TodayisWednesday,June17,2015

RepublicofthePhilippinesSUPREMECOURT

Manila

SECONDDIVISION

G.R.No.85464October3,1991

DAVIDP.LLORENTE,petitioner,vs.THESANDIGANBAYAN(THIRDDIVISION),andPEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,respondents.

PadillaLawOfficeforpetitioner.

SAMIENTO,J.:p

Thepetitionerquestions theDecisionof theSandiganbayan * holding him civilly liable in spite of an acquittal. The facts are notdisputed:

Atty.LlorentewasemployedinthePCA,apubliccorporation(Sec.1,PD1468)from1975toAugust31,1986,whenheresigned.HeoccupiedthepositionsofAssistantCorporateSecretaryforayear,then Corporate Legal Counsel until November 2, 1981, and, finally, Deputy Administrator forAdministrativeServices,FinanceServices,LegalAffairsDepartments....

As a result of a massive reorganization in 1981, hundreds of PCA employees resigned effectiveOctober31,1981.AmongthemwereMr.Curio,Mrs.Perez,Mr.Azucena,andMrs.Javier(TSN,Oct.22/87,p.2Exhs.M2,N1,andO1).TheywereallrequiredtoapplyforPCAclearancesinsupportoftheirgratuitybenefits(Exhs.C,M2,N1,and01).Condition(a)oftheclearanceprovided:

TheclearanceshallbesignedbythePCAofficersconcemedonlywhenthereisnoitemappearingunder"PENDINGACCOUNTABILITY"orafterevery itempreviouslyenteredthereunderisfullysettled.SettlementthereofshallbewritteninREDink.(Exhs.DorD1and1B)

AftertheclearancewassignedbythePCAofficersconcerned, itwastobeapproved,first,byAtty.Llorente,inthecaseofarankandfileemployee,orbyCol.Duefias,theactingadministrator,inthecaseofanofficer,andthenbyAtty.Rodriguez,thecorporateauditor...

NotwithstandingCondition(a)justquoted,theclearancesofMrsPerezandMr.AzucenabothdatedOctober30,1981,were favorablyacteduponby theCPAofficersconcerned, includingMrs.Sotto,actingfortheaccountingdivision,eveniftheclearancesshowedtheyhadpendingaccountabilitiestotheGSISandtheUCPB,andsubsequentlyapprovedbyAttys.LlorenteandRodriguez(Exhs.MandN).Thereafter, the vouchers for their gratuity benefits, also indicating their outstandingobligationswere approved, among others, byAtty Llorente, and their gratuity benefits released to them afterdeductingthoseaccountabilities....

The clearanceof Mrs. Javier of the same date of October 30, 1991 was also signed by all PCAofficers concerned, including Mrs. Sotto even though the former had unsettled obligations notedthereon,viz 'SIS loanP5,387.00andUCPBcar loanP19,705.00, or a total ofP25,092.00, andlater on approveed by Col. Dueas, Mrs Javier being an officer, and Atty. Rodriguez "Exh. (O)".Similariv the, voucherofMrs Javier for hergratuity benefits likewise recitedheraccountabilitiesofP25,092.00plusP92.000.00,whichwashandwritten.Bothaccountsweredeductedfromhergratuity

benefits,andthebalancereleasedtoheronNovember16,1981.ThevoucherpassedpostauditbyAtty.RodriguezonDecember1,1981(Exhs.L,L1,L2,andL3).

The said P92,000.00 was the disallowed portion of the cash advances received by Mr. Curio inconnectionwithhisdutiesas"supercargo"inthedistributionofseednutsthroughoutthecountry.Hereceived them through and in the name of Mrs. Javier from the UCPB. When the amount wasdisallowed, the UCPBwithheld from the PCA certain receivables the latter, in turn, deducted thesameamountfromthegratuitybenefitsofMrs.Javier,shebeingprimarilyliabletherefor(Exhs,L,L1, L2, and L3), At the time of the deduction, the additional liquidation papers had already beensubmittedandwereinprocess.Justincaseshewouldnotbesuccessfulinhavingtheentireamountwipedout, she requestedMr.Curio,whoadmittedly received it, toexecute, ashedid, anaffidavitdatedNovember26,1981,inwhichheassumedwhateverportionthereofmightnotbeallowed...

TheclearanceofMr.CuriodatedNovember4,1981, (Exh.DorD1) likewise favorablypassedallofficers concerned, including Mrs. Sotto, the latter signing despite the notation handwritten onDecember8,1981,thatMr.Curiohadpendingaccountabilities,namely:GSISloan2,193.74,201accountsreceivableP3,897.75,andUCPBloanP3,623.49,oratotalofP10,714.78.However,when theclearancewassubmitted toAtty.Llorente forapproval,herefused toapprove it.For thisreason,theclearancewasheldupinhisofficeanddidnotreachAtty.Rodriguez,...

ThereasongivenbyAtty.LlorentewasthatwhentheclearancewaspresentedtohimonDecember8, 1981, he was already aware of the affidavit dated November 26, 1981, in which Mr. Curioassumedtopayanyresidualliabilityforthedisallowedcashadvances,whichatthetime,December8,1981,stoodatP92,000.00(Exhs.2and2A).Moreover,Mr.Curiohadotherpendingobligationsnoted on his clearance totalling Pl0,714.98 (Exh. 1a). To justify his stand, Atty. Llorente invokedCondition(a)oftheclearance(Exhs.DandIB),which,hesaid,was"verystringent"andcouldnotbeinterpretedinanyotherway...

OnDecember 1, 1982,Mr.Curio brought thematter of his unapproved clearance toCol.Dueas(Exh. G), who referred it to the Legal Department, which was under Atty. Llorente as DeputyAdministrator for legalaffairs.After followup in thatdepartment,Mr.Curio received theanswerofCol.DueasdatedFebruary11,1983,sayingthattheclearancewasbeingwithhelduntiltheformersettledhisallegedaccountability forP92,000.00 reducedalready toP56,000.00 (Exh. I).Mr.CurioelevatedthemattertotheChairmanofthePCABoard,whoindorsedittoCol.Dueas,who,inturn,sentittotheLegalDepartment.Thistimethelatter,throughitsManager,ManuelF.Pastor,Jr.,firstcousin of Atty. Llorente, submitted a formal report under date of August 14, 1986, to the PCAChairman,justifyingtheactiontakenbyAtty.LlorenteandCol.Dueas(Exh.12).ThePCAChairmandidnot respond inwriting,butadvisedMr.Curio towait for the resolutionof theTanodbayanwithwhich he (Mr. Curio) had filed this case initially against Atty. Llorente and, later on, against Col.Duerias also.OnAugust 31, 1986,Atty. Llorente resigned from thePCA the clearance, however,couldnotbeissuedbecause,accordingtothePCACorporateLegalCounsel,ArthurJ.Liquate,thePCAdidnotwanttopreempttheTanodbayan.OnNovember12,1986,thelatterdecidedtoinstitlitethiscaseincourt...

Ninedays thereafter,oronNovember21,1986,Mr.Curioaccomplishedanotherclearance,whichnolongerimposedCondition(a)ofhisearlierclearance(Exh.E).Thenewclearancewasapproved,even ifhestillhadpendingaccountabilities, totallingP10,714.78thathadremainedunsettledsinceDecember1981.Hisvoucherwasalsoapproved,andhisgratuitybenefitspaidtohiminthemiddleof December 1986, after deducting those obligations (Exh. F). Nothing was mentioned anymoreaboutthedisallowedcashadvancesofP92,000.00,whichhadbeenreducedtoP55,000.00...

Between December 1981 and December 1986, Mr. Curio failed to get gainful employment as aresult, his family literally went hungry, In 1981, he applied for work with the Philippine CottonAuthority, but was refused, because he could not present his PCA clearance. The same thinghappenedwhenhesoughtemploymentwiththePhilippineFishMarketingAdministrationinJanuary1982. Inbothprospectiveemployers, the itemapplied forwasP2,500.00amonth.At that time,hewasonlyabout45yearsoldandstillcompetitiveinthejobmarket.Butin1986,beingalreadypast50years,hecouldnolongerbehiredpermanently,therebeingaregulationtothateffect.HispresentemploymentwiththePhilippinePortsAuthority,whichstartedonMarch16,1987,wascasualforthatreason. Had his gratuity benefits been paid in 1981, he would have received a bigger amount,considering thatsince then interesthadaccruedand the foreignexchange rateof thepeso to thedollarhadgoneup...1

OnDecember10,1986,an Information forviolationofSection3(c)of theAntiGraftandCorruptPracticesActwasfiledagainstthepetitioner:

That on or about December 8, 1981 and/or subsequent thereto, inQuezonCity, Philippines, andwithin the jurisdictionof thisHonorableCourt,accusedDavidPastorLlorente,DeputyAdministratorfor thePhilippineCoconutAuthority(PCA),andassuchwasempoweredamongothers toapproveclearancesofemployeesthereat,takingadvantageofhisposition,throughevidentbadfaith,didthenandthere,wilfullyandunlawfullyrefuseto issueacertificateofclearancetoHerminigildoM.Curio,anemployeethereat,whowasforcedtoresignasaresultoftheabolitionofhisitempursuanttothe1981reorganizationofthePCA,resultinginhisdeprivationtoreceivehisgratuitybenefitsamountingtoP29,854.90,andtosecureemploymentwithotherofficestohisdamageandprejudice,andthatofthepublicservice.

CONTRARYTOLAW.

Manila,Philippines,December10,1986.2

As indicatedat theoutset, theSandiganbayanacquitted thepetitioner in theabsenceof anyevidence that heactedinbadfaith.3TheSandiganbayancitedthreeconsiderationsthatprecludedbadfaith:

First,whenAtty.LlorentewithheldfavorableactionontheclearanceonandafterDecember8,1981,therewasstillthepossibility,remotethoughitwaswhenviewedafterthefact,thattheaccountability,which Mrs. Javier was primarily liable therefor and which was fully settled by deduction from hergratuitybenefitsonNovember16,1981(Exhs.L,L1,L2,andL3),wouldbereinstatedandchargeddirectlytoMr.Curio,forthelatterexecutedonNovember26,1981, an affidavit assuming responsibility for the obligation to the extent of the amount finallydisallowed,and theaffidavitwasonDecember8,1981,alreadypendingconsiderationby thePCAmanagement(Exhs.2and2A).

Second, Atty. Llorente was appointed Deputy Administrator for administrative services, financeservices, and legal affairs departments only onNovember 2,1981 (TSN,March 9/87, p. 3). Beingnewinhisjob,itwasbutnaturalthathewaszealousintheperformanceofhisfunctionsinfact,overzealousintheprotectionofthePCAinterests,evenifthatprotectionwasnotnecessary,astheP92,000.00accountabilityhadalreadybeenpaid(SeeExh.12,4thparagraph).

Finally, Atty. Llorente was officiously, though incidentally, taking care also of the interest of Mrs.Javier who, justice and equity demanded, should not be made to shoulder the P92,000.00unliquidatedcashadvances,forthereasonthatitwasMr.Curiowhoadmittedlyspentthemorwho,attheveryleast,shouldbeabletogetreimbursementofwhatshepaid,totallyorpartially,fromhisgratuitybenefits(SeeExh.5,pp.23).4

The Sandiganbayan, as we also indicated earlier, took the petitioner to task civilly, and ordered him to pay"compensatorydamages" in thesumofP90,000.00.According to theSandiganbayan, thepetitionerwasguiltynonethelessofabuseofrightunderArticle19oftheCivilCodeandasapublicofficer,hewasliablefordamagessufferedbytheaggrievedparty(underArticle27).

Thepetitionerclaims that theSandiganbayan'sDecision iserroneouseven if theSandiganbayanacquittedhimtherein,becausehewasneverinbadfaithasindeedfoundbytheSandiganbayan.

Under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, amending Rules 110 through 127 of the Rules of Court, thejudgment of the court shall include, in caseof acquittal, and unless there is a clear showing that the act fromwhichthecivilliabilitymightarisedidnotexist,"afindingonthecivilliabilityoftheaccusedinfavoroftheoffendedparty."5Theruleisbasedontheprovisionsofsubstantivelaw,6thatifacquittalproceedsfromreasonabledoubt,acivilaction,liesnonetheless.

Thechallenged judgment found that thepetitioner, in refusing to issueacertificateofclearance in favorof theprivateoffendedparty,HerminigildoCurio,didnotactwith"evidentbadfaith,"oneoftheelementsofSection3(e)ofRepublicActNo.3819.7Weagreewithtilejudgment,insofarasitfoundlackofevidentbadfaithbythepetitioner,forthereasonscitedthereinbasicallv, because the petitioner was acting within the bounds of law in refusing to clear Curio although "[t]he practice was that the clearance wasneverthelessapproved,andthentheamountoftheunsettledobligationwasdeductedfromthegratuitybenefitsoftheemployee."8

WealsoagreewiththeSandiganbaya(althoughtheSandiganbayandidnotsayit)thatalthoughthepetitionerdidnotactwithevidentbadfaith,heactedwithbadfaithnevertheless,forwhichheshouldrespondfordamages.

Therecordsshowthat theofficepractice indeed in thePhilippineCoconutAuthoritywas toclear theemployee

(retiree) and deduct his accountabilities from his gratuity benefits. There seems to be no debate about theexistence of this practice (the petitioner admitted it later on) and in fact, he cleared three employees on theconditionthattheirobligationsshouldbedeductedfromtheirbenefits.9Wequote:

Confrontedwiththeseevidence(sic),Atty.Llorenteconceded,albeitgrudgingly,theexistenceofthepracticebytheaccountingdivisionofnotcomplyingwithCondition(a).He,however,claimedthathelearnedofthepracticeonlyduringthetrialofthecaseandthathemusthaveinadvertentlyapprovedtheclearancesofMrs.Perez,Mr.Azucena,andpossiblyotherswhoweresimilarly situated (TSN,March9/88,pp.45).Thistheevidencebelies.First,hehimself testified thatwhen theclearanceofMr.CuriowaspresentedtohiminDecember1981,italreadyborethesignatureofMrs.SottooftheaccountingdivisionandthenotationsetoppositehernameabouttheoutstandingaccountabilitiesofMr.Curiobuthe (Atty.Llorente) significantlydidnotaskherwhyshesigned theclearance (TSN,Nov. 24/87, pp. 2425). Second, in that month, Atty. Llorente approved Mrs. Perez's and Mr.Azucena's vouchers showing that hey has pending obligations to the GSIS and the UCPB, whichwerebeingdeductedfromtheirgratuitybenefits.Attachedtothosevouchersweretheclearancesassupporting documents (Exhs. M2 and N1 TSN, Dec. 7/87, pp. 13,23). And third, in the samemonth, Atty. Llorente was already aware of the cae ofMrs. Javier whose clearance and voucherwere, according to him, preciselywithheld because of her unsettled accountability for the cashadvancesofP92,000.00,buthere laterongivenduecourseandhergratuitybenefitsreleasedonNovember16,1981,minusthatamount(TSN,Nov.24/87,pp.3132Exhs.L,L1,L2andL3).

The cash advances of P92,000.00 were the primary obligation of Mrs. Javier, since they weresecured through her and in her name from the UCPB. That was why they were charged to anddeducted from,hergratuitybenefits.Consequently,asearlyas thatdateand inso faras thePCAandtheUCPBwereconcerned,theaccountabilitywasalreadyfullypaid.TheassumptionofresidualliabilitybyMr.CurioforthecashadvancesonNovember26,1981,wasamatterbetweenhimandMrs.Javier(Exhs.2and2A).10

ThegeneralruleisthatthisCourtisboundbythefindingsoffactoftheSandiganbayan.11

Aswesaid,theactsofthepetitionerwerelegal(thatis,pursuanttoprocedures),asheinsistsinthispetition,yetitdoesnotfollow,aswesaid,thathisactsweredoneingoodfaith.Foremphasis,hehadnovalidreasonto"golegal" all of a sudden with respect to Mr. Curio, since he had cleared three employees who, as theSandiganbayan found, "were all similarly circumstanced in that they all had pending obligations when, theirclearanceswerefiledforconsideration,warrantingsimilarofficialaction."12

TheCourtisconvincedthatthepetitionerhadunjustlydiscriminatedagainstMr.Curio.

Itisnodefensethatthepetitionerwasmotivatedbynoillwill(agrudge,accordingtotheSandiganbayan),sincethe facts speak for themselves. It is no defense either that he was, after all, complying merely with legalproceduressince,asweindicated,hewasnotasstrictwithrespecttothethreeretiringotheremployees.Therecanbenootherlogicalconclusionthathewasactingunfairly,nomore,noless,toMr.Curio.

It istheessenceofArticle19oftheCivilCode,underwhichthepetitionerwasmadetopaydamages,togetherwithArticle27,thattheperformanceofdutybedonewithjusticeandgoodfaith.InthecaseofVelayovs.ShellCo.ofthePhilippines,13weheldthedefendantliableunderArticle19fordisposingofitspropertvaperfectlylegalactinordertoescapethereachofacreditor.Intwofairlymorerecentcases,Sevillavs.CourtofAppeals14andValenzuelavs.CourtofAppeals,15weheldthataprincipalisliableunderArticle19interminatingtheagencyagain,alegalactwhenterminatingtheagencywoulddeprivetheagentofhislegitimatebusiness.

WebelievethatthepetitionerisliableunderArticle19.

The Court finds the award of P90,000.00 to be justified bv Article 2202 of the Civil Code, which holds thedefendant liable for all "natural and probable" damages. Hennenegildo Cunct presented evidence that as aconsequenceofthepetitioner'srefusaltoclearhim,hefailedtolandajobatthePhilippineCottonAuthorityandPhilippineFirstMarketingAuthority.Healso testified thata job ineitherofficewouldhaveearnedhimsalaryofP2,500.00 a month, or P150,000.00 in five years. Deducting his probable expenses of reasonably aboutP1,000.00amonthorP60,000.00infiveyears,thepetitioneroweshimatotalactualdamagesofP90,000.00

WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,thePetitionisDENIED.Nopronouncementastocosts.

ITISSOORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, MelencioHerrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, GrioAquino,Medialdea,RegaladoandDavide,Jr.,JJ.,concur.

#Footnotes

1Rollo,6266.

2Id.,4950.

3Inthecaseofmejoradavs.Sandiganbayan,Nos.5706572,June30,1987,151SCRA399,theCourtcitedthreeelementsmakingupviolationsofSection3(e)oftheAntiGraftLaw:"First,thattheaccusedmustbeapublicofficerchargedwiththedutyofgrantinglicensesorpermitsorotherconcessions.Petitionercontendsthatinasmuchasheisnotchargedwiththedutyofgrantinglicenses,permitsorotherconcessions,thenheisnottheofficercontemplatedbySection3(e).

Section3citedaboveenumeratesinelevensubsectionsthecorruptpracticesofanypublicofficersdeclaredunlawful.Itsreferenceto"anypublicofficer"iswithoutdistinctionorqualificationanditspecifiestheactsdeclaredunlawful.WeagreewiththeviewadoptedbytheSolicitorGeneralthatthelastsentenceofparagraph(e)isintendedtomakecleartheinclusionofofficersandemployeesofofficesorgovernmentcorporationswhich,undertheordinaryconceptof"publicofficers"maynotcomewithintheterm.Itisastrainedconstructionoftheprovisiontoreaditasapplyingexclusivelytopublicofficerschargedwiththedutyofgrantinglicensesorpermitsorotherconcessions.

Thefirstelement,therefore,ofSection3(c)isthattheaccusedmustbeapublicofficer.This,theinformationsdidnotfailtoallege.

Second,thatsuchpublicofficercausedundueinjurytoanyparty,includingtheGovernment,orgaveanyprivatepartyunwarrantedbenefits,advantageorpreferenceinthedischargeofhisofficialadministrativeorjudicialfunctions.

PetitionerdeniesthattherewasinjuryordamagecausedtheGovenimentbecausethepaymentswereallegedlymadeonthebasisofadocumentsolelymadebytheHighwayDistrictEngineertowhichpetitionerhadnohandinpreparing.Thefact,however,isthatthegovernmentsufferedundueinjuryasaresultofthepetitioner'shavinginflatedthetrueclaimsofcomplainantswhichbecamethebasisofthereportsubmittedbytheHighwayDistrictEngineertotheRegionalDirectoroftheDepartmentofHighwaysandwhicheventuallybecamethebasisofpayment.Hiscontentionthathehadnoparticipationisbeliedbythefactthatasarightofwayagent,hisdutywaspreciselytonegotiatewithpropertyownerswhoareaffectedbyhighwayconstructionsforthepurposeofcompensatingthem.

Onthepartofthecomplainants,theinjurycausedtothemconsistsintheirbeingdivestedofalargeproportionoftheirclaimsandreceivingpaymentinanamountevenlowerthantheactualdamagetheyincurred.Theyweredeprivedofthejustcompensationtowhichtheyareentitled.

Third,theinjurytoanyparty,orgivinganyprivatepartyanyunwarrantedbenefits,advantageorpreferencewasdonethroughmanifestpartiality,evidentbadfaithorgrossinexcusablenegligence."(Supra,405406.)

4Rollo,Id.,.72.

5RULESOFCOURT,Rule120,sec.2.

6CIVILCODE,art.29.

7SeeMejoradavs.Sandiganbayan,supra.

8Rollo,Id.,53,

9Id.,70,71,75.

10Id.,7071.

11Castillovs.Sandiganbayan,Nos.5235257,June20,1987,151SCRA425.

12Rollo,Id.,71.

13120Phil.187(1956).

14Nos.L4118283,April15,1988,160SCRA171.

155G.R.No.83122,October19,1990,190SCRA1.

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