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TRANSCRIPT
Europeanization of Polity and Politics: a Network
Analysis of the Decision-Making Process in Romania
Paper prepared for the Fifth Pan-European Conference on EU
Politics
Porto, Portugal
24-26 June 2010
Flavia Jurje
Ph.D. Candidate
ETH Zurich
Draft version, please do not quote!
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Table of Contents
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 3
1. The Theoretical Framework ............................................................................................ 5
1.1 Defining Europeanization ............................................................................................ 5
1.2 Conditions for Europeanization ................................................................................... 7
1.3 Variables and Hypotheses ............................................................................................ 7
1.3.1 Institutions of the Decision-Making Process ............................................................ 8
1.3.2 Power Configuration ............................................................................................... 10
1.3.3 Conflict Structure .................................................................................................... 12
2. Methodological Aspects ................................................................................................ 14
2.1 Case selection ............................................................................................................. 14
2.1.1 Policy sectors ........................................................................................................... 15
2.2 Social Network Analysis ............................................................................................ 16
3. Data Analysis ................................................................................................................ 17
3.1 The Immigration and Asylum Policies: Overview of the Reform ............................. 17
3.2 The Social Assistance and Social Services Policies: Overview of the Reform ......... 18
3.3 The Fiscal Decentralization in Primary Education: Overview of the Reform ........... 19
3.4 The Impact of EU Pressure on Institutions of Decision-making ............................... 20
3.5 The Impact of EU Pressure on Power Configuration ................................................. 22
3.6 The Impact of EU Pressure on the Level of Conflict ................................................. 23
Final Remarks ...................................................................................................................... 24
References ............................................................................................................................ 26
Figure 1 Cross-sector and cross-time analysis: a graphical representation ........................................................... 15 Figure 2 The cooperation/conflict network ........................................................................................................... 24 Table 1 Importance of the phases of a decision-making process (before and after the EU integration) ............... 21 Table 2 Reputational Power .................................................................................................................................. 22 Table 3 Betweenness Centrality ............................................................................................................................ 23
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Introduction
Europeanization, generally referred to in terms of the domestic impact of European
Union (EU) integration, has been ardently debated in the last years. While the concept per se
has been under continuous contestation, there is no doubt that a new research agenda has
emerged drawing from international relations, EU studies, public policy, and comparative
politics alike (Graziano and Vink 2007, 2008). The promising research arena associated with
this agenda has sought to disentangle the aforementioned impact by primarily looking at
either the conditions under which Europeanization is likely to succeed or to the mechanisms
that would lead to domestic implementation of EU policies, or in other words to national
adaptation (see for example Knill 1998, Heritiel et al. 2001, Börzrl 2002).
While these burgeoning studies are of utmost relevance for Europeanization research,
there are at least three shortcomings indentified that this paper will address. First, the main
research focus employed by previous studies is on the policy dimension solely, namely to
what extent a national public policy converges towards the EU demands or not. This paper
argues that the polity and politics dimensions of any policy process are of particular
relevance, since determining how a decision is reached and who participated in the policy-
making process can reveal important aspects about the likely outcome of that policy.
Secondly, from a methodological point of view this research develops an innovative
approach to the study of decision-making by relaying on the tools of social network analysis1.
More specifically, it provides a structural account of the policy-making process, by assessing
the impact of EU pressure on two policy sectors, affected by a different degree of
Europeanization: immigration and asylum reform (a ‘hard’ case of Europeanization) and
social policies (a ‘soft’ type of Europeanization) respectively. These effects are then
compared to a control case, i.e. education reform, a domestic driven policy change, both for
the period before integration and afterwards. Thus, the asset of this design is that it will allow
capturing variation in the EU domestic impact on polity and politics across time, in two
different stages of the Europeanization process (Romania – as candidate and member state),
and also across-sectors, looking at various decision-making policies, affected by a different
degree of the EU pressure.
Third, the bulk of the Europeanization literature concentrates either on old member
states (MS) or on the 2004 enlargement wave, while Romania (and also Bulgaria) was often
neglected. The aim of this paper is to address these gaps by analyzing the impact of EU
1 Similar research paths were undertaken by authors like Fischer et al (2002) or Sciarini et al (2004), however their analysis focuses on decision-making processes in Switzerland, a case of ‘autonomous Europeanization’.
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pressure on policy-making in a new EU member state (MS), Romania. The country case
selection is of particular relevance, as Europeanization studies are scarce for the Romanian
context.
Furthermore, there is an extensive body of literature on the importance of different
phases of the decision-making process in Western countries (see for example Kriesi 1980,
Knoke 2003, Fischer et al 2009), while in Romania there is only limited research on this topic
and drawing mostly on legal approaches. In addition, the existing studies point towards a poor
policy-making process or as Ionita (2004) puts it “governing by default”. Therefore, the
purpose of this selection is twofold: first, to account for the EU impact on specific policy
processes and second, to in-depth analyze the decision-making process.
Moreover, from an economic point of view, Romania has been the laggard among
the candidate states in 2004 performing lower than Turkey a country with no foreseen entry,
according to the Lisbon Review (Papadimitriou 2006, Blanke and Lopez-Claros 2004).
Furthermore, as acceding country in 2007, Romania was again ranking lower than Croatia and
Turkey (Lisbon Review 2006). In addition, the newest EU MS, Romania and Bulgaria, make
allegedly less than 1% of its GDP (EUbusiness 2006). Not least, as Papadimitriou and
Phinnemore (2008, p.14) state, Romania was the ‘most difficult’ case among the CEE
countries acceding to EU. Along these lines, studying a country that belongs to another
economic category than the rest of the MS may represent a plausibility test for the conclusions
generated by previous enlargement-driven Europeanization studies that largely looked at
performing economies (see for example Whewell 1984, King et al 2000).
There are three main expected causal relationships produced by the EU pressure on
decision-making. First, Europeanization leads to a less inclusive decision-making process, in
the sense that it reduces the possibilities for pre- and Parliamentary consultations, debate in
Plenum, and dialogue with non-state actors. This is related to the relatively short time frame
within which foreign decisions have to be taken and to the alleged ‘take-it-or-leave-it’
character of EU conditionality (Moravcsik 1998), which diminishes the chances for law
amendments from Parliaments and other non-state actors. Secondly, Europeanization impacts
on the power configuration among domestic actors, by empowering state executives at the
expense of the legislative and other societal actors. The rationale behind this hypothesis is that
governmental bodies represent nation states in international negotiations and also have the
technical capacity and expertise to elaborate public policies (Moravcsik 1998,
Schimmelfennig 2001). Thirdly, Europeanization influences the level of conflict in the
domestic legislative process by reducing its intensity. This is a consequence both of the fact
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that controversial rules are likely to be accepted more easily under the EU pressure and the
general consent towards integration (Grabbe 2002). All these effects are expected to be
stronger in the case of hard Europeanization and especially before Romania joined the Union
than in the soft case and after integration. To investigate these potential causalities, social
network analysis is the main method employed (see for example Wassermann and Faust
1999).
This paper is structured as follows. The first part will provide an overview of the
analytical framework, followed by a discussion of the variables and hypotheses proposed. The
second part will address methodological aspects, related to the case selection and methods
employed. The third part presents the analysis. Conclusion follows.
1. The Theoretical Framework
This part starts with a presentation of the state of research on Europeanization, with
the accent on the literature that addresses the purposes of the current study. Afterwards, it
introduces the variables, formulating hypothesis on the institutions of the decision-making,
power configuration and conflict among domestic actors for the Romanian seting.
1.1 Defining Europeanization
There are ardent disagreements among scholars in determining what Europeanization
refers to, or what falls outside this concept (see Radaelli 2003). Nevertheless, as Mair (2004,
p. 340) notes “despite the confused meanings, what we also see here […], is the recurrence of
two motifs in particular”, namely “two faces of Europeanization”. On the one hand, the author
claims that Europeanization consists of the “institutionalization of a distinctly European
political system” and it “involves the creation and consolidation of authoritative political
institutions at the supranational European level” (p. 340-341). On the other hand
Europeanization entails “the penetration of European rules, directives and norms into the
otherwise differentiated domestic spheres” (p. 341). These two faces of Europeanization are
not mutually excludable, but rather interlinked, as without institutionalization ‘there would be
nothing that could penetrate’ (p.343). Mair goes on to argue that the second face is the more
intricate and he differentiates between three operational levels. The first, the formal one, is
associated with the internalization of the common body of rules into the domestic legislation
of MS. It refers mainly to the top-down approach, the adoption of the acquis, which all MS
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have to accept and implement. The second, the informal, is related to the less formalized
agreements reached by various states (non-member states included), that are not strictly part
of the acquis, but can have substantial implications for national policies and practices. An
example here can be the introduction throughout Europe of the semi-standardized BA and
MA systems (Mair 2004). The third, in Mair’s opinion, is one that reaches beyond the EU and
any formal agreements and it describes the standardization and convergence of cultural
practices and lifestyles. This is so broadly defined that can be easily conflated with
globalization and this is the reason why this research focuses only on the first two levels.
Whilst Mair’s effort is a watershed in the Europeanization literature it does not
account for the definitional incongruence. In a contribution intended to solve this gap Radaelli
(2003) proposes a systematized concept (see Adcock and Collier 2001) that encompasses
these two levels of Europeanization as follows:
“Europeanization consists of processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c)
institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways
of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the
EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub-national)
discourse, identities, political structures and public policies” (p. 30).
This broad definition – or multi-level conceptualization, as Mair terms it (2004, p.
340) – captures the above-mentioned operationalization of Europeanization. Specifically,
domestic policy change can be traced at the political structures, public policies and public
discourses, identities, and it is the result of the institutionalization of formal and informal
rules. Put otherwise, this definition attributes the hard dimension of Europeanization to how
the EU has transferred rules, procedures and policy paradigms to (member) states and the soft
one is connected to the transfer of styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms.
An example of the hard Europeanization is given by the adoption and implementation of the
EU acquis (e.g. sectors from the first EU pillar – immigration policies, environmental
policies, and so on). The soft Europeanization is likely to be present in policy areas that are
not under the direct EU regulation system, for example in the case of social policies through
the open method of coordination (OMC), social learning of ‘best practices’, peer pressure, or
self-adaptation (e.g. health care). In addition, the concept of Europeanization is regarded here
as not only restricted to MS, but rather a process that produces domestic consequences on
candidates and non-MS as well (see also Grabbe 2003, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier
2007). The question that follows is how do these rules, procedures, paradigms, beliefs and
norms are diffused and institutionalized?
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1.2 Conditions for Europeanization
Efforts have been devoted to exploring whether states respond positively to
integration pressures or rather resist such forces. In terms of Europeanization outcomes,
scholars (Knill 2001, Schmidt 2002, Radaelli 2003) are asking whether there is preservation
of the status-quo, convergence or divergence of societies. Trying to give an answer to this
type of question, authors (Börzel 1999, Heritier et al 2001, Börzel and Risse 2003) have
concentrated their efforts on identifying the conditions under which Europeanization is likely
to succeed, namely to lead to national adaptation. In this vein, domestic change depends on
the existence of a ‘misfit’, i.e. the degree of incompatibility between European requirements
and national processes, policies, and institutions. Opinions differ regarding the relationship
between misfit and domestic change. While, Börzel and Risse (2003) claim that the higher the
misfit the higher the adaptational pressure, Haveland (2000) shows that also policy cases with
a medium or low degree of misfit can converged towards EU requirements. To solve this
puzzle, scholars agree that the existence of a misfit is a necessary, but not sufficient condition
for expecting domestic change. A second condition connects the probability for change with
the existence of various facilitating factors and/or their absence (the so-called veto points, be
it formal institutions, individuals, or certain groups – see also Haverland 2000).
Börzel and Risse (2003) have devised an analytical framework in order to explain the
logics of national change by the lenses of two meta-theoretical approaches: rationalist
institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. For the rationalist view that follows the
‘logic of consequentialism’, the misfit between the EU and domestic processes, policies or
institutions provides societal or political actors with new opportunities or constraints to pursue
their interests. In contrast, the sociological approach, emphasizing the ‘logic of
appropriateness’, points to the role of entrepreneurs or epistemic communities for the
domestic learning process, together with the impact of political culture on the likelihood of
change. In the light of this research, the rationalist approach would describe and explain the
conditions and working mechanisms of hard Europeanization (i.e. ‘stick-and-carrots’
incentive structure), while the sociological institutionalism of the soft EU rules and practices
(i.e. socialization, policy learning).
1.3 Variables and Hypotheses
The independent variable of the study is EU adaptational pressure, namely the EU
conditionality and requirements that applicants and MS have to fulfill in order to join the
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Union (both hard and soft rules). The dependent variable, decision-making process, is
operationalized on three dimensions, institutions of the decision-making (polity), power
configuration and conflict among national elites in the legislative act (politics).
1.3.1 Institutions of the Decision-Making Process
This paper approaches institutions as formal and informal rules of the decision-
making process. More precisely, they refer to the various arenas of the decision-making
process, where a specific reform is discussed. In order to identify these arenas, the current
study employs, as the underlying conceptual device, the stagist approach of a policy
processes2 (Jones 1977, DeLeon 1999, see also Kriesi 1980). It implies dividing a policy-
making process in various phases/stages: problem definition, agenda-setting, identification of
alternatives and decision-making, implementation, and evaluation. This disaggregated image
of a policy process clearly depicts how policy-making is conducted and offers the possibility
of mapping the actors that participated in different stages, thus revealing important insights
for the analysis of policy-making.
A policy cycle, for the Romanian legislative process involves the following stages:
the legislative initiative (that belongs to the Government, Parliament, or citizens3), debates
and consultations among various ministerial bodies and social partners (i.e. the pre-
Parliamentary phase), the examination in parliamentary committees, debate and voting in the
plenum of the informed Chamber, examination, debate, and voting in the other Chamber, re-
examination, promulgation, and publication of the law.
The most important phases of a legislative process are considered to be the drafting of
a legislative act and consultations in the pre-Parliamentary arena and then the amendments
part brought in the Parliamentary Committees (face-to-face semi-structured interviews held
with Romanian decision-makers, Bucharest, December 2007; see also Boc 2005). The
consultations in the pre-Parliamentary phase, both formally (in the format of expert working
groups, dialogue sessions, and so on) and informally (from informal meetings among
stakeholders to e-mails or phone calls) are of particular relevance, as at this stage the ordinary
legislative process is open for input from Government and other social partners and
2 The criticisms of policy cycles in terms of an outdated theory (e.g. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, Sabatier 1999) are acknowledged. However, the stagist approach is not used as a theoretical device, but rather as a concept that helps reducing the complexity of policy-making by providing a clear picture of the steps of this process (see for example DeLeon 1999). In terms of theory, this research mainly draws on Europeanization literature. 3 There are hardly any examples of citizen initiatives that have become laws, thus the Parliament and the Government are the main de facto actors for initiating laws.
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stakeholders. The Parliamentary phase is also important, as lobbying for support for the given
piece of legislation in the Parliamentary committees can be used as an access point to the
decision-making process by various stakeholders. Furthermore, when a decision is commonly
agreed upon during the Committees consultations and compromises, the final vote in the
Parliament is more likely to have a formal character, unless there is discontent from one or
more groups on the results of the committee deliberations. In this case, depending on the
nature of the subject, a debate on specific articles of the proposed law may follow in the
Parliament (Deleanu 2001, Boc 2005).
The ‘take it or leave it’ proposition of the European legislation (see Mair and
Zeilonka 2002) together with the ‘close’ character of foreign decision-making (Sidjanski 1966
in Sciarini et al 2004) implies a less inclusive domestic decision-making. There is not much
room left for national debate and consultation. As Moravcsik (1998, 2001) notes, international
negotiations are likely to become themselves the most important step, thus moving out from
the domestic arena of the decision-making (see also Sciarini et al 2004). In addition, in
Romania, the executive interferes in the legislative processes related to EU rules adoption
through Government Ordinances or Decisions that further restricts the prospects for debate.
Moreover, the limited time frame within which foreign-oriented decisions have to be
taken, together with the massive quantity of the EU ‘imposed’ legislation put additional strain
on deliberation. This applies particularly to CEE applicant states that are considered to have
an asymmetric bargaining and domestic contestation power implying full compliance unlike
the Western states (Schimmelfennig 2001, Grabbe 2003).
The soft Europeanization of the polity is likely to differ from the effects produced by
the hard rules, specifically by having a lower impact on the inclusiveness of the decision-
making process. First, ‘soft’ rules are not part of the acquis, thus allowing for more domestic
deliberation. Secondly, given the fact that no strict frameworks on how these policies should
look in practice are devised at the EU level, the debate in national Parliaments can address
issues of the decision to adapt and the extent of compliance (see Sciarini et al 2004 for
autonomous adaptation).
It is assumed that the EU impact on the polity dimension differs before, respectively
after integration. A candidate state seeking to become an EU member, will try to comply with
the EU conditionality as much as possible, without displaying sound contestation (see for
example Grabbe 2003, Vachudova 2005). Legislation in meeting these requirements would
thus be adopted without involving extensive domestic analysis or consultation in the domestic
decision-making structures. After a country becomes a member of the Union, (after 2007 for
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Romania) the picture may change to a certain extent. Given that the EU pressure for change is
not that acute anymore, or as Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeir (2007) put it “once the
candidates have joined the EU, they already reap the benefits of membership and cannot be
induced to comply with EU rules by conditional incentives” (p.94), it might be the case that
states change their decision-making style. Namely, a lower EU pressure may imply more
domestic legislative consultations and debate as compared to the before accession moment.
However, the decision-making process on issues involving EU is expected to be less inclusive
than in the case of an ordinary legislative act, given that accession conditions are still in place.
Hypothesis 1a: The impact of hard EU pressure on the legislative process leads to a less inclusive
decision-making process, by weakening the role of consultation procedures with non-
state actors.
Hypothesis 1b: The impact of EU soft rules changes the decision-making process by making it less
inclusive, although this effect is expected to be weaker compared to the hard EU
impact.
Hypothesis 1c: Before integration, both the hard and soft Europeanization would lead to a less
inclusive decision-making process; after integration, Europeanization (especially in
its soft face) is likely to produce weaker effects on the level of inclusiveness
(compared to the before integration period) on the polity dimension of the decision-
making process.
1.3.2 Power Configuration
According to Börzel and Risse (2003), the Europeanization process may lead to a
redistribution of power among domestic actors. This perspective is in line with the rationalist
institutionalism logic, where Europeanization is conceived of as “a political structure which
offers some actors additional resources to exert influence, while severely constraining the
ability of others to pursue their goals” (2003, p.63), thus leading to a ‘differential
empowerment’ (Börzel and Risse 2000, Risse et al. 2001).
In the same vein, Moravcsik (1998, 2001) has emphasized the fact that
Europeanization strengthens state executives. He argues that “international negotiations and
institutions change the domestic context in which policy is made by redistributing four
domestic political resources: initiative, institutions, information and ideas (Moravcsik 1998,
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p.2). Thus, the main argument would be that international negotiations influence who would
have the control over the domestic agenda (initiative), alter who can participate in the
domestic decision-making procedures (institutions), and increase information asymmetries
“altering legitimate domestic ideological justifications for policies (ideas)” (Moravcsik 1998,
p. 11). In this view, changes in the channels of decision-making brought about by
Europeanization usually favor the actors who are directly involved in international
negotiations and institutions, that is, state executives. Putnam’s (1988) work on the two-level
game, contending that the transfer of a domestic issue to the international level reinforces
state executives, both at the national and international level follows the same line of
argumentation.
These arguments are likely to work in the Romanian setting as well. First, it is the
government that represents the states in the EU negotiations processes. This is a general
indication of the legal ‘positional power’4 hold by domestic actors in issues regarding foreign
affairs, and particularly EU negotiations. Second, for the particular case of the negotiation
regarding EU legislation that has to be domestically internalized, the role of the executive
bodies (e.g. the Ministry of European Integration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and various
governmental agencies) was also empowered by the ‘exclusive nature’ of this kind of
decisions, at the expense of the legislative bodies (see Holzhacker 2007).
It is assumed that this effect (i.e. the empowerment of executive bodies) would be
lower in the case of soft Europeanization than in the hard face, since in this case, reforms do
not follow strict rules or deadlines decided in Brussels, thus opening the legislative process
towards other domestic actors with the power to impact on the decision-making. However,
state executives remain the driving forces for legislation changes in meeting EU requirements,
regardless of its form (Moravcsik 1998). Therefore, it is expected to find a stronger executive
branch in both forms of Europeanization, although the effect should be weaker in the soft
case.
The time element points also towards a power configuration structure in favor of
domestic executives, but with a stronger power degree before integration as compared to the
2007 accession moment and afterwards when the EU adaptational pressure loses its intensity.
State cabinets are likely to be empowered both when Romania was a candidate country and as
a member state, although after 2007 the effect is expected to be weaker compared to the
previous phase. In addition, numerous external assessments of the decision-making process in
4 The positional power approach refers to elites as all holders of important institutional positions with legal possibilities to influence formal decisions; for this point of discussion it refers to state executives members.
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Romania (e.g. OECD/SIGMA, World Bank reports) indicate that the main mechanism of
legislating is Governmental Emergency Ordinances. When it comes to decisions related to the
EU, it is even more the case that the government would prevail in articulating policies.
Hypothesis 2a: State executives are strengthened as a consequence of hard Europeanization.
Hypothesis 2b: Soft Europeanization empowers state executives, although the effect is weaker than in
the case of the hard EU pressure.
Hypothesis 2c: Europeanization (hard and soft) empowers the executive both before and after
integration, although the effect is weaker after 2007, especially in the case of soft
Europeanization.
1.3.3 Conflict Structure
Authors argue both for less and more conflict as a result of Europeanization. In the
first camp are those scholars (see for example Katzenstein 1985 on internationalization, Grote
and Schmitter 1999) who claim that the adoption of ‘imposed’ legislation from a superior
body as EU, is likely to favor domestic consensus, in the sense that policies that would be
controversial in a domestic setting are more likely to be accepted under European pressure.
Furthermore, actors favoring change are less likely to be blamed by opponents for possible
negative effects brought by that change in legislation, as the reform was made under the EU
demand. Another branch of authors (see for example Hug and Sciarini 1995) argue that, on
the contrary, it is precisely the ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ character of EU decisions – that
significantly alters the established national order and weakens national elites’ power over the
political agenda – that would lead to a higher level of conflict in decision-making processes
that are under EU influence, compared to those that are not. In a similar vein, Lindstrom
(forthcoming, p.2) argues that EU critical public opinion makers in Estonia and Slovenia
oppose EU pressure on the grounds that it “adversely affects their particular5 political-
economic national development paths”. More precisely, applying a varieties of capitalism
framework to the aforementioned case, the author claims that depending whether the EU is
perceived to fall to the left or right of the national status quo, it has a significant impact on
support for EU integration.
5 Emphasis in original.
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In Romania, party politics and civil society activity point to a pro-EU discourse. Even
the ultra nationalist party, the Greater Romania Party, changed its platform, advocating for
European integration. There was no sign of contestation in any of the social spheres, at least
until 2007, of what EU was demanding. Adding the fact that legislation in meeting the EU
conditionality has a relative closed character, in the sense that it is mainly decided by
governmental bodies and there is little room for maneuver in domestic legislatures it further
pave the way to consent in adopting EU requirements (see Ilie 2005). Put otherwise, the
adoption and implementation of the acquis is generally conducted at the executive level,
therefore it further restricts other actors’ access to debate and hence the possibility for conflict
(OECD 2005).
The soft Europeanization leaves more room for domestic debate, as no binding rules
are established at the European level. In this case, the Parliament becomes a more visible
actor in domestic legislative process. Nevertheless, the conflict in the decision-making
process caused by EU pressures might vary from sector to sector, depending on the actors
affected that might influence the final decision.
The effects of Europeanization might lead to different consequences in terms of
conflict in the decision-making process when Romania had the candidate status and in the
current period, as an EU MS. On the one hand, before Romania joined the Union, the level of
conflict among domestic elites is likely to be low, as legislation in meeting the acquis had to
be adopted as rapidly as possible, without too much consultation. On the other hand, after
2007 the level of conflict may increase compared to the previous stage (although it is still
expected to be lower than in a ‘classical’ legislative process), as at this stage the EU
adaptational pressure is weaker, leaving more room for debate and exposition of conflicting
interests in domestic legislation.
Hypothesis 3a: The EU pressure for change – hard Europeanization –translates into a lower level of
conflict among elites in the decision-making process.
Hypothesis 3b: The soft Europeanization produces weaker effects on the level of conflict among
domestic legislators than the hard Europeanization however it still accounts for a
decrease in the level of conflict.
Hypothesis 3c: Europeanization (hard and soft) leads to a low level of conflict in the decision-making
process before integration and would have a weaker impact, especially in the soft
dimension from 2007 onwards.
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In sum, the main hypotheses this research proposal will test are:
Europeanization leads to a less inclusive decision-making process
The EU domestic impact empowers state executives
Europeanization decreases the level of conflict among domestic elites
All these effects are expected to be stronger in the case of hard Europeanization, and
especially in the period before integration, than in the soft case and after integration
2. Methodological Aspects
This part will first discuss aspects related to the case selection, followed by an
overview and justification of the methods employed. Finally, data-collection and analysis
techniques are introduced.
2.1 Case selection
The country case selection is relevant for several reasons. First, it provides the
opportunity to investigate whether the Europeanization concepts developed for Western states
can also be applied to the CEE region (see Grabbe 2003, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier
2005), thus adding a substantial contribution to this field of study. Secondly, research on
Europeanization and decision-making in general is lacking in Romania. In addition, given the
laggard economic status of this country, compared to the other members and candidates,
conducting research in this setting would represent a solid test case for the Europeanization
theories that were mainly generated from analysis of well performing economies (see King et
al 2000).
For Romania, Europeanization is present in both the hard (e.g. policy reforms in the
immigration sector) and the soft face (for example legislative changes in the social field).
Furthermore, the EU domestic impact is likely to produce effects from (at least) 2000
onwards, when Romania started the official EU integration negotiations. It might prove out
that Europeanization has led to different consequences in various sectors during this time-
frame (as a candidate state and as a member), therefore this research will account for this
variation both in a longitudinal and a cross-sector fashion.
Looking at one country, but comparing various policy sectors follows the most
similar cases design (Przeworski and Teune 1970), or Mill’s method of difference which has
the advantage of cases selection (policy sectors) that are similar in as many ways as possible
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Time dimension
2003-2005 2007-2008
Hard Europeanization
Soft Europeanization
Low/No effect
Policy sector: Immigration and asylum policies
Policy sector: Social assistance and social
services
Policy sector: Fiscal decentralization in primary education
Europeanization Impact
(keeping other variables constant), but different in their degree of Europeanization. This
allows for better sizing the variation in the independent variable of the model. As Haverland
(2005, p. 8) puts it “Comparing sectors where EU pressure, incentives or models exist with
other sectors comes close to the ideal of the most similar systems design, because the
investigator can keep all national factors constant.”
2.1.1 Policy sectors
In order to classify policy sectors based on the EU impact, in addition to the legal-
institutional analysis and insights from the Europeanization methodological literature that
looks at various transmission mechanisms (hard and soft), a reputational approach –
interviewing experts from the Romanian public spectrum (like technocrats from various
administrative departments both at the central and local level, scholars engaged in research on
public policy and Romania, journalists, and so on) on their estimation of the EU pressure on
various policy sectors – was employed. The correlation of these two methods provides a clear
picture of the relevant policy sectors, affected by different degrees of Europeanization.
The immigration and asylum policy sector is a case of hard Europeanization (part of
the acquis, Chapter 24 on Justice and Home Affairs, but also with implications for chapter 2
on the Freedom of Movement of Persons), strongly reformed in order to adopt and implement
the binding directives set by the EU. Social assistance and social services represent the
decision-making process affected by the soft EU pressure. Furthermore, the control case of
this analysis is the education reform, a policy change that was mostly domestically driven. A
graphical representation of the three policy sectors presented in this study is provided below:
Figure 1 Cross-sector and cross-time analysis: a graphical representation
16
2.2 Social Network Analysis
To test the hypotheses formulated above, in terms of importance and inclusiveness of
the decision-making, power configuration of state and non-state actors, and level of conflict
among domestic elites, network analysis provides the appropriate methodological tools (see
Wassermann and Faust 1999). The structural network analysis is regularly employed by
researchers in the field of policy analysis studies to learn about the structures and power
configuration that are formed in decision-making processes, i.e. policy networks (Laumann
and Knoke 1987, Knoke and Pappi 1989, Knoke 1990, Schneider 1992, Scott 1997). As
Borzel notes, the general understanding of policy networks is ‘a set of relatively stable
relationships […] linking a variety of actors, who share common interests with regard to a
policy and who exchange resources to pursue these shared interests acknowledging that co-
operation is the best way to achieve common goals’ (1998, p.254). The basic assumptions of
the social network method are that actors are interdependent and their relational ties constitute
channels for transfer or flow of resources, providing opportunities or constraints on actors’
actions. Following a similar operationalization of the concept, this analysis employs policy
networks as an analytical tool to describe and explain the complex relationship between actors
in various sectors of public policy making6.
For data collection, face-to-face, semi-structured interviews with domestic elites
were conducted. To identify the relevant actors, a combination of three schools – positional,
reputational and decisional – was employed (see Kriesi 1982). This approach emerged as a
solution to a long debate on how to identify elites and measure the power relations among
them, i.e. community power controversy (elitists vs. pluralist scholars – see for example
Truman 1951, Hunter 1953, Schattschneider 1960, Dahl 1961). In this sense, a comprehensive
list of the relevant stakeholders from the given policy process was elaborated. The
questionnaire contains socio-metric and qualitative questions about the phases of each policy
process as well as power and conflict structures. In average, 22 interviews (at the
organization/collective level) per policy process were conducted.
6 This research also acknowledges the ‘governance school’ approach that defines policy networks as non-hierarchical relationships between public-private actors, a type of governance opposed to hierarchy and market structures, however the stance taken by this study is a methodological approach to analyze the decision-making process.
17
3. Data Analysis
This section will present an overview of the policy sectors, followed by data analysis
for each dependent variable, i.e. institutions/phases of a policy process, power configuration,
and conflict structure. The analysis was conducted for the two Europeanized policy sectors
and the control case respectively, both before and after Romania joined the EU.
3.1 The Immigration and Asylum Policies: Overview of the Reform
The immigration and asylum sector is an important policy domain, relevant not only
for the Romanian socio-political context, but also for the international environment, as
migration flows are constantly increasing patterns in both member and non-member states. In
this sense, EU has set clear regulations that member states have to follow. For example, in
2005 member states adopted a programmatic document, the Hague Program, for further
improvement of liberties, security and justice within EU for the period 2005-2010. Special
attention is paid to immigrants, asylum seekers and their social inclusion (i.e. of those legally
residing on the territory of one of the MS). Furthermore, in 2006 it was elaborated the
program for solidarity and management of migration flows for period 2007-2013 and also the
strategy for cooperation with third countries regarding migration and asylum policies. One of
the most important EU requirements is the need to ensure that candidate countries are
institutionally and administratively equipped to meet adequate and acceptable standards of
implementation of these policies. In this sense, building and capacitating institutions is a must
for EU newcomers. For Romania, policy implementation was always seen as a problem and
the Commission has constantly (for example through the country monitoring reports)
highlighted this administrative shortcoming and urged the Government to find viable
solutions, namely by forming institutions capable of implementing and enforcing public
policies (se for example Monitoring Report 2005, 2006).
The large volume of legislation that has to be transposed in the immigration field
involves the necessity for building effective national institutions that would be able to cope
with all migration policies. The EU has clearly specified the type of institutions and
respectively the necessary functions national administrative organisms dealing with
immigration strategies and programs should have.
The most important projects implemented in Romania, both before and after
integration address aliens and asylum regulations. Important changes brought by the
immigration and asylum reform refer to compliance with the terminology used at European
18
level. It defines specific concepts such as form of protection, asylum seeker, asylum claim,
alien, country of origin, asylum procedure, refugee status, subsidiary protection, temporary
protection, family members, unaccompanied minor, detached person, mass influx and other
related concepts. It also explicitly comprises the principles and procedural warranties
applicable to asylum such as: the right to asylum of any alien or stateless person which
solicits protection; non-discrimination on any basis, the principle of non-deportation, the right
to family reunification, confidentiality of data, priority of child’s interests, presumption of
good-faith and so on. The institutional reform, namely the establishment of the Romanian
Office for Immigration (ORI) was designated as the national specialized institution for
migration management, following the EU practices and regulations in the immigration
domain. It was created by reshuffling the Authority for Aliens and the National Office for
Refugees. The new Office has taken over all the prerogatives and territorial structures of the
former Office for Refugees. Among the most important functions of the institution are the
issuing of work authorizations for employment based on an individual employment contract,
self-employment or transfer of a migrant worker to Romania by his/her company, and all
other related working documents, long term visa documents and others.
3.2 The Social Assistance and Social Services Policies: Overview of the
Reform
After 1989 in Romania, social developments were constantly on the political agenda
of the government. Important pieces of legislation were adopted as a consequence of the EU
foreseen entrance. Besides substantive reforms, new institutions capable of implementing
social policies had to be organized. The policy reforms undertaken in the social field, namely
social assistance and social services fall into the soft case of Europeanization. Here, mostly
secondary EU legislation is in place and mechanisms such as the OMC, policy learning aim at
bringing national policies closer in this field. The most important reforms in this sector are
laws regulating the social services and social assistance domain.
The particular issue of social assistance, as part of the national social protection
system, was shaped in Romania through the OMC (as of 2002 Romania was included in the
EU decision making through the OMC) based on the strategies and objectives set by the
Union in the Lisbon Strategy. The rationale for building a framework law on the national
social assistance system is given primarily by the attention MS devoted in creating a
multidimensional social inclusion policy that would address various social problems of the
19
target groups (e.g. maximum employment, social cohesion, the quality of working conditions)
and would have commensurable outcomes. In this context, the main objectives of the
Romanian reform on social services and social assistance are to set up an integrative
framework for the organization and coordination of social policies, elaboration of unitary and
coherent policies and programs in this domain, establishing clear financing methods, and not
least clearly specifying and identifying the types of social services and respectively the target
population. This reform is promoting the EU social values and objectives set up by the
Council Recommendation 92/442/EEC, namely convergence of the programs on social
protection, by supporting marginalized groups (unemployed persons that could not re-enter
the labor market and do not have minimum subsistence resources) to receive appropriate
social assistance. Furthermore, the two newly established administrative bodies, the National
Agency for Social Services and the Social Inspection, with implementation and monitoring
functions, were envisaged as the institutional development in the social field.
3.3 The Fiscal Decentralization in Primary Education: Overview of the
Reform
In the past years, Romania has engaged in a fiscal-administrative decentralization
process in various policy sectors. Reforming the education system, in terms of fiscal
decentralization was constantly an issue on the agenda of national policy-makers. Given the
highly centralized pre-1990 education system, the debate about the objectives of
decentralization has been fierce in the country. The strong and mostly opposed interests of the
central and local administration, as well as the schools and other education professionals,
together with a powerful labor union market imposed additional strains on the reform.
Nevertheless, the main steps for introducing a per capita formula for financing the primary
education sector were taken by the 2004 Government. This new legal framework foresees a
financing system based on standard costs and increased school autonomy in managing and
allocating funds. Initially, the per capita financing system was introduced in eight counties, as
a pilot study and afterwards it was extended to the other local government units in the
country.
Another important legal development concerning decentralization in the education
sector was the adoption of another law in 2007 that prescribes the financing mechanisms of
the post-secondary education system. These measures continue the fiscal reform in the
primary education system and differentiate the costs that should be covered from local
20
budgets, based on the number of students enrolled in each education unit, from those allocated
from the central budget. Initially, the entire financing structure was defined and managed at
the central level. Furthermore, the legislation also sets various principles in distributing and
managing the funds by local governments and school principles, respectively.
As discussed, decentralizing the financing system in primary education was mainly a
domestic reform, without major impacts from other external bodies in terms of the content of
the new legislation. The World Bank was funding an independent Polish expert on education
policies that worked closely with the Romanian government and civil society in elaborating
the per capita formula, however substance of the reform was decided by domestic
stakeholders, in the context of the entire process of decentralization in Romania.
3.4 The Impact of EU Pressure on Institutions of Decision-making
The questionnaire included a section on the perceived importance of the various
stages of the decision-making. Each policy process was broken down in two main parts: the
pre-parliamentary and parliamentary stage. Furthermore, given the general importance
attributed to the pre-parliamentary stage, this was divided in other two main phases: drafting
of the legislative act within working groups and committees at the ministerial level and
consultation procedures with other government bodies and non-state actors. The
Parliamentary stage also consists of two main sub-parts, the committee work and final vote in
Plenum.
Table 1 shows in percentages the importance of each policy stage, in each decision-
making process analyzed, both before and after Romania joined the EU. At the aggregate
level, the pre-parliamentary stage is the most important phase of a policy cycle, in all of the
three sectors investigated, both before and after integration. Looking at each sub-phase,
drafting a legislative act in the Pre-parliamentary phase received the highest scores in terms of
relevance, however within a decreasing pattern of variation across sectors and across time.
The highest value attributed to this sub-phase was in the Europeanized case, before
integration, with a score of 70% relevance. The consultation procedures, in the Pre-
parliamentary stage were also perceived as important. Generally, at this level the main aspects
of a reform are debated and negotiated between state and non-state actors. However, when it
comes to EU related policies, the number and importance of non-state players diminishes
substantially. In this case, the key decision-makers are state bodies, namely departments and
agencies within the respective ministry.
21
Table 1 Importance of the phases of a decision-making process (before and after the EU integration)
Importance phases of a policy‐process (%)
Policy Sectors Immigration &
asylum reform
Social reform Education
reform
Time frame
Stages
Before After Before After Before After
Pre‐parliamentary stage
Drafting 70 58 56 47 43 39
Consultations 21 28 27 31 26 25
Parliamentary stage
Committee 7 11 12 19 25 29
Plenum 2 3 5 3 6 7
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
As already mentioned above, before integration, the highest importance was
attributed to drafting the legislative acts, and the overall importance granted to the pre-
parliamentary phase exceeded 90% of the total answers in the hard Europeanized case, in the
period before integration and a similar value maintains afterwards (86%). The figures from
the hard and soft Europeanized case show that the pre-parliamentary stage remains the most
important decisional arena, both before and after integration, however the consultation
procedures and also the committee work in the Parliamentary stage gained in relevance,
especially in the after integration period. The results from the control case point to the Pre-
parliamentary stage as being the most important step of a decision-making process (with a
value of more than 60% of importance), nevertheless there is a consistent increased in the
importance attributed to the parliamentary phase, especially the committee work.
Most of the interviewees specified that the decision-making process tends to become
‘exclusive’ and handled in the pre-parliamentary phase (mostly during the drafting activities),
by the bureaucratic apparatus when the legislation subject is EU driven. This leaves little
space for social participation, national debates or contestation. It is a consistent pattern,
indentified in both the immigration and social (at a different level, in the hard case and
especially before integration the entire process being almost entirely handled by the national
administration at the ministerial level), underlining the reinforcement of the importance of the
pre-parliamentary stage as an EU effect on decision-making.
22
3.5 The Impact of EU Pressure on Power Configuration
As already implied by the ‘closed’ nature of the decision-making, a powerful
executive tends to dominate the political scene, in sectors affected by EU requirements. This
is further confirmed by the centrality measures employed to assess the importance of actors.
Both the subjective measurement, reputational power (calculated as the percentage of the
most important actors, as nominated by each interviewee) and the indicator based on the
position of an actor in the cooperation network7, betweenness centrality (score that measures
the percentage of actors that need to get in contact with a specific actor in order to reach other
actors in the network) point to the fact that state bodies are the most important/powerful actors
in the decision-making process.
Table 2 Reputational Power Reputational Power (%)
Policy Sectors Immigration & asylum reform
Social reform Education reform
Time frame*Actors
Before After Before After Before After
Central public administration 92 89 85 76 40 39
Local authorities 0 2 1 5 12 16
Total state actors 92 91 86 81 52 55
Interest groups** 0 2 5 9 11 12
Labor unions 0 0 1 3 33 27
Political parties 0 0 1 2 3 5
Experts*** 8 7 7 5 1 1
Total Non‐state actors 8 9 14 19 48 45
In terms of reputational power, state actors substantially overweight social partners,
in the two Europeanized policy sectors, before as well as after integration. Nevertheless, in the
soft Europeanized case and especially after integration, local authorities together with other
societal actors become more visible, indicating a de-concentration of the central power. An
even more powerful non-state sector occurs in the control case. The local government
together with labor unions and political parties share the policy-making prerogatives with the
executive. The network centrality measures calculated for the cooperation network further
confirm the central position of the executive in those policy areas affected by the EU pressure.
Both before and after integration, in the immigration and asylum sector as well as in the social
domain, state bodies had a high control power over the rest of the actors in the network. The
7 The question for the collaboration network was formulated as follows: “Based on the list of actors presented, can you please indicate the actors with whom you collaborated closely (frequent, regular contacts in the decision-making process)?”
23
strengthening of state actors is clearly depicted in Table 3, the network centrality measure –
betweenness centrality showing a strong state apparatus in each of the three policy sectors
analyzed, with the highest values in the Europeanized cases. In other words, the existing
strong executive (about 60% in the control case) is further empowered by the integration
process, reaching values of over 90% in the hard case of Europeanization, before the EU
enlargement. A strong executive was identified in the soft Europeanization case with values
raging from 86% before integration to 73% afterward. The control case indicates a powerful
executive, with values around 60%, however looking at the composition of the stakeholders
that participated in these policy reforms and the scores obtained, it transpires that other non-
sate actors (like labor unions and other interest groups that were almost absent in the
Europeanized cases) are important players in the decision-making process.
Table 3 Betweenness Centrality Betweenness Centrality (%)
Policy Sectors Immigration & asylum reform
Social reform Education reform
Time frame*Actors
Before After Before After Before After
Central public administration 90 84 77 66 57 54
Local authorities 1 2 3 7 4 6
Total state actors 91 86 80 73 61 60
Interest groups** 1 4 6 11 16 15
Labor unions 0 2 5 6 15 16
Political parties 0 1 3 5 5 7
Experts*** 8 7 6 5 3 2
Total non‐state actors 9 14 20 27 39 40 Notes: *The time frame refers to the period before Romania joined the EU (i.e. 2003-2005), and after integration (i.e.
2007-2008) respectively **It generally refers to various domestic civil society organizations. Employers’ associations, parents and students
organizations were mainly present in the education reform. ***Experts encompass EU technocrats, especially in the case of the immigration and asylum reform and social
policies. Other experts, like UNHCR, IOM, or WB Romania were considered to be relevant actors in these policy reforms.
3.6 The Impact of EU Pressure on the Level of Conflict
In order to measure the level of conflict, the questionnaire included a section on the
convergence and divergence of opinions. The average level of conflict was calculated by
adding the scores of the convergence/divergence matrix (-1, 0, 1) and divided it by the overall
number of possible ties.
24
The average value for the conflict network is positive in the two cases affected by the
EU pressure, indicating that national decision-makers collaborated more often with each
other, than were engaged in conflictual instances. On the contrary, the control case is
dominated by more conflictual relationships, domestic policy-makers embarking in various
debates and controversies while legislating on the education reform. Generally, the
conflict/cooperation data indicates that the EU pressure foster domestic consensus, while in a
domestic setting, where no time constrains or imposed rules from above apply, disagreements
tend to occur more often among policy-makers.
Figure 2 The cooperation/conflict network
Final Remarks
The results based on the comparison of the hard Europeanization case, i.e.
immigration and asylum policies with the soft one, i.e. social services and assistance, and the
control case, i.e. education policies, before and after integration, show significant changes
brought by the EU integration on the decision-making process. In terms of the
institutions/phases of a policy process, overall the pre-parliamentary stage is the most
important decisional arena across sectors and across time, effect that is being further
amplified by the EU integration. This translates into an ‘exclusive’ character of the decision-
making process, the most relevant aspects of the reforms being handled in the executive
arena, by state departments. The consultation procedures, as well as debates and amendments
in the parliamentary stage lose their importance, the whole policy processes that are under the
Before After Before After Before After
Immigration & asylum reform
Social reformEducation
reform
Average level of conflict 0.35 0.16 0.17 0.06 -0.05 -0.04
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
Aver
age s
core
of th
e con
flict
/ coo
pera
tion
level
in th
e dec
ision
-mak
ing p
roce
ss
Average level of conflict/cooperation, before and after the EU integration
25
EU regulations being almost entirely closed for non-state actors (like for example NGOs, IOs,
political parties, labor unions, or business organizations). In the control case the Parliamentary
stage is considered almost as important as the pre-parliamentary stage, pointing to a more
opened/inclusive decision-making process.
The power relationship is restructured, the executive becoming the most visible and
powerful actor in the two Europeanized policy networks, although the scores show a variation
mainly across time among these two sectors and a consistent difference towards the control
case, where various non-sate actors can advance their policy preferences in the decision-
making process. Furthermore, Europeanization significantly reduces the level of conflict,
leading to a high level of convergence of opinions between the actors involved in the
Europeanized decision-making processes. All these effects are higher in the case of hard
Europeanization and especially before integration, as a consequence of a strong EU pressure
as compared to the soft Europeanized sector and the control case. However, the soft
Europeanization mechanisms also produce important changes in the decision-making process,
leading to a closed policy process, with a powerful administration, and cooperation
relationships, results that show a strong overall EU effect on domestic settings. In other
words, national decision-makers perceived both the hard (the acquis legislation) and soft
(recommendations) rules important and necessary to adopt, deciding to fully comply with the
EU requirements before the integration moment, when the core objective was to achieve the
member state status. Afterwards, the EU pressure lost from its intensity and ‘binding’
character, the entire decision-making process getting back to a domestic ‘way of doing
things’.
This paper proposed an innovative inquiry area for Europeanization research,
looking at the effects of EU pressure on polity and politics, across policy sectors and time. In
addition, it made a substantial contribution to the study of decision-making, assessing the
decision-making process based on the structural relationships of the actors involved in
designing public policies, research path that has not been developed so far for the Romanian
context.
26
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