B V I A K I N G  S 7 R A T E G V  
A n  n t r o d u c t i o n  t o N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y  
p r o G O S s e s  a n d E ' r o D i e m s  
COL DENNIS M . DREW  
DR DONALD^jW. SNOW  
' J^riJ^ ni.-   'r.L ,'^  
OMB No. 0704-0188 
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1. REPORT DATE 
Problems 
5d. PROJECT NUMBER 
5e. TASK NUMBER 
Air Univ, Maxwell AFB, AL 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:  17. LIMITATION OF
ABSTRACT 
SAR 
 
Processes an d Problems 
Airpower Research nstitute 
A ir University 
University   o f   Alabama 
Augus t 1988  
 
Li brary of Congr ess Cat al ogi ng- i n- Publ i cat i onData
Dr ew,
Denni sM
Maki ngStrategy : An I t roducti on t o Nat i onal Securi t y
Processes and Pr obl ems / byDenni sM
Dr ew, Donal dMSnow
I ncl udes bi bl i ographi es .
1 . Uni t ed Stat es- Nat i onal s e c u r i t y . 2 Uni t ed States- M l i tary ol i cy 3 Strategy
I . Snow
UA23.D691988
I SB 1- 58566- 021- 3
F i r s t Pri nt i ng August 1988
Second Pri nt i ng Oct ober 1989
Thi rd Pri nt i ngMay 1991
Fourth Pri nti ngMarch1995
Apri l
1999
Sevent h Pri nt i ng J u l y 2001
Ei ghth Pri nt i ng Sept ember 2002
SCLA R
hi s publ i cati onwasproduced i n theDepart ent of Defenseschool envi ronment i n thei nt erest
of academc freedo andtheadvancement of
nati onal defense-rel ated concepts. Thevi ews
expressedi nt h i s publ i cat i onarethoseof the
authorsanddonot ref l ec t theof f i c ia l pol i cyor pos i t i on
of theDepartment of Defenseor theUni tedStates
government .
hi s publ i cat i onhasbeen reveiwedbysecuri tyandpol i c y revi ewaut hor i t i es andi s cl eared
f or
i i
Drew, Dennis M . 
Making Strategy: A n Introduction to National Security  Processes and Problems / by  Dennis M . 
Drew, Donald  M . S n o w . 
p. cm . 
"August 1988." 
Includes  bibliographies. 
1 . United States—National  security. . United  States—^Military  policy. 3. Strategy.  
I. S n o w , Donald  M ., 1943- II. Title. 
UA23.D691988
Second  Printing October 1989 
Fourth  Printing March  1995 
Sixth  Printing September 1999  
Seventh Printing  July 2001 
Eighth Printing September 2002  
DISCLAIMER 
This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environment In the Interest 
of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts. The views 
expressed In  this publication  are   those  of the  autfrars  and  do  not   reflect  the  official policy  orposition  
of the Department   Defense or the United States  govemment. 
This publication has been revelwed by  security and policy review authorities  and Is cleared for 
public release. 
I TR CTI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
STRATEGYI N E TI . . . . . . . . . . . 1
.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
EG ES . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3
St ep 1- Det ermni ng Nat i onal Securi t y
Obj ect i ves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
St ep 2- Formul at i ngGrandSt rat egy . . . . . . .
16
St ep 3- Devel opi ng Mi l i t a r y
St rat egy . . . . . . 18
Operat i onal St rat egy . . . . 19
St ep 5
- Formul at i ng
B a t t l e f i e l d St rat egy
( Tac t i c s ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
I nf l uences on t he St rat egy Process . . . . . . . . . 21
Cont i nui ng t he I nve s t i gat i on
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
CONTENTS 
Chapter age  
D I S C L A I M E R  i 
FOREWORD
 
 
Foundations  o f M o d e r n  Warfare 
Contrasts in  the Nuclear  A ge 
 
Objectives  4 
Step  3—Developing  Military  Strategy 8 
Step  4—Designing  Operat ional Strategy .... 9 
Step  5—Formulat ing Battlefield Strategy  
(Tactics)
Continuing  the Investigation
THEPOLI I CA D SI
3 GRANDATI AL AT . . . . . . . . 27
Vi tal Nat i onal I n t e r e s t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
I nst ruments o f Nat i onal Power
. . . . . . . . .
4 POLI I A RO
OF
GRAND
Fundament al Nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Negat i ve Obj ect i ves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Conservat i ve i as . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Technol ogi cal Nature . .
St r a t egi c Cul t ure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Concl usi on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Execut i ve Branch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
L e g i s l a t i v e Branch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Ot her Actors
T H E  POLITICAL  DIMENSION  
3 RAND N A T I O N A L  S T R A T E G Y 7  
Vital National  Interests  7 
 
 
 
2  
5 RAND STRATEGY A C T O R S A N D  
INSTITUTIONS
her Woul
ForceDepl oyment S t r a t e g y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
87
Mi l i t a r y Strategy
. . . . . . . .
ombi nedCampai gns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
po t Campai gns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Essence of Operat i onal Strategy :
Orchest rat i ng Theater Campai gns . . . . . . 102
8 I SURG
. .
.
. . . . . . . . . . 116
. . . . . . . . . . . . 118
. . . . . . . . 123
Atomc . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . 124
125
I ntercont i nental B a l l i s t i c Mi s s i l e . . . . . . .
126
Mul t i pl e I ndependent l y Targetabl e
Reent r y Vehi cl e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
127
Against W h o m  Would  Forces  Be 
Employed?  3 
 
Combined Campaigns  5 
Joint Campaigns  7 
C o m p o n e n t Campaigns  01  
Essence o f  Operat ional Strategy: 
Orchestrating  Theater Campaigns ..... 02  
Nature  o f  Insurgent Warfare —, 10 
Fundamenta l Differences  16 
 
 
Chapter
Page
Basi c Concept s and Rel at i nshi ps . . . . . . . . 128
Def i ni t i on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . .
Rel at i onshi ps
bet ween Concept s . . . . . . . 131
Nucl ear S t a b i l i t y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . 136
P LITI , AND
Cl ausew t zi an T r i o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Fogof War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
F r i c t i on i n War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
Chance i n War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
Strategy and t he Cl ausew t zi an T r i o
. . . . . . . 153
.
154
. .
on
Strategy
. . . . . . . . 158
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
Types
Fundament al . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
Or gani zat i onal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
I n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
Rel at i onshi p o f Doct r i ne and Strategy . . . . . 171
Chapter age  
Definition 28 
INFLUENCES O N  TH E  PROCESS 
10 OG, FRICTION, C H A N C E , M O N E Y , 
 
 
Chance  in  W ar
Economic  Influences  on  Strategy 54  
Political  Influences o n Strategy
 
11 ILITARY  DOCTRINE
 
 
How E f f o r t ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
Get t i ng Ther e versus Bei ng Ther e . . . . . . . . 179
Qual i t y versus Quant i t y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Expans i on and Escal at i on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
13 I SU ENWRAR . . 185
How E f f o r t ?
. . . . . .
and
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wagi ngaCount er i nsurg nt War . . . . . . . . . 190
14
CL SSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
Per spect i ve onNucl ear I s s ues . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
Current I s s ues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
Of f ensi ve Force Moder ni zat i on . . . . . . . . 197
St r a t egi c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
Arm Control andArm Reduct i on . . . . . 203
15
. . .
Ho w  M u c h  Effort?  77 
Gett ing There  versus  Being There 79 
Quality  versus Quantity  81 
Expansion and Escalation  83 
1 3 NSURGENT WARFARE D I L E M M A S . 85 
Ho w  M u c h  Effort?  85 
Deterring and  Assisting
14 NUCLEAR I S S U E S  95 
Perspective o n  Nuclear  Issues
 
Strategic  Defense  01  
Arms Contro l  and  Arms  Reduction 03  
 
Page
1 The S t r a t e g y Pr ocess . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
.
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3 Capabi l i t y / S t r at egy Rel at i onshi ps . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 134
. . . . . . . . . . . . 171
5
.
. . . . . . . .
 
Nat i onal secur i t y strategy i s a vast subj ect
i nvol vi ng
adaunt i ng
array of i nt er r el at ed subel ement s o n i n i n t r i c at e , somet i mes
vague, andever - changi ng patterns . I t s processes ar e often i r r egul ar
and conf usi ng and ar e al ways basedon d i f f i c u l t deci si ons l aden
w t h ser i ous r i sks
.
I n short, i t i s a subj ect under s t ood by fewa d
conf si n t o mst . I t i s , a t t he s m t i me, a subj ect of
ver helmng i mpor t ance t o t he f a t e of t he Uni t ed States a d
c i v i l i z a t i on i t s e l f .
Col Denni sM
rewandDr al dMSnowhave done a
consi der abl e ser vi ce by drawng together of t he di ver se
t hr eads of nat i ona secur i t y strategy i n t o a coher ent whol e They
consi der pol i t i cal andml i t a r y strategy el ement s as part of a l ar ger
deci si onmaki ng process i nf l uenced by economc, t echnol ogi cal ,
c u l t u r a l , and factors . knowof no other recent vol ume
t hat addr esses t he enti r e nat i onal secur i t y m l i e u i n such a l ogi cal
manner and yet al so mna es t o
addr ess current concer ns so
t hor oughl y . I t
i s
they
such evenhanded a r .
l tho gh the t i t l e suggests t hat thi s i s an i nt r oduct or y
vol ume-and i t i s-I amconvi nced t h a t exper i encedpr acti t i oner s
i n t he f i e l d of nat i onal secur i t y strategy ul dbenef i t gr eat l y om
a cl ose exam nat i on of t h i s excel l ent book
SI EY7WSE
Col onel ,
Cent er f or Aer ospace Doct r i ne,
Resear ch, and Educat i on
i x
National security strategy  is a vast subject involving a daunting 
array of interrelated subelements woven in intricate, ometimes  
vague, and  ever-changing  patterns. Its  processes  are  often  irregular 
and confusing and are always based on difficult decisions laden  
with serious risks. In short, it is a subject understood  by fe w and  
confusing o most. t s, t he ame ime,  ubject f 
overwhehning unportance o he ate of the United States and  
civiUzation  itself. 
C ol Dennis M . Drew and D r Donald M . Snow have done a  
considerable ervice by drawing ogether many of the diverse 
threads of national security strategy into a coherent whole. They  
consider political  and military  strategy  elements as part of a  larger  
decisionmaking process influenced by economic, echnological, 
cultural, and historical factors. I know of no other recent vo lume 
that addresses the entire national security milieu in  such a logical 
manner and yet also manages o address current concerns o  
thoroughly. It is equally remarkable that they have addressed so  
many  contentious problems in  such an evenhanded  manner. 
Although he itle uggests hat his s n ntroductory 
vo lume—and  it is—I am  convinced that experienced  practitioners 
in  th e field of  national  security strategy  would  benefit  greatly  from  
a  close examination  of this excellent book. 
U-^/^A 
SlDNEYJJ. WISE 
Commander 
Research, and Education  
di r ect or of t he i rpowr
Resear ch
I nst i tute a t t he Ai r
Uni ver si t y Cent er f or erospace
Doct r i ne
el l AFB, Al bamaA
vet er an of 23 year s
ser vi ce, he has been on
ext ended f acul t y
appoi ntment t Ai r
Uni ver si t y si nce 1978 He i s a
r of t he
Secti on on
M l i t ar y St udi es of t he
I nt er nat i onal St udi es
Associ at i on and i s a
f el l ow of t he I nt er - Uni ver si t y
Semnar on
hol ds a BAfromWl l amet t e
Uni ver si y, anMSfromt he
Uni ver si t y of W ng, andan
MA
t he Uni ver si t y of Al abama
Si nce 1981, Col onel Drewhas
aut hor ed or coaut hor ed f our books and
nu er us book chapt er s,
monographs,
anda r t i c l e s deal i ng w t h
ml i t ar y strategy, ai r er
doct r i ne, and
i nsur gent war f ar e .
DrDonal
MSnow s pr of essor of p o l i t i c a l sci enceand
di r ect or
of t he I nt er nat i onal
St udi es Programt t heUni ver si t y of
Al bam
He i s a past chai rman of t he
Sect i on of M l i t ar y St udi es of
t he
I nt er nat i onal St udi es
Associ ati on and i s a f e l l ow of
t he
I nt er - Uni ver si t y Semnar on
Ar edFor ces and Soci et y
He hol ds
andMAfromt he
Uni ver si t y of C l or do andaPhD
from
numerous
a r t i c l e s ondef enseandnucl ear
i ssues, i ncl udi ngNucl ear
St r at egy i n a
Wor l d : Amer i can
Pol i cy i n t he 1980s and
The Nucl ear
Uncer t ai nt y .
XI
Colonel Dennis M . Drew s he director of he Airpower 
Research nstitute at th e Air University Center or Aerospace  
Doctrine, Research, and Education, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. A  
veteran of 23 years ervice, he has been on extended aculty  
appointment at A ir  University since 1978. He is a member of   th e 
Section on M ili tary Studies of he nternat ional Studies 
Association and is a fellow of the Inter-University Seminar on 
Armed Forces and Society. He holds a BA rom Willamette 
University, an  M S from the University of Wyoming, and an  M A  
from the University of Alabama. Since 1981, Colonel Drew has 
authored or coauthored four books and numerous book chapters, 
monographs, and articles dealing with military strategy, air  power 
doctrine,  nd insurgent warfare. 
Dr   Donald  M . Snow   is  professor  of   political science  and  director 
of  the  International Studies Program  at th e University  of  Alabama. 
He is a past chairman of th e Section of MiUtary Studies of the 
International tudies Associat ion nd s a ellow f he  
Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. He holds 
a BA and M A  from the University of Colorado and a PhD  from 
Indiana University. D r Snow has published several books and 
numerous  articles on  defense  and  nuclear   issues, including  Nuclear 
Strategy in a Dynamic World: American Policy in the 1980s and 
The Nuclear Future: Toward  a Strategy  of Uncertainty. 
 
aki ng I n 1980 t he
aut hor s began
worki g on a t ext book
f or Ai r Uni ver si t y' s Ai r
and
Staff Col l ege t h a t woul di nt r oduce
t he concept of
st r at egyandt hevagar i es of
st r at egymaki ng t om dcareer Ai r Force
of f i cers . Theout om
of t hat effort was I nt roduct i on t o S t r a t e g y ,
a r at her r udi ment ary vol ume
t h a t , surpr i si ngl y, has remai ned i n
const ant use f or t he past seven
years . The current wor i s an
out gr owt h of I nt roduct i on t o St rat egy
andi t i ncorpor at es al l t h a t
we have l earned about wr i t i ng and
or gani zi ng an i nt r oduct or y t e x t
t hat examnes t he t f undament al and yet arcane
ml i t a r y ar t
The aut hor s owea great debt of grat i t ude
t o t he out st andi ng
product i on s t a f f of
t he Ai r Uni ver si t y Press f or t hei r
consi der abl e
l abor s i n
br i ngi ng th is vol um t o f r u i t i on . We al so owe a
mnu ntal debt t o
our edi t or , J ohn E J or dan, J r . ,
whose
consi der abl e s k i l l , great
i n s i g h t , andl i m t l ess pat i encehave t urned

, .
PREFACE 
This volume has been seven years in the making. In 1980 the 
authors began working on a textbook fo r Air University's A ir 
Command and Staff College that would introduce the concept of 
strategy and   th e  vagaries of strategymaking to  midcareer  A ir  Force 
officers. The outcome of that effort was Introduction to Strategy, 
a rather rudimentary volume that, surprisingly, has remained in  
constant use or the past even years. The current work s an  
outgrowth of  Introduction to Strategy and it incorporates al l that 
we have leamed about writing and organizing an  introductory text 
that examines th e most fundamental and yet arcane military art. 
The authors owe a great debt of gratitude to the outstanding 
production staff of th e A ir  University Press fo r their considerable  
labors n bringing his volume o ruition. We also owe a 
monumental debt o our editor, ohn E. ordan, r. , whose 
considerable skill, great insight, and  limitless  patience  have turned 
our scribbhngs into a readable  text. 
DENNIS M . DREW, Col, USAF 
Director 
Airpower Research Institute 
DR D O N A L D M. S N O W  
Professor of Political Science 
I TR TI
Thi s book
i s about nat i onal s e c ur i t y s t r a t e g y : what
i t
i s ,
what i t s
obj ecti ves are , what probl ems i t seeks t o
sol ve or at l eas t manage,
andwhat
ki nds of i nf l uences constr ai n and c r e a t e
oppor t uni t i es f o r
t he devel opment
and i mpl ement at i on of s t r a t egi es .
Theheart of t he
pr obl emw t h whi ch nat i onal s ec ur i t y s t r a t e gy
deal s i s t he s er i es of m l i t a r y
t h r e a t s t h a t t he nat i on must conf ront .
Thus, t he maki ng and
i mpl ement i ng of s t r at eg a r e l a r ge l y an
exerci se i n r i s k m e ent and r i s k
r educt i on . The not i on of r i s k
r equi r es d e f i n i t i o n at t he out s e t . I n a or or
l e s s t r adi t i ona l
manner , r i s k i s def ned as t e di f f erence
bet ween
t he
t o
our s ec ur i t y by adversari es and po t e nt i a l
adversari es and our
c a p a b i l i t i e s t o
count er t hose t h r e a t s . I n ci r cumst ances wher e
adequate
resources ( manpower , mat er i e l , percei ved wi l l , et c . ) a r e
av ai l abl e, r i s k can
be reduced and s ec ur i t y i ncr eased t h e r e
i s a gap bet ween t he amount
of t h r e a t and c apabi l i t y t o count er i t ,
.
I n t h ebest of al l wor l ds, r i s k assessment
and anagement oul
not be probl ems . One oul si mpl y l i s t
al l t he e x i s t i n g and
pot ent i a l t h r e a t s t o nat i onal s ec ur i t y
and then a l l o c a t e what ever
resources
wer e needed t o bl unt t hose t h r e a t s , thereby
r educi ng al l
r i s k s
t o nonexi st ence .
I n t he r ea l
wor l d, i t i s i possi bl e t o r emove r i s k
al t ogether f o r
a t l eas t t wo r e l a t e d
reasons . The f i r s t i s t h a t t h e r e i s
honest
di sagr eement ng
t hosewho pol i cy about what t he t h r e a t s
a re , hows e r i ous they a r e ,
and wh ch a r e i n need of bei ng reduced
and t o what degree . About such
probl ems as t he physi cal s u r v i v al
o r t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of Amer i can
s o i l , t h e r e i s agreement t h a t t he
t h r e a t , ho ever def i ned, must be
countered . Even a t t hi s
consensual
l e v e l , def i ni ng t h nature of t he
t h r e a t and determ ni ng
t he
appropr i at e ans t o counteract i t i s a
mat t er
XV
INTRODUCTION 
This  b o o k  is about national security strategy: what it is , what its  
objectives are, what problems it seeks to solve or at least manage, 
and what  kinds of influences constrain  and create  opportunities  fo r 
the development and implementat ion of strategies. 
The heart of the problem  with which national security strategy  
deals is the series of military  threats  that the nation must confront . 
Thus, he making and mplementing of strategy are argely an 
exercise in  risk  management and  risk reduction. The notion of risk 
requires definition at he outset . n a more o r ess raditional 
manner, risk is defined as the difference between  the  threats posed 
to o ur security by adversaries and potential adversaries and o ur 
capabilit ies o counter hose hreats. n circumstances where  
adequate resources  (manpower, materiel, perceived  will, etc.) are 
available, risk can be reduced and security increased. W h e n there  
is a gap  between  the amount of threat and capability  to  counter  it, 
th e difference is the risk one incurs. 
In  the  best  of  all worlds, risk  assessment  and  management  would 
no t be problems. ne would imply is t all he existing nd  
potential threats to national security and then allocate whatever 
resources were needed  to  blunt those threats, thereby  reducing all 
risks to nonexistence. 
In the real world, it is impossible  to  remove risk altogether fo r 
at east w o elated easons. he irst s hat here s honest 
disagreement among  those  w ho  make  policy  about  what  the  threats  
are, how  serious they are, and which are in  need of being reduced 
and to what degree. A b o u t such problems  as the physical survival 
or territorial integrity of American soil, there is agreement that  the 
threat, owever efined, must be ountered. ven t his 
 
as t he ent i r e debat e about appr opr i at e nucl ear st rategy and forces
vi vi dl y t e s t i f i e s . I n ot her areas, such as t he t hr eat s t o meri can
i n t e r e s t s
posed
by var i ous p o l i t i c a l andm l i t ar y f or ces i n
Cent r al
Amer i ca, there i s consi der abl e di sagr eement about
how
uch
threat ( i f any) i s posedbyt he di f f er ent forces and t hus hat ( i f any)
m l i t a r y capabi l i t i es we need t o count er t em
Theot her const r ai nt i s on t he r esour ces avai l abl e t o count er t he
threat . Thedebat e of t he ear l y andm ddl e 1980s i s strong t est i mony
that eri can def ense pol i cy, al ong w t h ot her a c t i v i t i e s of t he
f eder al gover nment , w l l beunder i ncr eased f i scal const r ai nt ; and
there ar e
sol ut i ons
t o t he probl m The hear t of t h i s
const r ai nt i s t he pol i t i cal (and m woul d ar gue
economc)
l ar ge
di scr epanci es bet ee f eder al r evenues
andexpendi t ur es- t he
def i i t .
per cent
of
t he gr os s nat i onal pr oduct dur i ng t he 1970s, t he def i ci t has
bal l ooned t o appr oxi mat el y 6per cent i n t hemd-1 0s; even or
di st r ess i ng, an i ncr eas i ng pr opor t i on of t he accumul at i ng debt i s
hel d by f or ei gn nat i onal s ( t he l ar ges t s i ngl e hol der of Ameri can
debt i n 1987 wasaJ apanese bank) .
The s i z e of t he def i ci t andt he r esul t ant const r ai nt on m l i t a r y
a c t i v i t i e s ar e not goi ng t o change eas i l y or r api dl y . The sol ut i on
w l l r equi r e d i f f i c u l t deci s i ons
t h a t
beunpopul ar
.
Gvent he structure of t he f eder al budget ( al most
85 per cent of expendi t ur es ar e f or ent i t l ement pr ogr ams , def ense,
andser vi ce of t he nat i onal debt- i n t h a t order), there can bel i t t l e
r educt i on of t he debt t h a t does not i ncl ude s i zabl e sacr i f i ces i n
f undi ng f or nat i onal def ense . The onl y al t er nat i ve way t o r educe
t he debt i s t o i ncr ease f eder al re enu s- t x i nc ases .
Thi s di scussi on serves as asampl e of he r eal -wor l d const r ai nt s
w t h i nwh c st rategy and s t r a t e g i s t s ust oper at e . Theheart of t he
s t r a t e g i c
pro l em
s howt o
t he maj or
m l i t a r y cont i ngenci es t h a t door ght conf r ont t he Un i t ed States
whi l e r ecogni z i ng t he
i mposs i bi l i t y
of r educi ng
that
ar e
three
maj r pl anni ng cases or cont i ngenci es w t h wh c s t r at egi c
Xvl
as the entire debate about appropriate  nuclear strategy and forces 
vividly testifies. n other areas, uch as the threats to American  
interests posed  by  various political and military  forces in  Central 
America, here s considerable disagreement about how much  
threat (if  any) is  posed  by  the  different  forces and  thus what (if  any) 
mihtary  capabilities  w e need  to counter  them. 
The other constraint is on the resources available  to  counter the  
threat. The  debate  of  the  early  and  middle 1980s  is  strong  testimony  
that American defense policy, along with other activities of the  
federal government, will be under increased fiscal constraint; and  
there are no easy olutions o he problem. The heart of this 
constraint s he political and many ould argue economic) 
unacceptabiUty of large discrepancies between federal revenues  
and  expenditures—the  deficit. After  running  less than  2  percent of 
the gross ational product during he 970s, he eficit has 
ballooned  to approximately 6 percent in  th e  mid-1980s; even  more 
distressing, an increasing proport ion of the accumulating debt is  
held by foreign nationals (the largest single holder of American 
debt in 1987 w as a  Japanese  bank). 
The size of the deficit and the resultant constraint on military  
activities are no t going to  change easily o r rapidly. The solution  
will  require difficult decisions that will undoubtedly  be unpopula r 
in  some quarters. Given  the structure of th e  federal budget  (almost 
85 percent of expenditures are fo r entit lement programs, defense, 
and service of the national debt—in that order), there can be little  
reduction of the debt that does no t include  izable acrifices n  
funding fo r national defense. The only alternative w ay to reduce 
the debt is to  increase  federal revenues—tax increases. 
This discussion serves as a sample of  the real-world  constraints 
within  w hich strategy  and strategists must  operate. The  heart of the  
strategic problem  is how  to  adapt as best as possible to  the major 
military contingencies  that  do  or might confront the United States 
while recognizing the impossibili ty of reducing to zero  the risks 
that  each  contingency  presents. General ly speaking, there  are  three 
major planning cases r contingencies  ith hich trategic 
 
pl anner s mst deal
: str at egi c nucl ear war , maj or convent i onal war ,
and l ow- i nt ens i t y conf l i c t .
Qui t e obvi ousl y, str at egi c nucl ear
war wi t h
Sovi et U i oni s
t he wor st case because t he consequences of such a
war
c l ear l y
t he ost devast at i ng . Gven t he possi bl e di sast r ous
outcomes
of
such a war , avoi dance of i t s occurrence t hr ough det er r ence has
been t he
hi ghest nat i onal pr i or i t y . There a r e , however , di f f er i ng
i deas about howl i k e l y such awar i s , howi t mght s t a r t and be
conduct ed, and t hus hat st rat egi es and f or ces are necessary t o
m ge t he
r i s k i t pr esent s .
Amaj or convent i onal ( at l e a s t
i n i t s ear l y st ages) war i n Europe
between NA and t he Warsaw Pact has been
t he pr i nci pal
concern f or s t r a t e g i s t s andpl anner s s i nce t he endofWrl dWar I I .
Because such awar woul dp i t nuc l ear - armed
nat i ons agai nst one
anot her andbecausesuchawar coul d escal at e t o astr at egi c nucl ear
war betweent heUni t ed States andt he Sovi et Uni on, i t s det er r ence
i s a primary cons i der at i on . c agai n, there are maj or
di sagr eement s (both w t hi n t heUni t ed St at es andwi t hi n t heNA
al l i ance) about l i k e l y such a
war
t hus hat ki nds and
l evel s of ef fort ar e necessary t o
m i nt ai n det er r ence .
The t hi rd cont i ngency i s not a
s i ngl e cont i ngency at a l l , but i s
i nst ead he probl emof
pot ent i al Ameri can i nvol vement i n t hi r d
worl dconf l i ct s t hat f a l l under t he general rubr i c of
l ow- i nt ens i t y
conf l i c t . Thi s i s a rel at i vel y newt opi c of concern wi t hi n m l i t a r y
pl anni ng c i r c l e s , and f u l l consi der at i on has been st unt ed by t h e ' ,
per cei ved r esembl ance of of t hese si t uat i ons t o Vi etnam
Al thou h t her e
i s consi der abl e agr eement t hat t hese t ypes of
s i t uat i ons
provi e t he st numerou "oppor t uni t i es" f or
A eri can
m l i t a r y i nvol vement, there i s consi erabl e
di sagr eement about t he
pr opr i et y of such i nvol vement andwhat '
k i nds of pr epar at i ons t he
Uni ted States shoul d e f or hese
cont i ngenci es . The contemporar debat e
about appr opr i at e
Ameri can response t o t he pol i t i co-m l i t ar y
si t uat i on i n Cent r al
.
and low-intensity conflict. 
Quite  obviously, strategic nuclear w ar with the Sovie t Union is  
the worst case because the consequences of such a w ar are clearly 
the most devastating. Given th e possible disastrous outcomes of 
such a war, avoidance of it s occurrence through deterrence has 
been the highest national priority. There are, however , differing 
ideas about ho w likely such a w ar is , ho w it might start and be 
conducted, and thus what strategies and forces are necessary to  
manage the risk it presents. 
A  major  conventional (at least in  it s early stages) w ar in  Europe 
between NATO nd he Warsaw Pact has been he principal 
concern fo r strategists and  planners since the  end of World  W ar H. 
Because such a w ar would pit nuclear-armed  nations against one  
another and  because  such  a  w ar  could  escalate  to  a  strategic  nuclear 
w ar  between  the United States and  the  Sovie t Union, it s deterrence 
is  primary onsideration. Once gain, here re major 
disagreem ents (both  within  the  United  States and  within  the  NATO  
alliance) about how likely such a w ar is and thus   and  
levels of effort are necessary  to  maintain deterrence. 
The third contingency is no t a single contingency  at all, but is 
instead the problem of potential American involvement in third  
world conflicts that fall under the general rubric of low-intensity  
conflict. This is a relatively new  topic of concern within military  
planning circles, and full consideration has been  tunted by the; 
perceived resemblance of many of these  ituations o Vietnam: 
Although here s considerable agreement hat hese ypes of 
situations rovide he most     or 
American military nvolvement, here s onsiderable 
disagreement about th e propriety of such involvement and what 
kinds of preparations he United States hould make o r these 
contingencies. he contemporary ebate bout appropriatq 
American esponse o he politico-mihtary  ituation n Centrall 
America is illustrative  of this disagreement. 
 
One t hi ng i s cl ear about these
three cont i ngenci es- t hey af f ect
t hi nki ng about strategy and
i t s i mpl ement at i on . Each cont i ngency
poses a
di f f er ent set of str at egi c quest i ons w t h
di f f erent answer s,
and these
answers and t he capabi l i t i es they suggest
ar e not
necessar i l y
mut ual l y suppor t i ve. The str at egi es
and f or ces one
devi ses
t o det er str at egi c nucl ear war , i n
ot her wor ds, mynot hel p
det er convent i onal wa i n Eur ope, and
they al most cer t ai nl y have
l i t t l e deterrent effect on l ow- i nt ensi t y
war f ar e i n t he t h i r d worl d
Li kewi se, a l esson of t he Vi et am
Wr i s that pr eparat i ons f or
convent i onal war i n Europe di d
not t r ansl at e i nt o appr opr i at e
capabi l i t y t o deal
w t h that si tuat i on . Si ml ar l y, few
woul dar gue
that a l l t he
count er i nsur gency pr epar at i on i n
t he worl d oul d
r educe t he r i s k
of str at egi c nucl ear war . These
poi nt s hel p def i ne
t he pr bl em
of strategy and pr epar e a
s t a r t i n g poi nt f or our
i nvest i gat i on of m i n strategy
As
and
t he al l ocat i on of resources
t o reduce t he r i sk i n one
cont i ngency does not necessar i l y
r educe ot her r i sks as wel l , t he
pro l emof strategy wi l l be r i s k
mnagemnt rather than r i s k
al l evi at i on . Howone
wi sel y devi ses pl ans of act i on
and
capabi l i t i es i n suppor t
of t hose pl ans i s t hus at t he
heart of t he ar t
of st r at egymaki ng
.
Theor gani zat i on
of t he r e s t of t h i s book i s i nt ended
t o f ac i l i t a t e
t he r ader ' s under st andi ng andappr eci at i on
of str at egi c probl ems
and pr ocesses . I n t he f i r s t sect i on, we l ook
at t he evol ut i on of
strategy and t he pr ocess by whi ch
strategy i s devi sed, a pr ocess
that f orms t he f r wor f or t he ent i re
book Thi s appr oach i s
uni que . aut hor s have of f er ed
advi ce andcounsel concer ni ng
howt o mke strategy
deci s i ons . Thi s vol u , i n contrast,
concentrates on
what deci si ons ust bemdeandt he f actor s that
i nf l uence t hose deci si ons
. Thus, t h i s book i s descr i pt i ve rather than
pr escr i pt i ve
i n nature . Thesecond sect i on deal s w t h
t he p o l i t i c a l
di mensi ons of strategy i n t er ms of t he r el at i onshi p
betwee
p o l i t i c a l
andm l i t a r y obj ect i ves andt he const r ai nt s
t h a t po l i t i c a l
r e a l i t i e s
pl ace on strategy . The t h i r d sect i on
concentrates on t he
m l i t a r y di mensi ons of strategy
and i ncl udes consi er abl e mat er i al
on t he cont i ngency cases j ust
i nt r oduced . The f our t h sect i on
xv i i i
One thing is clear about these three contingencies—they  affect 
thinking about strategy  and  its implementation.  Each contingency  
poses a different set of strategic questions with different answers, 
and hese answers nd he capabihties hey uggest are no t 
necessarily mutual ly upportive. The  trategies and orces o ne 
devises to  deter strategic  nuclear war, in  other  words, m ay  no t  help  
deter  conventional w ar in  Europe, and they  almost certainly have  
little deterrent effect on low-intensity warfare in the third world. 
Likewise, a lesson of the Vietnam W ar is hat preparations for 
conventional w ar n Europe did no t ranslate nto appropriate  
capability  to deal with that situation. Similarly, fe w would argue  
that all he counterinsurgency preparation n he world would 
reduce the risk of strategic nuclear war. These points help define  
the problem of  trategy nd prepare a  tarting point or o ur 
investigation  of making strategy. A s long as resources are scarce  
and he llocation f resources o educe he risk n ne 
contingency does no t necessarily reduce other risks as well, the 
problem of  trategy will be isk management ather han isk 
alleviation. o w ne wisely evises lans f action nd 
capabilities in  support of those  plans is thus at the heart of the art 
of strategy  making. 
The organization of the  rest of  this b o o k is intended to  facilitate  
the reader's understanding and appreciation  of strategic problems 
and processes. n he irst ection, w e o o k at the evolut ion of 
strategy and the process by which strategy is devised, a process 
that forms the f ramework fo r th e entire book. This approach is  
unique. M a n y  authors  have offered advice and  counsel concerning  
ho w o make trategy ecisions. his olume, n contrast, 
concentrates on what decisions must be made and the factors that 
influence  those  decisions. Thus, this book  is  descriptive  rather   than  
prescriptive in  nature. The second section deals with the political 
dimensions f  trategy n erms f he elationship etween  
political and military objectives and th e constraints that political 
realities place on strategy. The third section concentrates on the 
mihtary  dimensions  of strategy  and  includes  considerable  material 
on he contingency cases ust ntroduced. he ourth ection  
 
examnes t he i n s t i t u t i o n a l and
ot her i nf l uences t h a t shape
deci si ons
wi t hi n t he s t r a t e gy pr ocess . I n
t he f i n a l s ec t i o n, we r e t u r n t o
t he
cont i ngency cases a s away t o
f r ame consi der at i on of f u t u r e
.
examines  the  institutional and  other  influences   that  shape decisions  
within the strategy process. In the final section, w e return to the  
three contingency cases as a w ay  to frame consideration of future  
strategic problems. 
FRAMING  TH E  
ml i t ary st rat egy have not
changed i n
recorded hi st ory . M l i t a r y
l eaders ( s t r a t e g i s t s ) have al ways
st r uggl ed, w t h gr eater or
l esser degr ees of success, to
overcom t he pr obl ems
i nvol ved i n ma shal i ng and
usi ng
m l i t a r y f orces t o achi eve
a desi red obj ect i vewhi l e copi ngw t h
myr i ad i nf l uences, of whi ch arebeyond
anyone' s control .
aki ng strategy i s as
si mpl e,
easy,
or st rai ght f orward t oday as i t
once t have
The r o le of t he
m l i t a r y st rat egi st has be
or
compl i cat ed .
Moder ml i t a r y f or ces are
general l y l a r g e r ,
r l e t h a l ,
f a r mr compl ex i n t hei r
organi zat i on, and
often r speci al i zed
i n of t hei r f unct i ons .
Thus they
are re d i f f i c u l t and
expensi ve t o t ra in and support,
part i cul arl y f or oper at i ons
i n envi r onment s that d i f f e r
i n
oppor t uni t i es and rest rai nt s . Moder
ml i t a r y f orces oper at e
i n three di mensi ons ( l a nd, s e a ,
and a i r ) andperhaps even
i n
wor l dw de basi s . Al l
of
these f a c t o r s , and a host of others,
compl i cat e t he process
of
l eaders have devel oped var i ous
et ods f or copi ng
w t h t he
i ncreasi ng compl exi t i es of war f ar e
and t he at t endant
d i f f i c u l t i e s i n
devel opi ng ef f ect i ve st rat egi es
. The t
been t he
prol i f erat i on of
l arger m l i t a r y s t a f f organi zat i ons
and, w t h i n
t he s t a f f s , t he use of
omplex t ool s of anal ysi s .
Perhaps t he
ul t i mat e ext ensi on of t h i s
trend i s f ound i n t he
A eri c
ml i t a r yest abl i shment
w t h i t s el aborat e s t a f f syst emthat
often
1
CHAPTERl 
STRATEGY   IN  PERSPECTIVE 
The fundamentals o f military strategy  have no t changed in  
recorded history. Military leaders strategists) have always 
struggled, with greater o r lesser degrees o f uccess, o 
overcome he problems nvolved n marshaling and using 
military   forces   t  achieve  a  desired  objective   while  coping  with 
myriad   influences,  many   o f  which  are  beyond  anyone's  control . 
This is no t to say that the process of making strategy is as 
simple, easy, or straightforward today as it once must have  
been. 
The role o f he military strategist has become more 
compUcated. M o d e r n military orces are generally arger, 
much  more   lethal, far  more  complex  in  their  organization, and  
often more specialized in  many of their functions.  Thus they 
are more difficult and expensive o rain and support, 
particularly o r operat ions n environments hat differ n  
opportunities and restraints. M o d e r n military  forces operate  
in  three dimensions (land, sea, and air) and  perhaps even  in  a 
fourth (space). Often  they operate o n  a  worldwide  basis. A ll 
of these factors, and a  host o f others, compUcate the process 
o f  making strategy. 
difficulties n developing effective  trategies. The most 
obvious and pervasive o f hese methods has been he 
proliferation  of larger military  staff organizations and, within 
the staffs, the use o f complex tools o f analysis. Perhaps the  
 
AKI STRATEGY
depends on sophi s i cat ed, hi gh- speed, o puter-b sed
quant i t at i ve anal ysi s t echni ques .
The al most overwhel m ng compl exi t y of mod r ml i t a r y
deci si onmaki ng obscures t he f a c t that t he f undament al s
of
strategyremai nunchangedWe st under st andhowandwhy
t he st r ategymaki ngprocess has evol ved bef or e
we
examne
t he
process i t s e l f . Al though i t l be i st ruct i ve t o begi n our
anal ysi s i n anci ent t i mes, i t w l l suf f ice t o begi n i n t he
ei ght eent h cent ur y . The two i nt er veni n cent ur i es have
w t nessed t l changes i n p o l i t i c s , econom cs, and
t echnol ogy that i l l u s t r a t e howandwhyt he strategyprocess
has
t he i ght eent h Ce t r
M l i t ar y hi st or i ans onl ref er to t he per i od fromt he
l a t t e r part of t he sevent eent h cent ur y t o t he begi nni ng of t he
.
The
l i mt at i onswerenei t her i n t erms of t he ber of war s f ought
.
of
bat
dur i ng
that per i od er general l y f ought f or l i m ted
obj ect i ves w t h l i m t ed resources andw t h a l i m ted ber
of bat t l es .
Theei ght eent h cent ur ywas t he age of absol ut emonarchi es
i n Eur ( Engl and bei ng a sem except i on) . The dynast i c
armes that suppor t ed t hese onar hs f ought war s f o r what
can onl y be c l a s s i f i e d
as
dynast i c obj ect i ves -as l i c e of l and
her e, a c i t y
there,
and t he r i g h t s of successi on t o
var i ous
t hrones . Suchobj ect i ves di d l i t t l e t o arouse t he man' s
ent husi asm f o r wr d gave himnoreal r easons t o r i sk h i s
l i f e i n bat t l e . The f er vor of t he r el i gi ous war of t he
sevent eent h cent ur y was a dimemor , and t he i deol ogi cal
passi ons pawne
by
t he Ameri c and Fr ch revol ut i ons
had
not
yet
appeared
quantitative  analysis techniques. 
decisionmaking obscures th e fact that the fundamentals of 
strategy  remain  unchanged.  We  must   understand  how  and   why 
the  strategymaking   process  has  evolved  before  we  examine  the 
process itself. Although it would be instructive to  begin our 
analysis n ancient imes, t will uffice o begin in he 
eighteenth century. The wo ntervening centuries have 
witnessed monimiental changes in  politics, economics, and 
technology  that  illustrate  how  and  why  the  strategy  process  has 
evolved. 
MiUtary historians commonly refer to  the  period from  the 
latter part of  the seventeenth century  to  the  beginning of  the 
French Revolut ion as an age of limited warfare. The 
limitations  were  neither   in   terms   of   the   number  of   wars  fought 
nor in  terms of the number of years in  which war occurred. 
Nor was war limited in  terms of combat casualties. Rather, 
wars during that period were generally fought fo r limited 
objectives with hmited resources and  with a Umited number 
of  battles. 
The  eighteenth   century   was   th e age  of   absolute   monarchies  
in Europe England being a semiexception). The dynastic 
armies that supported these monarchs fought wars fo r what 
can only be classified as dynastic objectives—a slice of land 
here, a city there, and the ights of succession to various 
thrones.  Such  objectives did   Httle to  arouse  the  common   man's 
enthusiasm  fo r war and gave him  no real easons to  risk his 
life n battle. The ervor of the eligious wars of the 
seventeenth century was a dim  memory, and the ideological 
passions spawned by the American and French revolutions 
had not  yet appeared. 
Dynast i c arm es were al so
l i m t ed i n size The l i m ted
t axat i on base of prei ndust r i al
econom es coul d not support
massi ve m l i t a r y est abl i shment s .
Further, pr i mt i ve, al most
subsi st ence
agai nst l arge- scal e
conscri t i on e f f o r t s that woul ds t r i p awayt he t
pr oduct i ve
n
servi ce . One
resul t of t h i s si t uat i onwas
that mer cenar y s o l d i e r s , s e l l i n g
t hei r
s k i l l s and servi ces t o
t he hi ghest bi dder r egar dl ess of
nat i onal i t y, mnated
uropean me . Such
mer cenar y f orces were
expensi ve t o mai nt i n . To f i l l out t he
ranks, onar h er f or ced t o
i mpress nonmer cenar i es,
dr aw ng themr i mari l y fromhe dr egs
of Europea soci et y.
Faced
w t h rel at i vel y smal l yet expensi ve
armes, m l i t a r y
l eaders
st r uggl ed t o i ncrease t he ef f ect i veness
of t hei r f or ces
by t he st
ef f ecti ve use of avai l abl e t echnol ogy .
The
was t hemuzz l e- l oadi ng smoot hbore
us et . Sl owt o
r el oad andonl y accurat e t o about
f i f t y yards
agai nst man- si zed
t ar get s , t hi s weapon' s l i mt at i on di ctated
t he t a c t i c s used ont he bat t l ef i el d
. Thepr obl ems er howt o
i ncrease f i r epower and
.
t he speed of rel oadi ng, t her eby
i ncreasi ng t he rat e of f i r e . But there
er l i m t s t o t he speed
at t ai nabl e
Asecond sol ut i onwas t o f i r e
musket s byvol l ey to
i ncrease
t hei r shock e f f e c t . A h i r d approachwas t o
pack r
menw t h
musket s ont o t he b a t t l e f i e l d . owever,
t he heavy
cr eat ed byei ght eent h- cent ur y
musket s often di d
as t o
f ri endl y f or ces ( by bl ow ng
i n t hei r
ear dr ums) as t he
musket s di d t o t he The sol ut i on
was
t o pack t hemen
t i g h t l y t oget her i n l ong, st rai ght
l i n e s so t hat
each mancoul d di scharge
h i s po w t hout doi ng
harmo
h i s comades ( al i gnment
bei ng al l i mpor t ant t o protect
f r i endl y
ear dr ums) . Al l three approaches
erecom ned
i n
t h i s t a c t i c a l
sol ut i on t o anessent i al l y
t echnol ogi cal probl em
and
fromt h i s sol ut i on t he term
l i near warf are, used t o
charact er i ze
era
3
taxation base of preindustrial economies could not support 
massive military establishments. Further, primitive, almost 
subsistence evel economies militated against arge-scale 
conscription  efforts   that   would  strip  away  the   most  productive 
members of a society and   place them   in   military  service. One 
result   of   this  situation   was   that   mercenary  soldiers,  selHng   their 
skills and ervices o he highest bidder egardless of 
nationali ty, dominated many European armies. Such 
mercenary  forces were expensive to  maintain. To fill out the 
ranks, monarchs were orced o mpress nonmercenaries, 
drawing them  primarily   from   the  dregs of  European society. 
Faced with relatively small yet expensive armies, military 
leaders straggled to  increase the effectiveness of  their forces
by  making the  most effective use of  available   technology. The 
standard  infantry   weapon  was the  muzzle-loading smoothbore  
musket. Slow to  reload  and only accurate to  about fifty   yards 
against man-sized targets, this weapon's limitation dictated  
the  tactics used  on   the  battlefield. The  problems were how   to  
increase firepower and how best to use available firepower. 
One solution   was to  increase the speed of  reloading, thereby  
increasing the rate of fire. But there were limits to  the speed 
attainable. A  second  solution  was to fire muskets  by  volley to  
increase   their  shock effect.  A  third  approach  was to  pack   more 
men with muskets onto the battlefield. However, the heavy 
muzzle  blast created   by  eighteenth-century   muskets often   did  
as much damage o riendly orces by blowing n their 
eardrams) as  the muskets did  to  the  enemy. The solution  was 
to  pack the  men  tightly  together in  long, straight lines so  that 
each man  could discharge his  weapon  without doing harm  to  
his comrades alignment being a l important o protect 
friendly eardrams). All three approaches were combined in  
this tactical solution  to  an essentially technological problem, 
and  from  this solution  came the term inear warfare, used  to  
characterize  th e tactical formations of  th e era. 
 
fronts . Consequent l y,
they ere
cl umsy t a c t i c a l f ormat i ons,
d i f f i c u l t t o depl o a f t e r
t he arc
t o t h e b a t t l e , and d i f f i c u l t
t o i n at t acki ng a f t e r
depl oyment . The at t ackers i n
ei ght eent h- cent ury bat t l ef i el d
m nuet s had t o mar ch, s t o p ,
real i gn t hei r f ormat i on, and
then
ar on-often whi l e
under f i r e fromar t i l l e ry
and
theywerecl ose enough
t o f i r e , e f f e c t i v e l y ,
often an
ext r emel y short r ange . I t was
reported, f or exampl e,
that i n t h e bat t l e
at Benheim1704) , t he
Br i t i sh di d not f i r e
t hei r f i r s t vol l ey
u n t i l t hei r l eadi ng
br i gadi er t ouched t he
French
bar r i cades w t h h i s swor d .
Needl ess
t o s a y , t he successf ul
appl i cat i on of l i near t a c t i c s
r equi r ed
sol di ers t o f ace such
r i g o r s .
Freder i ck t he Great , t he Prussi an
sol di er - ki ng, once
opi ned
that h i s men t f ear
t hei r o f f i c e r s r than
t hei r
uropeanarmes
even mnor br eaches
Sol di ers coul d bef l ogged
t o deat h onorders fromhei r
o f f i c e r s
( ho ere
most l y ber of t he n o b i l i t y )
w t h t he o f f i c i a l
causeof deat h
l i s t e d as "di ed byact of God "
Suchwas t he s t a t u s
of o f f i c e r s and
t hei r men
di sci pl i ne and t o t each
t he i n t r i c a t e maneuvers
r equi r ed
by l i near f ormat i ons, d r i l l
was endl ess andexact i ng .
Pr ussi an of f i cers were
noted f or t hei r use of
surveyors'
i nst r ument s t o al i gn and real i gn
r anks d r i l l i n g on parade
gr ounds
of
t he age of
l i near t a c t i c s .
Theresul t s of al l t hese
factors er several . F i r s t ,
as al r eady
ment i oned, armes
er rel at i vel y smal l and er
not drawn
fromhe
bul k of t he popul at i on Si nce
armes consi st ed of
mer cenar i es
andt he dr egs of s oc i e t y ,
t of anat i on' s soci et y
was
i sol at ed fromt s r y except i n
suppor t i ng i t through t ax
l e v i e s
of one sort or anot her . Second, monar hs
hesi t at ed t o
put t hei r
armes a t ser i ous r i s k because
t he t i me and
rebui l di ng
def eat ed ( even vi ct ori ous
4
they   were clumsy  tactical formations, difficult to  deploy  after 
the  march  to   the  battle, and  difficult to   move in  attacking  after 
deployment. The attackers in  eighteenth-century battlefield  
minuets had  to  march, stop, realign   their formation, and then  
march on—often while under ire rom artillery and  
skirmishers-until they  were close enough  to  fire, effectively, 
often  an  extremely  short range. It was reported, fo r example, 
that in  the battle at Blenheim (1704), the  British did  not fire 
their first volley until their leading brigadier ouched the 
French  barricades  with his  sword. 
Needless to  say, the successful appUcation of  linear tactics 
required incredibly disciplined soldiers to face such rigors. 
Frederick the Great, the Prussian soldier-king, once opined
that his men must fear their officers more than  their enemy. 
Harsh  corporal  punishment was universal  in  European  armies 
and was meted out fo r even minor breaches of discipline. 
Soldiers could  be  flogged  to  death  on  orders  from  their  officers 
(who were mostly members of the nobility) with the official 
cause  of  death   listed  as  "died   by   act   of  God." Such  was   the  status 
of    and  their men. 
To instill discipline and to teach the intricate maneuvers 
required  by linear formations, drill  was endless and  exacting. 
Prussian officers were noted or heir use of surveyors' 
instruments o align and realign ranks drilling  n parade 
grounds. Conventional wisdom  held that it took tw o years of 
discipline and practice to  make a good soldier in  the age of 
linear tactics. 
The  results of all  these  factors   were  several. First, as already  
mentioned, armies were relatively small and  were not drawn 
from the bulk of th e population. Since armies consisted of 
mercenaries   and  the  dregs   of  society,  most  of  a   nation's   society 
was  isolated  from  its army  except in supporting it  through  tax 
levies of one sort or another. Second, monarchs hesitated to  
put their  armies at serious riskbecause of   the time and  cost  of 
rebuilding an army should it be defeated even victorious 
 
armes requi red
consi derabl e
" r e b u i l d i n g " a f t e r maj or
b a t t l e s ) .
Thi r d, because armes er sl ow and um rsom t o
maneuver , bot h s i d e s had t o t a c i t l y agree t o f i g h t a b a t t l e .
Ei t her s i d e coul d w t hdraw f a s t e r t han t he other s i d e coul d
depl oy and arc w t h i n f i r i n g r ange . Fourth, war s t ended t o
be sl owmovi ngbecauseof pri mt i vet ransport at i onand suppl y
syst ems and because campai gni ng was usual l y l i mted
t o
went i n t o " i n t e r
q u a r t e r s , "
a
p r a c t i c e t ha t prevai l ed at l eas t t hrough t het i me
of
t he Amer i can C i v i l War .
I n
t erms o f s t r a t e g y , t he ar t o f t he eneral was l i m t e d t o
rather
narrow
c on f i nes , t h a t i s , pr i mar i l y t o t he b a t t l e f i e l d
i t s e l f . Cer t ai nl y l o g i s t i c s were a concern, but t he pr i mary
i n t e r e s t cent ered on t he b a t t l e f i e l d , and by ext ensi on t o t he
pract i ce f i e l d wher di sci pl i ne was i n s t i l l e d and l i near
m ent mast ered. Tobe s u r e , t hevagar i es of i n t e r n a t i o n a l
p o l i t i c s were i mpor t ant , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n choosi ng one' s a l l i e s
and l i m t i n g one' s enemes . But t he hor i zons o f t he s t r a t e g i s t
were l im ted
and t heprocess of
maki ng s t r a t e g y was r e l a t i v e l y
si mpl e by oder st andards .
Of t en i n t e r n a t i ona l p o l i t i c a l
consi derat i ons andb a t t l e f i e l d
s t r a t e g i e s were t he provi nce
of
a s i n g l e person, t he "warr i or
ki ng "
Fr eder i ck t he Gr eat i s an
exc el l e n t exampl e of t h i s phenomenon, a s i s Napol eon Aswe
s ha l l s ee , however , t he s t r a t e g i s t ' s task soon be s o
compl ex t h a t s p e c i a l i s t s were requi red t o di vi det hewor k l oad .
Fo dati on of Moder arf re
TheAmer i can and French revol ut i ons near t he end of t he
ei ght eent h cent ury ret urned i deol ogy
and i t s passi ons t o
war f are . Al t hough t he Amer i can
Revol ut i on preceded i t s
French counterpart, i t was probabl y l e s s
s i g n i f i c a n t i n i t s
i mmedi at e e f f e c t onwar f are
TheAmer i canRevol ut i onwas a
rel at i vel y smal l af f ai r i n a remote cor ner of the
ei ghteent h- cent ury wor l d . Further, i t di d not
generat e t he
m ss emot i onal i sm of t he French Revol ut i on
Hi stor i ans
Third, because armies were low and cumbersome o  
maneuver, both sides had to tacitly agree to fight a battle. 
Either side could withdraw  faster than the other side could 
deploy and   march  within  firing range. Fourth, wars tended  to  
be  slow   moving  because  of   primitive  transportation  and  supply 
systems and because campaigning was usually limited o  
seasons of mild weather. Armies often went nto "winter 
quarters," a   practice  that  prevailed at  least through  the   time  of 
the  American  Qvil  War. 
In terms of strategy, the art of the general was limited to  
rather narrow confines, that is, primarily to the battlefield 
itself. Certainly logistics were a concern, but the primary 
interest centered on the battlefield, and by extension  to  the 
practice ield where discipline was nstilled and linear 
movements  mastered. To   be  sure, the  vagaries of  international 
politics were important, particularly in choosing one's aUies 
and  limiting one's enemies. But the  horizons of   the strategist 
were   limited  and  the  process of  making   strategy  was  relatively 
simple by modern standards. Often international politick 
considerations and  battlefield  strategies were the  province of 
a single  person, th  "warrior king." Frederick the Great is an 
excellent example of   this phenomenon, as  is Napoleon.   As  we 
shall ee, however, he trategist's ask oon become o 
complex  that  specialists  were  required  to  divide  the   work   load. 
Foundations ofModern  Warfare 
The  American and  French revolutions near the end  of  the 
eighteenth century returned ideology and ts passions o  
warfare. Although he American Revolution preceded its 
French counterpart, t was probably less ignificant in its 
immediate effect  on  warfare. The  American  Revolution  was   a 
relatively small affair n a remote corner o f he 
eighteenth-century world. Further, it did no t generate the 
mass emotionalism of the French Revolution. Historians 
 
AKI STRATEGY
est i mat e that onl y about one- t hi r d of meri an
acti vel y
suppor t ed t he revol ut i on, about one- t hi r d opposed
i t , and
The French Revol ut i on, ont he ot her
hand, ws amassi ve
upheaval i n t he cent er of
e t r c i v i l i z a t i o n . I t aroused
f i ercepassi ons andchanged t he
face of war f ar e I n def endi ng
i t s revol ut i on from
reacti onary f orei gn monarchi es,
France
a
i n
arms w t h al arge r recrui t ed f omhe
masses and
mot i vat e byt he passi ons of popul ar nat i onal i sm
Nap l eon l at er
harnessed p ul ar nat i onal i sm f or hi s
purposes and as thus abl e t o f i e l d hugearm es and
t o r epl ace
f earsome
l osses w t h recrui t s suppl i ed bya
nat i on dedi cat ed
t o l i t t l e r than support of i t s r
The meri c and French revol ut i ons
gave t he
ma acauseheconsi der ed
wrthdyi ng f o r i n b a t t l e . Theywere
cruci al st eps on t he
road t o od rn t o t a l war . owever,
anot her revol ut i on, t he i ndust r i al
revol ut i on, had e f f e c t s of at
l east equal i mpor t ance .
Oneof t he f i r s t
e f f e c t s rought b t he i ndust ri al r evol ut i on
was t he mechani zat i on
of t ranspor t at i on by t he advent of
steam r and
t he devel opment of rai l roads . I n t he
Uni ted
States,
t he i mpact of r a i l transport onwar f ar ewas f i r s t
f e l t i n
a maj or way dur i ng t he C i v i l War . Rai l r oads
r api d
al l owed these depl oyed
t obesuppl i ed e f f i c i e n t l y . The
s t r a t e g i s t s ' hor i zons expanded beyondt he
narrowconf i nes of
i ndi vi dual bat t l ef i el ds
t o encompass hol theaters of
oper at i ons, and ometi es
extended t o several w del y
separ at ed theaters .
Ra l r oads, com ned
w t h armes, al so ef f ect i vel y
ended
t he era of t he "deci si ve" bat t l e as t he det erm ner of a
war ' s
out ome Previ ousl y, war s had often consi st ed of l i t t l e
ore than one or two l arge pi t ched bat t l es a f t e r w i ch t he
def eat ed si de sued f or peace . Because rai l r oads al l owed rapi d
r ei nf or cement or r epl acement of def eat ed f orces,
they
any one vi ct ory or def eat l e s s deci si ve . Thus, t he C i v i l
War
6
estimate hat only about one-third of Americans actively 
supported the evolution, about one-third opposed it, nd 
one-third  were neutral. 
The French Revolution, on the other hand, was a massive 
upheaval in the center of Western civilization. t aroused 
fierce passions and changed  the  face of  warfare. In  defending 
its revolution from reactionary foreign monarchies, France 
became  a nation  in  arms   with a   large army   recruited  from  the 
masses and  motivated  by  the  passions of  popular nationalism. 
Napoleon later harnessed popular nationalism o r his 
purposes  and  was thus able  to  field   huge  armies   and  to  replace 
fearsome losses with recruits supplied  by a nation dedicated 
to  little  more than  support of its army. 
The American and French revolutions gave the common 
man  a   cause he   considered   worth  dying fo r  in  battle.  They   were 
crucial steps on the oad to modern total war. However, 
another  revolution, the industrial revolution, had  effects of  at 
least equal importance. 
One  of  the first effects wrought by  the  industrial   revolution 
was the mechanization of transportation by the advent of 
steam  power and  the  development of railroads. In  th e United 
States, the  impact of  rail transport on   warfare  was first felt in 
a major way during he Qvil War. Railroads made apid  
transport of mass armies over great distances possible and 
allowed  these deployed armies to  be  supphed efficiently.  The 
strategists' horizons expanded   beyond  the  narrow  confines of 
individual battlefields o encompass whole heaters of 
operations, and ometimes extended o everal widely  
separated theaters. 
Railroads, combined with mass armies, also effectively 
ended the era of the "decisive" battle as the determiner of a 
war's outcome. Previously, wars had often consisted of little 
more than one or two large pitched battles after which the 
defeated  side sued   fo r  peace. Because   railroads  allowed  rapid 
reinforcement or replacement of defeated forces, they made 
 
STRATEGYINPE SPECTIVE
pr oceeded f o r f our years i n s p i t e of maj or b a t t l e s , any of
whi chm ght previ ousl y havebeendeci si ve .
The const r uct i on, mai nt enance, and
oper at i on of an
ef f ect i ve rai l road
syst em al so r equi r ed a
l arge
i dust r i al
capaci t y, theresources to feed that i ndustry, andconsi derabl e
t echni cal exper t i se
i n r a i l
operat i ons . Thes t r a t e g i s t was agai n
f or ced t o broaden hi s hor i zons, t h i s t i me t o i ncl ude such
"nonm l i t ar y" consi der at i ons as the mobi l i zat i on and
oper at i on of the nat i on' s i ndust ri al i nf rast ructure .
Other products of t he i ndust r i al r evol ut i on al so changed t he
f ace of ar . For exampl e, t he mme bal l (na ed a f t e r t he
French i nvent or aude $ti enn Mni e)
sol ved t he
of
musket s qui ckl y and
w t h i t s devel opment r i f l e d
po be t he st andard f o r
Ci vi l War i nf ant ry . R f l ed po s provi ded f a r greater
accuracy andvast l y i ncr eased ef f ecti ve ranges h ompared
w t h smoothbor musket s, a ci r cumst ance w t h f ar - reachi ng
i mpl i cat i ons . The r i f l e spel l ed t he end of r i g i d l i near t a c t i c s
and f or ced i nf ant ry t o "go t o gr ound" f or survi val . Gr eat er
accuracy a t l ong r ange t i ncr eased c as ua l t i e s , pl aci ng
great er emphasi s onmedi cal servi ces andi ncreasi ng t he need
f or an ef f i ci ent r epl acement syst em or r epl acement s
st rai ned t he troop
t rai ni ng
syst em as wel as t he l o g i s t i c a l
syst em
i ncl udi ng
t he i ndust r i al pr oduct i on r equi r ed t o equi p
newsol di ers . Br eech- l oadi ng eapon ereal so used dur i ng
t he Ci vi l War ( al t hough
general l y
not as st andar d i s s u e ) ,
whi ch
i ncr eased t he aver age rate of f i r e andpl aced great er s t r a i n on
l o g i s t i c a l syst ems and i ndust r i al capaci t y
Al l of these factors l ed o t he est abl i shment of l a y e r s of
subor di nat e t o cont r ol arm es and t he
prol i f erat i on of speci al i zed s t a f f s t o pr ovi de t echni cal
exper t i se ThePrussi ans f i r s t r ecogni zed t he need f o r super i or
s t a f f wor and,
dur i ng t he Napol eoni c War s, establ i shed a
general s t a f f syst em h a t , w t h l a t e r modi f i cat i ons, be t he
t he e ternwor l d ther nat i ons
f ol l owed s u i t , t oone
degr ee or anot her , but f ewequal ed t he syst em
of educat i on
STRATEGY IN  PERSPECTIVE  
proceeded   fo r  four years  in  spite of  many  major