01a introductionto the intl training course (1) - sandia.gov twenty-sixth international training...

1 – Introduction to ITC-26

The Twenty-Sixth International Training Course

In t roduc t ion to the ITC and DEPO

October 24 – November 11, 2016Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA

Greg Baum

Introduction to ITC and DEPO

Learn ing Object ives

After completing this module, you should be able to:• Recognize the basic goal and structure of ITC• List the objectives of a State’s physical protection regime• List the three basic steps in the Design and Evaluation

Process Outline (DEPO)• Identify the fundamental approach used in ITC to design

and evaluate PPS

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The Twenty-Sixth International Training CoursePage 2


Course Goal

At the end of this training course, participants will be able to: • Apply the principles of a performance-based

methodology to design and evaluate a physical protection system (PPS) for nuclear facilities and materials against the threat of theft or sabotage Principles and methods are taught in each subject module Learning objectives and daily quizzes focus on these principles

and methods

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Course Structure

The course consists of:• Lecture sessions (30)• Subgroup exercise sessions (20)

Application of lecture material through practical exercises Final exercise is a comprehensive design and evaluation problem

• Field trips for equipment demonstration, performance testing, and implementation examples

• Guest lectures Physical protection in the US and other countries

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Course Sect ions

I. Defining Physical Protection System Requirements (Define)

II. Designing a Physical Protection System (Design)III. Evaluating the Physical Protection System Design

(Evaluation)IV. Guest Lectures and Supporting Information

Hypothetical Facility and Exercise Data

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Course Sect ions

• Each section in the red-green-blue menu is a subject module that has 3 subsections: Copy of viewgraphs from lectures Subgroup exercises Text with additional information

• Hypothetical Facility and Exercise Data are used in all subgroup exercises

• You will receive copies of the guest lectures later in ITC

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Typica l Dai ly Act iv i t ies at ITC

• Breakfast• Review of previous day’s lessons• Review of current day’s schedule• Lecture• Subgroup• Lunch• Lecture• Subgroup• Module evaluation• Participant quiz

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Module Evaluat ion

• The daily questionnaire helps us determine if the material that we have presented to you is useful. The questions will relate to the questions below: Was the material clear and understandable? Was the instructor clear and understandable? Was the subject valuable to your work?

• Survey evaluations can be found under each module on the ITC App

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Part ic ipant Quiz

• Short quiz is given at the end of each day• Quiz results provide feedback to staff and participants on

training effectiveness• Results will be discussed in the daily review session each

morning• Quizzes are anonymous• Two types of questions are used:

True - False Multiple choice

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Other C lass Act iv i t ies

• Weekly off-site dinner• Class team building picnic• Weekend cultural activities• Evening shopping trips

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Administrat ive Requirements

• Attendance is required for all lectures, subgroup exercises, and field trips

• Completion of daily module evaluations and quizzes is required

• Be on time after breaks and lunches, and for the bus in the morning

• Turn off all personal wireless communication devices during lectures and subgroups

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Br ief History of the ITC

1. In the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, the US made a commitment to conduct training for other IAEA Member States on the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities

2. First ITC was conducted in November 19783. ITC has been conducted approximately every 18

months since then4. As of the end of ITC-25 in 2015, there have been 841

participants from 71 Member States

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Part ic ipat ing Member States in Past ITCs

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Albania (1)

Algeria (3)

Argentina (23)

Armenia (5)

Australia (16)

Austria (2)

Bangladesh (9)

Belarus (11)

Belgium (4)

Brazil (29)

Bulgaria (16)

Canada (50)

Chile (11)

China (21)

Croatia (5)

Cuba (2)

Czech Republic (20)

Denmark (1)

DR of Congo (2)

Egypt (25)

Finland (9)

France (19)

Germany (15)

Ghana (8)

Greece (3)

Hungary (12)

India (28)

Indonesia (24)

Iran (1)

Iraq (5)

Israel (5)

Italy (6)

Jamaica (1)

Japan (29)

Jordan (1)

Kazakhstan (8)

Korea (21)

Latvia (2)

Lithuania (18)

Malaysia (12)

Mexico (25)

Morocco (6)

Netherlands (6)

Nigeria (2)

Norway (2)

“Observers” (14)

Pakistan (17)

Philippines (16)

Poland (17)

Portugal (2)

Romania (22)

Russia (21)

Saudi Arabia (1)

Serbia (3)

Slovakia (17)

Slovenia (14)

South Africa (20)

Spain (11)

Sweden (19)

Switzerland (7)

Syria (1)

Thailand (17)

Tunisia (4)

Turkey (10)

Ukraine (19)

United Arab Emirates (2)

United Kingdom (1)

Uzbekistan (1)

Venezuela (3)

Vietnam (6)

Zaire (3)

Total Participants: 841


(44) ITC-26 Part ic ipants f rom 33 States

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AlgeriaAustraliaBangladeshBelarusBelgiumBrazilBulgariaCanadaCzech RepublicFinlandGermanyGhanaHungaryIndiaIndonesiaJapanRepublic of Korea

LibyaLithuaniaMalaysiaMexicoNigeriaPolandRomaniaRussiaSlovakiaSloveniaSouth AfricaSpainTurkeyUkraineUnited Arab EmiratesVietnam




Sponsors

• US Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security

• Office of Global Material Security

• US Department of State (DOS) Office of International Security and Nonproliferation

• Office of Nuclear Energy, Safety, and Security

• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Department of Nuclear Safety and Security

• Office of Nuclear Security

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Presenters

• Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) prepares and presents this course because we: Developed the methodology used in this course, beginning in the

1970s Have extensive experience in using this methodology for the

design and evaluation of our domestic physical protection systems

Work closely with the IAEA and Member States on international physical protection, using this same methodology

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Scope

• The ITC material Is designed for security professionals who work in physical

protection of nuclear facilities and materials• Government officials and competent authorities• Facility operators and transport shippers and carriers

Uses an approach consistent with the recommendations in:• Physical Protection Objectives and Fundamental Principles,

GOV/2001/41 • The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities,

IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev.5

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Objec t ives o f a S ta te ’s Phys ica l P rotec t ion Reg ime

• Protect against theft and other unlawful taking of nuclear material in use, storage, and transport Ensure the implementation of rapid and comprehensive

measures to locate and, where appropriate, recover missing or stolen nuclear material

• Protect nuclear material and nuclear facilities against sabotage Mitigate or minimize the radiological consequences of sabotage

Note: In this course “sabotage” means radiological sabotage.

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Introduct ion to the DEPO Methodology

• The DEPO methodology is a systematic approach with three major steps:1. Define the PPS requirements2. Design a new, or characterize an existing, PPS3. Evaluate the PPS

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Final PPS Design

Evaluate PPS

Response(14)

Access Delay(13)

Intrusion Detection Systems

(9)

Alarm Assessment

(12)

Alarm Communication and Display

(15)

Entry Control(10)

Design PPS

Physical Protection Systems(8)

Delay ResponseDetection

Define PPS Requirements

Risk Management/ Regulatory

Requirements

(6)

Facility Characterization/

Target Identification

(3)

Threat Definition(5)

Redesign PPS

Evaluation of PPS(18)

Introduction to DEPO(1)

Adversary Sequence Diagrams

(19)

Insider Analysis(25)

Contraband Detection

(11)

Neutralization Analysis(22)

Scenario Analysis(23)

Performance Testing (16 and 17)

Path Interruption Analysis

(20)

Multipath Analysis (21)

Information Security (27)

Introduction to Hypothetical

Facility

Tabletop Analysis (24)

Note: Numbers refer to lecture sessions

Transportation Security

INFCIRC 225 Revision 5

(2)

Contingency Planning

(28)

Insider Design(25)

Des ign and Eva lua t ion Process Out l ine (DEPO)

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Nuclear Material Accounting &

Control

(7) Human Reliability Programs & Security

Culture(28)

(4)

(26)




A l te rnat ive PPS Des ign and Eva luat ion Approaches• Expert approach: The PPS design and evaluation is conducted

using subject matter expertise • Prescriptive features approach: The PPS design and evaluation

is conducted based on specifications and implementation of a required set of features

• Component criteria approach: The PPS design and evaluation is conducted using performance criteria for some required security features

• System performance approach: The PPS design and evaluation is conducted using a systems engineering approach based on specifying and achieving an overall level of system effectiveness against the Design Basis Threat (DBT)

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ITC Design and Evaluat ion Approach

• ITC emphasizes the performance-based PPS effectiveness, design, and evaluation approach (DEPO)

• In practice, State physical protection regimes generally include a mixture of performance-based and prescriptive approaches

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Regulatory Requirements

• Physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials is the right and responsibility of every sovereign state Stated in Amended CPPNM

• State government establishes laws for the state’s physical protection regime Risk management

• Competent authority(ies) establishes regulations and is responsible for oversight of physical protection Prescriptive and performance-base requirements

• Facility operators implement physical protection and are responsible for satisfying state requirements Resource management

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Summary

• ITC objective Apply the principles of a performance-based methodology to

design and evaluate a physical protection system for nuclear facilities and materials against the threat of theft or sabotage

• Objectives of a State’s physical protection regime Protect against theft of nuclear material Protect against radiological sabotage of nuclear facilities and

material

• Three basic steps of DEPO are (1) define PPS requirements, (2) design PPS, and (3) evaluate PPS

• ITC emphasizes a performance-based approach of evaluating PPS effectiveness against DBT

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