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Europeanization of Polity and Politics: a Network Analysis of the Decision-Making Process in Romania Paper prepared for the Fifth Pan-European Conference on EU Politics Porto, Portugal 24-26 June 2010 Flavia Jurje Ph.D. Candidate ETH Zurich [email protected] Draft version, please do not quote!

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Europeanization of Polity and Politics: a Network

Analysis of the Decision-Making Process in Romania

Paper prepared for the Fifth Pan-European Conference on EU

Politics

Porto, Portugal

24-26 June 2010

Flavia Jurje

Ph.D. Candidate

ETH Zurich

[email protected]

Draft version, please do not quote!

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Table of Contents 

 

Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 3 

1.  The Theoretical Framework ............................................................................................ 5 

1.1 Defining Europeanization ............................................................................................ 5 

1.2 Conditions for Europeanization ................................................................................... 7 

1.3 Variables and Hypotheses ............................................................................................ 7 

1.3.1 Institutions of the Decision-Making Process ............................................................ 8 

1.3.2 Power Configuration ............................................................................................... 10 

1.3.3 Conflict Structure .................................................................................................... 12 

2.  Methodological Aspects ................................................................................................ 14 

2.1 Case selection ............................................................................................................. 14 

2.1.1 Policy sectors ........................................................................................................... 15 

2.2 Social Network Analysis ............................................................................................ 16 

3.  Data Analysis ................................................................................................................ 17 

3.1 The Immigration and Asylum Policies: Overview of the Reform ............................. 17 

3.2 The Social Assistance and Social Services Policies: Overview of the Reform ......... 18 

3.3 The Fiscal Decentralization in Primary Education: Overview of the Reform ........... 19 

3.4 The Impact of EU Pressure on Institutions of Decision-making ............................... 20 

3.5 The Impact of EU Pressure on Power Configuration ................................................. 22 

3.6 The Impact of EU Pressure on the Level of Conflict ................................................. 23 

Final Remarks ...................................................................................................................... 24 

References ............................................................................................................................ 26 

Figure 1 Cross-sector and cross-time analysis: a graphical representation ........................................................... 15 Figure 2 The cooperation/conflict network ........................................................................................................... 24  Table 1 Importance of the phases of a decision-making process (before and after the EU integration) ............... 21 Table 2 Reputational Power .................................................................................................................................. 22 Table 3 Betweenness Centrality ............................................................................................................................ 23 

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Introduction

Europeanization, generally referred to in terms of the domestic impact of European

Union (EU) integration, has been ardently debated in the last years. While the concept per se

has been under continuous contestation, there is no doubt that a new research agenda has

emerged drawing from international relations, EU studies, public policy, and comparative

politics alike (Graziano and Vink 2007, 2008). The promising research arena associated with

this agenda has sought to disentangle the aforementioned impact by primarily looking at

either the conditions under which Europeanization is likely to succeed or to the mechanisms

that would lead to domestic implementation of EU policies, or in other words to national

adaptation (see for example Knill 1998, Heritiel et al. 2001, Börzrl 2002).

While these burgeoning studies are of utmost relevance for Europeanization research,

there are at least three shortcomings indentified that this paper will address. First, the main

research focus employed by previous studies is on the policy dimension solely, namely to

what extent a national public policy converges towards the EU demands or not. This paper

argues that the polity and politics dimensions of any policy process are of particular

relevance, since determining how a decision is reached and who participated in the policy-

making process can reveal important aspects about the likely outcome of that policy.

Secondly, from a methodological point of view this research develops an innovative

approach to the study of decision-making by relaying on the tools of social network analysis1.

More specifically, it provides a structural account of the policy-making process, by assessing

the impact of EU pressure on two policy sectors, affected by a different degree of

Europeanization: immigration and asylum reform (a ‘hard’ case of Europeanization) and

social policies (a ‘soft’ type of Europeanization) respectively. These effects are then

compared to a control case, i.e. education reform, a domestic driven policy change, both for

the period before integration and afterwards. Thus, the asset of this design is that it will allow

capturing variation in the EU domestic impact on polity and politics across time, in two

different stages of the Europeanization process (Romania – as candidate and member state),

and also across-sectors, looking at various decision-making policies, affected by a different

degree of the EU pressure.

Third, the bulk of the Europeanization literature concentrates either on old member

states (MS) or on the 2004 enlargement wave, while Romania (and also Bulgaria) was often

neglected. The aim of this paper is to address these gaps by analyzing the impact of EU

1 Similar research paths were undertaken by authors like Fischer et al (2002) or Sciarini et al (2004), however their analysis focuses on decision-making processes in Switzerland, a case of ‘autonomous Europeanization’.

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pressure on policy-making in a new EU member state (MS), Romania. The country case

selection is of particular relevance, as Europeanization studies are scarce for the Romanian

context.

Furthermore, there is an extensive body of literature on the importance of different

phases of the decision-making process in Western countries (see for example Kriesi 1980,

Knoke 2003, Fischer et al 2009), while in Romania there is only limited research on this topic

and drawing mostly on legal approaches. In addition, the existing studies point towards a poor

policy-making process or as Ionita (2004) puts it “governing by default”. Therefore, the

purpose of this selection is twofold: first, to account for the EU impact on specific policy

processes and second, to in-depth analyze the decision-making process.

Moreover, from an economic point of view, Romania has been the laggard among

the candidate states in 2004 performing lower than Turkey a country with no foreseen entry,

according to the Lisbon Review (Papadimitriou 2006, Blanke and Lopez-Claros 2004).

Furthermore, as acceding country in 2007, Romania was again ranking lower than Croatia and

Turkey (Lisbon Review 2006). In addition, the newest EU MS, Romania and Bulgaria, make

allegedly less than 1% of its GDP (EUbusiness 2006). Not least, as Papadimitriou and

Phinnemore (2008, p.14) state, Romania was the ‘most difficult’ case among the CEE

countries acceding to EU. Along these lines, studying a country that belongs to another

economic category than the rest of the MS may represent a plausibility test for the conclusions

generated by previous enlargement-driven Europeanization studies that largely looked at

performing economies (see for example Whewell 1984, King et al 2000).

There are three main expected causal relationships produced by the EU pressure on

decision-making. First, Europeanization leads to a less inclusive decision-making process, in

the sense that it reduces the possibilities for pre- and Parliamentary consultations, debate in

Plenum, and dialogue with non-state actors. This is related to the relatively short time frame

within which foreign decisions have to be taken and to the alleged ‘take-it-or-leave-it’

character of EU conditionality (Moravcsik 1998), which diminishes the chances for law

amendments from Parliaments and other non-state actors. Secondly, Europeanization impacts

on the power configuration among domestic actors, by empowering state executives at the

expense of the legislative and other societal actors. The rationale behind this hypothesis is that

governmental bodies represent nation states in international negotiations and also have the

technical capacity and expertise to elaborate public policies (Moravcsik 1998,

Schimmelfennig 2001). Thirdly, Europeanization influences the level of conflict in the

domestic legislative process by reducing its intensity. This is a consequence both of the fact

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that controversial rules are likely to be accepted more easily under the EU pressure and the

general consent towards integration (Grabbe 2002). All these effects are expected to be

stronger in the case of hard Europeanization and especially before Romania joined the Union

than in the soft case and after integration. To investigate these potential causalities, social

network analysis is the main method employed (see for example Wassermann and Faust

1999).

This paper is structured as follows. The first part will provide an overview of the

analytical framework, followed by a discussion of the variables and hypotheses proposed. The

second part will address methodological aspects, related to the case selection and methods

employed. The third part presents the analysis. Conclusion follows.

1. The Theoretical Framework

This part starts with a presentation of the state of research on Europeanization, with

the accent on the literature that addresses the purposes of the current study. Afterwards, it

introduces the variables, formulating hypothesis on the institutions of the decision-making,

power configuration and conflict among domestic actors for the Romanian seting.

1.1 Defining Europeanization

There are ardent disagreements among scholars in determining what Europeanization

refers to, or what falls outside this concept (see Radaelli 2003). Nevertheless, as Mair (2004,

p. 340) notes “despite the confused meanings, what we also see here […], is the recurrence of

two motifs in particular”, namely “two faces of Europeanization”. On the one hand, the author

claims that Europeanization consists of the “institutionalization of a distinctly European

political system” and it “involves the creation and consolidation of authoritative political

institutions at the supranational European level” (p. 340-341). On the other hand

Europeanization entails “the penetration of European rules, directives and norms into the

otherwise differentiated domestic spheres” (p. 341). These two faces of Europeanization are

not mutually excludable, but rather interlinked, as without institutionalization ‘there would be

nothing that could penetrate’ (p.343). Mair goes on to argue that the second face is the more

intricate and he differentiates between three operational levels. The first, the formal one, is

associated with the internalization of the common body of rules into the domestic legislation

of MS. It refers mainly to the top-down approach, the adoption of the acquis, which all MS

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have to accept and implement. The second, the informal, is related to the less formalized

agreements reached by various states (non-member states included), that are not strictly part

of the acquis, but can have substantial implications for national policies and practices. An

example here can be the introduction throughout Europe of the semi-standardized BA and

MA systems (Mair 2004). The third, in Mair’s opinion, is one that reaches beyond the EU and

any formal agreements and it describes the standardization and convergence of cultural

practices and lifestyles. This is so broadly defined that can be easily conflated with

globalization and this is the reason why this research focuses only on the first two levels.

Whilst Mair’s effort is a watershed in the Europeanization literature it does not

account for the definitional incongruence. In a contribution intended to solve this gap Radaelli

(2003) proposes a systematized concept (see Adcock and Collier 2001) that encompasses

these two levels of Europeanization as follows:

“Europeanization consists of processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c)

institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways

of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the

EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub-national)

discourse, identities, political structures and public policies” (p. 30).

This broad definition – or multi-level conceptualization, as Mair terms it (2004, p.

340) – captures the above-mentioned operationalization of Europeanization. Specifically,

domestic policy change can be traced at the political structures, public policies and public

discourses, identities, and it is the result of the institutionalization of formal and informal

rules. Put otherwise, this definition attributes the hard dimension of Europeanization to how

the EU has transferred rules, procedures and policy paradigms to (member) states and the soft

one is connected to the transfer of styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms.

An example of the hard Europeanization is given by the adoption and implementation of the

EU acquis (e.g. sectors from the first EU pillar – immigration policies, environmental

policies, and so on). The soft Europeanization is likely to be present in policy areas that are

not under the direct EU regulation system, for example in the case of social policies through

the open method of coordination (OMC), social learning of ‘best practices’, peer pressure, or

self-adaptation (e.g. health care). In addition, the concept of Europeanization is regarded here

as not only restricted to MS, but rather a process that produces domestic consequences on

candidates and non-MS as well (see also Grabbe 2003, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier

2007). The question that follows is how do these rules, procedures, paradigms, beliefs and

norms are diffused and institutionalized?

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1.2 Conditions for Europeanization

Efforts have been devoted to exploring whether states respond positively to

integration pressures or rather resist such forces. In terms of Europeanization outcomes,

scholars (Knill 2001, Schmidt 2002, Radaelli 2003) are asking whether there is preservation

of the status-quo, convergence or divergence of societies. Trying to give an answer to this

type of question, authors (Börzel 1999, Heritier et al 2001, Börzel and Risse 2003) have

concentrated their efforts on identifying the conditions under which Europeanization is likely

to succeed, namely to lead to national adaptation. In this vein, domestic change depends on

the existence of a ‘misfit’, i.e. the degree of incompatibility between European requirements

and national processes, policies, and institutions. Opinions differ regarding the relationship

between misfit and domestic change. While, Börzel and Risse (2003) claim that the higher the

misfit the higher the adaptational pressure, Haveland (2000) shows that also policy cases with

a medium or low degree of misfit can converged towards EU requirements. To solve this

puzzle, scholars agree that the existence of a misfit is a necessary, but not sufficient condition

for expecting domestic change. A second condition connects the probability for change with

the existence of various facilitating factors and/or their absence (the so-called veto points, be

it formal institutions, individuals, or certain groups – see also Haverland 2000).

Börzel and Risse (2003) have devised an analytical framework in order to explain the

logics of national change by the lenses of two meta-theoretical approaches: rationalist

institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. For the rationalist view that follows the

‘logic of consequentialism’, the misfit between the EU and domestic processes, policies or

institutions provides societal or political actors with new opportunities or constraints to pursue

their interests. In contrast, the sociological approach, emphasizing the ‘logic of

appropriateness’, points to the role of entrepreneurs or epistemic communities for the

domestic learning process, together with the impact of political culture on the likelihood of

change. In the light of this research, the rationalist approach would describe and explain the

conditions and working mechanisms of hard Europeanization (i.e. ‘stick-and-carrots’

incentive structure), while the sociological institutionalism of the soft EU rules and practices

(i.e. socialization, policy learning).

1.3 Variables and Hypotheses

The independent variable of the study is EU adaptational pressure, namely the EU

conditionality and requirements that applicants and MS have to fulfill in order to join the

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Union (both hard and soft rules). The dependent variable, decision-making process, is

operationalized on three dimensions, institutions of the decision-making (polity), power

configuration and conflict among national elites in the legislative act (politics).

1.3.1 Institutions of the Decision-Making Process

This paper approaches institutions as formal and informal rules of the decision-

making process. More precisely, they refer to the various arenas of the decision-making

process, where a specific reform is discussed. In order to identify these arenas, the current

study employs, as the underlying conceptual device, the stagist approach of a policy

processes2 (Jones 1977, DeLeon 1999, see also Kriesi 1980). It implies dividing a policy-

making process in various phases/stages: problem definition, agenda-setting, identification of

alternatives and decision-making, implementation, and evaluation. This disaggregated image

of a policy process clearly depicts how policy-making is conducted and offers the possibility

of mapping the actors that participated in different stages, thus revealing important insights

for the analysis of policy-making.

A policy cycle, for the Romanian legislative process involves the following stages:

the legislative initiative (that belongs to the Government, Parliament, or citizens3), debates

and consultations among various ministerial bodies and social partners (i.e. the pre-

Parliamentary phase), the examination in parliamentary committees, debate and voting in the

plenum of the informed Chamber, examination, debate, and voting in the other Chamber, re-

examination, promulgation, and publication of the law.

The most important phases of a legislative process are considered to be the drafting of

a legislative act and consultations in the pre-Parliamentary arena and then the amendments

part brought in the Parliamentary Committees (face-to-face semi-structured interviews held

with Romanian decision-makers, Bucharest, December 2007; see also Boc 2005). The

consultations in the pre-Parliamentary phase, both formally (in the format of expert working

groups, dialogue sessions, and so on) and informally (from informal meetings among

stakeholders to e-mails or phone calls) are of particular relevance, as at this stage the ordinary

legislative process is open for input from Government and other social partners and

2 The criticisms of policy cycles in terms of an outdated theory (e.g. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, Sabatier 1999) are acknowledged. However, the stagist approach is not used as a theoretical device, but rather as a concept that helps reducing the complexity of policy-making by providing a clear picture of the steps of this process (see for example DeLeon 1999). In terms of theory, this research mainly draws on Europeanization literature. 3 There are hardly any examples of citizen initiatives that have become laws, thus the Parliament and the Government are the main de facto actors for initiating laws.

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stakeholders. The Parliamentary phase is also important, as lobbying for support for the given

piece of legislation in the Parliamentary committees can be used as an access point to the

decision-making process by various stakeholders. Furthermore, when a decision is commonly

agreed upon during the Committees consultations and compromises, the final vote in the

Parliament is more likely to have a formal character, unless there is discontent from one or

more groups on the results of the committee deliberations. In this case, depending on the

nature of the subject, a debate on specific articles of the proposed law may follow in the

Parliament (Deleanu 2001, Boc 2005).

The ‘take it or leave it’ proposition of the European legislation (see Mair and

Zeilonka 2002) together with the ‘close’ character of foreign decision-making (Sidjanski 1966

in Sciarini et al 2004) implies a less inclusive domestic decision-making. There is not much

room left for national debate and consultation. As Moravcsik (1998, 2001) notes, international

negotiations are likely to become themselves the most important step, thus moving out from

the domestic arena of the decision-making (see also Sciarini et al 2004). In addition, in

Romania, the executive interferes in the legislative processes related to EU rules adoption

through Government Ordinances or Decisions that further restricts the prospects for debate.

Moreover, the limited time frame within which foreign-oriented decisions have to be

taken, together with the massive quantity of the EU ‘imposed’ legislation put additional strain

on deliberation. This applies particularly to CEE applicant states that are considered to have

an asymmetric bargaining and domestic contestation power implying full compliance unlike

the Western states (Schimmelfennig 2001, Grabbe 2003).

The soft Europeanization of the polity is likely to differ from the effects produced by

the hard rules, specifically by having a lower impact on the inclusiveness of the decision-

making process. First, ‘soft’ rules are not part of the acquis, thus allowing for more domestic

deliberation. Secondly, given the fact that no strict frameworks on how these policies should

look in practice are devised at the EU level, the debate in national Parliaments can address

issues of the decision to adapt and the extent of compliance (see Sciarini et al 2004 for

autonomous adaptation).

It is assumed that the EU impact on the polity dimension differs before, respectively

after integration. A candidate state seeking to become an EU member, will try to comply with

the EU conditionality as much as possible, without displaying sound contestation (see for

example Grabbe 2003, Vachudova 2005). Legislation in meeting these requirements would

thus be adopted without involving extensive domestic analysis or consultation in the domestic

decision-making structures. After a country becomes a member of the Union, (after 2007 for

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Romania) the picture may change to a certain extent. Given that the EU pressure for change is

not that acute anymore, or as Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeir (2007) put it “once the

candidates have joined the EU, they already reap the benefits of membership and cannot be

induced to comply with EU rules by conditional incentives” (p.94), it might be the case that

states change their decision-making style. Namely, a lower EU pressure may imply more

domestic legislative consultations and debate as compared to the before accession moment.

However, the decision-making process on issues involving EU is expected to be less inclusive

than in the case of an ordinary legislative act, given that accession conditions are still in place.

Hypothesis 1a: The impact of hard EU pressure on the legislative process leads to a less inclusive

decision-making process, by weakening the role of consultation procedures with non-

state actors.

Hypothesis 1b: The impact of EU soft rules changes the decision-making process by making it less

inclusive, although this effect is expected to be weaker compared to the hard EU

impact.

Hypothesis 1c: Before integration, both the hard and soft Europeanization would lead to a less

inclusive decision-making process; after integration, Europeanization (especially in

its soft face) is likely to produce weaker effects on the level of inclusiveness

(compared to the before integration period) on the polity dimension of the decision-

making process.

1.3.2 Power Configuration

According to Börzel and Risse (2003), the Europeanization process may lead to a

redistribution of power among domestic actors. This perspective is in line with the rationalist

institutionalism logic, where Europeanization is conceived of as “a political structure which

offers some actors additional resources to exert influence, while severely constraining the

ability of others to pursue their goals” (2003, p.63), thus leading to a ‘differential

empowerment’ (Börzel and Risse 2000, Risse et al. 2001).

In the same vein, Moravcsik (1998, 2001) has emphasized the fact that

Europeanization strengthens state executives. He argues that “international negotiations and

institutions change the domestic context in which policy is made by redistributing four

domestic political resources: initiative, institutions, information and ideas (Moravcsik 1998,

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p.2). Thus, the main argument would be that international negotiations influence who would

have the control over the domestic agenda (initiative), alter who can participate in the

domestic decision-making procedures (institutions), and increase information asymmetries

“altering legitimate domestic ideological justifications for policies (ideas)” (Moravcsik 1998,

p. 11). In this view, changes in the channels of decision-making brought about by

Europeanization usually favor the actors who are directly involved in international

negotiations and institutions, that is, state executives. Putnam’s (1988) work on the two-level

game, contending that the transfer of a domestic issue to the international level reinforces

state executives, both at the national and international level follows the same line of

argumentation.

These arguments are likely to work in the Romanian setting as well. First, it is the

government that represents the states in the EU negotiations processes. This is a general

indication of the legal ‘positional power’4 hold by domestic actors in issues regarding foreign

affairs, and particularly EU negotiations. Second, for the particular case of the negotiation

regarding EU legislation that has to be domestically internalized, the role of the executive

bodies (e.g. the Ministry of European Integration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and various

governmental agencies) was also empowered by the ‘exclusive nature’ of this kind of

decisions, at the expense of the legislative bodies (see Holzhacker 2007).

It is assumed that this effect (i.e. the empowerment of executive bodies) would be

lower in the case of soft Europeanization than in the hard face, since in this case, reforms do

not follow strict rules or deadlines decided in Brussels, thus opening the legislative process

towards other domestic actors with the power to impact on the decision-making. However,

state executives remain the driving forces for legislation changes in meeting EU requirements,

regardless of its form (Moravcsik 1998). Therefore, it is expected to find a stronger executive

branch in both forms of Europeanization, although the effect should be weaker in the soft

case.

The time element points also towards a power configuration structure in favor of

domestic executives, but with a stronger power degree before integration as compared to the

2007 accession moment and afterwards when the EU adaptational pressure loses its intensity.

State cabinets are likely to be empowered both when Romania was a candidate country and as

a member state, although after 2007 the effect is expected to be weaker compared to the

previous phase. In addition, numerous external assessments of the decision-making process in

4 The positional power approach refers to elites as all holders of important institutional positions with legal possibilities to influence formal decisions; for this point of discussion it refers to state executives members.

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Romania (e.g. OECD/SIGMA, World Bank reports) indicate that the main mechanism of

legislating is Governmental Emergency Ordinances. When it comes to decisions related to the

EU, it is even more the case that the government would prevail in articulating policies.

Hypothesis 2a: State executives are strengthened as a consequence of hard Europeanization.

Hypothesis 2b: Soft Europeanization empowers state executives, although the effect is weaker than in

the case of the hard EU pressure.

Hypothesis 2c: Europeanization (hard and soft) empowers the executive both before and after

integration, although the effect is weaker after 2007, especially in the case of soft

Europeanization.

1.3.3 Conflict Structure

Authors argue both for less and more conflict as a result of Europeanization. In the

first camp are those scholars (see for example Katzenstein 1985 on internationalization, Grote

and Schmitter 1999) who claim that the adoption of ‘imposed’ legislation from a superior

body as EU, is likely to favor domestic consensus, in the sense that policies that would be

controversial in a domestic setting are more likely to be accepted under European pressure.

Furthermore, actors favoring change are less likely to be blamed by opponents for possible

negative effects brought by that change in legislation, as the reform was made under the EU

demand. Another branch of authors (see for example Hug and Sciarini 1995) argue that, on

the contrary, it is precisely the ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ character of EU decisions – that

significantly alters the established national order and weakens national elites’ power over the

political agenda – that would lead to a higher level of conflict in decision-making processes

that are under EU influence, compared to those that are not. In a similar vein, Lindstrom

(forthcoming, p.2) argues that EU critical public opinion makers in Estonia and Slovenia

oppose EU pressure on the grounds that it “adversely affects their particular5 political-

economic national development paths”. More precisely, applying a varieties of capitalism

framework to the aforementioned case, the author claims that depending whether the EU is

perceived to fall to the left or right of the national status quo, it has a significant impact on

support for EU integration.

5 Emphasis in original.

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In Romania, party politics and civil society activity point to a pro-EU discourse. Even

the ultra nationalist party, the Greater Romania Party, changed its platform, advocating for

European integration. There was no sign of contestation in any of the social spheres, at least

until 2007, of what EU was demanding. Adding the fact that legislation in meeting the EU

conditionality has a relative closed character, in the sense that it is mainly decided by

governmental bodies and there is little room for maneuver in domestic legislatures it further

pave the way to consent in adopting EU requirements (see Ilie 2005). Put otherwise, the

adoption and implementation of the acquis is generally conducted at the executive level,

therefore it further restricts other actors’ access to debate and hence the possibility for conflict

(OECD 2005).

The soft Europeanization leaves more room for domestic debate, as no binding rules

are established at the European level. In this case, the Parliament becomes a more visible

actor in domestic legislative process. Nevertheless, the conflict in the decision-making

process caused by EU pressures might vary from sector to sector, depending on the actors

affected that might influence the final decision.

The effects of Europeanization might lead to different consequences in terms of

conflict in the decision-making process when Romania had the candidate status and in the

current period, as an EU MS. On the one hand, before Romania joined the Union, the level of

conflict among domestic elites is likely to be low, as legislation in meeting the acquis had to

be adopted as rapidly as possible, without too much consultation. On the other hand, after

2007 the level of conflict may increase compared to the previous stage (although it is still

expected to be lower than in a ‘classical’ legislative process), as at this stage the EU

adaptational pressure is weaker, leaving more room for debate and exposition of conflicting

interests in domestic legislation.

Hypothesis 3a: The EU pressure for change – hard Europeanization –translates into a lower level of

conflict among elites in the decision-making process.

Hypothesis 3b: The soft Europeanization produces weaker effects on the level of conflict among

domestic legislators than the hard Europeanization however it still accounts for a

decrease in the level of conflict.

Hypothesis 3c: Europeanization (hard and soft) leads to a low level of conflict in the decision-making

process before integration and would have a weaker impact, especially in the soft

dimension from 2007 onwards.

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In sum, the main hypotheses this research proposal will test are:

Europeanization leads to a less inclusive decision-making process

The EU domestic impact empowers state executives

Europeanization decreases the level of conflict among domestic elites

All these effects are expected to be stronger in the case of hard Europeanization, and

especially in the period before integration, than in the soft case and after integration

2. Methodological Aspects

This part will first discuss aspects related to the case selection, followed by an

overview and justification of the methods employed. Finally, data-collection and analysis

techniques are introduced.

2.1 Case selection

The country case selection is relevant for several reasons. First, it provides the

opportunity to investigate whether the Europeanization concepts developed for Western states

can also be applied to the CEE region (see Grabbe 2003, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier

2005), thus adding a substantial contribution to this field of study. Secondly, research on

Europeanization and decision-making in general is lacking in Romania. In addition, given the

laggard economic status of this country, compared to the other members and candidates,

conducting research in this setting would represent a solid test case for the Europeanization

theories that were mainly generated from analysis of well performing economies (see King et

al 2000).

For Romania, Europeanization is present in both the hard (e.g. policy reforms in the

immigration sector) and the soft face (for example legislative changes in the social field).

Furthermore, the EU domestic impact is likely to produce effects from (at least) 2000

onwards, when Romania started the official EU integration negotiations. It might prove out

that Europeanization has led to different consequences in various sectors during this time-

frame (as a candidate state and as a member), therefore this research will account for this

variation both in a longitudinal and a cross-sector fashion.

Looking at one country, but comparing various policy sectors follows the most

similar cases design (Przeworski and Teune 1970), or Mill’s method of difference which has

the advantage of cases selection (policy sectors) that are similar in as many ways as possible

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Time dimension

2003-2005 2007-2008

Hard Europeanization

Soft Europeanization

Low/No effect

Policy sector: Immigration and asylum policies

Policy sector: Social assistance and social

services

Policy sector: Fiscal decentralization in primary education

Europeanization Impact

(keeping other variables constant), but different in their degree of Europeanization. This

allows for better sizing the variation in the independent variable of the model. As Haverland

(2005, p. 8) puts it “Comparing sectors where EU pressure, incentives or models exist with

other sectors comes close to the ideal of the most similar systems design, because the

investigator can keep all national factors constant.”

2.1.1 Policy sectors

In order to classify policy sectors based on the EU impact, in addition to the legal-

institutional analysis and insights from the Europeanization methodological literature that

looks at various transmission mechanisms (hard and soft), a reputational approach –

interviewing experts from the Romanian public spectrum (like technocrats from various

administrative departments both at the central and local level, scholars engaged in research on

public policy and Romania, journalists, and so on) on their estimation of the EU pressure on

various policy sectors – was employed. The correlation of these two methods provides a clear

picture of the relevant policy sectors, affected by different degrees of Europeanization.

The immigration and asylum policy sector is a case of hard Europeanization (part of

the acquis, Chapter 24 on Justice and Home Affairs, but also with implications for chapter 2

on the Freedom of Movement of Persons), strongly reformed in order to adopt and implement

the binding directives set by the EU. Social assistance and social services represent the

decision-making process affected by the soft EU pressure. Furthermore, the control case of

this analysis is the education reform, a policy change that was mostly domestically driven. A

graphical representation of the three policy sectors presented in this study is provided below:

Figure 1 Cross-sector and cross-time analysis: a graphical representation

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2.2 Social Network Analysis

To test the hypotheses formulated above, in terms of importance and inclusiveness of

the decision-making, power configuration of state and non-state actors, and level of conflict

among domestic elites, network analysis provides the appropriate methodological tools (see

Wassermann and Faust 1999). The structural network analysis is regularly employed by

researchers in the field of policy analysis studies to learn about the structures and power

configuration that are formed in decision-making processes, i.e. policy networks (Laumann

and Knoke 1987, Knoke and Pappi 1989, Knoke 1990, Schneider 1992, Scott 1997). As

Borzel notes, the general understanding of policy networks is ‘a set of relatively stable

relationships […] linking a variety of actors, who share common interests with regard to a

policy and who exchange resources to pursue these shared interests acknowledging that co-

operation is the best way to achieve common goals’ (1998, p.254). The basic assumptions of

the social network method are that actors are interdependent and their relational ties constitute

channels for transfer or flow of resources, providing opportunities or constraints on actors’

actions. Following a similar operationalization of the concept, this analysis employs policy

networks as an analytical tool to describe and explain the complex relationship between actors

in various sectors of public policy making6.

For data collection, face-to-face, semi-structured interviews with domestic elites

were conducted. To identify the relevant actors, a combination of three schools – positional,

reputational and decisional – was employed (see Kriesi 1982). This approach emerged as a

solution to a long debate on how to identify elites and measure the power relations among

them, i.e. community power controversy (elitists vs. pluralist scholars – see for example

Truman 1951, Hunter 1953, Schattschneider 1960, Dahl 1961). In this sense, a comprehensive

list of the relevant stakeholders from the given policy process was elaborated. The

questionnaire contains socio-metric and qualitative questions about the phases of each policy

process as well as power and conflict structures. In average, 22 interviews (at the

organization/collective level) per policy process were conducted.

6 This research also acknowledges the ‘governance school’ approach that defines policy networks as non-hierarchical relationships between public-private actors, a type of governance opposed to hierarchy and market structures, however the stance taken by this study is a methodological approach to analyze the decision-making process.

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3. Data Analysis

This section will present an overview of the policy sectors, followed by data analysis

for each dependent variable, i.e. institutions/phases of a policy process, power configuration,

and conflict structure. The analysis was conducted for the two Europeanized policy sectors

and the control case respectively, both before and after Romania joined the EU.

3.1 The Immigration and Asylum Policies: Overview of the Reform

The immigration and asylum sector is an important policy domain, relevant not only

for the Romanian socio-political context, but also for the international environment, as

migration flows are constantly increasing patterns in both member and non-member states. In

this sense, EU has set clear regulations that member states have to follow. For example, in

2005 member states adopted a programmatic document, the Hague Program, for further

improvement of liberties, security and justice within EU for the period 2005-2010. Special

attention is paid to immigrants, asylum seekers and their social inclusion (i.e. of those legally

residing on the territory of one of the MS). Furthermore, in 2006 it was elaborated the

program for solidarity and management of migration flows for period 2007-2013 and also the

strategy for cooperation with third countries regarding migration and asylum policies. One of

the most important EU requirements is the need to ensure that candidate countries are

institutionally and administratively equipped to meet adequate and acceptable standards of

implementation of these policies. In this sense, building and capacitating institutions is a must

for EU newcomers. For Romania, policy implementation was always seen as a problem and

the Commission has constantly (for example through the country monitoring reports)

highlighted this administrative shortcoming and urged the Government to find viable

solutions, namely by forming institutions capable of implementing and enforcing public

policies (se for example Monitoring Report 2005, 2006).

The large volume of legislation that has to be transposed in the immigration field

involves the necessity for building effective national institutions that would be able to cope

with all migration policies. The EU has clearly specified the type of institutions and

respectively the necessary functions national administrative organisms dealing with

immigration strategies and programs should have.

The most important projects implemented in Romania, both before and after

integration address aliens and asylum regulations. Important changes brought by the

immigration and asylum reform refer to compliance with the terminology used at European

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level. It defines specific concepts such as form of protection, asylum seeker, asylum claim,

alien, country of origin, asylum procedure, refugee status, subsidiary protection, temporary

protection, family members, unaccompanied minor, detached person, mass influx and other

related concepts. It also explicitly comprises the principles and procedural warranties

applicable to asylum such as: the right to asylum of any alien or stateless person which

solicits protection; non-discrimination on any basis, the principle of non-deportation, the right

to family reunification, confidentiality of data, priority of child’s interests, presumption of

good-faith and so on. The institutional reform, namely the establishment of the Romanian

Office for Immigration (ORI) was designated as the national specialized institution for

migration management, following the EU practices and regulations in the immigration

domain. It was created by reshuffling the Authority for Aliens and the National Office for

Refugees. The new Office has taken over all the prerogatives and territorial structures of the

former Office for Refugees. Among the most important functions of the institution are the

issuing of work authorizations for employment based on an individual employment contract,

self-employment or transfer of a migrant worker to Romania by his/her company, and all

other related working documents, long term visa documents and others.

3.2 The Social Assistance and Social Services Policies: Overview of the

Reform

After 1989 in Romania, social developments were constantly on the political agenda

of the government. Important pieces of legislation were adopted as a consequence of the EU

foreseen entrance. Besides substantive reforms, new institutions capable of implementing

social policies had to be organized. The policy reforms undertaken in the social field, namely

social assistance and social services fall into the soft case of Europeanization. Here, mostly

secondary EU legislation is in place and mechanisms such as the OMC, policy learning aim at

bringing national policies closer in this field. The most important reforms in this sector are

laws regulating the social services and social assistance domain.

The particular issue of social assistance, as part of the national social protection

system, was shaped in Romania through the OMC (as of 2002 Romania was included in the

EU decision making through the OMC) based on the strategies and objectives set by the

Union in the Lisbon Strategy. The rationale for building a framework law on the national

social assistance system is given primarily by the attention MS devoted in creating a

multidimensional social inclusion policy that would address various social problems of the

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target groups (e.g. maximum employment, social cohesion, the quality of working conditions)

and would have commensurable outcomes. In this context, the main objectives of the

Romanian reform on social services and social assistance are to set up an integrative

framework for the organization and coordination of social policies, elaboration of unitary and

coherent policies and programs in this domain, establishing clear financing methods, and not

least clearly specifying and identifying the types of social services and respectively the target

population. This reform is promoting the EU social values and objectives set up by the

Council Recommendation 92/442/EEC, namely convergence of the programs on social

protection, by supporting marginalized groups (unemployed persons that could not re-enter

the labor market and do not have minimum subsistence resources) to receive appropriate

social assistance. Furthermore, the two newly established administrative bodies, the National

Agency for Social Services and the Social Inspection, with implementation and monitoring

functions, were envisaged as the institutional development in the social field.

3.3 The Fiscal Decentralization in Primary Education: Overview of the

Reform

In the past years, Romania has engaged in a fiscal-administrative decentralization

process in various policy sectors. Reforming the education system, in terms of fiscal

decentralization was constantly an issue on the agenda of national policy-makers. Given the

highly centralized pre-1990 education system, the debate about the objectives of

decentralization has been fierce in the country. The strong and mostly opposed interests of the

central and local administration, as well as the schools and other education professionals,

together with a powerful labor union market imposed additional strains on the reform.

Nevertheless, the main steps for introducing a per capita formula for financing the primary

education sector were taken by the 2004 Government. This new legal framework foresees a

financing system based on standard costs and increased school autonomy in managing and

allocating funds. Initially, the per capita financing system was introduced in eight counties, as

a pilot study and afterwards it was extended to the other local government units in the

country.

Another important legal development concerning decentralization in the education

sector was the adoption of another law in 2007 that prescribes the financing mechanisms of

the post-secondary education system. These measures continue the fiscal reform in the

primary education system and differentiate the costs that should be covered from local

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budgets, based on the number of students enrolled in each education unit, from those allocated

from the central budget. Initially, the entire financing structure was defined and managed at

the central level. Furthermore, the legislation also sets various principles in distributing and

managing the funds by local governments and school principles, respectively.

As discussed, decentralizing the financing system in primary education was mainly a

domestic reform, without major impacts from other external bodies in terms of the content of

the new legislation. The World Bank was funding an independent Polish expert on education

policies that worked closely with the Romanian government and civil society in elaborating

the per capita formula, however substance of the reform was decided by domestic

stakeholders, in the context of the entire process of decentralization in Romania.

3.4 The Impact of EU Pressure on Institutions of Decision-making

The questionnaire included a section on the perceived importance of the various

stages of the decision-making. Each policy process was broken down in two main parts: the

pre-parliamentary and parliamentary stage. Furthermore, given the general importance

attributed to the pre-parliamentary stage, this was divided in other two main phases: drafting

of the legislative act within working groups and committees at the ministerial level and

consultation procedures with other government bodies and non-state actors. The

Parliamentary stage also consists of two main sub-parts, the committee work and final vote in

Plenum.

Table 1 shows in percentages the importance of each policy stage, in each decision-

making process analyzed, both before and after Romania joined the EU. At the aggregate

level, the pre-parliamentary stage is the most important phase of a policy cycle, in all of the

three sectors investigated, both before and after integration. Looking at each sub-phase,

drafting a legislative act in the Pre-parliamentary phase received the highest scores in terms of

relevance, however within a decreasing pattern of variation across sectors and across time.

The highest value attributed to this sub-phase was in the Europeanized case, before

integration, with a score of 70% relevance. The consultation procedures, in the Pre-

parliamentary stage were also perceived as important. Generally, at this level the main aspects

of a reform are debated and negotiated between state and non-state actors. However, when it

comes to EU related policies, the number and importance of non-state players diminishes

substantially. In this case, the key decision-makers are state bodies, namely departments and

agencies within the respective ministry.

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Table 1 Importance of the phases of a decision-making process (before and after the EU integration)

Importance phases of a policy‐process (%) 

Policy Sectors Immigration & 

asylum reform 

Social reform  Education 

reform 

Time frame

Stages 

Before  After  Before  After  Before  After 

Pre‐parliamentary stage             

Drafting  70  58  56  47  43  39 

Consultations  21  28  27  31  26  25 

Parliamentary stage             

Committee  7  11  12  19  25  29 

Plenum  2  3  5  3  6  7 

Total   100  100  100  100  100  100 

As already mentioned above, before integration, the highest importance was

attributed to drafting the legislative acts, and the overall importance granted to the pre-

parliamentary phase exceeded 90% of the total answers in the hard Europeanized case, in the

period before integration and a similar value maintains afterwards (86%). The figures from

the hard and soft Europeanized case show that the pre-parliamentary stage remains the most

important decisional arena, both before and after integration, however the consultation

procedures and also the committee work in the Parliamentary stage gained in relevance,

especially in the after integration period. The results from the control case point to the Pre-

parliamentary stage as being the most important step of a decision-making process (with a

value of more than 60% of importance), nevertheless there is a consistent increased in the

importance attributed to the parliamentary phase, especially the committee work.

Most of the interviewees specified that the decision-making process tends to become

‘exclusive’ and handled in the pre-parliamentary phase (mostly during the drafting activities),

by the bureaucratic apparatus when the legislation subject is EU driven. This leaves little

space for social participation, national debates or contestation. It is a consistent pattern,

indentified in both the immigration and social (at a different level, in the hard case and

especially before integration the entire process being almost entirely handled by the national

administration at the ministerial level), underlining the reinforcement of the importance of the

pre-parliamentary stage as an EU effect on decision-making.

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3.5 The Impact of EU Pressure on Power Configuration

As already implied by the ‘closed’ nature of the decision-making, a powerful

executive tends to dominate the political scene, in sectors affected by EU requirements. This

is further confirmed by the centrality measures employed to assess the importance of actors.

Both the subjective measurement, reputational power (calculated as the percentage of the

most important actors, as nominated by each interviewee) and the indicator based on the

position of an actor in the cooperation network7, betweenness centrality (score that measures

the percentage of actors that need to get in contact with a specific actor in order to reach other

actors in the network) point to the fact that state bodies are the most important/powerful actors

in the decision-making process.

Table 2 Reputational Power    Reputational Power (%) 

Policy Sectors Immigration & asylum reform 

Social reform  Education reform 

Time frame*Actors 

Before  After  Before  After  Before  After 

Central public administration  92  89  85  76  40  39 

Local authorities  0  2  1  5  12  16 

Total state actors  92  91  86  81  52  55 

Interest groups**  0  2  5  9  11  12 

Labor unions  0  0  1  3  33  27 

Political parties  0  0  1  2  3  5 

Experts***   8  7  7  5  1  1 

Total Non‐state actors  8  9  14  19  48  45 

In terms of reputational power, state actors substantially overweight social partners,

in the two Europeanized policy sectors, before as well as after integration. Nevertheless, in the

soft Europeanized case and especially after integration, local authorities together with other

societal actors become more visible, indicating a de-concentration of the central power. An

even more powerful non-state sector occurs in the control case. The local government

together with labor unions and political parties share the policy-making prerogatives with the

executive. The network centrality measures calculated for the cooperation network further

confirm the central position of the executive in those policy areas affected by the EU pressure.

Both before and after integration, in the immigration and asylum sector as well as in the social

domain, state bodies had a high control power over the rest of the actors in the network. The

7 The question for the collaboration network was formulated as follows: “Based on the list of actors presented, can you please indicate the actors with whom you collaborated closely (frequent, regular contacts in the decision-making process)?”

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strengthening of state actors is clearly depicted in Table 3, the network centrality measure –

betweenness centrality showing a strong state apparatus in each of the three policy sectors

analyzed, with the highest values in the Europeanized cases. In other words, the existing

strong executive (about 60% in the control case) is further empowered by the integration

process, reaching values of over 90% in the hard case of Europeanization, before the EU

enlargement. A strong executive was identified in the soft Europeanization case with values

raging from 86% before integration to 73% afterward. The control case indicates a powerful

executive, with values around 60%, however looking at the composition of the stakeholders

that participated in these policy reforms and the scores obtained, it transpires that other non-

sate actors (like labor unions and other interest groups that were almost absent in the

Europeanized cases) are important players in the decision-making process.

Table 3 Betweenness Centrality     Betweenness Centrality (%) 

Policy Sectors Immigration & asylum reform 

Social reform  Education reform 

Time frame*Actors 

Before  After  Before  After  Before  After 

Central public administration  90  84  77  66  57  54 

Local authorities  1  2  3  7  4  6 

Total state actors  91  86  80  73  61  60 

Interest groups**  1  4  6  11  16  15 

Labor unions  0  2  5  6  15  16 

Political parties  0  1  3  5  5  7 

Experts***   8  7  6  5  3  2 

Total non‐state actors  9  14  20  27  39  40 Notes: *The time frame refers to the period before Romania joined the EU (i.e. 2003-2005), and after integration (i.e.

2007-2008) respectively **It generally refers to various domestic civil society organizations. Employers’ associations, parents and students

organizations were mainly present in the education reform. ***Experts encompass EU technocrats, especially in the case of the immigration and asylum reform and social

policies. Other experts, like UNHCR, IOM, or WB Romania were considered to be relevant actors in these policy reforms.

3.6 The Impact of EU Pressure on the Level of Conflict

In order to measure the level of conflict, the questionnaire included a section on the

convergence and divergence of opinions. The average level of conflict was calculated by

adding the scores of the convergence/divergence matrix (-1, 0, 1) and divided it by the overall

number of possible ties.

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The average value for the conflict network is positive in the two cases affected by the

EU pressure, indicating that national decision-makers collaborated more often with each

other, than were engaged in conflictual instances. On the contrary, the control case is

dominated by more conflictual relationships, domestic policy-makers embarking in various

debates and controversies while legislating on the education reform. Generally, the

conflict/cooperation data indicates that the EU pressure foster domestic consensus, while in a

domestic setting, where no time constrains or imposed rules from above apply, disagreements

tend to occur more often among policy-makers.

Figure 2 The cooperation/conflict network

Final Remarks

The results based on the comparison of the hard Europeanization case, i.e.

immigration and asylum policies with the soft one, i.e. social services and assistance, and the

control case, i.e. education policies, before and after integration, show significant changes

brought by the EU integration on the decision-making process. In terms of the

institutions/phases of a policy process, overall the pre-parliamentary stage is the most

important decisional arena across sectors and across time, effect that is being further

amplified by the EU integration. This translates into an ‘exclusive’ character of the decision-

making process, the most relevant aspects of the reforms being handled in the executive

arena, by state departments. The consultation procedures, as well as debates and amendments

in the parliamentary stage lose their importance, the whole policy processes that are under the

Before After Before After Before After

Immigration & asylum reform

Social reformEducation

reform

Average level of conflict 0.35 0.16 0.17 0.06 -0.05 -0.04

-0.1

-0.05

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

0.3

0.35

0.4

Aver

age s

core

of th

e con

flict

/ coo

pera

tion

level

in th

e dec

ision

-mak

ing p

roce

ss

Average level of conflict/cooperation, before and after the EU integration

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EU regulations being almost entirely closed for non-state actors (like for example NGOs, IOs,

political parties, labor unions, or business organizations). In the control case the Parliamentary

stage is considered almost as important as the pre-parliamentary stage, pointing to a more

opened/inclusive decision-making process.

The power relationship is restructured, the executive becoming the most visible and

powerful actor in the two Europeanized policy networks, although the scores show a variation

mainly across time among these two sectors and a consistent difference towards the control

case, where various non-sate actors can advance their policy preferences in the decision-

making process. Furthermore, Europeanization significantly reduces the level of conflict,

leading to a high level of convergence of opinions between the actors involved in the

Europeanized decision-making processes. All these effects are higher in the case of hard

Europeanization and especially before integration, as a consequence of a strong EU pressure

as compared to the soft Europeanized sector and the control case. However, the soft

Europeanization mechanisms also produce important changes in the decision-making process,

leading to a closed policy process, with a powerful administration, and cooperation

relationships, results that show a strong overall EU effect on domestic settings. In other

words, national decision-makers perceived both the hard (the acquis legislation) and soft

(recommendations) rules important and necessary to adopt, deciding to fully comply with the

EU requirements before the integration moment, when the core objective was to achieve the

member state status. Afterwards, the EU pressure lost from its intensity and ‘binding’

character, the entire decision-making process getting back to a domestic ‘way of doing

things’.

This paper proposed an innovative inquiry area for Europeanization research,

looking at the effects of EU pressure on polity and politics, across policy sectors and time. In

addition, it made a substantial contribution to the study of decision-making, assessing the

decision-making process based on the structural relationships of the actors involved in

designing public policies, research path that has not been developed so far for the Romanian

context.

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