NO. ___________

In TheSupreme Court of the United States

IN RE WILLIAM SCHEIDLER,Petitioner,

v.JAMES AVERY, et. al,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Rule Nisi, or Writ of Mandamus to the

9th Circuit Court of Appeals

PETITION FOR RULE NISI, OR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS

William Scheidler.Petitioner, pro se

1515 Lidstrom Place East.Port Orchard, WA 98366

Tel: (360) 769-8531Email: billscheidler@outlook.com

I. ORDERS REQUESTED

Plaintiff and defendants, (a.k.a. the state’s governed and their government), are bound to each other directly, but inversely, and solely under Washington state’s constitution and laws. Therefore this Court should,

Compel the 9th Circuit to, or show cause why it does not, apply Washington State laws as the US 10th amendment provides, 28 USC 1652demands, and 28 USC 2072(b) prohibits “abridging, modifying or enlarging”.

Compel the 9th Circuit to exercise its fiduciary obligations to hold its ‘officers of the court’ to their legal and ethical duty as required by FRAP 46, circuit rule 46-2 and LCR 83.3.

Or provide by rule, an impartial forum, as 28 USC 455(a) and (b)(4) mandates, to address frauds upon the court, Scheidler and society, by officers of the court, and halt the incestuous practice in judges-judging-judges concerning the laws, rules and ethical obligations that govern judges,

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II. PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

William Scheidler,Plaintiff, Petitioner

VJames Avery, individually and in his official capacity as Kitsap County’s Assessor; Alan Miles, individually and in his official capacity as Kitsap County’s deputy prosecutor; M. Karlynn Haberly, Individually and in her official capacity; Kay S. Slonim, Individually and in her official capacity; Felice Congalton, Susan Carlson, David Ponzoha, Zachary Mosner, Ione George individually and in her official capacity, the Washington State Board of Tax Appeals (BoTA),the Washington State Bar Association, and Jane and John Does, 1-100.

Defendants/Respondents.

ContentsI. ORDERS REQUESTED............................1II. PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING..............3III. PETITION FOR A SHOW CAUSE ORDER, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, WRIT OF MANDAMUS....................................................8IV. RULINGS AT ISSUE................................8

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V. JURISDICTION........................................9VI. RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS................................9VII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE..................10

1. Introduction........................................................2. Facts/Exhibits.....................................................3. Summary of proceedings below.........................

VIII. ARGUMENT.........................................141. State law must be the rule of decision in

federal courts as the US 10th amendment provides and 28 USC 1652 demands............................................................

2. Civil actions are constitutionally protected, a jury trial is an “inviolate right”; neither can be limited or denied by a judge..........................................................

3. The Federal Courts, on the face of their memorandums, are in violation of the US 10th amendment, 28 USC 1652 and 28 USC 2072(b)..................................................

4. The Federal Courts, on the face of their memorandums, are in violation of federal common law...........................................

IX. REASONS FOR ISSUING A SHOW CAUSE OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE MANDAMUS..........31X. CONCLUSION......................................34

CasesAshcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)......21

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Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 14379, 383, 74 S.Ct. 145, 98 L.Ed. 106 (1953)............................................................32

Batey v. Batey, 35 Wn.2d 791, 215 P.2d 694, 1950 Wash. LEXIS 512...................................21

Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 US 198, 203 (1956).............................................16

Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350, 203 US 198 (1956).........................................19

Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 US 504, 516 (1992)............................................................20

Cities Service Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208.......30Cudihee v. Phelps, 76 Wash. 314 (Wash. 1913)15Erie R. Co. v. Tompkin.......................................30Estate of Stalkup v. Vancouver Clinic, Inc., PS,

145 Wn. App. 572, 187 P.3d 291, 2008 Wash. App. LEXIS 1576............................................29

Hicks v. Small, 69 F.3d 967, 969 (9th Cir. 1995)......................................................................20

Hollingsworth v. Perry, -- U.S. -- 130 S.Ct. 705, 709-10 (2010)................................................32

Ikeda v. Curtis, 43 Wn.2d 449, 261 P.2d 684, 1953 Wash. LEXIS 329...................................21

Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 110*110 313 U.S. 487,......................................................................30

McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 169 Wn.2d 96..................................................................18

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McNabb v. United States, 318 US 332, 347 (1943)............................................................31

Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).......................................................25

Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117..............30Pesnell v. Arsenault, 543 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th

Cir. 2008).......................................................24Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754.................30Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 US 104, 111 (1964)

......................................................................19Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wn.2d 636, 771

P.2d 711, 1989 Wash. LEXIS 42, CCH Prod. Liab. Rep. P12................................................17

State v. Lord, 161 Wn.2d 276, 284, 165 P.3d 1251 (2007)...................................................29

U.S. ex rel. Lee v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011)................................22

Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95, 88 S.Ct. 269, 19 L.Ed.2d 305 (1967)...........................32

Statutes28 U.S.C. § 1254.................................................928 USC §§ 2106, 2201, 2202.............................3328 USC 1251.................................................9, 3128 USC 1651.......................................................928 USC 1652..............................................passim28 USC 2072..............................................passim28 USC 455................................................passim

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RCW 2.28................................................9, 50, 51RCW 2.28.030.........................................9, 17, 50RCW 2.48.180.....................................................9RCW 4.36.240.......................................10, 18, 58RCW 4.40.060.......................................10, 17, 58RCW 4.44.090.......................................10, 17, 58RCW 4.92.010.................................10, 15, 18, 59RCW 4.96.010.............................................15, 60RCW 84.36.383...............................10, 17, 18, 19RCW 84.36.385.................................................10Rulescircuit rule 46-2.............................................1, 26FRAP 46............................................1, 26, 40, 43LCR 83.3.......................................................1, 45Constitutional ProvisionsArticle 1, section 1..................................9, 16, 17Article 1, section 12............................................9Article 1, section 21................................9, 15, 16Article 1, section 28............................................9Article 1, section 4........................................9, 15Article 1, section 8..............................................9Article 2, section 28................................9, 15, 18Article 2, sections 26........................................18Article 4, section 16................................9, 16, 22Article 4, section 19..........................................23Article 7, section 10..........................9, 10, 11, 18

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III.PETITION FOR A SHOW CAUSE ORDER, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, WRIT OF

MANDAMUSWilliam Scheidler, pro se, respectfully

petitions for rule nisi, or for a writ of mandamus to address the judicial misconduct in violating the laws that apply to judges and the split between the 2 panels of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concerning the laws that apply in this case.

IV. RULINGS AT ISSUE.

The January 29, 2018 Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Case no. 15-35945, (Appendix 1, pp.), denying en banc review to address the split between panels of the 9th Circuit on the law of the case.

The August 14, 2017 unpublished Memorandum of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Case no. 15-35945 (Appendix 1, ) affirming the district judge’s FRCP 12(b)(6) dismissal of the case.

The March 30, 2015 unpublished Memorandum of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Case no. 13-35119,

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(Appendix 1, pp) which AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED the district judge’s 12(b)(6) dismissal.

The November 17, 2015 District Court’s order dismissing the action on the pleadings.

V. JURISDICTIONWilliam Scheidler invokes this Court’s

original jurisdiction under 28 USC § 1251(b)(2), or under its supervisory powers, 18 USC Ch. 1 §4; 28 USC § 1651(b); 28 USC § 2106; or alternatively, an extraordinary writ per 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).

VI. RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS.

FULL CITATIONS ARE PROVIDED IN APPENDIX 2.

Federal Authorities:US Tenth Amendment, Title 28 U.S.C. § 455, 28 U.S. Code § 1652, 28 U.S. Code §§ 2072, 2106, 2201 and 2202

Washington State:Article 1, sections 1, 4, 8, 12, 21, and 28; Article 2, sections 16, 26, 28(12) and (17); Article 4, section 16; Article 7, section 10; RCW 2.28.030to RCW 2.28.060; RCW 2.48.180 through RCW

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2.48.230; RCW 4.04.010; RCW 4.32.250; RCW 4.36.070; RCW 4.36.170; RCW 4.36.240; RCW 4.40.060; RCW 4.44.090; RCW 4.92.010; RCW 4.92.060; RCW 4.92.090; RCW 4.96.; RCW 9A.08.020 through 9A.08.030; RCW 9A.60.030; RCW 9A.80.010; RCW 42.20.080; RCW 84.36.383; RCW 84.36.383; RCW 84.36.385.

VII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. IntroductionIt all arises from one, unauthorized act that

neither defendants, their lawyers, nor judges have yet addressed. Defendant, James Avery, Kitsap County’s Assessor, alters a controlling law, RCW 84.36.383(5), on the county’s application for the state’s Article 7, section 10 property tax exemption (Appendix 3). Every retired and/or disabled homeowner must complete Avery’s application, (RCW 84.36.385(1)), to obtain this constitutional right.

Because Avery adds words, substitutes words, omits words, and rearranges words, of this controlling law, which is evident on the face of the application itself, the calculation this law describes is, necessarily, changed in the same way – adding other numbers, rearranging mathematical sequences, leaving out numbers.

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This “unlawful” calculation and bogus result produced is used, by Avery, to determine if the retired/disabled homeowner qualifies for the Article 7, section 10 exemption. Avery’s intent is to “disqualify” otherwise “qualified” retired/disabled homeowners of their rights.

Even Scheidler’s lawyer (Scott Ellerby) was extorted from representing Scheidler by the Kitsap Prosecutor’s threat to Ellerby’s bar license if he continued his representation. Such a tactic by the prosecutor is illegal – lawyers are to uphold the constitution, specifically Article 7, section 10. This too is ignored by judges despite their fiduciary obligations to hold lawyers to their oath and the law.

2. Facts/ExhibitsScheidler provided documents, which on

their face, support the allegation Avery and the other defendants are altering the words of the controlling law and engaging in fraud and extortion.

Appendix 3: Kitsap County’s 2008 application PROVES, page 3, first paragraph, that James Avery alters the controlling law the application purports to cite. It is a criminal violation to violate any

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provision of law that regulates officials duties. See RCW 9A.80.010 and RCW 42.20.080Appendix 4: Dept of Revenue memo to WA State Assessors that PROVES the fraud originates with the DOR, under advice by the Washington State Attorney General. Appendix 5: Scheidler was forced to sign defendants’ ‘fraudulent applications’, under duress – a Class-C Felony under RCW 9A.60.030 - Obtaining a signature by deception or duress. Appendix 6: The letters and emails that prove Scheidler’s lawyer was extorted from his case by the Kitsap County Prosecutor.

3. Summary of proceedings below.

Defendants, without rebutting the allegations or addressing the evidence, engaged in forum shopping and removed Scheidler’s state case to federal court. Scheidler motioned for disqualification of the assigned judge, Ronald B. Leighton, because Leighton’s wife, a lawyer, had a financial/business relationship with Kitsap County re their risk insurance coverage. Judge

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Leighton refused to disqualify. Then, Judge Leighton, on defendants’ motion to dismiss, dismissed the case based in federal common law claims of 11th amendment immunity, lack of jurisdiction to review a state agency’s decision, pleading deficiencies under Iqbal/Twombly, absolute immunity, and failure to state a claim.

Scheidler appealed, arguing Judge Leighton’s only legal avenue was to ‘remand’ those claims for which he lacked jurisdiction. Scheidler further argued state law prohibits dismissal, prohibits immunities, and therefore a valid claim exists. The appellate court (1st panel) ‘affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded’ back to district court. [Appendix 1]

The remanded case was again before Judge Leighton and the same lawyers who presented these false and irrelevant defenses responsible for the appeal, 2-year delay and the “abuses of discretion” noted by the 1st panel. Scheidler again motioned to disqualify Judge Leighton and added the “abuses of discretion” noted by the 1st panel. Leighton refused. Again Judge Leighton dismissed the case on defendants motion to dismiss based in federal common law defenses. Scheidler appealed

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arguing the 1st panel already disposed of those defenses as they collide with state law. However the 2nd panel, without any rationale, affirmed dismissal based in federal common law defenses that appear to invoke immunity, pleading deficiencies under Iqbal/Twombly, or failure to state a claim.

Scheidler petitioned for En banc review to resolve the split between the 1st panel and 2nd

panel concerning the state laws governing “immunity” “pleading standards”, “rights of action” and the Washington State Supreme Court’s expressed rejection of “Iqbal/Twombly” standards.

En banc review was denied 1/29/2018. Scheidler petitions this Court exercise its fiduciary duty it has to society to insure the integrity of our courts and its ‘officers of the court’.

VIII. ARGUMENT

1. State law must be the rule of decision in federal courts as the US 10th

amendment provides and 28 USC 1652 demands.

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Congress used the word “shall” in §1652. ‘Shall’ denotes the law is mandatory. There can be no “discretion” involved. On the face of the 9th circuit’s memorandums you find only the word “discretion” in characterizing the lower courts conduct. For the 9th circuit to convert a law that is “mandatory” to one of “discretion” is clear proof judges are “enlarging” their powers so as to decide the scope of their own authority in violation of 28 USC 2072(b). “To permit branches to measure their own authority would quickly subvert the principle that state governments, while governments of general powers, must govern by the consent of the people as expressed by the constitution.” Wash. State Labor Council v. Reed, 149 Wn.2d 48 (Wash. Apr. 3, 2003), Chambers concurring.

2. Civil actions are constitutionally protected, a jury trial is an “inviolate

right”; neither can be limited or denied by a judge.

As 28 USC 1652 ‘mandates’, and this Court said, “the federal court enforcing a state-created right in a diversity case is, as we said in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 108, in substance "only another court of the State." The

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federal court therefore may not "substantially affect the enforcement of the right as given by the State.” Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 US 198, 203 (1956).

The controlling state law, in this case, is RCW 4.04.010, which mandates, “The common law, so far as it is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, or of the state of Washington nor incompatible with the institutions and condition of society in this state, shall be the rule of decision in all the courts of this state.”

a. The Constitutional Role of the Jury has been abridged by judges.

Scheidler’s civil action is against defendants who are either Washington’s “officials, elected officials, or employees…” (See RCW 4.92.010 and RCW 4.96.010). “Governments are established to protect and maintain” Scheidler’s rights (See Article 1, section 1). “[A] public officer, their servant, has no rights whatever, so far as his possession of the office is concerned, which may not be ignored by the people speaking in a lawful

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manner.” Cudihee v. Phelps, 76 Wash. 314 (Wash. 1913).

The “lawful manner” in which the “people speak” within the judicial branch is via a ‘jury’ (see Article 1, section 21- a jury is an inviolate right). For a judge to deny a jury, as in this case, renders irrelevant the words of Article 1, section 1 “governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed”.

Judges who deny a jury their authority, claim for themselves the power to “enlarge governments’ just powers’ without the consent of the governed. This is prohibited by 28 USC 2072(b) and is an overt attack on the very principles that define our society.

See also, Article 4, section 16 (judges shall not comment nor charge the jury with respect to the facts); RCW 4.40.060; RCW 4.44.090 (facts are for a jury); and RCW 2.28.030 (judges cannot exceed their statutory powers. “Because of the constitutional nature of the right to jury trial, litigants have a continued interest in it … Otherwise, article 1, section 21 means nothing.” Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wn.2d 636, 771 P.2d 711, 1989 Wash. LEXIS 42, CCH Prod. Liab. Rep. P12.

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Avery’s power to change the law is both a question of fact and law. In this case the law is clear. RCW 84.36.383 specifically states, “As used in RCW 84.36.381 through 84.36.389, except where the context clearly indicates a different meaning: …(5) "Disposable income" means …” Clearly, by the express and unambiguous language in using the word “means” in RCW 84.36.383, Avery’s ‘rewording’ is unauthorized and must be decided by a jury trial.

b. State law controls civil actions, pleading standards and remedies

for pleading deficiencies -- not Iqbal/Twombly or federal rules or

federal common law.

In this case, governments’ actions that center on their duties imposed by law and involve RCW 84.36.383 which implements a state constitutional right -- Article 7, section 10, concerns a matter affecting the common good. Clearly governments’ conduct concerning a constitutional right merits Article 1, section 4 protection that shall never be abridged. See also, Article 2, section 28(17) – civil action not to be limited; RCW 4.32 et. seq. to RCW 4.36.240

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(pleadings and remedies); RCW 4.92.010 (any person shall have a right of action).

Federal common law notions such, as Iqbal/Twombly, res judicata, collateral estoppel cannot abridge, or modify these laws. Furthermore, Washington’s Supreme Court rejected adopting Twombly and Iqbal standards of pleading in McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 169 Wn.2d 96.

For judges to deny a jury, deny or limit civil actions, necessarily, leaves only non-civil actions as remedies. And again, necessarily, devolves into judges-judging-judges, a consequence prohibited by 28 USC 455.

c. Privileges and immunities, including 11th Amendment

immunity, have been abolished, and laws granting the same are

prohibited.

State laws prohibit granting defendants privileges and immunities for their unauthorized or improper administration of RCW 84.36.383. See Article 1, sections 1, 8, 12, and 28; Article 2, sections 26 and 28(12) and (17); RCW 4.92.090 (right of action against “officers, elected officials,

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employees” for any act or omission). Judges who apply federal common law as the means to deny a jury, dismiss civil actions are in effect granting “immunities and privileges” prohibited by Washington’s constitution and laws.

d. State laws regulate the legal profession and powers of judges.

The preeminent obligation imposed upon ‘the state and local governments, their officers, elected officials, employees’ is expressed in Article 1, section 1, is to protect individual rights. State laws ‘regulate’ defendants conduct (including lawyers and judges – RCW title 2) and provides Scheidler his “right of action” that “shall never be abridged” or “limited.” (Id., RCW 4.92.010; Article 1, section 4; Article 2, section 28(17), respectively). These state laws, and those contained in Appendix 2, are the only standards by which defendants’ conduct and Scheidler’s right of action shall be measured. Any other standard “abridges, modifies or enlarges” the state’s laws involved, and is prohibited by 28 USC 2072(b).

For the 9th Circuit courts to deny the people their jury powers, to dismiss civil actions,

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to grant “immunities”, to ignore the mandate of RCW 84.36.383 …, necessarily, devolves into judges-judging-judges deciding to enlarge the scope of Avery’s powers, as well as enlarging the scope of their own authority that is limited by law.

The 9th Circuit Courts have abolished Article 1, section 1, and take for themselves what rightfully belongs to Scheidler and the People. Such usurpation of powers is prohibited by both 28 USC 2072(b) and 28 USC 455(a) and (b)(4) as there are no ‘fair forums’ that address the ‘bias’ ‘fiduciary conflicts of interest’ or ‘other conflicts of interest’ when judges violate the laws that apply to judges.

3. The Federal Courts, on the face of their memorandums, are in violation of the US 10th amendment, 28 USC

1652 and 28 USC 2072(b).

a. Count 1: Fraud upon the Court by Officers of the Court.

The Federal Court, without any rationale, dismissed Scheidler’s claim, for “Failure to state a claim”, citing, Hicks v. Small, 69 F.3d 967, 969

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(9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Probable Cause: Hicks v Small is irrelevant case law. The litigants in Hicks are not ‘bound together’ by Washington State law as are the parties in this case. Any application of Hicks, for that reason alone, abridges, modifies, or enlarges the state laws that apply and discussed in 1 and 2 above. Hicks is inappropriate as it fails to meet the standards imposed by RCW 4.04.010, supra.

Federal common law cannot preempt state law because common law is not an Act of Congress as the US 10th amendment makes clear. This Court, in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 US 504, 516 (1992), states, “the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded … unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947)”. See also, Estate of Stalkup v. Vancouver Clinic, Inc., PS, supra, and Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs. Inc., supra, (… applies the wrong law, it [Court] errs as a matter of law.)

The appellate court in applying irrelevant common law, in violation of the US 10th

amendment, 28 USC 1652 and 28 USC 2072(b) 22

is a fraud upon Scheidler, the Courts and Society. “[F]raud vitiates everything tainted by it, even to the most solemn determinations of courts of justice”. Batey v. Batey, 35 Wn.2d 791, 215 P.2d 694, 1950 Wash. LEXIS 512 “Fraudulent misrepresentation may be effected by half-truths calculated to deceive. A representation literally true is actionable if used to create an impression substantially false. 37 C. J. S. 251, Fraud, § 17 b. Ikeda v. Curtis, 43 Wn.2d 449, 261 P.2d 684, 1953 Wash. LEXIS 329.

b. Count 2: Fraud upon the Court by Officers of the Court

The Federal Court, without any rationale, dismissed Scheidler’s claim, alleging he “failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Probable Cause: Iqbal is irrelevant common law for the same reasons as stated in Count 1. Therefore, Iqbal is inappropriate under the standards of RCW 4.04.010, and is actionable under Ikeda v. Curtis, supra.

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c. Count 3: Fraud upon the Court by Officers of the Court

The Federal Court, without any rationale, claims, “the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Scheidler leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. See U.S. ex rel. Lee v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011)”;

U.S. ex rel. Lee v Corinthian is irrelevant common law for the same reasons as stated in Count 1. Therefore, Iqbal is inappropriate under the standards of RCW 4.04.010, and is actionable under Ikeda v. Curtis, supra.

d. Count 4: Fraud upon the Court by Officers of the Court

The Federal Court states, “The district court properly denied Scheidler’s state tax appeal because Scheidler failed to identify any error in the state tax agencies’ decisions. See Wash. Rev. Code §§ 34.05.570(3) (circumstances under which court may grant relief from agency decision), 84.36.383(5) (definition of “disposable income”).

On the face of this ruling is the evidence that Judge Leighton violated the state’s Article 4,

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section 16, which ‘mandates’, “Judges shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, nor comment thereon, but shall declare the law.” Clearly Judge Leighton is both denying the jury its powers to decide the facts, and then Judge Leighton devotes a few pages to “comment on the facts.”

Furthermore, defendants never answered the complaint, but motioned only for dismissal, which Judge Leighton granted. This begs the question, “who argued the case”? Who presented evidence? Who cross-examined witnesses? When was Scheidler given his opportunity to present oral testimony? These questions raise another constitutional violation, Article 4, section 19, “JUDGES MAY NOT PRACTICE LAW. No judge of a court of record shall practice law in any court of this state during his continuance in office.”

As in Count 1, probable cause exists for fraud by both the district and federal courts and is actionable under Ikeda v. Curtis, supra.

e. Count 5: Fraud upon the Court by Officers of the Court

The Federal Court states, “The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Scheidler’s

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motion for recusal of the district judge because Scheidler failed to identify a ground for recusal. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455; Pesnell v. Arsenault, 543 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2008)”;

On the face of this statement it is certain judges are deciding the facts, the laws, the rules, the ethical obligations that apply to judges. A blatant violation of 28 USC 455(a) and (b)(4), because judges have a “bias”, “a fiduciary conflict” and “direct interest” concerning the facts at issue, the laws, the rules, the ethical obligations concerning judges.

Beyond the facial violation of law, Scheidler, at the very instance district court judge, Ronald B. Leighton, was assigned, demanded his “disqualification”. The basis was Judge Leighton’s wife (ex-wife), a lawyer, was counsel to Kitsap County’s risk management re their liability coverage. It is a financial interest in the outcome of the litigation.

The continuing claim by judges that “Scheidler failed to identify a ground for recusal” is false and a fraud upon the court.

As in Count 1, probable cause exists for fraud and is actionable under Ikeda v. Curtis, supra.

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f. Count 6: Fraud upon the Court by Officers of the Court

The Federal Court claims, “We reject as meritless Scheidler’s contentions that the district court lacked authority to decide the motions to dismiss, that federal pleading standards are inapplicable, and that the district court failed to comply with this court’s prior mandate”;

Implicit in the 1st panel’s memorandum is a view directly opposite the 2nd panel’s. In fact the 1st

panel’s memorandum leaves the state laws that apply ‘mostly’ intact. The second panel neither addresses its opposite view, or explain why state laws are ignored.

As in Count 1, probable cause exists for fraud and is actionable under Ikeda v. Curtis, supra.

g. Count 7: Fraud upon the Court by Officers of the Court

The Federal Court claims “We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009)”.

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First, Wright is not on point in this case. Wright concerned a summary judgment ruling, not dismissal on the pleadings, as in this case. Wright is inappropriate under the standards of RCW 4.04.010

Second, “de novo” review is the standard of review for appeals of cases dismissed on the pleadings. A de novo review is of the “whole record” not just what is argued in a brief. Clearly the 9th circuit did not conduct a ‘de novo’ review as they expressly stated they won’t consider anything not found in the brief.

Third, under Washington laws, RCW 2.48.180 through RCW 2.48.230, it is the lawyer’s duty to present ‘all facts and law’ that apply which have been overlooked. In this case, Scheidler is pro se. It is defendants’ lawyers who have a statutory duty to “remedy” any substantive issue inadvertently omitted by the opposing party. The courts have a fiduciary duty under FRAP 46, circuit rule 46-2 and LCR 83-3, to hold lawyers to their legal obligations.

Probable Cause: Wright is irrelevant common law for the same reasons as stated in Count 1. Therefore, Wright is inappropriate under the standards of RCW 4.04.010, and is actionable under Ikeda v. Curtis, supra.

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h. Count 8: Official Misconduct – a gross misdemeanor

Under Washington laws, RCW 9A.80.010 and RCW 42.20.080, a public servant or officer who violates any provision of law regulating their conduct is Official misconduct and a gross misdemeanor.

Defendants are all ‘public servants’ and are regulated by the state’s laws noted in Appendix 2, particularly Article 1 section 1, and RCW 84.36.383 to RCW 84.36.385. Defendants’ lawyers are ‘public servants’ and are regulated by the state’s laws noted in Appendix 2, particularly RCW 2.48.180 to RCW 2.48.230.

Defendant James Avery has no authority to deceive retired/disabled homeowners from their Article 7 section 10 rights by altering the words of a law. The other defendants have an affirmative duty to both protect Scheidler and to take action against Avery’s fraud. Defendants’ lawyers have no authority to remove a state case to federal court (forum shopping) to seek dismissal based in 11th amendment immunity, absolute immunity, Iqbal/Twombly,… when Washington state waives 11th amendment immunity (RCW 4.92; Article 2, section 26), and

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prohibits granting immunities under Article 1, sections 8, 12, 28; Article 2, section 28(12). Defendants’ lawyers are seeking to abolish Washington’s constitution and laws to aid in ‘official misconduct’ and other more serious crimes.

Each violation of a provision of law is a gross misdemeanor. These defendants and their lawyers should be locked up for the rest of their life for their betrayal of the US and Washington State constitutions.

i. Count 9: Aiding and Abetting

Washington State was established to “protect and maintain individual rights”. See Article 1, section 1. Defendants, their lawyers, and judges have a common fiduciary duty, as ‘officers, elected officials or employees’ of the state’s governments. That duty is ‘solely’ to protect Scheidler’s rights. To the contrary, Defendants, their lawyers, and judges, have engaged in conduct unauthorized, and may be illegal, under both state and federal laws; and have used their government offices to abridge or modify Washington State’s constitution and laws affecting Scheidler’s rights, by ‘enlarging’ their powers under the unlawful scheme that relies upon the violations of 28 USC 455(a) and (b)(4),

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28 USC 1652 and 28 USC 2072(b). The principles of liability, RCW 9A.08.020, implicates all these public servants in aiding and abetting each other’s unlawful conduct.

4. The Federal Courts, on the face of their memorandums, are in violation

of federal common law.

Notwithstanding the statutory violations, the federal court judges violated federal common law. If state law is ignored, as in this case contrary to 28 USC 1652 mandating state law rule decision in federal court, “a trial court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong law. See, e.g., State v. Lord, 161 Wn.2d 276, 284, 165 P.3d 1251 (2007). “If a trial court has tenable grounds for a decision but applies the wrong law, it errs as a matter of law. Moreover, whatever its stated reasons under the inapplicable standard, these reasons are no longer reasonable under the controlling legal standard.” Estate of Stalkup v. Vancouver Clinic, Inc., PS, 145 Wn. App. 572 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008); "[w]hen a court misapprehends or fails to apply the law with respect to underlying issues, it abuses its discretion." Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs. Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 446 (4th .2003).”

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Also it is facially evident, there is a split between appellate panels re the ‘law of the case’ that center on these state law issues of first impression. Furthermore, anyone can see from the face of every judicial order, neither panel of the 9th Circuit has addressed RCW 84.36.383(5) – which is the state law at the center of this case, and the exhibits related to the Avery’s altering this law. This Court in Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 US 104, 111 (1964), states, “the Court of Appeals should have also, under these special circumstances, determined…new and important problems.

IX. REASONS FOR ISSUING A SHOW CAUSE OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE

MANDAMUS

This is a Federal v State controversy created by judicial usurpation of power – there is no forum that is free of conflict to resolve judges-judging-judges claiming powers they do not have.

This Court has “held that in diversity cases the federal courts must follow the law of the State as to burden of proof, Cities Service Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208, as to conflict of laws, Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 110 *110 313 U.S. 487,

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as to contributory negligence, Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117. And see Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins has been applied with an eye alert to essentials in avoiding disregard of State law in diversity cases in the federal courts. A policy so important to our federalism must be kept free from entanglements with analytical or terminological niceties.” Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 US 99,110 (1945); Id., Bernhardt.

The US 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, en banc and without explanation, exceeded its statutory jurisdiction defined by the US 10th amendment, 28 USC 1652, 28 USC 2072(b), 28 USC 455 (a) and (b)(4), to conspire with these state public servant defendants to ‘abridge or modify’ Washington State’s constitution and laws by applying federal common law holdings that have no preemptive authority over state law. This unlawful scheme is intended to render irrelevant all the state laws that establish the “governed-government relationship”.

This usurpation of the state’s constitution and laws has raised this case to a federal v state controversy of broad and substantial public importance. In fact President Trump was elected in part for his promise to address judicial

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overreaching and government corruption. Id. Cipollone v. Liggett, supra. (only by an act of Congress is state law preempted – judge made law is not an ‘Act of Congress’)

This Court has supervisory powers to ensure “the history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural safeguards.” McNabb v. United States, 318 US 332, 347 (1943).

Forum shopping by state officials for a federal judiciary willing to disregard, both federal and state constitutional and statutory obligations is an attack on our constitutions and the people’s liberties. “The Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of: inter alia, (2) All controversies between the United States and a State; …” . (28 USC 1251(a) and (b)(2).)

There are no adequate remedies to address judicial corruption as there are no court rules providing a fair forum established by the courts. Violations of the US constitution and federal laws by federal judges create the exceptional circumstances warranting this action. Furthermore an appellate decision that is devoid of any rationale in explaining their

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violations of federal law cannot be reviewed by this court as there is nothing to review. For this reason a show cause order should issue.

Therefore the important issues raised and supported by the argument, are ripe for review and disposition under this Court‘s Original jurisdiction or All Writs Act and supervisory jurisdiction. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, -- U.S. -- 130 S.Ct. 705, 709-10 (2010). In Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for DC, 542 US 367, 380 (2004), “[O]nly exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial ‘usurpation of power’ Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95, 88 S.Ct. 269, 19 L.Ed.2d 305 (1967)… or a “clear abuse of discretion,” Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 14379, 383, 74 S.Ct. 145, 98 L.Ed. 106 (1953), “will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy,” Will, 389 U.S., at 95, 88 S .Ct. 269.

X. CONCLUSION

This Court, as authorized under 28 USC §§ 2106, 2201, 2202, must exercise its fiduciary duty and issue the mandate, or provide, by rule, an “impartial forum”, as 28 USC 455(a) and (b)(4) dictates, to remedy judicial corruption that doesn’t reek with “bias”, “fiduciary conflict” and

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“other conflicts of interests” in having judges-judge-judges concerning the laws, rules, and fiduciary duty imposed upon officers of the court.

DECLARATIONI declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that the foregoing is true and correct:

_____________ ________________________________ (Date) (Signature)

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TABLE OF STATUTES

US CONSTITUTION:

TENTH AMENDMENTThe powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.

US CODE

28 U.S. Code § 455 - Disqualification of justice, judge, or magistrate judge(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning

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the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy;(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party;(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;(iv) Is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.(c) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself about

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the personal financial interests of his spouse and minor children residing in his household.(d) For the purposes of this section the following words or phrases shall have the meaning indicated:(1) “proceeding” includes pretrial, trial, appellate review, or other stages of litigation;(2) the degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil law system;(3) “fiduciary” includes such relationships as executor, administrator, trustee, and guardian;(4) “financial interest” means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or other active participant in the affairs of a party, except that:(i) Ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that holds securities is not a “financial interest” in such securities unless the judge participates in the management of the fund;(ii) An office in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization is not a “financial interest” in securities held by the organization;(iii) The proprietary interest of a policyholder in a mutual insurance company, of a depositor in a mutual savings association, or a similar proprietary interest, is a “financial interest” in the organization only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the interest;

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(iv) Ownership of government securities is a “financial interest” in the issuer only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the securities.(e) No justice, judge, or magistrate judge shall accept from the parties to the proceeding a waiver of any ground for disqualification enumerated in subsection (b). Where the ground for disqualification arises only under subsection (a), waiver may be accepted provided it is preceded by a full disclosure on the record of the basis for disqualification.(f) Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this section, if any justice, judge, magistrate judge, or bankruptcy judge to whom a matter has been assigned would be disqualified, after substantial judicial time has been devoted to the matter, because of the appearance or discovery, after the matter was assigned to him or her, that he or she individually or as a fiduciary, or his or her spouse or minor child residing in his or her household, has a financial interest in a party (other than an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome), disqualification is not required if the justice, judge, magistrate judge, bankruptcy judge, spouse or minor child, as the case may be, divests himself or herself of the interest that provides the grounds for the disqualification.

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(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 908; Pub. L. 93–512, § 1, Dec. 5, 1974, 88 Stat. 1609; Pub. L. 95–598, title II, § 214(a), (b), Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2661; Pub. L. 100–702, title X, § 1007, Nov. 19, 1988, 102 Stat. 4667; Pub. L. 101–650, title III, § 321, Dec. 1, 1990, 104 Stat. 5117.)

28 U.S. Code § 1652 - State laws as rules of decisionThe laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 944.)

28 U.S. Code § 2072 - Rules of procedure and evidence; power to prescribe(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals.(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.

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(c) Such rules may define when a ruling of a district court is final for the purposes of appeal under section 1291 of this title.(Added Pub. L. 100–702, title IV, § 401(a), Nov. 19, 1988, 102 Stat. 4648; amended Pub. L. 101–650, title III, §§ 315, 321, Dec. 1, 1990, 104 Stat. 5115, 5117.)

28 U.S. Code § 2106 - DeterminationThe Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 963.)

28 U.S. Code § 2201 - Creation of remedy (a) In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal taxes other than actions brought under section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, a proceeding under section 505 or 1146 of title 11, or in any civil action involving an antidumping or countervailing duty proceeding regarding a class or kind of merchandise of a free trade area country (as defined in section 516A(f)(10) of the Tariff Act of 1930), as determined by the

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administering authority, any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.(b) For limitations on actions brought with respect to drug patents see section 505 or 512 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, or section 351 of the Public Health Service Act.

28 U.S. Code § 2202 - Further reliefFurther necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted, after reasonable notice and hearing, against any adverse party whose rights have been determined by such judgment.

28 U.S. Code § 2403 - Intervention by United States or a State; constitutional question (a) In any action, suit or proceeding in a court of the United States to which the United States or any agency, officer or employee thereof is not a party, wherein the constitutionality of any Act of Congress affecting the public interest is drawn in question, the court shall certify such fact to the Attorney General, and shall permit the United States to intervene for presentation of evidence,

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if evidence is otherwise admissible in the case, and for argument on the question of constitutionality. The United States shall, subject to the applicable provisions of law, have all the rights of a party and be subject to all liabilities of a party as to court costs to the extent necessary for a proper presentation of the facts and law relating to the question of constitutionality.(b) In any action, suit, or proceeding in a court of the United States to which a State or any agency, officer, or employee thereof is not a party, wherein the constitutionality of any statute of that State affecting the public interest is drawn in question, the court shall certify such fact to the attorney general of the State, and shall permit the State to intervene for presentation of evidence, if evidence is otherwise admissible in the case, and for argument on the question of constitutionality. The State shall, subject to the applicable provisions of law, have all the rights of a party and be subject to all liabilities of a party as to court costs to the extent necessary for a proper presentation of the facts and law relating to the question of constitutionality.(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 971; Pub. L. 94–381, § 5, Aug. 12, 1976, 90 Stat. 1120.)

RULES OF FEDERAL COURTS

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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 8(b)(6) Effect of Failing to Deny. An allegation—other than one relating to the amount of damages—is admitted if a responsive pleading is required and the allegation is not denied. If a responsive pleading is not required, an allegation is considered denied or avoided.

FRAP 46. Attorneys(a) Admission to the Bar.(1) Eligibility. An attorney is eligible for admission to the bar of a court of appeals if that attorney is of good moral and professional character and is admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of the United States, the highest court of a state, another United States court of appeals, or a United States district court (including the district courts for Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands).(2) Application. An applicant must file an application for admission, on a form approved by the court that contains the applicant’s personal statement showing eligibility for membership. The applicant must subscribe to the following oath or affirmation:“I, ________________, do solemnly swear [or affirm] that I will conduct myself as an attorney and counselor of this court, uprightly and

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according to law; and that I will support the Constitution of the United States.”(3) Admission Procedures. On written or oral motion of a member of the court’s bar, the court will act on the application. An applicant may be admitted by oral motion in open court. But, unless the court orders otherwise, an applicant need not appear before the court to be admitted. Upon admission, an applicant must pay the clerk the fee prescribed by local rule or court order.(b)Suspension or Disbarment.(1) Standard. A member of the court’s bar is subject to suspension or disbarment by the court if the member:(A) has been suspended or disbarred from practice in any other court; or(B) is guilty of conduct unbecoming a member of the court’s bar.(2) Procedure. The member must be given an opportunity to show good cause, within the time prescribed by the court, why the member should not be suspended or disbarred.(3) Order. The court must enter an appropriate order after the member responds and a hearing is held, if requested, or after the time prescribed for a response expires, if no response is made.(c) Discipline. A court of appeals may discipline an attorney who practices before it for conduct unbecoming a member of the bar or for failure to

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comply with any court rule. First, however, the court must afford the attorney reasonable notice, an opportunity to show cause to the contrary, and, if requested, a hearing.(As amended Mar. 10, 1986, eff. July 1, 1986; Apr. 24, 1998, eff. Dec. 1, 1998.)

Circuit Rule 46-2. Attorney Suspension, Disbarment or Other Discipline(a) Conduct Subject to Discipline. This Court may impose discipline on any attorney practicing before this Court who engages in conduct violating applicable rules of professional conduct, or who fails to comply with rules or orders of this Court. The discipline may consist of disbarment, suspension, reprimand, counseling, education, a monetary penalty, restitution, or any other action that the Court deems appropriate and just.(b) Initiation of Disciplinary Proceedings Based on Conduct Before This Court. The Chief Judge or a panel of judges may initiate disciplinary proceedings based on conduct before this Court by issuing an order to show cause under this rule that identifies the basis for imposing discipline.(c) Reciprocal Discipline. An attorney who practices before this Court shall provide the Clerk of this Court with a copy of any order or other official notification that the attorney has been subjected to suspension or disbarment in

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another jurisdiction. When this Court learns that a member of the bar of this Court has been disbarred or suspended from the practice of law by any court or other competent authority or resigns during the pendency of disciplinary proceedings, the Clerk shall issue an order to show cause why the attorney should not be suspended or disbarred from practice in this Court.(d) Response. An attorney against whom an order to show cause is issued shall have 28 days from the date of the order in which to file a response. The attorney may include in the response a request for a hearing pursuant to FRAP 46 (c). The failure to request a hearing will be deemed a waiver of any right to a hearing. The failure to file a timely response may result in the imposition of discipline without further notice. (Rev. 12/1/09)(e) Hearings on Disciplinary Charges. If requested, the Court will hold a hearing on the disciplinary charges, at which the attorney may be represented by counsel. In a matter based on an order to show cause why reciprocal discipline should not be imposed, an appellate commissioner will conduct the hearing. In a matter based on an order to show cause based on conduct before this Court, the Court may refer the matter to an appellate commissioner or other judicial officer to conduct the hearing. In

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appropriate cases, the Court may appoint an attorney to prosecute charges of misconduct. (Rev. 1/1/12)(f) Report and Recommendation. If the matter is referred to an appellate commissioner or other judicial officer, that judicial officer shall prepare a report and recommendation. The report and recommendation shall be served on the attorney, and the attorney shall have 21 days from the date of the order within which to file a response. The report and recommendation together with any response shall be presented to a three-judge panel. (Rev. 12/1/09)(g) Final Disciplinary Action. The final order in a disciplinary proceeding shall be issued by a three-judge panel. If the Court disbars or suspends the attorney, a copy of the final order shall be furnished to the appropriate courts and state disciplinary agencies. If the order imposes a sanction of $1,000 or more, the Court may furnish a copy of the order to the appropriate courts and state disciplinary agencies. If a copy of the final order is distributed to other courts or state disciplinary agencies, the order will inform the attorney of that distribution.(h) Reinstatement. A suspended or disbarred attorney may file a petition for reinstatement with the Clerk. The petition shall contain a concise statement of the circumstances of the disciplinary proceedings, the discipline imposed

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by this Court, and the grounds that justify reinstatement of the attorney.(i) Monetary Sanctions. Nothing in the rule limits the Court’s power to impose monetary sanctions as authorized under other existing authority. (New 1/1/02)

LCR 83.3 STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT; CONTINUING ELIGIBILITY TO PRACTICE; ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE(a) Standards of Professional ConductIn order to maintain the effective administration of justice and the integrity of the court, attorneys appearing in this district shall be familiar with and comply with the following materials ("Materials"):(1) The local rules of this district, including the local rules that address attorney conduct and discipline;(2) The Washington Rules of Professional Conduct (the "RPC"), as promulgated, amended, and interpreted by the Washington State Supreme Court, unless such amendments or additions are specifically disapproved by the court, and the decisions of any court applicable thereto;(3) The Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure; (4) The General Orders of the court.

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In applying and construing these Materials, the court may also consider the published decisions and formal and informal ethics opinions of the Washington State Bar Association, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Bar Association and Ethics Opinions issued pursuant to those Model Rules, and the decisional law of the state and federal courts.

WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION:

ARTICLE 1, SECTION 1 POLITICAL POWER. All political power is inherent in the people, and governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, and are established to protect and maintain individual rights.

ARTICLE 1, SECTION 4 RIGHT OF PETITION AND ASSEMBLAGE. The right of petition and of the people peaceably to assemble for the common good shall never be abridged.

ARTICLE 1, SECTION 8 IRREVOCABLE PRIVILEGE, FRANCHISE OR IMMUNITY PROHIBITED. No law granting irrevocably any privilege, franchise or immunity, shall be passed by the legislature.

ARTICLE 1, SECTION 12 SPECIAL PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES PROHIBITED.

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No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens, or corporations.

ARTICLE 1, SECTION 21 TRIAL BY JURY. The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, but the legislature may provide for a jury of any number less than twelve in courts not of record, and for a verdict by nine or more jurors in civil cases in any court of record, and for waiving of the jury in civil cases where the consent of the parties interested is given thereto.

ARTICLE 1, SECTION 28 HEREDITARY PRIVILEGES ABOLISHED. No hereditary emoluments, privileges, or powers, shall be granted or conferred in this state.

ARTICLE 2, SECTION 26 SUITS AGAINST THE STATE. The legislature shall direct by law, in what manner, and in what courts, suits may be brought against the state.

ARTICLE 2, SECTION 28 SPECIAL LEGISLATION. The legislature is prohibited from enacting any private or special laws in the following cases: …6. For granting corporate powers or privileges.

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12. Legalizing, except as against the state, the unauthorized or invalid act of any officer…17. For limitation of civil or criminal actions.

ARTICLE 4, SECTION 16 CHARGING JURIES. Judges shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, nor comment thereon, but shall declare the law.

ARTICLE 7, SECTION 10 RETIRED PERSONS PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 7, section 1 (Amendment 14) and Article 7, section 2 (Amendment 17), the following tax exemption shall be allowed as to real property:The legislature shall have the power, by appropriate legislation, to grant to retired property owners relief from the property tax on the real property occupied as a residence by those owners. The legislature may place such restrictions and conditions upon the granting of such relief as it shall deem proper. Such restrictions and conditions may include, but are not limited to, the limiting of the relief to those property owners below a specific level of income and those fulfilling certain minimum residential requirements. [AMENDMENT 47, 1965 ex.s. House Joint Resolution No. 7, p 2821. Approved November 8, 1966.]

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WASHINGTON STATE STATUTES

RCW 2.28.030 Judicial officer defined—When disqualified.A judicial officer is a person authorized to act as a judge in a court of justice. Such officer shall not act as such in a court of which he or she is a member in any of the following cases:(1) In an action, suit, or proceeding to which he or she is a party, or in which he or she is directly interested.(2) When he or she was not present and sitting as a member of the court at the hearing of a matter submitted for its decision.(3) When he or she is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity within the third degree. The degree shall be ascertained and computed by ascending from the judge to the common ancestor and descending to the party, counting a degree for each person in both lines, including the judge and party and excluding the common ancestor.(4) When he or she has been attorney in the action, suit, or proceeding in question for either party; but this section does not apply to an application to change the place of trial, or the regulation of the order of business in court.In the cases specified in subsections (3) and (4) of this section, the disqualification may be waived by the parties, and except in the

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supreme court and the court of appeals shall be deemed to be waived unless an application for a change of the place of trial be made as provided by law.[ 2011 c 336 § 39; 1971 c 81 § 11; 1895 c 39 § 1; 1891 c 54 § 3; RRS § 54.]

RCW 2.28.050 Judge distinguished from court. A judge may exercise out of court all the powers expressly conferred upon a judge as contradistinguished from a court and not otherwise.

RCW 2.28.060Judicial officers—Powers.Every judicial officer has power:(1) To preserve and enforce order in his or her immediate presence and in the proceedings before him or her, when he or she is engaged in the performance of a duty imposed upon him or her by law;(2) To compel obedience to his or her lawful orders as provided by law;(3) To compel the attendance of persons to testify in a proceeding pending before him or her, in the cases and manner provided by law;(4) To administer oaths to persons in a proceeding pending before him or her, and in all other cases where it may be necessary in the exercise of his or her powers and the performance of his or her duties.

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RCW 2.48.180Definitions—Unlawful practice a crime—Cause for discipline—Unprofessional conduct—Defense—Injunction—Remedies—Costs—Attorneys' fees—Time limit for action.(1) As used in this section:(a) "Legal provider" means an active member in good standing of the state bar, and any other person authorized by the Washington state supreme court to engage in full or limited practice of law;(b) "Nonlawyer" means a person to whom the Washington supreme court has granted a limited authorization to practice law but who practices law outside that authorization, and a person who is not an active member in good standing of the state bar, including persons who are disbarred or suspended from membership;(c) "Ownership interest" means the right to control the affairs of a business, or the right to share in the profits of a business, and includes a loan to the business when the interest on the loan is based upon the income of the business or the loan carries more than a commercially reasonable rate of interest.(2) The following constitutes unlawful practice of law:

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(a) A nonlawyer practices law, or holds himself or herself out as entitled to practice law;(b) A legal provider holds an investment or ownership interest in a business primarily engaged in the practice of law, knowing that a nonlawyer holds an investment or ownership interest in the business;(c) A nonlawyer knowingly holds an investment or ownership interest in a business primarily engaged in the practice of law;(d) A legal provider works for a business that is primarily engaged in the practice of law, knowing that a nonlawyer holds an investment or ownership interest in the business; or(e) A nonlawyer shares legal fees with a legal provider.(3)(a) Unlawful practice of law is a crime. A single violation of this section is a gross misdemeanor.(b) Each subsequent violation of this section, whether alleged in the same or in subsequent prosecutions, is a class C felony punishable according to chapter 9A.20 RCW.

(4) Nothing contained in this section affects the power of the courts to grant injunctive or other equitable relief or to punish as for contempt.(5) Whenever a legal provider or a person licensed by the state in a business or profession

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is convicted, enjoined, or found liable for damages or a civil penalty or other equitable relief under this section, the plaintiff's attorney shall provide written notification of the judgment to the appropriate regulatory or disciplinary body or agency.(6) A violation of this section is cause for discipline and constitutes unprofessional conduct that could result in any regulatory penalty provided by law, including refusal, revocation, or suspension of a business or professional license, or right or admission to practice. Conduct that constitutes a violation of this section is unprofessional conduct in violation of RCW 18.130.180.(7) In a proceeding under this section it is a defense if proven by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time of the offense, the conduct alleged was authorized by the rules of professional conduct or the admission to practice rules, or Washington business and professions licensing statutes or rules.(8) Independent of authority granted to the attorney general, the prosecuting attorney may petition the superior court for an injunction against a person who has violated this chapter. Remedies in an injunctive action brought by a prosecuting attorney are limited to an order enjoining, restraining, or preventing the doing of

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any act or practice that constitutes a violation of this chapter and imposing a civil penalty of up to five thousand dollars for each violation. The prevailing party in the action may, in the discretion of the court, recover its reasonable investigative costs and the costs of the action including a reasonable attorney's fee. The degree of proof required in an action brought under this subsection is a preponderance of the evidence. An action under this subsection must be brought within three years after the violation of this chapter occurred.[ 2003 c 53 § 2; 2001 c 310 § 2. Prior: 1995 c 285 § 26; 1989 c 117 § 13; 1933 c 94 § 14; RRS § 138-14.]

RCW 2.48.210 Oath on admission.Every person before being admitted to practice law in this state shall take and subscribe the following oath:I do solemnly swear:I am a citizen of the United States and owe my allegiance thereto;I will support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the state of Washington;I will maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers;I will not counsel or maintain any suit or proceeding which shall appear to me to be

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unjust, nor any defense except such as I believe to be honestly debatable under the law of the land, unless it be in defense of a person charged with a public offense; I will employ for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to me such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and will never seek to mislead the judge or jury by any artifice or false statement of fact or law;I will maintain the confidence and preserve inviolate the secrets of my client, and will accept no compensation in connection with his or her business except from him or her or with his or her knowledge and approval;I will abstain from all offensive personality, and advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which I am charged;I will never reject, from any consideration personal to myself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed, or delay any person's cause for lucre or malice. So help me God.[ 2013 c 23 § 1; 1921 c 126 § 12; RRS § 139-12. Prior: 1917 c 115 § 14.]

RCW 2.48.230 Code of ethics.The code of ethics of the American Bar Association shall be the standard of ethics for the members of the bar of this state.

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RCW 4.04.010 Extent to which common law prevails.The common law, so far as it is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, or of the state of Washington nor incompatible with the institutions and condition of society in this state, shall be the rule of decision in all the courts of this state.[1891 c 17 § 1; Code 1881 § 1; 1877 p 3 § 1; 1862 p 83 § 1; RRS § 143. Formerly RCW 1.12.030.]

RCW 4.32.250 Effect of minor defects in pleading.A notice or other paper is valid and effectual though the title of the action in which it is made is omitted, or it is defective either in respect to the court or parties, if it intelligently refers to such action or proceedings; and in furtherance of justice upon proper terms, any other defect or error in any notice or other paper or proceeding may be amended by the court, and any mischance, omission or defect relieved within one year thereafter; and the court may enlarge or extend the time, for good cause shown, within which by statute any act is to be done, proceeding had or taken, notice or paper filed or served, or may, on such terms as are just,

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permit the same to be done or supplied after the time therefor has expired.[ 1988 c 202 § 2; 1893 c 127 § 24; RRS § 250.]

RCW 4.36.070 Pleading judgments.In pleading a judgment or other determination of a court or office of special jurisdiction, it shall not be necessary to state the facts conferring jurisdiction, but such judgment or determination may be stated to have been duly given or made. If such allegation be controverted, the party pleading shall be bound to establish on the trial the facts conferring jurisdiction.

RCW 4.36.170 Material allegation defined.A material allegation in a pleading is one essential to the claim or defense, and which could not be stricken from the pleading without leaving it insufficient.[Code 1881 § 104; 1877 p 22 § 104; 1854 p 143 § 65; RRS § 298.]

RCW 4.36.240 Harmless error disregarded.The court shall, in every stage of an action, disregard any error or defect in pleadings or proceedings which shall not affect the substantial rights of the adverse party, and no judgment shall be reversed or affected by reason of such error or defect.

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RCW 4.40.060 Trial of certain issues of fact—Jury.An issue of fact, in an action for the recovery of money only, or of specific real or personal property shall be tried by a jury, unless a jury is waived, as provided by law, or a reference ordered, as provided by statute relating to referees.[ 1893 c 127 § 33; Code 1881 § 204; 1877 p 42 § 208; 1873 p 52 § 206; 1869 p 50 § 208; 1854 p 164 § 183; RRS § 314.]

RCW 4.44.090 Questions of fact for jury.All questions of fact other than those mentioned in RCW 4.44.080, shall be decided by the jury, and all evidence thereon addressed to them.[Code 1881 § 224; 1877 p 47 § 228; 1869 p 56 § 228; RRS § 343.]

RCW 4.48.010 Reference by consent—Right to jury trial—Referee may not preside—Parties' written consent constitutes waiver of right.The court shall order all or any of the issues in a civil action, whether of fact or law, or both, referred to a referee upon the written consent of the parties which is filed with the clerk. Any party shall have the right in an action at law, upon an issue of fact, to demand a trial by jury. No referee appointed under this chapter may

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preside over a jury trial. The written consent of the parties constitutes a waiver of the right of trial by jury by any party having the right.[ 1984 c 258 § 512; Code 1881 § 248; 1854 p 168 § 206; RRS § 369. Formerly RCW 4.44.100, part, and 4.48.010.]

RCW 4.92.010 Where brought—Change of venue.Any person or corporation having any claim against the state of Washington shall have a right of action against the state in the superior court.The venue for such actions shall be as follows:(1) The county of the residence or principal place of business of one or more of the plaintiffs;(2) The county where the cause of action arose;(3) The county in which the real property that is the subject of the action is situated;(4) The county where the action may be properly commenced by reason of the joinder of an additional defendant; or(5) Thurston county.Actions shall be subject to change of venue in accordance with statute, rules of court, and the common law as the same now exist or may hereafter be amended, adopted, or altered.Actions shall be tried in the county in which they have been commenced in the absence of a

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seasonable motion by or in behalf of the state to change the venue of the action.

RCW 4.92.090 Tortious conduct of state—Liability for damages.The state of Washington, whether acting in its governmental or proprietary capacity, shall be liable for damages arising out of its tortious conduct to the same extent as if it were a private person or corporation.

RCW 4.96.010 Tortious conduct of local governmental entities—Liability for damages.(1) All local governmental entities, whether acting in a governmental or proprietary capacity, shall be liable for damages arising out of their tortious conduct, or the tortious conduct of their past or present officers, employees, or volunteers while performing or in good faith purporting to perform their official duties, to the same extent as if they were a private person or corporation. Filing a claim for damages within the time allowed by law shall be a condition precedent to the commencement of any action claiming damages. The laws specifying the content for such claims shall be liberally construed so that substantial compliance therewith will be deemed satisfactory.

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(2) Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, for the purposes of this chapter, "local governmental entity" means a county, city, town, special district, municipal corporation as defined in RCW 39.50.010, quasi-municipal corporation, any joint municipal utility services authority, any entity created by public agencies under RCW 39.34.030, or public hospital.(3) For the purposes of this chapter, "volunteer" is defined according to RCW 51.12.035.

RCW 9A.08.020 Liability for conduct of another—Complicity.(1) A person is guilty of a crime if it is committed by the conduct of another person for which he or she is legally accountable.(2) A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when:(a) Acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the crime, he or she causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct; or(b) He or she is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by this title or by the law defining the crime; or(c) He or she is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of the crime.(3) A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of a crime if:

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(a) With knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of the crime, he or she:(i) Solicits, commands, encourages, or requests such other person to commit it; or(ii) Aids or agrees to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or(b) His or her conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his or her complicity.(4) A person who is legally incapable of committing a particular crime himself or herself may be guilty thereof if it is committed by the conduct of another person for which he or she is legally accountable, unless such liability is inconsistent with the purpose of the provision establishing his or her incapacity.(5) Unless otherwise provided by this title or by the law defining the crime, a person is not an accomplice in a crime committed by another person if:(a) He or she is a victim of that crime; or(b) He or she terminates his or her complicity prior to the commission of the crime, and either gives timely warning to the law enforcement authorities or otherwise makes a good faith effort to prevent the commission of the crime.(6) A person legally accountable for the conduct of another person may be convicted on proof of the commission of the crime and of his or her complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the crime has not been

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prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different crime or degree of crime or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted.[ 2011 c 336 § 351; 1975-'76 2nd ex.s. c 38 § 1; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.08.020.]

RCW 9A.80.010 Official misconduct.(1) A public servant is guilty of official misconduct if, with intent to obtain a benefit or to deprive another person of a lawful right or privilege:(a) He or she intentionally commits an unauthorized act under color of law; or(b) He or she intentionally refrains from performing a duty imposed upon him or her by law.(2) Official misconduct is a gross misdemeanor.[ 2011 c 336 § 408; 1975-'76 2nd ex.s. c 38 § 17; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.80.010.]

RCW 42.20.080 Other violations by officers.Every officer or other person mentioned in RCW 42.20.070, who shall willfully disobey any provision of law regulating his or her official conduct in cases other than those specified in said section, shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor.[ 2012 c 117 § 116; 1909 c 249 § 318; RRS § 2570.]

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RCW 84.36.383 Residences—Definitions.As used in RCW 84.36.381 through 84.36.389, except where the context clearly indicates a different meaning:(1) The term "residence" means a single-family dwelling unit whether such unit be separate or part of a multiunit dwelling, including the land on which such dwelling stands not to exceed one acre, except that a residence includes any additional property up to a total of five acres that comprises the residential parcel if this larger parcel size is required under land use regulations. The term also includes a share ownership in a cooperative housing association, corporation, or partnership if the person claiming exemption can establish that his or her share represents the specific unit or portion of such structure in which he or she resides. The term also includes a single-family dwelling situated upon lands the fee of which is vested in the United States or any instrumentality thereof including an Indian tribe or in the state of Washington, and notwithstanding the provisions of RCW 84.04.080 and 84.04.090, such a residence is deemed real property.(2) The term "real property" also includes a mobile home which has substantially lost its identity as a mobile unit by virtue of its being fixed in location upon land owned or leased by

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the owner of the mobile home and placed on a foundation (posts or blocks) with fixed pipe, connections with sewer, water, or other utilities. A mobile home located on land leased by the owner of the mobile home is subject, for tax billing, payment, and collection purposes, only to the personal property provisions of chapter 84.56 RCW and RCW 84.60.040.(3) "Department" means the state department of revenue.(4) "Combined disposable income" means the disposable income of the person claiming the exemption, plus the disposable income of his or her spouse or domestic partner, and the disposable income of each cotenant occupying the residence for the assessment year, less amounts paid by the person claiming the exemption or his or her spouse or domestic partner during the assessment year for:(a) Drugs supplied by prescription of a medical practitioner authorized by the laws of this state or another jurisdiction to issue prescriptions;(b) The treatment or care of either person received in the home or in a nursing home, assisted living facility, or adult family home; and(c) Health care insurance premiums for medicare under Title XVIII of the social security act.(5) "Disposable income" means adjusted gross income as defined in the federal internal revenue code, as amended prior to January 1,

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1989, or such subsequent date as the director may provide by rule consistent with the purpose of this section, plus all of the following items to the extent they are not included in or have been deducted from adjusted gross income:(a) Capital gains, other than gain excluded from income under section 121 of the federal internal revenue code to the extent it is reinvested in a new principal residence;(b) Amounts deducted for loss;(c) Amounts deducted for depreciation;(d) Pension and annuity receipts;(e) Military pay and benefits other than attendant-care and medical-aid payments;(f) Veterans benefits, other than:(i) Attendant-care payments;(ii) Medical-aid payments;

(iii) Disability compensation, as defined in Title 38, part 3, section 3.4 of the code of federal regulations, as of January 1, 2008; and(iv) Dependency and indemnity compensation, as defined in Title 38, part 3, section 3.5 of the code of federal regulations, as of January 1, 2008;(g) Federal social security act and railroad retirement benefits;(h) Dividend receipts; and

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(i) Interest received on state and municipal bonds.(6) "Cotenant" means a person who resides with the person claiming the exemption and who has an ownership interest in the residence.(7) "Disability" has the same meaning as provided in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 423(d)(1)(A) as amended prior to January 1, 2005, or such subsequent date as the department may provide by rule consistent with the purpose of this section.

[ 2012 c 10 § 74; 2010 c 106 § 307. Prior: 2008 c 182 § 1; 2008 c 6 § 709; 2006 c 62 § 1; 2004 c 270 § 2; 1999 c 358 § 18; 1995 1st sp.s. c 8 § 2; 1994 sp.s. c 8 § 2; 1991 c 213 § 4; 1991 c 219 § 1; 1989 c 379 § 6; 1987 c 155 § 2; 1985 c 395 § 3; 1983 1st ex.s. c 11 § 4; 1980 c 185 § 5; 1979 ex.s. c 214 § 2; 1975 1st ex.s. c 291 § 15; 1974 ex.s. c 182 § 2.]

RCW 84.36.385 Residences—Claim for exemption—Forms—Change of status—Publication and notice of qualifications and manner of making claims.(1) A claim for exemption under RCW 84.36.381 as now or hereafter amended, may be made and filed at any time during the year for exemption from taxes payable the following year and

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thereafter and solely upon forms as prescribed and furnished by the department of revenue. However, an exemption from tax under RCW 84.36.381 continues for no more than six years unless a renewal application is filed as provided in subsection (3) of this section.(2) A person granted an exemption under RCW 84.36.381 must inform the county assessor of any change in status affecting the person's entitlement to the exemption on forms prescribed and furnished by the department of revenue.(3) Each person exempt from taxes under RCW 84.36.381 in 1993 and thereafter, must file with the county assessor a renewal application not later than December 31 of the year the assessor notifies such person of the requirement to file the renewal application. Renewal applications must be on forms prescribed and furnished by the department of revenue.(4) At least once every six years, the county assessor must notify those persons receiving an exemption from taxes under RCW 84.36.381 of the requirement to file a renewal application. The county assessor may also require a renewal application following an amendment of the income requirements set forth in RCW 84.36.381.(5) If the assessor finds that the applicant does not meet the qualifications as set forth in RCW

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84.36.381, as now or hereafter amended, the claim or exemption must be denied but such denial is subject to appeal under the provisions of RCW 84.48.010 and in accordance with the provisions of RCW 84.40.038. If the applicant had received exemption in prior years based on erroneous information, the taxes must be collected subject to penalties as provided in RCW 84.40.130 for a period of not to exceed five years.(6) The department and each local assessor is hereby directed to publicize the qualifications and manner of making claims under RCW 84.36.381 through 84.36.389, through communications media, including such paid advertisements or notices as it deems appropriate. Notice of the qualifications, method of making applications, the penalties for not reporting a change in status, and availability of further information must be included on or with property tax statements and revaluation notices for all residential property including mobile homes, except rental properties.[ 2011 c 174 § 106; 2010 c 106 § 308; 2001 c 185 § 8; 1992 c 206 § 13; 1988 c 222 § 10; 1983 1st ex.s. c 11 § 6; 1983 1st ex.s. c 11 § 3; 1979 ex.s. c 214 § 3; 1977 ex.s. c 268 § 2; 1974 ex.s. c 182 § 3.]

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