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    TheGermanSubmarine Warinthe North Atlantic1939-1944

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    2 S&T nr. 47 published Nov/Dec 1974

    WOLFPACK 5The German Submarine War inthe North Atlantic, 1939-43Frank DavisThe Magazine of Conflict Simulation

    circulation:28,100Art Director/Co-EditorRedmond A. SimonsenEditor/PublisherJames F.Dunnigan WORLD WAR THREEThe Potential forConflict in the 1970's

    21Editorial: Christopher J. Allen, Howard Barasch, Stephen G. Bettum,Edward Curran, Frank Davis, Bob Felice, Irad B. Hardy, David C. Isby,Stephen B. Patrick, Sid Sackson, Thomas Walczyk, John MichaelYoung, Kevin Zucker. Graphic Production: Manfred F. Milkuhn,Linda Mosca. Administrative: Margaret Davis, Patricia Dugan, CarlJacobsen, George Murison, Bridget Murphy, Joan Scott, KarleneScott, Kathy Scott, Margaret M. Scott, Kathy Tennyson, SalvatoreZito. Game Evaluation and Research Assistance: Richard Berg,Martin Campion, Omar DeWitt, Lawrence Ercolino, Abe Fox, JohnHeydt, Steve List, Joseph Seliga.

    Original Editor and Founder: Christopher WagnerPrinting: Reflex Offset, Inc., College Point, N.Y. Presswork: JohnBanks. Binding: Apollo Bindery, College POint, N.Y. Die-cutting:Freedman Die-Cutters, Inc., N.Y., N.Y.STRATEGY & TACTICS Magazineis copyright C) 1974by SimulationsPublications Inc. Printed in USA. All rights reserved. All editorial andgeneralmail should be sent to SimulationsPublications Inc., 44 East23rdStreet, New York, N.Y. 10010.One Year Isix issue) subscriptions are$12.00peryear.Pleasesendchecksor money orders only. Basicad rateis$3,000per page for game-relatedproducts.GREAT BRITAIN & EUROPE:British and Europeancustomers shouldplacetheir ordersfor SPIproducts andsubscriptionswith SIMULATIONSPUBLICATlONS,UNITEDKINGDOM,P.O.Box46,Altrincham, Cheshire,WA15 6PE, United Kingdom. Basic subscript ion rate from SPUK isIPounds) 7.50 per year.

    Stephen B. Patrick

    Simulation:WOLFPACKSubmarine Warfare inthe North Atlantic, 1942-44James F. DunniganRedmond A. Simonsen

    Frank Davis

    xs49

    OUTGOING MAIL The Editors 2FOOTNOTES Everybody 41

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    NEW! Available for shipping 37 December 74

    rid Nuclear weapons and brinkmanship Multi-scenario with three-Plaver options

    Strategic level, global warfare Economic warfare

    Total Conflict in the 70's

    World War Three is SPl's hypotheticalconflict s imulation of what could happentomorrow, in ten years or, hopefully,never - a third world war.Each counter in World War Threerepresents an entire army or fleet. Theseforces can engage virtually anywhere inthe world on air, land or sea. The EastBloc Coalition, i.e., the Russian-dominated Communist world, is facedwith the task of overrunning as much ofthe globe as possible while theirsubmarines, both nuclear and conven-tional, attempt to inflict so much damageon the shipping of the Western Alliance,i.e., U.S.-dominated nations, thatAmerican-led forces will not be able toinvade and liberate the comquered areas.

    1 ' ; / 4 1 1 1 : / 8 , 1 SS8N 1 " 1 1 1 SS8N ~ SURF A- - - - - - - - _.__S/4' [4JI [2J'I w ~ : 1 I W ' ~ 1 ~ I ' : ~ , 1 1 1 : ; 2 ) 1 [!]L ! J1w~@J~~ I ~ ~ 1 [IJI ~ I I if I I ' ' I [I] I ' I r n W PACT181(1)

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    4

    N A P O L E O N

    A strategic-level game of the Waterloo campaign for two,three, or four players. Careful planning, forced-marching,and skilful use of cavalry can create the whole range ofactual and possible campaign maneuvers.The style and tempo of a Napoleonic battle is captured bymorale rules and realistic tactical rules for infantry (in-cluding squares), cavalry, and artillery. Average playingtime is two hours. $10.00 postpaid.1 8 1 2

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    By the tim e the vaunted panzer divisions ro lled onto the Russian steppe to initiathe decisive land campaign of W orld W ar II, the German U-boat fleet had be, 'poaching on the Allies' vita l Atlantic sealanes for alm ost two years. During thofirst tW enty, m onths the U -boats had rap idly recaptured the notorie ty of their F iW orld War predecessors by sinking m ore than three m illion tons of A llied sh ippinFollow ing the Luftw affe 's fa il,ure over Brita in in 1 940 and the halting of the W ehmacht before Moscow a year later, the U-boat rem ained the sole weapon whicafforded H itlera chance for victory. For tw o om inous years thereafter, the coursof the w ar hung upon the outcom e of the contest betw een the G erm an "w olfpacks"- and the vulnerable North A tlantic merchant convoys upon which they preye

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    6THE WOL VES' DEBUT

    The submarine's debut in World War I wasmore impressive than that of the tank.Although rudimentary submersibles hadbeen clumsily stalking warships ever sincethe American Revolution, it was the GermanU-boat which abruptly ended the slapstickpioneer exploits in submarine warfare.By the summer of 1914, the submarine wasfirmly established in the navies of the majorpowers about to go to war. The thirty boatsof the Imperial German Navy formed thefourth largest of the submarine fleets,preceded by Britain, France and Russia. Themost modern of the German boats werethose of the U-23 to U-41 Class which hadbeen designed in 1912. These had a surfacedisplacement of 675 tons, were 212 feetlong, and carried a crew of thirty-nine. Themain armament comprised two bow andtwo stern 450mm torpedo tubes and one ortwo 88mm or 105mm deck-mounted guns.The U-boat's maximum surface speed was16 knots and their radius of action about3,000 miles. Submerged, the boat couldmake 10 knots for an hour's duration, orcruising at 4 knots, it could travel 60 milesbefore it was forced to surface to rechargethe batteries for its electric underwaterpropulsion system. Because the design hadbeen drafted before the threat of effectiveant i-submarine weapons materialized, HieU-boat required two and one-half minutesto fully sutimerge and had a safe diving' limitof only 160 feet. Quite apart from their low

    carrying war materials, she could be seizedor sunk on tHe condition that her crew wasensured a safe means for reaching land, forwhich purpose the merchant ship's l ifeboatswere not considered sufficient. Clearly, thishumane code favored Great Britain whichpossessed the world's largest mercantilefleet, but deprived the submarine of itsraison d'etre.The U-boat had been designed, to attackwithout warning from a submergedposition. Her surface armament could notcompete with that of a conventionalwarship nor even against an armedmerchant ship. Moreover, a U-boat couldhardly accomodate the survivors of vesselswhich she torpedoed.As British propaganda turned world opinionagainst the U-boat, the Kaiser was forced tochoose between condemning his submar-ines to an impractical, if not suicidal, form ofcombat, or to continue the gradualescalation toward unrestricted submarinewarfare even though this encouraged thewrath of neutrals like America which wereeager to profit off trade with the belliger-ents. The latter course, which prevailed,soon led to the sinking of the Cunardpassenger liner, the Lusitania, on May 7,1915. This, in turn, led to America's eventualdeclaration of war against Germany,ensuring her ultimate defeat. Before then,however, the free reign given to theU-boats almost produced a German victory.Overall, the U-boats sank some 5,000 ships

    which might equal but not exceed Britain'ssubmarine strength.Britain's curious acceptance of this treatywas based on her belief that any futureU-boat threat could be countered by thrapid adoption of the convoy system. Alsoagreeing- to a German submarine fleet thamight equal her own seemed a small rissince Britain planned little submarineconstruct ion for the forseeable future. Mosimportant, since the conclusion of the laswar, the Royal Navy's development of asdian underwater radio-echoing device fodetecting a submerged submarine, led theBritish to believe that the U-boat would nowbe far more vulnerable than had been thecase between 1914-1918.As events later revealed, Britain's compla-cency toward the potential U-boat menacewas extremely foolhardy. By 1939, theUnited Kingdom had become even moredependent on sea commerce than she hadbeen in 1914, for while the British populationincreased by four million between wars, theinternal resources of the Brit ish Isles did noincrease. Although sufficient coal, and parof her iron ore needs were produced locallyBritain's survival depended on her ability toimport about half her food requirements,eight million tons of timber to prop her coamines, and twelve million tons of petroleumproducts.While, in 1939, the British Commonwealthcould still rely on the world's larges

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    by either surface or airborne search exceptin the immediate vicinity of convoys, oralong congested U-boat transit routes suchas in France's Bay of Biscay where the areato be searched was strictly confined.THEZ-PLAN

    Considering their dangerous disregard of thepotent ial U-boat menace, the British owed adebt of gratitude for the fact that Hitler hadso little appreciation of naval strategy. Hitlerfirst perceived that Britain was his potentialenemy during the Sudeten Crisis of 1938. Inthe latter part of that year, Grand AdmiralRaeder (C-in-C of the German Navy)ordered an examination of the problemsinvolved in war with England and, as a resultof that examination, he submitted to Hitlertwo alternatives for the expansion of theGerman fleet. The first, more economical,plan emphaized production of U-boats andpocket-battleships to be used against theBritish merchant traffic in the event of war.The alternative, known as the Z-Plan,involved a long term commitment toconstruct a high seas fleet which coulddirectly challenge the British Navy, whosestrength would necessarily be dissipated toprotect Britain's worldwide merchant trade.In offering Hitler this alternative, Raederwarned him that the fleet envisioned in theZ-Plan would require a decade to constructand if Germany became involved in apremature war with England her chances forsuccess would be minimal. As Hitler gaveRaeder assurance that hewould not risk anyconfrontation with Britain before 1946, the

    Z-Plan which was to provide only 1completed U-boats by early 1944. Covinced that an early war with England wlikely, Donitz repeatedly warned Raeder ththe U-boat construction schedule envioned in the Z-Plan was terribly inadequatBecause one-third of whatever numberboats were available would alwaysenroute to and from the area of operat ionand another third of the available flewould have to be retained in home watefor refitting and training purposes. Doncalculated that a minimum of 3ocean-going U-boats would have to behand in order to wage an effective suppwar against Great Britain.Donitz also disagreed with the Z-Planemphasis on constructing a large numberheavy (2,000 ton) U-boats. Believing ththe number of "eyes" which could searfor convoys would be more important thaeither armament or endurance, Donsupported the medium-sized (500-700 toType VII boat as the optimum weapon fthe pack tactics he planned to emploAlthough he repeatedly implored Raedermodify the Z-Plan to produce the necessanumbers, and to construct Type VII boain a three to one ratio to all other types, hefforts met with little success. For far longthan was prudent, Raeder remaineconvinced that Hitler would avoid confliwith England. Hitler himself strongly favorethe construction of the heavier, more presgious ships. Thus, although betwee

    than in 1918, no less so was the British mer-chant ship.Unfortunately, however, the belief in theu-boat's greater vulnerability was based ona series of miscalculations. The RoyalNavy's peacetime testing of asdic had beenlargely confined to hunting submarineswhose initial positions were known withinfairly narrow limits. These tests had onlybeen conducted in daylight under favorableweather conditions. Despite these favorablecircumstances, due to a blind zone whichasdic developed asit approached the target,there were as many unsuccessful hunts asthere were "kills" in these mockanti-submarine attacks. The British alsofailed to appreciate that the greatlyincreased endurance of contemporary sub-marines would allow them to operate far outin the Atlantic well beyond the range of theirshort-winded, asdic carrying escort vessels.The most damaging example of Britishmyopia was their assumption that theU-boats would behave like "true submar-ines", approaching and attacking only whilesubmerged. The British held to this opiniondespite their knowledge that the U-boatfleet's commander was an advocate of thetechnique of using groups of boats in nightattacks on the surface. This technique, theso called "wolfpack" tactic, had beendeveloped by Admiral Karl Donitz during the1935-39 period as a means by which theU-boat could overcome both the asdic,which was ineffective against a surfaced

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    8

    North Atlantic Oceanu-Boat Operational Areas is :September 1939 July 1942 '=

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    by mid-1942, the chance for a Germanvictory had by then been destroyed byHitler's impatience, which plunged theGerman Navy into war with Great Britainseven years sooner than they had expected.THE OPENING ROUND

    [September 1 93 9 - June 1940)In August, 1939, Donitz had 56 U-boats.Eight of the boats were modified Type VII'sof about 700-tons. These were capable ofoperating as far as Gibralter or the Azores.Eighteen were 5OQ-ton Type VII's whichcould only reach out to 15 degrees Westlongitude in the Atlantic. The remainingthirty boats were Type lt's, nicknamed"canoes", since they displaced only250-tons and could operate onlv' in theNorth Sea or in British coastal waters.By September 3, 1939, when Britaindeclared war against Germany, thirty-nineU-boats had been deployed in positionsbordering the principal British shippingroutes. The first victim of the sea war wasthe British passenger liner Athenia whichwas mistaken for a troop ship and sunk byU-3D on the first evening of the war.Although the Athenia's sinking was, in fact,attributable to her misidentification, theBritish government immediately accusedthe Germans of resurrecting unrestricted.submarine warfare. In fact, Hitler was stillextremely anxious to avoid an escalation ofhostilities between Germany and GreatBritain and he had expressly forbidden .attacks such as sank the Athenia. Within a

    forces was the fact that; following the lossesof two boats to British mines in theChannel, all boats bound for the Atlanticwere being forced to make a lengthy voyagearound northern Scotland. This consider-ably shortened the amount of time a boatcould operate in the Atlantic. Thus, thenumber of boats capable of operating in theAtlantic remained around twenty through-out this period with a third of these at seatogether at anyone time.Despite the small numbers of boats,excellent individual achievements weremade. The enemy's use of "hunter-killer"groups received a sharp set-back onSeptember 17, 1939, when U-9 sank theBrit ish aircraft carr ier Courageous whichhad been supporting the anti-submarinepatrols in the Western Approaches to theChannel. As a result of the loss ofCourageous and 518 of her complement, theBritish withdrew carriers from all anti-submarine operations until well into 1942.The most noteworthy exploit of this initialperiod was the sinking of the antiquatedBritish battleship, Royal Oak, in the HomeFleet 's main anchorage at Scapa Flow. Thisdaredevil feat, which considerably enhancedthe morale of the U-boat service, wasexecuted by U-47 whose commander,Lieutenant Gunther Prien, went on tobecome one of the U-boats' greatest"aces". As a result of Prien's attack onOctober 14, 1939, the British Home Fleethad to be transferred to more remote

    A depth charge erupts in the wake of an esc

    Later, as additional and more long-rangeescort ships became available, the convolimit was pushed farther out into tAtlantic from both the North American aBritish coasts, but it was not until Jun1941 that it became possible to escortconvoy for its entire voyage across tAtlantic.

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    Die Rudeltaktlk[The Wolfpack]Because of the ever increasing All iedshipbuilding capacity, Donitz' objectivethroughout the war was the quickestpossible sinking of the greatest possibleenemy tonnage. From the beginning,Donitz recognized that unless theU-boats could overcomethe defensesofAll ies merchant convoys the tonnagewar would inevitably be lost. Theconcept of Die Rtide/tsktik, that is, thesubmarine pack attack, was developedby Donitz specifically as the means bywhich the U-boats could penetrate themerchant convoy's anti-submarinedefenses.The key to the problem of successfullyattacking a convoy lay in the differencein speedbetween the merchant ship andthe submerged U-boat. The averagespeed of a convoy, even in goodweather, was somewherebetweensevenand nine knots. In comparison, theU-boat, until the Schnorkel wasintroduced in 1944, had an averagesubmerged speed of only two to threeknots. If the U-boat increased hersubmerged speed, her batteries wouldquickly become exhausted and shewould be forced to surface to rechargethem. Thus, the pre-Schnorkel U-boatresembleda slightly mobileminewith its

    To attack a single, fast moving ship, theU-boat neededto be in a position aheadof the target when it was first sighted.Eventhen a sudden zigzagby the targetship might thwart any possibility for asuccessful attack. Similarly, to attack acomparatively slow-rnovinq convoy, thesubmerged U-boat requited a goodsighting position from somewhereaheadof the convoy. Moreover, except in fineweather and bright moonlight, thevisibil ity afforded by periscope was sopoor it prohibited attacking from asubmerged position at night. Further-more, if a U-boat fired her torpedoeswhile submerged, she could not reloadand overtake a convoy for a secondattack while remaining submerged.Takentogether, these facts led Donitz toabandonoperationsby singlesubmergedboats and to adopt tactics in whichgroupsof boats operatedon the surfaceat relativelyhigh speed,diving only whenforced to do so. The principal advantageof these tactics lay in the fact that theU-boat's surface speed not onlyexceededthat of the merchantship, butfrequently topped that of the convoyescort vessels. Thus, the U-boat couldoperate in a "hit and run" manner,launching an attack and then fleeing onthe surface before the surface escorts ofthe convoy could get close enough to

    problem of finding the convoysthemselves. In the vast areas of thAtlantic, even the most unwieldy convois only a speck. Fortunately, Donitz waaidedon this front by the excellentworof his operational intelligence stafAlthough from time to time, wheneveBritish naval codes were changed, thU-boat service was temporarily depriveof such information, for most of the firsfour years of the war, Germancryptographers were 'supplying Donitwith specific information concernindeparture and arrival schedules foAtlantic convoys, information on thescort strength of various convoysrendezvous points for convoys anapproximate courses of independentrouted ships, and weather reports fromall ocean areas. This information, ocourse,was invaluablein locating targetfor U-boat concentrations.Despite the advantage provided by 'thitype of detailed intelligence,the numbeof "eyes" which could betrainedalongcertain convoy's projected course wacrucial in the struggle to actually contacthe target. As the U-boats were noequipped with radar, Donitz solved theproblem by deploying a numberof boatinto pack formations which spread oualong a line perpendicular to theconvoy's course and searched in a

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    sometimes as many as twenty boatswould operate as a pack. Each packdeployed into a concave patrol line inwhich an interval of about ten miles wasmaintained between each of the packmembers. As a patrol line combed theAtlantic in generally an easternly orwesternly direction, the individual boatswould maintain radio silence while thepack as a whole was closely controlledby radio from Donitz' command post atLorient.When an individual submarine firstsighted a convoy it would immediatelyradio its course and position to Donitzwho would then radio orders, homingevery member of the pack inward on theprojected course of the convoy. TheU-boat which originally establishedcontact would continue shadowing theconvoy at the maximum distance fromwhich it could observe the convoy'ssmoke or masts. By doing so, it couldkeep Donitz advised of any change in theconvoy's course and this informationwould be relayed to the gathering packmembers.When a "quorum" of at least threeU-boats was in contact with the convoy,the attack could begin. At this pointDonitz would turn over control of thesituation to the individual U-boat

    prohibited communications between theindividual boats. Nonetheless, the multi-faceted attack would confuse anddisrupt the escorts and improve eachboat's chance of obtaining a goodposition from which to launch an attack.Under cover of darkness the U-boatswould converge on the convoy on thesurface to lessen the effectiveness of theenemy's asdic. The compact silhouetteof the U-boat was a source of naturalprotection which was not shared by thetarget merchantment and freighters. AU-boat which gained a favorable posit ionwould fire a "fan" or salvo of three orfour torpedoes which diverged alongseveral paths, increasing the chances ofa hit. As a convoy, except whenstraggling, formed a compact target, asalvo might allow several hits on differentships in successive columns within theconvoy. After its attack, the U-boatgenerally submerged to escape counter-attack. Maintaining a course parallel tothe convoy, the U-boat later resurfacedand maneuvered into position for a freshattack. Of course, any ship whichdropped out of the convoy and became a"straggler", was easily finished off in theabsence of any guarding warship.Unless the convoy managed to elude thepack by a radical change of course, themerchantmen might be hounded by the

    the majority of the boats had exhaustedtheir torpedoes. Alternately, the convoymight escape its shadowers due to theinterference of bad weather, a notinfrequent occurrence in the oftenstormy Atlantic. In any event, the attackwas usually lifted when the convoyreached a point where continuous aircover could be provided for it.Of course, the primary weakness of thewolfpack concept was the necessaryradio communications between theshadowing U-boat and Donitz' head-quarters in France. While thesecommunications allowed the growingU-boat fleet to remain under acentralized control, the introduction ofHF/DF equipment in Allied escort vesselsrapidly undercut this advantage. As moreHF/DF equipped escorts joined theconvoys, the shadowing U-boat keepingDonitz informed' could be quickly locatedand either forced to submerge or bedestroyed. The Germans remainedignorant of this Allied capability andcontinually attr ibuted U-boats lost in thismanner to allied radar detection. Thusthe genius of Donitz' tactics fell victim toAllied technological superiority.It is worth noting, however, that Donitzhad formulated Die Rudeltaktikexpecting to deploy 300 U-boats againstthe convoys from the very beginning of

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    12

    T he C onv oy S ystemSimply defined, a convoy is one.ormoremerchant ships sailing under theprotection of one or morewarships. Thepractice of escorting unarmed merchantships by warships is of very ancientstanding. The English convoy systemwas begun in the thirteenth century toprotect wine cargoes in transit fromFrance. In the Anglo-Dutch and Frenchwars of the seventeenth and eighteenthcenturies, thewarring powers customar-ily convoyed their merchant ships.During the Napoleonic Wars convoybecame virtually obligatory for Britishships simply because British insurance'companies refused to insure anindependentlysailedship unlessshewasexceptionally fast and well armed. Thusthe convoy has traditionally beenacceptedasthe bestmeansof protectingurgent maritime trade. And the reasonfor this is because the convoyconcentrates friendly naval forces at thevery point where enemy raiders areforced to strike.Despite this obvious fact, shipownersand certain naval "experts" havetraditionally opposedthe convoy system;the former finding it too inconvenient;the latter believing it too defensivelyoriented. Misguided by this opposition,during the First World War the British

    that war were ships sunk while sail ingindependently. When the British finallyregained thier sensesand adopted theconvoy system in June 1917 the volumeof U-boat victims declinedprecipitously.Remembering the painful lesson ofWorld War I,the Britishlost l ittle time inintroducing the convov ~stem at theoutbreak of the Second World War.During the autumn of 1939 mercantileconvoy routes were established whichconnected the British Isleswith sourcesof raw materials in every corner of theworld. Each of these routes wasallocated an alphabetical code whichusually hada "self evident" significance.For example, "OG" was used todesignate "outward-Gibralter" boundconvoys. The addition of the third letter"F" or "S" was usedto signify fast andslow convoys. Fast convoys consistedentirely of ships which could maintain aspeed of at least nine knots. Slowconvoys only managed a speed ofabout seven and one-half knots. Fastconvoys often steeredevasivecoursestoavoid suspected U-boat concentrations.Slow convoys generallysteamed along,zigzaggingonly to eludea definite attack.Thus, the rateof transit of fast and slowtrans-Atlantic convoys differed onlyslightly. From port to port a fast convoyaveragedten to fourteen days in transit.The same voyage by a slow convoy

    KingdomandNorth America.The firstthe famous "HX" (Halifax, NovaScotconvoys, around whose passage tBattle of the Atlantic was largelyrevolve, sailed on September 16, 193By 1942, either a fast or a slow convwould departfrom NovaScotia for GreBritain every four or five days andconvoy bound for North America woudepart at similar intervals. As the wprogressed and America realized hreputation as "the arsenaldemocracy", the importance of tNorth Atlantic convoy routes steadincreased.Across these routes came tfood, weapons, and equipment whisustained Britain in 1940when she wthreatened with invasion.Later in the war the American forcwhich participated in the TORCinvasion of North Africa were convoyacross the North Atlantic. The NorAtlantic convoy routeswere also usedship armaments which eventualreached the Russian allies by wayMurmansk. And the maintenanceof tNorth Atlantic convoy routes wabsolutely essential for the build-uwhich preceded the invasionNormandyin 1944.The typical North Atlantic convconsisted of 45 to 60 merchant shisteaming in nine to twelve columnWhenever possible the ships would

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    a depth of about one and one-half miles.When straggling due to bad weather orenemy attacks, the same convoy mightspread over sixty squaremiles or more.Because the use of heavy ships wasconfined to escorting troop convoys, amerchant convoy's escorts were gener-ally destroyers and corvettes. Initiallyonly one or two such escorts wereassignedto each convoy andbecauseoftheir low fuel capacity these escortscould only accompany the convoy for afew hundred miles beyond either theCanadian or Irish coasts. Beginning inmid-1941,however, the escort situationbegan improving. Additional and moremodernescorts were becomingavailableand these could now be refueled at seafrom convoyed tankers. Thus, in June of1941 escorts began accompanyingconvoys throughout the long trans-Atlantic voyage.During the passage the escorts formedthe convoy's screen. Each unit of thescreen was assigned a segment of animaginary circle encompassing theconvoy. Byday, if the weatherwas clear,the escort would patrol this segmentusingits submarinedetection equipment.At night, or in thick weather, the escortkept to a definite station in closeproximity to the outer column of theconvoy. In the early period of limitednumbers of short-ranged escorts,pursuing a U-boat for more than one

    escorts became available their doctrinebecame more offensive. The escortswere able to patrol a larger circlesurrounding the convoy and thus keepsubmarines beyond effective torpedorange. Escorts were also able to beginworking in pairs and eventually theydeveloped a particularly effective anti-submarine tactic.One escort would pursue a U-boatadvising a follow-up escort of thesubmarine's actions. The U-boat com-manderwould switch to "silent running"to elude his pursuer.When the U-boat'shydrophones assured the submarinecommanderthat the danger had passed,he would order a resumption of theboat's full power unaware that theseengine noises were now being detectedby the follow-up escort. A depth chargeattack by the second escort usuallycrippled the U-boat. The first escortcould now return to aid in thedestructionof the trapped prey.At sea, the internal discipline of theconvoy was the responsibility of theconvoy commodore. In convoysin whichthe majority of the shipswere British theconvoy commodorewas usuallya retiredflag officer of the Royal Navy. Inpredominantly American convoys thecommodorewas usually a United StatesNavalReserveofficer who had consider-able merchant marine experience.

    the escort group, the escort commanderhad the authority to divert the convoyanywherewithin a forty milebeltto avoidsuspected U-boat concentrations. Majorcourse changes to avoid wolfpacks andicepacks were ordered from eitherWashington or London by speciallyencrypted radio transmissions.Inthe Spring of 1943,the North Atlantic'merchant convoys were finally affordedadequate protection and betweenFebruaryand May the U-boat threat wasovercome. First, the strength of theescort groups was increased from anaverageof five vesselsto saven escortsper convoy. In addition, support groupsand escort carrier groups began to beassignedto provide additional protectionto North Atlantic convoys. The supportgroups varied in strength between fiveand seven vessels specifically outfittedand trained for anti-submarine opera-tions. Two British escort carriers (BiterandArcher) and the U.S. Navy's Bogue,were also introduced during this periodwith a decisiveeffect against the U-boatoperations. In effect, the escort carriersfinally closedtheAtlantic "air gap", thatareaof the ocean beyond the range oflong-ranged shore-based aircraft. Thecoupling of the escort carrier to theconvoy finally ended the U-boats' reignof terror for the Atlantic convoys.By theend of May 1943,Donitz was forced to

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    14

    The Principal ConvoyBattles [1940-1943]

    Date Convoy Ships inDesig- Convoynation[sJ inc.EscortsU-BoatsPartici-pating ShipsSunk

    TonnageSunk[G.R.T.JU-BoatsSunk

    NOTES: This table gives the detailsinvolved in the most successful anti-convoy operations undertaken by theGerman U-boats. During the entire warthese were the only seven battles inwhich the U-boats sank more than 50,000G.R.T. All of the battles occurred on theNorth Atlantic Convoy Routes except thebattle of PO-17 which was intercepted byGerman air and surface units as well asU-boats on the North Russia Run in July,1942. The German operation to intercept

    15 82,81714,46179,872

    1616

    borne aircraft. Nevertheless, PO-17 wasmauled by the combination onslaught ofGerman aircraft and U-boats. Despite itsstrong escort of six destroyers, PO-17lost 23 out of 36 merchant ships. Thehigh losses were predominant ly causedby the fact that the convoy was orderedto disperse because of the threat posedby German surface units. As a result,two-thirds of the convoy's cargo wassunk, including 210 out of 297 aircraft,430 out of 594 tanks, and 3,350 out of

    [continuedfrom page 9]

    THE HAPPY TIME[Ju/y 1940-December 1941]Following the Fall of France in June, 194the danger to Britain's shipping routebecame much more severe. By July, 194the Germans had established the firAtlantic U-boat base at Lorient on the Baof Biscay in western France. Subsequentlythe Germans established additional basesBrest, St.-Nazaire, and La Pallice, allwhich gave the U-boats direct access to thAtlantic and shortened the previous transroute from Germany by more than 1,00miles. The possession of these baspermit ted the U-boats to increase both thetime at sea and the distance out into thAtlantic in which they could hunt. Becausof the shortened transit route, more U-boacould be kept simultaneously at sea.further advantage accrued when F.W. 20Kondor long-ranged German bombersarr ived in newly acquired bases in northerFrance. From these bases the Kondorposed a serious threat. to British shippinanywhere within their extensive 2,200 mirange. Most serious of all, the British wernow menaced with the prospect of invasioand were forced to withdraw mandestroyers from convoy escort duties anreassign them to the Channel ports as thprincipal deterrent force to OperatioSea/ion.While the fall of France shortened th

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    T he T ech no lo gica l W a rThe technological aspects of thesubmarine war in the North Atlantic werenot only cr itical, but decisive. The Allieswon the submarine war primarilybecause their technology was superior tothe Germans', and more rapidlyimplemented. The Germans could havesurpassed the Allies. Most of the Germantechnological advances, however, wereimplemented too late to affect the war'soutcome. The best way to describe theimpact of technology is to first discussthe U-boat's weapons and tactics, and,secondly, the weapons and tactics of theASW (Ant i-Submarine Warfare) forces.THE U-BOATSBasically, a U-boat, or any other WorldWar II submarine, was in fact nothingmore than a submersible torpedo boat,and a slow one at that. While Germanyproduced about 1,100 ocean-goingsubmarines for the war, only about 900of these were built in time to see action.Of these, roughly 78 percent were TypeVII's while the remainder were theslightly larger Type IX's. The Type IXU-boats were quite similar to thestandard submarine used by the UnitedStates and Great Britain. The Type VIIpredominated due to the fact that it wascheaper to build than the standard size

    speeds of between 30-44 knots.Unfortunately, this torpedo displayed avery prominent wake. Therefore, the G7E(electric) torpedo was preferred. Al-though the G7E had a range of only 5,800yards and a speed of 30 knots, it left nowake and thus was undetectable until ithit its target. Both types of torpedoeswQre 21 feet long and 21 inches indiameter. In both types, the warheadcontained 1,000 pounds of highexplosives.In late 1943 (which was too late), theGermans began using two new types oftorpedoes. The acoustic torpedo couldhome itself on the motor noise generatedby any ship within 500 meters. Theacoustic torpedo was developed for useagainst escort vessels which weregenerally too small and nimble to be hitby conventional torpedoes. Againstmerchant ships, the Germans eventuallybegan using the "zig-zag" torpedo. Thiswas a slow-moving, long-range torpedowhich was pre-programmed to run in acircular or zig-zag pattern. Once fired,the torpedo would zig-zag back and forthacross a convoy's course until it struck atarget.During 1942, the Germans developed a"radar detector" (the Metox) whichwarned a U-boat that it was beingmonitored by enemy radar. The Metox

    method of attack was nothing more thana naval "ambush". Later in the war, thGermans introduced the Schnorkeldevice which enabled a submarine tcruise for an indefinite period at perscope depth, exposing only the scopeand the Schnorkel breathing apparatuswhich drew air enough to allow thsubmarine to run on its deisel engineswhile submerged. This device madevisual spotting of submarines far moredifficult and thus the submarines wereable to return to coastal areasUnfortunately, however, while using theschnorkel, the U-boat's speed walimited to about 6 knots. In addition,made life in the already cramped crewquarters even more unbearable. Thecrew's efficiency often suffered due totheir inability to relax and exercise ondeck.ANTI-SUBMARINE FORCESThe U-boat had two mutual enemies.The one it was most prepared to deawith was the surface escort ship,generally a corvette or a destroyer. Mostescorts were approximately the samesize as submarines. The typical surfaceescort was 200-250 feet in length and hada displacement of about 1500 tons. Itgenerally carried one or two 3" or 4"guns, plus a number of lighter caliberguns. Generally, it would also be armed

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    underwater object. The "echo" couldthen be detected by the searching ship'shydrophones. When used by anexperienced operator, asdic wouldenable a searching ship to pick up a"silent running" or stationary submergedsubmarine.Because submarines spent most of theirpatrol time on the surface, the surfacesearch devices played a critical role indefeating the U-boats. The principalsurface search device was radar. Similarto asdic, a radar device transmitted anelectronic pulse which bounced off anintervening object and was picked upelectronically by the searching ship.Radar's range was ten times as great asthe 2-3,000 meter range of theunderwater devices.The most important surface searchdevice was the High Frequency DirectionFinder (HF/DF or "Huff-Duff"). AnHF/DF device, installed aboard an escortvessel, could detect the approximatesource of any radio transmissionoccurring within 50-100 miles. If two orthree HF/DF-equipped escorts wereavailable, the exact source of the radiotransmission could be pinpointed.Because U-boat radio transmissionswere used to report sighted convoys,HF/DF-equipped escorts could home in

    threw patterns of smaller depth chargesa few hundred yards in front of the escortvessel. This was an extremely usefuldevice because asdic contact could notbe held at extremely close range. A depthcharge thrower allowed the escort toattack the submarine before asdiccontact broke off.The most potent anti-submarine weaponwhich escort ships carried was aircraft.The escort carrier, introduced to protectNorth Atlantic convoys in the Spring of1943, rapidly became the submarine'smortal enemy. Without doubt, theprimary U-boat killing weapon was theairplane. Forty-six per cent of theU-boats sunk in the war were sunk byaircraft. By comparison, thirty-two percent were sunk by surface escorts, andsix per cent were sunk by air-surfaceteamwork. The remainder were sunk by avariety of miscellaneous causes includingmines, accidents, etc. Airplanes hadbetter speed and visibility than surfaceescorts and were usually as heavilyarmed as a destroyer for anti-submarinecombat. All types of aircraft, from single-engined fighters to four-enginedbombers, were used against the U-boats.The fighters principally operated off theescort carr iers. The large, shore-basedbombers carried radar and searchlightsand an anti-submarine arsenal which

    submerge before the radar-carryingaircraft could get close enough to attack.During 1942, also, the Allies beganinstalling radar and HF/DF equipment inmany 'surface escorts. Thus, althoughthe U-boats were able to defeatdetection from airborne radar, they soonfound themselves hounded by increas-ingly potent surface escorts, nowcarrying the new depth charge throwers.Gradually, the Allies realized theeffectiveness of aircraft and allocatedever-increasing numbers of planes forconvoy escort and submarine patrolduties. The airplane's threat was nextenhanced by the introduction of amicrowave radar device which theGerman Metox could not detect. Incombination with the introduction ofmicrowave radar in early 1943, the Alliesalso i~troduced beefed-up support-groups and escort carriers to strengthenthe defenses of the vital North Atlanticconvoys. A support group was simply anindependent group of escort vesselswhich could either be assigned directly toa convoy or could roam freely until arequest for assistance sent it speedingtoward a convoy under attack.When all of these advances werecombined in early 1943, the Battle of theAtlantic reached a climax. GermanU-boat losses became so great that

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    E agles an d W o lves.The outbreak of war in 1939saw CoastalCommand, the R.A.F. organizationresponsible for maritime operations,almost totally unprepared to deal withthe U-boat menace. While Britain hadmade considerable use of anti-submarineaircraft in the First World War, anover-reliance on Asdic and the lack offunds for development of aircraft forcedCoastal Command to begin almost fromscratch.For the first year of the war CoastalCommand suffered from an acuteshortage of modern aircraft. The pre-warAnson bomber was too short-ranged.The large Sunderland fly ing boat and theAmerican-built Hudson, however, wereentering service. - To make up thenecessary numbers, Wellington andWhitley bombers were diverted fromBomber Command. Yet aircraft were notthe only shortcoming. The only way todetect a submarine during this periodwas with the naked eye. This was verydifficult under operational conditions andimpossible in bad weather or at night. Onthe rare occasions a U-boat was spotted,they proved difficult to destroy. TheBritish 250-lb. anti-submarine depthbomb was a poor weapon. Even a direct

    based in Iceland and issued to 120Squadron R.A.F., for many months theonly Liberator-equipped unit involved inthe u-boat war.In late 1941, British Operational Researchscientists had modified the depth bombto make it more effective against U-boatssurprised on or near the surface. Themodified depth bombs were now set toexplode at depths of between four andeight fathoms. A new 500-lb. depthbomb had also been recently developed.It could crack a U-boat's hull if itexploded within eight feet of thesubmarine. These innovations increasedaircraf t ef fect iveness against U-boats by250%.The American entry into the war was, inmany ways, a temporary setback forCoastal Command. The Americanscomandeered Liberators for use in thePacific, and it was many months beforefurther American-built aircraft joinedBritish squadrons in the North Atlantic.Throughout the war, very long rangeaircraft were required for many tasks andthere was a constant shortage of theseaircraft which particularly hurt the Alliesin the North Atlantic U-boat -war,The Germans, faced with more effectiveaerial opposition, searched for aneffective countermeasure. They eventu-

    in the Battle of the Atlantic. ThesFW-200 Kondors were used to spoconvoys so that U-boats could be homein for the attack. The Kondors alsfrequently made deadly low levebombing attacks on the convoysparticularly those on the Gibralter anMediterranean convoy routes whichpassed close to their bases in France. Ooccasion, Kondors would engagedogfights with R.A.F. anti-submarineaircraft, usually to the latter's advantageThe threat posed by the Kondors led thBritish to introduce the "CAM-Ships".These were merchant ships equippedwith a catapult and a single fighteaircraf t which could be launched over thconvoy to discourage the Kondors. Athese ships had no flight deck, the fightewas forced to "ditch" in the sea when ifuel ran out. The pilot was then pickeout of the sea by one of the convoy'sescorts. Although the "CAM-Ships"were effective, a more dangerouadversary of the U-boat was introducedin September, 1942. These were smaaircraft carriers which began escortingtroop convoys involved in the TORCHinvasion of North Africa in the Autumnof 1942. While the use of carriers in aanti-submarine role had been tried i1939 and had proven a failure, it now

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    'The SubHunten " .~" b ~'Q b g ,+ ' ~ Notes: Name of aircraft shows bothr - ( $ V..S ,,6 ~ c : J ~ ~ fjAIRC_RAFr ~'6 c :R -J t : : > ~ Eng. Nat. l!/se R ate B,itlsh and US designat ions, the latter inparenthesis where assigned. Also inparenthesis is the plane's nickname,790 158 36 0 188 2 GB 39-42 usually better known than Its "real" one.The Sunderland's nickname was given It2,160 185 1,000 284 2 US 39-46 47 by the LuftWaffe, and means "flyinghedghog". Tile Whitley's nickname Isunprintable. Although! the fW-200 neverShort Sunderland V 2,980 134 2,000 213 4 GB 39-45 57 hunted submarines, it Is included in(Der Fliegend Ingellstellung) cO"lpat lson with the other aircraft which

    Armstrong-Whitworth 1,650 185 3;000 222 2 GB 39-42 37 patticlpated In the t!J-boat wa~. TrheotherWhitley V data' Is shown in order. of Importance.Range is maximum, inl miles, and atVickers Wellington III 2,200 160 1,500 255 2 GB 42-45 cruising speed shown. Bomb/oad is(Wimpey) normal at long range, and Is In pounds,

    Consolidated (B-24E 2,850 200 4,000' 30 3 4 US 41-46 98 Ma xim um s pe ed , in MPH, is pract ical forLiberator III short bursts only. Eng. Is number of(Lib) engines. More engines added reliabili ty.Nat. is country of manufacture. Ali i US2,000 5 0 2,000 85 US built airplanes were used by, British asGR 40-42 well. U se = years in service. Rate = anumerical quantlf lcatlon of the aircraft'sworth as a sub-hunter. An "idealt'

    sub-hunter of 1939-1945 wOtild rate546 125 1,500 139 GB 39-45 40 "100". Comparison of silip based andshore-besed aircraft Is not really validbecause they, worked in ditferingGrumman (TBM-3) Avenger 1,000 117412,000 262 US 4 2 . : . 4 6 52 environments. The same may be seid for(Turkey) the blimp.

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    20

    long flights to and from a distant base.This was very important as the majorityof attacks on U-boats occurred far out inthe Atlantic in the immediate vicinity ofconvoys. Also an escort carrier boreenough aircraft to allow for continuousdaytime air escort of a convoy. This wasextremely advantageous as the merepresence of aircraft was usually apowerful U-boat deterrent. Two Liber-ators were sufficient to thwart a largewolfpack's attack on convoy HX 217 inearly 1943. Another excellent deterrentwas the blimp, which was used only bythe U.S. Navy. While blimps accountedfor only two U-boats during the entirewar, very few submarines remained in anarea patrolled by blimps. No convoy, ineither World War, ever lost a ship whileescorted by a blimp.Since 1940, the U-boats had tended torun submerged by day and surface torecharge batteries at night, when theywere harder to detect. But in mid-1942,the U-boats lost the immunity thatdarkness had previously afforded. At thattime, the R.A.F. introduced the LeighLight, an aircraft mounted searchlight.This device made night attacks onU-boats practical, providing the U-boat'sgeneral location could be estimated withthe aid of radar. The radar and Leigh

    could actually listen for submergedsubmarines passing near the sonobuoy.Once detected, submerged U-boatscould now be attacked with a new Alliedacoustical homing torpedo. SurfacedU-boats could be located by new Alliedcentimetric radar devices which used anew radar lengthwave which the GermanMetox could not detect.The first half of 1943 saw the greatconfrontation between the U-boats andtheir airborne assailants. More and more,the Germans found the "Atlantic Gap"shrinking in size. Yet the realbattleground was no longer themid-Atlantic but the Bay of Biscay.British Operational Research had deter-mined that it was infinitely easier todetect U-boats in this transit area thanout in the broad, empty stretches ofocean. Therefore, Coastal Commandmade a round the clock effort to interdictthe U-boat traffic in the Bay. TheGermans initially tried to counter theseair patrols by running submerged atnight. As this reduced the boats' speedand increased the length of time requiredfor a boat to break out into the Atlantic,the Germans changed their tactics inApril, 1943. Instead of diving to avoidaircraft , the U-boats were equipped withadditional anti-aircraft guns and were run

    A new aircraft versus U-boat battlebegan with the D-Day landings in June1944. As might be expected, theGermans concentrated U-boats from allover Europe against the invasion. Theywere met by strong air patrols at bothentrances to the English Channel. Within17 days of D-Day, 13 U-boats had beensunk by these air patrols alone. Facedwith these heavy losses, and with manybases threatened by Allied forces, theGermans were forced to call off thisabortive U-boat offensive in early July. I thad been defeated almost totally byunassisted aircraft.Finally, the Germans succeeded inproducing an effective countermeasure.This was the Schnorkel, a tube whichallowed the U-boats to recharge theirbatteries while submerged. CoastalCommand found it difficult to deal withthe schnorkel-equipped boats whichbegan appearing in Brit ish coastal watersin late 1944. These waters had been freeof U-boats since 1940. Fortunately, therewere few schnorkel-equipped boatsavailable.The last great battle of the submarinewar took place in April 1945, when theRussians captured the U-boat trainingbases on the Baltic. The U-boats

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    [continued f rom page 15)

    Donitz, despite the de facto war whichalready existed. Hitler instead opted toretain a third of the available U-boats in theMediterranean. As in the case of Norway in1940, this Mediterranean diversion was aserious blunder. Because of the smallvolume of Allied shipping, the Mediterra-nean U-boats accomplished very little incomparison to the U-boats working theNorth Atlantic convoy routes.In January, 1942, however, Donitz wasgiven permission to begin operations in thewestern Atlantic. The initial German opera-tion, involving only five boats workingbetween the Gulf of St. Lawrence and CapeHatteras, began in mid-January and wascodenamed Paukenschlag (Roll of Drums).In two weeks, the five boats, captained by"ace" German crews, sank at least 20 shipsof approximately 150,000 gross tons. It wasthe beginning of a six month massacre.American merchant ships were unarmedand no arrangements had been made tobegin convoying the heavy Americancoastal shipping traffic . Ships sailed fully litat night and broadcasted information abouttheir schedules, air search patrols, etc. on afrequency regularly monitored by theU-boats. It took five months to enforce ablack-out along the American coastlineduring which time merchant traffic wasbrilliantly silhouetted each night, invitingsubmarine attacks. By day, the U-boatsstayed submerged beneath the congested

    The U-boat massacre was aseffective asthedestruct ion of a half -dozen major Americanwar plants by saboteurs. In a typical night'swork, a U-boat might sink two 6,OOO-tonfreighters and a 3,ooo-ton tanker. Onaverage, this would mean the loss of 42tanks, eight six-inch howitzers, eighty-eight25 lb. guns, forty two-pound guns, twenty-four armored cars, fif ty Bren carriers, 5,200tons of ammunition, 600 rifles, 425 tons oftank equipment, 2,000 tons of stores, and1,000 tanks of gasoline.Donitz quickly realized he had struck goldand immediately dispatched additionalboats to the "golden west", as the Germansnicknamed these rich new hunting grounds.The campaign was waged for a full sixmonths. The maximum German effort wasmade in May, 1942, when Donitz had about30 boats operating between Halifax andTrinidad. The operations in the Carribeanwere made possible when the first U-tankers(Type Xl and supply U-boats (Type XlVIbecame operational during the early part of1942. The U-tankers had no offensivearmament, but each carr ied .about 600 tonsof reserve fuel which was used to refuel themedium-sized U-boats at sea. One U-tankercould keep a dozen Type VII's fully fueledfor a month. The use of the U-tankers there-fore increased the range of the smaller boatsby a factor of two, and made it possible tokeep 50% of the U-boats at sea in fightingcondition at all times.In late April, 1942, the Americans, pressed

    the Florida coast into the Gulf of Mexicothe Carribean. By August, 1942,interlocking convoy system had bestablished encompassing all shippinbetween Cuba and Nova Scot ia, and theof U-boat victims had trailed off sharpNevertheless, the U-boats' s ix month spin the western Atlantic netted somemerchant ships totalling about 2,250,gross tons for which only eight U-bowere sacrificed. It was the greatest shippmassacre of the war.THE CLIMAX [August 1 94 2 - May 194

    The rich vein of merchant targets alongAmerican seaboard dried up rapidly as soas an efficient convoy system was institutthere in the summer of 1942. On JulyDonitz issued orders which shifted the foof the tonnage war back to the NoAtlantic convoy routes. The U-boat flnow totalled more than 330 U-boats,which almost half were availableoperations.In May, 1942, a German study had bprepared which had noted the steadecline in British imports over the previotwo years. The report had concluded tha700,000 tons of Allied shipping couldsunk during each month of 1942, the Allshipbuilding capacity would be negatedBritain would be doomed.With this in mind, Donitz had formulatednew system for increasing sinkings inAtlantic. U-boats putting to sea from bFrance and Germany would ~ather into

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    22

    Tonnageschlacht[T he T on nage W a r]Throughout the war Donitz contendedthat the sole objective of U-boatoperations should be the quickestpossible sinking of the greatest possibleenemy ship tonnage. His contention wassimply that if the U-boats could sinkmerchant ships faster than Alliedshipyards could replace their losses,Britain would inevitably be starved intosubmission. As he believed this to be theonly formula which could bring about aGerman victory, he bitterly opposedsending U-boats on any mission notdirectly intended to heighten theeffectiveness of the tonnage war.Furthermore, as the Atlantic convoyroutes offered the heaviest Alliedmerchant traffic, Donitz wished toconcentrate all of the available U-boatstrength in the Atlantic for as long as itremained profitable to do so. Thus,although he wil lingly dispersed the avail-able U-boat strength to different areaswithin the Atlantic at different timesduring the war to exploit weaknesses inAllied anti-submarine defenses, hevehemently opposed the diversion ofU-boats to Norway in 1940 and into theMediterranean in 1941-42 as ordered byHitler. As these diversions provedpitifully ineffective, part of U-boat's

    losses were sustained between 1939-42,Britain was, in fact, losing the war.During 1941, Britain managed to importonly about 30.5 million tons against her.required peacetime norm of 50 million. In1942, during the highwater mark of theU-boat offensive, Brit ish imports sank to22.9 million tons. British consumptionwas exceeding imports by almost 2.5million tons during 1942 and half the rawmaterials consumed by British industrywere being drawn from reserve stocks.

    About this time a study prepared forDonitz estimated that the maximumAllied shipbuilding capacity for 1942-43was approximately 18.5 mill ion tons. Thismeant that if the volume of Alliedsinkings could be maintained at 700,000tons per month (and the campaign of1942 indicated it could) the new Alliedconstruction could be continuouslynegated by losses and Britain would

    total U-boat victims, the Germansubmarines had accounted for over 1million tons, the Italians slightly morethan half a million tons, and theJapanese, the remainder. Of the 785German U-boats derstroyed by enemyaction, British forces accounted for 513"kills", the Americans for 147, jointBritish and American forces for 12, andthe Russians for 7. The remainingU-boats succumbed to a variety ounknown causes. At the time of theirsurrender, the Germans scuttled morethan 200 U-boats.The value of the Allied convoy system ireflected in the following figures.Sixty-one percent of the Allied losses toU-boats were ships sunk while sailingindependently. Thirty per cent of thelosses came from convoyed shipsAnother nine per" cent were sunk whilestraggling from convoys. In 1941, shiplosses in Atlantic convoys amounted toone ship for every 181 sailings. Noconvoy was ever totally destroyed. Only3,064 of the 4,453,061 soldierstransported from the United States toEurope were lost at sea.

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    Month TotalU-Boats U-:'Boat U-BoatCmsnd. Strength LossesTonnageShips SunkSunk (G.R.T.'

    Sept na 57 2 41 153,8791939Oct na 5 5 a 5 27 134,807.5 2a 21 51,589

    114 421,15654a 25 80,881

    Mo.Avg. 1.5 54 2.2 28 105,289Yr.Totsl 6 9

    1940Feb 1 50 5 49 185,950Jan 2 54 178,

    Mar 2 502 63 355,4312 23 66,246Apr 3 47

    May 3 496 6 30,927

    15 63,407June 3 50

    38 194,922uly 3 5 2

    61 344,684Aug 5 55

    34 173,996Se!)t ., 61Oct 8 68

    39 229,501Nov 9 76

    2 54 283,3861 62 266,7372

    Yr.Totsl 54 26 492 2,373,070Dec 9 83Mo.Avg. 4.5 2.271941

    41 197,755

    Jan 11 9442 207,64917 98,702

    Feb 9 103

    Month TotalU-Boats U-Boat U-BoatCmsnd. Strength LossesTonnageShips SunkSunk (G.R.T.'

    1943Jan 42 218,449132 6Feb 68 380,83515 191

    426 16 105 590,2347429 15 48 276,5178

    26 413 42 44 226,772421 17 20 66,8075

    July 40 8 39 46 246,1786Aug 21 404 25 17 88,957Se!)t 12 19 106,8201 413Oct 24 82,1997 414 26Nov 9 30,726185 21Dec 9 63,0381 442 7Yr.Tots! 2 9 0 245 451 2,395,632Mo.Avg. 418 20.4 38 199,6294.21944Jan 11 74,81647 150Feb 20 75,0279 444 22Mar 443 24 17 99,4973Apr 23 10 61,80745 21May 441 4 24,4249 23June 11 426 11 51,6846July 416 25 16 76,1995Aug 15 38 7 18 98,8764Sept 23 7 43,3680 38 4

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    24[conrinuedfrom page 21)pounded by additional sinkings by Germanaircraft, mines, and surface raiders, the700,000 ton quota which was to havefinished off the British was consistentlybeing met. What the Germans had notcounted on, however, was the tremendouscapacity of the American shipbuildingindustry. During 1943, the Americans builtand launched more than 20 million tons ofshipping, more than double the Germanestimate of the total Allied constructioncapacity. Thus, even the inflated claimsreported by the U-boats (which led theGermans to estimate Allied shipping lossesfor 1942 at close to twelve million tonswhen the actual amount was about half a~much) were inadequate to actually producea German victory in the tonnage war.But the Germans had more immediateproblems. These were chiefly due to thetechnical progress being made by the Alliesin anti-submarine warfare. During theautumn of 1942, the Allies had begun usingairborne radar to hinder the passage ofU-boats through the Bay of Biscay transitarea. Between October and the end of 1942,the Germans had gained temporary relieffrom this type of detection by devising aradar detector which warned when a U-boatwas being monitored by enemy radar. InFebruary, 1943, however, the Allies intro-duced a new short-wave radar which theGerman device could not detect. TheGermans were unable to develop any

    less, by increaSing the average size of theconvoys enough vessels were conserved toallow the number of escorts per convoy tobe increased from six to nine vessels. Moreimportantly, additional warships conservedin the same manner were formed into fiveBritish convoy support groups, later joinedby one American support group. These sup-port groups had a sudden and decisiveeffect on the Battle of the Atlantic. Eachsupport group was comprised of betweenfive and seven destroyers and frigates.Three of the support groups were bolsteredby the addition of one escort apiece.Generally, a support group would accom-pany a convoy through the" Atlantic gap"area which could not be reached by aircraftbased either in Iceland, Greenland, New-foundland or Northern Ireland. If thesupport group included an escort carrier, itvirtually closed the "gap" entirely, deprivingthe U-boats of their favorite huntinggrounds. Support groups without escortcarriers were extremely effective because aconvoy escorted by such a group virtuallybristled with submarine location equipmentand anti-submarine weaponry.In combination, the numerically strength-ened and technologically improved anti-marine forces rapidly overwhelmed theU-boats between the beginning of Marchand the end of May, 1943. March is perhapsthe worst month, weatherwise, on the NorthAtlantic. For the first nine days of the monthin 1943, westerly gales, snow and hail

    Donitz lost 41 U-boats, more than 25% ohis operational strength. For each submar-ine the Germans lost in May, only 4,500 tonsof Allied shipping was destroyed. One yeaearlier, the ratio had been 60,000 tons peU-boat lost. The May figures were intoler-able. On May 24, Donitz withdrew all but atoken number of U-boats from the NorthAtlantic convoy routes. He had alwaysfought to keep the U-boats in that theater.Their withdrawal was tantamount to anadmission of defeat.On May 31, Donitz reported to Hitler. Hedescribed the situation in detail, noting theAll ies' apparent technological edge. He thendescribed the desperate search for counter-measures which German scientists wereconducting. The "Naxos" short-wave radardetector was being tested. The "Zaunkonig"acoustic homing torpedo for use againstescort ships was ready to be put into ser-vice. The "LuT' torpedo, which was toweave back and forth across a convoy's lineof advance, would be available by theautumn. There was tAe "schnorkel"breathing apparatus that could be fittedonto presently operating U-boats to relievethem of the necessity of surfacing torecharge batteries. Finally, there was, on thedrawing board, two versions of arevolutionary new type of U-boat. Theplanned Type XXI and Type XXIII U-boatswere to have an underwater speed of 17.5and 12.5 knots repectively. This would allowthem to operate as "true" submarines.

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    FootnotesS&T Footnotes presents short articles andespecially interesting letters written by the readersand staff of S&T.

    TOWN PLANNING IN TANKITactical game maps usually have a townor village to shield the defender, serve asan objective to fight over, or justgenerally get in the way. At the scale ofPanzerBlitz a village can be just a clumpof undifferentiated hexes constituting aspecial type of terrain. At the scale ofSniper the town is a highly differentiatedmaze of walls, floors, windows andstairways. Tankl has a scale intermediatebetween these levels, and we may"build" a town, village or hamlet on theTankl mapboard that simulates thecharacter istics of buildings, or blocks ofbuildings appropriate to this scale.Take fortification counters from anyother SPI game (e.g., American CivilWar). Arrange them individually, or inclumps, leaving "streets" or "aleys" onehex wide between separate blocks.Blocks of buildings rnav exist in twostates: Intact or destroyed. (Since ourborrowed fortification counters will

    COMBINATION PLA Y SYSTfMWithin the past year and a half, SPI haspublished several games featuring the"simultaneous movement system". Whenapplied to the tactical level games such asKampfpanzer and Desert War, this systemhas been generally well received. We feel,however, that it has added realism andsuspense at some cost in playing time.Because this system requires full writtenplots for all unit activities, it becomesunwieldy whenever there are more thantwenty to thirty units per side in play.When we decided to do replacement gamesfor Combat Command and Red Star/WhiteStar, we started with the basic Desert WarSi-Move system and deCided to modify thissystem to eliminate as much written plott ingas possible while sti ll retaining the essentialsimultaneous elements. What follows is thepreliminary draft for the optional Combina-tion Sequence of Play. We have retained thesimultaneous Fire Combat procedures (ofDesert War) while making Movement analternate sequential process. This eliminatedmost of the paperwork which a puresimultaneous system involves. Yet it retainssimultaneity where it is most important, inthe combat procedure.In playtesting this system (which we will callthe Combination Play System for the timebeing) we found that alternating movementdid not give a substantial advantage toeither Player. However, the simultaneous

    execute combat and movement. ThSequence of Play is repeated Game-Turafter Game-Turn until the termination of thScenario.During a Game-Turn a Player is free to ushis units as he sees fit. He may move someall or none of his units. But no unit may botmove and attack in the same Game-TurnSEQUENCE OFPLA Y OUTLINE[Modified Sequential and SimultaneousSystem]A. Mutual Plot Phase (simultaneous)Both Players plot Direct Fire andOpportunity Fire for their units. Plot shouldnote the firing unit, method of fire, anTarget hex number. Playors designate whichunits shall move during the MovementPhase, but do not indicate the actual pathof movement for their units.B . Panic Determination Phase(simultaneous)Both Players execute Panic Procedure andetermine which of their units are subject tPanic. Panic markers are placed oPanicked units.C . Direct Fire Phase(simultaneous application of results)1. The first Player executes Direct Firaccording to his plot.2. The second Player executes Direct Firaccording to his plot. Both Players placindirect fire H markers.3. Disruption markers are placed according

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    26Since 1945, the world has been in the throesof readjustment in many ways. Mostimportant, for the first time it has become amatter of accepted fact that the world nolonger revolved around western Europe, asit had for two thousand years. Not only wasthe United States a major power of unheardof strength, but the Soviet Union was ableto capitalize on its post-war position andevolve into a superpower itself. By 1950,Asia was a force to be reckoned with for thefirst time since the Mongols moved west.China, India and a reviving Japan made theirinfluence felt. A decade later, Africa wasbecoming independent.In this new system, few, if any, of the oldvalues made any sense. The seeminglyeternal r ivalry between England, Germanyand France paled by comparison with therivalry between the US and USSR whichdeveloped in the immediate postwar years.THE ALLIANCESThe USSR occupied all of eastern Europeand the Balkans (except Greece andEuropean Turkey) at the end of World War IIand soon had installed favorable govern-

    ments in almost all of them. Yugoslavia, ofcourse, had Tito, who owed his power moreto his own partisans than Soviet might. Inthe 1960's, Albania went its own curiousway. The rather brutal defenestration ofPrague (round two, for history buffs) andthe civ il war in Greece between Communistand non-Communist forces, as well astheBerlin blockade, convinced western Europethat it was only a matter of time before theshaky Italian Hepublic, fragmented Franceor recovering West Germany were targetsfor internal or external pressures from theUSSR. The result was the North AtlanticTreaty Organization, formed in 1949 andcomprising all of the western Europeanwartime allies plus West Germany (in 1954),Not content, the US began to implement itscontainment policy, organizing two otherpacts involving countries bordering theSoviet Union: Southeast Asia TreatyOrganization (SEATO) (1954) and MiddleEastTreaty Organization (METO), called theBaghdad Pact (also formed in 1954) andrenamed Central Treaty Organization(CENTO) in 1959, after a coup toppled thepro-western Iraqi kingdom. The Soviets, not

    to be outdone, countered with the WarsaPact, which included everyone on their siof the line in Europe except for apostaYugoslavia. The result was, basically, ththe countr ies bordering the Communist blochose up sides.A look at a map shows the militaposition of the USSR. Simply put, itmostly surrounded by hostile countr ies. Itinteresting to note that the two best meanof access (for the USSR) to the sea lie outthe Baltic and Black Seas, both of whicmust pass through NATO held land(between Norway and Denmark in the nortand through Turkish waters in the southWhat remains is the always nasty traround North Cape or seeking access fromthe Far East, primarily Vladivostok. Evethat is not entirely clear since the Japanesislands present constricted waters.

    THE BALANCE OFECONOMIESThe ability to wage war on a global scalerelated, at least in part, to the economstrength of the nations participating. Aeconomically weak country will soonexhausted. Indeed, a case can be made th

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    Britain, quite strong before 1939, has neverreally recovered from World War II and thedrain it placed on the British economy. One"ballpark" measure is to compare the grossnational products of the nations involved.No matter how you pick the sides, the oneswhich will be lined up with the US will havean overwhelming advantage in GNP. Ingreat measure, this is because the GNP ofthe US, alone, is greater than that of thewhole Warsaw Pact. The total GNP of theNATO countries, for example, is2,138 bil liondollars versus 604 billion dollars for theWarsaw Pact. (Note: all GNP figures usedare 1972 figures.) The impact of thesuperpowers is most evident when it isnoted that the US provides 54% of the GNPof NATO and the USSR 38% of the WarsawPact. Of equal importance, for Europe, is thefact that between the two pacts, theycomprise 85% of the GNP of Europe. Thismeans, in effect, that no viable third forcecan exist in Europe to counterbalance thetwo pacts as long as they remain realtivelyfirm.There are, of course, other blocs toconsider. There is the Arab bloc, a loose

    conglomeration focused around Egypt,Syria and Saudi Arabia including, in varyingdegrees of enthusiasm, Jordan, Sudan,Libya, Iraq, Lebanon, Algeria and Tunisia.The GNP of this bloc is 32 billion dollars. Thestrongest nation in the Near East,economically, is Iran. Recent developmentsin Iran indicate that it is on the verge oftrying to translate some of that into militarypower. After Iran, in GNP, is Egypt, fol lowedclosely by Israel. Israel's GNP is 20% of thatof the whole Arab bloc. It is interesting tonote Israel's position in the economicstandings since it does indicate thateconomic power, alone, does not guaranteemilitary success. It is equally important toexamine the economic diversity (or lack ofit) which goes into that GNP. Aone-economy country ends up importingthe essential materials to build a militaryforce. Compare, for example, the militarystrength of India with that of Sweden, yetIndia has the greater GNP.In essence, even if a number of thenominally pro-US nations remain neutral,the allies who will probably join the US willensure that the greater economic strength

    lies in the pro-US bloc. Although,noted in the case of Israel and Sweden, tis not a guarantee of military success, tparallel holds true more often than not.A similar imbalance exists in the sinewswar - the access the various nations havethe materials with which to build tequipment used in wartime and with whito power them. Although the Arab worhas the largest single known source of cruoil, its value to the USSR is somewhephemeral since the routes to the USSR aover pro-US waters and lands. On the othhand, the USSR does have consideraboil resources of its own. Much of this is nfully tapped and would, in all probabilityable to sustain the USSR in the same wthat American oil supplies would sustain tUS. Equally important is the refininfacilities available. Here the pro-Ucountries have a considerable edge. Othareas of importance in wartime includmetal ores. Once again, those developesources available are much greater for tpro-US countries than for the pro-USSR.the same time, the USSR has vauntapped areas and as time progresse

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    28more and more of these areas are openedup, some of this imbalance will ease. But aslong as they remain undeveloped, theadvantage lies in the west.The disadvantage of the pro-USSR nationsin terms of GNP is that, coupled with thefact that they have largely untappedresources, they lack easy access toresources outside their national boundaries.This will work against the ability of theUSSR and its allies to withstand a long warof attrition. Even with large numbers ofneutrals in the nominally pro-US bloc, therelative ease of access to resource areasoutside the US will give the US a betterposition than the USSR.Again, though, a word of caution is in order.Raw figures such as GNP and tons of oreeither untapped or being tapped can bedeceptive. History has taught severallessons on this point, one of which is thedegree to which the Soviets can mobilizetheir economy when necessary. Theireconomy is not now anything like what itwas in 1941 and, assuming that, proportion-ately, they achieve the same results, theirefforts will be even greater. Against this isthe risk of the US adopting a position of"guns and butter" in the event of war withthe USSR - refusing to reduce the qualityof life for the average citizen in order tomaximize the war effort. In World War II,the US rose to the occasion but in Vietnam,there was 'relatively lit tle impact on civilianlife. There were no onerous shortages, such

    the enemy homeland is thousands of milesaway. This isstrategic warfare in its ult imatesense - ICBM's, intercontinental bombersand so forth. Nations lacking this weaponrybecome confined to border wars withlimited long range strikes behind the lines(such as .the Israeli strikes on Egyptianairfields in 1967). But the weaponry isessentially tactical, even in making thesestrikes - short range missiles, interceptorsand the like. The chart showing strategicweaponry capabilities reflects the consoli-dation of power in a few hands.In addition to having the unique power toescalate the war to global war, there is apower also held in the hands of only a fewnations to cut off a war. The chart showingthe material producers shows how fewnations make the principal equipmentneeded to fight a war. Most nations maketheir own bullets and gunpowder, as well assmall arms. But the big stuff comes fromthis small group and, in effect, they can cutoff the rest of the world. It has been notedthat the 1973 Arab-Israeli war could nothave gone on much longer in any eventsince the losses sustained by both sides hadnot been replaced in sufficient quantities.No war can go' very long with substantiallosses without either achieving a militarysolution or being resupplied with newequipment by one of these powers. If themajor powers choose not to give thesesupplies, the minor power is hurting.Witness the problems Israel had when

    Guns o r Bu tte r R e vis ite dHermann Goring is quoted as sayingthe German people had to chobetween guns or butter in the 1930'smany ways, things haven't changedmost countries.It is hard to say, looking at simstatist ics, whether the f igures they shin terms of size of army versus grnational product are indicative ofeconomic requirement or merelygeneral trend. A s can beseen by the cshowing the percentage of GNP spon the military, the Warsaw PactNATO countries spend a greapercentage of their GNP on the militthan most other countries. The otunsurprising figure is that the militoriented nations (i.e., those who hbeen involved in fighting in the pastyears) spend a greater percentage ththose in that sector who have not binvolved in war during that period.The next two charts show the countrspending the greatest proport ion of thGNP on their armed forces and thhaving the greatest proportion of thpopulation in the armed forces.The point that these charts make is thwith the nations spending the greapercentage on the military, almost a

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    of materiel (not to mention people) weresimply irreplaceable: the nations couldnot afford to go too far into hock to theirsuper power backers in replacing theirlosses. The small nations which fieldarmies are effectively one shot armies:they must stake it all on one big push orrisk exhausting all of the resources theyhave built up. The nations with stayingpower are those which have the largereconomies. It is they who not only canwield proport ionately greater power, butthey can actually exceed the proportion

    as they get greater. Thus, the US, infielding an armed force equal to 1% oftheir population can absorb the costmore easily than, say, Albania.There is a breakpoint beyond which asmall country is simply in over its head.This means the civilian quality of lifemust suffer. Basic machinery forindustrialization and basic consumergoods have a "floor" cost. With a limitedamount of money to spend, if an inordi-nate amount is spent on the military, the

    consumer goods and machinery must goby the boards. The United Statesachieved, in Vietnam, the ability to wagea major war without disrupting the(material) quality of life at home. Criticswill correctly note that what was lost wasa number of domestic improvementprograms. To keep in the same context,what happened in Vietnam was that theUS could have guns and butter, butcouldn't afford to improve the quality ofthe butter. Most countries don't havethat option.

    Average % of GNP Spent on MlUtary Top Nations In % of Population In MlUtary% of GNP spent % of population % of population % of GNP spenton military in military in military on military

    4.1 ... Israel 3.616 2,1.618US 7.3 1.0 ... China(Taiwan) 3.323

    4.0 1.01.3SSR South0.9 Vietnam 15.160

    Major sub-Saharancountries 0.4 0.2 ? NorthVietnam 2.627 Cambodia 2.496Near East, ..... Japan

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    30

    B ig B r ot he r Is WatchingThe 1973 Arab-Israeli war graphicallydemonstrated the impact of a new andpotentially significant dimension of war-fare: the practical use of satellites forintelligence purposes.This is one of themost limited areas of activity In war;far.esince,at present, onlya few nationshavedevelopeClearth satellites and only fourhave actually launched their own.However, when it comes to the areaofmjlitalY uses, the field is solely the pro-perty of the US and USSR.The present US program is, of course,highly classified. Most programs don'teven have a nameand the launching isdesignatedby year and sequence'in thatyear, solely for the purpose of keepingtabs on what Is up in space (which isgetting rather crowded now). liSsatellitesappeartobe of seyerElIdifferenttypes. There is a military-meteorologicaltype,the IntegratedMissileEarlyWarningSatell ite (lMEWS) and its predecessorBallistic Missile Early Warning Satel.lite(BMEWS) (which may bephasedout bynow), the Tlmation and Transit naviga-tional satellites, Satellite and MissileObservation System (SAM0S) which isa "close-look" type and the Big Birdtype, both of which are recon satellites;Ocean Area Reconnaissance Satellite

    The Soviet system is equally classified,but the problem is compounded by thefact that the western powers don't wantto let 'out how much information theyactually,know about the USSB's satelliteprogram. Therefore"a greatdealof whatis known about the USSR's program Isbasedon deduction. Factors consideredare the weight of the satellite, the sizeand shape of the orbit and the length oftime It staysup.The shapeof the satelliteis also considered, but this is morevaluablefor determining whether a givensatellite is related to anything which hasbeen put up before or appears to besomethiRg new. The Soviets lack eventhe good grace to giveany namesto theirsatellites. All are launched under theubigultous Cosmos designation, whichalso includes many purely researchsatellitesand, apparently, hasbeenusedasa cover name for failed space probes(if they had been successfulthey mighthaveIleen a Venera or some other typewhich is named by the USSR).They seemto haveabout the sametypeof satellites as the US, including arecoverable photographic satellite, navi-gational and meteorological satellites,inspection/destruction satellites, whichalter their position inorbit, a seriesof 400kg satellites which send back radio

    supplies or troops as it leaves themarshalling yards. Since a satellite cantravel around the earth in 90 minutes,there is little chance to avoid itsobservation.Moreover, the days when asatell ite had to be launohedat a certainanglearenow over.A satellitecanbe putInto a polar orbit or any other o~bitthatthe launching nation desires. It is notdone on the launchitself, i t can be donewith the control elements on thesatellites.Given the maneuverability of the reconsatellites and the necessary maneuver-ability of the inspection/destructionsatellites, it is easy to conceive afuturistic "dogflght" between satellites.The important, andunansweredquestioniswhether the killer satellitesand "spacemines" areeffective enough to outweighthe number being sent up to replacelosses.It is expensiveto put a lsatelliteinorbit. lihe cost in terms of a launchvehicle andmanpower neededto send itup is the most significant factor, thoughthe cost of such a sophisticated satelliteis not to be written off, either.Presumably,the cost of putting up killerswould be substantial, too. But themultiple satellite launch program of theSoviets, for example, would ease thatcost considerably if they could put eightsatellite destroyers in orbit for evei

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    [continuedjrom page 28]choose up sides (such as the Arab-Israeliwar) and into which they are drawn againsttheir will. Another scenario is a war betweena super power and a third nation (such asVietnam or Czechoslovakia) where the rivalmajor power feels compelled to make agesture and finds itself suddenly in a war(the Chinese "volunteer" system in Koreawould be an example of thisl.Areas in which one or the other of the abovetwo possibilities could occur obviouslycommence with the Arab-Israeli situat ion.The determination that it is worth superpower intervention turns on the value of thearea to the power involved, either in purelyeconomic terms (oil) or in political terms(loss of prestige, such as led toCzechoslovakia and Vietnam). Similarproblems are possible in areas where-Cornrnunist nations have achieved territorialgains from partition (such as Korea) orstraight out war (such as lands acquired byChina from India a decade agol. Stillanother potential area for war is the Indiansubcontinent with Pakistan still unhappy atthe loss of Bangladesh or India and Pakistanstill at odds over Kashmir. In fact, now thatIndia has the atomic bomb (for "peacefuluses only") the possibility is present thatIndia may seek to resolve the Kashmirmatter once and for all by peacefully usingtheir nuclear weapon in downtownIslamabad.A decade ago subsaharan Africa was in the

    a nation with the result that the majoritytribe now has the opportunity to put theminorities down. This was at the core of theNigeria/Biafra situation and the potential forits repetition is certainly there. Dependingon the nation, the possibility exists that thepowers will support either the centralgovernment or the rebelling tribe. Theeconomic strength of Nigeria, the greatestof the black African nations, is one reasonfor the outside support as the variouspowers determined whether it was in theirinterest to have the central government orthe rebels prevail. Finally, Africa is stillunsettled politically and the potentialseems greatest there for the type of politicalaberration that is presently found inUganda, where former heavyweight boxerAmin has built a navy for his landlockednation to sail Lake Victoria so that invadersfrom Tanzania can be repelled.The increased stabilizat ion of subsaharanAfrica is one reason why there is less activerivalry there than a decade age and,accordingly, less likelihood of war. Anotherfactor for the reduced potential for war isthe lack of economic development insubsaharan Africa. At this point there isreally no prize worth fighting for. Perhaps inyears to come, when the natural resourcesare more developed, this situation willchange.The western hemisphere, by contrast, issurprisingly devoid of any real potential foreast-west conflict. Cuba has proven to be a

    So, when talking about the prospects of win the world, either coincidentally or perhapdirect ly as a result of the Communist/non-Communist confrontations, the greatethreats are to be found in the countriebordering the Communist bloc.TH E PR OB LEM O FOF NUC LEAR PROLIF ERA T IONIn 1969, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treawas finally worked out and executedmost of the world's nations. Principamong the signers were the US and USSRIn essence, the treaty says that nuclepowers will not give nuclear weapons.non-nuclear powers nor help them develonuclear weapons. The non-nuclear powesigning the treaty agree not to try to obtanuclear weapons. Curiously, the nationwhich did not sign the treaty are precisethose who were either in the relatively ear

    [continued on page

    tilsGross National 2 -~ ~Product and "t)Q "t)mAcquisition of !Il~. . . , . .s I I I .~ 13Nuclear . . . . 5 ,~ 5 , : : 1Q f . . I . . . f . . I Ij:Weapons til ~~ III Qc : : ! ! i~Nation t!)~ ~~ ~'S1- --1. USA 1151.8 '45 '52

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    32

    Conventional Combat Forces

    NationPop. GNP Active

    [millions] [$, billions] Div.

    U.S.S.R.Warsaw Pact - CWarsaw Pact - S

    JordanSaudi Arabia

    IranIndonesiaAustralia, N.Z.

    211225102 -25 3664 13.3366.82.68.51140

    5 90653213616

    219'

    1200'839,1474 5 0115557

    7 . 63.7

    4.8201253

    Res.Div. Tanks MP

    AircraftAS 8

    90030 0

    3400100048 0----4302~,1103060130200400

    600 38005 00120

    305090

    Navy~e Manpowert . ; ; : [thousands]

    3500680052002 0 0 02 0 0 0130040090

    100096 0190010009003001 5 0

    '18(28) 32(38)33(42) 8(~0)33(30)65(65) 99(79)27(21) 4(3)19(13)3(6)

    6000e o O o 1300,

    240200

    5050

    9036420

    , 180031017017001306060

    664zag10246 041181 4152o10

    1530

    oooooooo

    6(5) 06(3) 01(2) 2(2)16(8) 0

    30180

    12(10)6(5)5(5)1(1)4(3)16 (11 )31(28)

    , 1060 1140 2546 2070 ~

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    the world's armed forces. Ground forcestrength is expressed in terms ofdivisions. The division is by far the mostcommon ground force organization.Those nations which do not have theirground forces organized into divisionscould, quite easily, adopt this form oforganization. Almost all divisions containbetween 10,000and 20,000men. Next tothe number of divisions is a standardstrength evaluation number for the totaldivisions in that country. This evaluationis based upon the average estimated"defensive" combat strength of anations divisions, the quantity andquality of the divisions' manpower andtactics. Since these factors vary sogreatly from one nation to another, thisstandard strength evaluation was neces-sary so that one nations "divisions"could be readily compared withanother's. The active divisions are thosewhich are either manned at full strengthor near full strength or can be brought tofull strength within a few days withoutcausing massive disruption in thatnation. Reserve divisions either takelonger to mobilize (as much as a monthor so) or cause considerably moredisruption of the nations peace-timeroutine when they are brought up to fullstrength. The number of tanks eachnation has is given because this is theprime indicator of that nations ability towage mechanized warfare.

    included in these totals, although theaircraft they operate are included in theaircraft totals.For purposes of comparison, we maydivide the world into seven geographicareas. First, there is the United States.For purposes of this analysis, we haveincluded Canada into the NATO Centralgroup as this is where Canada hasstationed a large proportion of its first-line combat forces and committed, forpossible future use, much of its reserveforces. For all practical purposes, theUnited States has no real or potentialmilitary opposition on the NorthAmerican continent.The second geographic area is Europe.Here we find the greatest concentrationof ground and air combat forces everassembled. Over one-third of the world'sground combat strength is found inEurope, not to mention nearly two-thirdsof the world's tanks and nearly half of theworld's combat aircraft. The potentialconfrontation in this region is betweenthe United States/NATO forces and theUSSR/Warsaw Pact forces. The centralregion includes evrything north ofSwitzerland and Czechoslovakia. Thesouthern region revolves around Italy,Turkey and Greece for the most part. Byfar, the bulk of the armed forces areconcentrated in the central region.

    larger GNP than Indonesia and isexperiencing more rapid economic andmilitary growth. The smallest of theseIndian Ocean nations, Australia/NewZealend, are small only in terms ofpopulation. Their GNP is the secondlargest and their land area is, by far, thelargest. Militarily, however, Australia/New Zealand is weaker than every othernation in the area with the exception ofIndonesia.Bordering on the Indian Ocean area issub-Saharan Africa. Militarily, this isdefinitely an area of secondary import-ance. The area has considerable internalproblems, not the least of which is theexistence of two nations (South Africaand Rhodesia) having White-minoritygovernments which are experiencingincreasing problems in ruling their Blackmajorities.Outside of Europe, EasternAsia is by farthe most heavily armed part of the world.China