WORD AND MEANING IN ANCIENT ALEXANDRIA

During the late Hellenistic and early Imperial periods (B.C. 50 – A.D. 300),

important developments may be traced in the philosophy of language and its

relationship to mind. This book examines theories of language in the work of

theologians and philosophers linked to Ancient Alexandria.

The growth of Judaism and Christianity in cultural centers of the

Roman Empire, above all Alexandria, provides valuable testimony to the

philosophical vitality of this period. The study of Later Greek philosophy

should be more closely integrated with the Church Fathers, particularly in

the theologically sensitive issue of the nature of language. Robertson traces

some related attempts to reconcile immaterial, intelligible reality and the

intelligibility of language, explain the structure of language, and clarify

the nature of meaning. These shared problems are handled with greater

philosophical sophistication by Plotinus, although the comparison with Philo,

Clement, and Origen illustrates significant similarities as well as differences

between Neoplatonism and early Jewish and Christian philosophy.

This book is dedicated to Josie Robertson

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria

Theories of Language from Philo to Plotinus

DAVID ROBERTSON

© David Robertson 2008

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system

or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording

or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher.

David Robertson has asserted his moral right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act,

1988, to be identified as the author of this work.

Published by

Ashgate Publishing Limited Ashgate Publishing Company

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Robertson, David, 1967–

Word and meaning in ancient Alexandria : theories of language from Philo to Plotinus

1. Plotinus 2. Origen 3. Philo, of Alexandria 4. Language and languages – Philosophy

5. Alexandrian school

I. Title

401

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Robertson, David, 1967–

Word and meaning in ancient Alexandria : theories of language from Philo to Plotinus /

David Robertson.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-7546-0696-3 (hardcover : alk. paper)

1. Language and languages–Religious aspects–Christianity. 2. Language and languages–

Philosophy. 3. Christian literature, Early. I. Title.

BR115.L25R58 2007

401–dc22

2007028310

ISBN 978 0 7546 0696 3

Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd. Bodmin, Cornwall.

Contents

Preface vii

Acknowledgements ix

List of Abbreviations xi

Introduction 1

1 Philo 9

2 Clement 29

3 Origen 45

4 Plotinus 63

Conclusion 97

Bibliography 99

Index Locorum 109

Index of Names and Subjects 112

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Preface

This book took shape like a great many human lives. It was conceived at

leisure, birthed in uncertainty, matured in confused alternations of pleasure

and pain, and completed in difficult circumstances. I can point to a chance

meeting in April 2000 with Sarah Lloyd from Ashgate, at the British Society

for the History of Philosophy Conference ‘Athens and Jerusalem’, University

of Keele. The shape of this project emerged from my five years of research

in London, although I left England with ambitions to write something far

more centered in ancient linguistics than the book in your hands. It is meant

to provide the sort of contribution in Later Hellenistic and Early Imperial

philosophy that I would have liked to read at the dissertation stage. I owe

uncountable debts to Mary Margaret McCabe, Verity Harte, Raphael Woolf,

Josef Lössl, Paul Helm, Bob Sharples, David Sedley, Martin Stone, and

John Lee, among many others, who all provided indispensable assistance

during and after my stay in London. At Felician College, David Rice and

Gerry O’Sullivan were enthusiastically supportive of this project. As noted

above, the Ashgate managers, editors, and administrators deserve the

greatest credit for their patience over several years, particularly Sarah Lloyd,

Anne Keirby, Paul Coulam, Rachel Lynch and Emily Ruskell. And I offer

warmest thanks to Richard Sorabji, my doctoral thesis supervisor at King’s

College London, who spotted me working in a thicket of books one fateful

day in the Institute of Classical Studies, cozily nestled in its old Gordon

Square lodgings. It was a divine appointment. Richard Sorabji enlisted me

in a series of research project tasks connected with the massive Ancient

Commentators Project, including serving for several years as postgraduate

assistant in preparation of the Sourcebook in the Philosophy of the Ancient

Commentators 200–600 AD (3 vols, London, 2004). After my repatriation

in America, Prof. Sorabji generously met with me in New York and Austin.

Without his advice, encouragement, references, hospitality, anecdotes, and

moral exhortation, this sort of research would be simply inconceivable. Any

shortcomings noted by the attentive reader may be charged solely to my

willful refusal to listen to his counsel. Finally, I express my gratitude to my

parents, who were unwittingly granted a perpetual work in progress for an

eldest son, and my wife and two daughters, who will greet the publication of

this monograph with a sense of wonder vastly incommensurate to its merits.

Now I must say a word about the title. I mean to pay my respects to Quine’s

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandriaviii

tough and witty classic of analytic philosophy, Word and Object.1 It was the

first truly important work of contemporary philosophy I read, devoured (and

re-devoured) in countless railway platforms, subway trains, and chilly bus

stops in North London. Well, it was contemporary—to compare great things

with small, I am comforted by the possibility that a deeply flawed book

could sustain its interest. Finally, I would like to comment on my system

of references to ancient texts. I have adopted the most common scholarly

conventions for the references to ancient texts whenever possible, usually

including the name of the editor or editors in the reference. At times, as in the

case of passages from Clement and Origen, I have also included information

following the name of the editor or editors, which presents the pages and

lines of the cited Greek or Latin text. Thus for Clement and Origen, the page

numbers are presented towards the end of the reference, followed by the line

numbers. (In cases of multiple pages in the reference, I adopt a format of

page number, line number–page number, line number.) I trust that the reader

will interpret this scholarly notation with no difficulty.

1 W.V.O. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, MA, 1960).

Acknowledgements

I acknowledge the permission of University of Pennsylvania Press, for

allowing me to reproduce the copyrighted material from my published article,

‘Mind and Language in Philo’, Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 67,

iss. 3 (July 2006) in the body of Chapter 1. Credit for translations pressed

into service from published sources is noted upon the first appearance of the

source in each chapter. Otherwise, the translated texts are my own. In no

instance have I used previously published translations from my own hand,

with the exception of the Philo texts.

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List of Abbreviations

Ancient Texts

Abr. De Abrahamo

Abst. De abstinentia

Agr. De agricultura

An. Post. Posterior Analytics

An. Proc. Tim. De animae procreatione in Timaeo

Cat. Categoriae

Cels. Contra Celsum

Col. Colossians

Congr. De congressu eruditionis gratia

1 Cor. 1 Corinthians

D.L. Diogenes Laertius

Decal. De decalogo

Det. Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat

Did. Didaskalikos

Diss. Dissertationes

Div. De divinatione

Enn. Enneads

Ep. Epistula

Fr. Fragmenta

Fug. De fuga et inventione

Gen. Genesis

Gig. De gigantibus

Gramm. Grammatica

Her. Quis rerum divinarum heres sit

List of Abbreviationsxii

Immut. Quod deus sit immutabilis

In Joh. In Johannem

Int. De interpretatione

Jn. John

Leg. All. Legum allegoriae

Lk. Luke

Marc. Aur. Marcus Aurelius

Math. Adversus mathematicos

Migr. De migratione Abrahami

Mos. De vita Moysis

Mt. Matthew

Mut. De mutatione nominum

Nat. Hom. De natura hominis

Opif. De opificio mundi

Paed. Paedagogus

Phd. Phaedo

Phaedr. Phaedrus

Phil. Philebus

Philoc. Philocalia

Plac. De placitis reliquiae

Plac. Hipp. Plat. De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis

Plant. De plantatione

Post. De posteritate Caini

Princ. De principiis

Prov. De providentia

Ps. Psalm

Quaest. Ex. Quaestiones et solutiones in Exodum

Quaest. Gen. Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesim

Rep. Republic

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria xiii

Sacr. De sacrificiis Abelis et Caini

Sch. in Dionys. Thr. Scholia in Dionysium Thracem

Sext. Emp. Sextus Empiricus

Somn. De somniis

Somn. Scip. In somnium Scipionis

Soph. Sophist

Spec. Leg. De specialibus legibus

Strom. Stromata

Theaet. Theaetetus

Tim. Timaeus

Tusc. Tusculan Disputations

Vit. Plot. Vita Plotini

Reference Works, Standard Works, Collections, and Series

ANRW Aufsteig und Niedergang der römischen Welt

EK Posidonius. Fragments and Commentary,

L. Edelstein and I.G. Kidd (eds) (3 vols,

Cambridge, 1989).

FDS Die Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker,

K. Hülser (ed.) (Stuttgart, 1987–8)

GCS Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der

ersten drei Jahrhunderte

LP Lexicon Plotinianum, J.H. Sleeman and

G. Pollet (eds) (Leuven, 1980).

LS The Hellenistic Philosophers, A.A. Long and

D.N. Sedley (eds) (Cambridge, 1987)

PGL Patristic Greek Lexicon, G.W.H. Lampe (ed.)

(Oxford, 1961)

RAC Realexikon für Antike und Christentum

RSV Revised Standard Version, H.G. May and B.M.

Metzger (eds) (Oxford, 1962).

SVF Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta

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Introduction

In the past century of research of the history of philosophy, a great many

reclamation projects have been carried out in intellectual terrain previously

submerged in obscurity. Later Greek philosophy, once the province of

pioneers and specialists, holds no philosophical Atlantis for the ambitious

young scholar. It is increasingly crowded with impressive work, and this

study is informed by quite a number of precedents.

Origins of Research

I hoped at the dissertation stage to forge a major new approach to the study

of ancient linguistics, namely through a more thoroughgoing study of Greek

Patristic writers in coordination with other materials, but scholars such as

Ineke Sluiter and Bernhard Neuschäfer had eloquently made the case, while

developing some interesting lines of inquiry.1

They have shown that there is the greatest opportunity for further studies

of this kind—the general principle that the study of ancient philosophy

should be more closely integrated with the Church Fathers. I have opted

to investigate theory of mind and language in the less traveled period of

roughly the first century B.C. to the third century A.D., in the hope of

filling a significant gap. I try to show some related attempts to cope with

the philosophical difficulties of reconciling physical and intelligible reality,

explaining the structure of language, and clarifying the nature of meaning.

The main problem seems to be explaining how the intelligibility of language

is related to the intelligibility of divine or immaterial reality.

It seemed natural to narrow my focus to four philosophers and theologians

who are often placed together, starting with Philo and making an end with

Plotinus. It may appear that I am tacking Plotinus, who is only associated

with Alexandria at one stage in his life, onto a book that rightly belongs to

the study of philosophy in Christian Antiquity. However, my intention is

1 Bernhard Neuschäfer, Origenes als Philologe (2 vols, Basel, 1987); Ineke

Sluiter, Ancient Grammar in Context. Contributions to the Study of Ancient

Linguistic Thought (Amsterdam, 1990). My early research was inspired by this

trend. For example, see David G. Robertson, ‘Grammar, Logic, and Philosophy of

Language: The Stoic Legacy in Fourth-Century Patristics’, PhD Thesis, Department

of Philosophy, King’s College London, 2000; ‘Basil of Caesarea on the Meaning of

Prepositions and Conjunctions’, Classical Quarterly, 53 (2003): 167–74.

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria2

to draw in an utterly evenhanded way from the treasures of Late Antiquity,

pagan and Christian.

A more comprehensive book, stretching beyond connections to Alexandria,

would work in far more of the later Stoic, Platonist, and Peripatetic traditions,

including Posidonius, Panaetius, Hierocles, Cornutus, Chaeremon, Antiochus

of Ascalon, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Porphyry, Plutarch, Numenius,

among others. Alternatively, several other figures, such as the fifth-century

Neoplatonist Hierocles of Alexandria, could have been easily adapted into

the overall scheme, within the intellectual context of Ancient Alexandria.

Hopefully, further studies will bring to light the philosophical riches of this

period in theories of language, including far greater consideration of the

architectural, literary, religious, social, and historical dimensions of these

issues.2

The Stoic Legacy

The most persistent theme here in relating developments in Jewish and

Christian philosophy of language with the philosophical schools is developed

with an eye to the Stoics, particularly the later Stoics. As with most of the

themes running through this book, this theme is inaugurated in Philo. The

relevance of the Stoic legacy to the major intellectual developments in Late

Antiquity is quite complicated, it can be discussed from various angles. In

the early stages of formulating this project, I hoped to build a foundation in

the philosophical achievements of the later Stoics Posidonius and Panaetius.

These studies did not, I confess, prove promising enough to work directly

into the research on Philo and friends. At the time, I felt that I would gain an

improved perspective with some work in Stoic metaphysics before I began

the book chapters in earnest, and this eventually was channelled into research

in Hellenistic philosophy of mathematics.3 But this is not a book that could

be titled, Stoicism in Plotinus and the Church Fathers.

It may surprise some readers that Stoicism is usually the dominant

philosophical reference point in a book that ends with Plotinus.4 Actually,

2 For example, I would mention in this connection the interesting recent

work on allegory by Robert Lamberton, Homer the Theologian (Berkeley, 1986);

David Dawson, Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision in Ancient Alexandria

(Berkeley, 1992).

3 David G. Robertson, ‘Chrysippus on Mathematical Objects’, Ancient

Philosophy, 24 (2004): 169–91.

4 As one might expect, the Stoic contribution to Plotinus is extensive. One

helpful resource is the survey of Andreas Graeser, Plotinus and the Stoics (Leiden,

1972).

Introduction 3

the importance of the Stoic legacy to Greek Patristics is extensive and

relatively unexplored. For my part, I have examined possible Stoic

contributions in logic, rhetoric, and grammar. It should be a commonplace

of Patristic scholarship that a dominant tributary of classical culture is the

study of rhetoric. There is much promise in further studies of rhetoric in

the Church Fathers, while the volume of recent work in later Greek rhetoric

has never received the attention it deserves. Among the Stoics, we discern

strong interest in grammar and rhetoric, continuing at least up to the time of

Posidonius.5 However, there is some disappointment in this quarter, in that

Stoic rhetorical theory seems to have attracted precious little following from

the Hellenistic period onwards.6 Other strands of ancient rhetoric are more

relevant. The story is quite otherwise with respect to Stoic physics, theology,

theory of mind, and even linguistics. This is required reading for the student

of Patristic thought and I have happily selected several points of contact to

pursue in the chapters on Jewish and Christian philosophy.

The Transmission of Philosophy and Philology

I will continue framing the Stoic legacy with a closer look at some

developments in Stoic influence. It is easy to disregard the role in the

Hellenistic and Imperial age of various kinds of resources which served

philosophy in a book deprived age, for better or for worse. I mean the prevalent

influence of textbooks, handbooks, compendia, and doxographical works,

which encapsulate the sacred remains of hundreds (thousands?) of treatises

penned in the development of philosophical schools at least from the time of

Plato and Aristotle onwards. This is a major source of philosophical learning

for Philo, Clement, and Origen, even in the intellectual setting of Alexandria,

a city which boasted the finest library of the Ancient World. I will illustrate

this point in what follows, bypassing Plotinus, who, like Porphyry, read a

substantial number of philosophy books rather closely for teaching or study

purposes.7

5 I refer to the invaluable collection of texts relating to Posidonius by

L. Edelstein and I.G. Kidd (eds), Posidonius. Fragments and Commentary (3 vols,

Cambridge, 1972–99), EK F192.

6 Catherine Atherton, ‘Hand Over Fist: The Failure of Stoic Rhetoric’,

Classical Quarterly, 38 (1988): 392–427. Jonathan Barnes, Logic and the Imperial

Stoa (Leiden, 1997), pp. 58–75 provides an overview of rhetorical arguments and

the study of enthymemes in the Imperial period.

7 The following material is adapted from Robertson, ‘The Stoic Legacy in

Fourth-Century Patristics’, pp. 12–33.

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria4

The increasing use of such works is a feature of the Hellenistic age. A

good example of the codification of philosophical positions and doctrines

in the rival Hellenistic schools is the composition of texts capturing Stoic

highlights during the course of the third century B.C., a natural step given

the massive corpus of writings left from the early Stoics.8 In fact, it has been

argued that much of an early compendium of Stoic ethics is preserved for us

by later doxographers.9 As for grammar and logic, it is possible that the Stoic-

influenced work preserved under the name of Dionysius Thrax was the first

systematic textbook of grammar to be written, an important document for the

origins of technical grammar in Antiquity.10 In addition, there is testimony

to Imperial use of introductions (ehisagwga´i) and outlines (Hupotup´wseiß)

in Stoic logic.11

In grammatical study, important to my understanding of Origen, there are

two basic levels of teaching in learned circles. Grammar in some contexts is

just the learning of basic literacy, rudimentary skills in reading and writing

Greek. But from the Hellenistic age onwards, talk of grammar is usually

talk of the much more sophisticated Alexandrian tradition of philology, and

an important part of this sort of grammatical study is the technical grammar

represented by the famous treatise of Dionysius Thrax. It is this technical

sort of grammar which corresponds most closely to the traditional grammar

8 Manfred Fuhrmann, Das systematische Lehrbuch (Göttingen, 1960), p. 154.

9 Fuhrmann, Das systematische Lehrbuch, p. 154 agrees with the suggestion of

other scholars that Chrysippus himself had prepared such a work, titled H Upograf`jto¨u l´ogou to¨u [hjqiko¨u] pr`oß Qe´oporon, whose content is reflected to some

degree in Diogenes Laertius 7.85–116 and other doxographical sources.

10 Fuhrmann, Das systematische Lehrbuch, p. 145. There have been serious

challenges to the attribution of the t´ecnj attributed to Dionysius Thrax, which is

considered in most recent scholarship to have been written toward the end of the

second century B.C. However, there is general agreement that at least some initial

portion of the treatise was composed by Dionysius, the student of Aristarchus and

contemporary as fellow student with the important grammarian Apollodorus of

Athens. Richard Janko, ‘Crates of Mallos, Dionysius Thrax and the Tradition of

Stoic Grammatical Theory’, in L. Ayres (ed.), The Passionate Intellect. Essays on

the Transformation of Classical Traditions Presented to Prof. I.G. Kidd, Rutgers

University Studies in Classical Humanities (New Brunswick and London, 1995),

pp. 213–33 at 213–16 gives a brief but useful overview to the complicated questions

involved. Recent studies on the work attributed to Dionysius recognize the influence

of the Stoics as well as the purposes and methods of Alexandrian philology.

11 Barnes, Logic and the Imperial Stoa, pp. 73–4, n. 200 provides some

references. There is additional information on Varro and other sources in Fuhrmann,

Das systematische Lehrbuch, pp. 166–8.

Introduction 5

known to the history of linguistics.12 The system of philological instruction

familiar to us from the scholiasts to Dionysius Thrax served as the basic

outline for studies of literature from the end of the Hellenistic Age until the

fourth century A.D., perhaps even later.

I will not dwell on the particular features of this traditional system

of philological instruction, characterized by the Dionysian scholiasts as

‘ancient’, or on the relative contributions of the supposed ‘Alexandrian’

and ‘Pergamene’ factions to the philological scene. Rather, I will

concentrate on philological study in Late Antiquity with reference to

Origen. Of course, Origen taught as a grammarian in Alexandria, prior to

the ecclesiastical and theological phase of his career. And it is important

to keep in mind the elements of his extensive apprenticeship in Imperial

school philology.

Neuschäfer argues that Origen provides valuable evidence for grammar,

rhetoric, and textual criticism in the schools of the Imperial period. Also, he

shows abundant testimony in the received corpus of writings from Origen

in confirmation of what is independently known regarding philological

studies in Alexandria and other centers of learning such as Athens.

These conclusions make sense in light of the reports describing Origen’s

extensive grammatical and philological training. For Origen was exposed

to elementary grammatical studies, basic philological training, advanced

philology, rhetoric, dialectic, and certainly the ‘cycle of humanistic

learning’ ( hegk´uklia paide´ia), the precedent for later encyclopedic efforts

up to the present day (think of Wikipedia). This ‘cycle’ was studied, based

on the earlier Greek works of the Hellenistic period, in overview of a

‘circle’ of standard disciplines, all written up by a single author. Probably

the best known ancient example of this comprehensive educational tool is

Varro’s influential Disciplinaram Libri, which contained books devoted to

Grammar, Dialectic, Rhetoric, Geometry, Arithmetic, Astronomy, Music,

Medecine, and Architecture.13

One of the major themes of Neuschäfer’s work is that in Origen

there is abundant evidence of the use of Stoic technical terms and Stoic

definitions, as well as evidence of knowledge of Stoic linguistics in an

Origen compendium such as the Philokalia. Neuschäfer explains the Stoic

inheritance of grammar in Origen from deeply rooted trends in Alexandrian

12 Michael Frede, ‘The Origins of Traditional Grammar’, in R. Butts and J.K.K.

Hintikka (eds), Historical and Philosophical Dimensions of Logic, Methodology,

and Philosophy of Science (Dordrecht, 1997), pp. 51–79 at 52.

13 Fuhrmann, Das systematische Lehrbuch, p. 163; H. Fuchs, ‘Enkyklios

Paideia’, RAC, 5 (1962): 365–98.

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria6

grammar.14 These changes, he thinks, may have been generated or boosted

when Chairemon the Stoic, whose work ‘On Comets’ (Per`i komjt¨wn)

Origen mentions, was appointed head of the Alexandrian grammar school.

As several scholars have pointed out, the first-century B.C. Alexandrian

grammarian Dionysius Thrax, whose identity has been questioned, shows

an openness to currents beyond strictly Alexandrian sources. This is shown

by the contributions of Stoic sources (t´ecnj per`i fwn¨jß) to his grammar.

The surviving grammatical texts seem to confirm the shift in the use of

Stoic technical terms, which Neuschäfer considers operative at least a

century before Origen’s work.15

In his conclusions, Neuschäfer posits two basic grounds for the strands

of Stoic influence in Origen. The first is the exposure, during the Hellenistic

period, of the proud tradition of Alexandrian philology to Stoic grammatical

theory; it appears that this development was even more advanced in the

early third century A.D. than when Dionysius Thrax and Apollonius

Dyscolus composed their treatises. This sounds plausible enough, to judge

from the surviving material. But Neuschäfer takes the additional step of

claiming a special affinity of Origen to Stoic grammar and indeed to Stoic

philosophy of language, beyond what was mediated and transmitted by

the grammatical tradition in Alexandria.16 Obviously, this second claim is

more difficult to support than the argument for Stoic grammar seeping into

Alexandrian school philology. Although Neuschäfer is probably correct that

it is broad shifts in Alexandrian school philology and not the dissemination

of Pergamene Homer exegesis that is most relevant to understanding Stoic

material in Origen, the Pergamene school may have still contributed to

14 Neuschäfer, Origenes als Philologe, p. 215.

15 Neuschäfer, Origenes als Philologe, pp. 216–17. ‘Das Eindringen stoisch-

grammatischer Nomenklatur nicht nur in das Lehrbuch des Dionysius Thrax,

sondern auch in die Abhandlungen des Apollonios Dyskolos verdeutlicht, dass

ein Jahrhundert vor Origenes bestimmte “termini technici” und ihre spezifische

Bedeutung, aus dem ursprünglichen Zusammenhang gelöst, längst grammatikalisch-

terminologisches Allgemeingut geworden waren ... Nun fällt allerdings folgendes

auf: Origenes gebraucht mit grösster Selbstverständlichkeit stoische Termini, deren

Inanspruchnahme bei Dionsius Thrax und Apollonios Dyscolos noch umstritten

ist.’ Neuschäfer, Origenes als Philologe, p. 219 argues for the growing use of Stoic

grammar in Imperial Alexandrian philology in part by adducing the influence of

Stoic rhetoric on Alexandrian Homer exegesis from A.D. 100 to 300, but this does

not strengthen his case too much, in my opinion.

16 Neuschäfer, Origenes als Philologe, pp. 217–18, p. 155, n. 120.

Introduction 7

knowledge of grammar and logic in all the major intellectual centers of the

Imperial period.17

17 Neuschäfer, Origenes als Philologe, p. 219. ‘Dieser Bereitschaft zur Aufnahme

stoischer Einflüsse im kaiserzeitlichen Alexandrien scheint zumindest nicht

hinderlich gewesen zu sein, dass diese philosophische Richtung einst entscheidend

die Auslegungsmethodik des pergamenischen Gegenlagers geprägt hatte.’

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Chapter 1

Philo

The Jewish theologian and philosopher Philo of Alexandria (about B.C.

30–A.D. 45) is a unique figure in what remains to us of the philosophy of

the late Hellenistic and early Imperial period. As a philosopher, he is too

often treated lightly in scholarly work, apart from specialized studies into

the origins of ‘Middle Platonism’. Yet Philo is the only figure in the period

following Posidonius, Panetius, and Cicero, and before Seneca, Marcus

Aurelius, Epictetus, and Sextus Empiricus, who has left us with a rich

legacy in all major areas of philosophy, including reflections on mind and

language.1 In Philo we encounter the transformation of philosophical views

into a Mosaic ‘blend of truth’ which sees philosophy in harmony with the

Hellenistic Jewish tradition.2 Philo, the Jewish Platonist, presents a kind of

dualism of thought and language. This dualism is nourished by a rich fund

of ideas, scriptural and philosophical, about logos, the fount of speech and

rationality. David Runia summarizes Philo’s basic view.

Philo’s philosophical conception of man is dualist. Man is basically

sunamf´oteron of body and rational soul or mind. Both of these parts are created

by God, but only with respect to one of them, the mind, is man related to Him.

Philo nowhere denies that man’s body is created by God. It is only with respect to

he irrational soul that he has doubts ... Philo’s dualism stands in a long tradition,

from Plato to Descartes and beyond.3

1 The body of this chapter is adapted from David G. Robertson, ‘Mind

and Language in Philo’, in Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 67, iss. 3 (July

2006). Reprinted by permission of the University of Pennnsylvania Press. Paul S.

MacDonald, History of the Concept of Mind (Aldershot, 2003), pp. 92–4 limits his

consideration of Philo’s concept of mind to a brief outline of the mix of Greek and

Hebrew ideas characteristic of his thought.

2 Philo blends Greek philosophy into a scheme that also develops the

Hellenistic Jewish tradition of biblical interpretation, an achievement well described

by Hans-Friedrich Weiss, Untersuchungen zur Kosmologie des hellenistischen

und palästinischen Judentums (Berlin, 1966), pp. 35–58; David T. Runia, Philo

of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato (Leiden, 1986), pp. 480–519; Gretchen

Reydams-Schils, ‘Stoicized Readings of Plato’s Timaeus in Philo of Alexandria’,

Studia Philonica Annual, 7 (1995): 85–102.

3 David T. Runia, ‘God and Man in Philo of Alexandria’, Journal of Theological

Studies, 39 (1988): 48–75 at 71–2.

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria10

The relationship of immateriality and materiality in Philo’s concept of our

logos is crucial to his philosophy of language. We find much that is drawn

from Stoicism and Platonism, although Philo also develops some ideas which

appear to depart from Greek philosophy, such as his notion of divine creative

activity by speaking things into being. I think Philo emerges as a significant

figure in the history of engagement with problems of the nature of mind,

the intelligibility of language, and the possibility of communication. Philo

deserves credit as the first detailed and surviving expositor of the view that

meanings are thoughts, immaterial items from the mind which are carried

about in the bodily vehicle of spoken discourse to other minds.

Divine Logos and Human Language

Let me briefly introduce the divine logos in Philo. I will not give a detailed

presentation of the complicated notion of logos in Greek philosophy

(Heraclitus, Plato, and the Stoics) and Jewish tradition, including the various

ways the term is used. This is very important background to Philo, but it

has already received a lot of scholarly attention.4 For Philo, everything that

exists, the incorporeal as well as the corporeal world, was created by the

4 David Winston, Logos and Mystical Theology in Philo of Alexandria

(Cincinnati, 1985), pp. 9–25 goes into the Platonist background to Philo’s doctrine

of logos, which features the contrast of inner logos and outer logos. Although the

Stoics were not the first philosophers to draw a distinction between inner and outer

speech, they developed the notion from Plato (Soph. 263E3–9; 264A1–2; Phil. 38E;

Theaet. 189E6–190A; 206D1ff.) and Aristotle (An. Post. 76b24; Cat. 4b34). The

Stoics seem to have influenced many later uses of the distinction, a philosophical

commonplace in Hellenistic and Later Greek philosophy; Richard Sorabji, The

Philosophy of the Commentators 200–600 AD. A Sourcebook (3 vols, London, 2004),

vol. 3, pp. 211–13, 245–9 introduces several Neoplatonist views on thoughts as an

inner language. On Stoic ideas about the relationship of thought and language in

connection with Philo consult Max Pohlenz, ‘Philon von Alexandreia’, Nachrichten

von der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen (Göttingen, 1942), pp. 409–87

at 445–7; Gregorios D. Farandos, Kosmos und Logos nach Philon von Alexandria

(Amsterdam, 1976), pp. 240–52; Winston, Logos and Mystical Theology, pp. 17–18;

Gertraut Kweta, Sprache, Erkennen und Schweigen in der Gedankenwelt des Philo

von Alexandrien (Frankfurt, 1996), pp. 58–66. On the Stoics, I favor the work of

Max Pohlenz, ‘Die Begründing der abendländischen Sprachlehre durch die Stoa’,

Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen (Göttingen, 1939),

pp. 151–98 at 196–7; Max Mühl, ‘Der l´ogoß hendi´aqetoß und proforik´oß von

der älteren Stoa bis zur Synode von Sirmium 351’, Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte, 7

(1962): 7–56 at 8–16; Wolfram Ax, Laut, Stimme und Sprache (Göttingen, 1986),

p. 105; Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (Berkeley and Los Angeles,

1992), p. 63.

Philo 11

rational principle or speech (l´ogoß) of God (Migr. 6 Wendland; Opif. 16–37

Cohn). There are two basic theological notions in Philo. The logos is the

image of God and as such it is closely associated with the thought and mind

of God, but it is also the instrument of the divine being (Migr. 6 Wendland;

Leg. All. 3.96 Cohn).5

Hence in some prior sense, the incorporeal world came to be first by the

agency of logos and ‘was established ( Hidruqe´iß) in the divine logos’ (Opif.

36 Cohn). The divine logos is the ‘place’ of the noetic realm (Opif. 20 Cohn).

The intelligible world (k´osmoß nojt´oß) is a world contained in God’s mind,

comparable to the ‘intellectual blueprint’ of an architect who engages in

rational planning for the sake of building a city (Opif. 24–5, 36 Cohn).

The sensible world is an inferior realm, a mere copy of the perfect

incorporeal world which is the model (par´adeigma) for it. What is difficult

to find in this picture is much room for the creation and composition of the

world soul of Plato’s Timaeus.6 Doing much of the work of the Platonic world

soul is the divine logos, bridging intelligible and sensible reality.7 Runia,

who does not consider Philo a proper Middle Platonist, has pointed out

how important Philo’s notion of the logos is to his story of God and world,

departing in some respects from Platonism and Stoicism.8 Runia also notes

that later Platonists, possibly under the influence of the Stoic cosmic logos

which unites all things in the Stoic world, continue the trend observable in

Philo of speaking of God’s logos in a way that takes over the roles previously

occupied by the Platonic world soul of the Timaeus.9

Philo gives the divine logos the starring role of creating the universe by

shaping matter into well formed things. The divine logos represents the focus

5 I choose to ignore here Philo’s occasional claim that God’s being, under the

name of ‘the one that is’, is beyond all attributes or functions, for example Abr.

120–23 Cohn.

6 Runia, Philo and the Timaeus, pp. 177–208, 446–51 points out that it is also

hard to find the idea of the cosmic body of the cosmos, another theme familiar from

the Timaeus.

7 Philo never makes clear whether the divine logos is a reality independent

from God, in passages such as Migr. 6 Wendland; Fug. 101 Wendland; Her. 206

Wendland; Leg. All. 3.150 Cohn. Mühl, ‘Der logoß hendi´aqetoß und proforik´oß’,

pp. 18–24; Weiss, Untersuchungen, pp. 267–9; Runia, Philo and the Timaeus,

pp. 207–8; Runia, ‘God and Man’, pp. 72–3 address the related theological issues.

8 Runia, Philo and the Timaeus, pp. 446–51, 482–3, 505–16.

9 Runia, Philo and the Timaeus, p. 206. Other scholars, such as Winston, Logos

and Mystical Theology, p. 15, have acknowledged early Middle Platonist tendencies

for the divine logos to subsume or displace the Platonic world soul, traced by

John Dillon, The Middle Platonists (Ithaca, 1977), p. 83 as early as Antiochus of

Ascalon.

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria12

of God’s thoughts in relation to the cosmos and the fullness of God’s powers

(Opif. 20–21 Cohn), uniting the creative functions familiar from the Timaeus

of demiurge, model, and cosmic soul.10 The sensible world is formed from

the pattern of what is intelligible (Opif. 15–36 Cohn). The intelligible world

is constituted by the Ideas inherited from Alexandrian Platonism; for Philo,

these Ideas are identified with the thoughts of God. Actually, the Timaeus’

demiurgic creation story (involving demiurge, matter, noetic or intelligible

cosmos) is divided by Philo into two separate accounts. There is a creation

of the immaterial noetic world in the mind of God, and there is a creation

of physical reality from the model of the noetic world and unformed matter

(Opif. 32–5, 134–6, 171 Cohn).11 Like the sensible cosmos, the human being

is created as the image (ehik´wn) not of God’s own self but rather in the image

of the divine logos (Opif. 25 Cohn; compare Gen. 1.27).12 In fact these aspects

of creation are nothing less than gospel for Philo; his enthusiastic appraisal

of God’s work (for example, Mos. 1.38 Cohn) underwrote the later tradition

of Patristic hexaemeral literature.

10 Runia, Philo and the Timaeus, pp. 449–51. Pohlenz, ‘Philon von Alexandreia’,

pp. 447–8; J.C.M. Van Winden, ‘The World of Ideas in Philo of Alexandria’, Vigiliae

Christianae, 37 (1983): 209–17 at 211–17 claim (wrongly) that Philo goes so far as to

identify the divine logos and the Ideas. Farandos, Kosmos und Logos, pp. 293–302;

Runia, Philo and the Timaeus, p. 447, n. 224 show that there is some distinction.

Another related element in Philo’s thought is the relation of the divine logos to the

divine ‘powers’ (dun´ameiß), entities associated with the divine Ideas, examined by

Pohlenz, ‘Philon von Alexandreia’, pp. 442–7; Dillon, The Middle Platonists, p.

165; Winston, Logos and Mystical Theology, pp. 19–21; Abraham P. Bos, ‘Philo of

Alexandria: A Platonist in the Image and Likeness of Aristotle’, The Studia Philonica

Annual, 10 (1998): 66–86 at 75–84. The ‘powers’ of God seem at times to be virtually

identified with the divine logos in Philo, or rather, the logos itself is one of the divine

‘powers’. Philo considers two ‘powers’ to be higher than the others, namely the

‘regal’ power and the ‘creative’ power. Weiss, Untersuchungen, pp. 259–75; Dillon,

The Middle Platonists, pp. 161–6 show that the ‘powers’ are (a) distinguished from

God himself, (b) similar in important respects to the Stoic ‘seminal logoi’ or the

immanent Stoic logos, by virtue of the close involvement of the ‘powers’ in the

material world (compare D.L. 7.147), and (c) essentially subordinated to their

source (the logos), although some texts speak of the these entities in parallel fashion.

Admittedly, the ‘powers’ seem at times to be almost identified with the divine logos.

Less prominent in Philo than the ‘powers’, but likewise associated with divine logos,

is the traditional Jewish figure of Wisdom (Sophia), discussed by Dillon, The Middle

Platonists, p. 164.

11 Roberto Radice, ‘Observations on the Theory of the Ideas as the Thoughts

of God in Philo of Alexandria’, The Studia Philonica Annual, 3 (1991): 126–34 at

127.

12 Runia, ‘God and Man’, pp. 66–73.

Philo 13

Now let us work Philo’s notion of logos more thoroughly into the

picture. There are two kinds of logos in the scheme of things, conceived in

parallel fashion to the two kinds of logos in the human being (Mos. 2.127

Cohn). In divinity there is one logos, a higher logos, which has to do with

the incorporeals and Ideas which structure the intelligible world. And there

is another lower logos, which has to do with the structure of the sensible

things created by God. The lower cosmic principle in this scheme works

like an immanent formal principle which structures all things. Thus it bears

some comparison to the Stoic ‘seminal logos’ (l´ogoß spermatik´oß: Her.

114–19 Wendland; Leg. All. 3.150 Cohn). This immanent logos is necessary

to provide an account of how rational order can be instituted in the sensible

world from the intelligible world. Plato’s Timaeus does not allow the divine

creative intellect to directly intervene in the world, establishing instead the

world soul, constructed as an intermediate entity in a blend of ‘higher’ and

‘lower’ materials. It functions as an instrument of rational government;

without a cosmic soul in hand, it is hardly surprising that Philo helps himself

to this role of logos inherited from Stoicism.13

Philo’s notion of God’s creative work as speech reflects the biblical

language of divine creation in terms of what God says (Gen. 1; Sacr. 65

Cohn; Decal. 47 Cohn). ‘God speaks, and all at once he does it, allowing

nothing between the two; but if one ought to present a truer teaching, his

speech (lógoß) is his accomplishment (‘ergon).’14 The logos of God unifies

13 Stephen Menn, Descartes and Augustine (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 88–90, 106

traces attempts among the later Platonists to deal with this fundamental problem.

Pohlenz, ‘Philon von Alexandreia’, pp. 450–53 observes rightly the tension in

Philo between an immanent logos and a transcendent logos, but does not see the

significance of a higher and a lower logos. Pohlenz, ibid.; Kweta, Sprache, Erkennen

und Schweigen, pp. 164–7 treat further complications on these issues; at times

Philo develops his notion of the ‘nature’ (f´usiß) of the world, itself the creation of

logos, much like a Platonic world soul. Weiss, Untersuchungen, pp. 259–60; Dillon,

The Middle Platonists, pp. 159–60; Runia, Philo and the Timaeus, p. 483, n. 45;

Reydams-Schils, ‘Readings of Plato’s Timaeus’, p. 92 outline the Stoic background

to ‘seminal logos’ in Philo.

14 Sacr. 65 Cohn. There has been much controversy over what Philo presupposes

in God’s work of creation. H.A. Wolfson, Philo. Foundations of Religious Philosophy

in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (2 vols, Cambridge, MA, 1947), vol. 1, pp. 303–4;

Runia, Philo and the Timaeus, pp. 290–91. When Philo talks about creation as the

formation of things out of matter, he usually seems to have in mind not elements or

something with some qualities, but rather matter which is completely unformed and

disorderly, compare ‘prime matter’ in the Aristotelian tradition, R. Sorabji, Matter,

Space and Motion (Ithaca, NY, 1988), pp. 3–59, apart from a few anomalous passages

(for example, Opif. 134–7 Cohn) which suggest that primordial matter already has

some qualities present. But there is the deeper problem that Philo does not present

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria14

all the divine powers (dun´ameiß) in its activity, it is set over these powers

and they are all the contents and modes of expression of God’s logos.15 John

Dillon points out that in one text (Fug. 94–105 Wendland), Philo talks about

the logos of the ‘powers’ but also about the one who speaks (to¨u l´egontoß),

‘a logical counterpart to the term Logos, certainly, but not a term for God

that I find used anywhere else in the Greek tradition.’16 There is a renewed

emphasis on divine speech in Philo.

Of course, even if human speech reflects divine creative action, Philo

would acknowledge that the creative powers of human speech are vastly

inferior. If I say ‘horse’, I utter articulate sounds in the form of the word

‘horse’, but I do not produce a horse.17

Characteristics of Mind

In spite of Philo’s statements that the essence and nature of the mind is

unknowable to us (for example, Somn. 1.30–34 Wendland), he discusses its

nature, characteristics, and activities in several treatises. Christopher Stead

notes this attention to the mind in Philo, in connection with the history of the

concept of God as mind.

I am inclined to think that as time went on orthodox Christians became more

discreet (or less enterprising) in their use of this metaphor, and ignored certain

characteristics of the mind which are important to Philo and to some early

Judaizing Christians, including Gnostics. Philo sees the mind as receptive,

nimble, and resourceful, and infers similar qualities in God himself. The mind’s

quickness is proverbial; it can ‘go anywhere’ (in imagination) without lapse of

time; it understands, but it cannot be understood (thus breaking the rule that

like is known by like); it has no form or sensible configuration of its own, yet it

a consistent account of the relation between God and matter in creation. Dillon, The

Middle Platonists, p. 158; Runia, Philo and the Timaeus, pp. 426–33, 451–5 reject

creation ex nihilo in Philo. Nonetheless, in spite of some divergent passages (for

example, Her. 160 Wendland), Philo sometimes claims (for example, Leg. All. 2.2

Cohn; Prov. 1.6–7 Aucher) that nothing existed prior to God’s creation, for God was

lacking nothing. Every created thing came into being at a single stroke, as argued by

R. Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum (Ithaca, NY, 1983), pp. 203–9.

15 Weiss, Untersuchungen, pp. 273–4; Dillon, The Middle Platonists, pp. 164–6.

See also my n. 10.

16 Dillon, The Middle Platonists, p. 166.

17 Etienne Gilson, Linguistics and Philosophy. An Essay on the Philosophical

Constants of Language (Notre Dame, IN, 1988), p. 21.

Philo 15

can ‘assume’ or ‘contain’ perceptible forms and sense qualities, just as soft wax

receives tangible and visible impressions.18

I would agree with Stead’s claim, if properly qualified, that the concept of

God as mind, along with more general discussion of the mind, is gradually lost

in Greek Christian thought, certainly by the latter part of the fourth century.

Of course, the story is quite different in the Latin tradition; the metaphor of

the mind and its characteristics is notoriously alive and kicking in Augustine

and his successors.

As Stead would suggest, it is characteristic for Philo to explain the

capacities of the human mind with an eye to the characteristics of the divine

mind: we can comprehend all things as a universe, we can know God, the

good, and virtue. In fact, our mental activities and knowledge can extend

beyond space and time.19 The quickness of mind and the speech it produces

is compared to the speed of time itself (Sacr. 65–6 Cohn):

Now the first virtue of beginners is that the imperfect strives to imitate the perfect

Teacher as much as possible. But the Teacher outstrips even time, not even moving

alongside when he created the universe, since time itself began to co-subsist with

the world coming into being. For when God speaks, he accomplishes all at once,

putting nothing between the two. If one ought to present a truer teaching, his

logos was his accomplishment. And there is nothing swifter than speech among

mortal stock, for the rush of the names and verbs passes by, outstripping the

grasp of the mind upon them. Just as the ageless streams being poured out by

the springs preserve unceasing motion, the oncoming flow always overtaking

the cessation, so also the current of speech, when it begins to be moved, runs

along with the mind the swiftest of what is in us, that which surpasses the winged

natures. So then according as the one who does not come into being outstrips all

that comes into being, so also the speech of the one who does not come into being

outruns the speech of that which comes into being, even if it is most speedily

carried upon the clouds.20

18 Christopher Stead, Divine Substance (Oxford, 1977), p. 170; compare

Christopher Stead, ‘The Concept of Mind and the Concept of God in the Christian

Fathers’, in B. Hebblethwaite and S.R. Sutherland (eds), The Philosophical

Frontiers of Christian Theology (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 39–54 at 39. Stead leaves

the Cappadocian Fathers, not to mention Marcellus of Ancyra, completely out of

consideration.

19 This point has received attention from recent scholarship: Runia, Philo and the

Timaeus, p. 472; Kweta, Sprache, Erkennen und Schweigen, pp. 229–31; Gretchen

Reydams-Schils, ‘Philo of Alexandria on Stoic and Platonist Psycho-Physiology:

The Socratic Higher Ground’, Ancient Philosophy, 22 (2002): 125–47 at 136–7.

20 Sacr. 65–6 Cohn. Pr´wtj d`e twn ehisagom´enwn haret`j to did´askalon Hwß‘enesti t´eleion hatele¨iß mime¨isqai gl´icesqai. H O d`e did´askaloß fq´anei ka`i t`oncr´onon ohudh “ote t`o p¨an heg´enna sunerg´jsanta, hepeid`j kai ahut`oß ginom´en^w t^¨w

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria16

Philo conceives these characteristics of divine speech in a relation of

eminence over characteristics of human speech. Although Philo seems to

be illustrating theological claims on the basis of observing human nature in

this particular discussion, at other times human speech is explained in light

of divine speech. As I have already suggested, Philo tends to develop his

remarks on human speech in analogy to his account of the divine creation of

the sensible world. Human speech is an imitation of divine creative activity,

bringing order out of disorder. The anthropic logos not only thinks and

contemplates, it expresses in rational order the immaterial thoughts of the

mind in audible, material speech through the bodily vocal organs.

Philo never makes clear how it is possible for divine mental activity to

be faster than human mental activity; in this connection we should consider

Philo’s view from another passage (Det. 89 Cohn, compare 90 Cohn) that

mental activity is timeless or faster than time. How can God’s timeless

activity be faster than any other timeless activity? Presumably, the superiority

of divine power makes this possible.

For the mind, itself unique among the things in us since it is swiftest of all,

outstrips and passes by even the time in which it seems to find itself, timelessly

touching upon the whole and the parts and the causes of these (earthly) things

according to unseen faculties. And at this point, having come not only up to

the limits of land and sea, but also of air and sky, not even there does it stop,

considering the cosmos to be a narrow boundary of the continuous and unceasing

course, striving to proceed further to grasp even the incomprehensible nature, if

possible, insofar as (the mind seeks) not only with respect to Being.21

k´osm^w sunuf´istato≥ Ho g`ar qe`oß l´egwn “ama hepo´iei, mjd`en metax`u hamfo¨intiqe´iß≥ ehi de cr`j d´ogma kine¨in haljq´esteron, Ho logoß ‘ergon ~jn ahuto¨u. L´ogoud`e hoxukinjt´oteron ohud`en ka`i par`a tw qnjt^¨w genei, parame´ibetai g`ar Hj Hr´umjt¨wn honom´atwn ka`i Hrjm´atwn t`jn heph ahuto¨iß fq´anousa kat´aljyin. “ Wspero~un t`a di`a kroun¨wn hekce´omena ha´enaa Hre¨iqra ‘aljkton ‘ecei t`jn for´an,hepikatalamb´anontoß hae`i tjn l¨jxin to¨u hepi´ontoß Hre´umatoß, o“utwß Hj toul´ogou pl´jmmura, “otan ‘arxjtai f´eresqai, t¨wn hen Hjm¨in t^¨w hoxukinjtot´at^wdiano´i^a, ”o ka`i t`aß ptjn`aß parame´ibetai f´useiß, suntr´ecei. Kaq´aper o~un Hohag´enjtoß fq´anei p¨asan g´enesin, o“utwß ka`i Ho to¨u hagen´jtou l´ogoß paraqe¨it`on gen´esewß, k’an hox´utata hep`i nef¨wn kataf´erjtai.

21 The words in round brackets appearing in the translation are meant to

complete the sense of the Greek text. Det. 89 Cohn. M´onon g`ar haut`o t¨wn parhHjm¨in Ho no¨uß “ate p´antwn hwkudrom´wtatoß ka`i ton cr´onon, hen ˆ^w g´inesqaidoke¨i, fq´anei ka`i parame´ibetai, kat`a haor´atouß dun´ameiß hacr´onwß to¨u tepant`oß ka`i mer¨wn ka`i t¨wn to´utwn ahit´iwn hepiya´uwn.‘ Jdj d`e ohu m´onon ‘acritwn g¨jß ka`i qal´attjß hall`a kai ha´eroß ka`i ohurano¨u per´atwn helq`wn ohudhhenta¨uqa ‘estj, brac`un “oron to¨u suneco¨uß ka`i hapa´ustou dr´omou nom´isaß

Philo 17

The emphasis in this passage is on the incommensurability of mind with

the movements of objects in space and time, which Philo presents by way

of confusing what the mind thinks about and the speed of thought itself.

Ultimately the ‘reach’ of intellect for higher realities leaves behind the world

which is subject to the parameters of space and time. However, we do not find

a detailed account, as in Plotinus, of how the relations of likeness between

our intellect and divine intellect make possible our ascent.

Immateriality of Mind

Now for Philo, the mind is sharply distinguished from the body. These are

the two basic parts or aspects of human nature. In one passage (Somn. 1.34

Wendland; compare Det. 90 Cohn), Philo says that the human mind is a ‘piece

of the divine’ (hap´ospasma qe¨ion). In another passage (Quaest. Gen. 2.59

Aucher; compare Her. 283 Wendland) he says similarly that the substance

of the rational soul is divine, immaterial pneuma.22 This strongly suggests

that the mind, the rational part of the soul or the ‘soul of the soul’ (Her. 55

Wendland), is immaterial. As Runia claims, ‘Both of these parts [body and

rational soul] are created by God, but only with respect to one of them, the

mind, is man related to Him.’23

Of course, the Platonist dualism of mind and body as adapted into Philo’s

thought is not the only dualist option available in his day. For example, there

is the Stoic dualism of two equally corporeal cosmological principles (one

t`on k´osmon e~inai, proswt´erw d`e cwr¨jsai glic´omenoß ka`i tjn hakat´aljptonqeo¨u f´usin, “oti m`j proß t`o e~inai m´onon, katalabe¨in, ’jn d´unjtai.

22 There is an interesting comparison here to Cicero, Tusc. 1.60–67 on the nature

of the mind (mens), perhaps representative of contemporary Middle Platonism,

addressed by Eyjolfur K. Emilsson, ‘Platonic Soul-Body Dualism in the Early

Centuries of the Empire to Plotinus’, ANRW, 2.36.7 (Berlin, 1994), pp. 5331–62 at

5333–4, 5339–40. This Platonist view is that the mind is divine, whether it is breath

(anima), fire, or aether. With respect to Philo, John Dillon, ‘Asômatos: Nuances of

Incorporeality in Philo’, in C. Lévy (ed.), Philon d’Alexandrie et le langage de la

philosophie (Turnhout, 1998), pp. 99–110 discusses how the human mind or the

divine logos can be fiery substances and yet immaterial and beyond all sensibles.

Philo sometimes affirms that we are partially divine; our minds can be in harmony

with the divine mind in dreams or ecstatic states, Somn. 1.2, 2.2–3 Wendland;

compare Det. 92 Cohn; Spec. Leg. 1.219 Cohn. Some scholars see overtones here

of Posidonius’ theory of divination (Cicero, Div. 1.63, 1.129–30 Müller). Pohlenz,

‘Philon von Alexandreia’, pp. 440–41; Weiss, Untersuchungen, p. 253; Farandos,

Kosmos und Logos, p. 269; Kweta, Sprache, Erkennen und Schweigen, pp. 244–6

review the long scholarly tradition of tracing material in Philo back to Posidonius.

23 Runia, ‘God and Man’, p. 71.

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria18

active, one passive), while in another camp, probably much less prominent,

there is the Aristotelian view which distinguishes the nature of body as a

substance from the soul as incorporeal but not a substance. Philo would then

be lumped in with the ‘classic dualists’ who sharply distinguish psychic and

corporeal realities. These dualists are Platonist and Pythagorean philosophers

who consider the soul to be a substance, not itself a body and independent

of the body.24

Philo’s arguments for the incorporeality of the mind must be adapted from

the Platonists of his day.25 In these arguments, Philo presumably falls into

line with contemporary Alexandrian Platonists, about whom we know very

little. Of course, some claims and assumptions about the soul, its origin, and

the proper objects of thought are standard in a great deal of later Platonism.26

The particular Platonist arguments that emerge from other sources diverge

from Philo, who may stand in a tradition we know only to a quite limited

degree. It has been argued that the Platonist tradition behind Philo includes

the first century B.C. philosopher Eudorus of Alexandria, besides even more

shadowy figures.27 Although the mind or the soul is at times spoken of as an

immaterial substance, Philo views the mind in the train of the (materialist)

Stoics as the rational part of the soul, governing the body in harmony with

24 Nemesius, Nat. Hom. 2.67–124 Morani; Cicero, Tusc. 1.18–24; Aetius, Plac.

4.2.1–4.4.7 Diels.

25 Robertson, ‘Mind and Language in Philo’, pp. 430–32 examines the arguments

for the incorporeality of mind in Philo and the Platonists. Kweta, Sprache, Erkennen

und Schweigen, pp. 59–60, 515, n. 77; Reydams-Schils, ‘Philo of Alexandria on

Stoic and Platonist Psycho-Physiology’, p. 137 point out that Philo has no consistent

story of the location of the rational part or leading part of the soul, compare Det. 90

Cohn; Post. 137–8 Wendland; Somn. 1.32 Wendland.

26 Many Middle Platonists hold the orthodox Platonic view (Rep. 509D) that the

objects of the mind’s thought are immaterial, compare Somn. 1.186–8 Wendland; if

like is required to know like, the mind must be immaterial as well. And in Alcinous,

Did. 177.19–23 Hermann we find the later Neoplatonist (Plotinian) notion of the

rational soul as an intelligible, incorporeal substance. Plotinus, the focus of Chapter

4, teaches that our souls have their origin in the intelligible world but now reside in

bodies, for example Enn. 4.1 Henry-Schwyzer. John Whittaker, ‘Platonic Philosophy

in the Early Centuries of the Empire’, ANRW, 2.36.1 (Berlin, 1987), pp. 81–123 at

116–17; Emilsson, ‘Platonic Soul-Body Dualism’, p. 5335 complete the picture.

27 Dillon, The Middle Platonists, pp. 114–83 asserts that the influence of Eudorus

on Philo is probable yet not dominant. On some points Philo has different views,

for example on the categories, where Philo seems to follow Platonist-Pythagorean

criticisms of Aristotle. Nevertheless, Eudorus and Philo seem to stand more or less in

the same Platonist tradition, particularly in comparison to the Stoicizing Platonism

of Antiochus of Ascalon with its materialist tendencies.

Philo 19

nature.28 But there is also the Platonic notion that the mind can obtain

knowledge by contemplative ascent to the intelligible realm, by progressive

removal from the limitations of the body.

The immateriality of the mind is certainly required by certain elements

in Philo’s metaphysical scheme, such as the thoroughgoing parallel between

divine and human nature. Our incorporeal thoughts are the products of our

immaterial minds. They are expressed outwardly by ordered utterances, by

physical sounds which are shaped by the vocal organs of the body. Thus

Philo represents for us in his era the stubborn tendency among philosophers

from Antiquity to the present day to view the connection of thought and

language in terms of a contrast between the physical and the immaterial.29

It seems that Philo sees things in this light even when he talks, as he

does on occasion (for example, Mos. 2.127 Cohn), of the ‘region’ (c´wra)

of the mind in much the same way as he speaks of the ‘region’ of the vocal

organs.

It is not far off the point that the rational is twofold. For the logos is twofold both

in the universe and in human nature. Throughout the universe there is the logos

which has to do with the incorporeal and modelling Ideas, from which the noetic

cosmos was framed, and there is the logos which has to do with the visibles,

which are but imitations and copies of those Ideas, from which this sensible

(cosmos) was brought to completion. On the other hand, in the human being

there is the (logos) inwardly residing, and the (logos) outwardly expressed. And

the former is something like a water spring, while the latter is sonorous, flowing

from that (water spring). And the region of the former is the leading part of the

28 When Philo speaks of the mind, the soul, or the body as substances, he means

simply ‘realities’ or ‘natures’, for example, Opif. 135 Cohn; Leg. All. 1.31–2 Cohn;

Post. 163 Wendland; compare Immut. 46 Wendland. As I note in Robertson, ‘Mind

and Language in Philo’, pp. 431–2, there are further complications to Philo’s uses of

the important philosophical term ohus´ia.

29 Gilson, Linguistics and Philosophy, pp. 20–21, 69, 81–7 is a recent example

of this, arguing for the metaphysical nature of language, that language involves ‘the

order of the immaterial’. He presents an argument for the metaphysical nature of

language. ‘All that is physically real is material and particular. The universal, whose

nature we are seeking to understand, is immaterial by definition. It is necessary

therefore that that which produces it ought to be equally immaterial if one does not

wish its production to be quasi-miraculous. But the order of the immaterial, of the

nonphysical, is precisely that of the metaphysical. Language, therefore, involves the

reality of the metaphysical by the very fact that it involves an element of universality.’

Some contemporary metaphysicians argue for and against immaterial aspects to

mind and thought, for example, John Gray Cox, ‘Must Mental Events Have Spatial

Location?’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 63 (1982): 270–74; James Ross,

‘Immaterial Aspects of Thought’, The Journal of Philosophy, 89 (1992): 136–50.

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria20

soul, while (the region) of the latter, which is expressed outwardly, is the tongue

and mouth and everything else of the vocal organs.30

Philo uses here the standard Stoic term for the ruling part of the soul (t`oHjgemonik´on), which is for the early Stoics just as corporeal as any other

part of the body (compare Leg. All. 2.6 Cohn; Opif. 117 Cohn). But in this

passage the analogy to the sensible and intelligible realms is quite overt; we

are confronted with another case of Stoic ideas and terminology converted

into the service of Philo’s Hellenistic Jewish Platonism.31 Obviously, these

terms tend to be tied in some way or other to the sensible world in their

philosophical uses.

The Physical and the Immaterial

Of course on either level, whether in divine creative activity or in human

speech, there is the question of how to bridge the metaphysical gap between

intelligibles and sensibles (compare the familiar ‘mind-body problem’).32

We can recast this basic problem into the question, how can immaterial,

intelligible thoughts be associated with audible utterances?

Perhaps Philo would respond by adducing the role of logos as an

intermediary between material utterances and immaterial thought, explaining

the causal relations between mind and body by denying any direct contact

between them. In his theology, Philo conceives the divine logos as the agent

of God’s creation of the physical world. And it is clear the human mind

does not itself speak on its own; rather, it requires an interpreter of thought

which is its logos (Migr. 81 Wendland). So then the currency of inner logos

is thoughts, while it is represented to the world in the voice. Philo would then

30 Mos. 2.127 Cohn. I follow the corner brackets of Cohn in the Greek.

Diplo¨un d`e t`o loge¨ion ohuk hap`o skopo¨u≥ ditt`oß g`ar Ho l´ogoß ‘en te t^¨w pant`ika`i hen hanqr´wpou f´usei≥ kat`a men t`o p¨an “o te per`i twn haswm´atwn ka`iparadeigmatik¨wn hide¨wn, hex ˆwn Ho nojt`oß hep´agj k´osmoß, ka`i Ho per`i t¨wnHorat¨wn, ”a d`j mim´jmata ka`i hapeikon´ismata t¨wn hide¨wn heke´inwn hest´in, hex ˆwnHo ahisqjt`oß oˆutoß hapetele¨ito≥ hen hanqr´wp^w dh Ho m´en hestin hendi´aqetoß, Ho d`eproforik´oß, <ka`i Ho men> oˆi´a tiß pjg´j, Ho d`e gegwn`oß haph heke´inou Hr´ewn≥ kai to¨um´en hesti c´wra t`o Hjgemonik´on, to¨u de kat`a profor`an gl¨wtta ka`i stoma ka`iHj ‘allj p¨asa fwn¨jß horganopoi´ia.

31 It would be valuable to compare similar notions of the ‘region’ (c´wra) or

‘place’ (tópoß) of the mind in Hellenistic and Imperial philosophy. Keimpe Algra,

Concepts of Space in Greek Thought (Leiden, 1995), pp. 31–71 examines concepts

of place and space in Hellenistic philosophy, but nothing quite like this.

32 Sorabji, Philosophy of the Commentators, vol. 1, pp. 182–216 presents the

leading soul-body issues in Later Greek philosophy.

Philo 21

seem to be compelled to claim immateriality for our human logos, to deal

with the contents of our minds.33

One objection to this approach, however, would be to ask what is it that

does the work of contact with the speech organs of the body on behalf of the

immaterial logos. Perhaps Philo would countenance an additional mediating

logos in us which is neither immaterial nor corporeal, being of an aetherial

nature like the superlunary heavenly bodies.34 Philo might find himself

positing an infinite regress of logoi if he went down this path, in addition to

the loss of clarity and simplicity in conceiving the role of logos.

Another objection could arise from a sort of creeping material infection.

To preserve the physical dimensions at the interface of logos and speech

organs, the interface mechanism, however conceived, would be explained

in terms which involve the physical aspects of the limits of the interfacing

parties, the place of contact, and so on. This explanation will drive physical

conceptualizations into the nature of logos. Our logos, unless Philo adduces a

higher logos and lower logos story in order to defuse the objection (compare

Mos. 2.127 Cohn), turns out to be a material entity after all. We are then

faced with the equally knotty problem of explaining the interface between a

material logos and an immaterial mind.35

Let me introduce a second possible Philonic response, namely by

considering audible speech itself to be non-corporeal in status, sharing some

properties with the mind. I will anchor this idea in a passage (Migr. 50–52

Wendland) where Philo says that only two things in us are invisible, mind

and speech (no¨uß ka`i l´ogoß).

Being innovative in all things with respect to knowledge and innovating in this

thing particularly and unusually, he says that voice is visible, (even though) it is,

33 Perhaps it is telling that Philo, as far as I know, never makes clear that our

human logos is immaterial to the same degree the mind is. Philo says that the divine

logos is immaterial only on rare occasions, as in Quaest. Ex. 2.122 Aucher.

34 With respect to the possible intermediate ontological status, compare the ‘soul

vehicles’ of later Platonists, a container for the soul of intermediate status, made of

pneuma or aether. Emilsson, ‘Platonic Soul-Body Dualism’, pp. 5339–40, compare

Sorabji, Philosophy of the Commentators, vol. 1, pp. 221–9, describes these ‘soul

vehicles’ as follows. ‘The ‘ocjma acted as an intermediary in the causal relationship

between the two [soul and body]; and the ‘ocjma itself could also come quite close

to the incorporeal soul in its attributes: Proclus describes the ‘ocjma of the higher

soul as immaterial and impassible.’

35 Compare Andy Clark, ‘Time and Mind’, The Journal of Philosophy, 95 (1998):

354–76 at 362 for ‘creeping material infection’ in the mind. Later Platonists explain

that soul is non-spatially related to body precisely in order to avoid conceiving the

soul along the lines of the behavior of spatial entities, as pointed out by Sorabji,

Philosophy of the Commentators, vol. 1, pp. 204–10.

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria22

subtracting the mind, nearly the only one of the things in us not to be visible. For

all things are visible under the purview of the other senses, the colors, the tastes,

the odors, the warmths, the chills, the smooths, the roughs, the softs and hards,

insofar as they are bodies. Why this is, I will speak of more clearly. The taste is

visible, not insofar as it is a taste, but only insofar as it is body, for the sense of

taste will know it insofar as it is a taste. And the odor, insofar as it is an odor,

will be examined by the nostrils, but insofar as it is a body, by the eyes also (it

is examined). And the other cases too will be explained in this way. On the other

hand, voice is of a visible nature neither as an audible nor as a body, if indeed it

is a body at all, but these two of the things in us are invisible, mind and speech.

Actually our voicebox is not on the level of the divine vocal organ, for ours is

mixed with air and flees to the place suited to it, the ears, while the divine one is

of pure and unmixed speech, escaping hearing on account of lightness, but seen

by a pure soul on account of the keenness in seeing.36

Philo excuses the words of Moses, which are strictly speaking quite

wrong. The human voice has the unique property of not being accessible by

our sight-perception. The voice is mixed in with some rather fine stuff (the

air), indeed Philo appears unsure as to whether the voice is a non-corporeal

‘audible’ (hakoust´on) or a body (s¨wma). There is an interesting comparison

here to another text (Plant. 24 Wendland), where Philo speaks of the mind,

being light in nature, being whirled upwards towards God as if it were drawn

upwards by a mighty divine breath or wind.

Clearly, Philo maintains some contrast with divine speech, which is entirely

intelligible in nature. But Philo may not understand so wide a metaphysical

gap between voice and thought, insofar as the human voice assumes some

of the attributes of the mind. The problem remains, of course, of accounting

not only for the interface with the visible, physical organs of speech but also

for the organs of hearing. Overall, this text could be interpreted as an attempt

36 Migr. 50–52 Wendland. Kain`oß dh ’wn hen “apasi t`jn hepist´jmjn ka`i to¨uthhid´iwß ka`i x´enwß kekaino´urgjken ehip`wn Horat`jn e~inai t`jn fwn´jn, T`jn m´onjnsced`on t¨wn hen Hjm¨in ohuc Horat`jn Hupex^jrjm´enjß diano´iaß≥ t`a m`en g`ar kat`at`aß ‘allaß ahisq´jseiß p´anq’ Horat´a, t`a crwmata, oHi culo´i, oHi hatmo´i, t`a qerm´a,t`a yucr´a, t`a le¨ia, t`a trac´ea, t`a malak`a kai skljr´a, ^ˆj s´wmata. T´i d´ehesti to¨uto, saf´esteron her¨w≥ Ho cul`oß Horat´oß hestin, ohuc ^ˆj cul´oß, hallh ^ˆjm´onon s¨wma, t`o gar ^ˆj cul`oß e‘isetai Hj geusiß≥ ka`i Ho hatm´oß, ^ˆj men hatm´oß, Hup`oHrin¨wn hexetasq´jsetai, ^ˆj d`e s¨wma, ka`i pr`oß hofqalm¨wn≥ ka`i ta ‘alla ta´ut^jdokimasq´jsetai. Fwn`j d`e o‘uqh Hwß hakoust`on o‘uqh Hwß s¨wma, ehi dj ka`i s¨wm´ahestin, Horat`on e~inai p´efuken, hall`a duo ta¨uta t¨wn hen Hjm¨in ha´orata, no¨uß ka`il´ogoß. h All`a g`ar ohuc “omoion t`o Hjm´eteron hjce¨ion t^¨w qei^w fwn¨jß horg´an^w≥ t`om`en g`ar Hjm´eteron ha´eri k´irnatai ka`i pr`oß t`on suggen¨j topon katafe´ugei,t`a ~wta, t`o de qe¨ion hakr´atou ka`i hamigo¨uß hesti l´ogou, fq´anontoß m`en hako`jndi`a lept´otjta, Horwm´enou d`e Hup`o yuc¨jß hakraifno¨uß di`a tjn hen t^¨w blepeinhox´utjta.

Philo 23

to make the relationship of mind and meaning to the outer, physical world

more plausible.

The Nature of Meaning

The Hellenistic philosophical schools addressed the problem of explaining

our comprehension of spoken language. Thus the various parties to the

Hellenistic debates adopted views on the nature of meaning. Philo, it has been

argued, seems to be aware of all the major differences, at least as expressed

in doxographical form.37 I will now present his claim that meaning is in the

head, that thoughts are what is in spoken language.

It is easy to show that Philo identifies meanings with thoughts, an idea that

might be traceable back to Aristotle on word meaning (Int. 16a3–10). Philo

claims that vocal sound receives thoughts in the course of being articulated

by the speech organs (Det. 127–8 Cohn; compare Migr. 3–4, 79 Wendland;

Somn. 2.260 Wendland; Post. 106–8 Wendland).

For whenever the mind becomes aroused and receives an impulse towards one

of its proper objects, either having been moved from within itself or having

registered various impressions from external objects, it is pregnant and it labors

with thoughts. And although it wishes to give birth, it is incapable of doing so,

until the sound (produced) by means of the tongue and the other speech organs

carries the thoughts in the manner of a midwife and thus brings them out into

the light.38

Philo’s metaphor is of articulated sound ‘carrying in its hands’ the thoughts

of the mind.39 The idea seems to be that our corporeal speech contains

meaning in an invisible way, a ‘piece of our minds’ that is immaterial and

37 David T. Runia, ‘The Beginnings of the End: Philo of Alexandria and

Hellenistic Theology’, in D. Frede and A. Laks (eds), Traditions of Theology. Studies

in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (Leiden, 2002), pp. 281–316

at 281–6.

38 Det. 127–8 Cohn. h Epeid`an g`ar Ho nouß hexanast`aß pr´oß ti t¨wn ohike´iwnHorm`jn l´ab^j ’j kinjqe`iß ‘endoqen hex Heauto¨u ’j dex´amenoß hap`o t¨wn hekt`oßt´upouß diaf´erontaß, kuofore¨i te kai hwd´inei t`a no´jmata≥ ka`i boul´omenoßhapoteke¨in hadunate¨i, m´ecriß ’an Hj dia glwttjß ka`i t¨wn ‘allwn fwnjtjr´iwnhorg´anwn hjc`j dexam´enj ma´iaß tr´opon ehiß f¨wß proag´ag^j ta no´jmata.

39 The ‘conduit’ or ‘decoding’ metaphor has enjoyed a very long career in

philosophy. Recently it has been challenged in favor of other components of

interpretation such as the role of inferences, a development summarized in Steven

Pinker, The Language Instinct (New York, 1994), pp. 190–230; Dan Sperber

and Deirdre Wilson, Relevance. Communication and Cognition (Oxford, 1995),

pp. 1–64.

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria24

not accessible to sense-perception. Presumably, our logos functions both as

agent of transfer and as interpreter of the mind, but Philo never makes things

entirely clear.

A similar metaphor used by Philo is of vessels of speech being filled with

the water which springs from the mind (Det. 92 Cohn).

So then of the living power, of which blood is what is essential in it, a certain

portion obtains voice and speech as an eminent prize, not the stream flowing

through mouth and tongue, but rather the source from which the containers of

uttered (speech) are filled up by nature. And the source is the mind, through

which we utter petitions and cries to the one who is, (and we do so) sometimes

voluntarily, sometimes involuntarily.40

Elsewhere Philo describes human speech itself as like a stream of water,

which carries thoughts along with it (Migr. 71, 81 Wendland). But more

frequently, Philo simply speaks of the ‘stream’ of speech issuing from the

mind (Mos. 2.127 Cohn; Somn. 2.238–47 Wendland; Mut. 69 Wendland;

Congr. 33 Wendland; Det. 40 Cohn; Sacr. 65–6 Cohn).41

The Inferiority of Speech

It was hinted above that Philo views spoken language as inferior, a mere

image of the unspoken speech of the mind. We met this idea in connection

with the function of logos as an intermediary between mind and the physical

world. David Winston explains some of the metaphysical motivation for

this.

In the majority of passages Philo seems to emphasize the inferiority of the spoken

word to that which is within the mind alone. The inferiority of the former is

ascribed to the fact that utterance belongs to the sense perceptible realm of body,

and involves duality and infirmity, whereas the latter is based on the indivisible

Monad and is characterized by perfect stability and resembles the pure and

unalloyed speech of God.42

40 Det. 92 Cohn. T¨jß o~un zwtik¨jß dun´amewß, ˆjß t`o ohusi¨wdeß aˆima, mo¨ir´atiß hexa´ireton ‘esce g´eraß fwn`jn ka`i l´ogon, ohu to dia st´omatoß ka`i glwttjßHr´eon n¨ama, hall`a t`jn pjg´jn, hafh ˆjß aHi to¨u proforiko¨u dexamena`i pljro¨usqaipef´ukasin≥ Hj de pjg`j no¨uß hesti, dih oˆu t`aß pr`oß t`on ‘onta hente´uxeiß ka`ihekbo´jseiß t¨^j men Hek´onteß t¨^j de ka`i ‘akonteß hanafqegg´omeqa.

41 Mühl, ‘Der l´ogoß hendi´aqetoß und proforik´oß’, p. 17; Kweta, Sprache,

Erkennen und Schweigen, p. 524, n. 182 cover the philosophical Begriffgeschichte

of language coming from a source or spring.

42 David Winston, ‘Aspects of Philo’s Linguistic Theory’, The Studia Philonica

Annual, 3 (1991): 109–25 at 125, compare Kweta, Sprache, Erkennen und Schweigen,

Philo 25

Philo also emphasizes in one passage (Immut. 83 Wendland) not mentioned

by Winston that God’s speech is superior by virtue of its perfect unity, being

completely free from mixture with air, which involves a duality.43 I will build

on these remarks with two further observations.

First, it is generally observable that Philo likes the idea that the inferior part

of something (the perceptible), can be joined together with the superior part

of something (the intelligible), in the structure of a divinely ordained product.

An example of this is found in Philo’s detailed description of the tabernacle

and its furnishings, which includes its correspondence to the natural order

(Quaest. Ex. 2.50–124 Aucher; Mos. 2.66–108, 136–40 Cohn; Spec. Leg.

1.82–96 Cohn; Her. 216–19 Wendland). Moses enjoyed access to an exalted

vision, an intelligible and divine model, which provided the pattern for the

earthly imitation. There are echoes of the Timaeus here in a creation, joining

body and soul, to be made as perfect as possible according to a divine model,

but within the constraints of material substances.44 Philo’s earthly tabernacle

features an inner sanctuary, ‘which is symbolically the intelligible (nojt´a)’

(Mos. 2.81–3 Cohn). In short, we are given the impression of intelligible

treasure housed in humble jars of perceptible clay.

Second, in one text (Abr. 82–3 Cohn) we find some confirmation for

understanding Philo’s views of mind and language, as Winston does, in light

of a contrast between audible word and intelligible meaning or thought. This

contrast is spelled out in terms of the relationship between parent and child.

Abram is, when interpreted, ‘father raised on high’, while Abraham is ‘father

elect of sound’. The first shows one called the astrologer and meteorologist, in

such a way devoting attention to the Chaldean doctrines as some father would

devote attention to his offspring; the second shows the wise man. For by means

of the ‘sound’, he (Moses) hints obscurely at the spoken logos, while by means

of the ‘father’ (he hints at) the ruling mind—insofar as the inward (logos) is by

pp. 62–3, 76, 274–8. There is some tension between positive and negative views of

speech. Philo understands the human capacity for speech, a key distinguishing feature

of human beings (Somn. 1.28–9, 1.108–11 Wendland; Leg. All. 2.22–3 Cohn), as an

important part of our likeness to the divine nature. However, Philo also considers

all human speech (especially rhetoric and sophistic argument) to be obscured

and to fall short of perfect intelligibility, Leg. All. 3.41 Cohn; Fug. 92 Wendland;

Gig. 52 Wendland. Also compare Immut. 83–4 Wendland, which contrasts divine

speech (an unmixed unity) and human speech (associated with the mixture of the

dyad). On the other hand, the wise men think and communicate with clarity and truth,

Mos. 2.128–9 Cohn; compare Mut. 193–4 Wendland. Philo claims at Mos. 2.37–40

Cohn that the translators of the Septuagint perfectly matched Greek words to reality.

43 This may explain why Philo never uses the term l´ogoß proforik´oß for

divine speech, as observed by Pohlenz, ‘Philon von Alexandreia’, p. 447.

44 Runia, Philo and the Timaeus, pp. 255, 382 covers the Platonic background.

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria26

nature father of the sonorous (logos), being senior to it and secretly sowing the

things which are said—while by means of the ‘elect’ (he hints at) the man of

refinement. For the worthless character is aimless and confused, while the good

man is the elect, selected from all according to merit.45

The image is that of a father begetting, not a son, but rather a sort of

linguistic offspring. The logos which is utterance features insubstantiality

and instability in contrast to the stable, authoritative logos of the mind. The

meanings of language are ‘secretly sown’ in the mind.46

The Stoic Legacy

In the course of presenting his creative mixture of Stoic and Platonic strands

in his theory of language, we look for Philo to explain more clearly how the

mind’s relation to the intelligibles is built into language. I would argue that

the limited resources in Philo to respond are based on the Stoic tradition.

In one passage, Philo describes spoken language as uniting the

intelligibles, but I doubt that this is meant to concern higher realities. The

meanings of pieces of language, letters, syllables, words, phrases, sentences,

and discourses, seem to be the ‘intelligibles’ (Quaest. Ex. 2.111 Aucher). A

harmony of these elements is formed when things play their proper and natural

role in our speech. Language is articulated by ‘natural bonds’ (fusiko¨ißdesmo¨iß), parallel in structure to the harmonious composition of elements

in God’s creation of the world, establishing the order of nature (f´usiß).

Unfortunately, Philo does not address in a disciplined way the problem of how

these linguistic intelligibles are related to the divine intelligibles (the Ideas

in the mind of God). However, it is true that some passages (Her. 280–83

Wendland; Mos. 2.128–9 Cohn; Mut. 193–4 Wendland) claim that in cases of

exceptional virtue, the human mind can ascend to contemplation of the Ideas.

45 Abr. 82–3 Cohn: hAbram m`en g`ar Hermjneuq´en hesti pat`jr met´ewroß,hAbra´am d`e pat`jr heklekt`oß hjco¨uß, t`o m`en pr´oteron hemfa¨inon t`onhastrologik`on ka`i metewrologik`on hepikalo´umenon, o“utwß t¨wn Caldavik¨wndogm´atwn hepimelo´umenon, Hwß ‘antißpat`jr hegg´onwn hepimeljqe´ij, t`odh “usteront`on sof´on. di`a m`en g`ar t¨jß hjco¨uß t`on proforik`on l´ogon ahin´ittetai, di`a to¨upatr`oß d`e t`on Hjgem´ona no¨un—pat`jr g`ar Ho hendi´aqetoß f´usei to¨u gegwno¨upresb´uter´oß ge ’wn ka`i t`a lekt´ea Hupospe´irwn—di`a d`e to¨u hepil´ektou t`onhaste¨ion≥ ehika¨ioß m`en g`ar ka`i pefurm´enoß Ho fauloß tr´opoß, heklekt`oß d`e Hohagaq´oß, hepikriqe`iß hex Hap´antwn harist´indjn.

46 Philo uses here the Stoic terminology of ‘sayables’ (t`a lekt´ea), more on this

shortly. Philo presents some elementary Stoic handbook material in another passage

(Agr. 141 Wendland), although this material does not use the distinctive technical

term which appears in the De Abrahamo passage.

Philo 27

These special individuals are allowed to experience some limited contact

with God’s mind.47 Thought and speech are perfectly formed by the sage or

saint, as in the case of Moses speaking the laws of God to the people of Israel.

As we have seen, Philo thinks that mind and language alike reflect the order

of nature. As part of this order, our minds occupy a position subordinate to

divine logos yet superior to the physical world.48 Much of this story sounds

like the portrait of a Stoic sage, with some Platonist overtones.49

Let me also point out that Philo himself may have considered his view

of what meaning is to be straightforwardly Stoic. The Stoics seem to have

discussed the nature of meaning more than any other school of Hellenistic

philosophy, and there are many other areas of substantial Stoic influence

traceable in Philo.50 Perhaps Philo represents a broader tendency in the late

Hellenistic period to identify ‘sayables’ with thoughts. Certainly the early

Stoics may have been twisted in this direction. Their view is that what is

understood by the hearer is an incorporeal item, a ‘sayable’ (lekt´on). They

have some being as incorporeal ‘somethings’, but are still distinguished from

bodies. ‘Sayables’ are closely associated with thoughts, doxographically

defined as subsisting in accordance with a special kind of thought, a ‘rational

impression’.51 The sources suggest that orthodox Stoic theory distinguishes

between utterances, thoughts, and ‘sayables’.

Were all later Stoics in complete agreement with the original views of

Chrysippus and Cleanthes? Perhaps some later Stoics altered Stoic theory

to the point of identifying ‘sayables’ with thoughts outright. This would

collapse some of the previous Stoic distinctions. One could argue that in

Posidonius we can trace just this sort of development, establishing a more

Platonist ontology which views reality on two levels, the material and the

immaterial (D.L. 7.135 = LS 50E; Macrobius, Somn. Scip. 1.14.19 Willis;

Plutarch, An. Proc. Tim. 1023B–D Hubert). Perhaps then for Posidonius,

meanings would fall into the class of straightforwardly immaterial objects,

being identified with thoughts. Even if these guesses are incorrect, Stoics

47 There is more detailed explanation in Kweta, Sprache, Erkennen und Schweigen,

pp. 243, 264–7.

48 Kweta, Sprache, Erkennen und Schweigen, pp. 164–7.

49 Compare, from the Stoic school, Marc. Aur., Ad se ipsum 10.6.1 Dalfen;

[Theodosius], Gramm. 17, 17–31 Göttling = FDS 536A; Sch. in Dionys. Thr. 356,

1–4 Uhlig = FDS 540; Sch. in Dionys. Thr. (ex Heliodoro) 514, 35–515, 5 Uhlig =

FDS 540.

50 Dirk M. Schenkeveld and Jonathan Barnes, ‘Language’, in K. Algra, J.

Barnes, J. Mansfeld, and M. Schofield (eds), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic

Philosophy (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 177–225.

51 References for Stoic ‘sayables’ include Sext. Emp., Math. 8.12 Mutschmann

= LS 33B; Math. 8.70 Mutschmann = LS 33C; D.L. 7.63 = LS 33F.

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria28

after Posidonius might identify ‘sayables’ and thoughts under Aristotelian or

Platonist influence.

In any case, there are several other points at which Philo clearly departs

from Stoic theory of mind and language. A good example of this is his two

levels of mental activity, including a notion of the ‘higher’ operation of thought

than what involves speech (for example, Her. 4, 14–17 Wendland). Behind

this feature lurks Philo’s dualist leanings, which contrast fundamentally with

Stoic materialist monism. This Philonic dualism of thought is an interesting

feature, which would anticipate the later Neoplatonic distinction between

discursive and non-discursive thought.52 The contemplation of the intellect

(no¨uß) proceeds among higher realities on a level independent of speech,

the mind leaves behind sensory perception and the dyad as it draws nearer

to divine perfection and realizes its true destiny in the monad. This sounds

particularly independent of Stoicism insofar as the Stoics lay emphasis on

the linguistic character of thought.53

Conclusion

I have argued that Philo is a valuable witness to the late Hellenistic-early

Imperial blending of Platonist and Stoic concepts of mind and language. As

such, he occupies a significant position in the history of philosophy in his

attempt to engage the enduring philosophical problems of the nature of mind

and its relationship to the natural order. He deserves historical credit for his

forthright identification of meanings with thoughts.

52 Kweta, Sprache, Erkennen und Schweigen, pp. 240–78, 380–83 illustrates the

distinction between discursive and non-discursive thought in Philo. Other differences

from standard Stoicism are noted by Weiss, Untersuchungen, pp. 42, 258–63, 279;

Farandos, Kosmos und Logos, p. 266; Runia, ‘Philo of Alexandria and Hellenistic

Theology’, pp. 295–6.

53 For example, in an argument attributed by Galen to Chrysippus for locating the

ruling part of the soul in the heart, the activity of the mind is inner discourse (Galen,

Plac. Hipp. Plat. 3.7.42–3 De Lacy = FDS 451). Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy

of Mind, p. 63; Catherine Atherton, The Stoics on Ambiguity (Cambridge, 1993),

pp. 95–7 clarify the role of content in Stoic philosophy of mind.

Chapter 2

Clement

Clement of Alexandria represents an important early attempt to reconcile

Christianity and Greek philosophy, writing in the last quarter of the second

century and the beginning years of the third. It is estimated that he lived,

studied, and taught in Alexandria for at least twenty years (perhaps A.D.

175–202).1 In view of Clement’s intellectual openness to a variety of different

sources of knowledge, it would be strange if he did not draw heavily from his

Jewish predecessor Philo, who is generally recognized as the first to attempt

an ambitious mediation of Hellenistic and biblical traditions. Fortunately,

this vital link has been extensively studied, to the point that we see how

much of Clement’s work is composed with Philonic treatises before him as

a strong and consistent undertow to his writing activity.2 Language in its

own right is not usually at the center of Clement’s attention, preferring to

dwell on the fundamental concepts of truth, wisdom, and knowledge. Putting

one in mind of Philo (or even Plutarch), virtually every topic celebrated in

ancient literature is treated in scattered passages. Language and meaning

are considered from various angles, particularly with reference to spiritual

knowledge. For my purposes, there are fundamental tensions in Clement

between the value of language and its limitations. As recent work on his

relationship to contemporary Platonism has shown, Clement attempts to

balance the status of God beyond thought and language with his Christian

Logos theology of divine revelation.3 Nevertheless, in the case of created,

1 Eric F. Osborn, The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria (Cambridge, 1957),

p. 3; Rüdiger Feulner, Clemens von Alexandrien (Frankfurt, 2006), pp. 21–7; Henny

F. Hägg, Clement of Alexandria and the Beginnings of Christian Apophaticism

(Oxford, 2006), pp. 51–70.

2 Annewies Van den Hoek, Clement of Alexandria and his Use of Philo in the

Stromateis (Leiden, 1988), pp. 5–19 provides a brief review of several generations

of scholarship on the dependence (and creative uses) of Clement in relation to

Philo. This turns out to be a complicated relationship, but Van den Hoek, Clement

of Alexandria, pp. 214–24 notes that often Clement simply works by some path or

other through a Philonic treatise, adapting material for his own purposes.

3 Hägg, Clement of Alexandria, p. 214. ‘Christ’s coming as Logos ends the

pre-incarnational silence and sanctions material reality, including language. Clement

sees the paradox central to Christian Platonism to a great extent, but not wholly, in

terms of a distinction between the Son as the revealer of God and God himself who

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria30

non-angelic rational beings, our destiny lies beyond language in our

contemplation of God in assimilation to the divine nature. Clement, like Philo

before him, represents a significant stage of reflection on language at the

origins of Christian philosophy. I will try to show how Clement upholds the

Philonic view that meanings are thoughts—language is a window to many

stages of knowledge on account of intelligible divinity. As we will see, there

is a strong theological concern attached to holding thoughts as the meanings

of language. For on the divine level, God’s knowledge of meaning penetrates

immediately to the level of thought, independent of spoken utterance and the

senses.

The Divine Logos

Mark Edwards, among others, has pointed out that by the time of Clement,

the classic ‘two stage’ theory of divine Logos, a favorite theme for a few

of the second-century apologists, was losing ground among Greek Patristic

writers. This theory, however, is not a feature of Clementine theology.

According to this [‘two stage’ concept of the Logos], the Logos was embedded

from all eternity in the Father, and became a second hypostasis when the Father

brought it forth, ‘before the ages’, as his instrument of creation. This doctrine,

which entails that only the nature and not the person of the Logos is eternal, was

a heresy for most Christians after the council of Nicaea, and there is no doubt that

it had already lost ground in Alexandria by the time of Clement’s death.4

According to Edwards, Clement upheld the eternal generation of the Logos

as a distinct reality (Hup´ostasiß), not a theory of procession of the Logos in

two stages, against the heresy of the Valentinian Gnostics. Clement does not

use either the term logos prophorikos or the term logos endiathetos to speak

about the divine Logos, as we find in some of the early apologists, who use

these terms to describe a scheme of stages developed from the divine mind.5

is unknowable. Language operates only as far as the level of the Son, beyond which

there is silence.’

4 Mark J. Edwards, ‘Clement of Alexandria and his Doctrine of the Logos’,

Vigiliae Christianae, 54 (2000): 159–77 at 159. Hägg, Clement of Alexandria,

pp. 189–94 is in fundamental agreement with Edwards, attributing to Clement a

‘single stage theory’.

5 Edwards, ‘Clement of Alexandria’, pp. 162–70. There is a brief notice of

Clement’s position in Max Mühl, ‘Der l´ogoß hendi´aqetoß und proforik´oß von

der älteren Stoa bis zur Synode von Sirmium 351’, Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte, 7

(1962): 7–56 at 48. The stubborn preference for the language of logos prophorikos

and logos endiathetos in presenting Clementine theology continues in the work of

Feulner, Clemens von Alexandrien, p. 119.

Clement 31

Such use of the term logos prophorikos would introduce concepts too gross

and earthly for the lofty reality of the Logos.6

On the other hand, it is entirely possible that Clement closely associates

the divine mind with the Logos, or outright identifies God’s intellect with

his Logos, in spite of the lack of solid textual evidence.7 And some would

claim that Clement has a role for the Platonic Forms as couched in the

Logos in some sense. There may be a contrast on this score with Origen,

who apparently shuns talk of the Forms as the thoughts of a divine mind,

although it is arguable that Origen adapts these traditional Platonist ideas

when presenting his notion of divine Logos. The tendency in Clement is to

emphasize the ruling and saving activity of the Logos towards the world.

Like Philo, he explains the Logos as a mediating being, at work to reconcile

the poles of divinity and cosmos. And this Logos is the key to the intellectual

and spiritual aspirations of the Christian sage, perfected in mind and speech

by an active divine power, as we will see in further parts of this chapter.

6 There is an interesting comparison here with Origen, In Joh. 1.38 Preuschen,

pp. 49, 3–50, 11. In this passage, Origen expresses concern with the insubstantiality

of utterance in discussion of God’s logos.

7 These views are ascribed to Clement by Robert M. Berchman, From Philo

to Origen. Middle Platonism in Transition (Chico, CA, 1984), p. 68; Edwards,

‘Clement of Alexandria’, pp. 166–8. However, I cannot find any Clementine text

which clearly identifies the Logos with the mind or thoughts of God; most texts cited

in the literature seem to be about Plato, not Clement. The text which comes closest

to expressing this view from Clement himself, a text frequently cited by Berchman

and others, is Strom. 5.16.3 Stählin-Früchtel, p. 336, 8–9. Another frequently cited

passage considered to show the divine mind as the place of the Forms (Strom.

4.25.155.2–4 Stählin-Früchtel, p. 317, 10–20) is heavily focused on Plato, but mixes

in the ascent of the soul to the Forms to be with Christ in contemplation. I find all this

confusing material inconclusive, but this very passage leads Eric Osborn, Clement

of Alexandria (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 65–6 (compare pp. 126–30) to suppose that

Clement has a role for the Forms in the dialectical ascent of the gnostic, as the objects

of contemplation. ‘It is worth noting that elsewhere Clement speaks of the logos not

so much as of higher rank than the forms, but as the place wherein they find their

meaning.’ For my part, I cannot understand how Platonic Forms ‘find their meaning’

in God. Osborn, Clement of Alexandria, p. 67 also points out, I think correctly, that

the intensified Christian focus on divine power lessens any possible role of Platonic

Forms. ‘Clement’s dialectic is only possible because the intellectual world is within

the mind of God. A world of forms (as in Timaeus) which stood over against God

was of no interest to him. God’s conceptual activity is, like his creative act, subject

to his will. It is not static but dynamic.’

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria32

Dialectic and Language

Clement is noteworthy among Greek Patristic writers for his enthusiastic

embrace of Greek philosophy within a Christian framework of thought.

Christianity is the ‘true philosophy’ which was happily anticipated by many

strands of Greek philosophy, literature, and religion. As a philosophical

enterprise under substantial Platonist (Middle Platonist) influence, seeking

wisdom must involve the discipline of dialectic.8

Clement devotes considerable attention to dialectic. Plotinian dialectic

is the pure study of immaterial reality, a stage of intellectual ascent which

transcends language. For Clement, dialectic is a way in which philosophy

contributes to the demonstration of the faith. Clement also upholds the

traditional Stoic view of language as a rational phenomenon. Of course the

practice of dialectic requires spoken language, and this connection is drawn

in a passage of his most ambitious intellectual achievement, the Stromata

(Strom. 1.9.45.4–5 Stählin-Früchtel, p. 30, 10–16). Clement claims that speech

is a ‘work’ (‘ergon), apparently an item of indeterminate ontology, which we

might compare with Plotinus, who considers speech to be an action or activity,

in particular an incorporeal ‘signifying activity’ (po´ijsiß sjmantik´j). And

it is generally Clement’s view that works (t`a ‘erga) follow the gnostic’s

knowledge as the shadow follows the body, which should be especially true

of the demonstration of knowledge in language (Strom. 7.13.82.7 Stählin,

p. 59, 11).9 Clement loads this short discussion of speech with Christian

notions of the Word as embodiment of God’s will.

What is the knowledge of answering questions? The same as the knowledge of

asking questions. This would be of course dialectic. What then? Is speaking not

a work, and activity comes to be from spoken language (logos)? If we are not

acting according to rational logos, we would be acting irrationally. The rational

(logikon) work is brought to fulfillment according to God. ‘And nothing came

into being without him,’ he (John) says of the Logos of God. Did the Lord not do

everything by his Logos?10

8 Salvatore R.C. Lilla, Clement of Alexandria. A Study in Christian Platonism

and Gnosticism (Oxford, 1971); Berchman, From Philo to Origen, pp. 55–81; Hägg,

Clement of Alexandria, pp. 71–133 attempt to locate Clement within the tradition of

Middle Platonism.

9 Hägg, Clement of Alexandria, p. 152.

10 I adapt the translation of John Ferguson (trans.), Clement of Alexandria.

Stromateis. Books One to Three (Washington, DC, 1991), p. 56. As usual, I supply

words in parentheses which do not strictly appear in the Greek. Strom. 1.9.45.4–5

Stählin-Früchtel, p. 30, 10–16. T´iß o~un Hj gnwsiß to¨u hapokr´inasqai; “ Jtiß ka`ito¨u herwt¨an≥ e‘ij dh ’an a“utj dialektik´j. T´i dh ; Ohuc`i kai t`o l´egein ‘ergon hest`ika`i to poie¨in hek to¨u l´ogou g´inetai; Ehi g`ar m`j l´og^w prattoimen, hal´ogwß

Clement 33

Clement’s discussion trades on the basic ambiguity of logos in Ancient

Greek (spoken discourse, rationality). What Clement seems to want to show

is that God’s work of creation is really an activity of speech, a claim that we

have already traced in Philo. The relevance of dialectic is obscure in this

passage, but there is help on this in a later passage of the first book of the

Stromata (Strom. 1.28.176–9 Stählin-Früchtel, pp. 108, 24–110, 11).

Here Clement claims dialectic as more than a part of Christian philosophy,

it is a major ingredient in all true philosophy; it yields knowledge of divine

matters in an intellectual and spiritual ascent towards God. Eric Osborn has

written about the significance of Clementine dialectic extensively. ‘Clement’s

account of dialectic shows how he makes logical procedure not merely a

technique for the protection of truth but an important part of knowledge. ...

It [the dialectic of the philosophical schools] concerns neither reality nor

truth but aims merely at the development of argumentative skill. ... Dialectic

can confirm what is true by demonstration and can remove doubts.’11 The

relevance to language primarily consists in the issue of dialectic in discursive

correctness and skill, guided by the possession of divine truth and the

knowledge of intelligibles (Strom. 1.28.177.1 Stählin-Früchtel, p. 109, 10–11).

Let us now turn from the pursuit of truth by dialectic to the nature of language

itself.

The Intelligibility of Language

I will try to construct Clement’s account of the intelligibility of language

from a few scattered passages. As we will see, the main focus of interest

is the different levels of understanding utterances, or the various ways of

failing to understand them. On the other hand, Clement does not address in a

philosophically rigorous way the sort of problems that exercise Plotinus. He

is more interested in explaining spiritual development in a Christian frame

of mind.

For a start, there is Clement’s unremarkable claim that all natural

languages are intelligible (Strom. 1.16.78.1 Stählin-Früchtel, p. 50, 21–6).

This discussion is situated in the course of a wider argument that barbarians,

not Greeks, originated most human skills. Unintelligible speech is a special

case which is recognized by Clement, although he brackets this ‘speaking to

poio¨imen ‘an. T`o logik`on d`e ‘ergon kat`a qe`on hektele¨itai≥ ka`i ohud`en cwr`ißahuto¨u heg´eneto, fjs´i, to¨u l´ogou to¨u qeo¨u. ’ J ohuc`i kai Ho kurioß l´og^w panta‘eprassen;

11 Osborn, The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria, p. 153. There is further

elaboration in Osborn, The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria, pp. 148–57, and in

his more recent work, Osborn, Clement of Alexandria, pp. 62–8.

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria34

the air’ off from the natural languages which are meaningful to competent

speakers of them. ‘So then if I do not know the meaning of the utterance (t`jnd´unamin t¨jß fwn¨jß), I will be a barbarian to the speaker and the speaker

a barbarian to me.’12 This point could only come from a writer versed in

the words of St. Paul on the topic of glossalalia (1 Cor. 14.2–40), for the

prospect in this connection is that words are spoken in ecstatic utterance

which are unintelligible, or at least not understood by the speaker; hence the

need for the Spirit to equip someone with an interpretation (1 Cor. 14.13).

Clement also argues that it is possible to produce utterances without

complete understanding of realities in a quite different sense. This is presented

as part of a long discourse about the shortcomings of the Greek philosophers,

who never quite plumbed the depths of God in spite of all their theological

and philosophical insight (compare Strom. 2.1.3.1–2 Stählin-Früchtel, p. 114,

7–14). Clement tries to illustrate, from the lack of intellectual grasp (‘ennoia)

behind mimetic bird cries, something of the intellectual depth in the gnostic,

based on faith and denied to many Greeks. Clement draws some linguistic

distinctions while he touches on something like knowledge of meaning

(Strom. 6.17.151.1–152.2 Stählin-Früchtel, pp. 509, 28–510, 16).

Actually, let it suffice to say that God is the Lord of all. Lord of all ultimately,

nothing omitted by way of exception. Since there are two forms of the truth, names

and things—some discuss names, who make much of the beauty of language,

the philosophers among the Greeks, while among us, the barbarians, things (are

discussed). Moreover, the Lord did not will to use the lowly shape of the body to

no good purpose, to the end that someone admiring and marvelling the loveliness

and beauty (of speech) might disregard what is said and be divorced from the

intelligibles by excessive attention to what is (to be) renounced. Accordingly,

we must attend to the meanings, not the expression (only). So then, the logos

12 Clement uses the same term in the plural (dun´ameiß) to talk about the

‘powers’ of the divine Logos (Strom. 4.24.156.1–2 Stählin-Früchtel, pp. 317,

24–318, 2); the idea is that the Son is not limited to the concept that concerns each

of the spiritual powers (h Apar´emfatoß d`e hesti t¨jß per`i Hek´astjß ahuto¨u twndun´amewn henno´iaß). But there is no close terminological parallel to the passage

about barbarian speech. In fact, Clement’s semantic terminology varies from passage

to passage. For example, in his description of the miraculously uniform translation

of the Hebrew Scriptures into Greek by seventy scholars, the translations agreed in

word (l´exiß) and meaning (di´anoia), Strom. 1.22.149.2 Stählin-Früchtel, p. 92,

18–20. In a sentence in the Paedagogus, Clement recommends that we find the

correct expression (t`o Hrjt`on) appropriate to the meaning (di´anoia) for his purposes

at hand, (Paed. 6.37.3 Stählin, p. 112, 20–21; compare Strom. 7.14.84.4 Stählin,

p. 60, 16–20). There is another class of linguistic terms which are contained in

texts which present Stoic material, for example Strom. 8.9.26.4–5 Stählin-Früchtel,

pp. 96, 23–97, 7.

Clement 35

is not entrusted to those susceptible to the expression and not making progress

towards knowledge, for even the crows imitate human voices, although they

lack understanding of the thing which they speak, but intellectual apprehension

depends on faith. In this way, Homer too says ‘Father of men and gods’, without

knowledge who is the Father and in what manner he is the Father. Just as to the

one who has hands it is according to nature to grasp and to one who has healthy

eyes it is (according to nature) to see the light, so also to the one who obtains

faith it is suitable by nature to partake of knowledge, if he desires to construct

and to build gold, silver, precious stones upon the foundation (already) laid.

Accordingly, this person does not (merely) profess to wish to partake, but has

made a beginning; nor (merely) to intend but he is established to be kingly and

illuminated and gnostic, not in name (only) but in action it is fitting (for him) to

will to take hold of the things.13

Clement mixes various strands from the philosophical schools of

Hellenistic and Imperial philosophy. There are traces of the Hellenistic

animal rationality debates between Stoics and Skeptics, the worries about

the close attention to logic and language among the Stoics and other schools

of dialectic, and the criticisms of rhetoric in the Platonist tradition, to name a

few of the currents worked into Clement’s Christian views.

The linguistic terminology agrees with what Clement knows from the

handbooks and notebooks of ancient logic. On the other hand, the combination

13 The translation from the Greek is entirely my own. Strom. 6.17.151.1–

152.2 Stählin-Früchtel, pp. 509, 28–510, 16. Ka´i moi hap´ocrj f´anai qe`one~inai t`on k´urion p´antwn. Ahutotel¨wß d`e l´egw t`on k´urion p´antwn, ohuden`oßHupoleipom´enou kat`a hexa´iresin. h Epe`i to´inun d´uo ehis`in hid´eai t¨jß haljqe´iaß,t`a te hon´omata ka`i ta pragmata, o”i men t`a hon´omata l´egousin, oHi per`i t`ak´allj t¨wn l´ogwn diatr´ibonteß, oHi parh “ Elljsi fil´osofoi, t`a pr´agmatad`e parh Hjm¨in hesti to¨iß barb´aroiß. Ahut´ika Ho kurioß ohu m´atjn hjq´eljsenehutele¨i crjsasqai s´wmatoß morf^¨j, “ina m´j tiß t`o Hwra¨ion hepain¨wn ka`i t`ok´alloß qaum´azwn hafist¨jtai t¨wn legom´enwn ka`i toiß kataleipom´enoißprosan´ecwn hapot´emnjtai t¨wn nojt¨wn. Ohu toinun per`i t`jn l´exin, hall`a per`it`a sjmain´omena hanastrept´eon. To¨iß m`en o~un <t¨jß l´exewß> hantiljptiko¨ißka`i mj kinjqe¨isi pr`oß gn¨wsin ohu piste´uetai Ho logoß, hepe`i ka`i oHi korakeßhanqrwpe´iaß hapomimo¨untai fwn`aß ‘ennoian ohuk ‘econteß oˆu legousipr´agmatoß, hant´iljyiß d`e noer`a pistewß ‘ecetai. O“utwß ka`i “ Omjroß e~ipenpat`jr handr¨wn te qe¨wn te, m`j ehid`wß t´iß Ho pat`jr ka`i p¨wß Ho pat´jr. H Wß d`et^¨w ceiraß ‘econti t`o labe¨in kat`a f´usin kai tw hofqalmo`uß Hugia´inontaßkektjm´en^w to f¨wß hide¨in, o“utwß t^¨w p´istin ehiljf´oti t`o gn´wsewß metalabe¨inohike¨ion p´efuken, ehi prosexerg´asasqai ka`i prosoikodom¨jsai crus´on,‘arguron, l´iqouß tim´iouß t^¨w katabljq´enti qemel´i^w gl´icoito. Ohu to´inunHupiscne¨itai bo´ulesqai metalamb´anein, hall`a ‘arcetai≥ ohud`e m´ellein, hallhe~inai basilik´on te ka`i fwtein`on ka`i gnwstik`on kaq¨jken, ohud`e hon´omati, hallh‘erg^w heq´elein “aptesqai t¨wn pragm´atwn pros¨jken.

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria36

of linguistics and theology is not so easily traced to other sources. As we will

find with Origen, key linguistic terms come into play in this kind of passage.14

Clement employs a word for things or realities (pr´agmata) in contrast to

names (hon´´omata), much like he does elsewhere.15 Dialectical studies will

enable the spiritual and wise person to see the distinction of names and things

clearly, promoting ‘great light’ in the souls of men (Strom. 6.10.82.3 Stählin-

Früchtel, p. 473, 1–4). He also presents a distinction between expression

(l´exiß) and meaning (t`a sjmain´omena); unfortunately, he does not explain

the relationship between ‘what is said’ (t`a leg´omena) and ‘the intelligibles’

(t`a nojt´a).

Let me explain more closely the contours as well as the limits of this

fragmentary account. Clement’s view is that meanings are intimately

connected with thoughts, as emerges from the focus on the operation of

intellect (‘ennoia, hant´iljyiß noer´a) in this passage. Clement makes

a contrast in other passages between the language of Scripture, and the

thoughts (t`aß diano´iaß ka`i ta Hup`o twn honom´atwn djlo´umena) that

come into play in signification (Strom. 6.15.132.3 Stählin-Früchtel, p. 498,

29–32).16 Richard Sorabji has pointed out that some Neoplatonists and

Commentators, who take thoughts to be the significations of words, consider

such thoughts as some sort of inner language, but I cannot find this inner

14 Compare Origen, Cels. 4.84 Koetschau, p. 355, 13–22; Origen, In Joh. 4 =

Philoc. 4.1 Robinson, p. 41, 9–15.

15 The first occurrence of t`a pr´agmata in this very passage is listed with

several other interesting uses in the PGL entry, ‘3. object, reality, opp. name’.

Alain Le Boulluec, ‘Clément d’Alexandrie et la conversion du “parler grec”’, in

C.G. Conticello (ed), Alexandrie antique et chrétienne. Clément et Origène (Paris,

2006), pp. 63–79 at 66–7 assumes too hastily that Clement is drawing heavily from

Stoic linguistics in this passage. It is helpful to take into account the terminology

from the logical treatise which comprises Book 8 of the Stromata, especially Strom.

8.8.23.1 Stählin, p. 94, 5–12. Clement distinguishes here between names, concepts,

and things (hon´omata, no´jmata, pr´agmata). Osborn, Clement of Alexandria,

pp. 206–7 touches briefly on the Aristotelian and Stoic roots of this treatise.

16 This is a difficult passage in other respects besides the points that I find most

interesting. Osborn, Clement of Alexandria, p. 59, tracks the contrast of style and

meaning in Clement’s thought. ‘Prophecy does not bother about lucidity of style but

conceals the truth in many ways, so that the light will dawn only on those initiated

into knowledge, those who in love seek the truth (6.15.129.4). ... We do not look to

the words but to the thoughts or noetic realities displayed by the words. The words

are the body of the earthly Moses. We make every effort to find the heavenly Moses

who is with the angels (6.15.132.3).’ Osborn assumes that the thoughts expressed

in the Scriptures are closely identified with noetic realities, but I do not see where

Clement explains the connection.

Clement 37

language definitely operative in Clement.17 Or take the Aristotelian heritage

of´explaining rational thought by rejecting the role of Platonic Forms and

using universal concepts (no´jmata), forms (e‘idj), and essences, or rather,

using propositional judgments of what is and is not the case. This apparatus

employing universal concepts and judgments presupposes language, in that

universal concepts require words, while propositional judgments require

sentence structure. I don’t quite find these elements developed anywhere by

Clement into a coherent account of the relationship of mind and language.

What we do find are claims that the gnostic is mentally shaped and purified

into the divine image (ehik´wn) by the power of the divine mind, hence his

communication with other parties is ordered by divine truth. Also, the ascent

of the soul will ultimately experience the complete indwelling of Logos,

filled with pure light of truth beyond the structures of language (l´ogoßhascjm´atistoß).18

I will round off my consideration of this passage with some notice of how

philosophy relates to language. Clement’s central argument proceeds along

the following lines. Under the governance of divine providence, philosophy

came as a propaedeutic gift which points towards the fulfillment through

Christ. Language involves two basic elements, speech and intelligible

content. The meaning of language is more important than its mode of

presentation to the hearer, in fact the philosophers are too engrossed with the

logical and rhetorical properties of language.19 Elsewhere, Clement claims

17 Richard Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators, 200–600 AD. A

Sourcebook (3 vols, London, 2004), vol. 3, pp. 205–13.

18 Strom. 3.5.42.6, Stählin-Früchtel, p. 215, 23–5; Strom. 4.23.152.3 Stählin-

Früchtel, pp. 315, 31–316, 4; Exc. 27.3–5 Stählin, p. 116, 2–14. Clement says

memorably at Strom. 6.3.34.3 Stählin-Früchtel, p. 448, 14–18, Hor¨^aß, “opwß Hjkuriak`j fwn`j logoß hascjm´atistoß≥ Hj <gar> to¨u logou d´unamiß, Hr¨jmakur´iou fwtein´on, hal´jqeia ohuran´oqen ‘anwqen hep`i t`jn sunagwg`jn t¨jßhekkljs´iaß hafigm´enj, di`a fwtein¨jß t¨jß proseco¨uß diakon´iaß hen´jrgei. I

refer the interested reader to further references and elaboration by Le Boulluec, ‘La

conversion du “parler grec”’, pp. 78–9.

19 Osborn, Clement of Alexandria, p. 25. ‘The Greeks are concerned with

words and the barbarians are concerned with things. Appropriately, the Lord had

a physical body of quite ordinary aspect, so that he would draw people by the

intelligible content of his message rather than his outward charm. Expression is

not as important as signification. There was a widespread tradition concerning the

absence of physical beauty in Christ.’ Osborn, Clement of Alexandria, p. 25, n. 86

provides several references to these fascinating early Christian claims about the

physical appearance of Christ. Perhaps more directly relevant is the tendency in

several later Greek sources (for example, Epictetus, Diss. 1.8.4–10 Schenkl) to warn

against excessive attention to the sort of subtleties of logic and language found in

the Stoics and Dialecticians, a moralistic tradition evaluated by Jonathan Barnes,

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria38

that the Greek philosophers are dependent on the Barbarians, who benefited

from divine grace (c´ariß); the Greeks cleverly dressed up these truths with

their language (Strom. 6.7.54.1–56.2 Stählin-Früchtel, pp. 459, 19–460, 16).

Their understanding of truth is inferior to the divinely instructed gnostic,

similar to the shortcomings in representation we discern in skilled painters

who follow the laws of perspective rather than the laws of nature. But even

the Greek language can be reformed to express the truth along the lines of the

prophetic language captured in the Septuagint, not by streamlining the style

so much as by showing the truth indirectly and enigmatically.20

Language, Immateriality, and Prayer

Clement boosts the tradition in Greek Patristics, continued by Origen and

paralleled to some extent in Neoplatonism, of philosophical explanation of

prayer. The Neoplatonists Porphyry and Iamblichus consider the problem of

how it is possible for intellectual beings to hear our speech, in the wake of

similar Stoic worries. And it has been argued that Clement’s notion of prayer

as a pure communion of soul meeting God, without the constraints inherent

to the human languages, is dependent on the Platonist tradition, attested

by Plutarch, of communication between sages and ‘demonic’ intellects.21

However, the Neoplatonists conceive of the communication between divine

and human as like touching like—one might compare the Stoic piety of

assimilation to divine rationality. No divine physical organs of hearing are

required, insofar as the prayer is offered in some sense incorporeally within

the incorporeal knowing embrace of the gods.22 Clement is similarly interested

Logic and the Imperial Stoa (Leiden, 1997). It is this tradition that Clement twists

in a Christian direction, charging the philosophers with linguistic artifice. It is his

brand of Christian intellectualism, as Le Boulluec, ‘La conversion du “parler grec”’,

69–71 shows, which takes him beyond simply promoting a neutral communication

of thought, including the deeper knowledge based on faith and the otherworldly

insight of the Hebrew prophets as expressed in Ancient Hebrew.

20 Le Boulluec, ‘La conversion du “parler grec”’, pp. 69–75 pursues this point,

and I return in the next section on prayer to what I call his ‘obscurity is helpful’

story.

21 Le Boulluec, ‘La conversion du “parler grec”’, pp. 76–7.

22 Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators, vol. 1, pp. 369–410 provides

an introduction to the philosophy of religious practice among Neoplatonists and

Christians, a topic of increasing research attention. In particular, the conversation

between Porphyry and Iamblichus is presented in a series of translated passages in

Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators, vol. 1, pp. 390–96. The fascinating

topic of Stoic religious practice is addressed by Keimpe Algra, ‘Stoic Theology’,

in B. Inwood (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (Cambridge, 2003),

Clement 39

in how communication with an immaterial God is possible for the embodied

soul seeking perfection by the indwelling power of the divine Logos.23 It is

noteworthy that these particular worries do not figure in Origen’s treatise

On Prayer, while Clement’s valuable discussion in the seventh book of the

Stromata amounts to a treatise on prayer in its own right. Several interesting

arguments and views are presented in connection with prayer, including the

relationship of speech to sensory perception, as well as why language is

transcended in the ascent of the Christian sage.

Let us first consider his response to the problem in the course of a detailed

elaboration of the qualities of the Christian sage, including his practice of

prayer (Strom. 7.7.43.1–5 Stählin, p. 32, 17–32).24 We will then examine

other passages which connect to central themes in his theory of language.

Every place is sacred, in reality, in which we receive the thought of God, as it

is with time also. And just when the rightly intentioned and thankful (gnostic)

makes petition by prayer, to an extent he co-operates in some way with a view to

receiving (an answer to prayer), joyfully laying hold of what is petitioned through

his prayers. For whenever the giver of blessings receives the superabundance

from us, all goods at once come upon the (prayerful) apprehension itself.

However one looks at it, the method is by prayer, in the way things stand with

a view to what is fitting. And if voice and expressions are granted to us for the

purpose of (communicating) thought, how will God fail to hear the soul and mind

itself, seeing that in our present estate, soul hears soul and mind hears mind?

From this (we see that) God is not limited by polyphonic tongues, as (bedevils)

the interpreters, but rather at one strike attends the thoughts of all men, and the

very thing the voice means for our benefit, this our thought speaks to God, which

(God) already knew prior to creation would come to (our) intellection. So then

it is not possible (for the gnostic) to send prayer by the voice to heaven, exerting

only from within the entire spiritual into intelligible voice, according to the

continuous reversion towards the divine.25

pp. 153–78 at 174–7. I note with pleasure Algra’s dismissal of the remarkable claim

of Max Pohlenz that aligns the Stoic concept of deity with the Hebraic (and Christian)

theology of a transcendent God, in Algra, ‘Stoic Theology’, p. 172, n. 52.

23 Osborn, Clement of Alexandria, p. 261. ‘Within intimacy of prayer and

conversation with God the true sage finds perfection. Such prayer is so precious that

no occasion for it must be neglected. ... So close is this relation with the father who

is the almighty power, that the content of prayer is received immediately and the

believer is joined to the spirit in boundless love.’

24 I refer the reader to Osborn, Clement of Alexandria, pp. 261–4 for a detailed

presentation of the spiritual theology germane to the philosophical problems of

interest.

25 The translation is entirely my own. I complete the sense of the Greek with

words in round brackets. Strom. 7.7.43.1–5 Stählin, p. 32, 17–32. P¨aß o~un ka`i t´opoßHier`oß t^¨w ‘onti, hen ^¨w t`jn hep´inoian to¨u qeo¨u lamb´anomen, ka`i cronoß. “ Otan d`e

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria40

Clement’s answer is that God does not hear like we do, for a divine

being has the power of spiritual hearing, while lacking physical organs of

communication. This emerges from the argument for the claim that God

receives prayer from human minds alone, in view of the communicative

success of incarnate human minds using spoken language. God’s hearing

is spiritually and immaterially accomplished, in fact audible human vocal

utterance would be irrelevant from the divine point of view.

In other passages, Clement stresses the impotence of human speech,

particularly in comparison to divine speech (Strom. 6.7.57.4–5 Stählin-

Früchtel, pp. 460, 29–461, 3; 6.18.166.1–2 Stählin-Früchtel, p. 517, 17–23);

this is the consequence of inferiority in power.26 Our language suffers from

inadequacy, it can be dangerous to speak of holy things plainly. In fact,

speaking obscurely and symbolically can express the truth in philosophy

more adequately (Strom. 5.9.56.1–5.10.65.3 Stählin-Früchtel, pp. 364,

4–370, 3). Allegorical interpretation is a powerful way to capture the general

sense behind (or above) the words (ohuc Hapl¨wß kat`a p´anta t`a hon´omata ...hhallh “osa t¨jß diano´iaß t¨jß kaq´olou sjmantik´a). As for theology, God

is above language and concept, divine power reveals God even if divinity

cannot really be expressed (Strom. 5.10.65.2 Stählin-Früchtel, p. 369, 26–8;

Strom. 5.11.71.5 Stählin-Früchtel, p. 374, 20–22).27

The gnostic will eventually assume intelligible contact in the course of

spiritual ‘reversion’ (hepistrof´j) towards the creator. Perhaps Clement

understands different levels of mental activity, with the fullness of divine

power beyond all possible levels intellectual and spiritual attainment—

similar to the view we find rigorously explained in a number of Plotinian

treatises on the progressive unification of the soul with the One. As Henny

Ho ehuproa´iretoß Homo¨u ka`i ehuc´aristoß dih ehuc¨jß ahit¨jtai, Ham^¨j g´e p^j sunerge¨iti pr`oß t`jn l¨jyin, hasm´enwß dih ˆwn e‘ucetai t`o poqo´umenon lamb´anwn. h Ep`ang`ar t`o parh Hjm¨wn ehuep´iforon Ho twn hagaq¨wn l´ab^j dot´jr, haqr´oa p´anta t^¨jsull´jyei ahut^¨j “epetai t`a hagaq´a. h Am´elei hexet´azetai, di`a t¨jß ehuc¨jß Ho tr´opoß,p¨wß ‘ecei pr`oß t`o pros¨jkon. Ehi d`e Hj fwn`j kai Hj lexiß t¨jß no´jsewß c´arind´edotai Hjm¨in, p¨wß ohuc`i ahut¨jß t¨jß yuc¨jß ka`i tou no¨u hepako´uei Ho qeoß, “opouge ‘jdj yuc`j yuc¨jß ka`i no¨uß no`oß hepa´iei; “ Oqen t`aß poluf´wnouß gl´wssaßohuk hanam´enei Ho qeoß kaq´aper oHi par`a hanqr´wpwn Hermjne¨iß, hallh Hapaxapl¨wßHap´antwn gnwr´izei t`aß no´jseiß, ka`i “oper Hjm¨in Hj fwn`j sjma´inei, to¨uto t^¨wqe^¨w Hj ‘ennoia Hjm¨wn lale¨i, ”jn ka`i pr`o tjß djmiourg´iaß ehiß n´ojsin “jxousanhjp´istato. ‘ Exestin o~un mjd`e fwn^¨j t`jn ehuc`jn parap´empein, sunte´inontam´onon [dh ] ‘endoqen t`o pneumatik`on p¨an ehiß fwn`jn t`jn nojt`jn kat`a t`jnhaper´ispaston pr`oß t`on qe`on hepistrof´jn.

26 I owe this reference to Hägg, Clement of Alexandria, p. 248.

27 Hägg, Clement of Alexandria, pp. 147–61 provides a more detailed account.

Clement 41

Hägg points out, Clement relies heavily on reverential silence as a higher

condition than speech, as well as his ‘obscurity is helpful’ story.

Whereas language is seen as a commitment to the senses, the mind is the medium

through which man may worship God in ‘silence and holy fear’ (Strom. 7.2.3),

in some kind of speechless contemplation. So when enigmas, metaphors, and

allegories have imperfectly pointed at the truth, what is left is nothing but silence.

The cause which is beyond (t`o hep´ekeina a‘ition) lies beyond the realm of

language and cannot be transmitted by words, but is to be worshipped in silence

(sig^¨j). ... Silence is for Clement a symbol of a higher form of knowledge, a

symbol of pure thought. Words, belonging to the realm of senses, are naturally

of a lower quality.28

Clement is not too forthcoming about the features of pure thought, in

particular how it relates to the divine mind. In any event, adopting some

standard Platonist ideas, Clementine prayer involves a ‘reversion’ away from

worldly things. Prayer not only functions by bringing us closer to God, there

is also the mental communion with a distinct spiritual entity. This intelligible

contact is to some degree assimilated to the unity of divine nature, not

diversified into different languages or discretely presented in parcels of

meaning. And surely this purer and more continuous mental contact is closer

to the commerce of angels. For it is removed from utterance, as the perfected

soul is endowed with the perfect divine Logos beyond language (Strom.

7.7.39.3–6 Stählin, p. 30, 8–18, compare Strom. 1.21.143.1 Stählin-Früchtel,

p. 88, 18–22).29

Now I turn to a further dimension of the connection between unspoken

communication and God’s knowledge of meaning. I will try to show the

Stoic contribution to Clement’s thought. Clement wants to show that God is

like us in that God attends to matters on earth, particularly the expressions

of the elect, but is quite removed from human nature by dispensing with

sense perception in the divine life of pure mind and spirit. For God knows all

speech and thought alike, although it is also claimed that the prayers of the

28 Hägg, Clement of Alexandria, pp. 163–4.

29 Osborn, Clement of Alexandria, pp. 25–6 presents this point eloquently.

‘Finally, the soul of the true Christian becomes so endowed with logos that it reaches

the condition of the great high priest and is directly inspired by the logos himself.

No longer is such a soul taught by scripture, but lays hold of ultimate reality; no

longer is it joined to the logos but becomes logos itself (exc 27.3–5). The voice of

the lord is word without shape, pure light and truth itself. So beyond all language

there remains another order of communication conveyed by the metaphor of light

in a relationship which is face to face with God; in this relationship, light becomes

logos.’ Osborn, Clement of Alexandria, pp. 263–8 further describes the immediacy

of spiritual contact involved in the higher reaches of prayer.

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria42

saints penetrate heaven and earth, due to the intellectual provenance of such

thoughts (Strom. 7.7.36.5–37.6 Stählin, pp. 28, 23–29, 15).

For he (the gnostic) is convinced that God knows and hears everything, not

only in regard to voice, but also in regard to thought, because the hearing in us,

operating through bodily orifices, does not have the comprehension by virtue

of the bodily power, but rather by virtue of a certain psychical perception and

intellection distinguishing vocal utterances which signify something. In point

of fact, God is not anthropomorphic for the sake of this, in order that (God)

truly hears, nor is there need to Him of sense perceptions, according to the

Stoics, particularly in the case of hearing and sight, for it is not possible ever to

comprehend otherwise. But actually the receptivity of the air, and the extremely

acute intellectual perception of the angels, and the power touching the soul in its

awareness by a certain unspeakable power apart from sensory hearing, knows all

things at the moment of thought. And if someone should say that the voice does

not arrive with God, being rolled about down here in atmospheric dispersal, on

the contrary (we claim that) the thoughts of the saints pierce not only the air, but

also the entire cosmos.30

This argument has a similar structure as the ‘prayer’ argument above, which

concluded that divine hearing is spiritually and immaterially accomplished.

Clement moves here from human understanding of utterances by virtue of the

power of soul, in order to show universal divine knowledge of meaning. The

flaws of this argument will not detain us. Actually, the argument has the virtue

of showing us how Clement conceives of the subordination of the physical to

the intellectual in explaining perception, which in turn helps explain divine

omniscience with reference to human thought and language meaning. When

communication and understanding is conceived as essentially an intellectual

matter, the problems of how God attends to everyone, how God hears prayer

without the use of ears, how God might change His mind, and so on, might

30 The translation is entirely my own. The Greek text of Stählin places the

ka`i in square brackets as shown. Strom. 7.7.36.5–37.6 Stählin, pp. 28, 23–29,

15. P´epeistai g`ar ehid´enai p´anta t`on qe`on ka`i hepa´iein, ohuc “oti t¨jß fwn¨jßm´onon, hall`a ka`i t¨jß henno´iaß, hepe`i kai Hj hako`j hen Hjm¨in, di`a swmatik¨wn p´orwnhenergoum´enj, ohu dia tjß swmatik¨jß dun´amewß ‘ecei t`jn hant´iljyin, hall`a diatinoß yucik¨jß ahisq´jsewß ka`i t¨jß diakritik¨jß t¨wn sjmainous¨wn ti fwn¨wnno´jsewß. O‘ukoun hanqrwpoeid`jß Ho qe`oß to¨udh “eneka, [ka`i] “ina hako´us^j, ohud`eahisq´jsewn ahut^¨w de¨i, kaq´aper ‘jresen to¨iß Stwiko¨iß, m´alista hako¨jß ka`i‘oyewß, m`j g`ar d´unasqa´i pote Het´erwß hantilab´esqai≥ hall`a kai to ehupaq`eßto¨u ha´eroß ka`i Hj hoxut´atj suna´isqjsiß t¨wn hagg´elwn “j te to¨u suneid´otoßhepafwm´enj t¨jß yuc¨jß d´unamiß dun´amei tin`i harr´jt^w ka`i ‘aneu t¨jß ahisqjt¨jßhako¨jß “ama no´jmati p´anta gin´wskei≥ k’an m`j t`jn fwn´jn tiß hexikne¨isqai pr`oßt`on qe`on l´eg^j k´atw per`i ton ha´era kulindoum´enjn, hall`a ta no´jmata t¨wnHag´iwn t´emnei ohu m´onon t`on ha´era, hall`a kai t`on “olon k´osmon.

Clement 43

not appear so pressing. This general understanding of divine hearing apart

from sense perception has been traced to Philo, who may have influenced

Clement on this point.31

However, the mention of the Stoics evokes the possibility that Clement

depends on Stoic theology to some extent, which was always connected to

Stoic physics. And some Stoic physics seems to be woven into Clement’s

assumption here of cosmic unity and cohesion, under the control of

pervading ‘pneumatic tension’ in the world, pneumatik`oß t´onoß (Strom.

5.8.48.2–3 Stählin-Früchtel, p. 358, 15–8 = SVF 2.447). In fact, Chrysippus

is reported by Diogenes Laertius in very similar terms as in Clement’s own

testimony of Stoic ‘pneumatic tension’. Intelligence (no¨uß) pervades the

entire ordered world, much like the soul permeates the entire body (D.L.

7.138)—an immanent Stoic deity is thoroughly mixed in with matter. This

shows more clearly how it is natural for Clement to assume a sort of field in

which thought zips around the cosmos by the power of intellection. Thought

is received with no constraints to obstruct divine immediate knowledge of

prayer, which strictly speaking concerns an entirely transcendent God.

Other sources show the Stoics in defense of their materialist, immanent

view of divinity. Leaving aside detailed consideration of the broader question

of Clement’s possible appropriation of Stoic rejection of anthropomorphic

theology (contrary to Epicurus), I will merely point out the following.32 It is

arguable that at least by the time of Diogenes of Babylon, the Stoic denial of

theological anthropomorphism included denial of divine sense perception,

with special reference to sight and hearing.33 This would correspond nicely

to what we find in Clement.

Conclusion

I find it difficult to show that Clement has worked out the relationship of

language and mind, particularly in the area of relating intelligible divine

31 In one passage (Quaest. Ex. 2.34 Aucher), Philo speaks of a peculiar ‘direct

hearing’ when commenting on Ex. 24.7. I owe this reference and the following quote

to H. Gregory Snyder, Teachers and Texts in the Ancient World (London, 2000),

p. 133. ‘Philo believes that a special kind of reading is indicated, one in which

the sound does not fall on the ear from outside. It is as though the strings of the

understanding were plucked directly, circumventing the act of hearing.’

32 Dirk Obbink (ed.), Philodemus. On Piety, Part 1 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996),

pp. 5–12 examines the anthropomorphic tendencies of Epicurus’ theology.

33 I refer to Obbink, Philodemus, pp. 19–23; Algra, ‘Stoic Theology’, pp. 156–78.

Of course, this point deserves to be examined with far greater attention than I can

offer here.

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria44

reality to the structures and meaning of language. However, his contributions

are worthwhile. We encounter in Clement the Philonic view that meanings

are thoughts, as well as his claim that the knowledge of meaning sought

by the Christian sage depends on God’s active power, rather than an

independent structure of immaterial reality. We are to be directed upwards

to the intelligible world, which will bring us beyond language to a stage of

pure thought. Clement develops the picture somewhat better on the other

end of knowing, in that God’s knowledge of meaning penetrates to the level

of thought apart from the senses and bodily organs, perceiving all thoughts

directed by the practice of prayer.

Chapter 3

Origen

Origen, a Christian theologian and biblical exegete of the third century

(A.D. 185–A.D. 254), is an influential figure who lived, taught, and studied

in the intellectual world of Alexandria. It is certain that he was influenced

by Philo’s body of work, although he departs from Philo at times.1 In

this chapter I will argue that Origen essentially agrees with Philo that

language involves an immaterial and intelligible component, although he

introduces some points of his own. Usually, Origen presents a traditional

(Philonic) view of incorporeal meanings conveyed by the vehicle of vocal

utterances. But in Origen we also find the claim that logos (language) is

something distinct from the human voice. I will try to relate this view to his

understanding of how in our embodied state we are dependent on physical

means of communication. Communication is still possible for us by virtue

of the indwelling power of logos. Origen distinguishes between voice and

language. Instead of relying heavily on the traditional logos distinction, we

find Origen introducing alternative conceptual schemes. In his commentary

on John’s gospel, the voice is not usually conceived as the outward version

of the inner language of the soul. Instead, the voice, not intelligible in its

own right, presents intelligible language. For the voice, a corporeal entity,

can only be understood by virtue of language, a separate incorporeal entity.

In what follows, I will try to explain these remarkable philosophical shifts,

and to show that on occasion, there are partial echoes of the traditional logos

distinction.

1 David T. Runia, Philo in Early Christian Literature (Assen, 1993),

pp. 157–83; David T. Runia, Philo and the Church Fathers, Supplements to Vigiliae

Christianae (Leiden, 1995), pp. 117–25; Hans G. Thümmel, ‘Philon und Origenes’,

in L. Perrone, P. Bernardino and D. Marchini (eds), Origeniana Octava. Origen

and the Alexandrian Tradition, Papers of the 8th International Origen Congress,

Pisa, 27–31 August, 2001 (2 vols, Leuven, 2003), pp. 275–86 have addressed these

questions recently. I will not argue for dependence of Origen on Philo for any of the

ideas emerging in this chapter, limiting myself to some key comparisons.

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria46

Christian Platonism, Psychology

Origen must be understood in light of his intellectual relationship to

Platonism. Origen has often been understood to be a Christian Platonist in

a strong sense, whose familiarity with Greek philosophy induced him to

depart from the apostolic doctrines. This view has recently come under close

scrutiny.2 At least it is beyond dispute that he defends certain uses of pagan

philosophy for purposes of theological reflection and biblical interpretation

and his uses of philosophical terminology are abundant. Speaking of Origen’s

‘weak’ Christian Platonism might be closer to the mark. It is clear that the

teachings of the philosophical schools make important contributions to

Origen’s philosophical views and arguments.

A good example of the complexity of philosophical influence emerges

in connection with Origen’s stance towards the standard distinction familiar

from previous chapters. Max Mühl claims that Origen, in contrast to the

early Christian apologists as well as many subsequent theologians, does

not make much constructive and explicit theological use of the traditional

philosophical distinction between inner speech (l´ogoß hendi´aqetoß) and

outer speech (l´ogoß proforik´oß), according to which inner speech is the

domain of reason, while outer speech is the expression of reason in language.

As noted in Chapter 2, Mark Edwards vigorously defends this kind of view,

claiming that already in the time of Clement some previous uses of the

logos distinction among the Greek Christian apologists were considered

theologically unacceptable, in view of the eternal generation of the Logos

from the Father.3 I agree that as a theological formula it is generally avoided.

This development is all the more intriguing for the Origen scholar on account

of his general knowledge of the distinction in the philosophical debates

2 Mark J. Edwards, Origen Against Plato (Aldershot, 2002) argues that Origen’s

understanding of human nature is anti-Platonist in essentials, against a long scholarly

tradition, including the outstanding revisionist work on Origen’s ‘Platonism’ by Hal

Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis (Berlin und Leipzig, 1932), pp. 229–304.

3 Max Mühl, ‘Der l´ogoß hendi´aqetoß und proforik´oß von der älteren Stoa bis

zur Synode von Sirmium 351’, Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte, 7 (1962): 7–56 at 52–3;

Mark J. Edwards, ‘Clement of Alexandria and his Doctrine of the Logos’, Vigiliae

Christianae, 54 (2000): 159–77. Compare Christopher Stead, ‘The Concept of Mind

and the Concept of God in the Christian Fathers’, in B. Hebblethwaite and S.R.

Sutherland (eds), The Philosophical Frontiers of Christian Theology (Cambridge,

1982), pp. 39–54 at 50–51. Cels. 6.65 Koetschau, p. 135, 18–25 represents a partial

exception to the views of Mühl and Edwards that Origen has no positive theological

use for the logos distinction. Mark J. Edwards, ‘Clement of Alexandria’, p. 162 points

out that there is no evidence for employment of the distinction in Stoic theology.

Origen 47

of the Hellenistic period, as is clear from the Contra Celsum.4 Besides its

theological defects (in one passage Origen insists that the Logos is not mere

utterance but rather is substantial), Origen may have doubted that the logos

distinction corresponds closely to anything taught in the Scriptures. In this

connection, Origen interprets the Scriptures in terms of a divided psychology

of soul (yuc´j) and spirit, in which the spirit, often closely identified with the

mind (no¨uß), is the better part of the soul in the struggle against the lower

desires. Usually, neither the Platonic tripartite soul is meant, nor the Stoic

division between the ruling, rational part of the soul and the other parts with

their respective functions.5

The Immateriality of Mind

Since all of Origen’s Christian philosophy has a distinctly theological tint, we

should begin with the immateriality of the divine mind. Origen introduces the

immateriality of divine mind very early in his exposition of God the Father in

his On First Principles (Princ. 1.1.6–7 Koetschau, pp. 20, 24–24, 21). God is

not in any sense a body nor is God contained in a body, rather God is a simple

intellectual nature (intellectualis natura simplex). Origen also claims in his

defense of Christianity against Celsus (Cels. 7.38 Koetschau, p. 188, 11–12)

that God is mind (no¨uß), simple and invisible and incorporeal. Berchman

summarizes Origen’s Platonist Christian theology as follows.

For Origen God the Father is an eternal, ungenerated intellect (no¨uß); an intellect

at rest. Moreover as first principle God is called ohus´ia, mon´aß, “enaß ... That

God is called a One and an intellect is common in Middle Platonism. That Origen

calls his first principle substance (ohus´ia) is also not unprecedented in later

Platonism and Aristotelianism.6

4 Henry Chadwick, ‘Origen, Celsus, and the Stoa’, The Journal of Theological

Studies, 48 (1947): 34–49 at 36–7.

5 Paul S. MacDonald, History of the Concept of Mind (Aldershot, 2003),

pp. 132–3 references a few passages in Origen which seem to adopt Platonic

psychology. Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis, p. 207 outlines some differences from

Stoicism, not confined to psychology. As Anders-Christian L. Jacobsen, ‘Origen on

the Human Body’, in Origeniana Octava, pp. 649–56 at 650 has recently pointed

out, in Origen’s early work there is a ‘cooling’ transformation of mind (no¨uß) into

soul (yuc´j), Princ. 2.8.3–4 Koetschau, pp. 155, 7–162, 10. However, as is also

clear from this passage, the transformation is not total and is complicated by the

persistence of the mind as the better part of the soul in human incarnate existence,

being stronger in some people than in others.

6 Robert M. Berchman, ‘Origen on The Categories: A Study in Later

Platonic First Principles’, in R.J. Daly (ed.), Origeniana Quinta. Origenism and

Later Developments, Papers of the 5th International Origen Congress, Boston,

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria48

God characterized as mind, and God is the source from which springs every

other intellectual nature or mind.

In the wake of Philo, Origen constructs a dualist picture of the minds

created by God in sharp contrast to bodies, in general agreement with the

Platonist and Pythagorean tradition.7 Origen argues extensively against

the view that the mind and the soul are corporeal (Princ. 1.1.7 Koetschau,

pp. 23, 15–24, 21). However, in these arguments Origen does not rely on a

two world scheme such as we find in Philo; Origen seems to have little use

for the ‘noetic cosmos’ of the Platonists. Edwards points out some crucial

differences.

Origen formally denies in his First Principles the existence of a world distinct

from our own and constituted by the Ideas, or intellectual Forms, of Greek

philosophy [Princ. 2.3.6 Koetschau] ... he adopts the locution kosmos noêtos

sparingly, and only in one instance does it clearly denote a world of incorporeals

superior to the human intellect.8

The mind may be directed towards intelligible objects, but not Platonic

Forms as proper objects of knowledge, nor, as in Middle Platonism and

Neoplatonism, the Ideas as the upper reaches of religious devotion.9

Voice and Language

Let me preface this section with some remarks on Origen’s notion of the

divine Word. The Logos is derived from the Father, being unquestionably

divine although subordinate in status. Unlike Philo, Origen’s Logos proceeds

14–18 August, 1989 (Leuven, 1992), pp. 231–52 at 236. In spite of his focus on

philosophical issues, it is not fair to place Berchman in the ‘strong’ Christian

Platonism camp attacked by Edwards (see my n. 2). Berchman tends to view Origen

as essentially a Christian thinker who is conditioned in complex ways by various

strands in the philosophical tradition.

7 The adapted traditional metaphysical dualism I find in Origen has little to

do with the cosmological and anthropological dualisms discussed by some Origen

scholars, for example Padraig O’Cleirigh, ‘The Dualism of Origen’, in Origeniana

Quinta, pp. 346–50. MacDonald, History of the Concept of Mind, pp. 133–4; Gerald

Bostock, ‘Origen and the Pythagoreanism of Alexandria’, in Origeniana Octava,

pp. 465–78, are more in tune with the dualism of body and spirit.

8 Edwards, Origen Against Plato, p. 96; compare Berchman, ‘Origen on

The Categories’, p. 236 who seems to miss this point. Gerald Bostock, ‘Origen’s

Philosophy of Creation’, in Origeniana Quinta, pp. 253–69 at 253–4 emphasizes

that the realm of incorporeal reality tends to be identified by Origen with the spiritual

world of Biblical tradition.

9 Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis, pp. 233–4.

Origen 49

from the Father as a distinct hypostasis, being eternally distinct as generated

as the ‘revealed mind’ from the Father (Princ. 1.2.3 Koetschau, p. 30, 9–19;

1.4.5 Koetschau, pp. 67, 16–68, 3; compare Cels. 3.21 Koetschau, p. 218,

3–5). Of course, there is also the doctrine of the incarnation of the Logos.

Being made incarnate, the Logos is subject to separation from the Father,

although his divinity is preserved. Certain attributes are shared with God

(for example, immortality) in a unique way.10 The Logos represents God’s

mind towards the world in such a way as to make possible the understanding

of God.11 Philo distinguishes more sharply than Origen the contents of the

divine mind from God’s providential work and communication towards the

world. Nevertheless, Origen also sounds vaguely Platonist at times. Similar

to a Middle Platonist second principle, his Logos reveals the truth from a

transcendent source.12 And although he shuns talk of the Ideas or Forms as

the thoughts in God’s mind, he does seem to build them right into his notion

of divine Logos.13 The Logos is active in the created order in bringing about

the divine will, but unlike the Stoic logos as the active and creative principle

immanent in all things, mediation between heaven and earth is the dominant

idea in Origen.14

Now we turn to the alternative philosophical scheme. We must examine

Origen’s distinction between voice (fwn´j) and language (lógoß), presented

in a key text (In Joh. 2.32 Preuschen, pp. 89, 22–90, 10). This distinction is part

of an interesting and neglected account of why vocal sounds are intelligible. It

is logos that explains why the human voice is intelligible to hearers. It forms

10 Hermann J. Vogt, ‘Beobachtungen zum Johannes-Kommentar des Origenes’,

in W. Geerlings (ed.), Origenes als Exeget (Paderborn, 1999), pp. 187–205 at 200–201

presents this aspect of the incarnate Logos, the true image of God, by contrast with

the limits of Christ, the Son of Man, with reference to Origen’s commentary on

John’s gospel.

11 Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis, pp. 71, 288 discusses this point, arguing that

Origen’s distinction between a human Jesus who suffers and lives (like us) and a

changeless, passionless Logos (unlike us) undermines the role the Logos is supposed

to serve in revealing God to humanity.

12 Berchman, ‘Origen on The Categories’, p. 236; J. Rebecca Lyman, Christology

and Cosmology (Oxford, 1993), p. 72 provide detailed accounts.

13 Henri Crouzel, Origène et la philosophie (Paris, 1962), p. 52 wrongly presents

Origen’s divine logos in terms more proper to Philo’s divine logos. ‘Le Verbe a pour

Origène un double rôle dans la création, celui d’exécuteur ad extra de la volonté du

Père et celui de modèle, en tant qu’il est Sagesse, Monde intelligible contenant les

idées et les “raisons” des êtres.’ Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis, pp. 255–6 provides

discussion and a comparison to Albinus, the Middle Platonist.

14 Bostock, ‘Origen’s Philosophy of Creation’, p. 259 discusses the unity but

also the separation of transcendent Father and mediating Logos with reference to

creation of the sensible world.

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria50

the basis for some of his most interesting remarks on language, in connection

with his commentary on Jn. 1.6 (‘There was a man sent from God, whose

name was John.’). Origen’s theological point is that distinguishing voice and

language is useful not only to explain the role of John the Baptist, but also

to avoid any harmful notions of divinity arising from the homonymy of the

lexicographically complicated Greek word logos.

I think that just as voice and logos differ in us—surely voice signifies nothing

insofar as it is capable on some occasion of being uttered without logos, while

it is possible for what is in fact logos to be recited in the mind apart from voice,

as when we meditate within ourselves—so also John, being a voice by analogy

while Christ is logos, differs from this man the savior, who is according to a

certain notion logos. And John himself invites me to this (view), as to who he is,

when responding to those questioning (him): ‘I am the voice of one crying in the

wilderness, prepare the way of the Lord, make straight his paths.’ And perhaps for

this reason Zacharias lost the voice when he disbelieved the origin of the voice

revealing the logos of God, receiving it again when the voice, the forerunner of

the logos, was born. For it is necessary to listen attentively to voice, to the end

that after these things the mind is capable of receiving the logos revealed by the

voice. Hence John is a little older according to birth than Christ. For we perceive

voice before logos. And also John reveals Christ; for logos is presented by voice.

And also Christ is baptized by John, John admitting that he should be baptized

by him. In the case of men, logos is purified by voice, although logos naturally

purifies every voice that signifies. And in truth when John reveals Christ, a man

reveals God and savior who is incorporeal, as also voice (reveals) logos (which

is incorporeal).15

15 The words in round brackets are meant to complete the sense of the Greek.

In Joh. 2.32 Preuschen, pp. 89, 22–90, 10. H Jgoumai d`e “oti “wsper hen Hjm¨in fwn`j ka`i l´ogoß diaf´erei, dunam´enjß m´entoi g´e pote fwn¨jß t¨jß mjd`en sjmaino´usjß prof´eresqai cwr`iß l´ogou, o“iou te d`e ‘ontoß ka`i l´ogou cwr`iß t^¨w n^¨w hapagg´ellesqai fwn¨jß, Hwß hep`an hen Heauto¨iß diexode´uwmen, o“utw to¨u swt¨jroß kat´a tina hep´inoian ‘ontoß l´ogou diaf´erei to´utou Ho h Iw´annjß, Hwß pr`oß t`jn hanalog´ian to¨u cristo¨u tugc´anontoß l´ogou fwn`j ‘wn.h Ep`i to¨uto d´e me prokale¨itai ahut`oß Ho h Iw´annjß, “ostiß pot`e e‘ij, pr`oß to`uß punqanom´enouß hapokrin´omenoß≥ h Eg`w fwn`j bo¨wntoß hen t^¨j her´jm^w≥ H Etoim´asate t`jn Hod`on kur´iou, ehuqe´iaß poie¨ite t`aß tr´ibouß ahuto¨u. Ka`i t´aca di`a to¨uto hapist´jsaß Ho Zacar´iaß t^¨j gen´esei t¨jß deiknuo´usjß t`on l´ogon to¨u qeo¨u fwn¨jß hap´ollusi t`jn fwn´jn, lamb´anwn ahut´jn, “ote genn¨atai Hj pr´odromoß tou logo¨u fwn´j. h Enwt´isasqai g`ar de¨i fwn´jn, “ina met`a ta¨uta Ho no¨uß t`on dein´umenon Hup`o t¨jß fwn¨jß l´ogon d´exasqai dunjq^¨j. Di´oper ka`i hol´ig^w presb´uteroß kat`a t`o genn¨asqai Ho h Iw´annjß hest`i to¨u cristo¨u≥ fwn¨jß g`ar pr`o l´ogou hantilamban´omeqa. h All`a ka`i de´iknusi t`on crist`on Ho h Iw´annjß≥ fwn^¨j g`ar par´istatai Ho l´ogoß. h All`a ka`i bapt´izetai Hup`o h Iw´´annou Ho crist´oß, Homologo¨untoß cre´ian ‘ecein Huph ahuto¨u baptisq¨jnai≥ hanqr´wpoiß g`ar Hup`o

Origen 51

Let me make some preliminary remarks. The main business of this passage,

of course, is to develop a conceptual parallel which explains the nature and

function of John the Baptist in relation to Christ. Why does Origen adopt

a distinction between voice and language in departure from the traditional

logos distinction? One way of explaining this departure is that Origen wishes

to avoid any harmful notions of divinity arising from certain uses of the

word logos. Of course, this may not be as directly relevant as his thoughts

about language being developed in view of the unique biblical role of John

the Baptist. In another piece of his Johannine commentary (In Joh. 1.24

Preuschen, p. 29, 17–31), Origen censures the heretics for seeking scriptural

passages to support their theology of a divine logos conceived merely as

the voice or utterance (profor`an) of God; this would amount to a denial

of the reality (Hup´ostasin) or substance (ohus´ian) of the Logos, which is

quite unacceptable. So Origen may have in mind this sort of worry when he

distinguishes voice and language, with the aim of securing a superior reality

for the divine Logos. Edwards points out some similar worries in Philo.

The learned Jew perceived that the divine will to communicate, evinced both

in creation and in scripture as the record of creation, was better represented by

this term [logos] than by its Platonic rivals, nous and paradeigma; on the other

hand, both commonsense and piety forbade him to imagine that the speech of

God consists of sounds like those emitted by the human larynx. The instrument

of creation in Philo’s thought is therefore not so much a ‘word’ as a changeless

pattern which abode in the mind as a coherent scheme of being when it had not

yet taken shape in space and time.16

Edwards may have stretched the point about the nature of Philo’s

‘instrument of creation’ a little too far (see Philo, Sacr. 65 Cohn; Decal. 47

Cohn; Migr. 6 Wendland; Opif. 16–37 Cohn), but there certainly is a greater

emphasis in Origen on the creative and communicative role of the Logos, a

divine power which is distinguished from the purely physical yet inspired

fwn¨jß kaqa´iretai l´ogoß, t^¨j f´usei to¨u l´ogou kaqa´irontoß p¨asan t`jn sjma´inousan fwn´jn. Ka`i Hapaxapl¨wß “ote h Iw´annjß t`on crist`on de´iknusin, ‘anqrwpoß qe`on de´iknusi ka`i swt¨jra t`on has´wmaton, ka`i fwn`j t`on l´ogon.

16 Edwards, Origen Against Plato, p. 67. The words in square brackets supply

what is clear from the context of discussion. Edwards covers a number of basic

contrasts with Philo on the Logos, particularly the basic shift in Origen away from

the Philonic notion of the Ideas as thoughts in the mind of God, towards speaking of

items or contents in the divine mind. Thümmel, ‘Philon und Origenes’, pp. 282–3

discusses the distinction in Origen between Sophia and Logos, which suggests to me

that Origen’s Sophia is a notion closer to Philo’s Logos; as Thümmel points out with

reference to the Johannine commentary, Origen’s Logos is more heavily oriented

towards rational beings and their destiny.

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria52

voice from God. Origen may have registered the theological worries shared

with Philo by distinguishing clearly between voice and language, raising the

reality of the divine Word to a superior level above mere voice. The Logos

is stable and not subject to physical limitations, yet it is separated from the

divine mind as well in being revealed in the world.

On the anthropic level, Origen does little to clarify the connection between

incorporeal and corporeal (audible) linguistic entities, apart from observing

that human logos is more independent. Our vocal faculty cannot produce

meaningful utterances by itself (compare St. Paul on glossolalia, 1 Cor. 13.1),

its utterances cannot independently attain the power of spoken language; on

the other hand, language may be produced by itself, being unspoken within

the mind.

However, we are told that utterances depend on the ‘purifying’ function

of incorporeal language to make them meaningful (t^¨j f´usei to¨u l´ogoukaqa´irontoß p¨asan t`jn sjma´inousan fwn´jn). Why does Origen load

his semantics with hieratic notions? What does he mean by the ‘purifying’

function of language? I would explain the matter as follows. Origen points

out that human logos can be independent of vocal sound, being freely active

in the mind without any verbal expression, in contrast to the voice, which

depends on language to be meaningful. Of course, there are important

connections between voice and language. This is seen from the examples

of John the Baptist as well as Zacharias, which show that hearing the voice

precedes the mind’s understanding of language. But we are also told that

utterances depend on the ‘purifying’ function of incorporeal logos to make

them meaningful. Perhaps Origen means by ‘purifying’ the ordering and

completion of vocal sound by logos (compare In Joh. 10.28 Preuschen, pp.

201, 28–202, 1). We might compare the rational ordering of logos to the

creative activity of the divine Logos in forming bodies by inserting qualities

into matter.17 Presumably, the function of human logos emerging from this

passage also makes meaningful utterances reflect truth, a capacity which

ultimately derives from divine reason.18

Now I will briefly introduce some broader philosophical comparisons. I

have already pointed out Origen’s emphasis on the activity of incorporeal

Logos in the world. For the Logos is required to assume an outward role, in

accord with standard Stoic ideas as well as the Johannine view of the Word

made incarnate. Denying logos an outward role would also depart sharply

from contemporary Platonist Peripatetics such as Origen’s nemesis Porphyry,

who stands firmly in the logos distinction tradition. For Porphyry, logos is

17 Compare Bostock, ‘Origen’s Philosophy of Creation’, p. 259.

18 Compare Robert M. Berchman, ‘Self-Knowledge and Subjectivity in Origen’,

in Origeniana Octava, pp. 437–50 at 438–9, 442–4.

Origen 53

speech articulated by the tongue, ‘signifying (sjmantik`j) of the inward

affections (paq¨wn) of the soul.’19 However, this distinction of meaningful

speech and the contents of mind differs from Origen’s distinction. Origen

denies that speech is intelligible in its own right, rather it is understood

by virtue of language, a view which is not prominent in the philosophical

mainstream.

Mind and Body in Language

In Chapter 1, we saw that Philo presents speech as the physical vehicle of

meaning. In Origen, we have reviewed one text which distinguishes voice and

language, detailing differences in the function and nature of these elements.

However, Origen is not always quite so concerned to distinguish voice and

language, even in this monumental work of biblical commentary, nor does he

use the same semantic terminology in everything he writes. On occasion, he

slips into the traditional ‘container’ or ‘vehicle’ images familiar from Philo

and other writers.

For example, when discussing the entry of Jesus into Jerusalem riding

on an ass (Jn. 12.12–14), Origen writes as follows (In Joh. 10.29 Preuschen,

p. 202, 13–16). ‘And perhaps (someone) might reasonably compare the

vocal sounds which envelop the logos which brings them into the soul to

an ass, for the beast is a burden bearer, and a great burden and a heavy load

are revealed from the text.’20 Here Origen locates language within voice, its

vehicle. Besides this passage, other passages are more closely aligned with

philosophical tradition in terminology and conceptual resources, as we will

see a bit later.

It is possible that Origen senses a lack of biblical support for the ‘container’

and ‘vehicle’ models—most of the relevant biblical passages focus on the

mouth and the heart, for example, Ps. 15.2; Ps. 44.2; Mt. 12.34; Lk. 6.45.

There may also be philosophical discomfort in the interaction of intelligible

and sensible realities. How is an intelligible content or meaning lodged in

an enveloping articulate sound? The relation between the incorporeal and

the bodily is a notorious problem for Origen’s theology in general. In his

19 Porphyry, Abst. 3.3 Nauck, p. 188, 17–20. At least in the bit about signifying

internal affections, Porphyry says something that sounds Aristotelian (Aristotle, Int.

16a5–6) and not too close to anything reported from the Stoics.

20 In Joh. 10.29 Preuschen, p. 202, 13–16. Ka`i t´aca ohuk hal´ogwß ‘on^w ehik´asat`aß perist´asaß fwn`aß t`on ‘agonta ahut`aß ehiß t`jn yuc`jn l´ogon≥ hacqof´orong`ar t`o zwon, pol`u de to ‘acqoß ka`i fort´ion bar`u djlo¨untai hap`o t¨jß l´exewß.I adapt here the translation of Robert E. Heine, Origen. Commentary on the Gospel

According to John. Books 1–10 (Washington, DC, 1989), pp. 295–6.

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria54

reflections on language, the problem is equally pressing, and there is also the

difficulty of accounting for the role of bodily organs in the sensory perception

of utterances. For although Origen would claim that the incorporeal mind

cannot hear anything, insofar as it is not itself the organs of hearing, it must

receive the intelligible content transmitted by the voice in order to grasp what

is said. Apparently, as we also find in Clement, the human mind can receive

from the ear as well as directly from another mind; the divine voice is received

immaterially in the person to whom God speaks or received immaterially

by God in prayer.21 There seem to be two ways of hearing, according to

the spiritual and sensory aspects of us.22 It is difficult to assess whether this

sort of philosophical discomfort is important to Origen’s thinking in these

exegetical passages.

We can expand this story a bit further by reference (primarily) to

Origen’s early treatise On First Principles (Princ. 2.1–3, 2.8–9 Koetschau).

The human mind, nearest in resemblance to its divine creator, finds itself

enmeshed in the sensible world, having previously been originally created to

enjoy a bodiless spiritual existence. In the course of Origen’s arguments that

the mind is superior to the body and of a different nature, it is said (Princ.

1.1.7 Koetschau, p. 24, 18–21) that the mind alone can apprehend divinity,

being an ‘intellectual image’ (intellectualis imago) of God by virtue of its

special kinship (propinquitas quaedam). Turning away from the divine good

resulted in being clothed in bodily (and psychic) garments suited to life here

on earth. These earthly garments are a necessary vehicle for God’s plan to

21 Origen mentions a Stoic definition of vocal sound, among others, in

two passages which distinguish the characteristics of human voice from divine

voice, Cels. 2.72 Koetschau, p. 194, 11–19; Cels. 6.62 Koetschau, p. 132, 16–21.

Henry Chadwick (trans), Origen. Contra Celsum (Cambridge, 1953), p. 121, n. 5

provides full references. The voice defined as ‘concussed air’ is part of a standard

philosophical definition by this time. It appears in at least one text of Philo (Immut.

83 Wendland).

22 However, there is no possibility, as we find occasionally in Philo, of a special

non-corporeal status for the voice which falls short of the incorporeality of the

mind. On the other hand, Origen employs a theory of aetherial bodies (astronomical,

anastatic, and christological) for other purposes, a complicated topic which has

received substantial scholarly attention in recent years: Crouzel, Origène et la

philosophie, pp. 33–4; Alan Scott, Origen and the Life of the Stars (Oxford, 1991),

pp. 116–21, 150–57; MacDonald, History of the Concept of Mind, p. 133; Richard

Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators 200-600 AD. A Sourcebook (3 vols,

London, 2004), vol. 1, pp. 229–38. It is in contrast to these special aetherial bodies

that the trinitarian God alone is declared to be absolutely incorporeal; Origen seems

to associate some kind of bodily condition with every created being.

Origen 55

restore humanity to original conditions (existence in a resurrected, spiritual

body) by means of corrective punishments germane to bodily life.23

So Origen’s explanation of why the immaterial mind needs the body would

include as a special case his story of why we need speech to communicate

what we have in mind to others. Since the mind or intellect (no¨uß) is a

remnant of original rational perfection, Origen might say something like the

following. The mind, guided by divine providence in its earthly life, adopts

this flawed system of words to communicate its contents to other people.

This general kind of adaptation is described in passages about divine speech

(for example, Cels. 4.71, Koetschau, pp. 340, 17–341, 8; compare Cels. 7.13

Koetschau, p. 165, 3). God accommodates the weakness of humanity by

lowering divine language to our level. ‘The Logos speaks like this because

he assumes (for¨wn), as it were, human characteristics for the advantage of

men.’24 The entire divinity and truth of the Logos would be too overwhelming

for all humanity, although some people are selected for greater exposure

than others.25 By analogy, the rational part of the soul needs the ‘garment’ of

vocally shaped sound for mundane advantage.

So far, I have said little about the relationship between logos and mind; it

does not seem to attract Origen’s concern to the same degree. The main problem

would be explaining how the ‘word’ or language in us is distinguished from

the mind and can be separated from it, besides the problem of how the mind

is represented in language. I will present another passage which distinguishes

the work of the Word and the intellectual, governing power of the divine

mind (In Joh. 1.38 Preuschen, pp. 49, 23–50, 9). Origen is developing here a

spiritual interpretation of Ps. 45.1. ‘My heart overflows with a goodly theme

(h Exjre´uxato Hj kard´ia mou l´ogon hagaq´on), I address my verses to the

king.’ This was a favorite text for theologians before and after Origen.26

What, then, is his ‘heart’, that ‘the good word’ should appear consequent upon the

heart? For if the term ‘word’ does not need interpretation, as they (some biblical

interpreters) suppose, obviously neither does the term ‘heart’. It is very strange

23 Bostock, ‘Origen’s Philosophy of Creation’, p. 258, 260–62; Edwards, Origen

Against Plato, p. 89; Jacobsen, ‘Origen on the Human Body’, pp. 648–56 pursue

these points in detail. I cannot devote myself here to the scholarly controversy about

the pre-existence of souls in Origen, or whether pure intellects required a spiritual

body or soul in their pre-incarnate state.

24 Cels. 4.71, Koetschau, pp. 340, 17–341, 8. OHione`i hanqr´wpou tr´opoußpr`oß t`o hanqr´wpoiß lusitel`eß for¨wn Ho l´ogoß toia¨uta l´egei. In preparing my

translation, I adapt the translation of Chadwick, Contra Celsum, p. 240.

25 Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis, pp. 68–74 offers a detailed account.

26 Cecile Blanc, Origène. Commentaire sur Saint Jean, Sources Chrétiennes,

No. 120 (Paris, 1966), p. 203, n. 2 provides references.

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria56

to suppose that the heart is a part of God, similar to the heart in our body. But we

must remind them that as God’s hand, and arm, and finger are mentioned, we do

not attach our understanding to the literal sense, but we examine how we should

understand these expressions correctly and in a manner worthy of God, so also

we must take God’s heart to be his intellectual and governing power concerning

the universe, and the term ‘word’ to be the expression of those matters in that

(heart). But who, other than the Savior, announces the will of the Father to the

creatures who are worthy, and who has come into existence in accordance with

them? Perhaps also the term ‘uttered’ was used intentionally, for a number of

other expressions could have been used in place of ‘uttered’. For example, ‘My

heart cast forth a good word’; ‘My heart has spoken a good word.’ But perhaps

as an exhalation is the emergence of hidden wind into the open, as though the

one exhaling breathes in this way, so the Father non-continuously exhales forth

visions of the truth and produces their form in the Word, and for this reason the

Word is called the ‘image of the invisible God’.27

Origen makes an important theological point in that there are no parts in

God; there is an emphasis on the divinity of the Logos in terms of the divine

image, not in terms of parthood. It is interesting that Origen employs a notion

of divine power (d´unamiß) and not of mind. Origen probably is influenced

not so much by divine ‘powers’ as we find so prominently in Philo, but rather

by the language and theology of Clement, who talks about the Logos active

in the world as the power of God.

However, a more complete picture is obtained from an adjacent passage

(In Joh. 1.38 Preuschen, p. 49, 3–8) which prefaces Origen’s interpretation of

27 The translation, including the additional translated text added below, is adapted

from Heine, Origen. Commentary on the Gospel According to John, pp. 91–2. In

Joh. 1.38 Preuschen, pp. 49, 23–50, 9. T´iß o~un Hj kard´ia ahuto¨u, “ina hakolo´uqwßt^¨j kard´i^a Ho agaq`oß l´ogoß fan^¨j; Ehi gar Ho logoß ohu de¨itai dijg´jsewß, Hwßheke¨inoi Hupolamb´anousi, d¨jlon “oti ohud’ Hj kard´ia≥ “oper hest`in hatop´wtaton,nom´izein t`jn kard´ian Homo´iwß t¨^j hen [t^¨w] Hjmet´er^w swmati e~inai m´eroß to¨uQeo¨u. h Allh Hupomnjst´eon ahuto`uß “oti “wsper ce`ir ka`i brac´iwn ka`i d´aktuloßhonom´azetai Qeo¨u, ohuk hereid´ontwn Hjm¨wn t`jn di´anoian ehiß yil`jn t`jn l´exin,hallh hexetaz´ontwn p¨wß ta¨uta Hugi¨wß heklamb´anein ka`i hax´iwß Qeo¨u de¨i, o“utwßka`i tjn kard´ian to¨u Qeo¨u t`jn nojtik`jn ahuto¨u ka`i proqetik`jn per`i twn“olwn d´unamin hekljpt´eon, t`on d`e L´ogon t¨wn hen heke´in^j t`o hapaggeltik´on.T´iß d`e hapagg´ellei t`jn boul`jn to¨u patr`oß to¨iß t¨wn genjt¨wn hax´ioiß ka`i p`arhahuto`uß gegenjm´enoß ’j Ho swt´jr; T´aca d`e ka`i ohu matjn t`o hexjre´uxato≥ mur´iag`ar “etera hed´unato l´egesqai hant`i to¨u hexjre´uxato≥ pro´ebalen Hj kard´iamou l´ogon hagaq´on, hel´aljsen Hj kard´ia mou l´ogon hagaq´on≥ hall`a m´jpote“wsper pne´umat´oß tinoß hapokr´uptou ehiß faner`on pr´ood´oß hestin Hj herug`jto¨u hereugom´enou, oHione`i dia to´utou hanapn´eontoß, o“utw t`a t¨jß haljqe´iaßqewr´jmata ohu sun´ecwn Ho pat`jr here´ugetai ka`i poie¨i t`on t´upon ahut¨wn hen t^¨wl´og^w, ka`i di`a touto ehik´oni kaloum´en^w to¨u haor´atou Qeo¨u.

Origen 57

the Psalm text. This passage addresses mind and logos. We find a distinction

not between voice and language, but rather between language and mind.

But the Logos can also be ‘the Son’ because he announces the secrets of that

Father, obtaining as a mind in correspondence to the Son being called ‘Logos’.

For as the logos in us is the messenger of the things seen by the mind, so the

Logos of God, having known the Father, reveals the Father whom he has known,

insofar as none among created beings can come into contact with him without a

guide.28

Origen is primarily concerned to explain why the Logos performs a

special communicative purpose. Note how the separate phase of language in

relation to the mind is built into the analogy with human speech capacities.

On both human and divine levels, there is a single logos (contrast Philo’s

two logoi) which is the mediator between the intelligible and sensible

realms. I think Origen moves a bit closer to the traditional logos distinction

here. And in the exegetical discussion of the Psalm text that follows, we

are told that the form (t´upoß) of the divine mind is represented in the

Logos, and Origen cites Col. 1.15 which describes the Son as the image

(ehik´wn) of the invisible God (In Joh. 1.38 Preuschen, pp. 49, 23–50, 9).

This part, I would argue, evokes the dependence of spoken utterance on a

more fundamental reality, along the lines of the traditional logos distinction.

Other Influences

Let us turn to some different ideas which appear elsewhere in Origen. One

notable discussion of voice, meaning, and mind appears in the debate with

Celsus over animal rationality. This appears in a stretch of argument from

the Contra Celsum which is also preserved in the Philocalia (Cels. 4.73–99

Koetschau, pp. 343, 5–373, 21 = Philoc. 20.1–26 Robinson, pp. 125, 1–151,

27). As Chadwick points out, the parameters of debate with Celsus are

inherited from the Hellenistic philosophical schools.

But it is far more common to find Origen supporting the Stoa against the Academy

... most notably in the long discussion at the end of contra Celsum book 4 on

the rationality of animals and their inferiority to human beings. ... We find a

28 In Joh. 1.38 Preuschen, p. 49, 3–8. D´unatai d`e ka`i Ho l´ogoß uHi`oß e~inai par`at`o hapagg´ellein t`a krufia to¨u patr`oß heke´inou, han´alogon t¨^w kaloum´en^w uHi^¨wl´og^w nou tugc´anontoß. H Wß g`ar Ho parh Hjm¨in l´ogoß ‘aggel´oß hesti t¨wn Hup`o touno¨u Horwm´enwn, o“utwß Ho to¨u Qeo¨u l´ogoß, hegnwk`wß t`on pat´era, ohuden`oß t¨wngenjt¨wn prosbale¨in ahut¨^w cwr`iß Hodjgo¨u dunam´enou, hapokal´uptei ”on ‘egnwpat´era.

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria58

remarkably similar discussion in Philo’s Alexander, in which Philo supports the

Stoic opinion against the Academic criticism.29

Origen defends the Christian ‘anthropocentric’ position against Celsus’

equally traditional Skeptic and Platonist view that providence endows and

favors humans no more than animals. By Origen’s lights, the animals, no

matter how well equipped and well organized they are, do not act by virtue

of reason. Man alone is created in the image of God, which is God’s reason

(qeo¨u Ho logoß).

At one turn in this argument, Celsus adduces the conversation of ants

and Origen responds (Cels. 4.84 Koetschau, 355, 13–22 = Philoc. 20.11

Robinson, 135, 12–21). The ants are a surprising choice in view of the more

likely candidates (birds, elephants) which turn up elsewhere in the tradition

(Sext. Emp., Math. 8.275 Mutschmann; Porphyry, Abst. 3.4 Nauck, p. 191,

3–13).

For he speaks of the ants as though they had discussions with one another, saying

the following. ‘And in fact when they meet together they have discussions with

one another, and this is why they do not lose their way; accordingly they also

have a completely developed rational faculty, and common notions of certain

general matters, and a voice with respect to objects and meanings.’ If a person

is to have a discussion with another, this must take place by means of a voice

which expresses some meaning, and which for the most part makes utterance

concerning the so-called ‘objects’. How is it not most ridiculous of all, to say

these things in the case of ants?30

A rational discussion (t`o dial´egesqai) requires both elements, voice

(fwn´j) and meaning (ti sjmain´omenon). But Origen also would say,

presumably, that this expressive capacity of voice is only possible by virtue

of our language faculty, a key feature of human rationality. Origen develops

these ideas with a notion of reference, in that our meaningful utterances

represent things (tugc´anonta), that is, objects in the world. Beyond this,

29 Chadwick, ‘Origen, Celsus, and the Stoa’, p. 36.

30 I adapt the translation of Chadwick, Contra Celsum, p. 251. Cels. 4.84

Koetschau, p. 355, 13–22 = Philoc. 20.11 Robinson, p. 135, 12–21. Fjs`i g`arper`i t¨wnmurm´jkwn Hwß dialegom´enwn hall´jloiß toia¨uta≥ ka`i men d`j ka`i hapant¨wnteßhall´jloiß dial´egontai, “oqen ohud`e twn Hod¨wn Hamart´anousin≥ ohuko¨un ka`il´ogou sumpl´jrws´iß hesti par’ ahuto¨iß ka`i koina`i ‘ennoiai kaqolik¨wn tinwnka`i fwn`j ka`i tugc´anonta ka`i sjmain´omena. T`o gar dial´egesqa´i tina pr`oß“eteron hen fwn¨^j g´inetai djlo´us^j ti sjmain´omenon, poll´akiß d`e kai per`i t¨wnkaloum´enwn tugcan´ontwn hapaggello´us^j≥ “aper ka`i hen m´urmjxi l´egein e~inaip¨wß ohu p´antwn ’an e‘ij katagelast´otaton;

Origen 59

Origen says nothing of what things can be represented in language (states of

affairs, predicates, propositions, concrete objects, or abstract objects).

The basic scheme in this passage is voice expressing a meaning, in contrast

to the commentary passages introduced above in which language (logos), not

a proposition or a meaning, is expressed by voice. My general impression

is that the Contra Celsum presents something closer to a Stoic or Philonic

view of separable meanings associated with vocal utterances. This shift can

be explained by the terms of the Hellenistic rationality debates, as well as the

general Stoic influence in the Contra Celsum. In any case, it is remarkable

that similar ideas and terminology crop up elsewhere in the Philocalia.

However, these other uses show Origen’s reliance on the terminology and

techniques of the philological tradition.31

An interesting discussion of dealing with rough spots in biblical texts

is preserved from a missing book of Origen’s commentary on John’s

gospel (Book 4). Origen addresses the issue of solecisms and bad style in

the Scriptures. We reviewed similar themes in Clement in Chapter 2, with

reference to the attention to language among the philosophers. For Origen

as well as for Clement, the unimpressive language of the Scriptures should

not present a problem for readers anticipating perfection, for it is the thought

that is beautiful and not always its expression in language.32 I will present

only the first few lines of the excerpt (In Joh. 4 = Philoc. 4.1 Robinson,

p. 41, 9–15).

The one who distinguishes for himself between voice and meanings and

things, upon which the meanings are based, will not stumble on the solecism

of the expressions, when by searching he finds the things healthy, upon which

the expressions are based. And in particular when the holy men confess that

their discourse and message is not in vessels of the wisdom of words, but in

demonstration of the spirit and of power.33

Once more we find ‘meanings’ (sjmain´omena) within a scheme which

distinguishes voice, meaning, and object. His term for ‘objects’ in the world

31 I refer the reader to the important work of Bernhard Neuschäfer, Origenes als

Philologe (2 vols, Basel, 1987) on Origen’s debts to ancient philology.

32 Crouzel, Origène et la philosophie, pp. 125–33 expands this point to consider

not only Origen’s view of the scriptual texts but also the qualities of his own style.

33 The translation is my own. In Joh. 4 = Philoc. 4.1 Robinson, p. 41, 9–15. H Odiair¨wn parh Heaut^¨w fwn`jn ka`i sjmain´omena ka`i pr´agmata, kaqh ˆwn ke¨itait`a sjmain´omena, ohu prosk´oyei t^¨w t¨wn fwn¨wn soloikism^¨w, hep`an hereun¨wneHur´isk∆ t`a pragmata, kaqh ˆˆwn ke¨intai aHi fwna`i, Hugi¨j≥ ka`i m´alista hep`anHomolog¨wsin oHi “agioi ‘andreß t`on l´ogon ahut¨wn ka`i to k´jrugma ohuk hen peiqo¨ißsof´iaß e~inai log¨wn, hall’ hen hapode´ixei pne´umatoß ka`i dun´amewß.

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria60

is changed (pr´agmata, compare tugc´anonta in Cels. 4.84), but the rest is

the same.34

It appears that when Origen deals with a traditional philological issue,

he adopts a tripartite semantic scheme, imported from ancient grammar

and philology with its Stoic roots.35 All of these terms in the Philocalia are

familiar from the grammarians and scholars of the Hellenistic and early

Imperial period.

There are even passages in which Origen works with a linguistic scheme

which only counts expressions and objects in the world. I doubt that these

passages betray an important shift in what Origen thinks about language

and meaning, contrary to the claim that Origen dispenses with the role of

the ‘signification’ (sjmain´omenon) altogether.36 We find this apparent

conceptual alternative in the Contra Celsum (Cels. 1.24–5 Koetschau,

pp. 74, 4–77, 10), where Origen speaks of words meaning things in the

world, or more precisely, of words (t`a hon´omata) incorporating a special

dimension in their referring function. Names are not assigned by arbitrary

convention by the people who use them (Cels. 5.45 Koetschau, p. 48, 10–11).

The focus is on the phonological properties of the names themselves and the

spiritual power contained in them.37 There is no separate role mentioned here

for meanings. Rather, we are told that human languages have a supernatural

dimension at their origin, which Origen does not explain in detail (Cels. 5.45

34 Compare Origen’s uses of ‘subject’ (Hupoke´imenon), references in Marguerite

Harl, ‘Origène et la sémantique du langage biblique’, Vigiliae Christianae, 26 (1972):

161–87 at 183–4. Origen’s linguistic terminology varies somewhat from work to

work, a similar feature to what I noted in Clement. It is helpful to compare with some

of the Stoic concepts and terminology noted earlier in my chapter on Philo, p. 26–8.

Gennaro Lomiento, ‘“Pragma” und “lexis” in den Jeremiahomilien des Origenes’,

Theologische Quartalschrift, 165 (1985): 118–31 details the terminological variations

for ‘expression’ and other key semantic features.

35 Partly in connection with this Philocalia passage, there is detailed

consideration of the influence of Stoic grammar in Neuschäfer, Origenes als Philologe,

pp. 206–13.

36 Ineke Sluiter, Ancient Grammar in Context (Amsterdam, 1990), pp. 34–6.

37 H. Gregory Snyder, Teachers and Texts in the Ancient World (London, 2000),

pp. 36–7 notes the tendency in Late Antiquity to take the phonological properties

of words quite seriously, citing some Stoic-redolent material in Seneca, Ep. 94.47,

among several other references. Snyder makes a quite sweeping claim about the

power of utterance. ‘Such sentiments strike post-Cartesian thinkers conditioned

to think of separation between intellectual and physical domains as rather odd.

However, we are reminded that people in antiquity generally saw the state of the soul

and the state of the body as fundamentally intertwined. ... So in the ancient world,

the pharmacological mechanisms of good advice are quite intelligible.’

Origen 61

Koetschau, p. 48, 11–15; compare Philo, Opif. 148–50 Cohn; Quaest. Gen.

1.20 Aucher). This explains why ‘spiritually sensitive’ utterances lose their

power when translated into another language.38

Conclusion

Origen’s possibly innovative philosophical views on mind and language are

blended with his theological concerns, although it is also easy to find examples

of more conventional views represented where theological concerns are not

so dominant.

In his commentary on John’s gospel, Origen departs from use of the logos

distinction, in that spoken language is not simply the outward expression

of inner discourse. Rather, it is voice by which language is revealed. I do

not see how the ‘container’ or ‘vehicle’ models of language and meaning,

familiar from Philo, fit into this picture. In this connection, Origen would

appear to be motivated by theological and exegetical concerns, but he may

also be mindful of philosophical concerns, or a lack of biblical support for

these models, insofar as most of the relevant biblical passages focus on the

relationship of mouth and heart. In any case, in other passages Origen slips

back into the comfortable ‘container’ or ‘vehicle’ images.

Origen’s departure from the logos distinction, largely motivated by his

theological and exegetical interests, is an interesting philosophical shift.

Regrettably, Origen does not provide much in the way of an explanation

of why human speech is intelligible, besides adducing a mysterious,

incorporeal logos which does the work. (Perhaps this reflects the general

Patristic tendency to take our linguistic faculties as basic, arguing for other

claims on their back.) Further, we might ask why, if language is incorporeal,

it is not more clearly confined to the mind. This move would iron things out

considerably, avoiding difficult questions of how language can have being

separate from the mind. I suppose Origen does not take this route on account

of the correspondence to his doctrines of the distinct role of the Logos in

the Godhead, as well as the incarnation of the Logos in separation from the

divine mind.

38 John Dillon, ‘The Magical Power of Names in Origen and Later Platonism’, in

R. Hanson and H. Crouzel (eds), Origeniana Tertia, The Third International

Colloquium for Origen Studies, Manchester, 7–11 September, 1981 (Rome, 1985),

pp. 203–16 offers an account of Origen’s theory of magical names, including

the extensive background in Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism. Sorabji, The

Philosophy of the Commentators, vol. 3, pp. 213–26 introduces the various strands

of debate on names in Later Greek philosophy.

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Chapter 4

Plotinus

Plotinus (A.D. 205–71), the most important philosopher of Late Antiquity

and the touchstone of Neoplatonism, was intimately connected with the

intellectual life of Alexandria. We know from Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus

that Plotinus settled in Alexandria in about A.D. 233, living a happy ten years

there in philosophical studies under the Platonist philosopher Ammonius

Saccas (Vit. Plot. 3 Henry-Schwyzer). Plotinus then moved on to other climes.

To the disappointment of countless generations of scholars, it is unlikely

that Plotinus crossed paths with Origen the Christian during this Alexandrian

sojourn, although the two figures are roughly contemporary. However, it is

reported that they both studied with a teacher named Ammonius, and in fact

someone named ‘Origen’ is mentioned as a fellow student of Plotinus (Vit.

Plot. 3 Henry-Schwyzer).1

Origen and Plotinus provide interesting comparisons. One good example

of Origen and Plotinus parting ways is Origen’s derivation of the second from

the first principle in terms of the act of the will from the mind, in contrast to the

rejection of such anthropomorphic notions in the emanation of Intellect from

Plotinus’ One.2 Plotinus does not conceive of pure divinity as divine mind,

nor as showing many of the traditional features of mind.3 Instead, Plotinus

1 There is an ongoing scholarly dispute over whether Origen studied under the

same Ammonius as Plotinus. Mark J. Edwards, ‘Ammonius, Teacher of Origen’,

The Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 44 (1993): 169–81 has recently argued

that Origen’s tutor was a different Ammonius (perhaps a Peripatetic philosopher

mentioned by Longinus) than Ammonius Saccas the Platonist, departing from the more

agnostic position of Richard Goulet, ‘Porphyre, Ammonius, les deux Origène et les

autres ...’, Revue d’histoire et de philosophie religieuses, 57 (1977): 471–96. Goulet

is uncertain as to whether Origen the Christian ever studied with Ammonius Saccas

(he dismisses study with any other Ammonius). Goulet, ‘Porphyre, Ammonius’,

p. 482 also touches on the interesting question of Porphyry’s meeting with Origen

the Christian.

2 Eberhard Schockenhoff, ‘Origenes und Plotin. Zwei unterschiedliche

Denkwege am Ausgang der Antike’, in R.J. Daly (ed.), Origeniana Quinta, Papers

of the 5th International Origen Congress, Boston, 14–18 August, 1989 (Leuven,

1992), pp. 284–95.

3 Henri Crouzel, Origène et Plotin. Comparaisons doctrinales (Paris, 1991),

pp. 38, 85–98.

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria64

envisions three basic ‘hypostases’ (immaterial metaphysical entities) in his

system: One, Intellect or Being, Soul. At the intermediate level, mind is

prominent. For in the perfect, self-thinking cognition of Intellect the Forms

have their being—there is a unity of thought and being. Beyond Being, there

is no mind, no definition for reality. Below Being, language emerges as a

symptom of the developing inferiority towards increased involvement with

matter. As I will try to show, in clearly recognizable form Plotinus places

language at the level of Soul.4 Language is not the purest expression of

exalted union, intellectual and spiritual.

Why are spoken utterances intelligible? Plotinus explains linguistic

understanding in light of metaphysical principles, not primarily as the transfer

of meaning from one mind to another. Meaning is explained as the presence

of immaterial Form to the air, a special kind of activity which depends on

Intellect. The reception of meaning in attending souls is explained in view

of the actualization of Form. This account of linguistic understanding and

the nature of meaning has some important advantages over the simple

models (vehicle, wellspring, container, garment) we have reviewed in his

Jewish and Christian Alexandrian counterparts. For Origen, Clement, and

Philo, language is a dominant feature of human rationality and divine power.

They usually claim that language involves immaterial meaning, carried by

a material vehicle. By contrast, Plotinus considers language to be entirely

incorporeal in essence, an activity which relates to the Forms. This account

has been largely ignored in Plotinian scholarship, providing balance to the

usual scholarly emphasis on the limits of discourse to speak of the One.

I argue that Plotinus develops his theory in connection with the ethical

and political dimensions of his philosophy, a topic of increasing interest in

Plotinian studies. This will involve Plotinus’ concept of unification with

Intellect, which I argue emerges from consideration of some key texts on

audience reception and political discourse (especially 6.5.10, 11–40 Henry-

Schwyzer). In the later stages of this chapter, we will review the unique

blend of mystical rigor and practical concern that informs Plotinus’ account

of moral and political discourse.

The Metaphysics of Language

Plotinus considers language to be a case of the general intelligibility of

everything governed by Soul, the bearer of Intellect.

In other words, the capacity of language to be understood depends on

the presence of the One. In view of the highest principle, all things are, all

4 By the term ‘Soul’ I mean the third hypostasis in Plotinus’ system, which is

the model of all souls.

Plotinus 65

things possess a share of value and form. Even the intelligibles themselves

are sequents of the One, entirely dependent on it for their being. The soul’s

pursuit of unity returns it upwards to perfect knowledge, consummated in

union with the One. Our highest calling leaves mind empty of itself and

full of the One. In his overall scheme of reality, Plotinus claims a highest,

albeit incomparable, rung in the ontological ladder which lacks all definition,

quality, and articulation as an explanation of why everything else has

definition, quality, and articulation. But it is this very source of reality to

which our souls aspire in spiritual attainment.

Image and Representation

Hence language is not relevant to our ‘higher’ life. Language is an

achievement of human nature in a rather low sense, as we might recognize it

in this terrestrial life. By comparison, contemplation is the proper function of

the soul—only by this primary activity is the soul to reach towards Being, but

also to constitute itself.5 As we will see, for Plotinus, in our ascent towards

contemplative actuality, reality and representation become increasingly

unified, until representation is eliminated. This will be experienced at

the point that language, or any other mode of representation (impression,

symbol, sign, image, picture) becomes irrelevant. For all representation

we use is provisional, removed from the realities themselves (5.8.4, 47–9

Henry-Schwyzer). In the road to reality, the soul will assume contemplative

fulfillment, much like nature itself engages in contemplation more

continuously than what lies below it (3.8.1, 1–2 Henry-Schwyzer). Souls

will surpass lower forms of cognition which trade in images or impressions

(6.5.7, 1–8 Henry-Schwyzer, especially 6.5.7, 4–6 Henry-Schwyzer). ‘So

then if we have a share in true knowledge, we are those (Beings), wresting

them not into ourselves, but rather we are in them.’ We will actually rise into

being the intelligibles, our soul being one with its objects of knowledge.

In fact, Plotinus institutes a developed activity of language and reasoning

as a function of Soul, not of Intellect (6.7.23, 18–20; 5.5.5, 16–27 Henry-

Schwyzer).6 There are different levels of expression, according to greater

5 Paul Kalligas, ‘Living Body, Soul, and Virtue in the Philosophy of Plotinus’,

Dionysius 18 (2000): 25–38 at 32–3.

6 John H. Heiser, Logos and Language in the Philosophy of Plotinus (Lampeter,

1991), pp. 49–57; Frederic M. Schroeder, Form and Transformation. A Study in the

Philosophy of Plotinus (Montreal and Kingston, 1992), pp. 69–79 claim misleadingly

that language is operative at the level of Intellect. They claim this under the sway of

5.3.10, 32–42; 5.3.14, 8–19; 5.8.5, 21–2 Henry-Schwyzer, perhaps also 5.4.2, 27–39

Henry-Schwyzer. However, any form of expression or cognition at this level is not

linguistic, it is more unified than Schroeder recognizes. The Intellect only ‘speaks’

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria66

and lesser degrees of unity. Images and icons express truth in a way that

more clearly reflects Being, the Forms (5.8.5–6 Henry-Schwyzer; compare

6.7.38, 1–25 Henry-Schwyzer).

In Plotinus ... , the thinking of intellect is viewed as non-propositional, in contrast

to the discursive thinking of reason. The gods do not see propositions (axiômata)

but images (agalmata). We may compare Egyptian hieroglyphs, or if Plotinus did

not mean hieroglyphs, ideograms on their temple walls, which being agalmata,

do not imitate the utterance of axiômata, but are all together at once (athroon).

The objects of intellect are not premisses (protaseis), axiômata, or statements

(lekta).7

This purer linguistic representation is proper to the level of Intellect,

depending more directly on the Forms. These representations are clearer

images of intelligible realities (5.8.6, 1–13 Henry-Schwyzer).

The wise men of Egypt too, I think, grasped by understanding, whether practised

or innate, that when they wanted to reveal something through their wisdom, they

should not use the imprint of letters, which expound sentences and claims, nor

use those which imitate the vocal utterances of propositions, but should draw

icons and imprint in their temples one icon each for each thing, to express the

non-discursiveness there (in the higher world of Being). The implication is that

each icon is a kind of understanding and wisdom and a coherent reality, not

discursive reasoning or thinking. At a later stage, based on this (wisdom) in

its coherence, there is an image with a different (status) yet now unravelled,

speaking it in discursive form and inquiring after the causes, according to which

it happens that there is wonder as to the beauty of the generated world in such an

excellent state.8

insofar as there is an expression at a lower level of its perfection. There is a ‘primal

response’ of Intellect to the One, not intelligible as a propositional, predicating, or

otherwise articulated response. Language and discursive reason comes into play

with soul in all its levels, as noted in John M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality

(Cambridge, 1967), pp. 100–101; Heiser, Logos and Language, pp. 6–9, 17–24, 49.

7 Richard Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators 200–600 AD. A

Sourcebook (3 vols, London, 2004), vol. 1, p. 91.

8 The words in parentheses supplement my translation of the Greek text. I

have adapted the translation from Sorabji, Philosophy of the Commentators, vol. 3,

pp. 228–9. 5.8.6, 1–13 Henry-Schwyzer: Doko¨usi d`e moi ka`i oHi Ahigupt´iwn sofo´i,e‘ite hakribe¨i hepist´jm^j lab´onteß e‘ite ka`i sumf´ut^w, per`i ˆwn hebo´ulonto di`asof´iaß deikn´unai, m`j t´upoiß gramm´atwn diexode´uousi l´ogouß ka`i prot´aseißmjd`e mimoum´enoiß fwn`aß ka`i profor`aß haxiwm´atwn kecr¨jsqai, hag´almatad`e grayanteß ka`i ”en “ekaston Hek´astou pr´agmatoß ‘agalma hentup´wsanteßhen to¨iß Hiero¨iß t`jn heke¨i ohu diexodon hemf¨jnai, Hwß ‘ara tiß ka`i hepist´jmj ka`isof´ia “ekast´on hestin ‘agalma ka`i Hupoke´imenon ka`i haqr´oon ka`i ohu dian´ojsißohud`e bo´uleusiß. “ Usteron d`e haph ahut¨jß haqr´oaß o‘usjß e‘idwlon hen ‘all^w

Plotinus 67

As a product of soul, language expresses truth less perfectly than icons.

Yet all levels of representation are images, suggestive of the ‘image’ status

of all levels of reality below the One. Egyptian icons are considered more

coherent than units of language. Even Intellect is an image, an icon (ehik´wn)

of the One (5.1.7, 1–2 Henry-Schwyzer). In turn, the Intellect is the archetype

of all other images, for it contains the pure images which furnish identity for

all the lower beings subject to difference. An interesting comparison could

be made between the wisdom of the Egyptian sages in expressing unity in

representation, and other ‘political’ texts I will take up later, describing the

nascent wisdom of citizen-souls attaining unity, with or without the guidance of

elders (6.4.15, 18–40; 6.5.10, 11–40 Henry-Schwyzer). Remarkably, Plotinus

tries to use his scheme of exemplar and image to unify all philosophy.9

The Logos of Plotinus

There is a rich conceptual investment in Plotinus’ notion of logos. Since this

is well known as a crucial element in Plotinus’ metaphysics and cosmology,

I will limit my reflections to a few points.10

hexeiligm´enon ‘jdj ka`i l´egon ahut`o hen diex´od^w ka`i t`aß ahit´iaß, dih ”aß o“utw,hexeur´iskon, Hwß t`o kal¨wß o“utwß ‘econtoß to¨u gegenjm´enou qaum´asai.

9 Lloyd P. Gerson, ‘Metaphor as an Ontological Concept: Plotinus on the

Philosophical Use of Language’, in M. Fattal (ed.), Logos et langage chez Plotin

et avant Plotin (Paris, 2003), pp. 255–69 at 260 provides an admirable discussion

of the ‘iconic’ status of all cognition and language, in dependence on Intellect.

‘Everything that is produced by the One with the instrumentality of No¨uß is doubly

an image. That is, it is an intelligible image of No¨uß and an existential image of the

One. The latter point is just the direct consequence of the fact that the One is the

cause of the existence of all. This duality of imagery, as we may term it, guarantees

the ontological groundedness of metaphor representations of everything inferior to

intelligible reality. Whereas in a non-Plotinian world we can readily distinguish an

image qua image from the same image qua what it really is, for Plotinus everything

is permanently an image of the first principle over and above the fact that it is or

contains an image of No¨uß.’

10 R.E. Witt, ‘The Plotinian Logos and its Stoic Basis’, Classical Quarterly, 25

(1931): 103–11; A.H. Armstrong, The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe

in the Philosophy of Plotinus (Cambridge, 1940), pp. 98–108; Heiser, Logos and

Language, pp. 17–21; Kevin Corrigan, ‘Essence and Existence in the Enneads’,

in L.P. Gerson (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus (Cambridge, 1996),

pp. 105–29 at 110–23. Rist, The Road to Reality, pp. 84–102 argues rightly that

logos is not a hypostasis distinct from Soul. A similar point is made by Michael F.

Wagner, ‘Plotinus on the Nature of Physical Reality’, in The Cambridge Companion

to Plotinus, pp. 130–70 at 136–7, 156–67.

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria68

Plotinus hierarchically arranges all manifestations of soul as derivations

of the highest Soul which is the primal rational expression (l´ogoß eˆiß) of

Intellect (4.3.5, 14–18 Henry-Schwyzer). Plotinus even claims that higher

logoi have priority in the Intellect over Disposition, Nature, and Soul (5.9.5,

24–5 Henry-Schwyzer). Soul, the expression of Intellect, functions as an

image (ehik´wn) of the Intellect. Soul is conceived as the activity and life

productive of being, issuing from Intellect like heat from fire (5.1.3, 6–10

Henry-Schwyzer). And the cosmic rational structure which is the work of

Soul, or rather World Soul subsumed under highest Soul, is formed by the

‘blueprint’ of all the more partial rational principles (l´ogoi) that spring from

the highest Soul. As we find in many later Platonists, the mediation between

immaterial realities and sensibles is assumed by the World Soul (4.4.9–10

Henry-Schwyzer).

It is noteworthy that Plotinus does not rely as heavily on the traditional

logos distinction as other Alexandrians such as Philo. The distinction still

appears in the relationship of logos in utterance, an imitation of inner logos,

and logos in the mind, an imitation and interpreter of intellect (1.2.3, 27–30

Henry-Schwyzer).11 Like Clement, Origen, and Philo, Plotinus features an

account of creation. But there is no anthropomorphic creator in whose image

we are made, and there is no concept of ‘speaking things into being’. In fact,

the possibility of a linguistic dimension to all structuring outflow from the

One is misleading—lower entities are connected to their source by reversion

11 Rist, The Road to Reality, pp. 100–101, denies any relations of influence

between Philo and Plotinus in connection with the logos distinction, for the

differences are too significant. ‘Plotinus, we then find, knows of the doctrine of the

two logoi (hendi´aqetoß and proforik´oß). He makes use of this distinction in at

least two places in the Enneads: 1.2.3.27 and 5.1.3.7. What he says in these passages

fits well together. In 1.2.3.27 l´ogoß hen fwn^¨j (the equivalent of proforik´oß) is an

imitation (m´imjma) of l´ogoß hen yuc^¨j (=hendi´aqetoß). Similarly l´ogoß hen yuc^¨jis an imitation and an interpreter (Hermjne´uß) of No¨uß. In 5.1.3.7 the l´ogoß henprofor^¨a is an image (ehik´wn) of the l´ogoß hen yuc^¨j (hendi´aqetoß) while the l´ogoßhen yuc^¨j is an image of no¨uß. First we may notice a similarity with Philo. The word

Hermjne´uß is used in discussing the two logoi in both Philo and Plotinus. But there is

also a difference. In Philo it is the l´ogoß proforik´oß which is an ‘interpreter’ while

in Plotinus this role is played by the l´ogoß hen yuc^¨j (or hendi´aqetoß). The fact of

the matter is that Plotinus has not followed Philo in fixing the l´ogoß hendi´aqetoßin the world of Forms. If Plotinus had followed Philo, this logos would have been

his second hypostasis—which it is not. Like the Stoics, but unlike Philo, Plotinus

has employed both logoi at the level of the World Soul. What then must our general

conclusion be? The use of the word Hermjne´uß—in different ways—in the two

authors can be given little weight.’

Plotinus 69

back towards the perfection of the One, in contact with a metaphysical

structure progressively abstracted and unified.12

Everything is formed by the unintentional emanation of the higher

principles downwards in progressively heavier material involvement.

Plotinus’ two world dualism of intelligible realities and sensible things unfolds

from the emanation from the highest principle of perfect unity downwards

into things enmeshed in matter. This basic metaphysical structure is the path

the soul must follow back to its source and life.

On every level, whether supraterrestrial, cosmic, or anthropic, bodies

are blessed with soul to govern with a view to the best. Soul must trouble

itself with running things well and establishing the characteristics that make

sensibles to participate in Being (intelligible reality). There is a goodness in

worldly things on account of this projected activity of Soul, a reflection of

the noetic realm, in spite of some harsh words from the master philosopher

Plato (4.8.1–6 Henry-Schwyzer).13 This goodness applies equally in the case

of the soul’s linguistic activity, as we will see.

12 On this point, I cannot follow Florent Tazzolio, ‘Logos et langage comme liens

à l’Origine dans l’hénologie plotinienne’, in Logos et langage, pp. 161–88. There is

no ‘language of the One’ which structures Plotinus’ entire metaphysical system by

connecting all entities to their source. Tazzolio presents his case as follows (p. 172).

‘Acte de l’Un, le Logos est Verbe dans un sens, génération de l’Intelligence dans la

Forme transcendante et de l’Idée propre à Platon, et, en même temps qu’acte du noûs,

vie et produit de l’Intelligence aussi. Le langage des Ennéades, dans l’engendrement

des êtres conduits par le Logos est celui de la contemplation. ... Le Logos, unité

ontologique de l’image, est le mode linguistique de la procession.’ But as Agnes

Pigler, ‘De la possibilité ou de l’impossibilité d’un Logos hénologique’, in Logos et

langage, pp. 189–209 has shown in some detail, even the highest logos of Intellect is

not a ‘henological logos’ conceived as a primary activity of the One. Pigler (p. 198)

notes the amorphous aspect of the One, without definition. ‘L’Un ne peut jamais

être réduit à l’ordre du logos, sinon il serait une Forme, et c’est pourquoi il y a un

abus certain à comprendre l’Intelligence comme son logos.’ Plotinus seems to say in

one text that Intellect is the logos of the One (5.1.6, 45–6 Henry-Schwyzer), but it

is vital to emphasize the silent isolation of the One (5.1.6, 12–13 Henry-Schwyzer).

Plotinus tries to account for why other entities arise, speaking of a kind of mysterious,

rebellious response to the One (t´olma). Intellect ‘dares’ to stand apart from the One,

John Bussanich, The One and its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus (Leiden, 1988),

pp. 80–83.

13 Soul’s activity improves lower levels of existence by its presence, Stephen

R.L. Clark, ‘Plotinus: Body and Soul’, in The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus,

pp. 275–91 at 286–7. Rist, The Road to Reality, pp. 113–16 takes the disanalogy

between our souls and World Soul a little too far, taking his cue from passages such

as 4.8.4–8 Henry-Schwyzer on the orientation and status of World Soul. World Soul

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria70

When speaking about the inferior work of logos and its subordinate logoi,

the logoi immanent in the material world, logos is Nature (f´usiß, 3.8.3–8;

5.8.3 Henry-Schwyzer). All things below conform to their immaterial

formative principles, including human individuals, being mere images and

imitations. All such principles have a unity in the single, highest logos, the

chief emanant of Intellect and the highest attainment of undescended Soul,

not a separate principle or hypostasis distinguished from Soul.14 The different

parts of things are blended into a unity in which life can flourish according to

physical laws of nutrition, combination of elements, and natural functions.

However, there is one important feature of this theory of logos. Plotinus

has left a gap between metaphysical principles (logoi), immaterial items

accessible to the soul (6.3.15, 29–38 Henry-Schwyzer), and accounting

for propositional truths. In other words, the truth of the claim ‘Socrates is

a man’ is presumably related to the principle which captures the being of

Socrates (as well as other metaphysical insights), but it is left mysterious

exactly how this works in view of the soul’s grasp of immaterial realities.

Plotinus might point out that the soul relates to the structures of language in

view of the intelligibles, for it is suited to understand and institute the logoi

of the intelligible world for every purpose, even for inferior imitations of

truth (1.2.3, 27–30; 5.5.1 Henry-Schwyzer). In his discussion of the truth

of Intellect, he claims that truth pure and simple is self-expressing, and the

knowledge of Intellect does not directly support the truth of structured,

complex expressions (5.5.1–3 Henry-Schwyzer). In what follows, we will

review the eruption of Soul into pure expression, imitating the birth of Intellect

(5.5.5, 16–27 Henry-Schwyzer). Of course, more detailed explanation of this

topic from Plotinus would be helpful. Or, as Gerson has recently argued, we

could understand this problem as more a confusion of thinking and being

than a failure to integrate two philosophically tasks distinguishable in other

philosophers, such as Aristotle.15

Limitations of Language, Origins of Language

Now we turn to the story of why language comes into being. Plotinian

scholarship has explored the limits of language in view of the One, a

prominent theme in Philo.16 Plotinus’ two highest metaphysical principles,

is distanced from Being and the One in much the same way as our souls are alienated,

World Soul must respond to perfect Soul just like any other soul.

14 Rist, The Road to Reality, pp. 86, 99–100 and others argue this unity of Soul

and its logos.

15 Gerson, ‘Metaphor as an Ontological Concept’, pp. 258–61.

16 Frederic M. Schroeder, ‘Saying and Having in Plotinus’, Dionysius, 9 (1985):

75–84; idem, ‘Plotinus and Language’, in The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus,

Plotinus 71

the Intellect (no¨uß) and the One (“en), attract discussion in several treatises as

to what can be said about them (for example, 5.3; 5.4; 6.9 Henry-Schwyzer).

I will bypass this issue, for the most part.

Language, although a falling away from perfection, is distantly inspired

by the ineffable source of everything; as I have argued, Plotinus connects

language (like discursive reasoning) to Soul more closely than to Intellect.

Abiding in light and silence, speechless commerce, closer union, these are

truer responses to the ultimate.17 In one late treatise (5.3.14, 8–19 Henry-

Schwyzer), Plotinus claims that the One is beyond linguistic expression, but

also the One gifts language to us. We cannot understand the One, but we can

be mystically influenced by the One.

Just like the enthusiasts and the possessed would understand only so much, that

they have a greater within themselves, even if they do not see what it is, from

which things they are moved and speak they take some perception of that which

moves (them), being other than that which moves (them), so also we are likely

to be oriented towards that (Supreme), whenever we possess pure Intellect,

divining that this is the Intellect within, conferring substance and all else which

is of this order; but it (the Supreme) is itself of a sort as not to be these things,

but something superior to this which we call Being, and also fuller and greater

than all our talk, for it is itself superior to language and intellect and perception,

providing these but not in its own right being these.18

Language (logos) is ultimately yet distantly inspired by the One, which

is distanced from language, intellect, and perception by ‘providing these but

pp. 336–55 at 343–51; Crouzel, Origène et Plotin, pp. 103–5; Heiser, Logos and

Language, pp. 59–72.

17 Schroeder, Form and Transformation, pp. 79, 89; idem, ‘Plotinus and

Language’, pp. 349–51 argues for the mimetic character of language as the expression

of union with higher realities. In spite of its inferiority, language (like all logoi)

indirectly depends on the One, as argued by Gerson, ‘Metaphor as an Ontological

Concept’, pp. 260–62.

18 The words in parentheses supplement my translation of the Greek text. The

translation is my own. The words in round brackets are meant to complete the sense

of the Greek. 5.3.14, 8–19 Henry-Schwyzer. h Allh “wsper oHi henqousi¨wnteß ka`ik´atocoi gen´omenoi hep`i toso¨uton k’an ehide¨ien, “oti ‘ecousi me¨izon hen ahuto¨iß,k’an m`j ehid¨wsin “o ti, hex ˆwn d`e kek´injntai ka`i l´egousin, hek to´utwn a‘isqjs´intina to¨u kin´jsantoß lamb´anousin Het´erwn ‘ontwn to¨u kin´jsantoß, o“utwka`i Hjme¨iß kindune´uomen ‘ecein pr`oß heke¨ino, “otan no¨un kaqar`on ‘ecwmen,cr´wmenoi, Hwß oˆut´oß hestin Ho ‘endon no¨uß, Ho douß ohus´ian ka`i t`a ‘alla, “osato´utou to¨u sto´icou, ahut`oß d`e oioß ‘ara, Hwß ohu ta¨uta, hall´a ti kre¨ittonto´utou, ”o legomen ‘on, hall`a ka`i pl´eon ka`i meizon ’j leg´omenon, “oti ka`i ahut`oßkre´ittwn l´ogou ka`i no¨u ka`i ahisq´jsewß, parasc`wn ta¨uta, ohuk ahut`oß ’wnta¨uta.

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria72

not in its own right being these’. One interesting feature of this passage is

the role of Intellect which is present to the soul, its knowledge fulfilling us

yet making us aware of its superior, the Supreme, which is beyond the limits

of what is perceptible, knowable, expressible, and speakable. As Plotinus

claims elsewhere, the intellect may report its union (t`jn sunous´ian) with

the One (for example, 6.9.7, 16–23 Henry-Schwyzer). Such a report of unity

is formed at a derivative stage. But it is also true that in some sense, all

uses of language are derived from the primal response of enlightenment. For

souls, this requires conformity with Intellect.

Plotinus says we are in accord with No¨uß in two ways: (1) ‘by having something

like its writing written in us like laws (n´omoiß)’ and (2) by being as if filled with

it and able to see it and be aware of it as present” (V, 3 [49], 4, 2–4). These two

ways of being in accord with No¨uß, expressed in Plotinus’ typically allusive

manner, should I believe be viewed from the perspective of metaphorical usage.

The ‘laws’ of No¨uß, whatever exactly these may be, mediate to us eternal truth.

The mediation is through the language of thought or expressions of thought in

words.19

All truths of language are dependent on the ‘writing’ in the soul, the

‘writing’ which issues from Intellect, although I doubt that the laws of

Intellect are extended in linguistic structures. Plotinus merely intends a loose

comparison to the inscription of laws. This dependent status of language is

described in other passages in terms of imitations of the imitations of the

One, the Forms which constitute Intellect (1.2.3, 27–8 Henry-Schwyzer). We

must rely on images of truth, as well as unknowing, mystical attainment.

Although language is remotely connected to the One, Plotinus demeans

language for involving difference and multiplicity. For one thing, language

has a scattered, discursive character (5.8.6, 1–9 Henry-Schwyzer), more

extended and dispersed than more unified forms of expression (5.8.5–6,

6.7.38, 1–25 Henry-Schwyzer). This recalls the cognitive limitations of our

incarnate condition, in which reasoning is required (logism´oß, compare

the similar Plotinian uses of dian´ojsiß, di´anoia, l´ogoß, bo´uleusiß), as

Kalligas describes.

Another important feature of discursive reasoning is its relation with linguistic

expression. Although linguistic formulations are by no means a necessary

prerequisite for the engagement in such reasoning, they reflect in the most

apposite way the mental process implied since, by the use of terms and various

combinatory forms, dianoia produces propositional statements, which can then

be asserted or denied, or even combined by means of syllogistic sequences and

thus form series of arguments or demonstrations purporting to reflect soul’s

19 Gerson, ‘Metaphor as an Ontological Concept’, p. 267.

Plotinus 73

insights into whatever it conceives as being reality. But this reality only vaguely

reflects the tightly-woven structure that—as we already saw—holds together

intelligible reality into a multiple unity. The disparity of the objects commonly

refered to or envisaged by the soul is such that only through logos they can be

brought together as to form ‘things’ bearing the semblance of unity and being.

And their shadowy instability causes them to appear as continuously changing,

either coming to be and passing away or undergoing all sorts of alterations which,

again, language is well-suited to describe.20

So reasoning, like language, is a consequence of diminished mental

and spiritual powers (4.3.18, 1–7 Henry-Schwyzer; compare 3.7.11, 35–45

Henry-Schwyzer, 5.8.6, 1–12 Henry-Schwyzer).21 Reasoning is inferior

to our more static, unified thought, often termed by Plotinus ‘intellection’

(n´ojsiß). This higher thought reaches for the continuous thinking of our

true intellect (no¨uß), a higher activity of soul beyond the brokenness of the

incarnate condition. This higher thought operates more at a strike, less as a

cognitive process. This continuous connection of the highest part of the soul

with the intelligible realm shows why it cannot be true that the soul apart

from body is rational, in a discursive, reasoning sense, and then becomes

irrational upon incarnation.22 Our reasoning down here must struggle along,

like a craftsman who fishes about in thought in dealing with problems.

Although the emphasis in Plotinus is on the mimetic nature of language,

it is useful to compare the Stoic view of the unity of propositions in terms of

a whole logos composed of an arrangement of parts.23 For the Stoics, human

language, in its basic structure, shows the rationality which orders the cosmos.

This rationality can be discerned in the grammatical structures of language,

which amounts to the nature of the parts of speech and the construction of

20 Kalligas, ‘Living Body, Soul, and Virtue’, p. 30.

21 Henry J. Blumenthal, Plotinus’ Psychology (The Hague, 1971), pp. 100–105

details how Plotinus uses the Greek terms t`o dianojtik´on and t`o logistik´on,

logism´oß/lógoß and dian´ojsiß/di´ánoia in a way that is highly parallel. There is

a significant difference between higher thought, captured in the undescended soul

which thinks without interruption, and the lower thought assumed by these Greek

terms, the reasoning which we do as incarnate souls. At its best, the lower can act in

conformity with the higher function.

22 Paul S. MacDonald, History of the Concept of Mind (Aldershot, 2003), p. 118

misses the significance of different levels of thought in Plotinus. ‘In its origin in the

intelligible realm every soul is rational; it is only through its descent into the host

body that soul becomes irrational.’

23 In Stoic linguistics, articulate, meaningful speech (l´ogoß) is formed from the

parts of speech which mirror the constituents of an incorporeal ‘sayable’ (lekt´on)ordered by a syntactical system. Stoic ‘sayables’ are introduced on p. 26–8 in

connection with the Stoic background to Philo.

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria74

these parts with one another. The human capacity for producing well ordered

linguistic structures reflects rational goodness, although only in the case of

the sage is it perfected. In contrast to Plotinus, linguistic sequences are not an

imitative unpacking of something which is more august, perfect, and unified.

Heiser develops this comparison.

Plotinus does not represent Soul, via Nature, as ‘uttering’ the Universe like some

cosmic logos prophorikos. He uses the Stoic term ‘utter’ exclusively for human

verbal utterance. But logos, whether it is being ‘uttered’ by a learner or simply

emerging on a lower level of reality as Nature’s creation, is always an ‘unfolding’

(anaptyssein) or an ‘unrolling’ (exelittein, anelittein) into multiplicity of something

more truly itself—because more one—at the higher level of Intellect. It is always

an expression and explication of a higher and more unified contemplation.24

Much of the difference from Stoic intellectual and spiritual perfection

(assimilation to divine rationality) lies in the contemplative, unchanging

destiny of the soul, a key point in my later discussion of discourse in political

communities. Contemplative unity with Intellect provides perfection in truth,

the soul being one with intelligible structure.25 And still higher beckons union

with the One, quite foreign to Stoic ideals.26 Unlike the Stoics, achieving the

ultimate in thought is pure activity, above particularity of soul and linguistic

representation.27

24 Heiser, Logos and Language, p. 19.

25 Kevin Corrigan, ‘La discursivité et le temps futur du langage chez Plotin’,

in Logos et langage, pp. 223–45 overstates the renewed, altered role of the future

tense for expressing the immense and undetermined sense of Plotinian metaphysics.

However, his remarks (p. 241) on the limits of commonly accepted truths are very

helpful. ‘Les représentations, les explications plausibles et les théories scientifiques

pertinentes peuvent nous rendre aveugles face à la réalité si nous les prenons pour

la vérité absolue sans les critiquer, mais elles peuvent aussi nous ouvrir à la réalité,

si nous sommes prêts à les faire voler en éclats afin d’entrevoir à travers elles la

réalité. ... Comme Plotin le précise: nous ne devrions pas confondre nos explications

au sujet du pourquoi des choses qui sont telles avec le fait qu’elles soient telles

(V, 8 [31], 7, 36–44).’

26 Keimpe Algra, ‘Stoic Theology’, in B. Inwood (ed.), The Cambridge

Companion to the Stoics (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 153–78 presents the essentials of

Stoic theology and spirituality.

27 Asger Ousager, Plotinus on Selfhood, Freedom and Politics (Aarhus, 2004),

pp. 31, 54 notes Plotinus’ adaptation of Aristotle’s idea that actual thought is identical

with its objects. Ousager argues (pp. 32–8) that there is no basis for distinguishing

individual souls on the level of assimilation to Intellect. However, Ousager argues

that there are Forms of particular souls which by necessary consequence serve in

the individuation of particulars, these Forms of our souls related to Soul as species

falling under a genus. Ascent to our particular Forms in Intellect is important to

Plotinus 75

A difficult passage about the birth of Being suggests an origin to expression

in the intelligible world as a type of response to the One, the source of all

things (5.5.5, 16–27 Henry-Schwyzer). In the discussion that leads into this

passage, an analogy is prepared with reference to number. The model from

which the numbers take their being, the monad, makes possible a dependence

in being in generating a sequence of numbers. A similar process is described

for the establishment of Being. The emergence of language is explained in

light of the primal relationships of these intelligible realities to the unmoved,

self contained One.

What is spoken of as Being, this primal from there above, advanced a little

outward, so to speak, yet willed to come no further, rather being turned inward

it stood firm, and came to be the reality and home of all things. It is like when in

the case of voice someone stresses (one’s voice), the word for One takes shape

(hen), meaning derivation from the One, and the word for Being is formed (on),

meaning that which has sounded as much as possible (for it to sound). In this

way, surely, what comes to be and reality and what-it-is-to-be involve imitation,

being effluent from the power of it (namely, the One). The Soul, seeing, being

moved by the sight, imitating what it sees, (the Soul) erupts into speech, (uttering)

‘Being’ and ‘what-it-is-to-be’ and ‘reality’ and ‘home’. These vocalizations wish

to signify the reality of that which has come into being by labored utterance,

copying, insofar as it is possible with them, the genesis of Being.28

explain our unification with other souls, which we examine later in this chapter. The

debate over individual Forms in Plotinus seems to be resolving in favor of their role

in explaining our higher identity, for example Henry J. Blumenthal, ‘On Soul and

Intellect’, in The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, pp. 82–104 at 99–100.

28 The words in parentheses supplement my translation of the Greek text. The

translation is my own. 5.5.5, 16–27 Henry-Schwyzer. T`o g´ar toi leg´omenon ’onto¨uto pr¨wton heke¨iqen oˆion hol´igon probebjk`oß ohuk hjq´eljsen ‘eti pr´oswhelqe¨in, metastraf`en d`e ehiß t`o e‘isw ‘estj, ka`i heg´eneto ohus´ia ka`i Hest´iaHap´antwn≥ oˆion hen fq´ogg^w henapere´isantoß ahut`on to¨u fwno¨untoß Huf´istatait`o ”en djlo¨un t`o hap`o to¨u Hen`oß ka`i to ’on sjma¨inon t`o fqegx´amenon, Hwßd´unatai. O“utw toi t`o men gen´omenon, Hj ohus´ia ka`i t`o e~inai, m´imjsin ‘econtahek t¨jß dun´amewß ahuto¨u Hru´enta≥ Hj d`e hido¨usa ka`i hepikinjqe¨isa t^w qeamatimimoum´enj ”o e~iden ‘errjxe fwn`jn t`jn ‘on ka`i to e~inai ka`i ohus´ian ka`i Hest´ian.Oˆutoi g`ar oHi fqoggoi q´elousi sjm¨jnai t`jn Hupóstasin gennjq´entoß hwd¨inito¨u fqeggoménou hapomimo´umenoi, Hwß oˆi´on te ahuto¨iß, t`jn g´enesin to¨u ‘ontoß.

I have benefited from the textual discussion of the latter portion of this passage in

R. Ferwerda, ‘Plotinus on Sounds. An Interpretation of Plotinus’ Enneads V,5,5,

19–27’, Dionysius, 6 (1982): 43–57, although my translation here reflects several

differences in interpretation, in particular rejecting some of his conjectures for

textual emendation.

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria76

Plotinus explains these difficult concepts from the phonetic properties

of Greek words, to show the derivation of Being from the greater power of

the One (5.5.6, 1 Henry-Schwyzer). Plotinus makes clear that Soul produces

these simple expressions, not Intellect. Even at this rarified level in the

intelligible realm, expressions are properly the work of Soul, in its imitative

response to Intellect. Apparently, the utterances of Soul at this level are

not predications. Its utterance is formed in the reversion towards its primal

source in the emergence of vocal sound. The mimetic capacity of unified,

single expressions ( ‘on, t`o e~inai, ohus´ia, Hest´ia) is explained along the lines

of a natural relationship between word and object.29 These pure eruptions of

vocal sound from Soul express reality (in fact, the birth of Being) even more

perfectly than the images and icons of the wisest souls (5.8.6, 1–13 Henry-

Schwyzer).

The Nature of Language

Up to this point, the focus has been the mimetic worth of all expressions of

soul. The presence of Intellect to soul (and to Soul) leads it upward to the

intelligibles, and the articulation of Intellect in logos provides order to the

plurality in the intelligible world (and in the sensible cosmos). In a final

sense, all order depends on the One, but Intellect is dominant in Plotinus’

theory of knowledge and truth. But we need a more complete metaphysical

picture, regarding the nature of language itself. In responding to the

Aristotelian categories, Plotinus provides valuable additional argument and

clarification of linguistic meaning (6.1.5, 1–14; 6.4.12, 1–28; 6.7.18, 41–5

Henry-Schwyzer). Plotinus claims that the essence of language (logos) is

incorporeal. Knowing the truth in what someone says is an illumination of

reality for the soul.

There is one passage which I will highlight, providing some clarification

of his views on what makes language intelligible. It occurs in the course of

his responses to the Aristotelian categories. This passage is found in Plotinus’

discussion of the category of quantity (6.1.5, 1–11 Henry-Schwyzer) which

takes up a few candidates to be quantities (Language, time, motion).

Language and time and motion, how (do these count as quantities)? First,

concerning language, if you like, for it is subject to measure. Yet language, being

this much in amount, is a (quantity), but insofar as it is language, it is not a

quantity. For it is signifying, like in the case of name and verb. Air is the matter

of it, like in the case of these (parts of speech). In fact, it (that is, language in

the looser sense) is composed from them. To be more precise, language is the

29 Also compare Origen on ‘magical’ as distinguished from ‘conventional’

names, p. 60.

Plotinus 77

striking, and not merely the striking, but the impression which is formed, like

shaping (of the air). So then it is an action and a signifying action. Actually,

one could reasonably affirm that this motion and striking is an action, while the

counter motion is an affection, or each (motion) is an action of one thing and

an affection of another thing, or (this motion and striking) is an action into the

substrate, while (the counter motion) is an affection within the substrate.30

Other passages on similar topics are not nearly as well developed as

this (4.5.5, 1–31; 6.4.12, 1–28; 6.7.18, 41–5 Henry-Schwyzer). Here we

are told that language signifies on account of the imposition of immaterial,

clarifying Form upon air. Air is the matter of spoken language (6.1.5, 4–5

Henry-Schwyzer), not vocal sound or fuzzy noise. The intelligibility by the

presence of Form is the essence of language, language qua language (l´ogo߈^j logoß, 6.1.5, 1–4 Henry-Schwyzer).

There is a useful comparison here with the soul’s activity in sense

perception. As in his account of the soul’s activity of sense perception, the

soul apprehends the qualities which come to bodies, the Forms (t`a e‘idj)

which make their impression (4.4.23, 1–3 Henry-Schwyzer).31 The objects

of sense perception, much like audible vocal sounds, are not strictly what

things are; the essence of objects of sense perception is a something (t´i) which is a logos (rational principle). Rather, the objects of perception count

as sensible substances, each sensible substance is a quale (poi´on), being a

mere imitation of its logos (6.3.15, 24–38 Henry-Schwyzer). The objects of

sense perception depend on ‘individual’ intelligible reality to keep them in

order. In the case of sense perception as in the case of utterances, there is a

looser sense of the being of objects, which is connected to categories like

30 The words in parentheses supplement my translation of the Greek text. The

translation is my own. 6.1.5, 1–11 Henry-Schwyzer. H O d`e l´ogoß ka`i Ho cr´onoßka`i Hj k´injsiß p¨wß; Pr¨wton d`e per`i to¨u logou, ehi boulei, metre¨itai m`eng´ar. h All`a logoß ’wn tos´osde hest´in, ˆ^j d`e l´ogoß, ohu pos´on≥ sjmantik`ong´ar, “wsper t`o ‘onoma ka`i to Hr¨jma. “ Ulj dh ahuto¨u Ho ha´jr, “wsper ka`i to´utwn≥ka`i gar s´ugkeitai hex ahut¨wn≥ Hj de pljg`j m¨allon Ho l´ogoß, ka`i ohuc Hj pljg`jHapl¨wß, hallh Hj tupwsiß Hj gignom´enj, “wsper morfo¨usa≥ m¨allon o~un po´ijsißka`i po´ijsiß sjmantik´j. T`jn d`j kinjsin ta´utjn kai t`jn pljg`jn po´ijsinm¨allon ’an ehul´ogwß tiß qe¨ito, t`jn d`e hantikeim´enwß p´aqoß, ’j Hek´astjn ‘alloum`en po´ijsin, ‘allou d`e paqoß, ’j poijsin ehiß t`o Hupoke´imenon, p´aqjma dh hent¨^w Hupokeim´en^w. There are textual difficulties. I have retained the reading of the

manuscripts (ka`i) instead of the conjecture of Henry-Schwyzer (kat`a) at 6.1.5, 8

Henry-Schwyzer. Also I reject their transposition of metre¨itai m`en g´ar from 6.1.5,

2 to fit into the following sentence (6.1.5, 3) in correspondence to Aristotle, Cat.

4b32–3. However, I follow Henry-Schwyzer in reading h All`a l´ogoß at 6.1.5, 2.

31 Blumenthal, ‘On Soul and Intellect’, pp. 87–90.

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria78

quality and quantity, and a stricter sense of the being of objects, which is the

essence.

Now I will add further remarks on how the nature of language relates to

Plotinus’ doctrine of the categories. The essence of language is described

in his discussion of the category of quantity (6.1.4–5 Henry-Schwyzer), in

parallel with time and motion. Language, time, and motion are quantities in

a secondary sense, while number is quantity in a primary sense (6.1.4, 1–52

Henry-Schwyzer). In a sense, these items are quantities, but in another sense,

they are not. The essence of language is activity, an incorporeal ‘signifying

activity’ (po´ijsiß sjmantik´j, 6.1.5, 7–8 Henry-Schwyzer).32 This activity

has the form of a ‘striking’ of air (tup´wsiß, 6.1.5, 6–12 Henry-Schwyzer;

compare 4.5.5, 8–27 Henry-Schwyzer), evoking Stoic terminology of

forming an impression in some malleable stuff.33 Like time, language is not

(strictly speaking) a quantity, but only in a secondary sense. Plotinus does

not return to the case of language in his full discussion of the category of

activity (6.1.15–22 Henry-Schwyzer).

However, Plotinus does not assume the Stoic distinction of corporeal

voice and incorporeal lekta, which we find adapted in Philo. Instead, Plotinus

uses the distinction between form and matter, the components of composite

things. The essence of language is an activity, and essences are always higher

entities than the composites that depend them (for example, 6.3.8, 30–37

Henry-Schwyzer). Essences are freer from material constraints, so the essence

of language, being incorporeal in nature, is not subject to the limitations of a

32 Kalligas, ‘Living Body, Soul, and Virtue’, p. 32 points out that the term

po´ijsiß is usually used by Plotinus for the secondary activity of the soul, while the

primary activity of the soul is contemplation (qewr´ia), the prototype of the higher

activity of the soul (pr¨axiß). ‘Like pr¨axiß in Aristotle, Plotinus’ primary activity is

a realization and actualization of a being’s nature in a way which implies the presence

of the aim of the act within itself, so that it can be considered as being perfect and

complete at any particular moment. ... In the case of the soul, this means that its

primary activity is directed towards the Intellect as a whole since, as we saw, the

foundation and the core of its being lies there and, moreover, comprises—in a way

which is peculiar to all intelligible beings—all the rest of the intelligible realm. This

amounts to saying that the proper, primary activity of the soul is its contemplation.’

I assume in my discussion below (in connection with 6.7.18, 41–5 Henry-Schwyzer)

that the activity of language, at any level, is subordinate to the proper activity of the

soul.

33 Compare Stoic epistemology, defining the impression (fantas´ia) as a

‘striking’ ´(tup´wsiß) in the soul (Plutarch, Comm. Not. 1084F Pohlenz = SVF

2.847). However, the nature of ‘striking’ attracted controversy in the school (Sextus

Empiricus, Math. 7.228 Mutschmann = SVF 1.484). The Stoic definition of vocal

sound is formulated as a ‘concussion’ of air (pljg´j) (SVF 2.138–42), although

unlike Plotinus this is conceived as a bodily item.

Plotinus 79

composite entity. Of course, the essence of language is precisely that which

is understood when there is insight in discouse situations. In a final sense, it

is a reflection of Intellect and thus it reflects the perfection of the One.

However, Plotinus does not always adopt concepts along these exact

lines. In other passages, voice is an entity dependent upon the individual

who speaks. This is shown in the following passage (6.7.18, 41–5 Henry-

Schwyzer).34

The primal activity is good, and what is defined in dependence on it is good, as

well as both together. And there is the good (which is the Intellect) that is generated

by it (which is the One), the good that is the intelligible order generated from it,

and the good that is both (Intellect and intelligible order) together. Derived from

it, then, not identical, for example if from the same (man) is derived voice and

walking and anything else, everything being set in proper order.35

Apparently, voice (fwn´j) is metaphysically the same sort of item as

the activity of walking. They are both derived from the individual, being

dependent in being on him, but these items are not qualities which inhere in

the individual, perceptible man. In light of the role of voice in parallel with

walking, this aspect of speech would be an activity. It is probably not the

proper activity of language qua language, although I don’t think that Plotinus

means to deliver a developed account in this brief notice about voice. The

involvement of voice with material constraints is likely.

In any case, we could interpret Plotinus to mean that voice is subject

to a double dependence. It is dependent not only in the sense of being a

derivative of the logos which is the activity of being the man. But also voice

is dependent in the sense of being subject to the proper activity which is the

essence of language.36

34 Plotinus makes clear in other passages that the perceptible individual is a

composite of form and matter (6.3.4, 1–37; 6.3.15, 24–38 Henry-Schwyzer). And I

think that in this passage regarding what is derived from the man, he has in mind the

perceptible man, in spite of the correspondence drawn to immaterial metaphysical

principles. Hence I suggest that perceptible persons, sounds, and walks are in

question.

35 The words in parentheses supplement my translation of the Greek text. The

translation is my own, supplemental words are supplied in round brackets. 6.7.18,

41–5 Henry-Schwyzer. Ka`i g`ar Hj hen´ergeia Hj pr´wtj hagaq`on ka`i t`o heph ahut^¨jHorisq`en hagaq`on ka`i t`o sun´amfw≥ ka`i to m`en “oti gen´omenon Huph ahuto¨u, t`o dh “otik´osmoß haph ahuto¨u, t`o dh “oti sun´amfw. h Aph ahuto¨u o~un, ka`i ohud`en tahut´on, oˆionehi hap`o to¨u ahuto¨u fwn`j kai b´adisiß ka`i ‘allo ti, p´anta katorqo´umena.

36 I will pursue the issue of the status of activities further, when I turn to Plotinus’

metaphysics of light and sound.

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria80

Now we have a more detailed picture of the nature of meaning. As an

incorporeal power bringing life to airy matter, the essence of language is an

activity in which the Forms are present. In orderly language use, the logos in

the soul is an activity, it functions as an interpreter of Intellect.37 Schroeder

points out the cosmic witness which expresses the goodness of Intellect in

the universe.

Plotinus gives voice to the cosmos’ declaration of its creator: ‘Looking upon

it one might readily hear from it, “A god made me,”’ (3.2 [47].3.19–21). This

passage seems to be reflected in St Augustine’s powerful phrase: Ecce sunt caelum

et terra, clamant, quod facta sint. Speech as declaration is located, not only in

ourselves, but in the cosmos of which we speak. We bring it to articulation. As

the word is not just our project but part of creation as a whole, we need not read

this passage merely in terms of the literary device of personification. As Intellect

creates the world, its icon, the creation, speaks to us of Intellect and (indirectly)

Intellect thus speaks to us, summoning us to itself.38

In my view, there is nothing fundamentally unique about our language as

an accomplishment of human nature. Our speech is merely a special case of

the intelligibility of everything, dominated by this immaterial structuring. It

is not a magic gift which enables culture and technological progress, in spite

of its important role in political affairs. By this point, we have seen how the

intelligibility of language depends on Intellect, which will emerge below

as the key to Plotinus’ explanation of the knowledge that blesses political

communities.

Soul and Body, Light and Sound

With our preliminary examination of the nature of language in place, we can

look further into the way language enters the world. Let us briefly consider

how soul and body are related, then we will consider the cases of light and

sound. These two phenomena are Plotinus’ favorite illustrations of how the

life of soul is projected into the inferior level of the body. These related

topics are crucial in attaining a clearer view of the way understanding of the

intelligible is possible in discourse.39 In particular, Plotinus addresses the

37 Schroeder, Form and Transformation, pp. 78–9 provides extensive explanation

of this point.

38 Schroeder, Form and Transformation, pp. 72–3.

39 In general, I am indebted here to the work of Schroeder, Form and

Transformation, pp. 28–36, 48–54, for recognizing the significance of light to

Plotinus’ theory of language. I agree that language has important connections to

light, although there are limits to the comparison. There has not been much work

on the Stoic contribution to Plotinus’ use of light and sound in his metaphysical

Plotinus 81

question of how linguistic meaning is made accessible to a field of auditors.

Thus he provides additional explanation of how articulate vocal sound in the

air is suited for linguistic understanding, which in turn undergirds his claims

about the uniformity of wisdom in political discourse.

Light is an important conceptual tool to explain the flow of perfection

downwards to lower realms, providing a useful point of comparison to

the intelligibility that blesses human utterances. The problem of how an

incorporeal soul can be related to material things draws attention in several

treatises (1.1.4, 14–16 Henry-Schwyzer; 4.3.22, 1–9 Henry-Schwyzer;

6.4.14–15 Henry-Schwyzer; 6.5.4–7 Henry-Schwyzer). Our souls address

the familiar activities of the body (for example, eating, drinking, vision)—yet

in a sense, the soul remains unaffected by the body. We see this point better

in the power of light. Light is not affected by the environment it suffuses.

For something to be full of light is not for some object to become actual

or to contribute to the effect of being illumined. Light is not blended with

air, although it is present to the air by enveloping it. ‘As the air is in light,

so the body is in soul, rather than soul in body.’40 For Plotinus, light is an

incorporeal entity, which is produced from corporeal sources like the sun or

fire. Light is ontologically dependent on the existence of a luminary source,

as an activity (hen´ergeia) determined by the nature of its source (4.5.6–7

Henry-Schwyzer). As it penetrates the atmosphere, it travels from its source

to illuminate objects on earth. Although it suffers no change, other things

are changed by its activity. Plotinus favors this metaphysics of light as the

clearest case of the derivation of everything from the One.41

Plotinus’ metaphysics of light trades on his ‘double activity’ theory, which

as adapted from Aristotle is also used to explain the procession of Intellect

from the One.42 Abiding in its source is the higher activity of light, yet light

also acts in procession from its source; the activity (hen´ergeia) which is

explanations, although Bussanich, The One and its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus,

p. 98 suggests some possible connections.

40 Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators, vol. 1, p. 205.

41 Schroeder, ‘Plotinus and Language’, p. 343. ‘Powers proceed from the

intelligible to the sensible world as light from light (VI.4.9.25–7). The examples of

spring and streams, snow and cold, and flower and scent work to the extent that they

illustrate this principle. Yet its paradigmatic instantiation is the procession of light

from its source. Thus the procession of sensible from intelligible reality is not merely

likened to the procession of light from its source. It is such a procession.’

42 Bussanich, The One and its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, pp. 28–31

provides detailed explanation, including Plotinus’ divergence from Aristotle. Both

Plotinus and Aristotle appear to treat hen´ergeia as activity as much as substance,

depending on the context of discussion (compare Bussanich’s remarks on d´unamißas potentiality as well as power).

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria82

substance (ohusía) produces a subordinate activity which is substance (5.4.2,

26–37 Henry-Schwyzer). For example, take the procession of heat from a

fire. The master activity of being fire abides in the fire, but a subordinate

activity of the fire issues from the fire, namely the fire’s activity of heating.

This relationship bears out the general principle that in everything there is

both a static activity (the power to act) and a dynamic activity derived from

it (the resulting action).43

If we assume an analogous scheme in our talk, the essence of language

is an activity which issues from a superior psychic activity. Presumably this

amounts to the same distinction expressed occasionally by Plotinus in terms

of inner and outer logos (1.2.3, 27–30 Henry-Schwyzer). It is arguable that

both of these activities are substances, although the external activity does not

proceed from the internal activity in a rigorously simple way, as in the case of

fire or light. Heat issues from light by necessity, in a way removed from these

activities of soul. Caught amid the hazards of bodily experience, the soul is

not primarily conceived as exercising freedoms to express itself, but rather

as traveling through experience, called to stability, quietude, liberation from

the body and its passions in desiring what is real and true.44 I suggest that

Plotinian speech is not produced by necessity like heat from fire, although

it could be tightly ordered, insofar as it issues from rational human control

over actions.45

Of course, there are other important differences between the nature of

language and the nature of light. Light seems to be a unique case of something

incorporeal issuing from a corporeal source.46 And sensible light is entirely

incorporeal, there is no material substrate which receives the form of light.

In some respects, the complicated discussions of light are more sophisticated

than the passages on language. The metaphysics of light shows how light

makes things intelligible, whether visible or invisible light is in question. For

example, light makes other objects intelligible, yet light itself can be an object

of sight (5.5.7 Henry-Schwyzer). This is a purer moment of vision. So in this

43 Schroeder, Form and Transformation, pp. 28–36, 62.

44 Georges Leroux, ‘Human Freedom in the Thought of Plotinus’, in The

Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, pp. 292–314 at 305–12.

45 Pauliina Remes, ‘Plotinus’s Ethics of Disinterested Interest’, Journal of the

History of Philosophy, 44 (2006): 1–23 at 7–13 helpfully elucidates the Neoplatonic

sage and action for ordinary living, which I cannot address within the limits of this

chapter.

46 Schroeder, Form and Transformation, pp. 24–39, 45–6, 50–53.

Plotinus 83

sense, Plotinus regards light itself as an object of perception distinguishable

from its illumination of objects.47

Another of his favorite examples uses sound to show the soul’s presence

to body (6.4.12, 1–28 Henry-Schwyzer; compare 2.8.1, 17–29). Sound is a

useful case for Plotinus to show the ubiquity of the intelligible. In addition

to the argument from sound, to establish the way soul is present, there is

some explanation of the way the intelligible is present when vocal sounds

are involved in auditory perception. This passage addresses the way meaning

(the presence of Form) is in the air from a slightly different angle than the

category of quantity discussion.

And just as the ear, being attentive, receives and perceives when on many

occasions voice is (dispersed) throughout the air and language (being) in the

voice, and even if you should interpose another (ear) in the vacuum, the language

and voice comes to it, or rather the ear comes to language, and many eyes look

towards it and all are filled with the vision, yet the object of vision is separated,

because the eye is one case, the ear is another case. In just this way, surely,

that which has the potential to obtain soul will obtain it and one thing, and still

another, will obtain it from the same (source). Now the voice is everywhere in

the air, not being one (voice) being partitioned, but rather one whole (voice)

everywhere. And with respect to sight, if the air by being affected takes the shape,

it does not take it partitioned; for wherever sight is positioned, there it possesses

the shape. But not every teaching countenances this view (of sight), nevertheless

let it be said, on account of that (observation), that the participation is from the

same unity. But the clearer case is that of voice, the Form is present as a whole

over the air space; for otherwise, it would not be true that every listener hears

the same thing, insofar as the language having been voiced would not be present

in every sector as a whole, and each hearing would not take in the entirety in a

uniform way. If it is not true even here that the whole voice is extended over the

entire air, so that one part of it is yoked with this bit, another mingled in with

another, why need one hesitate (to draw our conclusions), that the one soul is not

extended by being distributed, but is omnipresent wherever it is present and is

not partitioned at every point of the all? Coming into the condition of physical

bodies, as if it were generated, it will be correlative to the voice when it is voiced

in the air, while (the soul being considered) prior to bodies (will be correlative) to

someone voicing and about to voice; although even when coming to be in a body,

not thus does it desist from being according to someone voicing, who by voicing

both holds voice as well as produces it.48

47 I owe much to Schroeder, Form and Transformation, pp. 28–36, 48–54; idem,

‘Plotinus and Language’, pp. 341–2.

48 The words in parentheses supplement my translation of the Greek text. The

translation is my own. 6.4.12, 1–28 Henry-Schwyzer. “ Wsper d`e fwn¨jß o‘usjßkat`a t`on ha´era poll´akiß ka`i l´ogou hen t^¨j fwn^¨j o~uß m`en par`on hed´exato ka`i^‘jsqeto, ka`i ehi “eteron qe´ijß metax`u t¨jß herjm´iaß, ~jlqe ka`i pr`oß ahut`o Ho logoß

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria84

When the voice (fwn´j) is uttered, it is present at each point.49 Plotinus

emphasizes that the sound is present, which is analogous to the presence of

‘the Form as a whole’ (“olon t`o e~idoß).

Let us tease out some of his theory of auditory perception. Form

is actualized when the ear attends to it by its receptive capacity, but this

actualization can only occur uniformly (Homo´iwß). In fact, Plotinus’ argument

for the omnipresence of Form in the air contains the claim that every listener

hears the same thing. In another passage (3.8.9, 24–8 Henry-Schwyzer),

Plotinus’ omnipresence of voice over space shows the way exalted realities,

the Intellect and the One, are close to the soul.50 Something in the soul

ka`i Hj fwn´j, m¨allon d`e t`o o~uß ~jlqe pr`oß t`on l´ogon, ka`i hofqalmo`i pollo`ipr`oß t`o ahut`o e~idon ka`i p´anteß hepl´jsqjsan t¨jß q´eaß ka´itoi henafwrism´enouto¨u qe´amatoß keim´enou, “oti Ho m`en hofqalm´oß, Ho de o~uß ~jn, o“utw toi ka`i t`odun´amenon yuc`jn ‘ecein “exei ka`i ‘allo a~u ka`i “eteron hap`o to¨u ahuto¨u. ~ Jn d`eHj fwn`j pantaco¨u tou ha´eroß ohu m´ia memerism´enj, hall`a m´ia pantaco¨u “olj≥ka`i to tjß ‘oyewß d´e, ehi paq`wn Ho ha`jr t`jn morf`jn ‘ecei, ‘ecei ohu memerism´enjn≥oˆu g`ar ’an ‘oyiß teq^¨j, ‘ecei heke¨i tjn morf´jn. h All`a to¨uto m`en ohu p¨asa d´oxasugcwre¨i, ehir´jsqw dh o~un dih heke¨ino, “oti hap`o tou ahuto¨u Hen`oß Hj met´aljyiß.T`o de hep`i t¨jß fwn¨jß henarg´esteron, Hwß hen pant`i tw ha´eri “olon t`o e~id´oß hestin≥ohu gar ’an ‘jkouse p¨aß t`o ahut`o mj Hekastaco¨u “olou ‘ontoß to¨u fwnjq´entoßl´ogou ka`i Hek´astjß hako¨jß t`o pan Homo´iwß dedegm´enjß. Ehi de mjdh henta¨uqa Hj“olj fwn`j kaqh “olon t`on ha´era parat´etatai, Hwß t´ode m`en t`o meroß ahut¨jß t^¨wdet^¨w merei suneze¨ucqai, t´ode d`e twde summemer´isqai, t´i de¨i hapiste¨in, ehi yuc`jm`j mia t´etatai summerizom´enj, hall`a pantaco¨u ou ’an par^¨j paresti ka`i‘esti pantaco¨u tou pant`oß ohu memerism´enj; Ka`i genom´enj m`en hen s´wmasin,Hwß ’an g´enoito, han´alogon “exei t^¨j ‘jdj hen t^¨w ha´eri fwnjqe´is^j fwn^¨j, pr`o d`e twnswm´atwn t^¨w fwno¨unti ka`i fwn´jsonti≥ ka´itoi ka`i genom´enj hen s´wmati ohudhˆwß hap´estj to¨u kat`a ton fwno¨unta e~inai, “ostiß fwn¨wn ka`i ‘ecei t`jn fwn`jnka`i d´idwsi.

49 This text should not be translated, from the opening words onwards, along

the lines of the ‘vehicle’ model. MacKenna’s venerable translation loosely slips into

this mistake when Plotinus introduces the comparison, Stephen MacKenna (trans.),

Plotinus. The Enneads (London, 1991), p. 450. ‘Think of a sound passing through

the air and carrying a word; an ear within range catches and comprehends.’ Rather,

the basic notion is clearly of atmospheric uniformity ‘through the air’ (kat`a t`onha´era), not transfer of meaning.

50 Bussanich, The One and its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 97 notes in

commentary on 3.8.9, 24–8 Henry-Schwyzer the importance of this illustration in

Plotinian metaphysics. ‘This remarkable auditory metaphor for describing how the

soul can actualize the presence of the One has received little attention. Plotinus

often uses the sound of a voice to symbolize metaphysical doctrines. In the cosmic

metaphor at III.2[47].17.65–75 the sounds of all voices harmonize in a universal

melody. At V.1[10].12.14–20, to dramatize the omnipresence of Intellect to the soul,

he counsels the soul to rouse its ‘power of hearing to catch what, when it comes,

Plotinus 85

identifies with the intelligible, like an immense voice sounding everywhere,

available to the attentive soul. Here also the omnipresence of the higher entity

makes possible participation in this entity (5.5.9, 11–16 Henry-Schwyzer).

In the passage I have translated, Plotinus mentions the attention of the ear

(6.4.12, 1–18 Henry-Schwyzer). The soul is present to the body everywhere

yet nowhere, not confined by material limitations to a physical location, being

attendant as a whole to every bodily part. This feature, the presence of soul

as a whole to the several parts of the body, is used by Plotinus in other parts

of the Enneads to argue for the difference in nature between soul and body, a

classic Platonist claim that is also operative in Philo.51 The parts of the body

are extended and divisible in space, being diverse in nature and function;

under direction of soul, a faculty of auditory perception emerges in the ideal

location of the ears, nerves, and brain, best suited for receptivity (6.4.11,

3–14 Henry-Schwyzer). If a creature is not suited for receiving meaningful

vocal sound by the prior work of World Soul, the utterance is experienced

as mere sonic impact in spite of its meaningful content (6.4.15, 1–14 Henry-

Schwyzer). This creates a special connection with bodily organs, where the

principle (harc´j) of the actualization of the faculty for hearing is located

(4.3.23, 9–21 Henry-Schwyzer). But the psychic power of hearing, which

transcends the body, uses the physical organs of hearing instrumentally

(4.3.23, 17–21 Henry-Schwyzer). In other words, the World Soul in a prior

phase makes certain bodily parts suitable for receiving intelligible utterances.

In another (posterior) phase, soul affects the body in making actual the faculty

of hearing in these prepared organs of hearing.

It has been argued that Plotinus’ explanation of the psychic faculties

provides a model for other difficult cases of understanding the presence

of immaterial powers which show their activity at special points in the

physical world.52 For example, take the case of Intellect being nowhere and

yet being located in a special location at the edge of the universe. ‘If this

sounds strange, it might be helpful to compare these ubiquitous powers ... to

radio and television waves which, despite being present nearly everywhere,

require (functioning) radios and televisions for their actualization.’53 For like

is the best of all sounds which can be heard’ (16–17), i.e. that of the intelligible

world.’

51 Ejolfur K. Emilsson, ‘Platonic Soul-Body Dualism in the Early Centuries

of the Empire to Plotinus’, ANRW, 2.36.7 (Berlin, 1994), pp. 5331–62 at 5350–53

summarizes all of Plotinus’ major arguments in defense of this claim.

52 J. Wilberding, ‘‘‘Creeping Spatiality”: Nous in Plotinus’ Universe’, Phronesis,

50 (2005): 315–34 at 328–34.

53 Wilberding, ‘Creeping Spatiality’, p. 328.

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria86

the activity of light in the air, the presence of the intelligible in the air is not

a local presence.54

In summary, Plotinus’ frequent uses of light and sound serve to highlight

important features corresponding to the presence of Intellect to the soul, as

well as the presence of intelligible entities in space. In fact, the omnipresence

and uniformity of Intellect to souls provides the metaphysical scaffolding for

Plotinus’ account of the omnipresence and uniformity of wisdom to all souls

in considering the general civic welfare, which I pursue in what follows.

Language and Communion

Now we are ready for the interpersonal, ethical, and political dimensions of

Plotinus’ theory of communication. There is a general tendency to subordinate

all human activities to an austere ideal of contemplation. It is undeniable that

his extravagant program of dialectical ascent and metaphysical speculation

is a dominant theme. So it is remarkable that Plotinus devotes some thought

to the uniformity of wisdom in the discourse of political communities.

I will try to show that the reception of wisdom by souls is supported by his

metaphysics of the presence of the intelligible to the air, to make linguistic

understanding possible. The importance of Plotinus’ political philosophy, and

its relevance to his ethics, has only recently attracted substantial attention.55

Plotinus is well aware of the requirements of human life in civic society,

and the actions and choices that we must make in order to be virtuous (2.9.9

Henry-Schwyzer). This is an important part of his rejection of Gnosticism’s

dark vision of life in the material world (2.9.4–5, 9, 16–18 Henry-Schwyzer).

In civic discourse, souls can rise above their particular points of view. And

in seeking wisdom, there is a sense in which souls are unified, by virtue of

their connection to Intellect. Plotinus’ philosophy of language does not take

its cue from diversity of understanding, the untidy negotiations of interactive

talk.

54 Schroeder, Form and Transformation, pp. 25–8, 45–6, 50–53.

55 Ousager, Plotinus on Selfhood, Freedom and Politics, pp. 211–84; Remes,

‘Plotinus’s Ethics of Disinterested Interest’, pp. 1–23; Leroux, ‘Human Freedom in

the Thought of Plotinus’, pp. 292–314. Leroux makes a few inviting comparisons

with Kantian moral and political theory.

Plotinus 87

Soul Connection

For Plotinus, language is intimately associated with the incarnate state of the

soul held in a worldly body (4.3.18 Henry-Schwyzer).56 Purer experience is

possible in a higher form of life freer from the body, however our incarnate

difficulties require discourse about many particulars. Similar to Origen,

Plotinus describes the requirement of language in our troublesome embodied

state to communicate our minds. Yet on an advanced level, Plotinus refines

language past recognition, or simply discards it, as souls ascend to pure

knowledge.57

Some passages describe a pure communion of souls in the intelligible

realm—I will argue that this concept of soul connection in Plotinus can easily

be misunderstood. It must be carefully qualified in view of the centrality of

Intellect. This concept of exchange is interpersonal but not overtly political.

In one of the lengthy tractates on problems of the soul (4.3.18, 7–24 Henry-

Schwyzer), Plotinus describes a more closely unified form of shared

knowledge among souls than is possible in the sensible world.

Now if there above (things are) without reasoning, how would (souls) still be

rational? Perhaps because, someone might reply, they have the potential, when

circumstance (arises), to be flush in deliberation. And we must understand the

reasoning that is of this sort—if we understand reasoning which always flows

from the Intellect, being in them a disposition, a standing activity, being like

a reflection (of Intellect); (in this sense) there would be (souls) engaged in

reasoning there above. Certainly, in my opinion, we should not consider that

(souls) use vocal sounds in the intelligible world, although in the heavens (souls)

altogether possess bodies. As many things as they discuss on account of needs or

difficulties here below, there above it would not be so; but rather acting in perfect

arrangement and according to nature, they order no particulars nor is counsel

taken, rather they know from one another in understanding. For even here below,

silent eyes have knowledge of many things, while there above all body is pure

56 Rist, The Road to Reality, pp. 135–51; Crouzel, Origène et Plotin, pp. 227–

404 address the issues of psychology, metaphysics, soteriology, and ethics which

are raised by Plotinus’ understanding of the predicament of souls embodied here on

earth.

57 It has been argued that Plotinus also goes far beyond Origen in working

out a detailed theory of the grades of virtue, in John Dillon, ‘Plotinus, Philo and

Origen on the Grades of Virtue’, in H.-D. Blume and F. Mann (eds), Platonismus

und Christentum. Festschrift für Heinrich Dörrie (Münster Westfalen, 1983),

pp. 92–105.

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria88

and each (being) is, as it were, an eye, nothing hid or counterfeit, but by sight

alone it knows prior to speaking to another.58

Our dependence on language is necessary for present purposes, but it is

merely a dim reflection of higher forms of understanding when we are free from

our familiar bodily existence. The argument proceeds from silent knowledge

shared from visual contact in our present state, to establish the dominance of

vision in sharing knowledge in the life to come.59 Communication is described

as still, immediate, complete. Bodily hindrances will be removed to attaining

knowledge in ‘understanding’ (súnesiß), a somewhat lightly used word in

Plotinus which often concerns the contact of the soul with the intelligible

realm (nojt´oß t´opoß).60 Plotinus notes the role of ‘soul vehicles’, although

vocal sound is not part of the picture in an environment without the air we

experience down here.61

Actually, I find this passage a little misleading, in that some key elements

are not visible on the surface of this discussion. For as I will argue below,

communication among souls on every level is fundamentally explained

by their inner access to higher realities. In the intelligible world as well,

these purer connections among souls can only be forms of contemplation.

Contemplation is a still, silent activity which assumes the perfections of

58 The words in parentheses supplement my translation of the Greek text. The

translation is my own. 4.3.18, 7–24 Henry-Schwyzer. h Allh ehi heke¨i ‘aneu logism¨wn,p¨wß ’an ‘eti logika`i e~ien; ’ J “oti d´unantai, e‘ipoi tiß ‘an, “otan per´istasiß,ehupor¨jsai diaskopo¨usai. De¨i de ton logism`on labe¨in t`on toio¨uton≥ hepe`ie‘i tiß logism`on lamb´anei t`jn hek no¨u hae`i ginom´enjn ka`i o~usan hen ahuta¨ißdi´aqesin, ka`i hen´ergeian Hest¨wsan ka`i oion ‘emfasin o~usan, e~ien ’an khake¨ilogism^¨w crwmenai. Ohud`e dj fwna¨iß, o~imai, cr¨jsqai nomist´eon hen m`en t^¨wnojt^¨w o‘usaß, ka`i pampan s´wmata dh heco´usaß hen ohuran^¨w. “ Osa m`en di`a cre´iaß’j dih hamfisbjt´jseiß dial´egontai henta¨uqa, heke¨i ohuk ’an e‘ij≥ poio¨usai d`e hent´axei ka`i kat`a f´usin “ekasta ohudh ’an hepit´attoien ohudh ’an sumboule´uoien,gin´wskoien dh ’an ka`i ta parh hall´jlwn hen sun´esei. h Epe`i ka`i henta¨uqa poll`asiwp´wntwn gin´wskoimen dih homm´atwn≥ heke¨i de kaqar`on p¨an t`o s¨wma ka`i oionhofqalm`oß “ekastoß ka`i ohud`en d`e krupt`on ohud`e peplasm´enon, hall`a pr`inehipe¨in ‘all^w hid`wn heke¨inoß ‘egnw.

59 Ousager, Plotinus on Selfhood, Freedom and Politics, p. 43 discusses the

Platonic roots of the ocular metaphor for the soul.

60 For example, 5.8.13, 23 Henry-Schwyzer; compare Plato, Rep. 517B5.

61 The concept of the soul’s otherworldly garment is inherited from Plato (Plato,

Phaedr. 247B, Phd. 113D, Tim. 41D–E; Plotinus 4.3.18 Henry-Schwyzer; 4.4.5

Henry-Schwyzer). Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators, vol. 1, pp. 221–41

introduces vehicles of soul in Later Greek philosophy.

Plotinus 89

highest Soul (5.1.2, 11–14 Henry-Schwyzer).62 At an even higher level of

focus, the soul has no separate object for its contemplation; it unifies with

Intellect and finally with the One. Eyes and ears have no place in experience

of the highest things, where intellection is perfected (5.5.12, 1–14 Henry-

Schwyzer). In the end, souls merge into the One, abandoning particularity.63

Of course, the actualization of intellect in the soul, whether stimulated by a

process of thought or by communication, is not really knowledge of anything

the soul does not already know. Knowledge is only accessible by the soul’s

prior connection to the Forms, it must only be awakened by some spark. The

two main uses of recollection in the Platonic dialogues are to prove the prior

existence of the soul and to show how learning is possible. Plotinian Platonic

recollection is an awakening to knowledge, a purification of the mind in

restoration to its transcendent wellspring (5.3.2, 9–14; 6.2.22, 3–7 Henry-

Schwyzer), attaining a greater awareness of the higher, continuous activity

of soul in accessing the intelligibles.64

I have argued that Plotinus’ notion of soul connection is fundamentally

the soul’s contemplation of Intellect. Now I will try to show that linguistic

understanding can be seen as the unification of souls in their assimilation

to Intellect, with reference to ethics and public life. There are two passages

which deserve special attention (6.5.10, 11–40; 4.4.39, 11–22 Henry-

Schwyzer)—we have already noted the disarray, compared to higher

communions, that afflicts many interchanges in our worldly sphere of talk

(4.3.18, 7–24 Henry-Schwyzer). In my opinion, Plotinus recognizes degrees

of linguistic understanding in this-worldly situations of discourse, in spite of

the dependence of all linguistic intelligibility on the uniformity and wholeness

from the Forms of Intellect. For some contributions to political discussion are

more orderly than other contributions birthed from uncontrolled desires, by

reflecting wisdom and truth in the intelligible world more perfectly (6.4.15,

18–40 Henry-Schwyzer). In the spirit of Plato’s vision of a happy political

community ordered by philosophical knowledge in the Republic, Plotinus

maintains an ideal of civic unity in view of the intelligibles.

62 Above the level of soul, a similar theme of silent unity appears in the self

knowledge of Intellect (5.3.10, 45–6 Henry-Schwyzer). Plotinus describes an

irruption of duality into this still, silent intellection, when thinking splits the thinker

in twain.

63 Regarding the significance of individual Forms in the ascent to the One,

I defer to the work of Ousager, Plotinus on Selfhood, Freedom and Politics,

pp. 95–110.

64 Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators, vol. 1, p. 172. ‘Recollection

is acknowledged by Plotinus. But it is needed only by the lower soul, not by the

undescended soul which is uninterruptedly thinking the Forms.’

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria90

Plotinus claims that unities formed in civic debates imitate the

contemplative activity of the soul communing with the intelligibles.65 This

imitation depends on souls becoming one with intellect.66 Wisdom is present

to each assembled communicant as a whole, similar to the omnipresence

of vocal sound in an auditory field, or the omnipresence of Form in the air.

The higher calling of the soul to contemplation of the forms (Intellect) is the

resource to unify citizen-souls in a public assembly, as well as what makes

the actions of the Plotinian sage good.67

The Unity of Souls in Politics

Plotinus conceives the state, when functioning well, as a perfectly harmonious

political unity. On occasion, Plotinus describes the cosmic order in similar

terms as the civic order and the anthropic order, although there is a hierarchy

of orders. Members of the cosmic order (the stars and planets) are subject

to law (2.3.8, 1–9 Henry-Schwyzer), while it is meet for the souls who

live in the city to honor virtue and law (1.2.1, 46–53; 1.2.2, 13–26 Henry-

Schwyzer). In fact, it is possible for the laws of the city to be perfected by an

ecstatic vision, as in the case of Minos, whose laws capture higher truths in

political application (6.9.7, 23–6 Henry-Schwyzer). The civic order is also

the work of the cosmic principle (logos), the universal expression of Intellect

applied to government. The following text describes legislation and civic

harmony being established in analogy to the logos of the All (4.4.39, 11–22

Henry-Schwyzer).

The logos of the All would be more in accordance with the logos that establishes

the order and law of a city, which knows already what the citizens will do and

for what reasons they will do it, legislating in view of all these things, weaving

together by the laws all their experiences and actions and the rewards and

punishments upon the actions, everything proceeding smoothly into harmony as

if of its own accord. The signification is not (present) for the sake of this, to the end

that there is signifying primarily; but when things happen in this way, different

things are signified from different quarters. (This is the case) because all is unity

and belonging to unity, and one thing is known by way of another, a cause in the

65 Ousager, Plotinus on Selfhood, Freedom and Politics, pp. 274–84 addresses

the power of philosophical contemplation applied to the civic arena.

66 Remes, ‘Plotinus’s Ethics of Disinterested Interest’, pp. 10–11 discusses

different levels of virtue, including the higher virtues of the sage, which may not be

shared by all citizens.

67 Kalligas, ‘Living Body, Soul, and Virtue’, pp. 31–3; Remes, ‘Plotinus’s Ethics

of Disinterested Interest’, pp. 11–13.

Plotinus 91

light of the caused, the posterior as arising from the prior, the compound from the

constituents, in that (the order) makes the constituents connected together.68

Actually, this passage about law, civic order, and signification provides

no explanation of linguistic understanding in its own right. The knowledge

belonging to logos, active in excellent political function, is loosely parallel to

the knowledge of what happens in the universe under its cosmic legislation

(2.3.8, 1–9 Henry-Schwyzer). In fact, the point of signification in this passage

has no direct relevance to linguistic political functions, such as informing

benighted citizens of their limited condition, along the lines of the Allegory

of the Cave in the Republic.69 This is a more sovereign kind of signification

than linguistic signification, although it is also true, of course, that laws and

customs may be articulated in linguistic form. Rather, this signification has

to do with the intellectual foresight accessible by dint of Soul’s recourse

to civic logos in administering the city; there is no need for language or

reasoning when wisdom and knowledge are in control. (Compare 4.4.11,

1–13 Henry-Schwyzer on the simplicity of the administration of the universe

by cosmic intelligence, which features no extended intellectual processes.)

In the All, different stars signify different things, under the governance of

cosmic law. Plotinus repeatedly claims that this signifying activity only

foreshows what is to come, but the heavenly bodies do not enter into causal

relationships (2.3.1–10 Henry-Schwyzer). In accordance with this cosmic

scheme, the activity of this civic logos consists in knowing future events

and the general order which subsumes the parts. Even in their limited state,

souls within the political community might understand this order, perhaps by

attending to some partial aspect of the entire civic harmony, even when the

underlying unity is not a focus of awareness to the soul. The duties, customs,

68 The words in parentheses supplement my translation of the Greek text. The

translation is my own. 4.4.39, 11–22 Henry-Schwyzer. h All`a mallon ’an heo´ikoiHo l´ogoß to¨u pant`oß kat`a l´ogon tiq´enta k´osmon p´olewß ka`i nomon, ‘jdjehid´ota ”a praxousin oHi pol¨itai ka`i dih ”a praxousi, ka`i proß ta¨uta p´antanomoqeto¨untoß ka`i sunufa´inontoß to¨iß n´omoiß t`a paqj p´anta ahut¨wn ka`i t`a‘erga ka`i t`aß hep`i to¨iß ‘ergoiß tim`aß ka`i hatim´iaß, p´antwn Hod^¨w oion ahutom´at^jehiß sumfwn´ian cwro´untwn. H J d`e sjmas´ia ohu toutou c´arin, “ina sjma´in^jprojgoum´enwß, hallh o“utw gignom´enwn sjma´inetai hex ‘allwn ‘alla≥ “oti g`ar ”enka`i Hen´oß, ka`i haph ‘allou ‘allo gin´wskoith ‘an, ka`i hap`o ahitiato¨u de to a‘ition,ka`i to Hep´omenon hek to¨u projgjsam´enou, ka`i t`o sunqeton hap`o qat´erou, “otiq´ateron ka`i q´ateron Homo¨u poi¨wn.

69 The question of how the enlightened philosopher addresses the city is

dominant in the recent discussions of the ‘political’ Plotinus by Ousager, Plotinus

on Selfhood, Freedom and Politics, pp. 274–84; Remes, ‘Plotinus’s Ethics of

Disinterested Interest’, p. 13.

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria92

contributions, and concerns of civic life would all be significations in this

sense from some angle or other.

And in a sense, when we are in tune with Intellect, something like laws are

inscribed in our souls (5.3.4 Henry-Schwyzer). This is our true kingship, it

is self knowledge. The good citizen will know what is lawful and virtuous to

do in the political community in light of these truths delivered from Intellect,

with knowledge relevant to whatever might transpire in political discourse

and civic administration.70

Let us turn to the second key passage about the life of souls governed

by civic order. This is the clearest presentation in the Enneads of linguistic

understanding, showing a focus on the discovery of virtue in the civic sphere

(6.5.10, 11–40 Henry-Schwyzer).

And it is true that wisdom is as a whole for all (souls). Hence wisdom is compresent

(to all), not being in this way for one, in another way for another. For it would be

absurd that wisdom is limited with respect to place. Wisdom is not like whiteness,

for wisdom is not (an accident) of a body; rather if we truly participate in wisdom,

it must be as one, the same, all united with itself. And from there (wisdom is

present) in this way, (we are) not appropriating portions of it, nor I one whole

having been torn away, you another whole. And even the assemblies and every

meeting imitate (this process of unification), in that individuals come into unity

with respect to wisdom. In fact each man separately is weak in wisdom, although

growing together into unity every man in the meeting and understanding which

is genuine begets wisdom and discovers it. What then will hinder mind from

one quarter or another from being in the same (center)? Rather, when we are

at one we do not seem to be at one; for example, if someone touches the same

(string) with many fingers, one believes another (string) and still another to be

touched, or strikes the same string even unawares. Or yet consider (our) souls

insofar as we contact the Good; I do not grasp a piece of it and you another, but

the same thing, not the same thing yet one effluent coming from above for me

while another for you, to the end that (the Good) is in some sense above while

its effluents are down here. In fact the giver <gives> to the partakers, so that they

might truly receive, [and the giver gives] not to alien (partakers), but to domestic

ones. Since not a work of transmission is the intelligible giving, since even in

the case of bodies divorced from one another in respect of localities the giving

is cognate one to another, and the giving and producing is directed towards it (in

the bodily realm), and the bodily in the All acts and is affected within itself, with

nothing from outside (coming to bear) on it. Now if in the case of body, which is

by nature of a sort to slip away from itself, nothing from outside (incurs), how (is

it possible for anything from outside to enter) in the case of the unextended?71

70 Compare Phdr. 276A1–9 on the logos written with knowledge in the soul.

71 The words in parentheses supplement my translation of the Greek text. In

the Greek text I closely follow the bracketing of Henry and Schwyzer, this appears

in the translation as corner or square brackets. The translation is my own. 6.5.10,

Plotinus 93

The chief element in this process is the discovery and begetting within the

individual, when there is genuine alignment, of intellectual enlightenment.

There is an awakening to truth in souls in the community like the cloaked

harmony of lyre strings. This deepening of intellect cannot be adequately

explained simply as the mutual understanding achieved in talk exchanges.

As I have translated Plotinus, ‘not a work of transmission is the intellectual

giving’. I would argue that the enlightenment ‘behind’ such occasions in

the civic sphere is essentially an inner identification with Intellect. The

intelligible is sufficient and complete to all citizens, similar in Plotinus’

eyes to the sufficiency, wholeness, and stability experienced by lovers of

Beauty (6.5.10, 1–11 Henry-Schwyzer; cf. Symp. 203C6–D3). In this sense,

under the concept of linguistic understanding as an approach to immaterial,

undivided reality, there is a unification of souls in the public arena. This

unification is not achieved, apparently, by means of attaining partial or

negotiated understanding among souls locked in public discourse over time.

Particular intellects come to transcend their points of view, indeed the

shared knowledge is described as progressively divorced from all individual

perspective. Wisdom and truth is just what is, without regard for what is

good for one person, what is good for another person, or even for a body of

citizens; it is the Good for all, in that it is perfectly and evenly good, and yet

11–40 Henry-Schwyzer. Ka`i g`ar ka`i t`o frone¨in p¨asin “olon≥ di`o ka`i xun`ont`o frone¨in, ohu t`o men ˆwde, t`o d`e Hwd`i ‘on≥ gelo¨ion g´ar, ka`i t´opou de´omenont`o frone¨in ‘estai. Ka`i ohuc o“utw t`o frone¨in, Hwß t`o leuk´on≥ ohu g`ar s´wmatoßt`o frone¨in≥ hallh e‘iper ‘ontwß met´ecomen to¨u frone¨in, ”en de¨i e~inai t`o ahut`op¨an Heaut^¨w sun´on. Ka`i o“utwß heke¨iqen, ohu mo´iraß ahuto¨u lab´onteß, ohud`e“olon heg´w, “olon d`e ka`i su, hapospasq`en Hek´ateron Hekat´erou. Mimo¨untai d`eka`i hekkljs´iai ka`i p¨asa s´unodoß Hwß ehiß ”en t`o frone¨in hi´ontwn≥ ka`i cwr`iß“ekastoß ehiß t`o frone¨in hasqen´jß, sumb´allwn d`e ehiß ”en p¨aß hen t^¨j sun´od^wka`i t^¨j Hwß haljq¨wß sun´esei t`o frone¨in heg´ennjse ka`i eure≥ t´i g`ar d`j kaidie´irxei, Hwß m`j hen t^¨w ahut^¨w e~inai no¨un haph ‘allou; h Allh Homo¨u ‘onteß Hjm¨inohuc Homo¨u doko¨usin e~inai≥ oˆion e‘i tiß pollo¨iß to¨iß dakt´uloiß hefapt´omenoßto¨u ahuto¨u ‘allou ka`i ‘allou hef´aptesqai nom´izoi, ’j t`jn ahut`jn cord`jn m`jHor¨wn kro´uoi. Ka´itoi ka`i ta¨iß yuca¨iß Hwß hefapt´omeqa to¨u hagaqo¨u hecr¨jnhenqume¨isqai. Ohu gar ‘allou m`en heg´w, ‘allou d`e s`u hef´apt^j, hall`a to¨u ahuto¨u,ohud`e to¨u ahuto¨u m`en, proselq´ontoß d´e moi Hre´umatoß heke¨iqen ‘allou, so`i d`e‘allou, “wste t`o men e~ina´i pou ‘anw, t`a de parh ahuto¨u henta¨uqa. Ka`i <d´idwsi>

t`o did`on to¨iß lamb´anousin, “ina ‘ontwß lamb´anwsi, [ka`i d´idwsi t`o did`on] ohuto¨iß hallotr´ioiß, hall`a toiß Heauto¨u. h Epe`i ohu p´ompioß Hj noer`a dosiß. h Epe`ika`i hen to¨iß diestjk´osin haph hall´jlwn to¨iß t´opoiß s´wmasin Hj d´osiß ‘allou‘allou suggen´jß, ka`i ehiß ahut`o Hj dosiß ka`i Hj poijsiß, ka`i t´o ge swmatik`onto¨u pant`oß dr^¨a ka`i pascei hen ahut^¨w, ka`i ohud`en ‘exwqen ehiß ahut´o. h Ei d`j hep`is´wmatoß ohud`en ‘exwqen to¨u hek f´usewß oˆion fe´ugontoß Heaut´o, hep`i pr´agmatoßhadiast´atou p¨wß t`o ‘exwqen;

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria94

it is good for none, insofar as it is good independent of any point of view.72

And apparently, this wisdom accompanies public discourse. Souls receive

enlightenment from the intelligibles in assemblies and meetings when wisdom

prevails, when souls are awakened to genuine understanding. Presumably,

on these civic occasions there is a particularly sovereign actualization of

the Forms of Intellect made accessible to an audience, a higher connection

than the intelligibility present whenever there is linguistic understanding

(2.8.1, 17–29; 6.4.12, 1–28 Henry-Schwyzer). This seems to be operative in

Plotinus’ description of the quiet unity of the elders in the assembly, spread

throughout the tumultuous multitude by an inspired speech (6.4.15, 18–40

Henry-Schwyzer).

Conclusion

Now for some concluding remarks. Plotinus’ explanatory recourse to higher

realms might seem extravagant, in view of the familiar purposes served

by language use. The point of discourse is serving ulterior purposes, for

example, warning someone of the hazards of military service (suggested in

3.2.8, 31–7 Henry-Schwyzer). Language use takes shape in the process of

understanding one another in view of these purposes. I think Plotinus would

handle the objection as follows. His view of language subsumes it in his

panoramic scheme of intelligible order. Similar to the subordinate role of

the civic virtues in his ethics, the standard quotidien functions of language

have their place in his philosophy of language. For all language use fits into

a higher order which may be understood to govern human interaction and

political community. So even the interactive, negotiated aspects of ordinary

talk exchanges are dependent on our recourse to Intellect, in that all linguistic

communication, however distorted, belongs to the unity overseen by the

logos that establishes civic order (4.4.39, 11–22 Henry-Schwyzer).73

72 Plotinus may be sharply contrasted with Nietsche, who did not focus heavily

on communication issues but is notorious in the history of philosophy for rejecting

truths and embracing perspectives, as detailed by Nick Trakakis, ‘Nietzsche’s

Perspectivism and Problems of Self-Refutation’, International Philosophical

Quarterly, 46 (2006): 91–110. There are no truths to be known, rather there are only

interpretations, which issue from some individual perspective.

73 In fact, it is reported that Plotinus, Porphyry, and other philosophers worked

extremely hard to obtain mutual understanding about highly difficult matters, such

as the relation between soul and body (Porphyry, Vit. Plot. 13 Henry-Schwyzer).

This must have involved questions of clarification of key terms, raising further

questions, a messy process of seeking linguistic understanding in a community

of philosophical souls. Of course, this is a record of highly abstruse metaphysical

discussion, a struggle for shared understanding, but far removed from civic affairs.

Plotinus 95

There is a possible comparison of the everyday purposes of language

use to the civic or ‘lower’ virtues, which occupy a derivative status in

Plotinian ethics. This subordinate role is clear in his critical evaluation of the

‘worldliness’ of Stoic virtue, insofar as it does not recognize the importance

of higher sources of virtue (5.9.1 Henry-Schwyzer). The virtues directly

relevant to actions and choices are part of good living, but they must take

shape under the sovereignty of intelligible reality (the Good) (1.2.6–7 Henry-

Schwyzer). The Plotinian sage lives according to these higher lights by which

all of life may be ordered in virtue and knowledge, even the most mundane

actions which are necessary for bodily existence in a political community.

The Stoics are right to dwell on the careful governance of assent, for the sake

of managing actions and emotions for the welfare of the soul. But they fail to

honor the ultimate grounds for virtue in the intelligibles.

By analogy, the linguistic actions we pursue for everyday purposes, such

as warning others about the hazards of military service in wartime, have

their place in the philosophical life. The point is that these uses cannot be

sufficiently explained in terms of their instrumentality alone, for their ultimate

explanation lies in the intelligibility which souls pursue in unification with

their source. Plotinus insists that the contemplative destiny of the soul does

not diminish when the concerns of earthly life are foregrounded. For our

true nature is always occupied with Intellect, where our happiness lies. This

connection to our higher calling furnishes the intelligibility of our everyday

linguistic activities and makes the actions of the sage in relation to other

moral agents good.

In summary, I have tried to show why Plotinus does not present

discourse as the transfer of meaning from one soul to another. It has become

commonplace in recent philosophy and communication theory to reject the

traditional view of ‘meaning transmission’, according to which utterance

transcendent meanings are transferred from one mind to another. In a unique

way, Plotinus shows how the simple transmission model can be avoided in

an ancient theory of language. On the other hand, it is not easy to put all

the pieces together from these difficult texts of Plotinus. Plotinus tends to

dwell on the intelligible architecture present in various levels, accessible to

some form of thought, at the expense of linguistic signification, the logical

structure of language, and conversation. And to my knowledge, there is no

discussion of linguistic signification in the Enneads, whether in civic debates

or in personal talk exchanges, which is carefully developed in light of his

metaphysics of language.

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Conclusion

For Plotinus, all linguistic understanding takes shape from above.

Understanding what is said is dependent on immaterial realities, the only

possible ground of understanding spoken utterances. Hence Plotinus is

set apart from Philo, Clement, and Origen. For these other Alexandrians,

meanings are thoughts, immaterial meanings which are transferred to other

minds in bodily vehicles. They do not work out a comprehensive scheme

explaining how language relates to immaterial entities. They take their cue

from the divine being, conceived as a God whose word is creative goodness.

Human linguistic function is an image of this ultimate divine perfection,

retaining a power to articulate thoughts in words. Providing an interesting

contrast, there seems to be less authority and goodness in the structures

of discourse according to Plotinus, for the soul’s restoration to its primal

unity in the One lifts it above the contours of thought and language. Plotinus

argues for the presence of the intelligible, when vocal sound commands the

air in such a way as to be accessible for auditory perception. When Plotinus

locates discourse on earth, it is woven into the political community—true

understanding is at heart an opening of souls to Intellect, transcending the

mental limitations of lives lived in embodied particularity.

Nevertheless, the other Alexandrians also come to light with valuable

philosophical contributions. I have argued that Philo is a valuable witness

to the blend of Platonist and Stoic ideas concurrent in his age. As such,

he presents an interesting conceptual stage in his regular identification of

meanings with thoughts. In several passages, we find the simple view that

these meanings are conveyed in vehicles of speech.

We also encounter in Clement the Philonic inheritance that meanings are

thoughts, as well as the claim that the knowledge of meaning sought by the

Christian sage depends on God’s active power, rather than a structure of

immaterial reality independent of divine will. The gnostic is to be directed

upwards to the intelligible world, which will bring us beyond language to a

stage of pure thought.

Origen’s apparently novel claims about mind and language are blended

with his theological concerns. In his commentary on John’s gospel, Origen

avoids outright use of the logos distinction, in that spoken language is not

simply the outward expression of inner discourse. Rather, it is voice by

which language is revealed. I take this as a departure from the ‘container’

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria98

or ‘vehicle’ models of language, familiar from Philo. Still, in some passages

Origen slips back into the traditional ‘container’ or ‘vehicle’ models.

The relationship of thought and language is a perennial philosophical

issue. Plotinus addresses problems common to the other Alexandrian figures,

although he does so with far greater metaphysical sophistication. All four

Alexandrian theologians and philosophers develop their theories in response

to the philosophical traditions honoring the ordering principle of logos in

soul, cosmos, and divine intellect. It would be extremely helpful to contrast

these four with the Later Platonists (aside from Plotinus) who articulate the

Aristotelian tradition in the centuries which provide a bridge from Antiquity

to the Middle Ages. Linguistic understanding, from whatever source, is the

human charism that promises insight even as it multiplies its puzzles.

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Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, G.E.M. Anscombe (trans.) (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953).

Wolfson, Harry A., Philo. Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (2 vols, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1947).

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Ancient Texts

Aetius

Plac. 4.2.1–4.4.7 Diels, 18

Alcinous

Did. 177.19–23 Hermann, 18

Aristotle

An. Post. 76b24, 10

Cat. 4b32–3, 77; 4b34, 10

Int. 16a3–10, 23; 16a5–6, 53

Cicero

Div. Müller 1.63, 17; 1.129–30, 17

Tusc. 1.18–24, 18; 1.60–67, 17

Clement

Exc. 27.3–5 Stählin, 37

Paed. 6.37.3 Stählin, 34

Strom. 1.9.45.4–5 Stählin-Früchtel,

32; 1.16.78.1, 33; 1.21.143.1,

41; 1.22.149.2, 34; 1.28.176–9,

33; 1.28.177.1, 33; 2.1.3.1–2,

34; 3.5.42.6, 37; 4.23.152.3,

37; 4.24.156.1–2, 34;

4.25.155.2–4, 31; 5.8.48.2–3,

43; 5.9.56.1–5.10.65.3, 40;

5.10.65.2, 40; 5.11.71.5,

40; 5.16.3, 31; 6.3.34.3, 37;

6.7.54.1–56.2, 38; 6.7.57.4–5,

40; 6.10.82.3, 36; 6.15.132.3,

36; 6.17.151.1–152.2, 34, 35;

6.18.166.1–2, 40; 7.7.36.5–37.6,

42; 7.7.39.3–6, 41; 7.7.43.1–5,

39; 7.13.82.7, 32; 7.14.84.4, 34;

8.8.23.1, 36; 8.9.26.4–5, 34

Diogenes Laertius 7.63, 27; 7.85–116,

4; 7.135, 27; 7.138, 43; 7.147, 12

Epictetus

Diss. 1.8.4–10 Schenkl, 37

Galen

Plac. Hipp. Plat. 3.7.42–3

De Lacy, 28

Macrobius

Somn. Scip. 1.14.19 Willis, 27

Marcus Aurelius

Ad se ipsum 10.6.1 Dalfen, 27

Nemesius

Nat. Hom. 2.67–124 Morani, 18

Origen

Cels. 1.24–5 Koetschau, 60; 2.72,

54; 3.21, 49; 4.71, 55; 4.73–99,

57; 4.84, 58, 60; 5.45, 60; 6.62,

54; 6.65, 46; 7.13, 55; 7.38, 47

In Joh. 1.24 Preuschen, 51; 1.38,

31, 55, 56, 57; 2.32, 49, 50; 4,

36, 59; 10.28, 52; 10.29, 53

Princ. 1.1.6–7 Koetschau, 47; 1.1.7,

48, 54; 1.2.3, 49; 1.4.5, 49;

2.1–3, 54; 2.8.3–4, 47; 2.8–9, 54

Philo

Abr. 82–3 Cohn, 25, 26; 120–23, 11

Agr. 141 Wendland, 26

Congr. 33 Wendland, 24

Decal. 47 Cohn, 13, 51

Det. 40 Cohn, 24; 89, 16; 90, 16,

17, 18; 92, 17, 24; 127–8, 23

Fug. 92 Wendland, 25;

94–105, 14; 101, 11

Gig. 52 Wendland, 25

Her. 4 Wendland, 28; 14–17, 28; 55,

17; 114–19, 13; 160, 14; 206, 11;

216–9, 25; 280–83, 26; 283, 17

Immut. 46 Wendland, 19;

83, 25, 54; 83–4, 25

Leg. All. 1.31–2 Cohn, 19; 2.2,

14; 2.6, 20; 2.22–3, 25; 3.41,

25; 3.96, 11; 3.150, 11, 13

Index Locorum

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria110

Migr. 3–4 Wendland, 23; 6,

11, 51; 50–52, 21, 22; 71,

24; 79, 23; 81, 20, 24

Mos. 1.38 Cohn, 12; 2.37–40,

25; 2.66–108, 25; 2.81–3,

25; 2.127, 13, 19, 20, 21, 24;

2.128–9, 25, 26; 2.136–40, 25

Mut. 69 Wendland, 24;

193–4, 25, 26

Opif. 15–36 Cohn, 12; 16–37, 11,

51; 20, 11; 20–21, 12; 24–5,

11; 25, 12; 32–5, 12; 36, 11;

117, 20; 134–6, 12; 134–7, 13;

135, 19; 148–50, 61; 171, 12

Plant. 24 Wendland, 22

Post. 106–8 Wendland, 23;

137–8, 18; 163, 19

Prov. 1.6–7 Aucher, 14

Quaest. Ex. 2.34 Aucher, 43; 2.50–

124, 25; 2.111, 26; 2.122, 21

Quaest. Gen. 1.20 Aucher,

61; 2.59, 17

Sacr. 65 Cohn, 13, 51; 65–6, 15, 24

Somn. 1.2 Wendland, 17; 1.28–9,

25; 1.30–34, 14; 1.32, 18;

1.34, 17; 1.108–11, 25;

1.186–8, 18; 2.2–3, 17;

2.238–47, 24; 2.260, 23

Spec. Leg. 1.82–96 Cohn,

25; 1.219, 17

Plato

Soph. 263E3–9, 10; 264A1–2, 10

Phd. 113D, 88

Phaedr. 247B, 88; 276A1–9, 92

Phil. 38E, 10

Rep. 509D, 18; 517B5, 88

Symp. 203C6–D3, 93

Theaet. 189E6–190A,

10; 206D1ff., 10

Tim. 41D–E, 88

Plotinus

Enn. 1.1.4, 14–16 Henry-Schwyzer,

81; 1.2.1, 46–53, 90; 1.2.2,

13–26, 90; 1.2.3, 27–8, 72; 1.2.3,

27–30, 68, 70, 82; 1.2.6–7, 95;

2.3.1–10, 91; 2.3.8, 1–9, 90, 91;

2.8.1, 17–29, 83, 94; 2.9.4–5,

86; 2.9.9, 86; 2.9.16–18, 86;

3.2.8, 31–7, 94; 3.7.11, 35–45,

73; 3.8.1, 1–2, 65; 3.8.3–8, 70;

3.8.9, 24–8, 84; 4.1, 18; 4.2.1–2,

94; 4.3.5, 14–18, 68; 4.3.18,

87, 88; 4.3.18, 1–7, 73; 4.3.18,

7–24, 87, 88, 89; 4.3.22, 1–9,

81; 4.3.23, 9–21, 85; 4.3.23,

17–21, 85; 4.4.5, 88; 4.4.9–10,

68; 4.4.11, 1–13, 91; 4.4.23, 1–3,

77; 4.4.39, 11–22, 89, 90, 91, 94;

4.5.5, 1–31, 77; 4.5.5, 8–27, 78;

4.5.6–7, 81; 4.8.1–6, 69; 4.8.4–8,

69; 5.1.2, 11–14, 89; 5.1.3, 6–10,

68, 96; 5.1.6, 12–13, 69; 5.1.6,

45–6, 69; 5.1.7, 1–2, 67; 5.3,

71; 5.3.2, 9–14, 89; 5.3.4, 92;

5.3.10, 32–42, 65; 5.3.10, 45–6,

89; 5.3.14, 8–19, 65, 71; 5.4, 71;

5.4.2, 26–37, 82; 5.4.2, 27–39,

65; 5.5.1, 70; 5.5.1–3, 70;

5.5.5, 16–27, 65, 70, 75; 5.5.6,

1, 76; 5.5.7, 82; 5.5.9, 11–16,

85; 5.5.12, 1–14, 89; 5.8.3, 70;

5.8.4, 47–9, 65; 5.8.5, 21–2, 65;

5.8.5–6, 66, 72; 5.8.6, 1–9, 72;

5.8.6, 1–12, 73; 5.8.6, 1–13, 66,

76; 5.8.7, 36–44, 105; 5.8.13,

23, 88; 5.9.1, 95; 5.9.5, 24–5,

68; 6.1.4, 1–52, 78; 6.1.5, 1–4,

77; 6.1.5, 1–11, 76, 77; 6.1.5,

1–14, 76; 6.1.5, 2, 77; 6.1.5, 3,

77; 6.1.5, 4–5, 77, 78; 6.1.5,

6–12, 78; 6.1.5, 7–8, 78; 6.1.5,

8, 77; 6.1.15–22, 78; 6.2.22,

3–7, 89; 6.3.4, 1–37, 79; 6.3.8,

30–37, 78; 6.3.15, 24–38, 77, 79;

6.3.15, 29–38, 70; 6.4.11, 3–14,

85; 6.4.12, 1–18, 85; 6.4.12,

1–28, 76, 77, 83, 94; 6.4.14–15,

81; 6.4.15, 1–14, 85; 6.4.15,

18–40, 67, 89, 94; 6.5.4–7, 81;

6.5.7, 1–8, 65; 6.5.7, 4–6, 65;

6.5.10, 1–11, 93; 6.5.10, 11–40,

64, 67, 89, 92; 6.7.18, 41–5, 76,

Index Locorum 111

77, 78, 79; 6.7.23, 18–20, 65;

6.7.38, 1–25, 66, 72; 6.9, 71;

6.9.7, 16–23, 72; 6.9.7, 23–6, 90

Plutarch

An. Proc. Tim. 1023B–D Hubert, 27

Comm. Not. 1084F Pohlenz, 78

Porphyry

Abst. 3.3 Nauck, 53; 3.4, 58

Vit. Plot. 3 Henry-Schwyzer,

63; 13, 94

Posidonius

EK F192, 3

Sch. in Dionys.

Thr. 356, 1–4 Uhlig, 27;

514, 35–515, 5, 27

Seneca

Ep. 94.47, 60

Sextus Empiricus

Math. 7.228 Mutschmann, 78;

8.12, 27; 8.70, 27; 8.275, 58

[Theodosius]

Gramm. 17, 17–31 Göttling, 27

Biblical Texts

Gen. 1, 13; 1.27, 12

Ex. 24.7, 43

Ps. 15.2, 53; 44.2, 53; 45.1, 55

Mt. 12.34, 53

Lk. 6.45, 53

Jn. 1.6, 50; 12.12–14, 53

1 Cor. 13.1, 52; 14.2–40, 34; 14.13, 34

Col. 1.15, 57

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Index of Names and Subjects

Abraham 25

Alexander of Aphrodisias 2

Alexandria 5

library 3

Ammonius Saccas 63

ancient philosophy 1

ant conversation, Celsus on 58

Antiochus of Ascalon 2

Apollonius Dyscolus 6

Aristotelianism 47

Aristotle 81

Athens 5

barbarians, Clement on 33–4,

37fn19, 38

Being, in Plotinus 64, 69, 75

Berchman, Robert M. 47

body, and mind, in language 53–7

cave allegory, Plato 91

Celsus

on ant conversation 58

Origen, debate 57–8

Chadwick, Henry 57

Chaeremon the Stoic 2

‘On Comets’ 6

Christian Platonism 46

Origen 47

Christianity, anticipation of, in

Greek philosophy 32

Chrysippus 27, 43

Cicero 9

civic order, Plotinus on 90

Cleanthes 27

Clement of Alexandria 3, 29–44

on barbarians 33–4, 37fn19, 38

on dialectic 32–3

on divine logos 39, 41

on God’s immaterial

perception 41–3

on language intelligibility 34–8

Logos

theology 29

two-stage concept 30–31, 32

on meaning, and thought 36

Philo, influence of 29

philosophy of language 37–8

on prayer 39–40, 41

prayer, concept 38

rationality, logos as 32, 33

significance 43–4

on silence 41

on speech

divine/human 40

logos as 32, 33

Stoic contribution 41–3

works

On Prayer 39

Stromata 32, 33, 39

contemplation, Plotinus 88–9

Cornutus 2

cosmic order, Plotinus on 90

Descartes, René 9

dialectic

in Clement, Osborn on 33

Clement on 32–3

in Plotinus 32

use 33

Dillon, John 14

Diogenes of Babylon 43

Diogenes Laertius 43

Dionysius Thrax, grammar

treatise (attrib) 4–5, 6

divine logos

Clement on 39, 41

and divine power 12fn10, 34fn12

and language 10–14

material/immaterial bridge

20–21, 24, 57

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria114

Origen on 31, 49, 51, 52

Philo on 10–14, 19–21, 27, 51

ambiguity 11fn7

role 11–12

soul as 11

two stage theory 30

and Wisdom (Sophia) 12fn10

see also human logos

dualism

Origen 48

Philo 9, 17–18, 28

Plotinus 69

Stoicism 17–18

Edwards, Mark

on Clement’s Logos

theory 30–31, 46

on Origen 48

on Philo 51

Epictetus 9

Eudorus of Alexandria 18

Forms, Platonic 31, 37, 48

in Plotinus

actualization 64, 84

of Intellect 89, 90, 94

see also Ideas

glossalalia 34, 52

Gnosticism 86

Gnostics 14

God

immaterial perception,

Clement on 41–3

as mind

Origen on 47–8

Philo on 14–15

reception of prayer 40

speech, superiority of 25

grammar

scope of 4–5

treatise, Dionysius Thrax (attrib) 4

Hägg, Henny 41

heat, Plotinus on 82

Heiser, John H. 74

Hierocles of Alexandria 2

human logos 21

Origen on 52

Iamblichus 38

Ideas 12, 13, 26, 48

see also Forms

image, and representation 65–7

incarnation, of Logos 49

Intellect (macrocosm) 95

Clement 31, 36

Origen 47, 48

Plato 13

Plotinus 17, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67,

68, 69fn12, 70, 71, 72, 74,

76, 79, 80, 81, 84, 85–6, 87,

89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 97, 98

intellect (microcosm)

Origen 55

Philo 28

Plotinus 17, 66, 68, 71,

72, 73, 89, 93

John the Baptist, Origen on 50–51

Kalligas, Paul 72–3

language

intelligibility, Clement on 34–8

logos as 45, 49–50, 59, 71, 76

mind and body in 53–7

Philo on 26

Plotinus on 64–86

rationality of 73–4

and reasoning 72–3

voice, distinction, Origen’s 49–50

light, Plotinus on 81, 82–3

logos

ambiguity 33

endiathetos 30, 46

in Greek philosophy 10fn4

human, Origen on 52

as language 45, 49–50, 59, 71, 76

Logos, distinction 46–7, 57, 61

mind, distinction 55–6

Plotinus 67–70, 77, 79

Index of Names and Subjects 115

of the All 90–91

civic 91, 94

as cosmic principle 90

inner and outer 82

prophorikos 30, 31, 74

as rationality 32, 33

in Clement 32, 33

in Plotinus 77

soul as 11

as speech 10fn4, 20

in Clement 32, 33

in Philo 13–14, 26

in Porphyry 52–3

Stoic 11

as thought 20

types 13

see also divine logos;

human logos; Logos

Logos 46

Clement’s concept 30–31, 32

incarnation of 49

logos, distinction 46–7, 57, 61

Origen’s concept 48–9, 51–2, 55–7

theology, Clement 29

see also logos

Marcus Aurelius 9

meaning

nature of, Philo on 23–4

Plotinus on 64

thought

Clement on 36

connection 23

mind

body

in language 53–7

separation 17

God as 14–15

Origen on 47–8

immateriality of 17–20, 47–8

logos, distinction 55–6

in Philo 10, 14–15, 16–17

quickness of, Philo on 15–17

Minos 90

Moses 22, 25, 27, 36

Mühl, Max 46

Neoplatonism 38, 48, 63

Neuschäfer, Bernhard 1, 5–6

Numenius 2

the One, Plotinus 64, 65, 70,

71, 72, 75, 81, 84

Origen 3, 4, 31, 38, 45–61, 63

on biblical bad style 59

Celsus, debate 57–8

Christian Platonism 47

on divine logos 31, 49, 51, 52

dualism 48

Edwards on 48

on God as mind 47–8

grammarian 5

on human logos 52

on John the Baptist 50–51

John’s Gospel, commentary

on 50–51, 61

Logos

concept 48–9, 51–2, 55–7

logos, distinction 46–7, 57, 61

mind, immateriality of 47–8

Philo, influence of 45

speech, concept of 53

Stoic influence in 6

voice/language (logos)

distinction 45, 49–51, 53

works

Contra Celsum 47, 57, 59, 60

On First Principles 47, 48, 54

On Prayer 39

Philocalia 5, 57, 59, 60

Osborn, Eric, on Clementine

dialectic 33

Panaetius 2, 9

Philo of Alexandria 1, 3, 9–28

Alexander 58

Clement, influence on 29

on divine logos 10–14,

19–21, 27, 51

dualism 9, 17–18, 28

Edwards on 51

on language 26

on meaning, nature of 23–4

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria116

on mind 10, 14–15, 16–17

immateriality 17–20

Origen, influence on 45

philosophy of language 10

Runia on 9, 11

significance 28

on speech, inferiority of 23, 24–6

Stoic influence 27

on the tabernacle 25

Winston on 24, 25

philosophy see ancient philosophy;

philosophy of language

philosophy of language 2

Clement 37–8

Philo 10

Plotinus 86–7, 94

Stoicism 6

Plato 9

Republic 89

cave allegory 91

Timaeus 11, 12, 13, 25

Platonism

Alexandrian 12, 18

Middle 32, 47

see also Christian Platonism;

Neoplatonism

Plotinus 1, 3, 63–95

Being 64, 69, 75

on civic order 90

communication, theory of 86–94

contemplation 88–9

on cosmic order 90

dialectic in 32

dualism 69

Enneads 92, 95

Forms, actualization 64, 84

on heat 82

hypostases 64

the Intellect 68, 71, 72, 76,

84, 85–6, 87, 90, 92, 93

language 64–95

and categories doctrine 78

incorporeality of 64

intelligibility 76–7

logos as 71

nature of 76–80

and the One 64–5

origins 70–76

and Soul 64, 68, 71, 76

soul, product of 67

on light 81, 82–3

logos 67–70, 77, 79

of the All 90–91

civic 91, 94

as cosmic principle 90

inner and outer 82

on meaning 64

the One 64, 65, 70, 71,

72, 75, 81, 84

philosophy of language 86–7, 94

Porphyry’s life of 63

soul

contemplation of Intellect 89

and language 64, 68, 71, 76

rationality of 87

and sound 83–5

on wisdom 92

Plutarch 2, 29

Porphyry 2, 3, 38

Life of Plotinus 63

logos as speech 52–3

Posidonius 2, 3, 9, 27, 28

prayer

Clement on 39–40, 41

Clement’s concept of 38

God’s reception of 40

incorporeality of 38

reasoning, and language 72–3

Runia, David, on Philo 9, 11

‘sayables’ 27

Seneca 9

Sextus Empiricus 9

silence, Clement on 41

Sluiter, Ineke 1

Sorabji, Richard 36

Soul (macrocosm), and language

64, 68, 71, 76

soul (microcosm)

as divine logos 11

in Plotinus

Index of Names and Subjects 117

contemplation of Intellect 89

and language 64, 68, 71, 76

rationality of 87

and sound 83–5

sound, and soul, Plotinus on 83–5

speech

divine/human, Clement on 40

God’s, superiority of 25

inferiority, Philo on 23, 24–6

and intelligible content 37

logos as 10fn4, 20

Origen’s concept 53

Philo on 24

quickness of 15–16

see also logos

Stead, Christopher, on mind

in Philo 14–15

Stoicism

Clement, contribution to 41–3

corpus 4

dualism 17–18

legacy 2–3, 26–8

monism 28

Origen, influence in 6

Philo, influence on 27

philosophy of language 6

tabernacle, Philo on 25

thought

logos as 20

meaning

Clement on 36

connection 23

Varro, Disciplinaram Libri 5

voice, language distinction,

Origen’s 45, 49–50, 53

Winston, David, on Philo 24, 25

wisdom, Plotinus on 92

world

incorporeal 11

intelligible 11, 19

sensible 11, 12, 19, 54

see also logos