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Page 1: 00000001 - NASA · final report w. mo plessand w. h. lewis lockheed-georgia company a division of lockheedaircraftcorporation marietta, georgia 30063 july i 974 preparedundercontract

-.. FOR:JOHN F. KENNEDY SPACEFLIGHT CENTER, FLORIDANATIONAL AERONAUTICS ,6N[) SPACEADMINISTRA'I iON

:. ?'

00000001

https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19750007654 2020-05-21T14:46:28+00:00Z

Page 2: 00000001 - NASA · final report w. mo plessand w. h. lewis lockheed-georgia company a division of lockheedaircraftcorporation marietta, georgia 30063 july i 974 preparedundercontract

NASA CR 1344_54 LG74ER-0074

SPACESHUTTLE

STRUCTURALINTEGRITY AND ASSESSMENTSTUDY

FINAL REPORT

W. Mo PLESSAND W. H. LEWISLOCKHEED-GEORGIA COMPANYA DIVISION OF LOCKHEEDAIRCRAFTCORPORATION

MARIETTA, GEORGIA 30063

JULY i 974

PREPAREDUNDER CONTRACT NAS10-8018 FOR THE:

JOHN F. KENNEDY SPACECENTERNATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACEADMINISTRATION

KENNEDY SPACECENTER, FLORIDA 32899

Publlcntion of thls documentdoesnot constitute N_tlonol AeronnuticsandSpe,ceAdminlst:otlon endorsementof the findings or conclusionsof the report.

ii

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TECNNICAL REPORT ST&NDARO TITLE PAGI_

1. Report No, 2, Oovemmlm! AeCO|ll!on No, $, Roglplent'l Cotolog No,NASA CR_134454

--4[ Tifl(i (Ind Subtitle S, Report 0oreJuly 1974

SPACI_ _HUTTLI_ _TRUCTURAL

: INTEGRITY AND ASSESSMENT STUDY 6. Porfo_mln9 attune|orlon Code

_* 7. AviaN*) W. M, Ph,ss nnd W, H. I:ewl_, O, PorlormlnO Oroon*lo*ion Report No,' LG74E R-0074

_" . 9. Po,|o,mino Oegonlsatlon Name cmdAddeoll 10. WeekUnit No."*.: Lock lead-Georgia Company

: Division of Lockheed Ah'craft Corp. II. C0ntweotc_rGrant ha,;"_: 86 S. Cobb Drive hAS 10"8018

,, i

'ii,' Marietta, Georgia 30063 13. Ttpo of Re#art and Period Covered

q _. ]2. SpOebiotln9 Age/toy Name and Addrele FINAL REPORT

.... 22 June 1972 -

_"_:i John F. Kennedy Space Center 22 July 1974" National Aeronautics & Space Admln;stratlon

i,i Kennedy Space Centel, Florida 32899 i4. SponlJetlnljAgency Code

, : 15. Suli)plement4ry No/el

This report contains an Appendix ina separate volume, identified as NASACR-139180.

,,:_i 16. Abstract"-,,o

o!:

._: ' This document describes the work performed under Contract hAS 10-8018, "Space Shuttle StructuralIntegrity and Assessment Study", for the Notional Aernnaut;cs and Space Admlnlstratlon, John F.Kennedy Space Center. The primary objective of _e study program was to determine thenondestruc-

"' tlve evaluation (NDE) requirements and to develop a preliminary nondestructive evaluation manual:,/.. for the entire Space Shuttle vehicle. The report includes a discussion of the rationale and guidelines

. ,. for structural analysis and NDE requirements development. Recommendations for development ofo°o' NDE technologv for the Orbiter thermal protection system and certain structural components are

,. included. Recc nendatlons to accomplish additional goals toward Space Shuttle inspection are pre-_. sented. A male product of the program Is the Preliminary Nondestructive Evaluation Manual for the

_ '. Space Shuttle which comprises the Appendix to this report.

=7:1

, • . , ,,. i , , , .,,,,.r , ,, ,.,m.

" : 11. Kil Woedi lJJ. OIiWIbullon Statement

: SPACE SHUTTLEi. NONDESTRUCTIVE INSPECTION

REFURBISHMENT NDT

REQUIREMENTS,, , ,,,,,

_ " 19. $eeueltI Cloiiif. (o! tell eeporl) _). Security CIosllI, (of/hie page) _1|.No. ol Pogn 22. Priceo _.

UNCL. UNCL.

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__:,_ ....................................... _.... ___/_ .............. _L_'.i,.,,_iir': _'_';I'%._.L.",_,:__''Z:L.Z\'...'Z;*__".._:._'_*!L:*._7_ :: ,,.i;'..,%*.-_= ....... Z........... i_ ................. I"° _ _ _o = ,_ t_ -_ _ _ " o o

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I

iI

FOREWORD

This final report is submitted to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration,

John F. Kennedy Space Center, in fulfillment of the requirements of Contract

NAS10-8018. The work was performed at the Lockheed-Georgla Company in

Marietta, Georgia, with the exception of the Solld Rocket Boosteranalysis which

was accomplished at the Lockheed Propulsion Company in Redlands, California.

Theobjective of this study programhasbeen to determine the nondestructive inspect-

ion requirements, guidelines, and criteria for the entire Space Shuttle vehicle,

directing particular attention to areaswhere defects could cause catastrophic failures

and which should be inspected during vehicle refurbishment/turnaround to detect

post-flight or pre-flight defects, and to provide recommendationsfor inspectability

and further nondestructive evaluation (NDE) technology development.

The main body of this report contains the discussion of the rationale, guidelines and

criteria for structural analysis and NDT requirements development; recommendations

for NDE technology development; and recommendations for future Space Shuttle

NDE efforts. An Appendix to the report consistsof the Preliminary Nondestructive

Evaluation Manual for the Space Shuttle, containing nine sections dete*illng the

NDE require,_ents, defect description, access factors and applicable NDE techniques

for each of the structural critical areas and thermal protection systemrequiring

post-fl ight or pre.-flight inspection.

The study programwas directed by Mr. W. H. Lewis, ProgramManager. Mr. W. M.

Plesswas the Principal Engineer,whgdeveloped the NDT requirements for the Orbiter

vehicle. Mr. Gus Richmondperformed the initial structural analysis to define critical

areas for the Orbiter and External Tank. The NDE requirements and structural analysis

for the Solid Rocket Boosterwere conductedon Lockheed inter-company Work Authori-

zation (IWA L1-13450) at the Lockheed Propulsion Company under the direction of

Ms. Judith Schllessmann.

The programwasconductedunderthe cognizance of Mr. RoccoSannicandoof DD-SED-4,

N/_SA/KSC, the Contract Technical Representative, who established contacts and

iv

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[

iq I

i

FOREWORD{continued)

channels of communlcntlonto sourcesof Shuttl_ design Information.

Lockheedgreatly apprc_clatesthe Important contrlbutlons derived from discussions

and design inform_tlon from Messrs.SamBahrer, Thermal ProtectionSystemDesign

and QA/NDEI RanBishopand RalphSugg, Structural NDE concepts;Lee Crockett,

deslgninformation; andmanyothers - all from the Space Dlvlslon of Rockwell

International. Additional dlscusslonsand informationwere obtained fromDr. Ross

Qulnn of LockheedMissilesandSpace Companyin the area of Thermal Protection

i Systemdesignand NDE, _nd Ms. Judith Schllessmann,Messrs.Gene DeRieux,i

BobCarrol andGeorge Bracket of LockheedPropulslonCompanyin the area of

SRB/SRMdesignand NDE concepts.i:

! Speclal appreciation is expressedfor the contlnued guldanceand direction of

Mr. Sannlcandro, NASA/KSC, during the entlre program.

The final reportand Preilmlnary NDE Manual are publishedunder the NASA identl-

flcatlons NASA CR-134454 and NASA CR-1391.80, respectively. They also have

: '_ the Lockheed-Georgla englneerlng report numbersLG74-ER-0074 anti LG74-ER-0075,

respectlvely.

!,

V

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-, TABLEOF CONTENTS

,_, TITLE PAGE

- _" FOREWORD iv

TABLEOF CONTENTS vl

. LIST OF FIGURES vlil?

INTRODUCTION 1

SU/'AMARY 5

_," DISCUSSION 7

, A. Structural Analysls Rationale 7

'" Structural DesignCharacteristics 7

Flight Loadsand Environments 9

"'_. B. Nondestructive InspectionRationale 12

: NDE Specifications 12

" Application of NDT Techniques 12

" Ultrasonic 13

Q:_' EddyCurrent 14

: Radiography 15%,,

o Penetrants 16

....: Magnetic Particle 17

VisuaI/Optics 17

_. Accesslblllty Factors 1B!I

Reliability 19

:, NDT Standards 21o,

_ Crack Size 22

......_: Structural Design Concepts 23° :i

; InspectionTime 24

_: Schedule Factors 27

',; New NDT Methods 2B

' Vli

_C_-_i_- %_ --_ i....... _ .... _-- =--._ ............. _..........................................

o, ,

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4

I i

TABLEOF CONTENTS (continued)

TITLE PAGE

SPACESHUTTLESTRUCTURALINSPECTION REQUIREMEN_ 31

A. RefurbishmentNDE Requirements 31

B. InspectionCriteria 44

Crack Slze 44

InspectionFrequency 45

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHERNDE DEVELOPMENT 47

A. Inspectabil;tyVersusDesign 47

B. NDE Technology 49

NDE for Structure 49

NDE for the Thermal ProtectionSystem(TPS) 51

C. DevelopmentApproach 55

RECOMMENDATIONS 65

REFERENCES 71

BIBLIOGRAPHY 75

APPENDIX SEPARATEREPORT

vll

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, !

'_ LISTOF FIGURES

FIGURE TITLE PAGE

1 THESPACESHUTTLESYSTEM 2

2 TPSAPPLICATIONS 52

3 HIGH-RISK AREASFOR THE THER/V_L 54PROTECTION SYSTEM

h

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE TITLE PAGE

1 NOMINAL INSPECTION TIMES FOR 25

!__,, NDT TECHNIQUES

:: 2 SUMMARY MATRIX OF SPACESHUTTLE 33i • NDE REQUIREMENTS

i 3 STRUCTURALAREASTHATSHOULD BE 41CONSIDERED FOR FUTUREINCLUSIONIN MANUAL

; 4 SUMMARY OF NDE DEVELOPMENTAREAS 50

vlll

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(

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INTRODUCTION

The compositeSpace Shuttle vehicle, shown in Figur_ 1, combines the}fnotures of a

i rocket booster, orbltlnt_ space capsule and conventional air-freighter to provide n, i

...._ monnsfor transportln_ persons, materials and equipment to and from an oorth-orbltlng

_,: spaceplatform. Becauseof the v_rious mission profiles, the primary Shuttle vehicle -

ii the Orbiter - will experience total flight loadsand environmentsnot oxperlenced byui r

previous spacevehicles. Since the Orblter and the Solld RocketBoosterwill be re-

usedtlme and agaln and refurblshed between flights, cumulatlve fatlgue, overstress,

!!' thermal and ¢orroslondamagebecome a meier concern in the task of assuring re-¢.

_ liability. The detectlon of such damagemust be undertaken and correctly character-

ized and repaired to assurethe readinessfor subsequentflights.,{!'

" To thls end, this studyprogramwasinitiated for the purposeof assessingpotentials

structural problems, identlfylng specific fracture-crfflcal areas, and determlnlng the

meansfor detection of induceddamage in these areas. The resultsof this study are

'_ not all-lncluslve, since they were derived from analysls basedon limited preliminary

• designand load information that wasavailable through April, 1974. Experiencewitho,

numerous alreraft ins_ctlon and overhaul programs coupled wlth conslderatlons of ano ::°

o unprecedentedcomblnotlon of loadsand envlronments to be experienced by theo; -

;. Shuttle were primary basesfor the analysls. Therefore, recommendationsare also

:. presentedir this report bearing on conHnuaHonof tasksto develop a full inspecHon

o programfor refurbishmentoperations. The stated objective of the programwas to

°°:: determine the nondestructlve inspectlon requlrements, criteria and guidelines for the

entire SpaceShuttle vehicle _nd to developa preliminary nondestruetlveevaluation• /• (NDE) manual for the Orlbter and boosterfor use during vehicle refurbishment turn-

around. The specific tasks involved in conducting the program were:

TASK I - SpaceShuttle Structural NDE Requirements

1) Analysls of the Sp_ceShuttle vehicle des;gn to identify specific areas a,_d

points where NDE is requlred during routlne refurblshmen',',conslderlng

normaland abnormalflight andground operatlons.

' 1

......... o, _" _ L_: :'_:-_2_ • :_ ,_2=_'. _,:,,,-L_

O0000001-TSAIO

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I

:ii lJi/ -,;<......o_,o,o_.,,,oo,,,, z.,qT

/ b':

\ \ \ / ._.1.. 44.8'\ \ _ , ---_......_J_-_\ ,

SOLIDROCKETBOOSTER l II165.7'...........

EXTERNAl..TANK

Figure 1. The Space Shuttle

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i

INTRODUCTION {cc_ntinu_d)

_} Oo_cribo qccos,_rnqulromont_to perform the NDE of e_ch _po_iflc qr_n,

3) Idontlfy _nd describe thn NDE t_:hnlqur_ _nd equipm_nt r_quirr_dto

detect structural defects.

4) Identify are_ which cannot be adoqLjat,:_lyInspectedbecauseof design or

NDE technology Iimltntion_, _nd m_kr_recommond_tlon_conr.ornlng 0r_mo,

TA_K II - Preliminary NDE Mnnual

Preparea Preliminary NDE Manual contalnlng the NDE requirementsfor the

critical areas of structure in _ccordonce wlth the provisionsof MIL-M-38780

(USAF), ;'Manual, Technical. Nondestructive Inspection",

Task I w_ performed by reviewing available SpaceShuttle study reports, design drew..

h_gsand other applicable documents to extract design concepts, load information,

environmental interfaces and fracture control and inspection factors. Early analysis

in the program wasperformedwith ATP (May 1972) and PRR(November 1972) baseline

design information which continued to evolve throughout the program performance

perlod. Most of the fracture-crltlcal _reas were Identified on early baseline drawings

and were re-evaluated later, Many other inspecfion-crltlcal area_ were added I_ter

as a result of data from Rockwell International originating from a Shuttle Fracture-

___ Control Study Programsponsoredby NASA (Reference 1). The final analysesand NDE

requlrements update were basedprlncl_lly on MCR 0200 baseline and subsequent

baseline revision drawings_nd dat_ whosestatus were reasonablycurrent through

April 1974.

TaskII is essentially the compilation of the resultsof Task I into manual formgt in

accordancewith the MIL-M-38780 speclflc_tlon. Thls final document is ln_:ludedas

the Appendix to this report and is the Prellmlnary Nondestructive Evaluation Manual

for the Sp_ceShuttle vehicle, It Includesinspection-critical area descriptions, defect

: information, accessfactors and recommendedNDE technlques for inspection of each

critical areasidentified. In conformancewith MIL-M-38_80_ thisdocumentis dlvlded

into sectionsaccording to the followlng arrangements;Section I. General; Section 2.

Orbiter-Forward Fuselage('Zones I, _,, and 3) and subsequentsectionsdealing with

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INTRODUCTION (_ontln_"_

the speoiflc Orbiter nn_omhllos(_ono_), the Solid Rocket Boo_ternnd I_xtornal Tnnk

nnd the TPS. The r_rrnnflementfollow_ the _paco Shuttle _ono do_lgnetion _y_tom

do,_crlhodIt,tar.

Detailed nondostructlvo In_l_ctlon prooodurosere not provided In this document

since the SpaceShuttle do_lgn It,still evolving end no Shuttle hardware inavailable

at thi_ point In tlme to adequately develop detailed procedural Instructions. It is

uneconomical end Impm.ctlcel to draft detailed proceduresfor manualswithout firm

-_J": nnd sufficiently detailed design information and/or availability of productionhard-

_ ware basedon the design. Detailed calibration proceduresare, however, prov_ed

in Section I - General for mostof the InstrumentedNDT techniques. Thesecallbr_-

t{on proceduresere basedon typical commercial!y ave{labia NDT equ{pment_nd

_ have been validated by Air Force personnelon product{on aircraft. Theseprocedures

I--_J _ ' " Sei_e to descr{be the type of inspect{onsinvolved and are referred to in the specific

.... requirements by their paragraph number.

_ The Orbiter's thermal protect{on system(TPS), consistingof reusable surface h_sula-

_ t{on tiles andpanels, is included ;n the analysiss;nce it ;s essential that the integrity

: of the TPSbe maintainedat a very high level. The TPSdescrlpt{onand NDE require-

i_ meatsare includedinthe final sectionof the Appendix. Since the TPSinspection

i_ will require additional technology development, a meier recommendationconcerning_-.

this fact is included in this Report.

_ L_ak testing of pressurizedcompartments,containers, or lines w_snot Included asan___i area for _nalyslsor NDE development in this program, since NASA/KSC has been

occupied with leak t st,noof pressurevesselsfor considerable time. Leak testing

techniquesand practices are well-established functionsat the spa_:eflight instella-

t}on. However, for the purposesof Inspection management,NASA might consider

incorporating the leak testlng techniques into the final NDE manual in order to pro-

!. vide a more Integrated control of the inspectionprogram.

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SUMMARY

Thln_tudy programh_gre_ultod in (0) the d0volopmnnl of o pr_llmlnnry nonde._truct_

i Ivo _valuntion (,_,lOg)manu¢llfor the Space Shuttle voldclo for po_tofllght ar,_,'pro_

i flight _tructure and thermal protection system Inspection, (b) description of orea_where fu_'therdevelopment of NDE tochnoloBy and approaches i_ needed, esnd(¢)

"_ recommendationsconcerning further development of' the NDE manual, and its use

during refurbishment operations. Theprogramwas begun in June 1972and was

origlnally scheduled for completion in thirteen months. A twelve-month extension

wa_negotiated in order for the progrcwmto coincide with design information re,_ulllng

from Shuttle design milestones. The extended programw_s completed in July 1974.

The programwas conducted primarily by engineering gvaluation of the best _,, _',a_',_."

information which includes Shuttle deglgn drawings, NASA contracto_ _e.'.-..o,_,and

i:_ other government-lndustry reports applicable to the Shuttle svstem. Throughanulysls

i :_ of the design drawingsand NASA contractor reports, a large numberof candidate

_. inspection areasand structural con-:_onentswere identified on the Orbiter and

booster vehicles. Through further evaluation the NDE require..lents for each of these

areaswere defined. The NDE manual wasprepared containing these requirements

k which consistof critical area description, defect description, access factors and

i applicable NDE technlques for primary and back-up inspection, and sketchesof the

structural area or component. Programguidelines and criteria were developed largely

l_ from experience and information found in government-lndustry reports.

i': The primary NDE manualwhich comprisesthe Appendix to thls report consi,_tof nine

sectionsas given below:

::_ Section I - General

Section II - Orblter Forward Fuselage Structure

!,:_ Section III - Orbiter Mid-Fuselage Structure

o Section IV - Orbiter Aft-Fuselage Structure

:i, Section V - Orbiter Wlng Structure

_;

_; ,

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SUMMARY (contlnued)

SectionVl ,, OrbiterVerticalSt,_billzerStructure

_: Section VII - External TankStructure

i ' Section VIII - Solid Rocket BoosterStructure

Section IX - Thermal Protection System

This arrnngementas well as the contentsof the manual generally follows the provisions

of Specification MIL-M-38780 (USAF): "Manual, Technical: Nondestructive!

i ' Inspection" About 134 structural areas on the combinedOrbiter, ET, and SRBvehicles,

__ excluding the TPS are included in the manual as cnndldnte inspectlon-crltlcal ,,ree,s.-, t

i The General Section contains vehicle de_criptlons, _ccessprovls_ons,NDT technfque

_ _nd equipment information.i

!', The program",dentlfl""ed several areaswhere further development or study_sneeded in

! .. order to provide effective, reliable NDE methods for thelr inspectlon. These nreasi'

include (1) developmentof primaryNDE techniquesand Inspection rouflnet, for the

TPS, (2) development of nn NDE method for honeycomb disbond detection wffhout re-

moval of local TPS, and (3) considerationsfor deploymentof built-in NDE devices in

:, uccess-restrlcted areas, particularly for crew module inspection. Conventional NDE

methodsare applicable without further developmer_tto primary structure inspection

.. with the exceptionsgiven in (2) and (3). The techniquesfoeins_ction of all areas

' ,_qulre developmentand validation of detailed procedures,

i

ii,. Recommendationsfor further developmentof the overall SpaceShuttle refurbishment/" inspection programinvolve further work on the NDE manual, contentsof the final

r_mnual, and incorporation of Shuttle inspection into fully integrated refurblshment

: t_ctivffles.:i

} ',

k-

i ,

i

i-

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DISCUSSION

A. Structural Analysis Rationale

Structural Design Characteristics

The primary structure of the Space Shuttle Orbiter has been reviewed In its

prellmlnary form to establish critical areas for NDE purposes. For the purposes

of th{sstudy, a critical area [sdefined as one which Is determinedby analysis

or experience with similar hardware to be proneto develop sc.-vlcedefects

in normalor abno_al usageand which would affect the serviceability of the

equipment. The first selection of inspection-crltical areas is largely basedon

experiencegained on similar structures. Areasof the type initially chosenhave

showna tendencyto develop fatigue cracks in the life of similar structuresin

both laboratory testsand in-servlce experience. Areaschosengenerally may he,ve a

relatively small margin of safety or have area proportionssuch aswould result in

greater likelihood of early fatigue damage. Typical areasconsideredare:

o Cornersof cutouts

o Splicesand joints

o Discontinuousmembers

: o Continuousmembersto which discontinuousmembersare attached

o Memberswith suddenarea transitions, especially with fastenersIn the

vicinity of the transition

._ o Structureswithout multi-load path fail-safe provisions

o Partswhich changeplanesfor someor all their elements to maintain load

continuity

o Structurewhere internal loadsanalysis is lesstellable for variousreasons

o Partsoperating frequently near limit load

o Blindareas where fretting, corrosionand thermal stressescan contribute

to early fatigue damage

o Critlcal inaccessibleareas

o Pointswhere fittings and bracketsare attached

o Stresscorrosionsusceptiblematerials or heavily machinedparts

_ o Partsmadeof materials with low stressintensity propertiesor with high growth

rate potential

'" 7

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t!

i

DISCUSSION (contlnuod)

o Pdma.ry load path membo.rsacras_ whlch a heavy member such as a frame

or rib cap is attached

o Regions of possible bimetallic corrosion which would accentuate fatigue

On thls basis, about 86 areas were initially identif;ed on the Shuttle-system

drawings VL 70-004015and VL 70-000044 for potential NDE purposes. Use

was made of the Preliminary Fracture Control Plan (Reference 2) to identify

pertinent materials and design stresses. For these materials a complete set of

constant amplitude S-IN curves were developed for rough assessmentof perform-

ance as a functlon of effective working stressand potential damage. These data

were reported to NASA in Reference 3, which presented early analysis rationale

In data form.

Crack propagation and initiation data were accumulated in Reference 3 for:

2219 T851 2024 T851 7075 T6511

2219 T87 2024 T62 7075-T7311

2024 T3

Data of the following type were also generated:

Crack growth rate, dJ/dn - /tK at constant stresssmplitude, AK thresholds

and R(upper and lower), NTO T and N R -1 curves for constant O'rnax , NTO T

and N R - ¢x curves for various initial crack lengths.max

For the purpose of tracking the performance of the inspection critical areas latert

a mote complete analysis of a few of the selected areas can be made with spectrum

loads as they become available to indicate how the design might be expected to

perform. On the basis of experience on similar structure, perhaps some correlation

can be made to indicate the probability of having crack damage equal or exceed-

ing a given length at a given lifetime. These data could be used to verify the

potential effectiveness of the NDE requirements established.

Later during the program, additional fracture critlcal areas were added to the

analysis of NDE requirements. The selection of these areas resulted from a study

performed for NASA/LRC by Rockwell International, under Contract NAS3-16765,

Fracture Control Design Methods (1). The areas were given in Quarterly Progress

8

•v ,,

' ° TsB0300000001-

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_, DISCUSSLON(contlnuod)!; i i

I: : Report73MA5769 with structuralconfigurations presentedpreviously in reportsii'

73MA4334 and 73MA5059. Thus, the Inspection-crltical areas included in

_,:i. the Appandix to thls report were derived from both Lockheedand Rockwell

_. analysis.[i

!i_i._ Flight Loadsand Environmentsii i m

The Space Shuttle vehlclest particularly the Orblter, will be subiected to filght

loadsrepresentativeof a launch vehicle, an orblting spacecapsule, a re-entry

vehicle and a conventionalair transport. Theexternal tank (ET) and solid rocket

ii!!: booster(SRB)vehicles will exnerience only the prelaunch, ignition and ascent,

maX-q boo,t, and staging loads. The SRBwill also see parachute recovery loads_ and sea-water immersion.

The repetitive flight loadsandenvironmentswill potentially producedamagetn

:": certain locationsof the structuredependingon many _actorssuchas materialL

[:;i!' strengthand toughness,stresslevels, loadcycles andenvironment. Damagewill

_i' accumulate or grow with progressiveload cycles until it reachesa critical size

ill:, relativetothestressthematerialcanwlthstand At this time fracture maycause! the paJt to fail catastrophically in overstress. It Is the purposeof inspection[:!_'_' routinesto detect stably growingcracksbefore they reach the unstable size.

:: Loadsthe SpaceShuttle structure is designedto accommodateand which were

consideredIn selectionof the Inspection-critical areasare summarizedbelow

Typesof Loadsthe SpaceShuttle mustaccommodate:(References2 and 4)

o Prelaunch Loadsresultingfrom assemblyoperations, hook-up

stresses,static post-assemblyloadsand winds.

ii o Ignition Transientloadsdueto Ignition of the MPS and SRB

_" combinedwith groundwind loads.

:: o Acousticand All acousticand vibration loadsexperienced during

:'i. Vibration liftoff and ascent.

" o Acceleration Maximumacceleration during SRBburn, and transients

_, . occuring at burnout.

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D ISCUSSION (continued)

o Max q-alpha Loadsresulting from the maximum c_nblnatio_ of

and q-bQta dynamic-pressure(q) and resultant pitch (alpha) and/or

yaw (beta) angle_ Induced by winds aloft envlronment.

o SRBSepa;atlon Transient loadsat SRBburnoutand separation.

o Orbtter/ET Ascent Transient loadsat initiation of throttling of main engine

burn and subsequentmaln engine thrusttermination.

o ET Separation Separationloadsand RCSthrustduring separation

maneuvers.

o On-Orblt Oper- a) The OMS and RCSthrustduring orbit cifcularizatlon_

ations rendezvous, and dockingmaneuvers; b) dockingand

undockingloads; c) payload handling reactions;and

d) RCSand OMS firings while in docked mode.

o De-Orbit OMS and RCSthrustsduring de-orbit.Maneuvers

o Orbiter Entry The thermal, acousticand structural loading conditions

compatible with the nominalentry trajectories.

o Approach/Terminal Loadsresultingfrom:

Area Energy a) Symmetricflight maneuverload factorsof 2.5g

Management positive and 1.0g negative

b) Symmetricand unsymmetricmaneuverand gustloads

consistentwith transportcategory aiewortkinessre-

qulrements(MIL-A-8861 A)

o Landingand Landing loadsresulting from criteria establishedin

Rollout MIL-A-8862, basedon a designlimit sinking speedof

9.6 ft./sec, for bothsymmetricaland drift landingsat the

designweight associatedwith a 32K lb. payload. The

landing gear and wheelwell structureshall sustaintaxi

and turning loads.

o Heating Rates The TPSshall sustain, without lossof operational cap-

and Total Heat ability_ the SRBplume heating rates, the ascent heating

Load Distrlb- ratesand total heat loads, the ET interference heating,

utlon the re-entry heating ratesand temperatureextremesde-

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DISCUSSION (c,_ntinuod)

fined fnr a mlssionprofile.

: Environments Hot day seaatmosphere,winds, tropmphereand

stratosphere,space vacuumsdirect radiation fromsun,

entry plasma_rain and.sleet,

Theseloadsmay be accom_nled by obnormcdloadingconditionswhich can hove

adverseresults.in the compgnent. Suchabnormalloadsmay consistof:

l. Longstay on launchi_d Insalt-prone atmosphereand high winds

2. H_ghwindsaloft

3. Stagingmishaps

4. Boostenglne-out

,, 5. Insufficient thermalconditioning

6. Erroneousentry angle=_ 7. Extremeturbulence

8. Hard landingt tail down landing, or hlgh cross-wlndlanding

9. Landinggear collapse

i

11

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_c! DISCUSSION (continued)

B. Nondostructlvo Inspection Rationale

NDI_ Spacificotlans

f: Nondestructive inspection (NDE) methods for the Space Shuttle structure for

b; turnaround/refurbishmen-t-2u_spactionare described along the lines, of the req.ulrements

of Air Force speclficatlon MJL-M-38780, "Milltary Specification Manual, Technical:

: Nondestructive Inspection ". To the extent posslble, all r_ondestructlve test (NDT)

techniques were derlved from ultrasonic, eddy current, radlographic, penetrar_t,

magnetic pa,rticle and optical/visual methods. Inst.rucfional information concerning

_' these NDT methods can be found in various NASA and military technical manuals

_ and Technical Orders such as those listed in the Appendix, Section I - General,

_, paragraph I .5. These methods are widely used, tlme-provedj and readily applied

with a minimum of auxiliary equipment and interpretation aids and are the most

0 reliable NDT methods available at the present time. In some cases, advanced re-

_ii finements of these methods may be det,irable, such as the use of image-enhancement

_ practices for radiography.i

:_ Many NASA documents contributed information which led dtrecfly to formulation

of rationale, guidelines and cr.ter_ for the NDE analys_s. Some of these are:

_, NASA SP 8057 Structural Design Criteria Applicable to a Jan. 1971o ,'

_" Space Shuttle

- Contract I",1AS10-7250 Methods of AssessingStructural Integrity Jan. 1971if:

._,_: for Space Shuttle Vehicles

ii" Contract NA_10-7679 Space Shuttle Structural Integrity Test Feb. 1972

_ and Assessment

_,: Contract NAS1-10184 Study of Damage Control Systemsfor Oct. 1971

° ' Space Station

°_. Contract NAS7-200 On-Board Checkout of the Structural

Integrity of Cryogenic Tanks

NASA SP-8095 Prelimlnary Criteria for the Fracture June 1971

,, Control of Space Shuttle Structures

_ i Application of NDT Techniquesiii i i f

,i Both primary and backup NDT methods have been suggested for critical area inspection

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D)_! !55!C)N (¢(_lt|nu_d)

where ap.pllcable. Theprimary methodwill be applled to _earch for cracks in

speclfi0d ¢_itical areas for flr_t-order-ln_ctlon..- The primary methodshould

therefore be effective, tellable, and require little or no structure disassemblyor

componentrerno.v._ls.The back-up techniquesare applied to verify the results

of the primary technique when the latter cannot indicate the crack with reasonable

certainty. Additional disassembly,removal or area preparationmay be necessary

to apply the back-up technique. The appllcation of all NDT techniquesare

closely tied to accessibility factorswhich may give rise to the need for structure

disassemblyor removal of componentsor equipment. This point is discussedmore

fully in the "Accessibility Factors" paragraph.

The selection of a NDT technique for L_spectionof a given area is madeafter

consideringall relevant factorsof the area, defect characterization and

applicable NDT methods. Factorswhich affect the choice of the primary tech-

nique can be listed as:

(a) capabilities and limitations of the applicable techniques,

(b) reliability and posltive_,_ssof the applicable techniques,

(c) location, orientation, and size of potential defect,

(d) material and geometryof critical area,

(e) configuration of part with respectto adjoining structure, attachments, etc.

(f) accessibility to area with respectto specific NDT techniquesand personnel,

(g) amountof disassemblyand/or removalsto gain access,

(h) amountof preparation to the inspectionarea relative to the various

techniques,

(i) structure designconcept - safe-llfe or fail-safe,

(j) safety problemsand unusualhumanfactors,

(k) set-up and inspectiontime.

Somegeneral considerationsfor applying the NDT methodsare described below.

(References5, 6 _nd7).

Ultrasonic - Ultrasonic techniquescan be applied when the fracture parameters

are well defined. The location and orientation of suspectedcracksmustbe knownso

that the ultrasoundcan be beamedaccurately, for target (crack) acquisition. Hand-13

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I f

!

DISCUSSION (continued)

scan techniquesare-not appropriate for general searching over largo Inspection

areasand are-bettor utllized when they can be confined to specific locations

in the part. AutomatedC-scan technlq.uescan cover larger areas on a nearly

100 percent coverage basis, providing the part geometry is uniformand the pert con

be removedfor Immersionor issuitabLe-formechcmizedwheel searchunlt or

water-columnscanning. Accesssurfacesmustbe smoothand clean. Smooth

layers of paint are usually acceptable in ultrasonic inspectionexcept perhaps

in the useof surface-wave techniques, tease or flaking point, thick sealant

of non-unifo_Tnthicknessand grime mustbe removedfrOmthe inspectionsurface.

Scanningmotion for the searchunit mustnot be unduly restricted for adequate

inspectionbecauseof fasteners,edges, stiffeners, or other structural elements.

Ultrasoundcannot be directed througha sealed faylng interface with con-

sistency or reliability. Thusadjoining membersmustusually be inspectedfrom

their own surfaces. Nonmetallic material is usuallyhighly attenuating to ultra-

soundbecauseof scattering andabsorption. Primarily, ultrasonic techniques

have beenspecified for inspectionof clevis lugattachments, butt and lap splices

fastenerholes, hinge fittings, hidden areas, landinggear componentsand

honeycombskin panels.

EddyCurrent - Eddycurrent techniquesalso are not appropriatefor

general large area inspection. Suspectareas shouldbe well defined sothat

. searching can be confined to specific locations on the part. Most surface cracks

: and cracks in bolt holes with the bolt removedare readily detectable by thls method.

The techniques can be applied to aluminum, titanium and low-magnetic steel alloys.

Uniform coats of paint and other nonmetallic coatings normally are easily

tolerated. Problemscan arise when the technique is applied to plated steels,

particularly when the plating is worn, spalled, or crocked. Inspectionof aluminum

structure immedlotely aroundsteel fastenersis very difficult, so that probe guides

for maintaining a constantprobe-to-fastener distance while scanningaroundthe

fastenerare necessary. Even thougheddy current techniquesare confined to

detection of cracks which intersectthe surface, aluminumstructure under thin

14

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( < 0,10 Inch) stalnle_sstool or titanium doubler0and._trap: can be inspected by,!

law-frequency ( < 6000 hertz) eddy cur-re.=ttechniques, _inco the magnetic field

from the probe can sufficiently penetrate thesematoriolo wl" in the Btntod

. thickness.

Radiography - Radlographic methodshave severe llmltatlons when small

- cracksmustbe detected. Large, tight cracksare often missedeven in thin

sections. Inspecflor_for small cracks in aluminum under steel fastener heads Is

_ impractical. Cracks in built-up structure that may be open becauseof transverse

tensile loadsare sometlmesappropriate for radiographic inspectionif more readily

..... appl led techniquesare not applicable.

X-ray techniqueshave excellent application to evaluation of honeycombinternal

damage, water-entrapment in honeycomb,metal fibe', composites,certain typesof

corroslon, part misalignment, eccentri,: fastenerholes, internal conditionsof pumps,

_-.... valves, a nd the like. Neutr.ozLradiography,highly complementarytechniqueto

X-ray radiography, described in the Appendlx in Paragraph1.5.6. Gamma-ray

_. radiographycan be usedin lieu of X-ray techniques in confined places sincesmall,

self-contc,lned gammaradiation sourcesare available, providing1he longerexposure

timescan be tolerated. G_mma-ray techniquesfor material evaluation are well

established, though not commonlyused

• Although immediate accessto a critical area is not necessarywlth radlographlc tech-

niques as is the casefor eddy current and penetrant techniques, two-s|ded accessto a

: built-up area is always necessaryfor target _lluminatlon and film placement. The

removal of insulation and other low-density materials is usually unnecessaryto applyi

X-ray inspection but may be deslrable when removal is practlcal. When applying

neutron radiography, the chemical compositionof these materials should be considered

to assure that their absorption coefficients will not excessively affect penetration and

film contrast. Safety practices to isolate personnel from dangerousradlatlons is

Radlography is specified in the SpaceShuttle Preliminary NDE Manual for inspectlon

of such items as honeycombskln panels, solid skln panels when large areasare to be

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DISCUSSlObl_(c.ontinued).

Insp_ctod_ bullt-up sheet mat.e.rJal,__uch as _kln/'strap/c_p ¢omblnatlon_, and sho_t

lffruct_ros where _ccoss Is not avallablg for the u_ of other tgchnlqug_, Many groq_

of 6kln on the Orblto_ must bg Insp_Gtodby radlggraphlc tgchnlques because the

RS!/TPSmatorlols on the skin exterior restrlcts access,for other NDT techniques.

_..onslderationshouldbe given to the Orbiter static loads in the inspoctlonenviron=

ment in view of the possibility that trunsversotensile loads tend to open up cracks

and transversecompressiveIo_dstend to close them. When posslble_it is recom-

mended,hat the structure be unloadedor reverse-loaded in order to open up cracks

for improving the detection probability not only for radiography, but other NDE

methodsas well. Fol'example, raising the wlng tips slightly by jackscan op,_nup

wing lower surfacechordwisecracks_ thusenhancing detection.

The criteria for applying radiography for primary inspectionof the SpaceShuttle

usually involves the following points: a) relatively large crackscan be tolerated

in the structuret b) thin sheetmaterialswhere through-cracksare mast likely to

occur, and c) direct accessis not available for useof other techniquesbecauseof

build-up or presenceof TPSmaterials.

Penetrants- Liquid penetrantscan be applied to large exposedareasand to

complete parts. Geometry is rarely a problem. Aluminum, steel, titanium alloys

and nonporousnonmetallic materials can be inspectedwith penetrants, but only

defects open to the surfaceare detectable by this means. The int,pectlon surfaces

mustbe bareand clean. Paints, sealants, insulation and othercoatingsmustbe

removedfromthe inspectionsurface. After removingall surfacecoatings, the

part mustbe thoroughlycleaned and degreasedprior to application of the penetrants.

Roughsurfacescan hinder penetrant inspection.

Somepenetrantsolutionsshouldnot be usedon titanium and hlgh-strength steel

alloys. Precautionsshouldalwaysbe taken to assurethat no harmsuchas oxl-

datlon and hydrogenembrlttlementwill occur to the part as a resultof applying

the penetrantsolutions. Considerationshouldbe given to the possibledele-

teriouseffects of penetrant residuesleft on the part. Special penetrantsmustbe

usedon parts or componentsthat are exposedto LO2. Penetrant inspectionhas

16

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Ii ii

DISCLIS._ION (eantlnuod)

been heavily _pecifiod a_ a bQckupor v_riflc_tlon techniqu_ _ln_g the u_g of thl_

m_thod roqulro_surface finish stripping, removal of.T-P-S._or limited area di_g_sombly.

• It ha_boonspecified as a prim(_rytechnique when the mrltr_rl_l _urfq_ i_ n_rmally

exposedor finish stripping is a minor problom.

Magnetic Partl_:le = This methodcan be usedto locate surface _nd nora'..

surface clefect_.Inmagnetic steele. The parts must be magnetizable in a direction

generally transverse to the orientation of the suspecteddefect. The detection

sensitivity is directly proportional to the magnetization of the part. However, overly

magnetized material collects too many test particles and tends to degrade re_olutlon

and sensitivity.

It is desirable to remove paints and other thin coatings from the part, although a

smooth, single layer of paint or cOating material is often acceptable. When the

part is plated with another metal, it may be difficult to discriminatebetweena

crack in the plating and a crack in the parent steel material. The inspectedparts

mustbe demagnetizedafter inspection, as residual magnetismcan have undesirable

effects on the vehicle's navigationsystemsor nearby solenoids.

• Magnetic particle inspectionhas been specified in the Preliminary NDE Manual

largely for inspectionof the steel landing gear components. Any magnetizable

steel part for which there is accessfor applylng the magnetizing head to properly

orient the magnetic field may be amenable to inspectionby thls hlgh-tellabillty

,,, NDT methad.

• Vit,ual/Optlcs - Optical methodsdepend on achieving a clear, unimpeded

view of the inspectionarea. Surfacedefects, large cracks, mlsallgnments,dis-

colorations, displacedcomponents,andspillages can be detected. Optical methods

are usually applied to inspectareasthat are not accessibleto other NDT methods.

Optical methodsare best usedfor crack detection whendefect sizesare.abouta

half-inch or mote in length and have propagatedthroughthe thicknessor to the

edge of the part.

Forvisual detection, paints, sealantsand other coatingsmustnot conceal the

17

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i

!! '

-. DISCLI551ON (c(_ntinu(_d)

" _urfaco. ko_l doformgtlon, _mck oponlnB mr_ovomd pgrt_ore chor_ctoristlc_ to

look for In optl_l crgck doto_tlon, Verification of _g_p_ctodcrgck,_by other NDE

tochnlquo_ mily be noco_8_ry, The g_oof a bock_up technique will probably no=,

=' cos,_It(]toromovln0 the BuBpoctodcomponentor pgrtlally diBg_BombllnFlthe local

structure to gain gcco_.

Optlcgl techniquesmay be usedto Inspect hoot=sonsltlvecolor'=changetope or_'

:. palntl placed at certain locations within the structure Io detect local failures in

; _ insulation (TPS)effectiveness by undergoingcolor changeswhen they reach selected

:i" temperaturesabove the deslgn maxlmum reentry temperature for structure (350°F).

". In inaccessible locations, the topesor p(_intscan be observedby use of optical

i borescopes.

,. Acce_ibility Factors- Critical-area accessibility heavily influences I) the/

3) the extent of vehicle preparation prior to and following inspection. Adequate

I i:! accessfor personneland equipment i=ta prerequisitefor effective inspection. Lack

ii of ready accels to a critical area shouldnot preclude the use of someNDT tech-

nique In that area, t.lnceaccesscan be gained by removingaccesspenels_ fairlngs,

ductlng, Insulation, flttlngs, straps, bolts, equipmentand the like, as necessary.

..... Additional preparationsuchas sealant and paint stripping is sometimesrequired as

part. Cleaning of the part to removeallen oils, hydraulic fluids, grease, dirt and

_i grime is practically a universal requirementfor mostinspectionmethods.

;' When specifying primaryand backup NDE techniques for specific areas, the

following considerationswere made'

a. Primary inspection techniques:

o .. o Due to the relatively small amount of time avail,able for insp-

,/ ectlon during oroiter turnaround, removalsand disassemblyof

ili. conserveC°mp°nentsandflnishessh°uldbekeptt°aminlmumtlme,inorderto

• ,','r_-," " 1 17 _, _' ,, _o° -:_

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i;

". DISCUSSIONf ntln,a). _ Of the applicable tochniqu_, th_oothat can bo ¢lpplk_dwith

i° little or no di_t_ombly or romov_l_will be _oloctod If pm_t_

i¢ol and NDT sonsltlvity and reliability I_ not compromi._d,

j_, o Whoreadequate dl0Qs_omblyor removal i_ not practk;al or!

i_ Qdvi,Jablot¢onslderotion ,_houldbe given to the fo_l,_ibillty

,, of on-boclfdpermanently installo_l Inspection poraphonoli_

or aids suchas bonded=In=placeultrasonicsearch units or

,. optical viewing ports,o Beforedisassemblyor removal is specified, ¢onsrdorc_tlon

t

"_ shouldalwcsysbe given to structural effect_ of doing so:

possiblemimlignment, likelihood of structural damage, level

!' of difficulty, relative manhoursrgqulred, personnelsafety hazards,

:_ and operational factors

'__ b. Back-upor verification inspectiontechntque,_,.

:ii;i o All of the above considerations.

. o When necessaryto apply back-up techniques_ the applicable

NDT technique requiring the minimurr_amountof additional

disassemblyor removalshould be selected providing inspection

reliability can be malntaine6.

The expected IocaHon, orientation and size of a potential defect can determine the

°:,. applicable NDE techniqueas well as someaccessibility requirements. The NDE

_ techniqueand accessrequirementsare strongly interrelated so that one will affect

_, the other. Occasionally the crack oarametersand accessfactors may "lock in"

o._, a given NDE technique to the exclusion of all others. Generally, however, a

:. choice between two or three applicable techniques may be possible The selection

of an NDT technique for a given are_ clearly restson having an accurate definition

_: of the potential problemand o knowledge of the local design factors.

: Reliability -Very little data are available relating to crack detection reliability

of the various NDT methods. Of the data that have been published, samedisappoint-

_. ing results have been presentedfor the statistical reliability of somemethods. De-

_:o_.. tectlon statlstics have been published by Packman(Reference B) and Pearson(Refer-

_ . 19

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DISCUSSION (continu_d)

ences 8 and 9), Sproat (ReforcJnce10), Pottlt and Hoeppnor (Rofereneo 11), and

Sattlo_r(Reference 12). Ultrasonic, penetrant7 X-ray and eddy current techniques

are represented in the works referenced above. The Martln-Marletto Corporation -

Denver Divislon, has evaluated the detection threshold sensltiviry for small cracks

uslng optlmlzed X-ray, penetranb eddy current and ultrasonic technlques (Reference

13). Theseefforts are largely concerned wlth malntenance inspection rellabillty as

opposedto productionor fabrication inspectiort. Production partsare usually con-

slderably easler to Inspect in their pre-fab condltlon than are built-up or ir_stalled

airframe structure. The BoeingCompanyhasreported depot level malntenance/inspec-

tion reliability data for eddy current NDT of some33,000 fastener holes In aircraft

wing structure (Reference 14).

Caution should be usedwhen attempting to relate rellabillty values for a given NDT

technlque to any inspectionsituation. The reliability of a technique can vary widely

_ due trj combinationof manyfactors, whl,'h are related in part to (1) materlal and

fabr;catlon characteristics, (2) crack characterlstlcs, (3) equlpmenteharacterlstlcs,

(4) accesslbillty factors, (5) humanfactors, (6) environmental factors, and (7) in-

' spection schedulefactors.

However, somegeneralizations can be derived frompublishedreliability data, which

" are:

: (1) Reliability for any technique is expected to be lessthan 100%.

(2) The smallest surface cracks are mostreliably found by penetrant tech-(

,,,, nlquesand magnetic particle inspection for steels.

: (3) Only the penetrant and magnetic particle techniques have hlgh detection

reliability for surface cracks in the 0.05 inch to 0.15 inch (1.25ram to

_: 3.75mm) size range.

(4) Generally, penetrant, eddy current, magnetic particle, ultrasonic shear-

, wave techniques all have good rellabillty for cracks greater than O.15

,_L inch (3.75mm)long.

_. (5) Radiographic techniques have acceptable reliability for detection of

fatigue cracks greater than 0.5 inch (12.5mm).

2O

_i ¸ . .....

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DISCUSSION (continued)

In addition to these considerations, reliability of defect detection is usually enhanced

' by the presenceof a tensile stresstransverse to-the crack, _ppllcatlon of a proof load

prior to and during NDE (Reference 10) and by useof re..dundantInspections. In the

last case, the critical area is Inspected at least twice by different inspectors, and the

inspectorsare aware of the resultsof any previous ins_ctlons so that they can con_:en-

trate on "accepted" areas.

Reliability data are usually developedas the number'of crack,_detected in a given

size range relative to the actual number of cracks in the size range. Rel_abillty confl-

dence limits established are dependenton the number of data pointsavailable. If

= only one data point is present, showingthat one crack wasdetected during one inspec-

tlon when only one crack actually exists, the inspection reliability for that event

appearsto be 100 percent. However_ the confidence that the results can be repeated

in subsequent inspectionsmay not be very high. The inspection should be repeated

for a sufficient number of times (about 30) if reasonablestatistical confidence limits

for that part/NDT method are to be established.

• ¢Detection reliability wasa prim., consideration in selection of NDE techniques for

the Shuttle. When two or more techniques were applicable to an area, the tech-

nique expected to yield the most reliable inspectionwas selected unlessaccessibility

restraints appeared to be a factor.

NDT Standards - Ultrasonic and eddy current standardsare necessaryto optimize

the technique and estabi;:h adequate sensitivity, resolution or llft-off. Standards

contain simulated defects in sizes, locations and orientation representative of the

actual part to be inspected. The material, heat-treat and finish mustalso be

representative.

An NDT standard for each specific critical area is often necessaryfor ultrasonic

inspection• On the other hand, for eddy current inspection, a universal standard

made of the appropriate material and containing fastener holes of all pertinent

sizes, fillets and lands can be fabricated with shnulated cracks in the holes, along

edges, on the lands and in radius areas. Simulated defects may be either real

fatigue cracks or slots madeby a fine saw or electrical dlscharge machine (ELOX).

21

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DISCUSS-I.ON(_.nnfl.._l)

Slots do not always closely simulate real cracks. The prlmary differences are related

to the wldths of the openingsand t¢ the texture of crack faces. I_atlguecracks are

usually tightly closedas opposedto the opennature of slots. Eddy current technlques

do not respondwlth equal sensltlvlty to cracks and sawcuts. Ultrasonlc response

can be affected somewhatby the crack openlng dlsplacement and is certainly affected

by the granular texture of the fatigue crack face whlch tends to scatter ultrasound

more profusely than the relatively smooth faces of a machined slot. The difference in

responseis often great and cannot be tolerated when small cracks must be found. For

this reason, it is deslrable that the NDT standard should contain a teal fatigue crack

of appropriate dlmenslonswhen small cracks must be detected.

Crack Size - Prlmary inspection techniques were chosen for thelr obillty to detect

cracks smaller than 0.15 inches (3.75mm) except where fall-safe or fracture toughness

design features may permit larger cracks. Cracks as small as 0.050 inches (1.25ram)

in length can rellably be detected repeatedly by ultrasonlc, eddy current, penetrant

and magnetic particle technlques when all or most of the relevant h,fluenclng

factors are favorable. This slfuatlon often exists but usually several unfavorable

factors will exlst so that detectable crack slzes will be in the range of 0.10 inch to

0.15 inch (2.50ram to 3.75mm). Allotted time and access will be prlme influence

factors. Rddlographyhas been specified when accessis not available for other tech-

niques or when the sub-critical crack slze may exceed 0.25 inches (6.25mm).

Where fracture-mechanics analysls has not provlded detection crack slzes for an area,

the technlque should be optlmlzed to detect the smallest slze that can be indlc_ted

wlth reasonable certainty in the presence of the local "nohe". An arbltrarily small

crack slze may be chosen in thls event for slmulatlon in an NDT standard- for example,

a 0.1 inch X 0.1 inch (2.5ram X 2.5ram) triangular simulated defect sawcut. The

mlnlmum crack slze should be indicated in the NDT equlpment by a responsewhlch is

signlficantly above the "nolse" level. As an example, an ultrasonlc responseequal

to at least 50 to 80 percent of CRTsaturation is usually specified for the standard

slmulated flaw. Where critical crack sizesare glven, the NDT technlque should be

able to Indlcate a crack slgniflcantly smaller than the critical slze. The detection

22

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&.

i

i

i_ DISCUSSION (continued)i , /

_' reliability and confidet_ceof the variou_NDT_me.tl_dsbegin to decreaserapidly for

i :o:_ crack_smallerthan somegiven size dependenton NDT technique, part g_omotryand

i _,_ accesslblllty factors.

:_: Structural DeslgnConcepts

i: The design conceptsconsideredfor the reusableShuttle _ttucture, safe-llfe and fail-

safe, influence the application (References2 and 4) of NDE techniques. The safe-

: :'_• life conceptassumeseither an initial subcrltlcal flaw or nucleation after a glven

_ numberof load spectrumcycles. Then crack growth under the applied load spectra is:{'_:

evaluated and the safe-life is determlned as the number of mlsslons or load cycles

°_i:: until the flaw growsto a size that could causefailure under Iimlt design conditions.

The slze of initial defect that is assumed to exist in the structure depends on the assumed- j4

i_:::;:i, or demonstratedcapablllties of available nondestructlvetesting techniques relative to

i_ _, the type of defect, material and structural conflguratlon - defining the largest crack: !

__!i that can be routinely missedduring inspection. Flaw growth characteristics under thei -:,,: applied loadspectrawill determine the inspection intervals or llfe of the componenti °

: i: or vehicle.i

F: ;_: The fail-safe concept is also applied to a damage-tolerant deslgn which requires thato i:

--:_ the failure of any single structural componentwill not degradethe strength or stlffness

._:':i of the remalnlng structure to the extent that the vehicle cannot complete the misslon.

.,'_ Damagetolerance is achieved through the useof tough materials, redundantload paths

_:_:: and crack arrest provisionssuchas geometrlc boundariesand stlffeners. The fatigue

i "i::! llfe of the remalnlngstructure after faiiure of a single principal element mu_.tbe

_'_" adequate to prevent slgnlflcant additional damagebefore the next regular inspection

_._ period. The fail-safe deslgnwill usually permit the useof visual, optical or radio-

:_::i,' graphic inspection on accesslblestructure•

_. The safe-life deslgnwill generally require the useof moresensitive NDT technlques

i:_iI:::: for inspectionof accessible structure. When posslble, bolts, fastenersor secondaryi ;

..... structural attachments should be removed so that small concealed cracks can be!_.1 ,,

__': detected and characterized. If possible, the d,menslonsof the crack should be ascer-!4'i*_,:

;,_:_ talned through use of the NDT methodsor vlsually, sothat the flaw slze can be used

_:_::_i:r_ to help predict the remalnlngservice life.

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PISCUSSION (continued)

:rltlcal areas that are Inaccos_iblewill nece_51tateIncorporationof Inspectlonde-

jlces Lntothe vehiclo design, suchas lns_ctlon port_and built-ln transducers.

i_hecriteria establishedfor thisstudyprogramsuggest_the use of portsfor borescopes

and x-ray film holderswhen fracture-crltlcol fail-safe deslgnis involvedand the

useof carefully placed built-ln ultrasonictransducerswhen fracture-crltical safe-llfe

design is involved. The reasoningbehind this crlterla is that the larger flawsallowed

in fail-safe structure ismore suitable to detection by optical or x-ray techniques,

where as the smaller cracksencountecedin safe-life structurerequiresmore sensitive

and precise techniques.

!nspecflonTime

The tlme necessaryto perform Indlvldual inspectionis very important In maintaining

the tight refurbishmentschedules. However, performingthe actual NDT is only a

relatively small portion of the inspectionactivity. Nominal inspectiontimesfor

actually applying the NDT techniquesin average situationsare given in Table I in

termsof elapsed time or manhourtime. Thesetimesare appropriate only for per-

formingthe inspectlon, justone of the manyfactors listed below. Much depends

upon the managementapproach, degreeof coordinationwith otheractivities, pro-

ficiency of the HDT operators, NDT reporting systemand other factors. A listing of

someof the pertinent factorsaffecting inspectiontimeare:

o timely availability of appropriate NDT standards

o familiarity with NDT proceduresneeding to be performed

o preparation of structure for inspection- gaining accessand cleaning

o NDT equipmentcheck-out_ set-up and calibration

o performingthe inspection(seeTable I)

o recording results

o interpreting results

o verification of resultswhendefects are found

o reporting results

o removingequipment

o restoringthe paints, finishes, componentsto flight configuration

Much dependson being ready to p_rforma set of scheduledinspectionswhenthe

vehicle comesin for refurbishment. Prlot to thisstage, all necessaryNDT standards,

24 j

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DISCUSSIO•N .(¢onfl.nuedl..........

NOMINAL INSPECTION TIMESFOR NDT TECHNIQUES

TABLE1 (INCLUDES ONLY_INSPECTOR/OPERATORFUNCTIONS)i i J II ii l

TYPEOF NDT TECHNIQUE, PROCESS TIME, MINUTESSTRUCTURE (Doesnot LncludedlsassembJy/ TE = ELAPSEDTIME

removal operations) TM = MANHOUR TIMEi ii i i ii i i

i' Bolt Hole in Lug Ultrasonic Shear Wave TE, 3-6 min/hole

Clevis or ButtSplice EddyCurrent Bolt-Hole, Single-Layer TE, 3 mln/hole

Construction, 3 Scans

EddyCurrent Bolt-Hole, 3 - Layer TE, 15 rain/hole

• Consh'uction, 9 Scans

Magnetic Particle (Clevls/Lug), (includes TM, 25 mln/holemagnetization, inspection, demagn.)

FastenerHoles Ultrasonic ShearWave TE, 10 mln/15 fasteners

EddyCurrent ScanAround Fastener TE, 5 min/15 fasteners

Fillets, Edges Ultrasonic Shear or SurfaceWave TE, 4 m|n/ft (13 rain/meter)

EddyCurrent Surface Probe TE, 1/2 m_n/ft (1-2/3 rain�• meter)

Penetrant (includes pre-cleanlng, dwell TM and TE

_T times, inspection, post-cleaning) 35 rain/area

Skin Panels, Splices X-ray, 1/2-inch thick (12.5mm) thick alum. TM, 30 rain/shot(includesequip, set-up, film placement,exposure, equip, tear down)

X-ray film processingand reading TM or TE 20 mln/film

Penetrant (asabove) TM and TE 35 mir_/area

Cylindrical, Bar Penetrant (as above) TM, 25 rain/piece

Shapes Magnetic Particle TM, 25 mln/piece

Honeycomb X-ray (as above) TM, 25 rain/shot

Film Processingand Reading TM or TE, 20 mln/film

Ultrasonic Resonance TE, 5 min/sq, ft. (54 rain�.......... sq. mnter)

25

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.,2iEW

_.__ DISCUSSION (cOntinued)

_ probe guides, materials, supplies and equipment should be on hand and ready

_,!_. for appllcation. Inspectors should be famillar wlth the individual procedures

_,i'_ they are to perform and with.the given areas on the vehlele. The necessary items_.. for removal or disassembly should be coordinated with the maintenance people.

-,'' Paper work should be prepared and minimized for reporting and control purposes

_i The actual inspection time for a given area may range from a few minutes to over

I!'i,, a half hour, depending mostly on the NDT technique used. Ultrasonic and eddy

i ii! current inspection may range from 3 to 10 minutes per area. Ulttasonlc lug

_ii: inspection can be typically performed in 4 to 6 mlnute_. Penetrant and X-ray

_:,.... techniques take longer to apply because of pre-cleaning, penetrant and

_,:,--_ developer dwell times, and post-cleaning, or film placement and exposure time for

_:_ radiography Film development and readout combined may take twenty minutes or

Eli, more. However, the actual inspection times may amount to only a small proportion of

_.!: the time required for all the functlons pertaining to the inspection if the inspections

are coord|nated and "overlapped" in order to m|nlmlze time°

'_,ii:

i,:L

, i

22 ' ,

'2S_I*

2/_i 26

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DISCUSS ION (confinuod)

Schedule Factors

During the planned two-week refurbishment turnaround period, limited time will be

available in which to inspect the orbiter's critical load-bearing s_ .u_e and thermal

insulation. According to the ATP baseline Ground Operations Schedule and discussions

with Rockwell Inter_atlonal, approximately 72 hours will be available For performing

the srructural inspection functions, commencing early in the refurbishment schedule.

These functions will consist of preparing the areas for inspection (i.e., disassembling,

removing, and/or cleaning components), applying the actual NDT techniques, data

evaluation, then restoring the areas to flight-readiness configuration.

The inspection data mustbe quickly and accurately interpreted so that decisions can

be made regarding possible structural analysis and repair of structure or materials

found to be damaged. Interpretation should be accomplished prior to restoration of the

inspected areas to flight configuration in order to avoid the possibility of having to

repeat disassemblyor removal of components for repair or replacement.

The time constraints thus imposed upon the total inspection processnecessitate the use

of NDT techniques which can be applied readily and the results interpreted in real time

as far as possible. This demands the selection of simple, proven NDT techniques which

provide minimum equipment, set-up time, inspection time, and interpretation functions.

The establishment of a reasonable inspection frequency for each area is important

from this standpoint, since the number of areas requiring inspection can be kept

to a minimum during most refurbishment periods. An inspection routine should be

worked out to deploy manpower and NDT procedures soas to minimize th_ overall

inspection perlc_dand to totally integrate the routine into the overall refurbishment

effort.

27

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1

DISCUSSION (continued)

Acoustic emissionand holographyNDE methodsfor structural o_o_ment have not

been specified in this preliminary manual. The useof acoustic emission techniques

in accompanimentwith pressureproof testing hasbecomea practical way to deter-

mine the presenceof crack-like defects in pressurevesselsand is thus recommended

i ' for use during proof testing of all types of ctyogenlc tanks used on the Space" Shuttle4" O

i

Acoustic emlsslontechnlquesand equlpment for crack-growth monltorlng of prlmary

. Ioad-bearlng airframe structur_ is presently recelvlng interest in the aerospace

. industry. The technique hasproven to be feasible on monolithic and complex

_._ built-up laboratory specimens. The Lockheed-Georgla Company, under fundingi'::': fl'om the Air Force, has designedacoustic emlsslonsystemsfor dynamlcally monitor-

_" ing structure :n flying aircraft and presently are fllght-testlng both low-level and.

i_ high-level acoustic monitoring systemson a fleet-operated C-SA Galaxy (Reference

! 15) Present indicationsare that suchsystemscan be developed to the point that

_:_' they are routinely installed on flying aircraft and spacecraft within the next two to

i four years.

!-

i . Likewise, laser interferometric holography hasbeen applied on laboratory specimens

.... to signal the presence of cracks around fastener holes, edges and other locations in

_ structure (Reference 16). The interferometry patterns are established under conditions

! of loading and no-loading so that light fringes are established due to material defor-

mation around the crack during loading. Necessary static loads can be easily and

_* readily applied to manyportionsof structure Increasingdevelopments in holography4

i v

i :

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'x

DISCUSSION (continued)

may produceseveral techniquesfor field or depot type in_pectlon of ,structurewithin

a few years.

i:.:_: Recentdevelopmentsin neutronsourcesfor radiographic inspection have produced

_,_ relatively portable systemsin the sensethat a stationary reactor Isno longer necessaryfor productlon of neutrons (References 5, 17, and 18). Relatlvely small 252-Callf-

........ orn;um isotopesourc can be housedIn a shleldedcontainer that can easily be

_, transported on o small truck to the croft for inspection of accessible components.V

_"_' The sourceitself can then be lifted by a self-contalned boomfor emplacementnear

"%:: the componentto be inspected. Componentsfor which neutronradiography ls parti-

.._,' cularly sultedare honeycombskln panels, boron/epoxy lamlnates, pumpand valve

_:!_ii! seals, hydrogenouscompounds, pyrotechnlc devlces such as franglble bolts, lubricant-_i_::_?. contalning systemsand other devlces that contain hydrogenor boron. Many materials::'_': that are opaqueto x-rays, suchas lead, are relatively transparent to neutrons•

L_II:I Neutron radiography is suggestedas an alternate inspection technique for someof

%:' the Shuttle structure in the Preliminary NDE Manual (Appendix)

-=';.:i The acoustic,sonicringing (ASR)method (Reference19) is belng consideredfor in-

"' spectlon of RSI/TPSmaterials installed on the Orbiter. Although acoustic resonance

....._,_' techniquesare not new, the ASRmethod is new in the senseof the computerlzed

_:. system needed to apply it and In it_ appli_tlan to the new TPS material system. The

oli:'. ASRmethodhas beenusedsuccessfullyat the Lockheed Missiles and Space Company

:_. to detect delamlnatlons, cracks, velds, dlsbonds,and severeemlsslvlty coating

.....}"l' erosionin the RSI/TPSmaterial The technlque is essentially a measurementof the'L-

.... soundreverberations producedin the material when the surface is lightly tapped wlth

. a weight of a few grams. The presenceof flaws producesa change in the reverbera=

iii: tlon frequencies whlch provlde the signature for flaw detection. The technlque uses

.',_; a sonic transducerto receive the reverberationswhich are amplified and displayed

: on a spectrumanalyzer. Good materlal may producea frequency of 8 KHz or less,

-.,,_." and material with flaws may producefrequencies from 12 to 25 KHz. Frequencies

...... generated depend on tile thickness, attachment system properties, material of con-

._i: structlon of tapper, emlssivlty coating thickness, defects andother factors. To use

=i::i!.::. 29

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i

i

DISCUSSION (continued)

the ASRtechnique, o data-bank mustbe complied for each RSIpanel con_L_.tlnoof

frequenciesrelaklng ta RSI, the Intemol defects, PSI tile coating defect_,_bondllne

defects_and soundmaterial. Thlspromisingtechnique takesonly a veeryshort time

to interrogate each penel.

3O

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t I

SPACESHUTTLESTRUCTURALI.NSPI_CTIONREQUIRI_MI_NT5

A, RefurbishmentNDE Roquirom_nt_

Far the purposeof this study_ a structural critical area Is defined asan area of struc-

ture or componentwhich Is determined by enalysls or expgrience te be prongt_ develop

se_Ice defects which would affect the serviceability of the equipment. These

i, are referred to as fracture-crltical portsand are usually consideredto fall into

i one of the following categorlesof critlcallty:

i (<I) failure can cause lossof _e ml_slonelossof the vehicle, and/or

lossof llfe; example: fracture of a veftlcal stabilizer/fuselage

attach fitting;

(b) Failure will lead to a lossof one or moremlsslongoals, or

reducedperformanceof the vehicle; example: fracture of a

wlng sparcap;

(c) f_lilure may not threaten the mlsslan, vehlcle or life wbut the

integrity of an on-board systemor subsystemis indlrectly

affected; example: fracture ef a feedl;ne supportbracket.

hemswhich can be describedby critical category (a) are hlgh-risk ports whosein-

tegrity must be assuredfor each mission. Many items in category (b) mu_t be con-

sidered hlgh-risk items in termsof accomplishing missiongoals. Assuranceof

integrity ;s accomplished through fracture-control design methods, inspection and

maintenance activities and other fracture control practices.

In the early part of the programt Orbiter ATP and PRRbaseline drawings were

analyzed to define areas where flight loads or environmentsmight causestructural

• damage. With a knowledgeof the typesof loadsthe Shuttle vehicles will encounter

in a typlcal missionprofile, about 86 areasand componentsof structure were initially

31

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i

i .... Ii : I

,r

i STRUCTURALINSPECT-E3NREQUIREMENTS(contlnued)

,. daflnod as "c_ndldoto" inspacflon _roos. In the absence of doslt_n_andload details

i ", for thosearea_, it wasnot possibleto-define positive requirements. Later baseline!

i .:-_ drawlng_, design Information _nd fracture analysis data wore used to define the

!_':.i 134 areas that are now included In the Prellmlnary NDE Manual comprisingthe

_- Appendixof this report. Of particular help in this respect-worethe progressreport_

::..,;, madeavailable from the contract study programNAS 3-16765: Fracture Control-.,

_ DOsignMethods (Reference1), performedby the Rockwell Intematlonal Space

_-_ Dlvldon.

!=':i: Table 2 pre,_,entsa matrix summaryof the structural NDE requirementsfor the Orblte biF

SRB'sand ETthat am applicable to _st-fllght or p_-flight assessment The matrixi_ I: e

_' glves component/areaname, numberof parts per vehicle, NDE techniques,

gen,_ral location of the _rts and pertinent eomment_. It should be noted that not all

_i t_,eseareasare to be Inspectedafter each flight, Someareas will probably need to

!_:ii be inspectedvery infrequently. Other areasmay need to be Inspectedonly In the

_,. event that unusualloadsor mlshapsare encountered. The NDE manual shouldin-

:, clude the NDE requirementsfor suchareas sothat "how to" Instructionswill exist in

the event they shouldbe needed.

i_ii:i._,: The structural areas included in the Manual shouldnot be regardedas complete or

!"_< conclusive. Someof the areasmay be droppedor new areasadded when more

!_:, completedeslgnand load data are avallable for a morerigorousanalysisof the struc-

!-__. ture. Futurecomponenttesting and flight test programswill stronglyInfluence the

_: contentsof the final NDE manual for the Shuttle. A list of additional candidate

_! areasand componentswhich were not included in the presentPrellmlnary NDE Manual

i_! ' Is given In Table 3, and shouldbe given ¢onslclerotionfor future inclusion In the

_ manual.

i '

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z

TABLE 2. SUMMARY MATRiX GF SPACESHUTTLEFIDE REQUIREMENTSPo - POS|ELIGHT

PR - P_E:LIGH1

PROC[DLIRE LOCATION AND TYPEOF PARTS, PI_IMAPY REMAklg_ I(PINUMBER AREA COMPONENT D[SCRIPTIOI-I PART AI,,EA5 NDT IMfiP.

-l_ WHIcEE ECHNIC_UE_,I!' _ , " '

'. I C; _WAIH) I I.,;( AOl gTRUCIUI_.EI

7-1LII CAIIlPIIII!,II-AGI':+FriLlSLIPP(311T;BRACKIIS, 73 (:'PiICAI C_Il rls1rlClllJ Pc+

i ii lit.IFAI,ID!_I_,A(tI.IT A+_+.y TIll!lAD[I) III'IfiALI.+I,C'+ACCI+,SMAYi IYIIK LI, _I,II._I'II'iIi!IAI'II__I_._IllfllI_IIIII-

'_:1 'd I I:VI VISit:_IlttHId tgPRC'-

i AT [ACHo _AllloGl_ AI_I!Y AC(-'[ '.f;

i MI NT',

' :! _oI(,,',i IWD I U" '>KIF,I' 'L'KII_'_ _IA[)I( )GIIAPHY III 51RIC11D P( 'I;: !Jr._Gur ^lJu_,l,llct,t Acct','.,/,

;°i*'._ ,'_I0.I IWD EU!; SHI It wIrID(!W !RAMES 6 WIND(;,WS RE',;TRICIID P(

_i' ',_°201 NLC DRAG link hlil_P()rT rll11,_O MACIIINI D 2 IIITRA',(_NICii FITTING

;_o202 NLG IrUNNl©N SUPPORt TITTING MI.CFI, 2 ILTRA'3C)I_.IICFItlING

;_-706 N!o AXlE bPLINED I MAGNFTIC FULL INSPEC-, pO'_!_ MACHIN_ _)ARTICI.F tlC N REQLIIrFS"_'_ ING DISASSEMBLY

2_204 NLG SHOCK STRUTPISTCN MACH, 1 MAGNETIC PARll_ PO_" : FORGING CLE AND IJ[1RA_. ' SONIC

.... +.._,

- :';i 2_205 NLG SHOCK STRUTCYLINDEr MACH, I ULTRASONIC AND POFORGING MAGNETIC PARTI- _

° • ,! CLE,,!

"i! 2-206 NtG TORQUE LINKS MACH. 2 ILTRASGNIC AND POFORGINGS _AGNETIC PArTI_" !:! _'LE

-<_f, 2-207 NLG LOWERDRAG BRACE WLLDED I ILTRASONIC AND PC' TUBING v_AGNETIC PARTl-

y'!" :LEo,, :_._',_ 2-20_ NkG UPPERDRAG BRACE WELDED I JLTRASONIC AND PO

. :! TUBING V_AGNETIC PARTl-

-;.:" 2-209 NLG LOWER DOWN LOCK BRACE MACH. I ULTRASONIC POFORGING

_°_" 2-210 NLG UPPERDOWN LOCK BRACE MACH. 1 LTRASONIC PO"_ FORGING

,!

: 2-211 NLG DRAG BRACECROSS TIE MACH, I MAGNETIC POFORGING PARTICLE

_ ' 2_212 I:WD ET/ORBIIER ATTACH FITTING MACHINED I ULTRASONIC AND PO & PR= _ ' LUC )ENETRANT

i'i 2-213 FWD RCS MODULE STRUCTURAL MOTOR 24_ EDDY CURRENT POi_!_ ATTACH ATTACH_i . FITTINGS::c, ; AND=-; iv 41FIGESY_

-i

L_ ' •=::#! ,

' i i i i

k_-_,' . " :.... ;_: - ::....... "..........................::-;:;:..............,- ........:..........................................- :'-" :.&_ ::.-", _ " :_i ; _ ;

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I I ! "I!

: TABLE _. SUMMARY MATRIX OF SPACESIIUTTL[ NDE REQUIRI!MENTSPO - POSTELIGHT

PR _ PREFLIGHT,l "'" r"

I_ROCEDURIELOCATION AND TYPE_OF PARTS, PRIMARY REMARKS T'I'P[NUMBER AREA/COMPONENT D[SCRIi ION PART AREAS NDT INSP.

/VIJHICLt_ TECHNIQUES

2-214 CREWMODULE ENTRANCE HATCH FRAMING I HATCH I-DDY CURRENT PC)C'PFNINO, FWD rUg SHELl STRUCTURE AND ULTRASONIC

•. 2-301 CABIN FWDBULKHEAD WI:LDFD I BLKHD ULTRASONIC AND POWAFFLE PI-NFTRANTPLATE

j: ?°302 CI,I w M(: DtJI:FW!NDC)W IRAMI_S W[LDf:D 6 WINDC, W!_RADICGRAPHY PC)PLATE AND ULTRASC,NIC

2°303 CABIN CANOPY PANEL!) WELDED ULTRASGNIC OR RESTRICTED POPLATI! RADIOGRAPHY ACCESS

/°304 CABINMLG ACCESSPANEL WELDED I PANEL RADIOGRAPHY POPLATE

, 2-305 CABINtLOOR o BULKHEADBEAMS BUILT-UP EDDY CURRENT I RESTRICTED PO- FRAMESAN RADIOGRAPFIY ACCESS

FITTINGS

2-306 CABIN bKIN PANELS WELDED ULTRASONIC, RESTRICTED POPLATE RADIOGRAPHY ACCESS

OR OPTICAL

2-307 CABIN AFT BULKHEAD WELDED I ULTRASONIC AND POWAFFLE OR EDDYPLATEAND CURRENTATTACH-MENTS

SECTION 3.

MID FUSELAGESTRUCTURE:I

3-40! PAYLOAD BAY FWD SILL LONG- IEXTRUSION 2 EDDY CURRENT SPLICEAREA PO_" ERON AND ULTRASONIC

i

,:i. 3-402 PAYLOAD BAY LOWERFWO EXTRUSION 2 EDDY CURRENT POi LONGERON _,ND ULTRASONIC

3-403 GLOVE FAIRING SKINS :ORMED 2 EDDY CURRENT PO_HEET _,ND VISUAL

3-404 MID FUS ACCESSOPENINGS _KIN/ 6 OPENING EDDY CURRENT POFRAME AND VISUAL

• 3-405 FWD ECSRADIATOR PANEL _ACHIN- B HINGES JLTRASONIC PO

HINGFS INGS _,ND EDDY:URRENT

,: 3-406 WHEELWELL FUSELAGEINNER/ _KIN/ 2 OPENING EDDY CURRENT PO" OUTER ACCESSOPENINGS _RAME AND VISUAL

. 3-407 LOWER SKIN PANELS _ACH. IADIOCRAPHY COVEREDWITH PO_LATE TPS ON LOWER

SURFACE

• 3-408 PAYLOAD DOOR POWERHINGES iVY,CHIN- 12 JLTRASONICS PO:: INGS

3-409 PAYLOAD DOOR IDLER/SHEAR _ACHIN- 26 JLTRASONIC: HINGES INGS

:: 3-410 PAYLOAD SIDELOAD RETENTION VIACHIN- 144 :DDY CURRENT POFITTINGS INGS

; 3-411 SIDE SKIN PANELS _ACH. RADIOGRAPHY, TPSABOVE POPLATE EDDY CURRENT WING ML

:" AND VISUAL

: i I imll

=L 34

00000001-TSD01

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_ j r

TABLE 2. SUMMARY MATRIX OF SPACESHUTTLENDE REQUIREMENTS

PC)- POSTFLIGHT

PR - PREFLIGHTIII .........

PROCEDURE L(DCATION AND TYPEOF PARTS, PRIMARY REMARKS IYPENUMBER AREA/COMPONENT DESCRIPTION PART ARCAS NDI INSP.

/ VEHICLE TECflNIQUESil ............ L......................

3-412 WII_|G CARRY:THRU SKINS MACH, RADIC GRAPIIY, TP5 ON LWR pC)PLATE & EDDY CURREFIf SURFACE

OR ULTRA._,ONIC

3-413 WING CARRY_THRUSPARFRAME.r, MACH. 4 FRAME!_ UL|RAr_ONIC & p(jPLATE EDDY CURRENT

3-414 WING_ICJ-fU_, LOWERAFT XTRUSIGN 144 BOLT ULTRA_GNIC p(_LONGERON TEN_]IGN TIE MACH. IIOIES

i

3_41_ MID FLJ_LOWERAFT LONGERON EXTRUSION 2 ULIRASONIC _PLICE AREA POMACH,

3-416 PAYLOAD BAY Art SILL LONG[rOb EXTRUblON 2 ULTRASONIC SPLICEAREA & P(_MACH. AI TACHMENTS

SECTION 4.AFT FUSELAGESTRUCTURE:

4-501 AFT ORBIrER/ET ATTACH FITTING DIFFUSION 2 ULTRASONIC & PO]C'NDED RADIOGRAPHY PRMACHININ(

4-502 AFT JACKING POINTS 2 PENETRANT PO

4-503 AFT FUS/WING SPARLOWER |UILT-UP 4 PADS RADIOGRAPHY TPSON LOWER POATTACH PADS _LATE & EDDY CURRENT SURFACE

4-504 LOWER THRUSTSHELFATTACH /_ACH. 2 ULTRASONIC & PCTO Xo1307 AND FLOOR )IFFUSION EDDY CURRENT

)ONDED

4-505 UPPERTHRUSTSHELFATTACH v_ACH. 2 ULTRASONIC & POTO Xo 1307 BULKHEAD :ITTING EDDY CURRENT

4-506 AFT HOIST POINT )IFFUSION- 2 ULTRASONIC & POIONDED _ADIOGRAPHY:ITTING

4-507 VERTICAL STABILIZER FWDSPAR TO _ACH. I ULTRASONIC, POFUSELAGE ATTACH :ITTING EDDY CURRENT

RADIOGRAPHY

4-508 AFT FUSELAGEFRAMES [}UILT-UP 4 FRAMES :DDY CURRENT SPLICE AREAS PO: _ CAPS, WEBS _ RADIOGRAPHY

STIFFENERS

4-509 AFT FUSELAGELOWER SKINS V_ACH, IADIOGRAPHY TPSON LOWER PO_LATE _ EDDY CURRENT SURFACE

4-510 WING AFT SPARCARRY THRU FRAME _UILT-UP 2 FRAMES !DDY CURRENT, BULKHEAD& LWR POAT Xo1365 AND FLOOR BEAM AT :APS, WEBS IADIOGRAPHY CAP/FLOORXo1470 ;TIFFENERS _ND ULTRASONIC _TTACH

4-511 UPPERTHRUSTSHELFSUPPORT :)IFFUSION- 2 ATTACH- JLTRASONICS POTRUSSATTACH 3ONDED MENTS _ EDDY CURRENT

:ITTINGS

4-512 LOWER THRUSTSHELFSUPPORT 31FFUSION- 2ATTACH- JLTRASONIC& POTRUSSATTACH }ONDED MENTS !DDY CURRENT

:ITTINGS

4-513 BORON EPOXY/THRUST STRUCTURE IEINFORCED NUMEROUS JLTRASONIC POBONDS rUBES

4-514 MAIN ENGINE GIMBAL ACTUATOR _IFFUSION- 6POINTS JLTRASONIC& J POSUPPORTPOINTS _ONDED !DDY CURRENT

:ITTING

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i

IAfiL_ 2, SUMMARY MATRIX C,E 5PA_.I_SHUTTLENDE REQUIkkMENT_PO _ POSTFLIGHT

PR _ PREFLIGHT

PROCEDURE LOCATION AND TYPI-_ OF PARTSI PRIMARY REMARKS T'. PI_NUMBER AREA COMPONENT DI_SCRIPTION PART AREAS l"IDT INSP.

, VI_HICLE TECHNIq_UES........... I.........................................................

4_515 MAIP; EI,IGINE gUPPCRTAND DIFFUSION.. 3 ULTRASONIC & P_GIMBAL POINTS BONDED EDDY CURRENT

IBEAMS

,I_516 LC_WERTHRUSTSHFL! AND MAIN DIFFUSION_ 2 SUPPORT JLTRASONIC & PO[NGINE FI_LDL!NESUPPORT BONDED f;TRUCTURES:DDY CURRENTATTACfIMF I',JTS FITTINGS

4°r. 17 UPPERTHRUSTSHELl AND MAIN DIFFUSION° I SUPPORT JLTRASONIC& PC)LNGINE v_IICEDLINE SUPPORT BONDED STRUCTURE ZDDYCURRENTATTACHMENTS FITTINGS

4o518 CAi'_TED FRAME, LOWER PORTION MACH. I FRAME JLTRASONIC SPLICESANDPLATE TRUSS

ATTACHMENTS

4-5H,' CANILD FRAMI, UPPERPORTION DIFFUSION- I FRAME JLTRASONIC & SPLICESAND POBONDED ]DDY CURRENT TRUSSFRAME ATTACHMENTS

4-5.70 VERTICAL THRUSTTRUSS DIFFUSION- 3TRUSSES ULTRASONIC & POATTACHMENIS BONDED EDDY CURRENT

TRUSSES

4-521 FIN SUPPORTFRAME, CLEVIS DIFFUSION- I FRAME, EDDY CURRENT POATTACH BONDED 16 HOLES OR ULTRASONIC

FRAME

4"522 BASE HEAT SHIELD FRAMING FORMED 8PLACES EDDY CURRENT POSTRUCTURE PLATE

,I-523 BASEHEAT SHIELD DOME FORMED 3 PLACES EDDY CURRENT POjUNCTURES PLATE

4-524 OMS POD ATTACH TO AFT FUS MACH. 10 PLACES RADIOGRAPHY, POFITTINGS EDDY CURRENT

AND OPTICAL

4-525 UPPERLONGERON, OMS DECK !XTRUSION 6 PLACES RADIOGRAPHY RESTRICTED POACCESS

4-526 OMSENGINE GIMBALACTUATOR _AACH. 4FITTINGS ULTRASONIC& POATTACH :ITTINGS EDDY CURRENT

4"527 OMS ENGINE THRUSTSUPPORT '_ACH. 4 FITTINGS LILTRASONIC & POSTRUCTURE :ITTINGS AND EDDY CURRENT

kND TRUSSES_RUSSES

4-528 AFTRCS POD ATTACH STRUCTURE :ITTINGS 6PLACES ULTRASONIC POBUILT-UP _,ND EDDYSTRUCTURE :URRENT

4-529 AFT RCS ENGINE MOUNTS _ACH. 24 FITTINGS JLTRASONIC& PO:ITTINGS _DDY CURRENT

4-530 AFT BODY FLAP HINGES MACH. 4 HINGES JLTRASONIC POFITTINGS

4-531 AFT BODY FLAP HINGE SPAR/RIB FORMED 4 PLACES JLTRASONIC OR POATTACH SHEET, EDDYCURRENT

FITTINGS

4-532 AFT BODY FLAP FRONT SPAR FORMED 4 AREAS :DDY CURRENT POSHEET

4-533 AFT BODY FLAPHONEYCOMB SKIN HONEY- UPR AND _ADIOGRAPHY rPSON UPRAND POPANELS COMB LWR FLAP /_ND SONIC LWRSURFACES

SURFACES DRULTRASONIC

ii ii

36

- ,. (2 , _ o .

00000001-TSDO3

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....!

TABLE 2. SUMMARY MATRIX OF SPACESHUTTLENDE REQUIREMENTS

PO _ POSTFLIGH1

= PR- PREFLIGHT

._' PROCEDURE LOCATION AND TYPEOF PARTS, PRIMARY REMARKS TYPE' NUMBER AREA�COMPONENT DESCRIPTION PART AREAS NDT INSP.

' /'VEHICLE TECHNJQUE5H -- .

SECTION 5

, 5-601 MLG DRAG I INK SUPPLIRTFITTING MACH, 4 FITTING_ LJLTRASCINICAND PCJ: FITTING _DDY CURRENT

:_,I _ 5-002 MLG TRUNNIO_,J 5UPPORTFITTINC MACH, 4 FITTINGS JLTRASONIC AND POFITTING EDDY CURRENT

: 5-a03 MLG MAIN STRUTUPLOCK 5UPPOR MACH. 2 AREAS _DDY CURRENT PO_-->-i FITTING _ND VISUAL

= ',, AND

_'__-;i BUILT-LIPSTRUCTURE

: __I'' 5--004 WING'TO'FUSELAGE CLEVIS MACH' 20 AREAS JLTRASONIC AND PO.... _/: ATTACH FITTINGS FITTINGS :DDY CURRENT

' , 5--605 WING LOWERWING'TO'FUSELAGE EXTRUSIOb 144BOLT ULTRASONIC PO

i'i : TENSION TIE MACH. HOLES:. PLATE

_-i_ 5-606 MLG BOX FWD SPAR BUILT-UP 8 PLACES EDDY CURRENT POcAPs,WEBS ORULTRASONIC! !ili ATTACHMENTSa,

5-607 MLG OUTER RIB BUILT-UP 12 PLACES EDDY CURRENT PC....!' CAPS, WEB, OR ULTRASONIC

& ATTACH-= _" MENTS

':' 5-608 MLG BOX AFT SPAR BUILT-UP 8 PLACES EDDY CURRENT PC," _:i_,: WEB & OR ULTRASONIC

i:,_ ATTACH-

,i,_r,-_ MENTS....... 5-609 MLG AXLE ISPLINED 2 MAGNETIC FULL INSPECTIOI' PO

!;': MACHIN- PARTICLE REQUIRES_:_; NO DISASSEMBLY'.i

" 5-610 MLG CROSSTUBE _ACH. 2 MAGNETIC PO:ORGING PARTICLE

..... '_i

," 5-611 MLG SHOCK STRUTPISTON _ACH. 2 ULTRASONIC & PO: :ORGING _AGNETIC

_ARTICLE

5-612 MLG SHOCK STRUTCYLINDER v_ACH, 2 ILTRASONIC & PO_" :ORGING _AGNETIC

_._ ; DARTICLE

_' 5-613 MLG TORQUE ARM _4ACH. 2 _AGNETIC PO_ _}, FORGINGS _ARTICLE

:- :' 5-614 MLG LOWERLOCK BRACE _4ACH. 2 JLTRASONIC POi.ii_',il FORGING

;._ ,5-615 MLG UPPERLOCK BRACE _ACH. 2 JLTRASONIC PO

FORGING

5-616 MLG LOWER DRAG BRACE MACH. 2 JLTRASONIC & PO-----_--'° FITTING _AGNETIC........._ ,' _ARTICLE=i ,

5-617 MLG UPPERDRAG BRACE _ACH. 2 JLTRASONIC & PO

;;-!!i_i FITTING _AGNETIC}ARTICLE

• 5-61B WING LEADING EDGE SPARCAPS "ZXTRUSION_- 28 LOCA- "DDY CURRENT PO'" AND RCC ATTACH BRACKETS _, MACH. TIONS _kND ULTRASONIC

ii_ FITTINGS

_:- .

o

00000001 -TSD04

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J

TABLE 2, SUMMARY MATRIX GF SPACESHUTTLE NDE RFQUIREMENTSPC)_ POSTFLIGHT

PR- PREFLIGHT

PROCEDURE LC)CATIQN AND TYPEc)F PARTS, PRIMARY REMARKS TYPI_NUMIIER AREA/COMPC)NE NT DESCRIPTION PART AREAS NOT INSP,

,'VEHICLE 'fECHNIQUES

5-619 WINE. LOWERSKIN PANELS MACH, NUMEROUI RADICC.RAPfiY TPSON LOWER PC)PLATI_ SURFACE

5-6?0 WINOOSPARCAPS FORMED NUMERC)LJ!FDDY CURRENT POSHEET QR ULTRA_CNIC

5_621 WING RIB CAP_ FORMED NUMEROU_ RADIC)GRAPHY PC)SHEET

5°622 WING SPAR/RIBSPLICE5 I:ORMED NUMEROUS RADIOGRAPHY PGSHEET, & EDDY CURRENTMACHIN-INGS

5-623 ELEVON ACTUATOR ATTACH MACHIN- 4 ULTRASONIC & PC)FITTING INGS SHEARWAVE

5-624 ELEVON HINGES MACH. 12 ULTRASONIC & POPLATE PENETRANT

5-025 ELEVON HONEYCOMBbKIN HONEY- 4ELEVONS RADIOGRAPHY & TPSONEXTERIO_ POPANEL5 COMB ULTRASONIC, SURFACES i

SONIC ORTHERMOGRAPHY

5-o26 ELEVON WEB STIFFENERS FORMED NUMEROU! OPTICAL POSHEET

SECTION 6.

VERTICAL STABILIZERSTRUCTURE:. J

6-701 VERTICAL STABILIZERFRONT SPAR BUILT-UP 4 AREAS EDDY CURRENT REMOVE V.S.L.E POCAPS, WEB &RADIOGRAPHY FAIRINGANDSTIFFENERS

6-702 VERTICAL STABILIZER-TO-FUSELAGI MACH. 8 BOLT EDDY CURRENT PC.AFT ATTACH FITTING PLATE HOLES

6-703 VERTICAL STABILIZERSKINS FORMED RADIOGRAPHY TPSON EXTERIO:_ PCSHEET SURFACES

6-704 VERTICAL STABILIZERREARSPAR BUILT-UP 2 AREAS EDDY CURRENT POAT RUDDERLWR FWD EDGE CAPS, WEB AND

GR TRUSSES RADIOGRAPHYANDISTIFFENERS

6-705 RUDDER/SPDBRKACTUATOR AND HINGE 4 AREAS EDDY CURRENT POHINGE ATTACH TO VERTICAL FITTINGS,STABILIZERREARSPAR SPARCAPS

AND WEB

6-706 RUDDER/SPDBRKACTUATORSAND MACH. 4 HINGES ULTRASONIC & POHINGES FITTINGS, EDDY CURRENT

ASSEMBLY

6-707 RUDDERFRONT SPAR BUILT-UP 4 AREAS EDDY CURRENT, POCAPS, WEB, & OPTICAL ORSTIFFENERS RADIOGRAPHIC

6-708 RUDDER/SPDBRKREARSPAR BUILT-UP 2 RUDDER OPTICAL AND POCAPS, WEB, SECTION_ RADIOGRAPFIICATTACH-MENTS J

/

6-709 RUDDER/SPDBRKHONEYCOMB HC,NEY_ 2 SURFACESRADIOGRAPHIC TPSON EXTERIO_ POSKIN PANELS COMB EACH & SONIC, SURFACES J

RUDDER ULTRASONIC OR ISECTION THERMALi i

0000000]-TSD05

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L

-" TABLE2, SUMMARY MATRIX OF ,SPACESHUTTLE NDE REQUIREMENTSPO _ POSTFLIGHT

PR- PREFLIGHT

PROCEDURE LOCATION AND TYPEOF PARTS, PRIMARY REMARKS TYPENUMBER AREA/COMPONENT DESCRIPTION PART AREA5 NDT II .F,

,,VEHICLE TECIINIQUE5

.SJLCT±OJ_!,

7oBOI fT/(_)RBITERFWD ATTACH FITTINGS MACH. 2 ULTRASC)NIC& PRAND TRU%ES PLATE PENETRANT

7,,902 fWD SRBATTACH THRUST MACH. 2, PENETRANT, PRlONGER( N FORGING EDDY CURRENT

7-803 IWD SRB,,ETATTACH FITTING MACH. 2 ULTRA_C,NIC & PRFITTINGS PENETRANT

7-804 AFT ET,'CJRBITERATTACH FITTINGS MACH. 6 ULTRASONIC & PRFITTINGS PENETRANT

7-805 AFT ET/ORBITER ATTACH TRUSSES DIFFUSION. 6 ULTRASONIC & PRBONDED PENETRANTTUBES

7-806 AFT ET/SRBATTACH FITTINGS MACH. 4 ULTRASONIC & PRi AND TRUSSES FITTINGS PENETRANT

ANDDIFFUSIONBONDEDTUBES

SECTION 8.soLID'ROCKET BOOSTERSTRUCTURE'

8-901 SRBRECOVERYSYSTEM (PARACHUTEAND ATTACHMENTS) FITTINGS, FITTINGS, PENETRANT PR

CHUTE 3 CHUTES AND VISUAL POCANOPY_NDSHROUDS

8-902 SRBSEPARATION MOTORS k-iOTOR 8 TO 10 RADIOGRAPHY PM_SSY AND VISUAL

PENETRANT PO

8-903 SRBINTERFACING V_ECHANIC,aL,:LECTRICAL 4 ATTACH VISUAL, PR_,LIGN- AREAS )ENETRANT & POWENT & 3PTICAL

rELEASE

8-904 ET/SRBFWD ATTACH FITTING AACH. 2 ATTACH _ENETRANT& PR--_ :ITTING AREAS /ISUAL PO

8-905 SRM IGNITER GNITER 2 IADIOGRAPHY PR' V_OTOR _.VISUAL

_SSY

8-906 SRM SEGMENT MEMBRANE 7 TO 11 PENETRANT & PO_/ISUALLJLTRASONIC

8-907 SRM SEGMENT CLEVIS JOINT :ASING 7 TO II _ENETRANT, POJLTRASONIC &v'ISUAL

8-908 SRM ASSEMBLY HARDWARE _TEELPINS NUMEROUS _AAGNETIC PINS REMOVED PO_ARTICLE&JISUAL

8-909 SRM NOZZLE AND IGNITER }UILT-UP 2 EACH )ENETRANT, J POATTACHMENT BOSSES _ASING JLTRASONIC &

/ISUAL

39

_,_ . . -_ .... _:_-_-_-_ _ _ ................................................................................................................................................................ ir .... ..-_._,/

00000001-TSD06

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TABLE 2, SUMMARY M_,TRIX GF SPACESHUTTLENDE REQUIREMENTS°i PO _ POSTFLIGHT

PR- PREFLIGHT~ " rl

PROCEDURE LOCATION AND TYPEOF PARTS, PRIMARY REMARKS TYPENUMBER AREA/COMPONENT DESCRIPTION PART AREAS NDT INSP,

• / VEHICLE TECHNIQUES

8_910 SRM I_OPELLENT SURFACES ;_RC)PELLI_NTEXTENSIVE VISUAL/OPTICAL PRDRAIN

_ _-911 SRM PROPELLENT-TO-INSULATION :_ROPELLENT ALL SEG- ULTRASONIC PR._,. BOND 3RAIN& MENT

!NSULATIOI" JOINTS

L_912 _;RMINSULATIGN-TOoCASE BOND NSULATIOI" ALLSEG- ULTRASONIC PR

._' & CASING MENT

'i JOINTS

8-913 SRM INSULATION-TO-RELEASE INSULATIGI' ALL SEG- ULTRASONIC PRFLAP BOND &FLAP MENT

i !i: COMPO- JOINTS

i NENTS

.. 8-_14 ET/SRBAFT ATTACH FITTINGS MACH. 4 ULTRASONIC PRii':" AND TRUSSES FITTINGS, AND PC._' & TUBING PENETRANT

8-915 SRBTHRUSTVECTOR CONTROL, ATTACH 2TO 4 ULTRASONIC& PC,STRUCTURE& ASSY FITTINGS _ENETRANT

_J-',lo bRB FLEXIBLESEAL METAL RINC S 2 _ISUAL & PC!i & ELASTO- ,_PERATICNAL

• MERIC PADS

_: _-917 SRBNOZZLE SHELL STEELSHELL 2 _ISUAL, PCi!'i." & ABLATIVE _ENETRANT,i_,_ PLASTIC ULTRASONIC

.!, _-918 SRBNC,ZZLE ABLATIVES _,BLATIVE 2 ]ISUAL/OPTICAL PRi!i' 'LASTICS

9-I001 RCC LEADING EDGES AND NOSE IEINFORCE[: NOSE AND ADIOGRAPHY, POCAP CARBON- WING LEAD. ULTRASONIC,

2ARBON ING EDGES _ENETRANT_ANELS

-, 9-1002 HRSI,/TPSAND LRSI/TPS ._ILICATILES ORBITER tHERMAL, SONIC

J_,r-i_i #ITH EXTERIOR IINGING, PO_TRAIN SURFACES )ENETRANT

- , ISOLATION_AD

i

L- ,

k:::_.o

: 40

00000001 -TSD07

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STRUCTURAL INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS--(continued)

TABLE 3

ST.RUCT-URALAREAS THAT SHOULD BECONSIDEREDFOR FUTURE INCLUSION IN MANUAL (Reference i)

|

Addltlonal Areas (Not inclluded i.npresent Preliminary NDE Manual

Fwd. Fus. Zones 1, 2 and 3

Cabln, Frame Webs

Cabin, Frame Caps

Fwd. Fus. Strlngers

Fwd. Fus. Frame Webs

Fwd. Fus. Fwd. Bulkhead

Fwd. Fus. Longerons

J SFwd. Hoist Fitting (X° 582_ Zo 345, Yo_ �105)

Mid-Fuselage Zone 4

Glove Falrlng Ribs

Payload, Glove and Intermediate Frame Webs

Payloadt Glove and Intermediate Frame Caps, Stiffeners and Trusses

Frame Support Rlbs

Access Doors (other than those included)

Bracketry

Payload Bay Liner

Payload Bay Doors, Skln

Payload Bay Doors, Stringers

Payload Bay Doors, Frame Web

Payload Bay Doors, Frame Cap

+ 61, Z 312Payload Floor Longerons, Yo - o

41

00000001-TSD08

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STRUCTURALINSPECTION REQUIREMENTS(continued)

TABLE3 (continued)

Aft Fuselage Zone 5

i FuselageFrames

i Skln/Strlnge-_

_; Floor (Waffle Plate)

Floor BeamCaps

Floor BeamWebs

TrussTubing

i, Fuel Line SupportFittingsi

Fuel Line SupportBeamWeb

Fuel Line SupportBeamCaps[ ,

": Wlng Zone 6

i. Stringers

Rib EMFTubesi :

r,! Rib EMF TubeFittings (included in blgh-dsk areas)Rib/Skln Shear Chanhels

_,. AccessDoors(lntm-spar)

.."

' Vertical Stabilizer Zone 7

Stringers

,, BoxRibs

Ribs

Spar Web

Dr_g Chute Frame

:, , RudderRibsi

-• i

_• 42[

00000001-TSD09

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, I' tr

I

STRUCTURALINSPECTION REQUIREMENTS(_antlnued)

TABLE3 (continued)

External Tank_ Zone 8

LO2 Tank_ErameY-R1.r_g

LO2 Tank Bulkhead

LO2 Tank Frame (Xt 715)

Intertanki Skin/Stringer

Intertank, Frames(96 Places)

:_' Inte:tank, Frame (Xt 947)

LH2 Tank, Fwd Bulkhead

;: LH2 Tank Frame (Xt 1078)

_, LH2 Tank Aft Bulkhead

LH2 Tank, Frame (Xt 2058)

CompresdonStrut

Solid Rocket Booster Zone 9

Nose Cohe

Recovery System Supt. Structure

ForwardCylinder

Forward C Iosure

Cylindrical Body

i--;: Aft Closure

J .i;: Nozz le

! _" Aft Sklrt

...... t,;

O000000]-TSD] 0

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STRUCTURALINSPECTION REQUIREMEbI-T-S-(continued)

B. Inspectlon Criteria

The lnsi_ction criteria for this programare defined In termsof (1) sizes of crack_

that mustbe detected and (2) the Inspection frequency. Thesecriteria are part of

the overall NDE requirementswhich requlre developmentfor the Shuttle critical

inspectionareas.

Crack Size

In conventionaldeslgn/NDE conceptst partscontalnlng cracksare assumedto be

screenedout by gu/no-go NDE methodsand the part presumablyenters servlee

wlthout defects. Llttle thought is given to the probablllty that flawsare mlssedand

somedeslgnconceptsdo not account for them other than througha marginof safety

which is applled to accommodatescatter in deslgnallowables,

In presentlyapplied safe-life damage-tolerantdesignconcepts, the probability

that flawsexist In parts is assumedand the servlce llfe of the part Is predicted

after conslderlng1) possibleinltlal flaw size missedby productlan inspection,

2) stressintensity factors, 3) type and Intensity of applled loads, 4) environment,

and 5) frequencyof Ioadlng. Thls approachalters the conceptof NDE In that a

greater burdenIs placed on it to rellably detect and characterlze defects for both

productionand In-servlce appllcatlons. Theobjective is to detect cracksbefore

they grow to somecrltlcal slze and to quantltatlvely assessthe crack size, shapeand

orlentatlon. It i_ important in thls respect to know the abillty of an NDE technique

to find or misstree:ksof a given slze. The fracture mechanicsdesignassumesthe

presence in the materlal of the largestflaw that could be routlnely overlooked by a

particular NDE approach _SeeReference20 for a dlscusslonof this concept).

The largestallowable flaw size for a structuralelementcan be derived at any time

by the useof the type of data presentedin References1 and 3. This Is the largest

flaw that shouldexlst In the structurefor a specified numberof cycles remaining

44

O0000001-rSD11

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r

5TRIJCTIJRALINSPI_CTION REQUIREMENT_(continued)

with con_iderationglv_n to malntalnin_ th_ mar_ln of safety. Theapplied NDE t_ch-

niquos must detect all flaws of thl_ size and IQrgor. Whore sufficient load, material,

geometry and environmental data are available, flaw size criteria can be generated

for NDE accept/reject considerations and for use in the design of NDE _tandc_rdsfor

ultrasonic and eddy current NDE techniques.

Critical crack size limits for Space Shuttle structure have not been determined for

specific com_nents. Since damage-tolerant designsand materlols having good frac-

ture toughnessare usedthroughout the Shuttle alrframes, it is presently assumedthat

critical crack sizes will generally lie within the cepabillty of present NDE methods.

There may be a few exceptions to this assumptlon. The NDE technlques specified in

the Manual for inspection of safe-life structures are, with the exception of radiography,

capable of reliably detecting cracks within the range of 0.10 inch to 0.150 inches

_ (2.5ram to 3.75mm).

InspectionFrequency

. The frequency of inspection for euch critical area can be established from consider-

atlon of crack growth data. Crack Initiation and growth rates will vary over the

Orbiter structure depending upon the stresslevels and materials involved so that some

componentsshould be inspected more often than others. Where crack propagation

values are small, i.e., the flaw will not atta;n a critical length wi._hin the service

life, the inspection frequency will be mlnlmum. However, the reallzatlon that

. nondestructive inspectionsmay not be 100 percent reliable and cracks can be missed

during an Inspection period should have somebearlng on establlshlng the inspectlon

frequency. An increased Inspection frequency would have to be established to

partially compensatefor low 1nspectlonreliability.

High-risk componentsshould generally receive a frequent Inspection even though

these componentsmay be generously designed. The failure of a hlgh rlsk component

can place the vehicle or mission in extreme danger and should be prevented through

• adequate inspection. Other componentswhich are not hlgh-rlsk items but which

45

00000001-TSD12

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i i

_TRUCT.URAL-I.N_PECITIONREQUlREMENT§._(_.p_n.tlnu_d)

traditionally have a shortmoon=tlmo=to=foiluro_houldalso be Insl_et_d frequently.

in Informationsufficient fo determine Inspectionfrequency of the componentsor areas

consldored In this study wa_not available during the study period. Duo to severe!

_" _' l ' tlme constralntsduring vohlcle refurbishment, if is paramountthat reasonableIn,put-

i} tion frequenciesbe establishedfor each area eventually consideredto be c_ltical

_- to the mission, vehicle, systemsand re,personnelsafety. Inspectionfrequenciesarei

° generally establishedthroughanalysis of detailed deslgn/Ioad factors, missionprofile,

"i! componentte_tand flight testhistorlese NDE capabilities and adequate safetymarglns.

_ Initial inspectlonfrequenciesare often altered duringthe vehicle Ilfetlme to reflect

_ the "learning curve" and remaining vehicle life guarantees.

r:

,y

I

(

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i

i" SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHERNDI_ DEVELOPMENT_: A, In_po_tablllty V_r,_ De_If!n

tl: One objective of thls _tudy wanto Identify areasor ¢ompon_nt_that calnnot bf_ In_

:' or conflguratlon, thug poslng a posslble roqulremont for redesign or further dev(,lopo

Ii mentofNDEtechnlqu_._.Structurolnspectabilltyl_onoofthede_lonrequlrement_for the Shuttle system, which provides, through design, adequatepersonnelaccess,

f'With clue consldera._onto the limited design detalls that were available, thls studyI "

i programdid not reveal any design features that would justify a redesigneffort to

I ' permit inspection. Thls statement is made on the assumptionthat, in certaln ca_es,

i:l I a particular item of structure can be removed to provide adequate ,nspectabllity.

:- Examplesinclude removal of the bolts, one at a time, in the told-fuselage sill

_::' Iongeron forward splice at the X 578 bulkhead or in the vertical stabillzer/aft'/ O

-°: fuselage attachments. In the event these bolts are not removable for routine inspec-

tion, the NDE efforts of theseareas could be unduly restricted. Overall, theLi:

SpaceShuttle appears to be a very inspectable structure, and design iterations for

_i- inspectabillty will probably be vcry minimal.

The level of deslgn detall was not available during thls Study effort to the extent

il. that design geometry factors could be fully evaluated, for example, in termsof

:_._" sufficient clearance for NDE probe manipulation. The useof ultrasonic shear wave

probes for Inspecting around fastener holes requlres sufflclent surface spacufar

_. scannlng the probe in at least one preferred directlon adlacent to the fastener. When

-_! such space Is not available, the ultrasonic Inspection cannot be performed. The

task of evaluating areas for sufficlent clearance remalns to be accomplished in futureL :"

:o ._ NDE proceduresdevelopment. Thls effort should interface with structure design

so that deslgn/inspectablllty iterations can be accompllshed when necessary.C ,_.

:::_-: The RSI/TPSpanelsgenerally deter access for airframe surface inspection. The TPS

I. ': prevents vlsual Inspectionof skln panels, fasteners,exterior accessopenlngs and the; 47

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: i

FURTHERNDE DEVELOPMENT (continued)

like. Ultrasonic, eddy current, and penetrant techniques are eliminated from

; exterior surface l.r_spectionunlessthe local TPSIs removed. Radlography_on the

other hand, can penetrate the TPSwith little attenuation, albel_ the crack

sensitivity relative to other NDE methodsis low. _ince relatively large skin

cracks can usually be tolerated, radiography has been specified for skln and

thln-sheet multi-layered structure inspection wlthout removlng the TPS.

As expected, someareas of the Orbiter structure may have limited access. But re-

deslgnlng for better accessis probably not justifiable since to do so could compro-

_,: mlsestructural integrlty from the deslgnstandpolnt. Areas whereaccessappears

W eto be re_trlcted ;nclude the folio rag.

1. crew module skln, frames, and floor beams

2. crew module forward and aft bulkheads

3. crew module-to-fuselage llnk assemblles

_, 4. crew ingress/egresshatch frame structure

i: 5. forward fuselageshell frames6. forwardfuselageskins

7. vertical stabillzer/aft fuselageattach fittings and shelf

8. rudder/speedbrake aft spar

. 9. eleven aft spar

10. honeycombskin panels (disbanddetection).

In the event that accessis unduly restricted in theseareas, considerationshouldbe

: given to providingbuilt-ln inspectionaidesand devices If crltlcality warrants. For

; example, built-ln X-ray film holders for radiographic inspectionof crew module

and forwardfuselageskin, built-in optical flberscopesfor inspectlonof link assem-

blles, or built-in ultrasonictransducersfor vertical stabillzer/fuselage attachment

_ttlngs may be advisable. The access-restrictedareasshouldbe evaluated further

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ii

FURTHERNDF,DEVF,LOPMENT(continued)

for determining adequate inspectionaccess,_crltlcality of component and cost-

effectiveness of using built-In NDE provk¢lons. Table 4 summarizesareas whero

further NDE development efforts appear to be needed.

8. NDF. Technology

NDE for Structurei ,111

As dlscussedabove, the need for determining the necessityand cost-effectiveness

for uslngbultt-ln NDE devlcesand aldesexlsts for somestructural componentswhere

accessis restricted. Feaslble technologyappearsto have alreacty beendeveloped

for this purposeby the Rockwell International Space Divlslon (References20 and 21).

Fixed and rotatable ultrasonic transducersare feasible, bond-coupledto the

metallic structure to wlthstundextremesof temperaturet vibration andaging. In

order for thesedevices to be effective and reliable, the Iocatlon and orientations

of potentlai cracks mustbe exactly pre-determlned. The addedweight of built-ln

provisionsis a conslderatlon. Rockwell International has also developedappllca-

_ fionstechnology_orbuilt-in optical systemsand film-holders. Further developments

: along this ilne shoulddeal wlth advantageouslyIocatlng built-ln devlces wlth|n the

structure, determining the cost-effectlveness for using them and determining read-

out mode._and equipment for applying the devices.

:_ Another potential developmentarea involves inspecting honeycombskin panels for

detection of dlsbondsbetween the core and face _heetswithout havlng to remove

the local external TPS. PresentNDE techniquesrequire a clean bare sklnsurface,

which meansthat the TPSand adhesivedebrismustbe removed. At, obviousadvan-

tage lies with a technique which can reliably detect rejectable disbandswith the

TPSintact. Sucha technlque musteither be insensltlveto or be able to discrlm-

inate againstTPSmaterial signatures. A candldate NDE methodmay involve the

useof sonicenergy at the right Frequencyand beamshape. The feaslbllffy of the

sonicor any other NDE method for this application must be proven, and the tech-

_ nlquesfurther developed for useduring Shuttle refurbishment.

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FURTHERNDE DEVELOPMENT (c_antlnuod)

TABLE4

SUMMARY OF NDE DEVELOPMENTAREASr

! i

Structure Inspoctlan: 1. Determine need and cost-effectlveness of installing

built-in blUE devices in restrlcted-_accessareas in

forward fuselageand at aff/fus vert-stablllzer

jur_ctu;'e.

2. Develop feasible NDE technlque to inspecthoney-

combskln _nels wlthout removlngTPS.

3. Assessdesimbillty of monltorlngcritical pressure

vesselswith acoustlcemisslor_system.

4. Assessdesirabillty of monltorlngstructural areas

wlth acousticemlsslonsystem.

5. Study to define effects of reslduefron, NDE and

cleanlng materialsand establish guldellnes

for their use.

Thermal Protection 1. Develop NDE proceduresand inspection routine

System: for use on Installed or removedRCC/TPS leading

edge panels to detect significant defects.

2. Develop NDE techniquesand inspectionroutine

for useon RSI/TPS panels for qulck primary

assessmentand verification.

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i_L !

PI! ,

Iy'

r FURTHERNDE DEVELOPMENT (continued)L_

, 6i_ Critical pressurevesselssuchas the liquid hydrogenand oxygenfuel tank_, ECLSSI:I '

i__ cr/ogenl¢ tanks, and the orbiter crew cabin should be considered for the deslr-

ability of monitoring crack initiation and flaw growth by acoustic emission tech-

nlques. Such techniquesare able to detect and locate extensionsof part-through

cracks in the vesselwalls during pressurization cycles (References22 and 23. Deve!')pment

_° should satisfy the following points: (a) identification of the mostlikely failure

:. zones in the pressurevessels, (b) best placement of A. E. transducers, (c) identlfl-

cation of systemequlpment for installation on spacecraft, (d) identification of

systemequlpment for pre-fllght and/or post-flight data analysis, (e) optimization

liii: of the systemto producehlgh signal-to-noise ratio, accurate crack location abillty,,!_:ii and acceptable operation under flight condltlons.i_

_ NDE for the Thermal Protection System(TPS)

:_iIi_ii:i The TPSwas evaluated for NDE refurbishment requlrementsearly in this Study since

li_'iI' thls system, though not part of the baslc structure, appeared to represent an area in

_ which considerable NDE development is required. The TPSaffects the access to

i,_i'_ structure inspection in addition to requiting inspection of its own. In the event

:,i that the TPSsuffers catastrophlc damage in high heat areas, the underlying airframe'(_,_

:i skin and adjacent structural attachments can be severely damaged. Thus, TPSin-

spectlon is a major concern. The TPSapplications on the Orbiter are shown in

,_,,_, Figure 2,

/ In the early evaluation, candldate TPSmaterials such as the ceramic (mulllte)

HRSI/TPS, the elastomerlc LRSI/TPS, and the RCC/TPS leading edge systemas then! :

_ envisioned, were evaluated in termsof material characteristics, environment, and

posslk,le failure modes. An analysis was madeof these TPSfactors in relationship to

the capabilities _jf state-of-art NDE technology. Feasible techniques were selected

for detection of the various defects in each of the TPSsystems. Since the appllcable

NDE techniques were not well e_tabllshed for the types of materials, development

°. was needed in order to completely define the capabilities and limitations of the tech-

r nlques and to devise a complete inspection approach for the indlvldual and combined

techniques.

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TPF,APPI ICATION_

"--1 L_I - 59% SURFACE COVERAGE

I RCC -_ 3% SURFACE COVERAGE

_ HI_SI - 38':%SURFACECOVEf_GE

Figure 2. TPS Applications

52

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4

' i

FURTHERNDE DEVELOP/V[NT (continued)

The resultsof the TPSevaluation and a developmentplan were reported in an interim

reporb LG73ER-0042t "Nondestructive Inspection Requlrementsfor the External

ReusableThermal Protection System"t which wasdistributed as an Appendix to the

program told-term report (Referem:e24: NASA CR-134452, "Space Shuttle Structural

Integrity and AssessmentStudy", June 1973). The modified TPSdevelopment plan |s

reprinted at the end of this section. Since that evaluation was performed, a coated

silica systemwas selected for both the HRSIand LRSIwhlch is known commerclally

as LI-900 developed and produced by the Lockheed Missiles and Space Company

(References19and 25). An updated summaryof the interim report appears in the

Preliminary NDE Manual asSection 9 - ThermalProtectionSystem, including both

the RCCand LI-900 TPSsystems.

The TPSNDE de;e lopment program is presently being conducted by the Rockwell

Internatlonal-Space Divlslon who has that responslbillty. An approach is to develop

a "broad-brush" Inspectlon to detect damagedtiles in hlgh-rlsk areasdepicted in

Figure 3. The approach mlght useboth infrared remote scanning and the acoustic

sonic rlnglng (ASR) technlquesas primary inspection meansto defect damage. These

would be performed in consonancewlth a walk-around vlsual inspection whlch would

survey the entire TPS.

TPStiles which are not consldered to be in hlgh-rlsk areas would be inspected on a

cyclic sampling bash such that all tiles are inspected periodically. The infrared

method is presently restricted to tiles less than 0.5-1nch (12.5mm) thick for detection sensl-

tlvlty to the full spectrumof grossdefects° Above this thlckness only surface related

defects such as molstureand grosscoating failures can be detected. The ASRtech-

nlque Iikewlse is limited becauseof its complexlty and the need to place the ASR

sensoron each tile inspected. The technique requires the ASR "signature" hlstory of

='. each tile to be stored in computer memory for real time comparison. Any bulk defect

such as dlsbond, delamlnatlon, or crack will change the slgnature and cause the ASR

systemto prov|de a reject slgnal.

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I ........ l ....... ! .......... _I 7..... 7i,

'i

_iil-

_!!i:

11

_" HIGH-RISK AREASTHAT MAY REQUIREMORE FREQUENT INSPECTION

i

Figure 3. High Risk Areas for Thermal Protection System

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FURTHERNDE DEVELOPMENT (continued)

The limitations of thesetwo prlma=yNDE techniquesor, in other words, the absence

of a single techniquewhich can quickly scan_theOrbiter TPSand identify flawed TPS

tiles, has given rlse to the approach involving hlgh-risk area inspec'ionand sampllng

of remalnlngtiles. Once a flawed tile Is indicated by any primary technique, a

declslonwould be required regardingcontinued lnvestlgatlon of the suspecttile

throughthe useof back-up NDE methods,or to disregardaddltlonal NDE and simply

replace all suspecttiles wlth new ones, and to extend the investlgatlon to adjacent

tiles.

C. DevelopmentApproach

Structure

1. Restrlctedaccessin someOrbiter subassembliesmay reduce the potential of NDE

techniquesin theseareas. Special attention shouldbe glven to the crew module

and forward fuselageshell where lack of accessmay penalize inspection by reduclng

reliability and by requiring moretlme for inspectionthan is reasonablein view of

the tight turnaroundschedule. To alleviate thesepotential problemsconslderatlon

shouldbe given for built-ln provisionsin theseareas for optical devices, bonded-ln-

place ultrasonlctransducersand X-ray film holers.

Structural areasin the forward fuselagethat may be affected Include the cabln-to-

fuselage link assembliesand flttlngs0 fuselageshell frame caps, fuselageskins, crew

ingress/egresshatch, fuselagGand cabln window frames, and cabin skins.

The following pointsshouldbe considered:

a. Doesadequate accessprovisionsexlsf for applying NDE techniques

suggestedin the Prellmlnary NDE Manual for the varlousareas.

b. If not, are subcrltlcal crack sizessufficiently large for the fail-

safedesigncomponentsto permit useof vlsual/optlcal techniques

or extended useof radiographictechniques.

55IJ

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FURTHERNDE DEVELOPMENT (continued)

¢. In safe-life designcomponents0where subcrltlcai crack slzes may

• be relatively small_ can-potential crack_locationsandorientations

be predlcted with sufficient accuracy to provide for built-In

• ultrasonicdevices.

• d. Compareadded weight penaltyand costbenefits of built-ln NDE

provisionsagainst conventional teardown (limited to presentaccess

provisions)inspection.

2. Core-to-facesheet disbandsin honeycombskin panelsare usuallydetectable by• eultrasonlc, sonicor thermal techn=qus. Thesetechniques require a clean, bare skin

surface. Thehoneycombskln panels that exist on the Orblter eleven, aft body flap,

and rudder/speed-brakeassemblies,are coveredexternally by bo_dedRSI/TPStiles

and thusdo not fulfill theserequirementswlthout removaland cleanlng of the skin

surface.

A desirableNDE techniqueis obviouslyone that could be usedto detect dlsbonds

without dlsturblngthe RSI/TPSmaterials. Feasibility for doing thismay exist in thei!

:_ sonictechnlque Furtherdevelopmentis requiredto provefeaslbillty and to develop

technique effectiveness and reliability• The following points may be involved to

accomplishthe development.

a. Designand fabricate I¢lbomtorytest panelsof suitablesize,

/ consistingof a honeycombpanel with bondedRSI/TPSfile

. on one slde. The honeycombcore thickness, core depth,

core material, facesheet thicknesses(includingdoublerswhere

appropriate)and facesheetthicknesswouldall be fully

representative af the partlcular portion of honeycombskin

panel. The TPSdensity, thickness, strain-lsolatlon pad,

coating and bondingsystemwouldalso be fully representative.

'_ Reallstlc simulated core-to-facesheet dlsbondsof several dla-

metersshould be contained in the test panels.

56

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i o':

! FURTHERNDEDEVELOPMENT(continued)

: b. Select several sonic test systemssuchas described In subsection: ix,

I .5.5 in Section 1 of the Preliminary NDE Manual or other

!=_; source, andan array of sonic tr_nsd_resenflng various

: _ dlarne.t.ersand frequency ranges.

c. Apply each _onle Instrument, according to the manufacturers

_: instruction manual0 wlth the varlous transducersover the fre-

_ quency range of the instrument, comparing"disband" areas in

*!: the test panel to goodareas.

, ,_ d. If feasibillty is shownto exist for one or mote of the instruments%,

i}iI:i, in detection of the "dlsbonds"further development is required

"if! to select the mosteffective instrumentand optimize the equip-

: ment and technique by determln|ng best frequencys sens|fivity

'.:i: level, transducer type and size, and other relevant factors.

=:: : e. Determine the smallestdlsbondthat can be rellably and con-

k li!_ slstehtly foundwith the instrument. Assessrellabilffy.°!?

f. Devise test panelsthat contain TPSdefects or standarddevla-

_ tlons to deferm|ne the|r maskingeffect on honeycombd|sbonds.

io_: g. Develop the sonlc honeycombdlsbonddetection procedure

for inclusion in the Space Shuttle NDE Manual.

i 3. Acoustic emissionsystemscan detect dynamic crack growth when the structureto

i i_ whlch the sensorsare bonded is underadequatestress. Acoustic stresswave emlsslons

i _'i may be released when an exNt|ng crack extends or a new crack neucleates at a small

i : materlal defect or designd|scontinuffy. Crack growth has been detected In pressure

.:_! vessels by acoustic emission systems when the vessel Is being pressurized or proof

...... tested.k--? "

,

ii Considerationshouldbe g_ven to the desirability of usingacoustic emissionsystemsto

,:, monitorall Space Shuttle cryogenic and gas-filled pressurevesselsas they are being

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FURTHERNDE DEVELOPMENT (continued)

filled on the launch pad in both the Orbiter and I_T. The technology exlsts ride=

quately for doing this and very little developmer_.Isnecessaryin this respect.

It would be necessaryto designand develop the specific acoustic emissionsystems

,_hatwould be appl_u:Lto the varLousvesselsandthe readoutmodesand equipment

needed fat applying them. Welght penaltiesfor attached sensors,wiring, pre-

amplifiers and systemhook-upsshouldbe assessed.

Adapting the acoustic emissiontechnology for Space Shuttle use that is belng deve-

J • iloped now for monltorlng structure on alrcraft (Reference15) should be g,v n ser,ous

consideration. Specially designedacoustic emissionsystemscan be usedto monitor

key structural areas and componentsduring the entire flight or at any selected por-

tion of the flight. Signals are accumulated in a small computermemoryor stored

on tape for later readout. The successof suchsystemshave the potential of greatly

reducing the need for conventional NDE ff-_pectlonsand can thus impact cash

manpowerand schedulefactors. Development would include:

a. Defining or selectlng the structural areas for acoustic emlsslon

_ mon|tarlng.

b. Deslgnlngthe acoustic emlsslonsenson, preamplifiers and overall

system-- "tailor make" the systemto do only the specific

tasksrequlred.

c. Pertain. an acousticnoisesurveyon a flylng Orbiter vehlcle to

determine the magnitudeand spectral content of the normal

operational nolsein the specific structuralareas.

d. Designthe acoustic emissionsystemto exclude background

nolsebath in amplitudeand frequency responsewhile maln-

talnlng adequatesensltlvlty for detectlon of acousticemlsslon

from growingcracks.

• e. Define real-time or storedinformationreadoutmodesfor the

system.

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FURTHERNDE DEVELOPMENT (continu_d)

f. Flight test the systemon o flying Orbltef to dotormlna proble,ns,

source__f f,,l_ _ignal_and to "fine tune" the _ystem.

ThermalProtectionSystem(TPS)

An NDE development plan for the TPSwas presented in the programmid-term report

and also was summarized in Tables 1 and 2 of that report (Reference24). Since con-

siderable NDE development is required to produce individual NDE techniques and an

overall NDE inspection approachfor the TPS, the modified plan is repeated in this

Final Report. Rockwell International is conducting material characterization and

Design Development Test programsfor the Shuttle TPS(Reference25).

PLAN FOR DEVELOPMENT OFNONDESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION METHODS FOR

THESPACESHUTTLEEXTERNAl. REUSEABLESURFACEINSULATION

Introduction

The spirit of the SpaceShuttle is embodied in the reusability of the craft and its

systems. The practical effects of repetitive flights into space on a vehicle and its

thermal protection systems(TPS)are largely speculative at this point. Experience

in many space program_can be used to project the first-flight performance of all

systems. The extent and effects of cumulative damage caused by the rigorsof space

flight during subsequentflights is presently assessedon the basisof projection and

calculated risk factors.

The typesand severity of damagethat will be Induced in the Shuttle's external thermal

protective shield will be knownwlth certainty only _fter manyflights of the system

Into space. Reasonableexpectationsof damageto the TPShave been usedto determine

the nondestructiveinspection requirementsdescribedin Section 9 - Thermal Protection

Systemof the Appendix. Themajor factorswhich mayproducedamagein the TPSare:

o High vlbrotlon loadsduring lift-off andascent

o High aerodynamicpressuresand gust loads

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T

L i

.... FURTHERNDE DEVELOPMENT (cantlnu_d)

o Implngemont of raln, dust, _loet Qndother d_brls

o Thermal soakduring orbit

, o High entry tomporaturo_i

- o Ctos_,.rangoflight

o Landlng

o Groundhandling

,!: o TPS/Structute mechanicaland thermomechanical lncompatlbillty

" The NDT techniqueswhich appear to be the best candldatesfor detecting and assessing

, the potential damage in the HRSI, LRSI, and the RCC¢omposlteleadlng edge were

discussedin the mid-term report Appendix (NASA CR-134452) and summaryin Section

_' 9 of the Appendlx to the final report. Most of these techniqueshave been usedon

/ similar materials with acceptable results. All of the technlquesdescribedhave at

least been demonstratedto have appllcabillty to the specific problem. In general,

further developmenteffort Is neededtel' all techniques to producereliable, optimized

_ inspection methodsfor post-flight and/or pre-fllght assessmentof the TPS.

o"_ DevelopmentPlan

; To develop the candidate NDT techniquesto thelr full potential, the following plan

. is suggested=

1. Define the T_3 failure modes. (An objective of the Thermal Protection System

_'_' Test Plan is described in Reference25.)ii:

2. Deslgn and fabrlcate reallstlc inspectlon standardsfor each materlal/defect

comblnatlon, contalnlng various sizesand/or severlty of the defective

= " condltlons;vary other parameterssuchas defect depth, orientation, etc.,

";_' when practlcal; use re¢=lor realistlcally slmulated defects; and reflect the

-_ actual geometrlc and material varlables whlch wlll affect the particular

NDT technlques.:;i'=_:i,

-/ 3. Determlneand opt]mlze the NDT equipmenttest parametersto achleve

dlscrlmmahon:_: the necessot7 se._sltlvlty, resolution, .... •

ii i 6oJ

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" FURTHERNDE DEVELOPMENT (_ntlnued)

4. 5cm_n the tnchniqua_ for a _ivan mqtari_l/dofact applic.atlan and

deriv_ rell_Jblllty and ca_t.-off_ctlveno;_ con,_Idomtlon!;l'_r th.

..iL va.lous t_ehnlquns.

:o: 5. Determine the mostQpproprlate me_n5to dlr,plgy, record, qnd inter=

.... ', prot the NDT data for refurblnhment operations.

6. Determine the mostpr_¢tlcal approaches In applying tile techl_Iquus,

_ e.g., methodsand equipment for scanning, whether part_,ar(_'in,tailedo'

-' c. removed for in,opecfion,, ' 0

-_:. 7. Determine the sensitivity, rellabillty, and confidence limits of the%.,

.o< tgchnlques, _rtlcularly of the relatively new untried technique_.:L:

....':,:_. 8. Determlne an effective _equencefor applylng primary, veriflc_tlon

_:: (l_ack-up), and exploratory techniques.

" 9, Write inspection procedures to Instruct in_pectr,r5 in the useof

the techniques. Define the accesslbil!ty factors and all equipment,

i_. standards,and calibration needsfor each technique.

I0. Evaluate the cost-effectlveness and rellabillty of the techniques

•-': after they have gone Into operational refurbishment use in early

Shuttle deployment period.

_::: Developmentshould be broad enough to provlde for evaluation of physical properties asgl

well as detection of defects. This approach will be particularly applicable to th_

carbon-carbon compositematerial in which degradation of physical properties may

occur as a result of oxldation or repeated exposure to re-entry temperatures°

Physlcal property evaluation may have limited appllcabillty to the silica RSI, ex-

i' cept possibly for surface coaling integrity.

":.2

!

Development should include the conslderat_on of enhancement techniques, p_rticularly

to radlographlc and C-scan presentations. The elimination of "noise", :;harpen_ng0

'i

........ _,.:::_,,ooo _:e_._o,,,,/;.:_=C";:',.-_cc

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fURi" iER NDF-DEVELOPMENT (contlnued)

of im_g,r,, and pattern recognltlon/m joctlon featur,_sshoald b_ _Qn_ldoredto improve

_iqnlflcantly th_ Int_rpretability of su_::hpresentations,

Since the RCC leading edge and nose cap may require multlpl_ NDT techniques for

compl_te assessment,con._ideratlonshould be 'given to i the_e ,romov ng _omOonent_

from the craft after each flight and taking them to an NDT Inboratory _:orinspcctlon.

In,'_pectionof the approxlrnately 36000 RSIpanels (HRSIand LRSI)bondedto the Grblt_r

outer surface during refurblshmentturnaroundwill be Hme-consumlngunlessoneor

more fast-scan techniques capable of detecting mostanomaliescan be developed.

If only NDT methodscapable of interrogaHnga single panel by contact are applicable,

an inspectionappro,:,:hmay be devlsedwhereby only thosepanels in the more severely

exposedportionsof the Orbiter are inspectedat each refurblshmentperiod. The

remaining panelsare inspectedon an alternating basisto conservetime and co_ts.

Walkaround visual inspectionsshouldbe applied regardlessof theapplicability of

other methods. Many surface defectsand RSItile deformationsresulting from internal

. defects may be detectable by vlsual means. The developmentshouldconcern itself

with arranging an overall inspectionapproach in which the applied techniques can

be usedin a reliable, effective, and economlcal maaner.

Development of the NDT techniques for the TPSshould extend beyond their initial

application to operational vehicles. Useof the techniques at the maintenance base

• will provide a better proving ground for theh" effectiveness than will the laboratory.

: The cost-effectiveness of the applied techniques should be conHnually assessedregarding

th_ r_ults of NDE on the actual Shuttle hardware. NDE techniques and approaches

that _.re found to be ineffective should either be improved through modification or

discarded in favor of better techniqu.:s. 1; ultimate effectiveness of inspection

tc'chn;ques is determined by intrinsic tech, [que llmltatlons and by human factors that

: yield to training and experience. All apl:'!ied techniques should improve in cost-

,_ff,_ctlvenessand reliability asexperience is gained with them in the maintenance

env ironment.

-._____

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FURTHERNDE DEVELOPMENT (_on_

Studyto Define A_coptable NDE a-rid,Cleaning Materiels

Addltlone_:studiesshouldbe conductedto determine the possibleharmful effe_:tsof NDE

materials residueson structuralareasand in enclosedenvironmentsandguidelines for

useof suchmaterials. Residuesmay result from the use of cleaning solvents,penettant

or magnetic particle materials, andacoustic,couplants. They may result in corrosion,

hydrogenembrlttlement_ surfacefinish breakdown,or crew environmental contamina-

tion. Thestudyshouiddefine acceptable and rejectable cleaning and NDE materials

capable of leaving residues, particularly in view of the potential effects producedby

bothnatural and inducedShuttle environments.

The studyshouldinclude the effects of high temperatureon materlal/resldue interactlons

and the susceptibility of the residuesfor contamination of the crew moduleenvironment

and air supply, which may ultimately affect-both the crew membersand equipment.

03j

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RECOMMENDATIONS

Bockgrolund

One of the Important features of this Study Programwas to revlew the nondestructive

evaluation plans for the Space Shuttle and formulate approOoCate recommendations

_ regarding the refurbishmentrequirements.

Nondestructive evaluation has beengenerally recognized as a basic engineering

dlsclpllne with the capability to enhance safety arid product reliability as well as

reducing test and evaluation costs. However, it is no longer considered just a tool

of quality control but now interfaces as a major parameter in the basic engineering

designprocess. Entire structures have their design integrity basedon the ability of

NDE to detect critical defects. Consequently, NDE cannot be consideredas an

: after thoughts particularly where in-servlce NDE is concerned. The increasing

reliance on damage-tolerant design conceptsdictates the need for a strong NDE

influence throughout the entire deslgn-manufacture-operatlonal llfe cycle. Severalt.

i _ independent studiesof major programsin recent yearshave pointed out the lack of

=i emphasisplaced on nondestructive evaluation. The USAF Scientific Advisory Board

• Ad Hoc Cotnmittee Reporton LessonsLearned from the F-111 Structural Experience

(Reference26) stated that "Too often NDI has been employedas an after-the-fact

:i tool; following the catastrophic failure of samecomponent, it has been usedto assess

_i the integrity of other aircraft of the samedesign". Their findings indicated that

"... deslgnersand productionplannersmustcarefully considerwhat appropriate NDI

: techniquesare requiredand can be usedwith confidence by productionand inspectioni

personnel, and the average capabillty of personnelperformingfield operatlonali "

_i inspections". They concluded that "adequate NDI can be obtained only by proper

ii considerationduringthe planning and designphasesof new systems".

eThe National Materials Advisory BoardAd Hoc Commlffee on Nond struchve

Evaluation concluded In their report (Reference27). "If materialsare to be

•-A , •

_C_,DING _'46F; ' BLANK NOT _'ILIff'g_ 65

,_ " H i - I II ..... I ** J

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::_i _

i,

f:r' RECOMMENDATIONS (continued)

designedto their I;mlfs to satisfythe ever-increasingdemandsof sophlsticute.d--/ ,

_r milltary, aerospace, and industrial-systems,It Is ne.cesSarythat nondestructive

" evaluation be dellberately consideredfor Incorporation into every phaseof the

deslgn - production - service cycle. Thls i:, s_clally Important in the screening

and quallflcatlon of candidate materials to meet new designcrfferla and i_ monF-

:: torlng productionprocessesand service life".

_, It Is for these reasons that the strong recommendation is made for the establishment

of a single point of responslbilityto provldeoverall NDE guidance and dlrection

_o,_ throughout the entire Space Shuttle Program. The many benefits would include

placement of necessary recognition and emphasis upon NDE technology. A slngle

_ NDE ProgramManagement sourcewould be in a sensea Program Integrator which_,'. would:

_,r

!io

_., o provide effective coordinationof all contractorsto require

::i properdesignemphasison |nspectabillty,

--_: o insureadequate design considerationof in-servlce inspection

_:.... capabilities,

: :i:_ o appralsethe NDE technology requirementsand provide guld-

ance and direction for necessaryresearchand development

_i, to meet design criteria,

o coordinate the compilatlon and useof a Space Shuttle NDE

i!_ Manual

o_ o provlde guidance and direction to all contractors in the pre-

paratlon of NDE proceduresfor the NDE manual,

• o verlfy and validate NDE procedures to ensure that they are

commensuratewith designcriteria,

o establlsh and monitor training and eertlflcatlon requirements

for NDE refurbishmentpersonnel,O _

_' 66

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i !

=

• !i

_;; RECOMMENDATIONS (continued)

°'" o coordinateplannlngand schedulingof NDE operationsduring

refurbishment.

::_ The responslbleentlty for coordh_atlngthe NDE Programfor the Space Shuttle could

_,: be either NASA In-house personnelor an experiencedcontractor• in elther case,,}

i;_. great ca_eshould be token to select indlvlduals of demonstratedtechnlcal as well

= i_: as admlnlsh'atlve ablllty.

_°_!i Space Shuttle NDE Manual

°_ It is recommendedthat NASA develop an NDE Manual contalnlng the detailed NDE

_ proceduresto be accompllshed during refurbishment• '°_i' inspectionof Spcce Shuttle,;i :

o_,: hardware• The actual NDE proceduresshouldbe developed by the primeand major

subcontractors in accordance with a Space Shuttle NDE Manual Preparation Guidei'

'"." discussedlater. The Shuttle designcontractors have available the necessarydetailed

structural informationto determinethe inspectionrequirementsand develop the

i:}: detailed proceduraldata Overall coordination and managementof the final docu-

ment should be provlded by a slngle entity to produce an effective and conslstent

.'i, NDE Manual• The proceduresfrom the variouscontractorsand sub-contractorsmust

be Integrated into a unified consistent final document usable by refurblshment

, inspection personnel.

=,},

. It is important that each contractor that providesNDE data for the final Manual

develop efflclent managementtools to coordinate information flow between the many

*_ and varied technical groupshaving inputsto the manual The design, stress,! •

_" fracture mechanlcs, structural test, manualsillustrators/wrltersand valldatlon/

verification disciplineshave to interface in a mannerto produceNDE procedures

that are accurate, effective, and workable as well as be responsive to deslgn

; changesand serialization. This requiresvery intricate managementcontrol not

readily apparent and which is never instituted in many companies,,';

o

!

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RECOMMENDATIONS (continued)

Mill tary Specif_a flon...MIJ.-M-38780 a_-5A Nondestructive Inspection

Manual which wasdeveloped to _hat specification are reasonablygood documents

to fo_.m-guld¢_Inesfor developmentof The Space Shuffle NDE Manual. However,

there are somesuggested-devlatlonsthat shouldbe madeto render the Shuttle

Manual more responslveto refurblshmentrequirements. Theserecommendations

include:

o TheManual shouldcontaln only NDE proceduresthat are valld

requlrementsfor either routine maintenanceor speclal inspec-

tlonsand not include proceduresfor componentsthat w111

probablynever requlre _nspectlon.

o A comprehenslveindex shouldbe providedin the Manual that

could be usedas a managementold in declslonsregarding

schedullng,addltlonal evaluations, etc.

o Visual inspectionsshouldbe included in the NDE Manual.

Thls includes suchvlsual alded inspectionsas b_rescopes,

magnifiers, etc.

o Proceduresfor leak checking componentsshouldbe included

in the NDE Manual.

o The SpaceShuttle NDE Manual shouldcontaln a mlnlmumof

referencesto other documents. It shouldbe as inclusive as

posslble.

o The numberlngsystemfor the proceduresand figures shouldbe

flexlble for ease in making changesand revlslonsto the Manual.

o The NDE Manual shouldbe developed in tlme to provide

advancedtralnlng of refurblshmer.tpersonnel.

o Details on when the procedureIs to be usedshouldbe included

in the manualbut undera separate "lnspectlonRequirements"

section.

68

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RECOMMENDATIONS (contlnu_d)

o A reallstic estimate of manhoursand spantime shouldbe included

for each procedure.;.f.j

o Both llne artwork and photographsshouldbe permlssibledependlng

uponwhlch providesthe clearestpresentation. Photographsmay be

especially helpful for vlsual inspectlons.

Volldation and Ve¢iflcatlon of NDE Proceduresi, '"

i! Once NDE procedureshave been developed_the validlty of the proceduremustbe

_:i assured• Thls involves proving that the procedureworks, that the NDE technique

'_._ is the best one for the part in termsof meetlng the crlteria_ that all necessarysteps

_. and data are ir_cludedfor performanceof the procedure, that all necessaryinstruc-

?: tlons for provldlngaccessand removalare includedand that the part is adequately

'. representedin the illustrations in termsof deslgndetails and inspectioncoverage•

_.i._ There are manyother factors that the validation effort shouldbe concernedwlth i

_' The NDE proceduresshould be valldated on complete structural assembliesas far as

iii possible by the organlzatlon that will be performlngthe NDE work during refurblsh-

merit. Since the number of Shuttle vehlcles will be small, availabillty of actual

hardware will be I|mlted. If an NDE contractor is to be utillzed they shouldbe

:__!i' selected at the earliest possibletlme to allow maximumcognizanceand input by the

.:-: contractor, whlch is then the using organlzatlon.

NASA should verlfy the valldlty of the NDE proceduresby having their own or theh

'!' NDE contractor personnelperformthe procedureson actual hardware. Validatlon

and verification activities are performedon a given NDE procedurebefore it is

:' approved for incluslonin the manual When a proceduremust be corrected to satlsry

_ valldatlon/verlficatlon requirements,the proceduremay need to be revalidated on

elther a partial or complete basis, then re-verified by NASA.

" 69

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il ! i

Rf:COMMENDA?IONS (continued)

!_,,. NASA should _nslder where and how often proced_Jresshould be verified, it is

_i::i likely that verlflcatlon m-both final assembly and flight test locations may be---

_:ii: requi_ed in order to efficiently utilize hardware of the correct configuration.

_i: Verification of groups of procedures sufficient to provide one to two weeks working

ii time has proved reasonable and efficient and should be considered.

NDE Advisory Group

• It is recommended that NASA establish a Space Shuttle NDE Advisory Group to en-

_ • hance communications between affected organizations and ensure the best possiblei,!i'

_:'!ill resolution of NDE related problems. The Advisory Group should be composed of_.i!:, technical representatives from the various NASA centers and the major Shuttle con-

}i tractor_, and should have scheduled meetings chaired by the source responsible for_,._'_. the Shuttle NDE Program The Group would provide the ideal forum for:_ _!,

. '_i o review of recommendations regarding new NDE technolr,gy develop-

ment,

.ii!,: o resolution of design interfaces between contractors influencing NDEo" !_i

_._i_, requirements,-_?_

= ii:i o overall scheduling of NDE Manual development,

;!_. o continued NDE support from major contractors during service llfe ofill ,_

the_ _nume,

i:!:::,_:: o publication of periodic status reviews of the Shuttle NDE Program

i,

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REFERENCES

1. Westrupe R. W. and Liu, A. F., "Fracture Control Design M_thods",Contract NAS 3-16765, ProgressReports,73MA5939, 73MA5769, and73MAI935.

2. Anon., "Space Shuttle Orbiter Fracture Control Plan", Contract NAS9-14000 (IRD TH-251T), North Amerlcan Rockwell-Space Division,SD 73-SH-0082, March 1973.

3. Richmond,G., "Crack Initiation and PropagationStudiesof SpaceShuttleMaterials", Lockheed-Georgla Report, 7 December1972.

4. Anon., "(SpaceShuttle) Requlrements/DeflnltlonDocument- Structures,Book1", 23 July i973, Contract NAS9-14000.

5. Anon., "Nondestructive Testing", (a surveyby SouthwestResearchInstitute),NASA SP-5113, NASw-1873, October 1971.

6. Army Materlal Command, "Guidance to Nondestructive Testing Techniques",AMCP 782-10, AD 728162, 29 April 1970.

7. Anon., "Technical Manual: Nondestructive Inspection Methods", USAFT.O. 33B-1-1, 1 February 1966.

8. Packman, P. F., Pearson, H. S., Marchese, G. B., and Owens, J. S.,"The Applicability of a Fracture Mechanlcs-Nondestructlve Testing Design

- Criterion", AFML-TR-68-32 (1968).

9. Pearson, H. S., "Quantitative NDT and Fracture Mechanics Critical CrackSizes", Paper presentedat the 1972 Materials Engineering Conference,Cleveland, Ohlo, 16 October 1972.

10. Sproat, W. H. and Dodd, B. D., "Methods for Determining NDI Reliabilityon Aircraft Structures", Paperpresentedat ASNT National Conference, LosAngeles, March 1973.

11. Pettit, D. E., Hoeppner, D. W., "Fatigue Flaw Growth and NDI Evaluationfor PveventlngThroughCracks in Spacecraft Tankage Structures", NASAContract NAS9-11722, Lockheed-Callfornla ReportLR-25387.

12. Saffler_ F. J.t "Nondestructive Flaw Definition Techniquesfor CriticalDefect Determination", NASA-CR-72602, TRWReportER-7419, Jan. 1970.

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REFERENCES(continued)i

13. Rummol_W. D., "Detection of Fatigue Cracks by Nonde_tructiveTestingMethod_", Progre_._Report, 13 july 1_2, Contract NAS9_12276.

14. Mo)rzis, J.A., Jr., "Rellablllty of Airframe Inspectionsat the DepotMaintenance Level", Boeing Company paper presentedat the 1974 SpringConference of the ASNT, LosAngeles, 11-14 March 1974.

15. Bailey, C. D. and Sproat, W. H., "C-SA Flight _tructural MonitoringSystem", PhaseI and PhaseII reports, Contract No. AF33(657)-15053,Change Order P00732, Lockheed-Georgla ReportNumbers LG73ER-0171

;_ and LG74ER-0044.

i_ 16. Err, R. K., et al., "Nondestructive Holographic Techniques for Structures_i Inspection", AFML-TR-72-204, October 1972.

17. Anon., Callfornium-252 Progress, Number 6, January 1971, and corres-i _ pondencefrom Dr. JosephJohn, Technical ProgramManager of Gulf" RadiationTechnology Callfornlum-252 DemonstrationCenter, San Diego,: Callfornla, 18 December 1972ii •

18. Neuschaefer, R. W. and Beal, J. B., "Assessmentof and Standardizationfor Quantitative Nondestructive Testing", NASA Technical MemorandumNASA TM X-64706, Sept. 30, 1972.

'_ 19. Qulnn, R.A., "Initial Investigation for NDE for TPS/Prlmary Structures",Final Report, LMSC/D282697; LMSCI 1972 Independent Development

_. Project 7201-2i 76.

_ 20. Packman, P. F., "Fracture Toughness/NDTRequirementsfor Aircraft-. Design", Paperpresentedat the T.T.C .P. Fracture Welding Institute,

Ablngton, Cambridge, 11-13 June 1973 (Vanderbilt University, Dept. ofMaterials Sciencesand Engineering)

21. Bishop, C R., "Nondestructive Evaluation Development for Advancedi Spacecraft", SD 72-SH-0052, Space Divlslon-North American Rockwell_ Report, July 1972.!

_ 22. Kammerer, C. C., et al., "Saturn S-II Advanced Technology Studies:_ On-Board Checkout of Structural Integrity of Cryogenlc Tanks", SD 7p-264,

NASA Contract NAS7-200 Final Report, 15 February 1972.

.... 23. Scherb, M. V., et al., "Study of DamageControl Systemsfor SpaceStation", NASA CR-111963, October 1971.

Z ,:

72

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REEERE_C_.(continued)

24. Pleas,W. M. and Lewt_, W. H., "Space Shuttle Structural Integrity andAssessmentStudy", NASA CR-134452, LG73-ER0082, Contract HAS10-B01B,Mid-term Report, June 1973 and AppondlxLG73ER-0042.

25. Rockwell InternatlonaI-Space Division prograrf_documentspreparedforthe Thermal ProtectionSystemTestPlan includingVol. Ix MaterialCharacterization TestProgram_SD-74-SH-0156-1, andVol. II, DesignDevelopmentTest Program,SD-74-SH-0156-2, 1974.

26. United StatesAir Force Scientific Advisory Boa_d,Reporton LessonsLearnedfrom the F-111 Structural Expertence, October 1971.

27. NondestructiveEvaluation, Publication NMAB-252, Preparedby the Ad HocCommlttee on Nondestructlve Evaluation, National Materials Advisor'y-Bo-_"d,Divislon of Engineering, National ResearchCouncil, January1969.

28. NASA/KSCe "Pteparatlon of Space Shuttle Nondestructive InspectionManuals",SL-T-0012 (draft), June 1974.

!l

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J

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ThermalPr t t,osystemo.aNOT

Anderson, R. T. and Delacy, T. J., "Application of Nondestructive To_tlng forAdvanced Composltes", Paper presentedat AFML/Aerospoce/Unlv. of DaytonConference on NDT of Plastic/Composlte Structures, March 1969.

Anderson, R. E., Kammerer, C. C. Stuckenberg, F. H., "Methods of AssessingStructural Integrity for SpaceShuttle Vehicles", SD 70-419 (NASA ContractNAS 10-7250/, Oct. 1970, PhaseI, FTnal Report (North American Rockwell SpaceDivision).

Andrade, D., Jr., "Nondestructive Testing of L1-1500", LMSC MRI 609.07, Dec.1971, Lockheed Missiles and Space Company.

Anon., "Application of Advanced Composite Mat_;;uls for Upper Stages", NASA-CR-123589, SD 71-354, 24 Feb. 1972.

Anon., "Evaluation of Nonmetallic ThermalPiotecfion Materials for the MannedSpace Shuttle. Volume l e Task 1: Assessmentof Technical RisksAssoclated withUtilization of Nonmetallic Thermal Protection _ystem", N72-15903 (NASA-CR-125402), October 15, 1970.

Beal, J. B., "Advanced Radiographic Imaging Techniques", paper, NASA/MSFC,1972.

Bishop, C. R., "Nondestructlve Evaluation Development for Advanced Spacecraft",SD 72-SH-0052, July 1972, North American Rockwell Space Divlslon.

;. Bishop, C. R., "Nondestructive Evaluation Developmentfor AdvancedSpacecraft",North American Rockwell SpaceDMslon, SD 71-153, Sept. 1971.

Cohen, S. E., "The Appflcatlon of Liquid Crystals for ThermographlcTestingofBondedStructures", N67-35747, Contract No. NAS 8-20627, 1967. (Lockheed-Georgia Co.)

Cook, J. L., "Nondestructive InspectionRequirementsfor the SpaceShuttle Vehlcle",Appendix C to MDAC E0386 (McDonnell-Douglas AstronauticsCo.).

Cook, J. L., R. Einhardt, W. W., and 7immer, J. E., "Development of Multi-directional Fiber-Reinforced ResinMatrix Composites", AFML-TR-71=187, Oct. 1971.

Cookt Jo L.e "Development af Nondestructive Test Techniquesfor MultldlrectlonalFiber-Reinforced ResinMatrix Composlte_",AFML-TR-70-239, February 1971.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY (contlnuf_d)

Dqrnr_ll, O• D• (_ndRieflort, J. A •, "Qugllty Control Methods Appllf_d to nnAdvQncodComposlt_ F-111 Horlzontal Tel!", Prosentatlon at AFML/Anrosp_Ge/Univ. of Dgyton Conferoncn on NDT of Pla_tlc/Cornl_lte 5tru_turn_, D_yton,Ohio_ 18 Me_r_h1969.

Epstein, G •, "Nondestructive Te_t Method_for Reinforced Pier.tic Composites,Etc.", N69-30909, AD 686 466, Fob• 1969.

_, Epstein, G. and Rowand, R. R., "NDT Method_for Composltos, ReinforcedPlastics", Meterials I_ngineering, Oct• 1969, p• 59•

Erf, R. K• et al., "Nondestructive Holographic Techniques for Structures Inspec-tion", AFML-TR-72-2_.4, Oct. 1972.

Evang.:lldes, J. S., Meyer, R. A., and Zlmmer, J. E., "Investigation of thePropertiesof Carbon-Carbon Compositesand Their Relationship to NondestructiveTest Measurements", AFML-TR-70-213, Part II, August 1971.

Green, D. R., "Thermal and Infrared Nondestructive Testing of Composltesand; Ceramlcs", Materials Evaluation, Vol. 29, No. 11, Nov. 1971.

Haas, D. W., "RefurblshmenfCost Studyof the ThermalProtection Systemof aSpaceShuttle Vehicle, Phase2," NASA CR-112034, 1 April 1972

-_ "Refurbhhment Cost Studyof the Thermal_ Haas, D. W. and Gerber, V. M.,Protection Systemof a SpaceShuttle Vehicle", NASA-CR-112034-1 (NASA Con-tract NAS 1-10990), PhaseI!, Final ReportSupplement, 12 July 1972, McDAC-East.

Hagemaler, D. J., McFaul, H. J., and Parks, J.T. "Nondestructive Testing__

Technlquesfor Fiberglass, Graphlte Fiber, and BoronFiber ComposlteAircraft=_ Structures", DouglasPaper5756, Given at ASNT Conference, LosAngeles, Callf.,

12 March 1970.

Hammons, J. M•, Manager, "Space Shuttle Thermal Protection SystemRefurblsh-_i ment Technlques", ProgressReportson Contract NAS10-8015, SD 72-SA-0135-2,- 16 August 1972, NAR-SD.

._ Hasffngs, C. H., "Physlcal PropertiesMeasurementand Defect Locations in

Composites'°, Materlals Evalua.tlon, Jan. 1972, Vol. 30, No. 1•

Legg, J. K. et al., "Thermal and Mechanlcal Propertiesof Advanced Heatshleld_ Resinous(CP)and Carbonaceous(CC)Composites, Vol 1, AFML-TR-72-160,_ July 1972

76_,i i_

_;;"._i '

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_ "7: •

=:,: BIBLIGGRAPHY !_ntlnu_d)

i

I"lnvasti_j_tlon of Nondontruc_": Lockyar,G. E., konoo, g, Me, end Schultz, A. W.,

-:i_ tire Mothod_ for the Evoluatlon of Graphite Matr_rI_lr,", AFML_.TRo66_I01, July_"_ 1966.

t

2.1ii kohse,K. H., "Appileatlon of PhotoI_xtr_etlvoT_ehnlqu_,!;to Nondcstru_tlveT_tln_'* of Graphites_ndOther M_ter!nl_", AFML_TR_70_162,Nov. 1970.

_, Morant, C. A., "Spoclflcatlon: MC364-0006: InsulQtlon,High TornpOrature

#_! ReusableSurface, Shuttle Orbiter, " North Amorlcun RockwelI-Sp_ce Division,=,_ 12Feb. 1973.

g:L

'Ii

": Murphy, C. G., gurchetb O. J., and Matthews, C. W., "Radial Deformation_ Analysis by Holographic Interferometry", SC-DR-71-0036, April 1971, Sandla! LaboratorIes.

!

:=_ North Amerlcan Rockwell, "Space Shuttle Program Proposal", SO 72-SH-50-7,.....'_ Volume II and VII, 1972.imlr,q

-_ Oaks, A. E., "New and Refined Nondestructive Technlque_for Graphite Billets...._ andShapes",Part II, AFML-TR-70-212, July 1971.

,;_

:-.4', Orner, J. W., "The Quantitative Significance of Nondestructive Evaluation of-_;!: Graphite and Ceramic Materials, AFML-TR-70-205, October 1970

:_!::_;: Pless,W. M. and Lewis, W. H., "Fabrlcatlon, Testingand Delivery of Advanced_; Boron/Epoxy and Graphle/Epaxy Nondestructive Test Standards", NASA Contract

NAS 8-27565", LGER=11199,Dec. 1971, Lockheed-Georgla Company.

_ Ryton, B., "Heat ResistantCompositeStructure for Shuttle Applications", NASA-

_:I:: CR-115713, 21 July 1972.

_i: Seizer, R. H., "Improving Biomedical ImageQuality wlth Computers", N69-13211,_':'_ NASA-CR-97899, Oct. 1, 1968.

_!:' Shaw,C. B. andCason, J. L., "PortableNeutronRadlographicCameraUsing_, Californlum-252", Materials E.valua!i0n, Vol. 29, No. 2, Feb. 1971.=;_: .......

_i Shelton, W. L. and Atklns, G. R., "The Correlation of Nondestructive Test Tech-__:_. nlques wlth the Fracture Behav:'_rof ATJ-S Graphite", AFML-TR-72-38, Aug. 1972o i

• . "A Ca_billty and Llmltatlon Study of Thermo-_ Stlefeld, B and Yoshlmura, R H.,gr_phy of Carbon-Carbon Cones", Materlals Evaluation, Dec. 1971, Vol. 29,

-_: No. 12

__::_ 77

_74 - : .....

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BIBLIOGRAPHY (contlnued)

Tied,, D. A., "Evaluation of Nondostrucfbv(_Tasting Techniques for the SpaceShuttle Nonmetalllc Thermai.Protectlon System", NASA-CR-12B607, July 1972i

! Wilkinson, W. H. et al., "Evaluation of Nonmetallic Thermal Protection Materials'_: for the Manned Spat0 Shuttle - Vol. 1 (Task 1): Assessmentof Technical Risks

Associated with Utilization of TPS", NASA-CR-125402, Oct. 1970.

Zurbrlck,J. R., "Development of Nondestructive Testsfor Quantitatively Evalu-ating Glass Fabrlc ReinforcedLamlnates", AFML-TR-67-170, June 1967.

Zurbrlck, J. R., "Nondest,uctlve Testing of Glass Fiber-RP; Key to CompositionCharacterization and Deslgn PropertiesPrediction", SPEJournal, Vol. 24, Sept.1968.

i ' General Structuresand NDTi

, "A Studyof Space Shuttle Structural IntegrltyAnderson R. E. and Poe, R. O.,Testand Assessment",NASA Contract NAS 10-7679, NAR SD 72-SH-0001, Jan.1972.

Anderson, R. E., Kammerer, C. C., and Stuckenberg, F. H., "Methods of. .. AssessingStructural Integrity ForSpace Shuttle Vehicles", NASA Contract NAS

10-7250, NARSD 70-419, Oct. 1970.

Anderson, R. E., "Nondestructive Evaluation Development for Advanced Space-craft", NAR SD 70-406, Sept. 1970.

Andrade, D.t Jr., "Acoustic Emissionof PressureVessels", LMSC MRI 700.00,; Dec. 1972, LockheedMissiles and SpaceCompany.! "

_ Anon., "Space Shuttle Program- Proposal", Vols. III andVII, Norfl_ AmericanRockwellSpace DIvislon, SD 72-SH-50-7, 1(;72.

Anon., "Structural DesignCriteria Applicable to a SpaceShuttle", NASA SP-8057,i Jan. 1971, Section 3.5.

i Anon., "Testing Methodsand Techniques: Quality Control and NondestructiveTesting", (compilation) NASA SP-5952 (01) and (02).

Anon., Drawlngs, Structural Diagram: VL70-000044, VL70-000040, VL70-004015,_ VE70-0099, VL70-004008, VL72-000028, VL70-005016, North American Rockwell

Space Division, ATP & PRRBaseline.

!_' 78

! .

"k_,:,._--.-__._:,:-_.,:_o,:.:::'7_::.':'.___._,__,-_r"_;-,,_- _"-'_,-_..... ' "...... _ "....... " " _r _''-- -'----- ""-- ........... -........................ _g/-;_ °'':........:_- -: .... #

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E4

i

BIBLIOGRAPHY (continued)

Anon., "Space Shuttle-System SummaryBriefing", North American Rockwell-SpaceDiv., SV 72-19, 8 July 1972.

Anon., "lnvestigatlon of Safe-Life Fail-Safe Criteria for the Space Shuttle", NASA-CR-112049, 18 May 1972.

Anon., "Staging Loads", NASA SP-8022, February 1969.

Anon., "Spacecraft Grav,tational Torques"t NASA-SP-8024, May 1969.

Anon., "Solid Rocket Motor Metal Cases", NASA-SP-8025, April 1970.

Anon., "Aerodynamic and Rocket-Exhaust Heating During Launch and Ascent",NASA-SP-8029, May 1969.

Anon., "So!id Rocket Motor PerformanceAnalysls and Prediction", NASA-SP-8039,May 1971.

Anon., "Deslgn-Development Testing", NASA SP-8043, May 1970.

Anon., "Qualification Testing", NASA SP-8044, May 1970.

Anon., "Acceptance Testing'l, NASA SP-8045, Apr;I 1970.

Anon., "Spacecraft Aerodynamic Torques", NASA SP-8058, January 1971.

Anon., "Acoustic LoadsGenerated by the Propulsion System", NASA SP-8072.

Anon., "Spacebome Electronic Imaging Systems", NASA-SP-8078, June 1971.

Anon., "Stress-Corroslon Cracklng in Metals", NASA-SP-8082, Aug. 1971.

Anon., "Discontinuity Stressesin Metallic PressureVessels", NASA-SP-8083,Nov. 1971.

Anon., "Preliminary Criteria for the Fracture Control of SpaceShuttle Structures",NASA-SP-8095, June 1971.

Anon, "Quality Assurance. Guidance to Nondestructive Testing Techniques",AMCP 702-10_ AD 728 162, April 1970.

Anon, "Space Shuttle Propulsion SystemsOn-Board Checkout and MonitoringSystemDevelopment Study. Vol. 2: Guidelines For Incorporation, etc.",NAS-CR-123570, April 1972.

o ..........o7. ......

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I,- i_

!

BlfiLIOG RAI_IY (,'_ntlnuod)

Anon., "Testing Methodsand Technlques: QualJty Control and NondestructiveTesting, A Compilation", NASA SP-5952(02) (nodate), NASA.

_ Anon., Californium-252 Progress,Number 6, Jan. 1971, AEC.

Archer_ J. S., "Structural Vibration Predictlon", NASA SP-8050.

Bailey, C. D. and Pless, W. M., "Acoustic EmlsslonsUsedto NondestructlvelyDetermine Crack Locationsin Afro,aft Structural Fatigue Specimen", paper pre-sentedat 9th Symposiumon Nondestructive Evaluatlont SanAntonlo, Texas, 25April 1973.

Beal, J. B., "Advanced Radlographlc Imaging Technlques", NASA/MSFC.

Bensan,W. et al., "Current Developmentsin Optics andVislon", AD 673 425,1968.

Bishop,C. R.e "Nondestructlve Evaluation Development for Advanced Spacecraft -1971, " NAR SD 71-153, Sept. 1971, NAR-SD.

BishopeC. R., "Nondestructive Evaluation Developmentfor Advanced Spacecraft",i SD 72-SH-0052, July 1972, NAR-SD.

! Burchett, O. J. and Irwin, J. L., "Using LaserHolography for Nondestructive_ Testlng"t SC-R-713362, March 1971, Sandia Laboratories.

Cohen, S. E., "The Application of Liquid Crystals for Thermographlc Testing of_ BondedStructures", N67-35747, Contract NAS8-20627, 1967.

,

Cook, J. L., "Nondestructive Inspection Requirementsfor the Space Shuttle"," Appendix C to MDAC E0386, 1972, McDAC-West.

Cook_ J. L., "Conductivity of 2024-T42 Aluminum Sheet Solution Heat Treated atVarious Temperatures"_ Paperpresentedat ASNT Fall Conference at Cleveland,

• Ohio, 19 Oct. 1972.

* Corle, R. R._ "Proof Testof SRAM Case UsingAcoustic Emission", LPC E-2400-0218,14 Aug. 1972, LockheedPropulsionCompany.

_ i Corle, R. R. andSchllessmann,J.A., "Flaw Detection andCharacterlzatlon UsingAcoustic Emission", LockheedPropulslonCompany.

_ Crlbbs, R. W., "Optical Processingof Microwave Swgnas for Nondestructive Testing",_ Electro PhysicsCo°

8O

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ram-i: , i

_iI '_ iJ

_gr' -

j!!;

J;-7_ :'

=! BIBLIOGRAPHY (continued)

...._ Dukes, W. H. et al., "Structural DesignCrlterla Applicable to a SpaceShuttle_:_ Vehicle", NASA SP-8057, January 197i•

_ Dunegan, H. L. and Green, A. T., "Factors Affecting Acoustic FmlsslonResponse' from Materlals", Materials Research and StanDards, Vol • II, No. 3, ASTM, 197!

'i

'_:. Eller, et al ., "Saturn S-2 Quality AssuranceTechnlques: Nondestructive Testlng;i Processes,Vol• 1. Requtremenf_and Procedures", NASA-CR-123482, Oct. 1970.

"Nondestructive Structural Integrity:_ Farber, E. A., Hs_ehand Yang, M. C. K.,i _,

and Flaw Determination Using Infrared Scanning and Pattern Recognltlon Techniques"o_:' Mid-Term ReportContract NAS 10-8051, 7 Jan 1973, Untv of Florida.

i_!, Freeman, J. E• et al., "Applications of AerospaceTechnology in Industry: A

} Technology TransferProfi'e, Nondestructive Testing", NASA-CR-126574, April 1972.

_::'.' Hartbower, C• E° et al •, "Stress-Wave Anal_is Technique Study on Thlck-Walled=*_: Type A302B Steel PressureVessels", NASA-CR-101887, July 1%9.

ii Johnson, W. A., "Application of an Approachand Landing SystemModel to the;_ Space Shuttle Orbffer Vehicle", NASA-CR-114465, Feb 1972

Lewis, W. H., Sproat, W. H •, and Pearson, H S•,.... "A Review of NondestrucHve: Testing for Aerospace Appllcations", LGER11051-1, June 1971, Lockheed-Georgla,' Company.

i Lohse, K. H., "Application of Photographlc Extraction Techniquesto Nondestructivei Testing", AFML-TR-70-162, AD 879494, Nov. 1970.

_ Martin, G. and Moore, J. F., "Researchand Developmentof Nondestructive TesHng_! Techniques,etc.", Contract AF33(615)-2865, AD 844 984,June 1968

McCown, J. W., "External Tank Design Approachfor the Space Shuttle", paper pre-o sentedat the 11th SpaceCongressat Cocoa Beach, Florida, 17-19 April 1974.

Neuschaefer, R. W• and Nal, J. B., "Assessment of and Standardization for_: Quantitative Nondestructive Testing", NASA TMX-64706, 30 September1972

_/. Pearson, H. S., "Quantltaffve NDT and Fracture Mechanics Crfflcal Crock Sizes",i Paperpresentedat 1972 Materials EngineeringConference (ASM), Cleveland, Ohio,

=_ 16 Oct. 1972.

• Pettlt, D. E. and Hoeppner, D., "Fatigue Flaw Growth and NDI Evaluation for-_. Preventing Through Cracks in Spacecraft Tankage Structures", NASA-CR-128600,; _ 25 Sept• 1972.iii.

:i-'i_il.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY (contlnuod)

"_: Pollack, A. A. and Radon, J C., "Acou_t.LcEmissionsin the Fl'octu_'eToughno._sof- i_:', o Mild Steel", FGRRNo. 26 (no date), Imperil College, London.

_ Reeves, C. R., "Development of AutomatedEddyCurrent InspectionSystemfor the_i: JetStar LandingGear ShockStruts", LG PDL No. 50, 1 March 1972, Lockheed-*_': Georgia Company.

Regalbutot J A., "Nondestrucfiv_ Testingof Diffusion BondedTitanium Alloys for....i:.i! EnglneandAirframe Components", FZM-6077, Jan. 1973, General Dynamics/

,_,_ Convair.

:iil);i Richmond,G., "Crack Initiation and PropagationStudlesof SpaceShuttle Materials",:i; NAS 10-8018 Study ProgramInterim Report, 7 Dec. 1972, Lockheed-Geo,g|a Company.

i!: Rockwell International, GrummanAircraft Corp., and Fairchild Aircraft Corp.,:_' Space Shuttle SystemDesign Drawlngs; ATP_ PRRand MCR-0200 Baseline.

-i-_i:,. Rockwell International, "Space Shuttle ProgramProposal,Vols. !11and VII, April1972.

_i_I

_'_! Rummel, W D., "DetecHon of Fatigue Cracks by NondestrucHve Testing Methods",...._!i,, °;. Contract NAS 9-12276 ProgressReport, 13 July 1972.

_-i:'_:_' Sorrier, F. J•, "NondestrucHve Flaw Defln'"_hon'Techniquesfor Critical Defect......_; Determination", NASA-CR-72602, Jan 1970.

_? Scherb, M. V. et al., "Study of DamageControl Systemsfor SpaceStation", NASA-_ CR-11963, Oct. 1971

'_,_°;i_ Schroeer, R. M. and O'Keefe, F., "Researchon Exploratory Development of

-0"' Nondestructive Methodsfor Crack Detection", AFML-TR-67-167-PR-4, Jan. 1971.

o_ Scott, I. G., "The Early Detection of Fatigue Cracking", ARL/MET-62, N69-38944,i_i Feb. 1969, Aeronautical ResearchLabs.

;i,, Seizer, R. H., "lmprovlng Biomedical ImageQuality with Computers", NASA-CR-97899, 1 C)ct. 196_.

"oi'". Spenser, et al., "Ultrasonic Scanner for Radial and Flat Panels", Patent Application,°° NASA Case MFS-20335-1, 27 March 1972, NASA.o

_ i Sflefeld, B., "Computer-BasedD_splayof Nondestructive Evaluation Data", SC-R-_:,: 71-3405 (nodate), Sand_aLaboratories•

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Ii i

BIBLIOGRAPHY (continued)

Sugg_ F. I_.r KommeroGC. C., Moskab F. J.t and Scherba_E. S._ "On-BoardCheckout of Structural Integrity of Cryogenic Tanks", SD 71-264, 15 Feb. 1972,NAR-SD.

Tatro, C. A., "Acoustic MissionSensorsand Instrumentatlon"_ UCRL-51320_TID-4500, UC-38_ Jan. 19730 Univ. of CalIf.,(LLL).

Tiffany0 C. E., "Fracture Control of Metallic PressureVessels", NASA SP-8040,May 1970.

Westrup, R. W._ "Establishmentof Design Criteria for Acceptable Failure Modesand Fall Safe Considerafion_for'the SpaceShuttle Structural System", NASA-CR-123725, 1 June 1972.

Westrup, R. W., "Fracture Control DesignMethods", Per;edit ProgressReportsonContract NAS 3-16765, Oct. 1972 thru March 1973, NAR-SD.

Lordj R. J., "Evaluation of the Reliability and Sensitivity of NDT Methods forTitanium Alloys", Interim ReportNo. 2, Contract F33615-72-C-1203, McDonnellAircraft CompanyReportMDC A2394.

• Martin Marietta Corp.,-Denver, "Space Shuttle Solld Rocket BoosterRecoverySystemDefinition", (Preliminary Draft), Vol. 1, Contract NAS8-29622, MCR-73-247,October 1973.

Sugg, F. E., "Nondestructive Evaluation (NDE) Systemfor Structural IntegrityMonitoring", Contract NAS7-200, SD73-SA-0110, 20 Aug. 1973.

83

00000001 -TSG06