002-star paper corp v. simbol, et. al. g.r. no. 164774, april 12, 2006

7/24/2019 002-Star Paper Corp v. Simbol, Et. Al. G.R. No. 164774, April 12, 2006

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Star Paper Corp. v. Simbol, et. al. G.R. No. 164774 1of

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 164774 April 12, 2006

STAR PAPER CORPORATION, JOSEPHINE ONGSITCO & SEBASTIAN CHUA,Petitioners,

vs.

RONA!O !. SIMBO, "I#RE!A N. COMIA & ORNA E. ESTREA, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PUNO,J.:

e are called to decide an issue of first i!pression" #hether the polic$ of the e!plo$er bannin% spouses fro! #or&in% in the sa!

co!pan$ violates the ri%hts of the e!plo$ee under the Constitution and the 'abor Code or is a valid e(ercise of !ana%e!ent prero%ative

)t bar is a Petition for Revie# on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of )ppeals dated )u%ust *, +- in C)/.R. SP No. 0*-0

reversin% the decision of the National 'abor Relations Co!!ission 1N'RC2 #hich affir!ed the rulin% of the 'abor )rbiter.

Petitioner Star Paper Corporation 1the co!pan$2 is a corporation en%a%ed in tradin% 3 principall$ of paper products. 4osephine On%sitco

its Mana%er of the Personnel and )d!inistration Depart!ent #hile Sebastian Chua is its Mana%in% Director.

5he evidence for the petitioners sho# that respondents Ronaldo D. Si!bol 1Si!bol2, ilfreda N. Co!ia 1Co!ia2 and 'orna E. Estrel

1Estrella2 #ere all re%ular e!plo$ees of the co!pan$.

Si!bol #as e!plo$ed b$ the co!pan$ on October +0, 677*. 8e !et )l!a Da$rit, also an e!plo$ee of th

co!pan$, #ho! he !arried on 4une +0, 6779. Prior to the !arria%e, On%sitco advised the couple that should the

decide to %et !arried, one of the! should resi%n pursuant to a co!pan$ polic$ pro!ul%ated in 677:, viz."

6. Ne# applicants #ill not be allo#ed to be hired if in case he;she has


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5hus, she severed her relationship #ith hi! to avoid dis!issal due to the co!pan$ polic$. On Nove!ber *, 6777, she !et an accide

and #as advised b$ the doctor at the Orthopedic 8ospital to recuperate for t#ent$one 1+62 da$s. She returned to #or& on Dece!ber +

6777 but she found out that her na!e #as onhold at the %ate. She #as denied entr$. She #as directed to proceed to the personnel offic

#here one of the staff handed her a !e!orandu!. 5he !e!orandu! stated that she #as bein% dis!issed for i!!oral conduct. Sh

refused to si%n the !e!orandu! because she #as on leave for t#ent$one 1+62 da$s and has not been %iven a chance to e(plain. 5h

!ana%e!ent as&ed her to #rite an e(planation. 8o#ever, after sub!ission of the e(planation, she #as nonetheless dis!issed b$ th

co!pan$. Due to her ur%ent need for !one$, she later sub!itted a letter of resi%nation in e(chan%e for her thirteenth !onth pa$.

Respondents later filed a co!plaint for unfair labor practice, constructive dis!issal, separation pa$ and attorne$Bs fees. 5he$ averred th

the afore!entioned co!pan$ polic$ is ille%al and contravenes )rticle 6* of the 'abor Code. 5he$ also contended that the$ #er

dis!issed due to their union !e!bership.

On Ma$ *6, +6, 'abor )rbiter Meluiades Sol del Rosario dis!issed the co!plaint for lac& of !erit, viz."


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5he State shall pro!ote the principle of shared responsibilit$ bet#een #or&ers and e!plo$ers, reco%niHin% the ri%ht of labor to its u

share in the fruits of production and the ri%ht of enterprises to reasonable returns on invest!ents, and to e(pansion and %ro#th.

5he Civil Code li&e#ise protects labor #ith the follo#in% provisions"

)rt. 60. 5he relation bet#een capital and labor are not !erel$ contractual. 5he$ are so i!pressed #ith public interest that labo

contracts !ust $ield to the co!!on %ood. 5herefore, such contracts are subect to the special la#s on labor unions, collective bar%ainin

stri&es and loc&outs, closed shop, #a%es, #or&in% conditions, hours of labor and si!ilar subects.

)rt. 60+. In case of doubt, all labor le%islation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safet$ and decent livin% for th

laborer.

5he 'abor Code is the !ost co!prehensive piece of le%islation protectin% labor. 5he case at bar involves )rticle 6* of the 'abor Co

#hich provides"

)rt. 6*. It shall be unla#ful for an e!plo$er to reuire as a condition of e!plo$!ent or continuation of e!plo$!ent that a #o!

e!plo$ee shall not %et !arried, or to stipulate e(pressl$ or tacitl$ that upon %ettin% !arried a #o!an e!plo$ee shall be dee!ed resi%n

or separated, or to actuall$ dis!iss, dischar%e, discri!inate or other#ise preudice a #o!an e!plo$ee !erel$ b$ reason of her !arria%e.

Respondents sub!it that their dis!issal violates the above provision. Petitioners alle%e that its polic$ !a$ appea

to be contrar$ to )rticle 6* of the 'abor Code but it assu!es a ne# !eanin% if read to%ether #ith the firpara%raph of the rule. 5he rule does not reuire the #o!an e!plo$ee to resi%n. 5he e!plo$ee spouses have th

ri%ht to choose #ho bet#een the! should resi%n. >urther, the$ are free to !arr$ persons other than coe!plo$ee

8ence, it is not the !arital status of the e!plo$ee,per se, that is bein% discri!inated. It is onl$ intended to car

out its noe!plo$!entforrelatives#ithinthethirdde%reepolic$ #hich is #ithin the a!bit of the prero%atives o

!ana%e!ent.

It is true that the polic$ of petitioners prohibitin% close relatives fro! #or&in% in the sa!e co!pan$ ta&es the nature of an antinepotis

e!plo$!ent polic$. Co!panies adopt these policies to prevent the hirin% of unualified persons based on their status as a relative, rath

than upon their abilit$. 5hese policies focus upon the potential e!plo$!ent proble!s arisin% fro! the perception of favoritis! e(hibit

to#ards relatives.

ith !ore #o!en enterin% the #or&force, e!plo$ers are also enactin% e!plo$!ent policies specifical

prohibitin% spouses fro! #or&in% for the sa!e co!pan$. e note that t#o t$pes of e!plo$!ent policies involv

spouses" policies bannin% onl$ spouses fro! #or&in% in the sa!e co!pan$ $%o'po(') )*plo+*)% poli-i)', an

those bannin% all i!!ediate fa!il$ !e!bers, includin% spouses, fro! #or&in% in the sa!e co!pan$ $/%

%)poi'* )*plo+*)% poli-i)'.

Jnli&e in our urisdiction #here there is no e(press prohibition on !arital discri!ination, there are t#ent$ state statutes in the Jnit

States prohibitin% !arital discri!ination. So!e state courts have been confronted #ith the issue of #hether nospouse policies viola

their la#s prohibitin% both !arital status and se( discri!ination.

In challen%in% the antinepotis! e!plo$!ent policies in the Jnited States, co!plainants utiliHe t#o theories oe!plo$!ent discri!ination" the i'p/r/)r)/*)%and the i'p/r/) i*p/-. Jnder the i'p/r/) r)/*)

/%/l+'i', the plaintiff !ust prove that an e!plo$!ent polic$ is discri!inator$ on its face. Nospouse e!plo$!e

policies reuirin% an e!plo$ee of a p/ri-(l/r ') to either uit, transfer, or be fired are faciall$ discri!inator

>or e(a!ple, an e!plo$!ent polic$ prohibitin% the e!plo$er fro! hirin% #ives of !ale e!plo$ees, but no

husbands of fe!ale e!plo$ees, is discri!inator$ on its face.

On the other hand, to establish i'p/r/) i*p/-, the co!plainants !ust prove that a faciall$ neutral polic$ has

disproportionate effect on a particular class. >or e(a!ple, althou%h !ost e!plo$!ent policies do not e(press

indicate #hich spouse #ill be reuired to transfer or leave the co!pan$, the polic$ often disproportionatel$ affec


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one se(.

5he state courtsB rulin%s on the issue depend on their interpretation of the scope of !arital status discri!inatio

#ithin the !eanin% of their respective civil ri%hts acts. 5hou%h the$ a%ree that the ter! !arital statu

enco!passes discri!ination based on a personKs status as either !arried, sin%le, divorced, or #ido#ed, the$ a

divided on #hether the ter! has a ro/)r!eanin%. 5hus, their decisions var$.

5he courts %/rro3l+ interpretin% !arital status to refer onl$ to a personKs status as !arried, sin%le, divorced,

#ido#ed reason that if the le%islature intended a broader definition it #ould have either chosen different lan%ua%

or specified its intent. 5he$ hold that the relevant inuir$ is if one is !arried rather than to #ho! one is !arrie

5he$ construe !arital status discri!ination to include onl$ #hether a person is sin%le, !arried, divorced, o

#ido#ed and not the identit$, occupation, and place of e!plo$!ent of oneKs spouse. 5hese courts have uphe

the uestioned policies and ruled that the$ did not violate the !arital status discri!ination provision of the

respective state statutes.

5he courts that have ro/l+construed the ter! !arital status rule that it enco!passed the identit$, occupatio

and e!plo$!ent of oneKs spouse. 5he$ stri&e do#n the nospouse e!plo$!ent policies based on the broale%islative intent of the state statute. 5he$ reason that the nospouse e!plo$!ent polic$ violate the !arital statu

provision because it arbitraril$ discri!inates a%ainst all spouses of present e!plo$ees #ithout re%ard to the actu

effect on the individualKs ualifications or #or& perfor!ance. 5hese courts also find the nospouse e!plo$!e

polic$ invalid for failure of the e!plo$er to present an$ evidence of ('i%)'' %)-)''i+other than the %ener

perception that spouses in the sa!e #or&place !i%ht adversel$ affect the business. 5he$ hold that the absence

such a o%/ i) o--(p/io%/l 5(/lii-/io% invalidates a rule den$in% e!plo$!ent to one spouse due to th

current e!plo$!ent of the other spouse in the sa!e office. 5hus, the$ rule that unless the e!plo$er can prove th

the reasonable de!ands of the business reuire a distinction based on !arital status and there is no better availab

or acceptable polic$ #hich #ould better acco!plish the business purpose, an e!plo$er !a$ not discri!ina

a%ainst an e!plo$ee based on the identit$ of the e!plo$eeBs spouse. 5his is &no#n as the o%/ i) o--(p/io%

5(/lii-/io% )-)pio%.

e note that since the findin% of a bona fide occupational ualification ustifies an e!plo$erBs nospouse rule, the e(ception is interpret

strictl$ and narro#l$ b$ these state courts. 5here !ust be a co!pellin% business necessit$ for #hich no alternative e(ists other than th

discri!inator$ practice. 5o ustif$ a bona fide occupational ualification, the e!plo$er !ust prove t#o factors" 162 that the e!plo$!e

ualification is reasonabl$ related to the essential operation of the ob involvedA and, 1+2 that there is a factual basis for believin% that all

substantiall$ all persons !eetin% the ualification #ould be unable to properl$ perfor! the duties of the ob.

5he concept of a bona fide occupational ualification is not forei%n in our urisdiction. e e!plo$ the standard o

r)/'o%/l)%)'' of the co!pan$ polic$ #hich is parallel to the bona fide occupational ualification reuire!ent.

the recent case of !(%-/% A''o-i/io% o !)/il*/%PTG"O /% P)ro T)-'o% . Gl/o ")ll-o*

Pilippi%)', I%-., #e passed on the validit$ of the polic$ of a phar!aceutical co!pan$ prohibitin% its e!plo$ee

fro! !arr$in% e!plo$ees of an$ co!petitor co!pan$. e held that /la(o has a ri%ht to %uard its trade secret

!anufacturin% for!ulas, !ar&etin% strate%ies and other confidential pro%ra!s and infor!ation fro! co!petitor

e considered the prohibition a%ainst personal or !arital relationships #ith e!plo$ees of co!petitor co!panie

upon /la(oBs e!plo$ees r)/'o%/l) under the circu!stances because relationships of that nature !i%

co!pro!ise the interests of /la(o. In la$in% do#n the assailed co!pan$ polic$, #e reco%niHed that /la(o onl

ai!s to protect its interests a%ainst the possibilit$ that a co!petitor co!pan$ #ill %ain access to its secrets an

procedures.


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5he reuire!ent that a co!pan$ polic$ !ust be r)/'o%/l)under the circu!stances to ualif$ as a valid e(erci

of !ana%e!ent prero%ative #as also at issue in the 6770 case of Pilippi%) T)l)8r/p /% T)l)po%) Co*p/%

. NRC. In said case, the e!plo$ee #as dis!issed in violation of petitionerBs polic$ of disualif$in% fro! #or

an$ #o!an #or&er #ho contracts !arria%e. e held that the co!pan$ polic$ violates the ri%ht a%ain

discri!ination afforded all #o!en #or&ers under )rticle 6* of the 'abor Code, but established a per!issib

e(ception, viz."O, #here the particular reuire!ents of the ob #ould ustif$ the sa!e, but not on th

%round of a %eneral principle, such as the desirabilit$ of spreadin% #or& in the #or&place. ) reuire!ent of th

nature #ould be valid provided it reflects an inherent ualit$ r)/'o%/l+ %)-)''/r+ for satisfactor$ o

perfor!ance. 1Emphases supplied.2

5he cases of !(%-/%and PT&Tinstruct us that the reuire!ent of reasonableness !ust be -l)/rl+established

uphold the uestioned e!plo$!ent polic$. 5he e!plo$er has the burden to prove the e(istence of a reasonab

business necessit$. 5he burden #as successfull$ dischar%ed in Duncan but not in P55.

e do not find a reasonable business necessit$ in the case at bar.

PetitionersB sole contention that the co!pan$ did not ust #ant to have t#o 1+2 or !ore of its e!plo$ees related bet#een the third de%r

b$ affinit$ and;or consan%uinit$ is la!e. 5hat the second para%raph #as !eant to %ive teeth to the first para%raph of the uestioned ru

is evidentl$ not the valid reasonable business necessit$ reuired b$ the la#.

It is si%nificant to note that in the case at bar, respondents #ere hired after the$ #ere found fit for the ob, but #ere as&ed to resi%n #he

the$ !arried a coe!plo$ee. Petitioners failed to sho# ho# the !arria%e of Si!bol, then a Sheetin% Machine Operator, to )l!a Da$r

then an e!plo$ee of the Repac&in% Section, could be detri!ental to its business operations. Neither did petitioners e(plain ho# th

detri!ent #ill happen in the case of ilfreda Co!ia, then a Production 8elper in the Selectin% Depart!ent, #ho !arried 8o#ard Co!

then a helper in the cutter!achine. 5he polic$ is pre!ised on the !ere fear that e!plo$ees !arried to each other #ill be less efficient.

#e uphold the uestioned rule #ithout valid ustification, the e!plo$er can create policies based on an unproven presu!ption of perceived dan%er at the e(pense of an e!plo$eeBs ri%ht to securit$ of tenure.

Petitioners contend that their polic$ #ill appl$ onl$ #hen one e!plo$ee !arries a coe!plo$ee, but the$ are free

!arr$ persons other than coe!plo$ees. 5he uestioned polic$ !a$ not faciall$ violate )rticle 6* of the 'ab

Code but it creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate i!pact theor$, the onl$ #a$ it could pa

udicial scrutin$ is a sho#in% that it is r)/'o%/l)despite the discri!inator$, albeit disproportionate, effect. 5h

failure of petitioners to prove a le%iti!ate business concern in i!posin% the uestioned polic$ cannot preudice th

e!plo$eeBs ri%ht to be free fro! arbitrar$ discri!ination based upon stereot$pes of !arried persons #or&in

to%ether in one co!pan$.

'astl$, the absence of a statute e(pressl$ prohibitin% !arital discri!ination in our urisdiction cannot benefit the petitioners. 5hprotection %iven to labor in our urisdiction is vast and e(tensive that #e cannot prudentl$ dra# inferences fro! the le%islatureBs silen

that !arried persons are not protected under our Constitution and declare valid a polic$ based on a preudice or stereot$pe. 5hus, f

failure of petitioners to present undisputed proof of a reasonable business necessit$, #e rule that the uestioned polic$ is an invali

e(ercise of !ana%e!ent prero%ative. Corollaril$, the issue as to #hether respondents Si!bol and Co!ia resi%ned voluntaril$ has beco!

!oot and acade!ic.

)s to respondent Estrella, the 'abor )rbiter and the N'RC based their rulin% on the sin%ular fact that her resi%nation letter #as #ritten

her o#n hand#ritin%. Loth ruled that her resi%nation #as voluntar$ and thus valid. 5he respondent court failed to cate%oricall$ ru

#hether Estrella voluntaril$ resi%ned but ordered that she be reinstated alon% #ith Si!bol and Co!ia.

Estrella clai!s that she #as pressured to sub!it a resi%nation letter because she #as in dire need of !one$. e e(a!ined the records


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the case and find EstrellaBs contention to be !ore in accord #ith the evidence. hile findin%s of fact b$ ad!inistrative tribunals li&e th

N'RC are %enerall$ %iven not onl$ respect but, at ti!es, finalit$, this rule ad!its of e(ceptions, as in the case at bar.

Estrella avers that she #ent bac& to #or& on Dece!ber +6, 6777 but #as dis!issed due to her alle%ed i!!oral conduct. )t first, she di

not #ant to si%n the ter!ination papers but she #as forced to tender her resi%nation letter in e(chan%e for her thirteenth !onth pa$.

5he contention of petitioners that Estrella #as pressured to resi%n because she %ot i!pre%nated b$ a !arried !an and she could not stan

bein% loo&ed upon or tal&ed about as i!!oral is incredulous. If she reall$ #anted to avoid e!barrass!ent and hu!iliation, she #ould n

have %one bac& to #or& at all. Nor #ould she have filed a suit for ille%al dis!issal and pleaded for reinstate!ent. e have held that i

voluntar$ resi%nation, the e!plo$ee is co!pelled b$ personal reason1s2 to dissociate hi!self fro! e!plo$!ent. It is done #ith th

intention of relinuishin% an office, acco!panied b$ the act of abandon!ent. 5hus, it is illo%ical for Estrella to resi%n and then file

co!plaint for ille%al dis!issal. /iven the lac& of sufficient evidence on the part of petitioners that the resi%nation #as voluntar$, Estrella

dis!issal is declared ille%al.

IN 9IE" "HEREO#, the Decision of the Court of )ppeals in C)/.R. SP No. 0*-00 dated )u%ust *, +-

A##IRME!.

SO OR!ERE!.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Azcuna, and Garcia., JJ., concur.

002-star paper corp v. simbol, et. al. g.r. no. 164774, april 12, 2006

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