pallavicino wrote to Manin that he was ‘sure’ that Cavour’s approach was ‘all an act’ and that what Cavour wanted was ‘just for Piedmont to be enlarged by a few square miles of Italian soil’). Nonetheless, the meetings and offers of support show that Piedmont and the democrats increasingly had common interests and might work together. In the events of XXX the support of and work of the National Society were crucial in the creation of the Kingdom of Italy.

So, for some patriotic Italians, Piedmont had started to emerge as the leading state in Italy. For the powers of Europe, a similar process had started. The Crimean war was a turning point in the relations of Piedmont and the outside world. Traditionally Cavour is seen as the wise architect of Piedmont’s foreign policy. However, it seems likely that it was Victor Emmanuelle who was keen for Piedmont to take part in the Crimean, so that she could show her valour in war.

The Crimean war started as a dispute between Russia and the Turkish, Ottoman Empire. Russia invaded Turkey, who turned to Britain for help. Britain, already frightened at the growth of Russian power sent an army to the Crimea, in Turkey, to fight the Russians. France took part, Napoleon III was keen to change the balance of power in Europe, and defeating Russia might be one way of doing this. Austria was less keen. Austria and Russia had long been allies in keeping the status quo in Europe.

That’s where Piedmont came in. France and Britain needed Piedmont to come on board and fight the Russians, not because of Piedmont’s army, but in order to encourage Austria to join the war. Austria didn’t want to risk war with Russia on one border to find that Piedmont was invading her Italian provinces on the other side of her empire. If Britain and France could persuade Piedmont to join in, Austria needn’t worry about Piedmont stirring up trouble in northern Italy.

Victor Emmanuelle thought all of this was a great idea, but Cavour needed to be persuaded. Using all his powers of tact and persuasion, the King threatened to sack Cavour unless he agreed to take Piedmont to war. Cavour agreed. No doubt he could see the potential advantage for Piedmont, but to say that Cavour was the brains behind the advantages that taking part gave Piedmont, would be an exaggeration – VE was the driving force.

Piedmont sent 18,000 men. 14 died in action, 2,000 died of Cholera. This contribution was enough however to earn Cavour a place representing Piedmont at the Paris Peace conference. For some historians it has been this seat at the Conference and the diplomacy that took place that was the important impact of the Crimean war for Italy.

However, there’s some evidence that Cavour cocked things up a little in Paris. He caused a minor diplomatic row when letters between Cavour and Turin were published. In these Cavour seems to have exaggerated the support of Britain for a war with Austria. Britain was not impressed, questions were asked in the British Parliament. Lord Clarendon, the foreign minister, announced that Cavour’s policy was not practical, and the suggestion that Britian would join a war ‘absurd’. In meetings with Cavour Clarendon pledged only ‘moral support’.

Similarly, the Italian question was discussed, but nothing decided. Meetings with Napoleon III resulted in warm words, but no concrete action.

For Collier, the real impact of the Crimean war was in the ‘collapse of 1815 settlement’. Indeed Collier describes it as the ‘watershed for Austrian power’. Because Austria had been reluctant to support either side, it had lost the support of both. France and Britain wouldn’t actively support Austria in retaining her Italian provinces, and she had lost her natural ally, Russia. From 1856 onwards Austria could no longer act with the freedom that she had previously enjoyed. Coupled with the rise of Prussian power, which we’ll look at towards the end of these podcasts, this meant that Austrian power slowly ebbed away in the years after 1856.

In these podcast we’ve seen how Piedmont took on the mantle of the leading state in Italy. We’ve seen how developments at home, and in her reputation abroad and in Italy itself brought Piedmont this role. In the next podcast, we’re going to see what she did with it, and how Austria’s diplomatic isolation brought an opportunity that France and Piedmont decided to seize.

Podcast No 13 – The Orsini Plot, Plombieres and the build up to the War of 1859.

In the last podcast we looked at the way Piedmont developed financially, politically and diplomatically to take on the role of the leading state in Italy. We heard how she took part in the Crimean war and gained a place at the peace negotiations. We learned how new telegraphs, canals and most importantly railways linked her to the outside world, and especially to France. We also heard how Austria, the dominant power on the Italian peninsula, was isolated by the Crimean war. At the end of the podcast we learned that in 1856 Cavour had become a little over-excited and put forward a plan for war with Austria which the British Foreign Secretary had described as not ‘practical’ and ‘absurd’. However, within 5 years there had been such a war, Austria had been defeated and a kingdom of Italy had been created which took in Piedmont, Lombardy, the Central Duchies and the Papal States, and even Naples. Only Vienna and Rome remained outside this Kingdom by the end of 1861.

So, in this podcast we’re going to look at the build up to what Italians sometimes refer to as the ‘second war of independence’, in 1859. In the next podcast we’ll look at how the war progressed, and its surprising outcome.

Piedmont needed allies to defeat Austria, that was the overriding lesson of 1848. Cavour had been working hard to develop Piedmont to make it a more attractive ally, though his aim was to expand Piedmont’s territories, and to maek the Piedmontese state strong, rather than to unite Italy. In 1855 Cavour had tried to persuade France and Britain to support a war to drive out the Austrians, but could not get this backing.

In 1859 Emperor Napoleon III of France, suddenly changed his mind, and arranged for a secret meeting with Cavour in the French town of Plombieres.

The trigger for this change of mind was something called the Orsini plot, which was a conspiracy between Italian radicals, led by a count Felice Orsini. In the plot four bombs were thrown at Napoleon’s carriage. 8 were killed, 150 injured and Napoleon and his wife were left untouched by the explosions. Orisini was hoping that Napoleon’s death would cause another revolution in France, and that a revolutionary government would help Italy to get rid of the Austrians.

But Napoleon didn’t die. At first he was furious, and threatened to invade Piedmont. Then, however, Napoleon seems to have realised what an opportunity this was for France. The Orisini plot gave him the excuse to dictate terms to Cavour and Piedmont. Napoleon published a letter supposedly written by Orisini from Prison, in which Orsini pleaded for Napoleon to help Italy get rid of the Austrians. Napoleon announced his intention to help, and then called the secret meeting.

Derby sums it up nicely ‘only when [Napoleon] could dictate terms to Cavour did he become seriously interested in the fate of Italy’.

So, what was in it for France, and for Napoleon? Napoleon wanted to increase the power of France, but he had to do it carefully. You’ll remember that he was the nephew of Napoleon I, who had conquered much of western Europe for France, and had been defeated by a coalition of powers. If Napoleon III acted too aggressively, if he looked too dangerous to the other powers, they might re-create that coalition, and remove him from the Imperial Throne.

Starting a war to remove the Austrians from northern Italy was an excellent way of increasing French power at their expense. By creating a more powerful Piedmont, France would replace Austria as the dominant power. The trick was not to make Piedmont too powerful, and to make it look like Austria was being the aggressive country. If Piedmont got too much out of a war, they wouldn’t have to follow France’s orders. If France looked too aggressive then the Prussians, or the British, might join the war against France.

So, on July 21st in Piedmont, Cavour and Napoleon secretly met. It was so secret that Napoleon’s foreign minister didn’t know. Indeed, he remarked to Napoleon that he’d seen Cavour in the town and how surprising this was! At the meeting they discussed what each country would get out of the deal, and what each would give. Cavour wrote an excited letter home to Victor Emmanuelle in which he said that Piedmont would get Parma, Modena, Venetia and Lombardy. There would be a new Kingdom of Northern Italy, made out of these states. Tuscany would get some of the Papal States, to create a kingdom of Central Italy and the King of Naples would be replaced. When the actual treaty was signed in January 1859 things were less exciting for Piedmont. Firstly their territories were not clearly set out, France however would definitely get Nice and Savoy (parts of Piedmont) and Piedmont promised to pay all of the costs of any war with Austria.

A good deal of the meeting in Plombieres was about how France and Piedmont create a war with Austria without looking like the aggressive parties. This wasn’t easy. In his letter home Cavour described how he and the Emperor paced around the room in discussion.

In the end a strategy of raising the tension was undertaken. King Victor Emmanuelle made speeches about how the Italian people longed for freedom. Piedmont mobilised its army, raising more troops, and moving them to the border with Austrian Lombardy. Radicals like Garibadldi were given positions in the Army. Over the winter of 1858 and into 1859 the tension was increased. Prussia, Russia and Britain attempted to calm things. Russia proposed a congress, Prussia threatened to join any war on Austria’s side. Napoleon lost heart and asked Piedmont to stand down.

This caused the Austrians to think that Piedmont had lost her ally, and they decided to teach Cavour and Victor Emmanuelle a lesson. Austria issued an ultimatum, a demand that Piedmont should disarm her troops or face war. The Piedmontese refused, and Austria had to declare war. This gave France the excuse they were looking for, and war was joined.

In today’s podcast, we’ve looked at the immediate reason why Napoleon III of France became really interested in the fate of Italy. We’ve heard what he hoped to get out of a change in the status quo in the Peninsula, and the promises he got from Cavour in exchange for helping Piedmont expand her borders. Finally, we found out how France and Piedmont went about goading Austria into declaring war. In the next podcast we’re looking at how the war progressed.

Podcast No 14 – The War of 1859 and the peace of Villafranca

Last podcast we covered the reasons for, and the build up to the war of 1859, sometimes called the ‘second war of independence’. In today’s podcast we’ll look at the course of the war, and discuss what it tells us about how Italy came to be unified.

The first thing to note is that the Piedmontese did not cover themselves in glory. Cavour had hoped, and indeed had promised a large army to match France’s contribtion of 120,000 men. In reality Piedmont could only muster 60,000. The army was further hampered by their lack of maps, supplies and proper planning (which had plagued them in the war of 1848 too). Victor Emmanuelle insisted on leading the troops personally, despite the fact that he really wasn’t very good at it. Duggan desribes his fondness for ‘outdated’ cavalry charges for instance. As a result of these various difficulties the Piedmontese army actually arrived too late to take part in the first major battle of the war, at Magenta on the 4th of June.

This battle was so destructive, so bloody that it gave its name to the deep, red colour of blood on the battlefield, known after as ‘Magenta’.

The second major battle, at Solferino on the 24th of June was even bloodier than Magenta, though this time Piedmontese forces did fight side by side with the French. Henry Dunant, a Swiss man, was inspired by the suffering of the dead and dying to start a charity, eventually called the Red-Cross, to aid those hurt by war.

Even before this fighting in the north had been going on, Cavour and the National society was busy in the Central Duchies. Mack Smith describes how

‘Cavour was playing his own game’, attempting to gain more for Piedmont than Napoleon perhaps wanted, and certainly more than had been discussed at Plombieres. In late April 1859 around 80 Piedmontese policemen, dressed as Tuscan workers, were sent to Florence to start a protest against the Grand Duke, who seeing that Austria was going to be tied up fighting France, promptly fled. After the victory at Magenta, the rulers of Parma and Modena also took flight, and soon after the Austrians withdrew their troops from the northern part of the Papal States, the Romagna, which then also revolted against the Pope’s rule. Many of the leaders of these revolts were Members of the National Society, and various forms of ‘unification’, ‘fusion’ and ‘annexation’ of these parts of Italy were offered to Victor Emmanuelle.

This made Napoleon extremely cross. The French Ambassador in Turin was sent to tell Cavour off on the 3rd of July, just after the great Battle of Solferino, at which thousands of French soldiers had died, seemingly so that Cavour was free to break his promises to the Emperor of France. The ambassador wrote back to Paris to report on the meeting like this ‘I then told Count Cavour than I was instructed to mention certain underhand, disloyal manoeuvres. […] M. de Cavour was visibly embarrassed and nettled’.

It was this disloyalty, and the fear that Piedmont was gaining too much out of the war, whilst France lost too much in terms of blood, that led to Napoleon agreeing a cease fire and peace with the Austrian Emperor at Villafranca on the 11th of August. We’ll talk about what was in the treaty shortly, but let’s go over the reasons why Napoleon stopped the war, just as France seemed to have Austria on the back foot.

Napoleon ended the war with Austria for four reasons: because France wasn’t getting what Napoleon hoped; because the losses were too great to continue; and because Austria was too strong to defeat in battle in the short term. The final reason was that Napoleon realised he couldn’t rely on Cavour. Let’s deal with these one at a time.

Firstly – Napoleon wasn’t interested in Italian unity. He wanted France to replace Austria as the dominant power in France. He had plans to place friends in royal positions in Italy; he wanted to re-create Piedmont as a satellite state of France, one which followed France’s orders and would be a capable ally in war; he wanted to destroy the settlement of 1815, so as to allow France to expand her power.

None of this seemed to be happening. Piedmont was gaining much more than it had agreed too, and might end up being too strong to be dominated by France.

French losses were great. France herself was losing thousands of men in costly and gruesome battles. At Solferino for instance 12,000 Frenchmen were killed, for little gain. In the meantime Prussia made threatening noises about joining in against France.

France was thus fighting further and further into Austrian territories, where Austria’s huge army could be brought to help with the fighting. It was

becoming obvious that defeating Austria would cost too much, and bring little advantage to France.

Finally, Cavour had shown himself to be un-trustworthy. Whilst French blood was being spilled he had worked to depose the leaders of Tuscany and to annex not only Tuscany, but Parma, Modena, the Romagna. This would make Piedmont too strong to be a satellite of France, and went much further than had been agreed at Plombieres.

The text of the Villafranca agreement (page 286 Mack Smith), which can be found on the website, shows these concerns. In it Austria gives up Lombardy, so that France can give it to Piedmont, but the Austrian Emperor is confirmed as the ruler of Venice. There’s also a clause stating clearly that the rulers of the Central Duchies are to be restored, so that Piedmont should not take control of these.

Villafranca was agreed without the Piedmontese being involved in the discussions. Indeed Cavour only learned of them from King Victor Emmanuelle. Reports suggest that Cavour spent a couple of minutes hurling colourful swearwords at the King, before resigning.

In this podcast we’ve looked at the conduct of the 1859 war against Austria. We’ve seen how the Piedmontese forces contributed much less than the French, how bloody the battles were, and how Napoleon realised that France was gaining little from the war. We’ve also learned about Cavour’s actions in the Central Duchies, and the attempts to expand Piedmont’s borders into these areas. Finally we learned about the peace of Villafranca, and Cavour’s colourful reaction to it. Cavour was deeply unhappy about the loss of this opportunity to remove the Austrians and expand Piedmont’s borders. However, within a year Piedmont had annexed Tuscany, the Romagna and the states of Parma and Modena, and Cavour was back in the position of Prime Minister. In the next podcast we’ll hear about how this came about.

Podcast No 15 – Why wasn’t the peace of Villafranca put in place?

As we heard in the last podcast, on the 11th of August 1959 Emperor Napoleon III of France met with Emperor Francis Joseph I of Austria in the Swiss town of Villafranca to agree a peace to end the bloody war between France and Piedmont on one side, and Austria on the other.

The Piedmontese were not told of the meeting, and had the terms of the agreement dictated to them. When Cavour heard that Piedmont would only get Lombardy, would have to pay for the war and would not be able to take control of Tuscany, Parma, Modena and the Romagna he was furious.

Piedmontese agents and the National Society had been working to create revolts and to hold assemblies in the central duchies. These assemblies had voted to join Piedmont. Austria had been defeated in two huge battles. It looked like France and Piedmont could even force the Austrians from Venetia. But it was not to be. Napoleon decided to end the war. It looked to France as if whilst they were shedding blood fighting the Austrians in the north, Piedmont was breaking the terms of their agreement and attempting to take over

Tuscany and the Central Duchies. To put a stop to this, Villafranca was signed and Cavour resigned. It looked like Piedmont was going to have to settle for gaining Lombardy only.

However, in December 1859 Napoleon changed his mind yet again. He signalled this change of mind by allowing a pamphlet to be published in France which suggested that the Pope might not be allowed to re-gain control of the Romagna. In January he started negotiations with Cavour (who had re-gained his job as Prime Minister) and by March Piedmont had taken formal control of not only Lombardy, but all the other central duchies.

So, what changed between August and December 1859? Why did Napoleon decided that Piedmont should be allowed to take the Central Duchies?

The answer seems to be that he worked out that Piedmont was going to take control of Tuscany, Romagna and the Central Duchies anyway, and that, unless Napoleon acted quickly, France wouldn’t get anything from the deal.

By August 1859, when Villafranca had been signed, the National Society had been doing (as Duggan puts it) Cavour’s ‘dirty work’ in the Central Duchies and Tuscany. The leaders of the revolts in these duchies were all in favour of Piedmont taking control, some because they wanted to see an expanded Piedmont (Farini, for instance who was a member of the National Society and had taken control in Emilia (Parma and Modena). Others agreed to Piedmont’s annexation of their duchies because it seemed like the best way to stop radicals and revolutinaries doing so (Baron Ricasoli who was in charge of Tuscany for instance). These leaders had elected assemblies that had called for unification with Piedmont, and remained in power after the peace of Villafranca had been signed.

As we’ve seen in all the revolts that had taken place before 1858, this would have been the cue for the Austrians to enforce the Villafranca treaty, by military might. Yet for a number of reasons the Austrians agreed in December not to interfere in Italy. Britain had made it clear that they wanted to see Piedmont expand its borders. Austria was still recovering from the fighting earlier in the year, and none of the other powers were enthusiastic about Austria marching into Italy again.

So, without Austria’s might to make sure it was done properly, the peace of Villafranca meant nothing. It looked like Piedmont was going to take control of these states, with or without French help. Napoleon III saw ho embarrassing it would have been to see Piedmont getting so much from a war in which France had shed so much blood, and yet had gained so little advantage. At that point, in December 1859 the French emperor signalled his change of mind and entered into negotiations with Piedmont.

The negotiations lasted until March, when the new treaty of Turin was put in place. Under the treaty Piedmont took control of Lombardy, Romagna, Parma and Modena. They promised to pay France’s expenses from the war of 1859, and crucially they gave away Nice and Savoy to the French. Savoy was the homeland of Victor Emmanuelle’s family, but was mainly French speaking. Nice however was decidedly Italian in character, was the birthplace of

Garibaldi, and it’s gift to France made many Italian patriots and radicals very angry, as we’ll see.

In March 1860, under the treaty of Turin, plebiscites (votes) were held in the land that was being given to France and to Piedmont. Martin Clark describes how these took place in a ‘festival atmosphere’, under the eye of the Piedmontese National Guard. The result was so carefully managed that many of the ballots were pre printed with the ‘right’ answer of ‘YES’.

So, what factors had allowed Piedmont to expand in 1859/60 when all other attempts to remove Austria from Italy had so spectacularly failed?

The most obvious one might be French might. The Austrians had previously had a clear advantage as the strongest power in the peninsula. Piedmont had tried to challenge them in 1848 and 1849, and was totally beaten each time. In 1859 however the Austrians couldn’t easily beat the French.

Leadership also seems to have played a part. Although Victor Emmanuelle didn’t cover himself in glory as a military leader, it seems that this time the Austrians felt the loss of their great general Radetsky. Duggan claims that it took the French and Piedmontese so long to become organised for war that if the Austrian commander had shown more initiative at the start of the war, then Piedmont could have been knocked out of the war before the French even got there. In other words, it Radetsky, or someone of his like had been in charge the outcome might have been very different. This seems like a convincing argument – War was effectively declared on the 23rd of April, Cavour’s Policemans’ revolt took place in Tuscany in May, but the Piedmontese and French didn’t see real action until the 4th June.

However, there’s an underlying factor here, which is not obvious. Previously Austria had been able to act freely in the Italian Peninsula. The other powers had not objected when Austria put down so many revolts in the years following 1815. However after the Crimean war the situation changed, Austria was much more isolated, having lost it’s Russian ally. Not only that but the other powers now wanted an end to the 1858 settlement which gave Austria such a powerful role in Europe. So in 1848 the British made no attempt to help the Italian revolts, and France actually sent an army to end the Roman Republic. In 1859 Britain made it clear that Austria should not intervene in the Central Duchies to enforce Villafranca, and France sent armies to fight Austria to force them from northern Italy.

In this podcast we’ve covered the reasons for the failure of the peace of Villafranca, and looked at the underlying reasons why things changed so much in Italy in 1859 and early 1860.

As far as Cavour was concerned, this was supposed to be the end of these changes. Martin Clark sums up what Cavour wanted to do after the treaty of Turin; ‘it was time to establish Piedmontese rule in the new provinces and mend fences abroad’. In other words, the job of expansion was finished, and Cavour had no ambitions to grow Piedmont’s power further. As we’ll find out in the next podcast, Garibaldi had other ideas however, and events were to take a dramatic and exciting turn…

Podcast No 17 – How did Garibaldi Conquer the South?

As we heard last time, when the Kingdom of northern Italy was formally announced in January 1860, Cavour had fulfilled his ambitions for the expansion of Piedmont. Cavour saw the task before him as one of making the new state work. In today’s podcast we’re going to hear how these plans were dramatically changed by the actions of Garibaldi. We’re going to cover the reasons why Cavour was so worried about Garibaldi’s actions, but also why he couldn’t intervene to stop Garibaldi.

Cavour’s tactics during 1859 had made Garibaldi his ‘bitter enemy’ according to Mack Smith. Many radicals like Garibaldi were angry at the decision to give Nice and Savoy to the French. They also thought that they should fight on until the whole of Italy was united. Early in 1860 Garibaldi was preparing a revolt in Nice, trying to gather support and arms. His close friend Francesco Crispi had been trying to persuade him that the best place to try next would be sicily.

Sicily had been in what Duggan calls a ‘febrile state’, a state of fever and tension in March and February of that year. Crispi felt that if Garibaldi travelled south to the Island, they could start a revolt that would enable them to take Sicily, and possibly the Kingdom of Naples itself, for the new Italian Kingdom. Garibaldi was persuaded, and preparations were made to sail south.

This left Cavour on what Duggan calls ‘the horn of a terrible dilemna” (p.208)

The big problem was that if Garibaldi caused too much trouble down south, the Austrians or the French might intervene, possibly by invading Piedmont and the new Kingdom might be lost. Even if this didn’t happen, GAribalid might set himself up as ruler of the south, or set up a republic, both situations would threaten the new Kingdom.

However, Cavour couldn’t openly oppose the expedition. Cavour was not popular amongst the left wing in Piedmont, radicals and democrats accused him or treachery over Nice. The king had already hinted that he thought is was a good idea. Directly opposing Garibaldi might therefore lose Cavour his job, or cause revolt in Piedmont.

Duggan writes that Cavour therefore did what he could, behind the scenes, to ensure that the expedition was a failure, for instance, ensuring that the volunteer’s enfield rifles were confiscated – so they had to leave with only old fashioned muskets and no ammunition.

On May the 16th a small battle at Calatafini saw Garibaldi’s men beating a larger and better armed Neapolitan army. The victory was dramatic and added to Garibaldi’s amazing reputation. One of Garibaldi’s men wrote, just before the battle that, ‘there is a magic in his look and in his name. It is only Garibaldi they want.’ Afterwards his reputation in Sicily grew and many peasants joined in the fighting. By the end of May the island capital, Palermo had falled to the rebels.

At this point Cavour acted again to try to stop Garibaldi from using Sicily as a base to attack Naples. Cavour sent La Farina, a trusted ally, to Sicily, armed with posters reading ‘we want annexation’. La Farina persuaded the local aristocracy that joining Piedmont was the only way to stop radicals and revolution from overrunning the island. However, before he was successful in engineering annexation, Garibaldi expelled him from the island. Garibaldi wanted to retain control of Sicily, which he could then use as a launch pad, for an invasion of Naples.

Again Cavour made a desperate attempt to gain control of the situation. His idea was to cause a rebellion in Naples before Garibaldi reached there, so that Piedmontese troops could invade with the excuse of stopping the trouble. Why was Cavour so desperate (and, as we’ll see he got even more desperate a little later)? Well, he was still worried about France and Austria intervening to save the Bourbons. Although Britain had made it clear that they thought that Italy should be left to it’s own destiny, it was pretty clear that if the Pope was directly threatened, Austria, and France especially would respond. What worried him now was that Garibaldi might succeed in conquering the south. Garibaldi’s men were fighting under the cry of ‘Italy and Victor Emanuel’, but Cavour couldn’t be sure that Garibaldi wouldn’t keep control of the south, perhaps even forming a radical, republican state to the south.

So, Cavour sent agents into Naples to start a revolution. Nothing happened. Garibaldi marched from the coast, and the Bourbon Army retreated ahead of him. Naples fell without resistance, Francis III – the last of the bourbons (it’s always sad when the biscuits run out), leaving early September. A final battle took place on the Volturno River a little later, but Garibaldi was victorious, and heading north towards Rome and what remained of the Papal states.

Cavour was therefore ‘forced to take one of the biggest gambles of his career’. Cavour warned Napoleon that the Pope was threatened. He persuaded the French Emperor to agree to Piedmont invading the Pope’s territory, not only in order to stop Garibaldi (he wasn’t clear to the French that he intended to annex the Papal States, but he told them enough to ensure they agreed to the invasion), but also to prevent the formation of a radical republic. Cavour was able to use the arrival of Mazzini in Naples as an illustration of the risk. He sent more agents into the Papal States to start a small revolt, which was his excuse to send in the army.

The Piedmontese army marched south, as Garibaldi’s army was fighting the Bourbon army at the Volturno River. The Papal states didn’t fall easily. Mac Smith writes that this was effectively a civil war, and how the ‘fighting was conducted with […] bitterness and cruelty on both sides’. Only Papal forces in uniform were recognised as legitimate enemy fighters. Peasants or priests who fought against the Piedmontese forces were executed. Mack Smith suggests that the inhabitants ‘did not easily forget this kind of treatment’.

Victor Emanuel and Garibadli met on the 26th of October, 1860 at Teano in the Papal States. They greated each other warmly, and the king shook Garibaldi’s hand as Garibaldi effectively gave the south to him. By March 1861 the carefully organised plebiscites had brought predictably huge votes for

annexation by Piedmont in Naples, Sicily and the Papal states and the Kingdom of Italy was proclaimed.

So who should take the credit for uniting North and South. The most obvious choice is Garibaldi, who seized the chance that Cavour didn’t want to take, and whose military genius enabled him to take 1000 men armed with, effectively, long sticks, and defeat a well equipped and very large army.

Yet, Martin Clark has an alternative view. He gives equal credit to Cavour, seeing 1860 as a ‘triumph of imaginative statecraft’ for the way that he kept Napoleon from intervening, but still managed to annex the territories that had been defeated, but also the way that he managed to stop Garibaldi from attempting to take Rome, which may well have caused an international protest, and perhaps an invasion.

We shouldn’t forget the effect of the international situation though. There was a window of opportunity, which even if Garibaldi didn’t see, he was able to use. France had been criticised by the British for taking Nice and Savoy. The British made it clear therefore that they didn’t want France to gain further influence in Italy. The British declaration and continuing support for the idea of non intervention in Italy also affected Austria. Austria was in any case still licking her wounds from the year before, and her only response was to reinforce her troops in Venetia. The British recognition of the new state which came in a statement on the 27th of October 1860 sealed the deal – the powers wouldn’t act to restore Francis or the Pope, Italy was safe for the time being.

In the next podcast we’ll examine the 10 years after this initial unification, to see how the new country fared, and discover that making a new state was more complicated than rigging plebiscites.

Podcast no 18 – Was Italian unification a success between 1861 and 1870?

The situation after 1861 was a complex one, but broadly speaking we can say with confidence that Italy (and for that matter Italians) went through a difficult time in the 10 years after unification. We’ll look at those difficulties in 5 different categories:

Continuing differences between North and South;The problems caused by Piedmontisation;The disillusionment of the radicals and democrats; andThe position of the Catholic Church to the new state;The Death of Cavour.

In today’s podcast we’ll look at the first two of these problems, that of the differences between north and south, and the problems caused by ‘Piedmontisation’, we’ll end by look at how these hit the south especially hard and caused a civil war known as ‘the brigands war’.

You will have heard that D’Azeglio said ‘Italy is made, now we must make Italians’. Even when looking at the differences between Lombardy and the next door state of Piedmont, this statement seemed true. However, it was doubly true of the differences between the north and the south. In Piedmont,

there was a long tradition of loyalty to the Royal family, and of a state bureaucracy, of men working for the government to get things done. In the south loyalty was much more to a town, or a city. Relationships with local landowners were far more important than to the King of Naples. We’ll see how this became a problem when Piedmontisation (at first at least) cut local landlords out of wielding power.

The economies of north and south were also very different. In the north agriculture was still the main way of making money. However, farms were often owned by peasants in the north, and some peasants had grown wealthy in their own right through farming. In the south peasants were much more likely to be landless, and to earn a living day to day by working for local landowners. In the period running up to unification, in a process known as ‘latifundia’ this had been getting worse. Landowners had been using the law to take control of land previously used by peasants to graze cattle or sheep. In the north there was a growing industrial sector, and better and better connections with Europe. Trains linked Paris with Turin, enabling goods to be traded outside of Italy.

Even the languages of Italy were still a barrier to unification. Only 2.5 % of those living in ‘Italy’ spoke ‘Italian’. Duggan writes how soldiers from Piedmont found the locals of Naples to be ‘incomprehensible’, leaving them with the feeling of being strangers in a foreign land.

The final difference between north and south I would like to look at is the attitude of northerners to southerners, something which remains a problem in Italy even to this day. Time and time again in the documents one can see a dismissive and superior attitude to the south and southerners in the use of words like ‘uncivilised’, ‘backward’, ‘barbaric’, ‘superstitious’, ‘immoral’, ‘lazy’, ‘cowardly’. Even in the a supporter of Garibaldi, described a volunteer peasant, fighting alongside him against the Bourbon Army as ‘a little dwarfish monster’, ‘more brute than man’. Southern Italy was often seen as being ‘sick’ or ‘ill’. The fear in the north was that, unless the illness was given some treatment, the disease would spread.

The difficulties caused by these differences were made even worse by the process of ‘Piedmontisation’ that took place after unification. Unification was completed in a hurry and Cavour had made no plans as to how to control the south. Those who joined Garibaldi often expected that Sicily and Naples would get some form of autonomy, and elsewhere in Italy democrats hoped that some sort of federation would be set up, so that the different parts of Italy would continue to have their own laws and traditions of government.

This was not to be. At first Piedmont’s laws and constitution was used as a temporary way of ruling the new provinces in the north, and there was talk of having a later constitutional congress or review, to decide the best way to rule Italy. However, when the south was joined to Italy, and when the south proved to be a difficult place to keep in order, the idea of local powers and local arrangements were abandoned. Instead Piedmont’s system of government was imposed across the peninsula, backed up by the army as a way of keeping the peace.

This meant that Piedmont’s currency, weights and measures, civil laws and eventually criminal laws, her voting laws and parliament, her tax system, tariffs, the system of conscription and even the school system was imposed across Italy. In some ways this probably represented progress for many of the states, but in others there were reasons to resent these changes. In Lombardy for instance the education system had been far better than that of Piedmont. In Tuscany a long tradition of autonomy and fair, progressive laws was ended overnight. In the south the new system of bureaucracy didn’t work well with the tradition of loyalty to the local town and the power of the landlords over the peasants. Conscription and higher taxes were especially hated in Naples. In Sicily, peasants who thought they’d been fighting to liberate Sicily from Naples, found instead that they were now ruled from Turin.

What’s more, they found themselves paying for the privilege of being ruled by the North. Piedmont had borrowed large sums of money from foreign investors, not only to pay for the industrial expansion of the 1850s, the railways and canals that Cavour needed to modernise Piedmont, but also to pay for the wars of 1850 and 1860. In the 1860’s Italy’s debt was running at about 400 million lire, which was equal to the whole of the money earned by every Italian in one year (to compare, in the UK in 2010, when we’re all so worried about the national debt, ours is equal to 50% of what the country earns). The taxes were raised across Italy to pay Piedmont’s debts, and this caused a great deal of resentment. Particularly hated by peasants, especially in the south, was a tax on grinding flour, called the ‘grist’ tax.

These problems hit the peasants, and those of the south especially hard. In the years running up to 1860, a process called ‘latifundia’ had seen local landowners take over more and more of the land used by the peasants to grow food and graze animals. The high taxes fell on to the peasant’s shoulders. The Piedmontese government had closed monasteries in the south, and sold their land to raise money. The monasteries had been the place peasants had gone when they had no food or money, and this welfare system was destroyed along with the sale of church land. Conscription caused 25,000 southerners to run away from the army in 1861 alone. They often joined bands of soldiers who had been sacked from the Bourbon armies at the end of the war of 1860, roaming the country and taking what they could to live.

These ‘brigands’ were often used by local landowners as a way of controlling their peasants, they sometimes had political aims and decided to fight for the return of the Bourbons. Sometimes they were just brigands, and killed and stole to stay alive. Sometimes they were peasants revolting at the high taxes, the conscription and their increasing poverty. Nonetheless, there were so many of these ‘brigands’ in the south in the 1860s that by 1864 100,000 Italian troops were required to keep the peace in the south. This period was really a civil war between those in the south who didn’t want to be ruled by Piedmont, and the Piedmontese determined to control them. The war became known as the Brigands war, and until things started to calm in the late 1860s, as many as 16,000 Italians died, more than in the wars of liberation, and many as a result of great barbarity on both sides.

This ‘brigand’s war’ is a great example of the way that the problems of Italy after unification hit the south especially hard. In today’s podcast we’ve seen

how the attitude of the northerners to the south, how the economic problems of Italy, and how the process of ‘Piedmontisation’ led to a bloody civil war. In the next podcast we’ll turn to the disappointment of the radicals, the democrats and those following Mazzini, and look at the difficult relationship between the catholic church and the new state.

Podcast No 19 – The Problems caused by Unification II

As in Sicily, all over Italy this imposition gave ammunition to those democrats, radicals and Mazzinians who claimed that Italy had not been united, instead it had been taken over by Piedmont, which had used 1859 and 1860 as a way of expanding and aggrandising. The unhappiness of these left-wingers could not be ignored. In 1862, and 1867 they tried again to raise a volunteer Army, under the leadership of Garibaldi to take Rome. Rome was still occupied by French troops, and the attacks on the Pope raised the risk that France or Austria, both catholic powers, would invade Italy to protect him.

They couldn’t even point to the parliament as a victory for democracy.