EN BANC

A.C. No. 1481  : October 17, 2008

REBECCA B. ARNOBIT, Complainant, v. ATTY. PONCIANO P. ARNOBIT, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM:

Facts

Rebecca B. Arnobit, in her affidavit-complaint1 dated May 11, 1975, prays that the Court exercise its disciplinary power over her husband, respondent Atty. Ponciano Arnobit, on the grounds of Immorality and Abandonment.

In her complaint, Rebecca alleged that she and respondent were married on August 20, 1942. Twelve children were born out of this union. Rebecca further alleged seeing respondent through law school, continuously supporting him until he passed the bar examinations and became a member of the Philippine bar. Several years after, however, or in 1968, respondent left the conjugal home and started cohabiting with one Benita Buenafe Navarro who later bore him four more children. Respondent's infidelity, according to Rebecca, impelled her to file a complaint for legal separation and support. A criminal case for adultery against Benita and respondent later followed.

In its Report dated June 21, 1995, the Commission found respondent liable for abandonment and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent should be disbarred from the practice of law

Ruling:

While the Court concurs with the inculpatory findings of the IBP on the charge of abandonment, it cannot bring itself to agree that respondent is liable only for that offense. As it were, the charge for gross immoral conduct has sufficiently been proven. Following established jurisprudence, respondent deserves to be disbarred.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct: cra:nad

CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

As we have already ruled, disbarment is warranted against a lawyer who abandons his lawful wife to maintain an illicit relationship with another woman who had borne him a child.12 In the instant case, respondent's grossly immoral conduct compels the Court to wield its power to disbar. The penalty is most appropriate under the premises.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Ponciano P. Arnobit is hereby DISBARRED.

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 7828 : August 11, 2008

JUDGE ALDEN V. CERVANTES, Complainant, v. ATTY. JUDE JOSUE L. SABIO, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Facts:

Judge Alden V. Cervantes (complainant) was the presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cabuyao, Laguna until his optional retirement on November 23, 2005. Some of the cases lodged in his sala were ejectment cases filed by Extra-Ordinary Development Corporation (EDC) against the clients of Atty. Jude Josue L. Sabio (respondent). It appears that respondent had filed motions for inhibition of complainant "on the basis of the fact that EDC gave him a house and lot putting into serious doubt his impartiality, independence and integrity." The motions were denied.

After the retirement of complainant, respondent, by Affidavit-Complaint dated April 6, 2006,1 sought the investigation of complainant for bribery.

In support of the charge, respondent submitted a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March 6, 2006 of Edwin P. Cardeño,2 a utility worker in the MTC of Cabuyao, stating that, inter alia, orders and decisions of complainant were not generated from the typewriter of the court but from a computer which the court did not have, it having acquired one only on May 2, 2005; that there had been many times that a certain Alex of EDC would go to the court bearing certain papers for the signature of complainant; that he came to learn that a consideration of P500.00 would be given for every order or decision released by complainant in favor of EDC; and that he also came to know that attempts at postponing the hearings of the complaints filed by EDC were thwarted by complainant as he wanted to expedite the disposition thereof.

By Resolution of August 30, 2006,3 this Court, after noting the July 20, 2006 Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) relative to respondent's complaint against complainant, approved the recommendation of the OCA to dismiss the complaint for lack of merit, "the complaint being unsubstantiated and motivated by plain unfounded suspicion, and for having been filed after the effectivity of his optional retirement" (underscoring supplied).

Thus, spawned the present verified December 18, 1996 letter-complaint4 of complainant against respondent, for disbarment.

The Investigating Commissioner thus concluded that while the evidence on record is sufficient to show that the allegations in respondent's affidavit-complaint against herein complainant were false, the evidence nonetheless show[s] that respondent had knowingly and maliciously instituted a groundless suit, based simply on his unfounded suspicions against complainant and that he violated Canons 10, 11, & 12 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility under his oath of office.

He accordingly recommended that respondent be fined in the amount of P5,000, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

The Board of Governors of the IBP, by Notice of Resolution,12 informs that on November 22, 2007, it adopted the following Resolution adopting and approving with modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Issues:

(1) Whether . . . the complaint filed by respondent against the complainant before the Office of the Court Administrator in Admin Matter OCA IPI No. 06-1842-MTJ was malicious, false and untruthful.

(2) If in the affirmative, whether . . . respondent is guilty under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Ruling:

The Court finds the action taken by the IBP Board of Governors well taken.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Jude Josue L. Sabio, is FINED in the amount of Five Thousand (P5,000) Pesos, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar questioned act will be dealt with more severely.

EN BANC

A.C. No. 7902 : September 30, 2008

TORBEN B. OVERGAARD, Complainant, v. ATTY. GODWIN R. VALDEZ, Respondent.

Puno, CJ., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,* Carpio Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-De Castro, Andbrion, JJ.

D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM:

Facts:

Complainant seeks the disbarment of Atty. Godwin R. Valdez from the practice of law for gross malpractice, immoral character, dishonesty and deceitful conduct. The complainant alleges that despite receipt of legal fees in compliance with a Retainer Agreement, the respondent refused to perform any of his obligations under their contract for legal services, ignored the complainant's requests for a report of the status of the cases entrusted to his care, and rejected demands for return of the money paid to him.

On December 16, 2005, the complainant, Torben B. Overgaard, a Dutch national, through his business partner John Bradley, entered into a Retainer Agreement1 with the respondent, Atty. Godwin R. Valdez. For the amount of PhP900,000.00, the complainant engaged the services of the respondent to represent him as his legal counsel in two cases filed by him and two cases filed against him, all pending in Antipolo City; including a dismissed complaint which was appealed before the Department of Justice. The Agreement stipulated that fees would cover acceptance and attorney's fees, expenses of litigation, other legal incidental expenses, and appearance fees.2

Upon the execution of the Retainer Agreement, the complainant paid the respondent USD16,854.00 through telegraphic bank transfer,8 as full payment for the services to be rendered under the Agreement. The respondent then assured the complainant that he would take good care of the cases he was handling for the complainant.9 chanroblesvirtuallawlibary

On April 11, 2006, four months after the execution of the Retainer Agreement, the complainant, through his business partner John Bradley, demanded from the respondent a report of the action he had taken with respect to the cases entrusted to him. However, despite his continued efforts to contact the respondent to inquire on the status of the cases, he was unable to reach him; his phone calls were not answered and his electronic mails were ignored.10 chanroblesvirtuallawlibary

The complainant had no knowledge of the developments of the cases that the respondent was handling for him. Upon his own inquiry, he was dismayed to find out that the respondent did not file his entry of appearance in the cases for Other Light Threats and Violation of Section 5(a) of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act.11 The respondent also did not inform him that he was entitled to prepare a Counter-Affidavit to answer the complaint for Other Light Threats. The complainant had no knowledge that there had already been arraignments for the criminal cases against him, and that there were already warrants of arrest12 issued for his failure to attend the arraignments. He was constrained to engage the services of another lawyer in order to file a Motion to Lift the Warrant of Arrest in the case for Other Light Threats,13 and an

Omnibus Motion to Revive the Case and Lift the Warrant of Arrest in the case for Violation of Section 5(a) of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act.14 chanroblesvirtuallawlibary

The complainant alleges that the respondent did not do a single thing with respect to the cases covered under the Retainer Agreement. Not only did the respondent fail to enter his appearance in the criminal cases filed against the complainant, he also neglected to file an entry of appearance in the civil case for Mandamus, Injunction and Damages that the complainant filed. The respondent also did not file a Comment on the complaint for Illegal Possession of Firearms which was dismissed and under review at the Department of Justice.15 chanroblesvirtuallawlibary

Due to the above lapses of the respondent, on November 27, 2006, the complainant wrote the respondent and demanded the return of the documents which were turned over to him, as well as the PhP900,000.00 that was paid in consideration of the cases he was supposed to handle for the complainant.16 However, complainant was unable to get any word from the respondent despite repeated and continuous efforts to get in touch with him.

Hence, on December 28, 2006, Torben Overgaard was constrained to file an administrative complaint against Atty. Godwin R. Valdez before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that the respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct.17

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner Antonio S. Tria, to whom the instant disciplinary case was assigned for investigation, report and recommendation, found the respondent guilty of violating Canon 15, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, Canon 17, Canon 18, and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In his Report dated January 29, 2008, he recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years. The IBP Board of Governors, through Resolution No. XVIII-2008-126, dated March 6, 2008, approved the recommendation of Commissioner Tria, and further ordered the complainant to return the PhP900,000.00 to the complainant within 60 days from receipt of the notice.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent should be disbarred from the practice of law

Ruling:

We find the respondent Atty. Godwin R. Valdez to have committed multiple violations of the canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Godwin R. Valdez is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is ORDERED to immediately return to Torben B. Overgaard the amount of $16,854.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency at the time of actual payment, with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from November 27, 2006, the date of extra-judicial demand. A twelve percent (12%) interest per annum, in lieu of six percent (6%), shall be imposed on such amount from the date of promulgation of this decision until the payment thereof. He is further ORDERED to immediately return all papers and documents received from the complainant.

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 7129 : July 16, 2008

FIL-GARCIA, INC., represented by its President, Filomeno Garcia, Complainant, v. ATTY. FERNANDO CRESENTE C. HERNANDEZ, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PUNO, C.J.:

Facts:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Fil-Garcia, Inc., represented by its President and General Manager, Filomeno T. Garcia, against respondent Atty. Fernando Cresente C. Hernandez charging the latter of malpractice, gross misconduct and for violation of his oath as a lawyer.

The facts are of record.

Sometime in 1990, complainant entered into an agreement with Magdalena T. Villasi (Villasi) for the completion of the construction of a condominium building owned by the latter located in Quezon City. During the progress of the construction, controversy arose between complainant and Villasi regarding the billing and payments. On March 11, 1991, complainant filed an action for recovery of sum of money with damages against Villasi before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 77. At that stage, complainant was represented by Atty. Bernardo F. Ligsay (Atty. Ligsay). On June 26, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of complainant and against Villasi.

Aggrieved by the RTC's decision, Villasi filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA). On November 20, 2000, the CA granted Villasi's appeal and reversed the decision of the RTC.

On December 14, 2000, complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration.5 This time, complainant engaged the legal services of a new counsel in the person of respondent.

In its April 27, 2001 Resolution,6 the CA denied complainant's motion for reconsideration and noted the appearance of respondent as counsel for complainant in substitution of Atty. Ligsay. Respondent received a copy of the resolution on May 8, 2001. Thus, he had until May 23, 2001 within which to file an appeal in accordance with Rule 45 in relation to Rule 56 of the Rules of Court.

However, instead of filing an appeal within the reglementary period, respondent filed three (3) successive motions for extension of time with the Court.

On May 22, 2001, respondent filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal by Certiorari .7 In his motion, he alleged that he was engaged as counsel by a mayoralty candidate and a senatorial candidate which required his presence in the canvassing of votes. Due to the "enormous time pressure from these commitments,"8 respondent prayed for an extension of thirty (30) days or until June 21, 2001 to file complainant's appeal.

On June 21, 2001, respondent filed a Second Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal by Certiorari .9 He alleged that "[he] fell ill"10 and that "[h]e sought medical consultation, which revealed that he needs extended bed rest."11 He prayed for an extension of twenty (20) days or until July 11, 2001 to file the appeal.

On July 11, 2001, respondent filed a Third Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal by Certiorari ,12 alleging that "[he] severely underestimated the time needed to complete the petition because he had to work on other equally urgent legal matters, which were unattended to during his illness."13 He prayed for an extension of ten (10) days or until July 21, 2001 to file the appeal.

Thereafter, respondent filed complainant's Petition for Review on Certiorari dated July 21, 2001.14 cra

On August 6, 2001, respondent received a copy of the Court's Resolution15 dated July 2, 2001 denying his first motion for extension of time.

Hence, on August 17, 2001, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 of the above resolution.

On August 20, 2001, the Court issued a Resolution18 denying respondent's second and third motions for extension of time considering that the first motion for extension had already been denied in the resolution dated July 2, 2001. On September 28, 2001, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration19 of the resolution.

On October 1, 2001, the Court issued a Resolution20 denying respondent's motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated July 2, 2001 and complainant's petition for review on certiorari.

On November 21, 2001, the Court issued a Resolution22 denying with finality respondent's motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated August 20, 2001.

On November 27, 2001, the Court issued an Entry of Judgment23 rendering the decision of the CA final and executory.

As admitted by respondent, he received a copy of the Court's resolution dated October 1, 2001 denying complainant's appeal on November 15, 2001.24 However, respondent forwarded a copy of the same to complainant's office only on June 16, 2002.25 cra

Feeling aggrieved by the fate of its appeal, complainant filed a Complaint26 for disbarment before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on April 21, 2004. Complainant alleged that

respondent's act of filing three (3) motions for extension of time within which to file the appeal and his wrong choice in the mode of appeal in the petition that he belatedly filed exemplify gross incompetence and caused serious prejudice to complainant. Complainant also alleged that the lapse of seven (7) months from the time the resolution dated October 1, 2001 was received by respondent before he informed complainant of the same constitutes inexcusable negligence.

After a mandatory conference, Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, the investigating commissioner of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, submitted her report and recommended to the IBP Board of Governors that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law.

The Board, in its Resolution30 No. XVII-2006-04 dated January 28, 2006, adopted and approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner San Juan. It reduced the penalty of disbarment to suspension for six (6) months.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent should be disbarred from the practice of law

Ruling:

After a careful review of the records and evidence, we find no cogent reason to deviate from the findings and the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors. Respondent's conduct relative to the belated filing of complainant's petition for review on certiorari falls short of his obligation to serve his client with competence and diligence under Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer not to "neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable." Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.31 He must constantly keep in mind that his actions or omissions or nonfeasance would be binding upon his client. Thus, he is expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client who deals with him has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the client's cause.32 cra

To make matters worse, it took respondent seven (7) months from the time he received a copy of the Court's resolution denying complainant's petition to inform complainant of the same.36 Under Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer "shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information."

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the January 28, 2006 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors in CBD Case No. 04-1230 is AFFIRMED.

EN BANC

A.C. No. 4515 : July 14, 2008

CECILIA A. AGNO, Complainant, v. Atty. MARCIANO J. CAGATAN, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Facts:

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Cecilia A. Agno against respondent Atty. Marciano J. Cagatan for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The record shows that respondent was the President of International Services Recruitment Corporation (ISRC), a corporation engaged in the recruitment of Filipino workers for overseas employment. On July 12, 1988, ISRC's recruitment license was cancelled by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) for violation of labor law provisions and subsequently, on August 9, 1988, ISRC was forever banned from participating in overseas recruitment.1 cra

On Sepetember 19, 1988, the respondent appealed the DOLE's cancellation of ISRC's license with the Office of the President. The appeal was resolved by the said office in respondent's favor in the Resolution dated March 30, 19932 which set aside the order of cancellation and directed both the DOLE and the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) to renew the recruitment license of ISRC subject to the payment of a guarantee bond which was double the amount required by law.

Since ISRC's recruitment license had already expired on September 17, 1989, ISRC filed on April 12, 1994, an application for renewal of its recruitment license with the POEA.3 cra

However, during the pendency of the aforementioned appeal with the Office of the President, particularly on August 9, 1992, the respondent entered into a Memorandum of Agreement4 with a United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) national, Mr. Khalifa H. Juma,5 the husband of herein complainant, Cecilia A. Agno.

On December 26, 1995, which was more than three (3) years after the execution of the aforesaid agreement, a Complaint-Affidavit6 for disbarment was filed with this Court by the complainant against the respondent claiming that the latter used fraud, deceit and misrepresentation, in enticing her husband, Khalifa, to join ISRC and invest therein the amount of P500,000.00 and that although the respondent received the aforesaid amount, the complainant learned from her inquiries with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the POEA that the respondent failed to comply with the terms of the Memorandum of Agreement. The complainant found out that the said Memorandum of Agreement could not be validated without the approval of the Board of Directors of ISRC. While respondent even had the complainant sign an affidavit stating that she was then the acting Treasurer of ISRC, her appointment as Treasurer was not submitted to the SEC. The records of the SEC showed that the Board of Directors, officers and stockholders of ISRC remained unchanged and her name and that of her husband did not appear

as officers and/or stockholders thereof. From the POEA, on the other hand, the complainant learned that ISRC's recruitment license was yet to be reinstated.

The complainant claimed that respondent used for his own personal benefit the P500,000.00 that she and her husband invested in ISRC. When she demanded that respondent return the said sum of money, respondent issued a bank check dated March 30, 19947 in favor of the complainant in the amount of P500,000.00 which was dishonored for being drawn against a closed account. Despite repeated demands by complainant, the respondent failed to settle his obligation or redeem his dishonored check, prompting the complainant to file a case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against the respondent. An information was filed before the Municipal Trial Court of Cainta, Rizal, charging the respondent with the said offense and a warrant of arrest was issued against respondent after the latter failed several times to attend his arraignment. The complainant prayed for the disbarment of the respondent for issuing a bouncing check and for his act of dishonesty in assuring her and her husband that the Memorandum of Agreement would suffice to install them as stockholders and officers of ISRC which induced them to invest in said corporation the amount of P500,000.00.

The IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, held several hearings, the last of which was on November 13, 2003. Eventually, on October 12, 2004, Commissioner San Juan submitted her Report and Recommendation.

Thus, the Commissioner's recommendation: cra:nad

Given all the foregoing, it is submitted that respondent manifested lack of candor, when he knowingly failed to provide the complainant with accurate and complete information due her under the circumstances. It is respectfully recommended that respondent be SUSPENDED from the practice of law in the maximum period prescribed by law and to return the money received from the complainant.

On October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2005-10216 adopting and approving, with modification, the afore-quoted report and recommendation of the investigating commissioner.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent should be disbarred from the practice of law

Ruling:

In view of the foregoing, the Court holds that respondent has violated the Code of Professional Responsibility as well as his attorney's oath.

The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates the following : cra:nad

Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Marciano J. Cagatan is SUSPENDED FOR ONE (1) YEAR and ONE (1) MONTH from the practice of law with warning that repetition of the same or similar acts will merit a more severe penalty; and ordered to RESTITUTE the amount of P500,000.00 to the complainant.

EN BANC

A.M. No. 07-11-13-SC : June 30, 2008

RE: LETTER-COMPLAINT OF CONCERNED CITIZENS AGAINST SOLICITOR GENERAL AGNES VST. DEVANADERA, ATTY. ROLANDO FALLER, and ATTY.

SANTIAGO VARELA.

R E S O L U T I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Facts:

The Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ) received on September 5, 2007 an unverified letter-complaint1 dated August 26, 2007 written by "Concerned Citizens" and addressed to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno.

In that August 26, 2007 letter-complaint, the "Concerned Citizens" informed that on August 6, 2007, they filed before the Court "through" the Office of the Chief Justice , a complaint for disbarment/disciplinary action against former Government Corporate Counsel (GCC), now Solicitor General Agnes Vst. Devanadera, along with the present GCC Alberto C. Agra and other lawyers of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), for "engaging directly or indirectly in partisan political activities" during the May 14, 2007 national and local elections, and for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." To the August 26, 2007 letter-complaint was attached a copy of the complaint of the "Concerned Citizens" filed on August 6, 2007, with annexes.

The "Concerned Citizens" further informed in the August 26, 2007 letter that they filed also on August 6, 2007 a complaint 2 before the Office of the Ombudsman against now Solicitor General Devanadera and Attys. Faller and Varela and that they were "filing [the following] complaints on the basis of the same facts and incidents [they] filed against the above three (3) lawyers in the Ombudsman" for Violations of Canons 1 and 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Issue:

Whether or not complaint should be dismissed on grounds of being anonymous, vague and baseless

Ruling:

A reading of the August 26, 2007 letter-complaint, however, shows that the allegations are vague. And the attachments thereto are mere photocopies, not to mention the plaint of the Solicitor General et al. that they were not furnished copies of the annexes to the August 6, 2007 complaint. The Court is thus inclined to, as it does, dismiss the complaint.

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 7022 : June 18, 2008

MARJORIE F. SAMANIEGO, complainant, v. ATTY. ANDREW V. FERRER, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Facts:

For resolution is the Complaint of Marjorie F. Samaniego against respondent Atty. Andrew V. Ferrer for immorality, abandonment and willful refusal to give support to their daughter, filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and docketed as CBD Case No. 04-1184.

The facts are as follows:cra:nad

Early in 1996, Ms. Samaniego was referred to Atty. Ferrer as a potential client. Atty. Ferrer agreed to handle her cases1 and soon their lawyer-client relationship became intimate. Ms. Samaniego said Atty. Ferrer courted her and she fell in love with him.2 He said she flirted with him and he succumbed to her temptations.3 Thereafter, they lived together as "husband and wife" from 1996 to 1997,4 and on March 12, 1997, their daughter was born.5 The affair ended in 20006 and since then he failed to give support to their daughter.7 cra

In Resolution No. XVII-2005-13811 dated November 12, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and imposed upon Atty. Ferrer the penalty of six (6) months suspension from the practice of law for his refusal to

support his daughter with Ms. Samaniego. The IBP also admonished him to be a more responsible member of the bar and to keep in mind his duties as a father.

On February 1, 2006, Atty. Ferrer filed a Motion for Reconsideration12 with prayer for us to reduce the penalty.

We referred the motion to the Office of the Bar Confidant for evaluation. Upon finding that Atty. Ferrer lacked the degree of morality required of a member of the bar for his illicit affair with Ms. Samaniego, with whom he sired a child while he was lawfully married and with 10 children, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that we affirm Resolution No. XVII-2005-138 and deny the prayer for reduced penalty.

Issue:

Whether or not the penalty originally given by the IBP board of Governors should be reduced in lieu of respondent’s and the case’s circumstances

Ruling:

ra

Finally, it is opportune to remind Atty. Ferrer and all members of the bar of the following norms under the Code of Professional Responsibility:

x x x

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

x x x

Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the integrated bar.

x x x

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

x x x

Needless to state, respondent ought always to keep in mind the responsibilities of a father to all his children. If there be a resultant hardship on them because of this case, let it be impressed on all concerned that the direct cause thereof was his own misconduct.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Andrew V. Ferrer GUILTY of gross immorality and, as recommended by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant,

SUSPEND him from the practice of law for six (6) months effective upon notice hereof, with WARNING that the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 6567 : April 16, 2008

JOSE C. SABERON, Complainant, v. ATTY. FERNANDO T. LARONG, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Facts:

In a Complaint1 filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant, this Court, complainant Jose C. Saberon (complainant) charged Atty. Fernando T. Larong (respondent) of grave misconduct for allegedly using abusive and offensive language in pleadings filed before the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: cra:nad

Complainant filed before the BSP a Petition2 against Surigaonon Rural Banking Corporation (the bank) and Alfredo Tan Bonpin (Bonpin), whose family comprises the majority stockholders of the bank, for cancellation of the bank's registration and franchise. The Petition, he said, arose from the bank's and/or Bonpin's refusal to return various checks and land titles, which were given to secure a loan obtained by his (complainant's) wife, despite alleged full payment of the loan and interests.

Respondent, in-house counsel and acting corporate secretary of the bank, filed an Answer with Affirmative Defenses3 to the Petition stating, inter alia,

5. That this is another in the series of blackmail suits filed by plaintiff [herein complainant Jose C. Saberon] and his wife to coerce the Bank and Mr. Bonpin for financial gain -

x x x x.4 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent made statements of the same tenor in his Rejoinder5 to complainant's Reply.

Finding the aforementioned statements to be "totally malicious, viscous [sic] and bereft of any factual or legal basis," complainant filed the present complaint.

Complainant contends that he filed the Petition before the BSP in the legitimate exercise of his constitutional right to seek redress of his grievances; and that respondent, as in-house counsel and acting corporate secretary of the bank, was fully aware that the loan obtained by his

(complainant's) wife in behalf of "her children" had been paid in full, hence, there was no more reason to continue holding the collaterals.

Complainant adds that respondent aided and abetted the infliction of damages upon his wife and "her children" who were thus deprived of the use of the mortgaged property.

By Resolution of March 16, 2005,7 the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.

In his Report and Recommendation dated June 21, 2006,8 IBP Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa held that the word "blackmail" connotes something sinister and criminal. Unless the person accused thereof is criminally charged with extortion, he added, it would be imprudent, if not offensive, to characterize that person's act as blackmail.

Commissioner Funa stressed that a counsel is expected only to present factual arguments and to anchor his case on the legal merits of his client's claim or defense in line with his duty under Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as follows:

A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.

Moreover, he noted that in espousing a client's cause, respondent should not state his personal belief as to the soundness or justice of his case pursuant to Canon 159 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Investigating Commissioner also opined that by using words that were "unnecessary and irrelevant to the case," respondent went "overboard and crossed the line" of professional conduct. In view thereof, he recommended that respondent be found culpable of gross misconduct and suspended from the practice of law for 30 days.

By Resolution No. XVII-2007-036 of January 18, 2007,10 the IBP Board of Governors disapproved the recommendation and instead dismissed the case for lack of merit.

Issue:

Whether or not the IBP Board of Governors’ resolution is illegal and void ab initio

Whether or not respondent should be disbarred, with the offense committed by respondent, as posited by complainant, manifesting an evil motive and therefore an infraction involving moral turpitude.

Ruling:

This Court finds respondent guilty of simple misconduct for using intemperate language in his pleadings.

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:

CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.

To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.14 cra

However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language.15 Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.16 cra

WHEREFORE, complainant's petition is partly GRANTED. Respondent, Atty. Fernando T. Larong, is found guilty of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT for using intemperate language. He is FINED P2,000 with a stern WARNING that a repetition of this or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

SECOND DIVISION

ADM. CASE NO. 6876 : March 7, 2008

HEIRS OF LYDIO "JERRY" FALAME, namely: MELBA FALAME, LEO FALAME and JERRY FALAME, Petitioners, v. ATTY. EDGAR J. BAGUIO, Respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

TINGA, J.:

Facts:

On Petition for Review1 is the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors dismissing the disbarment complaint filed by the Heirs of Lydio "Jerry" Falame (complainants) against Atty. Edgar J. Baguio (respondent), docketed as CBD Case No. 04-1191.

In their Complaint2 against respondent, complainants alleged that on 15 July 1991, their father, the late Lydio "Jerry" Falame (Lydio), engaged the services of respondent to represent him in an

action for forcible entry docketed as Civil Case No. A-2694 (the first civil case) and entitled "Heirs of Emilio T. Sy, represented by Anastacia Velayo Vda. De Sy and Belen V. Sy vs. Lydio 'Jerry' Falame, Raleigh Falame and Four (4) John Does," in which Lydio was one of the defendants.3 cra

Complainants recounted that respondent, as counsel for the defendants, filed the answer to the complaint in the first civil case. Subsequently, when the parties to the first civil case were required to file their respective position papers, respondent used and submitted in evidence the following: (1) a special power of attorney dated 1 July 1988 executed by Lydio in favor of his brother, Raleigh Falame, appointing the latter to be his attorney-in-fact; and (2) the affidavit of Raleigh Falame dated 23 July 1988, executed before respondent, in which Raleigh stated that Lydio owned the property subject of the first civil case.4 cra

Complainants claimed that even after the Municipal Trial Court of Dipolog City had ruled in favor of the defendants in the first civil case, Lydio retained the services of respondent as his legal adviser and counsel for his businesses until Lydio's death on 8 September 1996.5 cra

However, on 23 October 2000, in representation of spouses Raleigh and Noemi Falame, respondent filed a case against complainants allegedly involving the property subject of the first civil case, entitled "Spouses Rally F. Falame and Noemi F. Falame v. Melba A. Falame, Leo A. Falame, Jerry A. Falame, Jr., Sugni Realty Holdings and Development Corporations, their representatives, agents and persons acting in their behalf" and docketed as Civil Case No. 5568 (the second civil case) before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 6.

Firstly, complainants maintained that by acting as counsel for the spouses Falame in the second civil case wherein they were impleaded as defendants, respondent violated his oath of office and duty as an attorney. Plainly, they contended that the spouses Falame's interests are adverse to those of his former client, Lydio.7 cra

Secondly, complainants claimed that respondent knowingly made false statements of fact in the complaint in the second civil case to mislead the trial court. In so doing, respondent violated paragraph (d), Section 208 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,9 complainants asserted further.

Lastly, complainants alleged that the second civil case is a baseless and fabricated suit which respondent filed as counsel for complainants' uncle against the heirs of respondent's deceased client. Specifically, they averred that respondent filed the case for the sole purpose of retaining, maintaining and/or withholding the possession of the subject property from complainants who are its true owners. Complainants concluded that respondent violated paragraph (g), Section 2010 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.11 cra

In their Position Paper16 dated 7 September 2004, in addition to their previous charges against respondent, complainants claimed that respondent violated Rule 15.0317 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he represented the cause of the spouses Falame against that of his former client, Lydio.18 cra

On 25 June 2005, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2005-167 adopting and approving Investigating Commissioner Winston D. Abuyuan's report and recommendation for the dismissal of this administrative case.

Issue:

Whether or not the IBP Board of Governors erred in passing Resolution No. XVI-2005-167 adopting and approving Investigating Commissioner Winston D. Abuyuan's report and recommendation for the dismissal of the administrative case

Ruling:

Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client.34 The test is whether, on behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to contest for that which his duty to another client requires him to oppose or when the possibility of such situation will develop.35 The rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.36 In addition, the rule holds even if the inconsistency is remote or merely probable or the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests.37 cra

In relation to this, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. His highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all hazards and costs even to himself.41 The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.42 cra

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edgar J. Baguio is found GUILTY of representing conflicting interests and meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND. He is further admonished to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession and to bear in mind that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

EN BANC

A.C. No. 7657 : February 12, 2008

VIVIAN VILLANUEVA, petitioner, v. ATTY. CORNELIUS M. GONZALES, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

Facts:

This is a complaint Vivian Villanueva (complainant) filed against Atty. Cornelius M. Gonzales (respondent) for failure to render legal services and failure to return the money, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT), and other documents he received from complainant.

Sometime in 2000, complainant engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of transferring the title over a piece of property located in Talisay, Cebu. Complainant, as mortgagee, wanted to transfer the title to her name because the mortgagor failed to redeem the property within the redemption period and the sheriff had already issued a sheriff's definite deed of sale in complainant's favor. Complainant gave respondent P8,000 as acceptance fee, the property's TCT, and other pertinent documents.1 cra

After receiving the money, TCT, and other documents, respondent began to avoid complainant.

In a letter dated 2 July 2003,3 complainant told respondent that she had lost her trust and confidence in him and asked him to return the P8,000, TCT, and other documents. Respondent refused to return the money, TCT, and other documents. After some time and after complainant's daughter confronted him, respondent finally returned the money. However, until now, respondent has not returned the TCT and other documents.4 Thus, complainant filed a complaint5

dated 10 September 2003 against respondent before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

In a Report10 dated 27 October 2006, IBP Commissioner for Bar Discipline Caesar R. Dulay (Commissioner Dulay) found respondent guilty of misconduct and negligent behavior: (1) he failed to perform any legal service to his client, (2) he did not inform his client about the status of the case, (3) he returned the P8,000 acceptance fee without any explanation, and (4) he was indifferent. Commissioner Dulay found that respondent violated Canons 16 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one year.

In a Resolution11 dated 31 May 2007, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) adopted and approved the Report dated 27 October 2006 with modification. The IBP Board suspended respondent from the practice of law for six months and ordered him to return to complainant the P2,000, TCT, and the other documents.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent should be suspended from the practice of law

Ruling:

The Court sustains the findings and recommendations of the IBP with modification. Respondent violated Canons 16, 17, and 18, and Rules 16.01, 16.03, 18.03, and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two years effective upon finality of this Decision, ORDERS him to RETURN the TCT and all other documents to complainant within 15 days from notice of this Decision, and WARNS him that a repetition of the same or similar offense, including the failure to return the TCT and all other documents as required herein, shall be dealt with more severely.

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 5738 : February 19, 2008

WILFREDO M. CATU, complainant, v. ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, Respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

CORONA, J.:

Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot1 and the building erected thereon located at 959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu2 and Antonio Pastor3 of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila4 where the parties reside.

Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings.5 When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.

Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint,6 claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.7 cra

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the conciliation proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings

including the answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By so doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service.

Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713:8

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent's violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)

For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.9 This was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.10 cra

Issue:

Whether or not respondent should be suspended from the practice of law

Ruling:

The Court modified the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the recommendation on the imposable penalty.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applies Only to Former Government Lawyers. Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC             January 31, 2008

Re: CONVICTION OF JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 121, CALOOCAN CITY IN CRIMINAL CASE NOS. Q-97-69655 to 56 FOR CHILD ABUSE

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Facts:

Before this Court is yet another administrative case confronting respondent Adoracion G. Angeles (respondent), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 121, Caloocan City (sala) filed by the Office of the Court Administrator1 (OCA) recommending that she be suspended pending the outcome of this administrative case.

On July 17, 2006, the RTC, Branch 100, Quezon City rendered a Decision2 in Criminal Case Nos. Q-97-69655-56 convicting respondent of violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 7610.3 The criminal cases are now on appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA).4

On July 25, 2006, Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco (SSP Velasco) of the Department of Justice (DOJ) wrote a letter5 to then Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban

inquiring whether it is possible for this Court, in the public interest, motu proprio to order the immediate suspension of the respondent in view of the aforementioned RTC Decision.

On October 6, 2006, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration11 of the aforementioned Resolution. Respondent claimed that the suspension order was wielded against her without affording her the opportunity to be heard since she was not furnished copies of SSP Velasco's letter and OCA's Administrative Complaint. Thus, respondent submitted that her suspension is essentially unjust. Moreover, respondent manifested that the two criminal cases against her are on appeal before the CA and have, therefore, not yet attained finality. As such, respondent still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence and her suspension clashes with this presumption and is tantamount to a prejudgment of her guilt.

On the other hand, on October 11, 2006, SSP Velasco filed an Urgent Appeal/Manifestation12 to the Court En Banc on the alleged unethical conduct of respondent, seeking the immediate implementation of this Court's Resolution dated September 18, 2006. On October 16, 2007, SSP Velasco filed an Opposition to the said Motion for Reconsideration,13 manifesting that respondent continuously defied this Court's Resolution dated September 18, 2006 as she did not desist from performing her judicial functions despite her receipt of said Resolution on October 6, 2006. SSP Velasco stressed that an order of suspension issued by this Court is immediately executory notwithstanding the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Moreover, SSP Velasco reiterated that due to her conviction on two counts of child abuse, respondent no longer enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence and should remain suspended in order to erase any suspicion that she is using her influence to obtain a favorable decision and in order to maintain and reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary.

In her Reply18 to SSP Velasco's Opposition, respondent admitted that she continued discharging her bounden duties in utmost good faith after filing her motion for reconsideration. She averred that she did not have the slightest intention to defy or ignore this Court's Resolution which did not categorically state that the said suspension is immediately executory. Respondent reiterated her arguments against the suspension order on the grounds that she was deprived of due process; that her conviction is not yet final; and that the crimes for which she was convicted have nothing to do with the discharge of her official duties. Lastly, respondent claimed that the instant case is but another harassment suit filed against her by SSP Velasco because she earlier filed an administrative complaint against the latter for maliciously indicting respondent with respect to another case of child abuse.

Thereafter, numerous motions, comments and pleadings were filed by both parties practically repeating their previous allegations, with respondent eventually accusing SSP Velasco of indirect contempt of Court due to the following statement of SSP Velasco in his motion for reconsideration dated Feb. 19, 2007: "as a sitting judge who wields power over all persons appearing before her and thus has immeasurable influence within the judicial system as one of its members, Judge Angeles could definitely cause pressure to bear, not only on the members of the Court of Appeals and, possibly, the Supreme Court, but also on the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that prosecutes her case on appeal. Only her suspension from official function, pending resolution of her case, will neutralize her judicial clout and clear the air of any kind of suspicion that justice is not going well in her case." Respondent argued that such statement

betrays SSP Velasco's cheap and low perception of the integrity and independence of this Court, of the CA and of the OSG. It also shows his utter lack of respect for the judicial system.

The Issues

There are two ultimate issues in this case:

First, whether or not grounds exist to cite SSP Velasco for indirect contempt of Court; and

Second, whether or not grounds exist to preventively suspend the respondent pending the resolution of this administrative case.

Ruling:

SSP Velasco must bear in mind that as a lawyer, he must be circumspect in his language. We remind him of our admonition to all lawyers to observe the following Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read:

Canon 8. Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Canon 11. A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

However, even as we find that the OCA and SSP Velasco have not clearly and convincingly shown ample grounds to warrant the imposition of preventive suspension, we do note the use of offensive language in respondent's pleadings, not only against SSP Velasco but also against former CA Lock.

The parties herein have admitted in their various pleadings that they have filed numerous cases against each other. We do not begrudge them the prerogative to initiate charges against those who, in their opinion, may have wronged them. But it is well to remind them that this privilege must be exercised with prudence, when there are clearly lawful grounds, and only in the pursuit of truth and justice. This prerogative does not give them the right to institute shotgun charges with reckless abandon, or allow their disagreement to deteriorate into a puerile quarrel, not unlike that of two irresponsible children.

Judge Angeles and SSP Velasco should bear in mind that they are high-ranking public officers whom the people look up to for zealous, conscientious and responsive public service. Name-calling hardly becomes them.

WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Nevertheless, respondent Adoracion G. Angeles, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121, is hereby REPRIMANDED for her use of intemperate language in her pleadings and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall merit a more severe sanction.

Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco of the Department of Justice is hereby WARNED that he should be more circumspect in the statements made in his pleadings and that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely. The motion to cite him for contempt is DENIED for lack of merit.

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 7893 : November 10, 2008]

TERESITA ENCARNACION P. LADERAS V. ATTY. MA. ARWIN JUCO SINAGUINAN

In her affidavit-complaint, Teresita Encarnacion P. Laderas accuses respondent Atty. Ma. Arwin Juco Sinaguinan of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph l(b)[1] of the Revised Penal Code and administratively charges her with violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Rule 16.01, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In the administrative charge, she prays that Atty. Sinaguinan be disbarred.

The provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility allegedly violated by Atty. Sinaguinan are as follows :

Rule 15.03-A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

Rule 16.01-A lawyer shall account for all money or properly collected or received for or from the client.

In her complaint to disbar Atty. Sinaguinan, Laderas averred that she engaged the legal services of Atty. Sinaguinan sometime in January 2002 to have the three properties of her parents, Carmen Encarnacion Punzalan and Santiago Punzalan, titled to her name. She said she gave the transfer certificates of titles (TCTs) to Atty. Sinaguinan and paid her PhP 210,000 as professional fees.  The titling never materialized and on November 2, 2005.she demanded the return of her money. She eventually learned that Atty. Sinaguinan became the lawyer of her brother, Anthony E. Punzalan, who is a US citizen. According to Laderas, Atty. Sinaguinan. as Anthony's lawyer, sent her a demand letter asking her to pay PhP 3 million and to vacate the property she was occupying. Laderas claimed that she was now facing an ejectment suit without benefit of any mediation or pre-trial conference.

In her Comment, Atty. Sinaguinan denied that she was ever the lawyer of Laderas as she was all along the lawyer of Anthony, for whom she sent Laderas demand letters relating to Laderas' failure to remit the rentals of Anthony's properties. Laderas was the caretaker of the properties. Atty. Sinaguinan said that Anthony had asked Laderas to deliver to her law office the TCTs and the PhP 210,000. The amount to be delivered was for expenses for the transfer of the three titles,

and not her professional fee as Laderas' lawyer. The money came from the two pensions of Anthony's mother and from Anthony himself.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent should be disbarred from the practice of law

Ruling:

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant and the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof. This Laderas has failed to do. WHEREFORE,   the  complaint  to   disbar  Atty. Ma. Arwin Juco Sinaguinan is DISMISSED for lack of merit.