00485-riaa v verizon complaint

8/14/2019 00485-riaa v verizon complaint

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IN mE UNITED STATESDISTRICT COURTFOR THE DISTRICTOF COLUMBIA

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rnRE:VERIZON llIorrERNET SERVICES. INC.SubpoenaEnforcement Matter

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RECORDING NDUSTRYASSOCIATIONOF AMERICA1330ConnecticutAvenue,N.W. Ste.300Washington,D.C. 20036 Miscellaneous ctionCaseNo.1 :O2MSOO323.VERIZON ~TERNET SERVICES, NC.1880CampusCommonsDriveReston,VA 20191

MOTION TO ENFORCE JULY 24, 2002 SUBPOENA SSUEDBY THIS COURT TO VERIZON INTERNET SERVICES, INC.AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORTTHEREOFThe Recording Industry Association of America ("RIM 'j, as authorized representative or

its member companies, espectfully submits this motion to enforce the subpoena ssued o VenzonInternet Services, nc. ("Verizon") on July 24~2002 by this Court under 17 U.S.C. 512(h) of theDigital Millemlium Copyright Act ("DMCA "). The subpoenaseeks imited infoxmation relating toa computer connected o the Verizon network that is a hub for significant music piracy. Verizon isthe only entity that can identify the infringer behind this computer.

The specialsubpoena uthorityof the DMCA. 17 U.S.C. 512(h). mposes .mandatory,unconditional duty on mtemet service providers such as Verlzon to provide "expeditiously," upon


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receiptof a subpoena,nfOmlationsufficient o identify usersof their networkswho arepiratingcopyrighted works. RIM complied with all of the requirementsof the statuteand obtained a validly

Thus,RIM requestshat thisssued ubpoenarom this Court. Verizonhas efused o comply.Court enteran ordercompellingVerizon o comply. Given the urgentneedofRIAA's copyrightholders o stop the piracy of their intellectual property, RIM further requests,by a separateMotionto Expedite, that the Court expedite briefing and decide the issue as soon as possible.

LEGAL FRAMEWORKThis is a straightforward subpoenaenforcementaction. The Digital Millennium Copyright

Act of 1998 ("DMCA'j, Pub. L. No.l0S-304, 112 Stat. 2860, createsa special subpoenaauthoritythat requires "service providers," such as Verizon, to respond o subpoenasssuedby United StatesDistrict Courts at the request of copyright owners seeking nformation sufficient to identify those

The tcnns of the statuteand tsommitting copyright nfringement. See17 U.S.C. S12(h).requirements are clear and require little further analysis. Because,however, Verizon seeks o graftconditions and imitations on the subpoenaauthority that do not appear n the text of Section 512(h)and are nconsistent with the purpose of the DMCA, additional backgroundon the statutory schememay be of assistanceo the Court.

Congressenacted he DMCA because he Internet has revolutionized he ~way thatcopyrighted works are disseminated,both lawfully and unlawfully. Virtually any cop)lTightedworkcannow be put in a digital format) and hus canbe copied and distnouted worldwide instantaneously.This can be a greatbenefit, but also eavescopyrightedworks susceptibleo "massivepiracy."S. Rep. No.1 05-190, at 8 (1998). Congresswas concerned hat, unless copyright owners have the

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"hesitate o make heir works readily availableon the nternet..' d.Title n of the DMCA seeks o ensure hat cop.)Tight wners are able to protect their

intellectual property and o give them enhancedability to quickly and effectively deal with copyrightinfringement on the Internet. It does so in two ways:

The DMCA createsa specialsubpoenaubpoenaAuthority under Section 512(h).provision that allows copyright owners o obtain nfonnation quickly concerning he dentity of thosewho are rifringing their copyrights on the Internet. Pursuant o 17 U.S.C. S12(h), District Courtsare authorized, at the requestof copyright owners, to issue subpoenas o Internet or on-line serviceproviders ("service providers") where the copyright owner has a good faith belief that infringementis occurring and needsadditional infonnanon to identify the alleged nfringer. 512(h). The logic

Often the serviceehind his provision s obvious. On the mtemet. dentities can be hidden.provider through whom an individual engaging n infringement obtains network access s the onlyentity that can dentifj the individual. Without this critical information, the copyright owner cannotdeal directly with the person rafficking in pirated worlcs.

Under Section512(h), CC[] copyright owner or person authorized o act on the owner's behalfmay request he clerk of any United Statesdistrict court to issue a subpoena o a serviceprovider foridentificationof an alleged nfringer n accordance ith this subsection," 512 (h)(l). To obtaina subpoena. nder Section 512(h). the copyright owner or its agentmust supply a "swom declarationto the effect that the purpose or which the subpoena s sought s to obtain the identity of an alleged

infringer and that such nformation will only be used or the purpose of protecting rights under thistitle." 512(h)(2)(C). The copyright owner must also file oca opy of the notification described n

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subsection 512] (c)(3)(A).t' 5 12(h)(1)(H). Subsection c)(3)(A) is a freestandingprovision of theDMCA that is referenced n several different subsections f the statute. It provides the elements ofan effective notification to a service provider that itS network is being usedby others for cop}Tightinfringementand riggers he serviceprovider'sobligationsunder he various subsections f thestatute. The notice provisions require, among other things, that the copyright owner, or its agent,identify the material being infringed, attest o its ownershipof the material, state ts good faith beliefthat the complained-ofuse is unauthorized, and provide infonnation sufficient to allow the serviceprovider to locate the material and, f appropriate,emove or disableaccess o the material S12(c)(3)(A). By substantially complying with the elementsof subsection c)(3)(A), the copyrightowner or its agent has established he bona fides of its ownership and claim of infringement. See 512(c)(2)(B)(i).

Upon receipt of the appropriate documentation, he DMCA requires hat the clerk issue he 512(hX4) {"If the notification filed satisfies he provisions ofsubpoena expeditiously,"

subsection cX3)(A), the proposed subpoena s in proper Conn,and the accompanying declarationis properly executed. he clerk shall expeditiously ssueand sign the proposed subpoenaand returnit to the requesteror delivery o the SelVice rovider."). Once ssued. he subpoena ompels heservice provider to disclose 4information sufficient to identify the alleged nfringer of the materialdescribedn the notification to the extentsuch nfoImation s available o the serviceprovider." S12(h)(3).

To achieve ts PUIPOse,ection 5 12(h)subpoenasmust bear ruit quickly. A copyright holderbas no recourseagainsta copyriiht pirate f it cannot dentify and ocate he ndividual. A pirate whois able o avoid identificationcan continue nfringing, hus mpairing he value of the copyright

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holder's intellectual property. Given the nature of the Internet, an individual user can cause iterallytens of thousandsof infringing copies to be distributed in a single day. Thus, Congressemphasizedthe need or expedition. Section 512(h) makesclear that the District Court clerk shall "expeditiouslyissue" the requestedsubpoena f all of the requirements are met and that, upon receipt, the serviceprovider "shall expeditiously disclose to the copyright owner or personauthorizedby the copyrightowner the information required by the subpoena,notWithstanding any other provision of law andregardlessof whether he service provider responds o the notification." 512(hX5). The legislativehistory of Section 512(h) describes ssuanceof the subpoenaas a "ministerial" act, and emphasizesthat t mustbe "perfonnedquickly for this provision o have ts intended ffect" S. Rep. 105-190at 51.

The Safe Harbor Provisions. In addition to the subpoenaprovisions under Section 5 12(h),Title II of the DMCA '~reserves trong ncentives or serviceprovidersand copyrightowners ocooperateo detectand dealwith copyright nfringementshat takeplace n the digital networkedenvironment.S. Rep. 105-190 t 40. To that end,Congress stablished varietyof safeharborsfor service providers o limit their own liability for copyright infringement "for 'passive,' automaticactions n which the service provider's systemengages hrough a technological process nitiated byanotherwithout the knowledgeof the serviceprovider." ALSScan, nc. v. RemarqCommunities,Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4~ Cir. 2001).1

lEachsafeharborappliesnarrowly o situationswhereservice rovidersareengagingnspecific unctions, uchas outing or transmittingdigital networkcommunicationssubsection(a)); system aching subsectionb); infomlation storing subsectionc; andprovidingsearchtools or infonnationon the ntemet subsectiond. S. Rep. 105-190 t 19-20. Whenengagingin oneof thosespecific unctionsandcomplyingwith the precise equirements f the relevantsubsection,he serviceprovidercannotbe held iable (as a resultof engagingn the specified-5-


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The safe harbor provisions do not alter the substantive oles of copyright infringement or

contrary, the safe harbor provisions are designed o induce service providers to work together withcopyright owners to identify infringers by providing some measureof certainty to innocent serviceproviders that they-.will not .be-held inancially responsible or infringement that occurs over theirnetworks,so ong as hey comply with the specificconditionsof the safeharbors. n order o fallwithin several of the safe harbors, service providers must assistcopyright owners by, for example,removing or disabling access o infringing material once hey arenotified of cop)orightnfringement.2See, .g. 512(b)(2)(E); 512(c)(lXC); 512(d)(3).To qualifyforanyofthesafebarbors, serviceprovider must also have n place a policy "for the tennination n appropriate ircumstances fsubscribers nd accountholders of the serviceproviders' systemor network who are repeatinftingers." 17 U.S.C. 5 12(i)(1XA). But the "DMCA's protection ofan innocent service providerdisappears t the moment he serviceprovider oses ts innocence,.e., at the moment t becomesaware hat a third party is using its system o infringe." ALS Scan, 239 F 3d at 625.

The scopeof the various DMCA safeharbors s not at issue n this case-only the subpoenaThe safe harbor provisions, however, work together withuthority n SectionS12(h) s relevant.

the subpoena uthority n Section512(h) and all of the provisionsof the DMCA to promote hedevelopmentof the Internet and to ensureeffective protection for intellectual property in the digital

function) for monetary relief for copyright infringement and can be subjected o injunctive reliefonly as specified in Section 5120).2Serviceproviders must comply with their obligations under several of the safe harborsany time they have actual knowledge that infringement is occurring, regardlessof whether theyhave ~eived a formal notification from the cop.vnghtowner. See,e.g., 512(d)(lXA).

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world. Nothing n the DMCA creates shield or thosedirectly nvolved n disseminating iratedworks or other violations of the copyright aws. That was not who Congress ought o protect;ind~d, the entiretyof the DMCA is designedo ensurehat such nfringerscanbe dentified andforced to face appropriate penalties.

THE VERIZON SUBPOENAOn July 24, 2002, RIAA obtained a subpoena, ssued by this Comt pursuant o 17 U.S.C.

512(h), ordering Verizon to disclose infolmation sufficient to Pemlit identification of an allegedcopyright infringer operating from a specified IP (Internet Protocol) address. See July 24, 2002,Subpoena o Verizon h1temetService, Inc. ("Subpoena.') (Attachment A). The Subpoena equestson!y information sufficient to identify the ndividual subscriberwho is trafficking in pirated material- that s, the subscriber's ame.address, nd elephone umber. RIM delivered he SubpoenaoVerlzon in conjunctionwith the documentationequiredby S12(h)(2)(C), ncluding a letternotifying Verizon that lUAA believed a computer on V erizon' s internet servicewas distributing tothe public for downloadunauthorized opiesof hundreds f copyrighted ound ecordings wnedby RIM member companies. SeeLetter from JonathanWhitehead, Vice Presidentand Anti-PiracyCO1.UlSelfRiAA, to Lauren K. Crowder, ContractsManager ofVerizon Internet Services, nc., ofJuly 24, 2002.at 1 ("Notification Letter") (Attachment ). The etterspecified he computer's Faddressand attacheddocumentation ncluding a list of the recordings available for download fromthat computer. RIAA also provided a declaration ndicating the basis or the issuance f theSubpoena nd a statement, nderpenaltyof peljury. that the infolmation obtainOOtom Venzonwould only be used or '~rotecting the [intellectualproperty] ights" of RlAA's members. See

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Declarationof JonathanWhiteheadat 1 ("WhiteheadDeclaration") AttachmentC). RIAArequestedVerlzon's ""immediateassistance n stopping his unauthorized activity." Id.

V won refused o comply with the Subpoena.SeeLetter sent by ThomasM: Dailey,GeneralCounsel ofVerizon mtemet Services nc., to JonathanWhiteheadof Aug. 6, 2002 ("VerizonLetter") (Attachment D). Verizon assertedhat because[0]0 files of the Customerare hosted,storedor cached y [Verizon]," it neednot respondo the Subpoena.d. at 2. RIM responded yletter, explaining that V erizon s argumentsprovided no basis or ignoring a subpoena ssuedunderSection 5 12(h). SeeLetter from Cary Sherman,GeneralCounselofRIAA, to Thomas M. Dailey ofAug. 9, 2002 (AttachmentE). Subsequentonversationsetween fficials at RIM andVerizonhave failed to resolve his matter, and RIAA has nfonned Verizon that it would be filing thismotion.

AccordinglYt RIAA invokes this Court's jurisdiction pursuant o 17 U.S.C. 512(h)(6) andFed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(2)(B) to obtain an order to compel the production of the subpoenaedinfonnation within 24 hours of the issuanceof an order from this Court.

ARGUMENTSection512(h)of the Digital Millennium CopyrightAct is crystalclear. Wherea service

provider receivesa subpoena alidly issuedunderSection512(h), "the serviceprovider shallexpeditiouslydisclose o the copyright owner or personauthorized y the copyright owner theinformation equiredby the subpoena, otwithstanding nyother provision of law." S12(h){5)(emphasisadded). The Subpoenaat issue n this casewas validly issuedby this Court, and RIAAcompliedwith all of the requirements f the statute.

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Venzon hasnot raisedany ssuewith respect o the form or validity of the Subpoena ralleged that compliance with the Subpoena s burdensome. Rather, Verizon has argued hat it cannever be required to provide information in a casesuch as his because, n its view, the DMCA doesnot allow a subpoena o be issuedunless he Verizon subscribercommitting copyright infringementusing V erizon' s network is actuallystonng.iUegatmaterialon serversowned or operatedby Verizon.

That claim ignores he plain language f the statute.as well as ts legislativehistory andpurpose, and would gut an important tool that Congressgave to copyright owners to protect theirintellectualproperty. Indeed,Verlzon's responseo the Subpoena onfuseswo totally differentthings: its duty as a seIvice provider to remove or disable access o infringing matmal upon notice(which is required n order to maintain imitations on its own liability under the safe harborprovisions)and ts obligation o respond o a validly issuedsubpoenaundersubsection h toprovide he nformation hat copyrightownersneed o addressnfringementbeing committedby

It is straightfo~ and entirelythers. The latter obligation s the only one at issuehere.ind~dent of whetherVerizon s eligtole or a safeharbor or itself. Upon receiptof a subpoenaunderSection512(h), he serviceprovider mustprovide he identifying nformation. This CourtshouldcompelVenzon o do exactly hat.

THE DMCA REQUIRES THAT INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS SUCH ASVERIZON EXPEDffiOUSL Y PRODUCETHE INFORMA nON REQUESTEDBYA SUBPOENA SSUED UNDER SECTION 512(h).L

Statutoryanalysisbeginswith the text. United Statesv. Braxtonbrown-Smith, 278 F.3d 1348,1352 D.C. Cir. 2002) citati,ons mitted); Ullit~ Slaw v. Wilson.290 F.3d 347. 352 (D.C. Cir.2002). "Wh~ the language s clear, that is the end of judicial inquiry iI1 all but the most

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extraordinary circumstances." Braxtonbrown-.)mith, 278 F 3d at 1352 quotation marks and citationomitted). The plain languageof the DMCA (reinforcedby its legislativehistory and purpose)compelsVerizon o produce he nfonnation equestedn this Court's Subpoena.

Section512(h) of the DMCA Applies to ServiceProviders, Like Verizon..Section 512(h) of the DMCA provides that a copyright owner may ask any district court "to

issue a subpoena o a service provider for identification of an alleged nfringer in accordancewiththis subsection." 512(h)(1) emphasis dded).A "serviceprovider," or purposes f 512(h). sbroadly defmedas "a provider of online services r networkaccesst r the operatorof facilitiestherefor." 512(k)(1)(B); see alsoALS Scan,239 F.3d at 623 ("The Act defines a service providerbroadly.'); H. Rep. No.1 OS-551 fl) at S4 1998) (definition or"service provider" includes hosewho'~rovide Internet access,e-mail," etc.). Section 512(h) applies o all "service providers" regardlessof what functions he serviceprovider may be performing. Here,Verizon concedeshat it is a"service provider," V enzon Letter at 2.3 Venzon is unquestionablyproviding "network access" othe subscriber eferenced n the Subpoena. It thus s subject to the subpoenaprovisions of Section512(h).

~e term "serviceprovider" s defined n 17U.S.C. 512(k). Section512(k) defines"serviceprovider" n two ways:onedefinitionwhich s applicable nly to Section5 12(a)'ssafeharbor,see 17U.S.C. 512(kXIXA), anda broader efinitionwhich s applicableo theremainder f Section512, ncluding Section512(h),see17 U.S.C. 512(k)(1)(B). The atterdefinition expressly ncompassesll entities hat all within the omler. See17U.S.C. 512(k)(1)(B);H. Rep.No. lOS-551(ll)at 54. In seekingo claim t falls within the safeharbordefined n 512(a),Venzon necessarilymustadmit t is a "serviceprovider." V erizonLetter at2. That concessionmeans hat t is a "serviceprovider" or purposes f the rest of Section512,including he subpoena rovisionsof Section512(h).-10-


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B. The DMCA's Procedure$For Issuing A SubpoenaTo Verizon Were Met InThis Case.Under the DMCA, a copyright owner, or its agent, must provide three things in order for a

subpoenao issue:a notification describedn subsection c)(3)(A), a proposed ubpoenan theproper fonn, and "a sworn declaration o the effect that the purpose or which the subpoena s soughtis to obtain he dentity of an alleged nfringer and hat such nfonnarionwill only be used or thepmpose f protecting ights under his title," 512(h)(2Xc).RIAA met all three equirements.

RIAA provideda proposed ubpoenan the proper orm, which was ssuedby the DistrictCourt clerk, aswell as a declaration addressing he ssuesdiscussed n the statute. SeeAttaclunentsA & C. RIM alsoprovideda notification ncluding all of the elements f 512(cX3)(A). SeeAttachmentB. RIAA's notification ncluded,amongother hings, a list of literally hundreds finfringing works that were being offered for download by Verizon's subscriberand he dentificationof the specific location from which the alleged nfringer was operating- an P address f a Verlzonsubscriber. From that.IP address, he alleged nfringer is using accessobtained through Verlzon' snetwork o sendand eceiveunauthorized opiesof copyrightedmaterial.The nfornlationRIAAprovided tells Verizon exactly where o find this computer and dentifies preciselywhere heinfringing material is located.4 Verizon needsno additional information to identify this subscriber.

The Subpoenaseeksonly a minimum amountof infonnation. It merely requires hat Verizonprovide dentifying information.such as a name,address, nd telephone umber. Verizon cancomply with the subpoena n a matter of seconds. But unless t does so, RIAA members will have

4RlAA alsoprovided he dateand ime of its evidence f infringing activity so hat herecanbe no mistakeas o who the nfringer actually s (suchas. f a different usersubsequentlyobtained he F addresshat hadbeenused or infringement).~11.


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no ability to seek edress or the nfringing activity that Verizon doesnot - andcannot deny soccurringover ts netWork.

The DMCA RequiresVerizon Expeditiously o ProduceThe InformationRequestedn The Subpoena.

c.Upon receipt of a subpoenaand heno.tification.undersubsection c (3)(A), disclosure of the

requested nfonnation is not optional. Under the DMCA, the service provider "shall expeditiouslydisclose to the copyright owner or personauthorizedby the copyright owner the nfonnation requiredby the subpoena.notwithstanding any other provision of law and regardless of whether the serviceprovider responds o the notification." S12(h)(S)emphasis dded). The words of the statutecould not be more explicit. Thus, regardlessof whether Verizon could itselfbe liable for copyrightinfringementor regardless f whetherVerizon must take other steps n order to maintain thelimitations on liability in the safeharbor provisions of the DMCA. V erizonmust nonetheless omplywith the Subpoena. Moreover. pursuant o Rule 45(c)(2)(B) and Section 512(h)(6), this Court hasthe authority o enforce he termsof the Subpoena ndcompelVcnzon to produce he requestedinfomlation. Compliancewith the subpoenawill requireonly a simple and ministerial act by

The Court should order Verizon to complyerizon,puttingvirtually no burdenon them.immediately n order o allow the rightful cop}rlght owners he opportunity o bring a halt to theunlawful dissemination f their copyrightedworks.

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NONE OF THE ARGUMENTS RAISED BY VERIZON .roS'1'l.II'~ REFUSING TOCOMPLY WITH A SUBPOENAVALIDL Y ISSUED BY THIS COURT.u.In its letter to RIM, Verizon raisesa number of issues hat it claims ustify ignoring a validly

issued ubpoena. eeAttachmentD. All ofVerizon's arguments tem rom ts interpretation f thevarious safeharbor provisions in the DMCA, but those provisions- all of which relate o Verizon'sown liability for copyright infringement - have nothing to do with Verizon's obligation to respondto a subpoena ssuedpursuant o Section S12(h). Moreover, all ofVerizon's arguments ack merit.

Limitation of Liability under Section512(a).Verizon argueshat,becauset believeshatit qualifies for a safe harbor under Section 512(a),5 t is entitled to ignore a subpoena ssued underSection 5 12(h). Verizon Letter at 2. That c!aim finds no support n the text 0 the statute and makesno sense.A selVice rovider s plainly obligated o complywith a subpoena ven f it canvalidlyclaim the protectionof a DMCA safeharbor. " .

Whether a service provider qualifies for the safe harbor in Section S12(a) has nothing to dowith whethera provider must comply with a subpoenassuedby a court under Section512(h).Thoseprovisionsare completelyunrelated.SectionS12(a), n conjunctionwith Sl2(b) - (d),defines the activitie$ or unctions of service providers which may qualify such service providers forpotential safe harbof$ rom being held .'liable for monetary elief. Of, except as provided insubsectionj), for injunctiveor otherequitable elief,for infringement f copyright." ~ 512(a); SRep. 105-190 t 55. Section512(a) h~on1yprotectsa service rovider tom liability for its own

'RlAA takes ssue with Verizon's claim that it falls within the tcrms of the safe harbordefined in Section S12(a). That issue, however, is for another day because t is wholly irrelevantto Verizon's obligation to respond to a subpoena ssued under Section S12(b).-13-


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actions hat may constitute cop)Tight nfringement, not rom responding o a valid subpoenaseekinginformation about another party's alleged copyright infringement.

In contrastt Section S12(h) applies o all serviceproviders. whether or not they fall within thesafe harbor provisions of subsection (a)-(d), and fCiardless of what functions the service provideris perfOllning. The safe harbor provisionsof subsectionsaHd) and he subpoena uthority ofsubsectionh) eachcreate ools to combatpiracy the folmer by encouragingservice providers tocooperatewith copyright owners by disabling accesso infringing material n exchange or receivingliabilitypl'Otection and the atter by giving copyright owners he ability to uncover nformation fromserviceprovidCli that will allow them to pursueappropriateaction againstdirect infringers. To readthe safeharbors as restricting the scopeof the subpoena rovision would make hash of the statutorydesign.

Verizon also contends hat it need not complyubsectionS12(c)(3)(A)Notice Provision.with SectionS12(h)becausehat provision s limited to situationsn which a serviceprovider sstoring infringing material on its network. In Verizon s view, where-as s believed o be he casehere - the alleged nfringer maintains iles on his or her own computer. ather lw1 on serversowned and controlled by the service provider. and uses he serviceprovidats network to distn"butethe inftinging material, a subpoenaunder Section 512(h) can never ssue. Verizon Letter at 2. Thatargument- which seeks o transfonn the notice provisions ofsubsectiOD c)(3XA) into a substantivelimitation that would eviscerate he subpoenaauthority createdunder Section 512(11) has no basis

in the statutory text and is antithetical to the policies Congresssought to advance n the DMCA.

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As an initial matter.Verizon erroneously ssumesmat a copyrightowner can detenninewhether the infringing material that is being offered fur download resides on a computer or serverowned and operatedby Verizon. SeeVerizon Letter at 2-3. But only Verizon knows what computerand what subscriber s at the IP address hat is offering unauthorized material fur download; indeed,only VerizonknowswhetherVerlzon tself ownsor controls hatcomputez:-RIAA nowsonly theunique IP addressof the computer; t provided that information in its Notification Letter to Verizon.Verizon's suggestion hat RIM should provide more specific infonnation ignores he fact that onlyVerlzon s in possession f the nfomlation hat s soughtby the Subpoena nd hat t unilaterallyclaims t shouldnot have o provide.

More mportantly,however, he text of the DMCA refutesVerizon's statutoryarguments.Section 5 12(h) does not limit subpoenas nly to situations where the allegedly infringing materialphysically esideson the serviceproviderstnetwork. SectionS12(h)authorizes ubpoenas"foridentification of an alleged nfringer" and saysnothing about where the alleged nfringing materialresides. 512(h)(1). n~ disclosures mandatorynotwithstanding nyotherprovisionoflaw." S12(hX5). This broad eading s confumedby the legislativehistory, which makesclear hatSection 512(h) was designed o permit "identification of alleged nfringers who areusersof a serviceproviders'system r network." H. Rep.No. 105-551 D) at 60. That s exactlywhat RIAA seekshere.

Further, nothing in subsection512(c)(3)(A) suggests hat the notification provisions createsubstantive imitations on the scopeof any other section.Congress xplained hat subsection(c )(3)(A) establishes "proced~," not substantive imitations. H. Rep. No.1 OS-S51II) at 55. Thecontours of the safe harbors and any limitations on the subpoenaauthority are to be fouud in those

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.

subsections, ot in the notification provisions o which they all refer. Moreover,Congressmadeclear hat strict compliance with the notification provisions was not required; substantialcompliancewas sufficient to trigger all of dle setViceproviders' obligations under the DMCA. See S12(c)(3)(A). CongTCSsxpected service providers and copyright owners "will comply with thefunctional requirementsof the notification provisions." H. Rep. No.1 OS-551 ll) at 56. So ong ascopyright owners urnish infonnation that would assistserviceproviders in understandinghenatureand scopeof the infringement" and n taking appropriate ction, suchas dentifying theinfringing user or disabling access o infringing material, he copyrightowner bas fulfilled itsobligations. d.

Finally the two snippetsof statutory anguage hat Verizon cites or its claim do not remotelysupport ts argument Verizon suggests hat subsectionS12(c (3XA) appliesonly to situations wherethe alleged nfringement nvolves "material that resideson a systemor network controlled oroperatedby or for fa] serviceprovider," Verizon Letterat 2 (emphasis ndbracket n original).That language,quoted and cmphasized n Verlzon's letter, does not appear n subsection512(c)(3)(A) or in Section 512(h). Rather. hat anguage ppears n subsectionS12(cXl) and definesthe terDlSof one of the safe harbor provisions. Thus unmasked,Verizon' s argument s truly bizane- n essence,V crizon argues hat becauseboth Section S12(h) and subsectionS12(c)(l) refermcethe notificationprovisionsof(c)(3)(A), the imitationsof subsection 12(cXl) shouldbe read ntoSection512(h). That makesno sense.

V enzon'8 attempt o graft one of the limitations of the safeharborprovisionsonto the8Ubpoenaauthority ignores that the DMCA createsseparateand distinct obliptions on serviceproviders - they must respond o valid subpoenas n~ if they wish to Im13in within the safe harbor

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to the notification").Verizon also seeks o dressup the samepoint in different clothing by claiming that,because

..

VenzonLetter at 3.As an initial matter, Verlzon's claim that it cannot locate the material rings hollow.

of."the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activitY and that isto be removed or access o which is to be disabled, and nformation reasonablysufficient to pel'IIlit

That Verizon unquestionablyanthe service provider to locate the material"} (emphasisadded).do, oncea copyrightownerprovides asRIAA has the IP address f the nftinger.

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Moreover, the DMCA expresslyprovides that subsection512(cX3)(A)"snotificationprovisionsapply n myriad situations, ncluding hose n which the infringing material doesnotresideon the serviceprovider'snetwork. Subsection 12(c)(3)(A)provides he generai-elementsof notice that are required for three of the safeharbors subsections b), (c). and (d), as well as thesafe harbor for educational nstitutions (subsection g - and for the subpoena..provision f SectionSl2(h). Under subsection d), a copyright owner may give notice pursuant to s.ubsection c)(3)(A)where nfringing material s not on the provider'snetwork but is accessiblehrough use of aninfomlation location tool or searchengine. See 512(d)(3). Similarly, subsection c)(3)(A) noticeis applicablewhere he cop)right owner s notifyina a serviceprovider that it has or is cachinginfringing material, whether or not that material s still being stored by the provider. See 512(b)(2)(E). The draftersof the DMCA wouldnot have eferencedhe notification provisionsof subsection c (3) in eachof thesesubsections as well as he subpoenaprovision found at SectionS12(h if they were not a freestandingprovision defining the elementsof effective notice, applyingwith equal force to situations where the seIViceprovider was not storing infringing files (as alleged

necessary y Vcrizon).6

6verizon's etter raisesoneadditionalafglDIlenthat s not an objection o the subpoena.See Verizon Letter at 3. ft 4-5. V~n argues hat it is not required to tenninate the subscriber'saccesso the hltemct underS~tion 512(i). d. at 3. Onceagain.whetheror not that obligationexists s irrelevant o whetherVerizon s obliged o reveal o the copyrightowner he nameof apersonpursuant o a valid subpoena.

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CONCLUSIONFor the foregoing reasons.RIAA respectfully ~uests that the Court enter an order requiring

Verizon o complywith the subpoenassuedby this Court on July 24, 2002,andgrantsuchotherrelief as s just and appropriate

Respectfully 8ubmi ted,

Of Counsel:BY:-+~~B ~.f4-;,;"DonaldB. Vem11i. r., D.C. Bar No. 420434Thomas . Perrelli,D.C. BarNo. 438929CynthiaJ. Robertson,D.C. BarNo. 472981JENNER& BLOCK, u..c601ThirteenthtI'cet,NW, Suite 1200Washington,D.C. 20005Phone: (202) 639-6000Fax: (202)639-6066

MatthewJ OppenheimStanleyPierre-LouisRECORDING NDUSTRYASSOCIAnON OF AMERICA1330 Connecticut Ave., N. W.Ste.300Washington..C. 20036Attorneys or the RecordinghldustryAssociation fAmerica

Dated:August20, 2002

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00485-riaa v verizon complaint

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