036 Municipality of Tiwi and Sangguniang Bayan ng Tiwi v

049 PCIB v. EscolinG.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974TOPIC: Succession PONENTE: BARREDO, J.

AUTHOR: NOTES: Short Summary:Mr. and Mrs Hodges both made in their wills provisions that upon their deaths, their whole estates should be inherited by the surviving spouse and that spouse could manage and alienate the said lands, with the exception of the Texas property. Upon death of the latter spouse, the residue of the estate inherited by the later spouse from the spouse who predeceased him would redound to the brothers and sisters. Mrs. Hodges died first then Mr. Hodges, but since there was no liquidation of Mrs. Hodges estate, the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges wanted to determine the extent of her estate that they could inherit

FACTS: (from Lorens digest in our succession class)

1. Charles and Linnie Jane Hodges (Husband and Wife) provided mutually in their respective will a provision wherein they would give all their estate to the surviving spouse and upon the death of the surviving spouse, the remainder of what has been inherited from the earlier deceased would be bequeathed to the brothers and sisters of the later deceased.2. Mrs. Hodges died first. Mr. Hodges was appointed special administrator and later executor of the will. No liquidation was made.3. Upon death of Mr. Hodges, Magno was appointed Administratix of Mrs. Hodges estate and was initially also Mr. Hodges estate but PCIB took over.4. Probate proceedings for both estate initiated, the two administrators (PCIB and Magno) differed in the alleged share of Mrs. Hodges in their conjugal partnership property that she could have bequeathed to her heirs. 5. PCIB contends that the estate left by Mrs. Hodges should be LESS than of her share in the conjugal estate (Apply Philippine law), notwithstanding Art 16 Civil Code which mandates the application of Texas Law, Mr. Hodges being citizen of Texas.6. Magno, on the other hand alleged Texas Law is applicable, wherein no system of legitime provided so estate of Mrs. Hodges could not be less than her share.

ISSUE(S): Whether there was a fideicommissary substitution?

HELD: No.

RATIO:

1. The legitime of the surviving spouse cannot be burdened by a fideicommissary substitution (Art 864 CC), nor by any charge, condition, or substitution (Art 872 CC).

2. It is clear, therefore in addition to of the conjugal partnership property as his own conjugal share, Mr. Hodges was also immediately entitled to of the half conjugal share of the deceased, Mrs. Hodges, or of the entire conjugal property, as his legitime.

3. There are generally 2 kinds of substitution provided and authorized by CC (Art 8750 870) namely:a. SIMPLE or COMMON SUBSTITUTION (vulgar substitution; Art 859)b. FIDEICOMMISSARY SUBSTITUTION (Art 863)4. The substitution provided for by paragraph 4 of the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges is NOT fideicommissary substitution, because there is clearly no obligation on the part of Mr. Hodges as the first heir designated, to preserve the properties for the substitute heirs. 5. It is a vulgar/simple substitution.6. It was held in this case that there was no fideicommissary substitution so the 1st heir instituted (Mr. Magno) had no obligation to preserve the properties inherited from his wife for the benefit of the latter's other heirs (the siblings)7. No proof yet of what Texas law is, but PCIB allegedly averred that under the laws of Texas (although it was arguing that RP laws apply), there is such legitime of 1/4 of the said conjgal estate8. PCIB would be estopped to claim that the estate of Mrs. Hodges should be less than as contended by it (which is initially at least 1/2 of the estate),for admissions by a party related to the effects of foreign laws, which have to be proven in our courts like any other controverted fact, create estoppel.

MAKALINTAL,C.J.,concurring:I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Teehankee, which in turn agrees with the dispositive portion of the main opinion of Justice Barredo insofar as it dismisses the petition forcertiorariand prohibition and affirms the appealed orders of the probate court. However, I wish to make one brief observation for the sake of accuracy. Regardless of whether or not C. N. Hodges was entitled to a legitime in his deceased wife's estate which question, still to be decided by the said probate court, may depend upon what is the law of Texas and upon its applicability in the present case the said estate consists of one-half, not one-fourth, of the conjugal properties. There is neither a minimum of one-fourth nor a maximum beyond that. It is important to bear this in mind because the estate of Linnie Hodges consists of her share in the conjugal properties, is still under administration and until now has not been distributed by order of the court.

The reference in both the main and separate opinions to a one-fourth portion of the conjugal properties as Linnie Hodges' minimum share is a misnomer and is evidently meant only to indicate that if her husband should eventually be declared entitled to a legitime, then the disposition made by Linnie Hodges in favor of her collateral relatives would be valid only as to one-half of her share, or one-fourth of the conjugal properties, since the remainder, which constitutes such legitime, would necessarily go to her husband in absolute ownership, unburdened by any substitution, term or condition, resolutory or otherwise. And until the estate is finally settled and adjudicated to the heirs who may be found entitled to it, the administration must continue to cover Linnie's entire conjugal share.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):