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West Coast Publishing2011 LDMoral Obligation

Resolved: Individuals have a moralobligation to assist people in need.

Hanne Jensen

Whitman College

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Summarized Topic Description

Individuals have a moral obligation to assist people in need.

This topic, more than most Lincoln-Douglas resolutions, will depend very much on how theaffirmative and negative choose to define the separate words in the resolution. More likelythan not, debates on this topic will whittle down to what are individuals rights andresponsibilities as human beings and as members of a society. Legally, there is little doubtthat most places in the world do not require any action to be taken by individuals for thepure benefit of others, which is why this question falls into the moral spectrum.Understanding what constitutes morality and a moral obligation is difficult because moralitymeans different things to different people. The various religions and cultures whichcompromise America, much less the world, show clearly how peoples difference of opinionson the matter of what is right and wrong can show through their laws and customs. In orderfor a resolution such as this to have any weight as a moral maxim, it should be universal.

This poses a dilemma because of the disagreements on the matter.

In addition, the potentially (but not explicitly) limiting term of individuals allows for avariety of interpretations. Individuals could mean persons acting solely individually orindividuals contributing to a group or organization in order to accomplish assistance on alarger scale. It could be argued that the use of the world individuals in the resolution meansthe exclusion of government or organizational involvement (that individuals rather thangroups have this moral obligation) or merely that individuals must have an involvement inthe process, as there is no overt mention of mutual exclusivity.Determining the need of people can be tricky: in order to establish that a person is in needrequires that either the person in question consider themselves to be in need or that a thirdparty observes them and deigns them to have a need. Both possibilities pose a problem forthe affirmative and negative as one would mean that only people able to freely accept andexpress their need would be considered able to accept assistance, and the other would allowfor the imposition of alien values and judgments on people who may not want, understand,

or even need their assistance.The very concept of assistance is riddled with its own problems as it does not specifywhether or not a person is required to make a substantial difference in the lives of people inneed. Assistance could mean a comprehensive and permanent solution to a need or it couldmean a small but well-intentioned gesture of good will. Clearly, both the negative and theaffirmative debaters have their work cut out for them as far as interpreting and defining theresolution before even debating its merits and shortcomings.

The affirmative debater would be best served by focusing on the natural equality of allpeople and the ability of almost all individuals to do something to help those in need.Keeping the expansive term assistance down to helping others help themselves ormitigating extremely forceful pressures on the needy as well as interpreting peopleloosely, allowing it to be persons the individuals know or come into contact with daily lifewould make it difficult for the negative to argue that there are not moral obligations to do

small generosities. The affirmative could successfully argue that it is more important for theindividual to become involved with the fabric of humankind in a positive way than it is tosolve every major world problem.In contrast, the negative should argue that while it is laudable for individuals to assist othersin their community and elsewhere that people have no moral obligations to assist others;the very reason that it is a good thing to do and praiseworthy is because it is going aboveand beyond what is required. Additionally, the negative has the ability to make manyarguments of how individual involvement with be either ineffective or evencounterproductive to the overall goal of assisting the needy. The negative would do well totake the side of consequentialism, that all the good intentions in the world wont necessarily

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evoke any real change in the landscape of the modern world; it is more important to causechange than it is to have an ethically motivated populace.Once the angles of the debate are established, it will (as usual) come down to the values.Not getting too bogged down in advantages or disadvantages to practical implementation ofeither case, truly hammering home the values will be the key to success in a large number

of rounds. Make sure they are clearly defined, weighed, and impacted out throughout theentire speech.

Definitions

Individual

Merriam-Webster (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/individual)a particular being or thing as distinguished from a class, species, or collection: as(1) : a single human being as contrasted with a social group or institution (2) : a single organism as distinguished from a group

Bing Dictionary (http://www.bing.com/Dictionary/search?q=define+individual&FORM=DTPDIA)

1. specific person: a specific person, distinct from others in a group"belief in the individual's right to self-expression"

2. any person: a human being, or a person of a specified type"a panel consisting of four individuals""a very unfortunate individual"

3. separate thing: a separate entity or thing4. [biology] separate organism: an independent organism separate from a group

"The plant part contains the embryo, which gives rise to a new individual."

Although individuals is clearly not the most contentious term in the resolution, it isimportant to decide whether or not to emphasize that individual is separate from a group. If

so, the Merriam-Webster definition is probably the best bet, but if the desired goal is to notdraw attention to potential mutual exclusivity arguments, it may be preferable to go withBings second definition.

Moral obligation

The Electric Law Library (http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/m142.htm)A duty which one owes, and which he ought to perform, but which he is not legallybound to fulfil.These obligations are of two kinds 1st. Those founded on a naturalright; as, the obligation to be charitable, which can never be enforced by law. 2d.

Those which are supported by a good or valuable antecedent consideration; as,where a man owes a debt barred by the act of limitations, this cannot be recoveredby law, though it subsists in morality and conscience; but if the debtor promise to

pay it, the moral obligation is a sufficient consideration for the promise, and thecreditor may maintain an action of assumpsit, to recover the money.

Moral

Bing Dictionary (http://www.bing.com/dictionary/search?q=definition of moral&qpvt=definition+of+moral+&FORM=Z7FD)

1. involving right and wrong: relating to issues of right and wrong and to how individualpeople should behave

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supplementally, use the verb in the transitive form. Technically, the use of assist in theresolution implies a transitive grammatical structure anyway.

People

Merriam-Webster (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/people)1. plural : human beings making up a group or assembly or linked by a common interest2. plural : human beings, persons often used in compounds instead of persons

often used attributively 3. plural : the members of a family or kinship4. plural : the mass of a community as distinguished from a special class often used by Communists to distinguishCommunists from other people

5. plural peoples : a body of persons that are united by a common culture, tradition, orsense of kinship, that typically have common language, institutions, and beliefs, andthat often constitute a politically organized group

6. lower animals usually of a specified kind or situation7. the body of enfranchised citizens of a state

thinkexist.com (http://thinkexist.com/dictionary/meaning/people/)1. (n.) One's subjects; fellow citizens; companions; followers.2. (n.) Persons, generally; an indefinite number of men and women; folks;

population, or part of population; as, country people; -- sometimes used as anindefinite subject or verb, like on in French, and man in German; as, people inadversity.

3. (n.) One's ancestors or family; kindred; relations; as, my people were English.4. (n.) The mass of comunity as distinguished from a special class; the commonalty;

the populace; the vulgar; the common crowd; as, nobles and people.5. (n.) The body of persons who compose a community, tribe, nation, or race; an

aggregate of individuals forming a whole; a community; a nation.

There are a surprising number of definitions of the term people. Avoid using MWsdefinitions #3-6 and thinkexists #1, 3-5 unless there is a clear purpose for attributingpeople to a specific group. The familial definitions can be useful for justifications of specialobligation but otherwise, as there is no clear mention of possessives in the resolution, thereshould be a reason before the definition is employed as such.

Need

Merriam-Webster (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/need?show=0&t=1310333064)

1. a : a lack of something requisite, desirable, or usefulb : a physiological or psychological requirement for the well-being of an organism

2. a condition requiring supply or relief

3. lack of the means of subsistence : poverty

Dictionary.com (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/need)1. a requirement, necessary duty, or obligation: There is no need foryou to

go there.2. a lack of something wanted or deemed necessary: to fulfill the needs of

the assignment.3. urgent want, as of something requisite: He has no need of your charity.

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Merriam-Websters second definition is probably the most accurate definition in the contextof the resolution. If, however, the goal is to argue that a need is something specific, be itfood or biological necessities as opposed to an emotional state of contentment, etc, it maybe preferable to use one of the other more directed definitions.

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Affirmative CaseHere is an example affirmative case which may be used as it is constructed, as a starting

point for possible additions, or even just as an example.

IntroductionAs the world grows more populous, tight-knit communities become rarer and rarer. It isbecoming more of an individually focused world where no one owes anything to anyone butthemselves. If everyone were completely self sufficient, this would not be a problem. But inthe modern world poverty, hunger, natural disasters, and other compromising circumstancesare making the likelihood that all people are living at an acceptable standard shrink away. Aworld where there can be no trust in other people, no possibility of shared experience in lifewith other people, is not a hospitable world for anyone. Each person has a duty to help withwhat then can when they can. Because of this fact, individuals have a moral obligation toassist people in need.

Value

Quality of Life"Glossary." The World Bank Group. World Bank, 2004. Web. 10 Jul 2011..

People's overall well-being. Quality of life is difficult to measure (whether for an individual,group, or nation) because in addition to material well-being (see standard of living) it includessuch intangible components as the quality of the environment, nationalsecurity, personal safety, and political and economic freedoms.

By assisting people in need, their quality of life will be improved because a wrong will be

righted, their needs aided. They are not the only ones who will benefit, however: when theoverall needs of the community are addressed, everyone benefits and a higher standard ofliving and quality of life is achieved for all. Without quality of life, life itself is meaningless.Because of this, it is the first thing that should be valued.

Value Criterion

Individual Responsibility"Wordnet." Princeton Wordnet 3.1. Princeton University, 2011. Web. 10 Jul 2011..

(

the social force that binds you to the courses of action demanded by thatforce) "we must instill a sense of duty in our children"; "every right implies a responsibility;every opportunity, an obligation; every possession, a duty"- John D.Rockefeller Jr

Everyone has the ability to help and if everyone does their part, then everyone will reap thebenefits. Advocating individual responsibility is the only way that the quality of life can beraised to its fullest potential.

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Contention One: Without individual investment,communities deteriorate

A. Individual apathy on matters of communal interest willcreate discord.The Atlantic, Internationally acclaimed social and political commentary periodical, March1982http://www.theatlantic.com/ideastour/archive/windows.htmlWe have difficulty thinking about such matters, not simply because the ethical and legal issues are so complex but

because we have become accustomed to thinking of the law in essentiallyindividualistic terms. The law defines my rights, punishes his behavior and is applied by that officerbecause of this harm. We assume, in thinking this way, that what is good for theindividual will be good for the community and what doesn't matter when ithappens to one person won't matter if it happens to many. Ordinarily, those areplausible assumptions. But in cases where behavior that is tolerable to one personis intolerable to many others, the reactions of the others--fear,

withdrawal, flight--may ultimately make matters worse for everyone,including the individual who first professed his indifference.

Taking other persons wants and needs into consideration when deciding what our actionswill be is the only way to make a truly cohesive society that will benefit everyone. If peopleare wholly self-centric, nothing can be accomplished and no progress can be made.

B. Without assistance by individuals, communities willdeteriorate; famous broken windows theory proves.

The Atlantic, Internationally acclaimed social and political commentary periodical, March1982http://www.theatlantic.com/ideastour/archive/windows.html

Philip Zimbardo, a Stanford psychologist, reported in 1969 on some

experiments testing the broken-window theory. He arranged to have an automobilewithout license plates parked with its hood up on a street in the Bronx and a comparable automobile on a street inPalo Alto, California. The car in the Bronx was attacked by "vandals" within ten minutes of its "abandonment." Thefirst to arrive were a family--father, mother, and young son--who removed the radiator and battery. Within twenty-four hours, virtually everything of value had been removed. Then random destruction began--windows weresmashed, parts torn off, upholstery ripped. Children began to use the car as a playground. Most of the adult"vandals" were well-dressed, apparently clean-cut whites. The car in Palo Alto sat untouched for more than a week.

Then Zimbardo smashed part of it with a sledgehammer. Soon, passersby were joining in. Within a few hours, thecar had been turned upside down and utterly destroyed. Again, the "vandals" appeared to be primarily respectable

whites. Untended property becomes fair game for people out for fun orplunder and even for people who ordinarily would not dream of doing suchthings and who probably consider themselves law-abiding. Because of the nature ofcommunity life in the Bronx--its anonymity, the frequency with which cars are abandoned and things are stolen orbroken, the past experience of "no one caring"--vandalism begins much more quickly than it does in staid Palo Alto,where people have come to believe that private possessions are cared for, and that mischievous behavior is costly.

But vandalism can occur anywhere once communal barriers--the sense ofmutual regard and the obligations of civility--are lowered by actions thatseem to signal that "no one cares." We suggest that "untended" behavior alsoleads to the breakdown of community controls. A stable neighborhood offamilies who care for their homes, mind each other's children, andconfidently frown on unwanted intruders can change, in a few years oreven a few months, to an inhospitable and frightening jungle. A piece of propertyis abandoned, weeds grow up, a window is smashed. Adults stop scolding rowdy children; the children,emboldened, become more rowdy. Families move out, unattached adults move in. Teenagers gather in front of the

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corner store. The merchant asks them to move; they refuse. Fights occur. Litter accumulates. People start drinkingin front of the grocery; in time, an inebriate slumps to the sidewalk and is allowed to sleep it off. Pedestrians areapproached by panhandlers.

A society that is not aware of itself as a group where individuals can affect the well-beings ofothers is one that will slowly deteriorate. The opposite holds true as well: when people are

invested in other people in the world, bonds are formed which are symbiotically beneficial.

C. Individual participation in communities and societies helpsto improve quality of life.

RobertCostanzaet al, various leaders in the field of Anthropology, Sociology, etc. December2008For example, objective measures include indices of economic production, literacyrates, life expectancy, and other data that can be gathered withoutdirectly surveying the individuals being assessed. Objective indicators may be usedsingly or in combination to form summary indexes, such as the UNs Human Development Index (Sen, 1985; UNDP,

1998). While these measurements may provide a snapshot of how well somephysical and social needs are met, they are narrow, opportunity-biased,and cannot incorporate many issues that contribute to QOL such as

identity, participation, and psychological security. It is also clear that these so-calledobjective measures are actually proxies for experience identified through subjective associations of decision-

makers; hence the distinction between objective and subjective indicators is somewhat illusory. Subjectiveindicators of QOL gain their impetus, in part, from the observation thatmany objective indicators merely assess the opportunities that individualshave to improve QOL rather than assessing QOL itself. Thus economic production maybest be seen as a means to a potentially (but not necessarily) improved QOL rather than an end in itself. Inaddition, unlike most objective measures of QOL, subjective measures typically rely on survey or interview tools togather respondents own assessments of their lived experiences in the form of self-reports of satisfaction,happiness, well-being or some other near-synonym. Rather than presume the importance of various life domains(e.g., life expectancy or material goods), subjective measures can also tap the perceived significance of the domain(or need) to the respondent. Diener and Suh (1999) provide convincing evidence that subjective indicators arevalid measures of what people perceive to be important to their happiness and well-being.

Action by governments and organizations are not enough to create true improvement inquality of life. Individual action, individual care must be taken, because quality of life is notlimited to just the basic physical needs that comprise standards of living. Quality of lifeincludes a semblance of connections between people, psychological and emotional wellbeing. Merely reaching out is assisting those in need.

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Contention Two: Obligation is limited to ability andrequired of all

A. Kant instructs that the practical construction of morals insists thatthey must be universalizable.

Garth Kemerling, contributorto the online philosophical dictionary philosophypages.com,2003http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/5i.htm

Constrained only by the principle of universalizability, the practical reasonof any rational being understands the categorical imperative to be: "Actonly according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will thatit should become a universal law." That is, each individual agent regardsitself as determining, by its decision to act in a certain way, that everyone(including itself) will always act according to the same general rule in thefuture. This expression of the moral law, Kant maintained, provides a concrete, practical method for evaluating

particular human actions of several distinct varieties.

It would be unreasonable to argue that some people should contribute and some should not.The fact is, everyone can assist those in need, and they dont have to (nor should they) gobeyond their means to do so. Whether it is a billionaire donating substantial sums to acharitable organization or a child sharing a piece of her sandwich with a homeless person,both are contributing.

B. Moral obligation does not depend on a certain position anindividual occupies in life.

Olufemu Badru, Department of Philosophy, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria, December 2009http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=7e70c8c7-36fa-47fa-ac65-e76d59278270%40sessionmgr113&vid=2&hid=111

In other words, from the foregoing, the point is that while obligation results from contract-like relationsor simply contractarianism between the self and the other, duty results from the fact ofoccupying a position of responsibility;duty is a certain job of value expected of a personwho occupies the position.

Moral obligations do not arise from people earning or losing certain rights. The differencebetween duty and obligation is that duty is something expected of a person because of whothey are or what they are capable of doing. Obligation is a relationship between a personand another, based on the nature that they are both people.

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Contention Three: Special obligation is destructive toliving in modern society

A. The bad Samaritan is morally reprehensible.RJ Howard, MD, Surgeon University of Florida School of Medecine, August 2006http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=d03cba5c-eff1-4dd9-b7e2-891a9cba96c4%40sessionmgr104&vid=2&hid=111

Feinberg would characterize one who refuses permission to recover organs as a bad samaritan. A badsamaritan is a stranger standing in no special relationship to theendangered party; who omits to do something warn of unperceived peril,undertake rescue, seek aid, notify police, protect against further injury[provide organs from deceased individuals]for the endangered party; which he couldhave done without unreasonable cost or risk to himself or others; as aresult of which the other party suffers harm, or an increased risk of harm

and for these reasons the omitter is bad (morally blameworthy). Somecountries in Europe even have laws against the bad samaritan who fails toundertake easy rescue.

If we see that something is wrong and do not try to make it better when we have thecapacity to do so, we are the Bad Samaritan. We have a responsibility to do what we can ifit does not create an unreasonable cost or risk to ourselves or others. This is ourresponsibility as individuals, our moral obligation to improve the quality of life by assistingpeople in need.

B. Persons have a right to be treated with respect regardlessof their place of origin.


Founding his justification on the right of common possession of the surface of the earth, Kantsconception consists in the right of a stranger not to be treated in a hostilemanner by another upon his arrival on the others territory, and thishospitable treatment is to continue so long as the stranger behavespeacefully, in the society of his host.

Whether a person is our neighbor or lives a million miles away, whether they are citizens orforeigners, all deserve to be treated with equal respect. Often we will only help thosepeople we are close to, or whose well being directly affects us. This is the problem of special

obligation, which stands in the way of improving the lives of the needy.

C. Special obligation is irrelevant, we have an obligation to helpstrangers just as much as those we know.

RJ Howard, MD, Surgeon University of Florida School of Medecine, August 2006http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=d03cba5c-eff1-4dd9-b7e2-891a9cba96c4%40sessionmgr104&vid=2&hid=111

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Ross suggests that the obligations of beneficence rest on the mere fact thatthere are other beings in the world whose condition we can make better. Ibelieve he would agree that we have an obligation to benefit others, even persons wedo not know.

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Negative

IntroductionIt is not unique to the modern condition that there are people in need all around theworld. Now and throughout history, there have been times when people have hadto rely on each other survive, much less live happily and contentedly. There is nodispute about that. A clarification must be made, though. While it is indeedformidable for one person to help another, to promote interpersonal relationships, itis not required. No person owes another anything just by nature of being alive. Toclaim otherwise would be to nullify basic concepts such as freedom, autonomy, and

justice. It is with this in mind that I argue individuals have no moral obligation toassist people in need.

Value

Freedom"Wordnet." Princeton Wordnet 3.1. Princeton University, 2011. Web. 10 Jul 2011.http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=freedom

the condition of being free; the power to act or speak or think withoutexternally imposed restraints

Freedom is a prerequisite to individuals having any individual power whatsoever. Todetermine what obligations an individual has, they must first be considered free actors,otherwise any agency is removed from the question and the discussion of moral obligationof individual action is moot.

Value Criterion

AutonomyDictionary.com online dictionary 2011http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/autonomy

independence or freedom, as ofthe will or one's actions: the autonomy ofthe individual.

In order to have truly free individuals, they must be autonomous, capable of making theirown decision with their own free will. Anything less would be a result of coercion of theexertion of one will onto anothers, an inherently immoral act to begin with.

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Contention Two: Competent individuals have theright to make their own decisions.

A. Before autonomy can be usurped, incompetency to makedecisions must be determined.

TLZutlevics, PhD in Philosophy Flinders Universityand PHHenning, MD Womens and ChildrensHospital, Australia, December2005http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=6a64c405-eba3-4b9f-a4d3-e99c550494e8%40sessionmgr113&vid=2&hid=111

If we are going to override someones autonomy the general view is that we shouldhave very good reasons before doing so. One such reason would be if the person weredeemed incompetent to make a decision. It is permissible to act in the interests of aperson in a situation where they are deemed incompetent to make adecision.

An individuals autonomy is key to their freedom, and therefore should not be mitigated byothers. The liberties we give up in order to live in a certain societies are exempt from thisrule because they are sacrificed by the choice of the individual. To impose a moralobligation on someone against their will would undermine their autonomy, thuscompromising their freedom.

B. Individuals should judge what they deem to be morally rightand then act accordingly

Larry Krasnoff, Professor of Philosophy at College of Charleston South Carolina, October 2010http://ejournals.ebsco.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/Direct.asp?AccessToken=5WN4444TRZPSQYJJW66BQSUPZYPBTRN69U&Show=Object

Of course weought to do what we judge to be good, and of course we ought to do itbecause of its goodness. The model here is one of recognition, drawn without fundamental alterationfrom the case of belief. Certainly we ought to exercise our autonomous judgmentabout what to believe, butjust as certainly we ought to believe what wejudge to be true, independently of anything about ourselves.In thetheoretical case, our thoughts are necessarily directed towards objectsbeyond ourselves, and so the role of our will must be to subordinate itselfto our best judgments about the nature of the object.

Moral obligations must be the results of our reasoning and judgments. If that happens tocoincide with the reasoning and judgments of everyone else in the world, then of course weshould do what we deem to be good. But it is a decision that must be arrived at from within,not an externally advocated obligation.

C. No moral obligation be universal in our culture, the only wayit can be determined is on an individual basis.Ana Iltis, Center for Health Care Ethics, Saint Louis University, 2003http://proquest.umi.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/pqdweb?index=0&did=575822021&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=10&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1310274871&clientId=48453

The multiplicity of autonomous selves do not sustain a single standard ofmorality. MacIntyre argues that we possess the fragments of a conceptual scheme.We possess

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indeed simulacra of morality, we continue to use many of the keyexpressions. But we have very largely if not entirely lost ourcomprehension, both theoretical and practical, of morality. The most striking feature ofcontemporary moral debates is that they apparently can find no terminus. There seems to be norational way of securing moral agreement in our culture, The ongoing debateconcerning the morality of immorality of abortion is a clear example of this lack of agreement or spectrum of views.

There are significant disputes concerning the moral and legal permissibility of abortion. A successfulaccount of moral integrity and moral responsibility, therefore, cannot beuniversal but must be situated in a particular context. Absent a universalunderstanding of morality, no single sense of moral obligation is available.There appears to be no framework within which we may justifiably assertthat all individuals are morally obligated in particular ways beyond alimited set of side constraints we may recognize as universal. It nevertheless isthe case that we routinely wish to attribute moral obligations to individuals and to understand the moral obligations

particular persons bear. We may understand particular individuals as havingparticular obligations only with an appreciation of their moral charactersand moral integrity. Moral character allows us to attribute moral

obligations, and moral integrity is the mechanism by which we canevaluate the extent to which they satisfy the obligations.

As each person experiences reality in a very different way and holds different values inhigher esteem than others (examples include religion, politics, even this round), we eachhave different views of what constitutes moral action. The concept of universal morality isan illusion, so saying that every individual has the same moral obligation (to assist those inneed) is laughable. Only individual morality can exist.

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Contention Three: Mass individual giving is harmful tosocial reform

A. Charitable giving distracts from the real problem and PREVENTSopportunities for lasting change.

BBC Ethics Guide, 2011http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/charity/against_1.shtml

Indeed charitable giving may even distract from finding the best solution -which might involve a complex rethink of the way the world organises itseconomic relationships, and large-scale government initiatives to changepeople's conditions. If that is so, then the effort put into charity might bebetter devoted to pressuring governments to bring about needed change.And governments might be more likely to focus on dealing with poverty if they weren't being helped by charities.

By attempting to fix the effects of injustice without addressing the cause, people arecreating an endless cycle of the very problems they are trying to prevent. Individuals do not

have the capability to change the world alone; they may affect some changes on the microscale, but cannot solve for corrupt governments, failing economies, or genocides. Largeraction is needed to solve the root problems.

B. An influx in charity spending results in a certain area, thegovernment will cut spending to areas that need it,stagnating growth.


The argument goes something like this. If the charity sector increases spending in anarea also funded by government then there is a risk that government will chooseto spend less in that area with the result that governments save money,and extra benefits provided by the charity spend are reduced.

When aid is given to a certain area of need by individuals, governments will stop sending asmuch assistance so that they may afford to help in other areas, leaving large problems toindividual assistance. Not only will benefits that only the government can offer be cut, butalso the stability of aid will be compromised. If individual aid shifts, the area they weresupporting will be left with nothing.

C. By individually assisting the needy, people will lose thedesire to affect real collective social reform and no realchange will happen.


This isn't a new argument: It is more socially injurious for the millionaire to spendhis surplus wealth in charity than in luxury. For by spending it on luxury, he chiefly injureshimself and his immediate circle, but by spending it in charity he inflicts a graver injury upon society. Forevery act of charity, applied to heal suffering arising from defectivearrangements of society, serves to weaken the personal springs of socialreform, alike by the 'miraculous' relief it brings to the individual 'case'that is relieved, and by the softening influence it exercises on the hearts

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and heads of those who witness it. It substitutes the idea and the desireof individual reform for those of social reform, and so weakens thecapacity for collective self-help in society, (J A Hobson, Work and Wealth, 1914).

If people are satiated by donating their five dollars a month to the AIDS foundation, they will

assume their moral obligation has been fulfilled (and in some interpretations, it has). Thiswill cause a complete stagnation of social reform and the change needs to happen asadvocated by the affirmative. Not only will individuals be less passionate about assisting theneedy, but governments will cease to be pressured as heavily to effect real change.

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Affirmative Blocks

Moral Obligations Dont Discriminate Against People

Kants claims only justify assistance to people living in the territory ofthe assister, not for all people everywhere.


At least, two points are deducible from Kants conception of universal hospitality. First, the Kantianconception of universal hospitality only entail doing good to astranger/foreigner when he is within the territory of the host. Thus, Kantianuniversal hospitality should rather be rendered as domestic hospitality towards strangers/foreigners. Second,following from the first point, the Kantian conception of universal hospitality does not, and caneven not, justify doing good in a morally obligatory way to a distant needy,

since this is outside its conceptual scope.

Everyone has an obligation to assist people living in absolute poverty.Squidoo.com, political and philosophical commentary website, 2011http://www.squidoo.com/worldhunger#

In Asia, Africa, and Latin America, over 500 Million people are living in what the WorldBank has defined as "absolute poverty." When reading the title of this article, in knowing that15 Million children die from hunger each year, how could one possibly reject the idea thatwe have a moral obligation to help? In truth, many may think we do have anobligation to the less fortunate. Yet, our actions often validate thearguments against helping those in need. Is our wealth maintained by the exploitation of theinnocent throughout the world? Is poverty a natural phenomenon? At the very least, each citizen of the world owes

this issue great consideration. Perhaps no one is innocent, we are all guilty of failing to breakpoverty's endless cycle.

The moral obligation to assist people in need transcends time, location,and culture.

ThomasPogge, German philosopher, Director of the Global Justice Program and Leitner Professor ofPhilosophy and International Affairs at Yale University, Jan-Mar 2000http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/stable/25115635?seq=2

Fourth, with respect to these moral concerns, all human beings have equalstatus: They have exactly the same human rights, and the moral

significance of these rights and their fulfillment does not vary with whosehuman rights are at stake. Fifth, human rights express moral concerns thatare unrestricted, i.e., they ought to be respected by all human agentsirrespective of their particular epoch, culture, religion, moral tradition orphilosophy. Sixth, these moral concerns are broadly sharable, i.e., capable of being understood andappreciated by persons from different epochs and cultures as well as by adherents of a variety of different religions,

moral traditions, and philosophies. The notions of unrestrictedness and broadsharability are related in that we tend to feel more confident aboutconceiving of a moral concern as unrestricted when this concern is not

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parochial to some particular epoch, culture, religion, moral tradition orphilosophy.

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Individuals Are Necessary in Evaluating Moral Obligations

Questions of morality are always ascribed to the individual.Jan Narveson, ethics philosopher, 2002

http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/stable/25115724?seq=2

The question for morals is always and fundamentally cast in individualterms: what is this, that, or the other person to do? If we think that there are things whichgroups should do, those claims will say nothing to anyone unless there issome way of understanding that individuals, such as members of thatgroup of persons affected by its behavior, have duties or rights or someother moral status in relation to it.

Individuals have a moral obligation to respect human rights, even ifthat means disregarding other considerations.

ThomasPogge, German philosopher, Director of the Global Justice Program and Leitner Professor ofPhilosophy and International Affairs at Yale University, Jan-Mar 2000http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/stable/25115635?seq=2

Persons have a moral duty to respect human rights, a duty that does notderive from a more general moral duty to comply with national orinternational legal instruments. (In fact, the opposite may hold: Conformity withhuman rights is a moral requirement on any legal order, whose capacity tocreate moral obligations depends in part on such conformity.) Second, humanrights express weighty moral concerns, which normally override othernormative considerations. Third, these moral concerns are focused on human beings, as all of themand they alone have human rights and the special moral status associated therewith. Fourth, with respect to thesemoral concerns, all human beings have equal status: They have exactly the same human rights, and the moral

significance of these rights and their fulfillment does not vary with whose human rights are at stake. Fifth, humanrights express moral concerns that are unrestricted, i.e., they ought to be respected by all human agentsirrespective of their particular epoch, culture, religion, moral tradition or philosophy. Sixth, these moral concernsare broadly sharable, i.e., capable of being understood and appreciated by persons from different epochs andcultures as well as by adherents of a variety of different religions, moral traditions, and philosophies. The notions ofunrestrictedness and broad sharability are related in that we tend to feel more confident about conceiving of amoral concern as unrestricted when this concern is not parochial to some particular epoch, culture, religion, moraltradition or philosophy.

A2: Consequentialism

Morality is about the duty, not necessarily about what happens

after.William Haines, Professor at University of Hong Kong, March 2006http://www.iep.utm.edu/conseque/

Consequentialism is controversial. Various nonconsequentialist views are that morality is all aboutdoing ones duty, respecting rights, obeying nature, obeying God, obeyingones own heart, actualizing ones own potential, being reasonable,respecting all people, or not interfering with othersno matter theconsequences.

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Moral Obligations Require Doing Something Good, Not JustNot Doing Something Bad

We have moral duties not only to prevent from doing harm butalso to take positive action.

ThomasPogge, German philosopher, Director of the Global Justice Program and Leitner Professor ofPhilosophy and International Affairs at Yale University, Jan-Mar 2000

The first understanding conceives human rights as moral rights that everyhuman being has against every other human being or perhaps, more generally, against everyother human agent (where this also includes collective agents, such asgroups, firms, or governments). Given this understanding of human rights it matters greatlywhether one then postulates human rights that impose only negative duties (to avoid depriving) or whether one

instead postulates human rights that in addition impose positive duties (to protect and/or to aid). A humanright to freedom from assault might then give every human agent merely

a weighty moral duty to refrain from assaulting any human being or alsoan additional weighty moral duty to help protect any human beings fromassaults and their effects.

It is better to inadvertently cause harm while trying to helpthan to let current harm happen and do nothing.

Gerhard verland, expert in Philosophy, Anthropology, and Sociology, June 2008http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=2&hid=106&sid=ab3a18c7-0387-4711-aed1-ca0914161581%40sessionmgr114

Two questions call for extra attention, namely to determine the significance of being an innocent contributor to

harm and the significance of being a culpable bystander. Because although it is uncontroversial

to assume severe implications following from being a culpable contributor,and no implications from being an innocent bystander, the significance of these othertwo options are routinely challenged. I argue that by merely being an innocentcontributor to harm one acquires a duty to shoulder a fair share of theharm in question.Even though one innocently causes harm, one has a dutyto shoulder a fifty percent of the harm, or risk of harm, and not to leave avictim to shoulder the whole load. I then go on to shed light on the significance of being aculpable bystander by evaluating situations in which we can choose between forcing contributors and bystanders. I

propose that in a choice between imposing cost on an innocent contributor and aculpable bystander, we should impose it on the latter. If I am right in thisjudgement, we have reason to believe that culpable bystanders may besubjected to substantial force to ensure they help protect people in need.

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HUMANS ARE MORALLY OBLIGATED TO CARE FOR THEGOOD OF OTHERS

A. INDIVIDUALS ARE INEVITABLY PART OF COMMUNITIES AND MUST BE CONCERNEDFOR OTHERSLinda Fisher, Associate Professor of Law and Director, Center for Social Justice,Seton Hall University School of Law, YALE LAW AND POLICY REVIEW, 2000, p. 357-358.It is helpful to view the issue not only from the perspective of the individual, butalso from a collective vantage point. That is, individuals are inevitably part of manycommunities - national, ethnic, religious, and the like. Any complete picture ofhuman life must capture the individual embedded within those larger structures,since no one can live in complete isolation. Thus recast, the issue becomes notwhether we as individuals desire communal life, or whether we think it is good,

but what sort of community or communities we want. How can communities bestensure that they promote human flourishing and well-being? The individual is nomore fundamental or primary than the communities in which she is embedded.Etzioni appropriately emphasizes the need to balance autonomy with concern fororder.B. THE BENEFITS OF THE COMMON GOOD ARE AVAILABLE TO EVERYONEClaire Andre and Manuel Velasquez, NQA, ISSUES IN ETHICS, Spring 1992, p. 3.As these examples suggest, the common good doe not just happen. Establishingand maintaining the common good requires the cooperative efforts of some, oftenof many, people. Just as keeping a park free of litter depends on each user pickingup after himself, so also maintaining the social conditions from which we all benefitrequires the cooperative efforts of citizens. But these efforts pay off, for the

common good is a good to which all members of society have access, and fromwhose enjoyment no one can be easily excluded. All persons for example, enjoy thebenefits of clean air or an unpolluted environment, or any of our society's othercommon goods. In fact, something counts as a common good only to the extentthat it is a good to which all have access.

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COMMUNITARIANISM ADDRESSES THE NEEDS OFEVERYONE

A. COMMUNITARIANISM INVOLVES A RESPONSIBILITY TO OTHERSHenry Tam, Chair of UK Communitarian Forum, COMMUNITARIANISM, 1998, p. 121.Central to the communitarian message is the notion of responsibility. Howindividuals behave affects the well being of others. No citizen of an inclusivecommunity can be allowed to entertain the delusion that responsibility cannot beproperly ascribed in the world in which we live. Apart from genuine ignorance whenthere is no indication that a person should or could have found out about theunforeseen harm of his or her actions, and involuntary behaviour arising from thephysical force of others or the psychological disruptions within a person, there areno grounds for denying that each individual is responsible for his or her behaviourand its effects on others (for a detailed exposition of the concept of responsibility,

see Tam, 1990).

B. SOCIETY-BASED ETHICS DO NOT THREATEN INDIVIDUAL RIGHTSLinda Fisher, Associate Professor of Law and Director, Center for Social Justice,Seton Hall University School of Law, YALE LAW AND POLICY REVIEW, 2000, p. 356.Although many Americans are instinctively repelled by the notion of a social orderthat can trump individual preference, and therefore may recoil at Etzioni'sprioritization of social order in a communitarian democracy, order need not beoppressive. Order can merely refer to the collective determination of appropriatemoral conduct and the preservation of public health and safety. The same conceptcan be rephrased as "the public interest." A decent community must, of course,promote the well-being of its individual members. In a constitutional democracy,

citizens may participate to define its content, both politically and morally, withconstraints produced by recognition of individual rights, a commitment toconstitutionalism, adherence to fair procedures, and a fundamental respect forothers' subcultural values. Consequently, a social order may exist that adequatelyrecognizes and protects individual rights, particularly the rights of less powerfulmembers of society. Therefore, as Etzioni repeatedly emphasizes, protecting thesocial order need not threaten individual rights that are necessary to encourage anoptimal degree of individual autonomy.

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THE GENERAL PRINCIPAL OF SELF-INTEREST IS ANTI-DEMOCRATIC

1. THE FOUNDING FATHERS VALUED THE COMMON GOOD ABOVE INDIVIDUALLIBERTY Tim Fort, Assistant Professor, University of Michigan, AMERICAN BUSINESSLAW JOURNAL, Spring 1999, p. 410. One of the most ardent Federalist judges,Samuel Chase, viewed the democratic principles coming from the atheistic andrationalistic French Revolution to be a dangerous corruption of virtue required forthe success of American government. Individual liberty was to flourish within theconstraints of a common good that allowed freedom to elect leaders. According toPresser, once leaders were elected, the English notion of government insisted thatleaders thereafter were not to be criticized. John Marshall's interpretation of theConstitution strongly in favor of individual liberties created an "originalmisunderstanding" of the Constitution - according to Presser -which rejected the

divinely-directed requirements of a citizen's life in favor of a Constitutionunderstood only as a protector of individual freedom. This originalmisunderstanding effectively divorced republicanism from liberalism because itreplaced support for the common good with protection of individual liberty.

2. RUTHLESS INDIVIDUALISM IS ANTI-DEMOCRATICClaire Andre and Manuel Velasquez, NQA, ISSUES IN ETHICS, Spring 1992, p. 1.It is precisely this sense of common purpose and public spirit crucial to the guidanceof institutions in a democracy that is absent from our society today. A ruthlessindividualism, expressed primarily through a market mentality, has invaded everysphere of our lives, undermining those institutions, such as the family or theuniversity, that have traditionally functioned as foci of collective purposes, history,

and culture. This lack of common purpose and concern for the common good bodesill for a people claiming to be a democracy. Caught up in our private pursuits, weallow the workings of our major institutions -- the economy and government -- to goon "over our heads." One way of summing up the difficulty Americans have inunderstanding the fundamental roots of their problems is to say that they still havea Lockean political culture, emphasizing individual freedom and the pursuit ofindividual affluence (the American dream) in a society with a most un-Lockeaneconomy and government. We have the illusion that we can control our fatebecause individual economic opportunity is indeed considerable, especially if onestarts with middle class advantages; and our political life is formally free. Yetpowerful forces affecting the lives of all of us are not operating under the norm ofdemocratic consent. In particular, the private governments of the great corporations

make decisions on the basis of their own advantage, not of the public good. Thefederal government has enormously increased its power, especially in the form ofthe military industrial complex, in ways that are almost invulnerable to citizenknowledge, much less control, on the grounds of national defense. The privaterewards and the formal freedoms have obscured from us how much we have lost ingenuine democratic control of the society we live in.

3. VALUING THE COLLECTIVE GOOD IS MOST DEMOCRATIC

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Andrei Marmor, JD, THE CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, July2001, p. 215.

The concept of a collective good is the easiest to define: collective goods are thosewhich require some form of collective action to produce. What marks this conceptof a good only concerns its typical production process. There is a considerable

variety of goods in our societies which can only be produced collectively, that is, bythe concerted action of numerous individuals, institutions, and agencies. Consider,for example, the goods of national security, the protection of the environment,democratic decision procedures, adequate health care, and perhaps also scienceand education; all these goods require collective action to produce. Note, however,that there is an element of contingency in this characterization. The production ofgoods may vary with circumstances. In some societies, or under certaincircumstances, the production of a given good may require collective action,whereas in others, it may not. Consider the good of clean air, for example. Theproduction of clean air becomes a collective action problem only in societies whichactually face a problem of pollution. If there is no pollution, such as in distant ruralcommunities, perhaps, there is no need to produce clean air, and clean air becomes

a good people can enjoy without any communal aspect whatsoever. On the otherhand, certain goods are essentially of such a nature that their production involves acollectivity. Democratic political procedures, for example, are of such an essentiallycollective nature. People cannot produce or have a democracy by themselves.

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COMMON GOOD IS THE ONLY WAY TO ADDRESSTHE PROBLEMS HUMANITY FACES

1. WE MUST FORGO OUR SELFISH INTERESTS TO SOLVE ISSUES THAT THREATEN HUMANITYClaire Andre and Manuel Velasquez, NQA, ISSUES IN ETHICS, Spring 1992, p. 5.This reinvigoration of democracy is not proposed as an idealistic project but as a practicalnecessity. The authors write that nowhere is the need more evident than in the internationalsphere, where problems are beyond the capacity of any single nation to solve. Our economiclife is dominated by the dynamics of a vast world market that cannot be controlled by theaction of any single nation-state. Problems of environmental pollution transcend nationalboundaries. The proliferation of nuclear weapons threatens the security of all. Vastdisparities in global wealth and power lead to petering conflicts that endanger economichealth and political security around the world. In a world of increasing complexity andinterdependence, we can no longer afford "to go our own way." Rather, we need to exerciseour capacity for developing institutions that recognize our interconnectedness, movingtoward the creation of "the good society," "where the common good is the pursuit of the

good in common."

2. RAWLS NOTION OF THE PUBLIC GOOD PROTECTS THE MINORITIES FROMOPPRESSIONCarlos A. Ball, Associate Professor, University of Illinois College of Law,CORNELL LAW REVIEW, January 2000, p. 457.Rawls defines public reason in a democracy as"the reason of its citizens, of those sharing the status of equal citizenship. The subject oftheir reason is the good of the public: what the political conception of justice requires ofsociety's basic structure of institutions, and of the purposes and ends they are to serve."Rawls's view of public reason is consistent with his original position heuristic, which positsthat citizens who do not know their individual characteristics or their places in society'seconomic and social hierarchies would serve as the optimal prototypes for establishingfundamental principles of justice. As citizens move from the original position to later stagesin the creation of a well-ordered society, they can gradually lift the veil of ignorance. Even

when citizens are at the last stage of the process, when they publicly debate particularpolicy issues within an established constitutional system, Rawls still calls for a separationbetween political values, which go to the right, and nonpolitical normative and moral values,which go to the good. Rawls explains that this separation protects the political discourse anddemocratic process, as well as individuals, from majoritarian definitions of the good.3. THEBENEFITS OF THE COMMON GOOD ARE AVAILABLE TO EVERYONEClaire Andre and Manuel Velasquez, NQA, ISSUES IN ETHICS, Spring 1992, p. 3.As these examples suggest, the common good doe not just happen. Establishing andmaintaining the common good requires the cooperative efforts of some, often of many,people. Just as keeping a park free of litter depends on each user picking up after himself, soalso maintaining the social conditions from which we all benefit requires the cooperativeefforts of citizens. But these efforts pay off, for the common good is a good to which allmembers of society have access, and from whose enjoyment no one can be easily excluded.All persons for example, enjoy the benefits of clean air or an unpolluted environment, or anyof our society's other common goods. In fact, something counts as a common good only tothe extent that it is a good to which all have access.

4. FAILING TO HELP THOSE IN NEED IS MORALLY AKIN TO MURDERClaire Andre and Manuel Velasquez, NQA, ISSUES IN ETHICS, Spring 1992, p. 5.Giving aid to the poor in other nations may require some inconvenience or some sacrifice ofluxury on the part of peoples of rich nations, but to ignore the plight of starving people is asmorally reprehensible as failing to save a child drowning in a pool because of theinconvenience of getting one's clothes wet. In fact, according to Singer, allowing a person to

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die from hunger when it is easily within one's means to prevent it is no different, morallyspeaking, from killing another human being. If I purchase a VCR or spend money I don'tneed, knowing that I could instead have given my money to some relief agency that couldhave prevented some deaths from starvation, I am morally responsible for those deaths. Theobjection that I didn't intend for anyone to die is irrelevant. If I speed though an intersection

and, as a result, kill a pedestrian, I am morally responsible for that death whether I intendedit or not.

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SELF-INTERSET UNDERMINES THE COMMON GOOD

1. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS UNDERMINE CIVIC VIRTUEThomas Franck, Murray and Ida BeckerProfessor of Law and Director of the Center for International Studies at New York University's

School of Law, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan-Feb 2001, p. 192.Harvard professor Michael Sandel, inhis recent book Democracy's Discontent, criticizes the accommodations made by U.S. law --

judge-made law, in particular -- to an ethos of individual rights that, the claims, underminesthe civic virtues that sustain Americans' sense of communal responsibility. Sandel complainsthat the emphasis placed on individualism in recent years has neutered the state andelevated personal rights above the common good. At the international level, MalaysianPrime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad espouses a variation on the same theme. In 1997, heurged the U.N. to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration of Human Rights byrevising or, better, repealing it, because its human rights norms focus excessively onindividual rights while neglecting the rights of society and the common good. FormerGerman Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, too, says that the declaration reflects "the philosophicaland cultural background of its Western drafters" and has called for a new "balance" between"the notions of freedom and of responsibility" because the "concept of rights can itself be

abused and lead to anarchy."2. WE MUST REPLACE SELF-INTEREST WITH CONCERN FOR THEPUBLIC GOODTim Fort, Assistant Professor, University of Michigan, AMERICAN BUSINESSLAW JOURNAL, Spring 1999, p. 396-397.The late-twentieth century republican revival in theU.S. has centered on developing a notion of citizenship based in the public good. The mostprominent theme of the revival revolves around replacing self-interest with a notion of civicvirtue. Interest group liberalism, the republicans argue, simply does not allow for aconversation about the public good. Instead, individuals, particularly members of the

judiciary and intellectual elites, must replace the pursuit of self-interest with concern for thecommon good. This theme leads to the second theme of the republican revival. There mustbe a rethinking of our politics in order to create the room and incentives for consideration ofthe common good. The common good, the republicans argue, can be defined by adeliberative political structure in which discussion of the good itself becomes the definingfeature of politics.

3. A FOCUS ON RIGHTS LEADS TO THE DISPLACEMENT OF INDIVIDUALS FROM THECOMMUNITYCarlos A. Ball, Associate Professor, University of Illinois College of Law, CORNELLLAW REVIEW, January 2000, p. 443-444.Communitarians are critical of the priority thatliberals give to individual rights; although communitarians do not deny that rights areimportant, they do question whether a society should emphasize individual rights overcommunal norms and responsibilities when confronting difficult questions of politicalmorality and justice. Communitarians believe that the liberal focus on rights leads to theseparation and displacement of individuals from the communities to which they belong.According to communitarians, rights are not preexisting, universal principles that arelogically prior to community; instead, rights are internal to the shared traditions andunderstandings of particular societies.3. INDIVIDUAL CHOICE IS NOT INTRINSICALLYVALUABLE

Daniel Bell, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, Winter 2001,http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2001/entries/communitarianism, Accessed February12, 2004, p. np.Communitarians can reply by casting doubt on the view that choice is intrinsicallyvaluable,that a certain moral principle or communal attachment is more valuable simply because ithas been chosen following deliberation among alternatives by an individual subject. If wehave a highest-order interest in choosing our central projects and life-plans, regardless ofwhat is chosen, it ought to follow that there is something fundamentally wrong withunchosen attachments and projects. But this view violates our actual self-understandings.We ordinarily think of ourselves, Michael Sandel says, as members of this family or

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community or nation or people, as bearers of this history, as sons or daughters of thatrevolution, as citizens of this republic, social attachments that more often than not areinvoluntarily picked up during the course of our upbringing, rational choice having played norole whatsoever on behalf of other peoples interests.

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Negative blocks

Individual Contributions and Charities Are More Trouble

Than Theyre Worth

Individual monetary contributions lead to disorganization andmismanaged funding.

Felix Salmon, Winner of the American Statistical Associations 2010 Excellence in Statistical ReportingAward, March 2011http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/03/14/dont-donate-money-to-japan/We went through this after the Haiti earthquake, and all of the arguments which applied there apply to Japan as

well. Earmarking funds is a really good way of hobbling relief organizationsand ensuring that they have to leave large piles of money unspent in oneplace while facing urgent needs in other places. And as Matthew Bishop and MichaelGreen said last year, we are all better at responding to human suffering caused by dramatic, telegenic emergencies

than to the much greater loss of life from ongoing hunger, disease and conflict. That often results in amess of uncoordinated NGOs parachuting in to emergency areas with lotsof good intentions, where a strategic official sector response would bemuch more effective. Meanwhile, the smaller and less visible emergencieswhere NGOs can do the most good are left unfunded.

Charities often only treat the consequences of injustices, masking theroots of the problems.


The idea is that charity is wrong when it's used to patch up the effects of the

fundamental injustices that are built into the structure and values of asociety. Charity, from this viewpoint, can sometimes be seen as actually accepting theinjustice itself, while trying to mitigate the consequences of the injustice.

Constant bombardment by charities makes people less inclined to give.TrevorJockins, English Professor at Harper College and NYT contributor, July2011Linking the cash register to the heart seems to be an outgrowth of thepeculiar fantasy that says if we just buy the right fair-trade coffee, theright $3 water, the right salvaged wood for our absolutely gorgeous newflooring, we can alleviate most of the suffering in the world along withour guilt for ignoring the pleas for help that arrive in the mail and confront us on thestreet daily. For the richest of countries, shopping our way to moral puritywould be a nice trick, but I have my doubts. Maybe if this werent such a big part of ourthinking, people wouldnt try to wring kindness from us at such odd times, or stand so boldly in the street hawking

goodness. And with a little less charity pollution around us, maybe givingwouldnt have to feel so much like being taken.

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Assistance Can Be Detrimental and Should Be Minimized

Assistance can take many forms, including coercion.Gerhard verland, expert in Philosophy, Anthropology, and Sociology, June 2008http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=2&hid=106&sid=ab3a18c7-0387-4711-aed1-ca0914161581%40sessionmgr114

Assistance force is any force applied to ensure that a particular agentassists a person in need. But the term denotes as well any force which has as a consequence thatsomething happens to a person that will undo the need of another. Forced assistance is theassistance that comes about as a result of assistance force.The assistancein question does not need to be motivated for the right reasons, nor even

be what we normally would call assistance. Pushing someone into a pool to saveanother person would qualify as assistance force. The fact that this saves Alice means that the person who waspushed into the water renders what I call forced assistance even though he or she is merely used by Alice as a

means of getting out of the water. Moreover, assistance force may simply be used to alertpeople about certain needs, after which these people choose to assistbecause they now see the need for it. I have invented the first label in order to have a neutralterm which covers a variety of ways of using force to ensure help reaches a person or people in need, or at leastthat the bad that is about to happen to him or her is avoided. Whether assistance force is permissible in certaincircumstances, and by what means, remains to be seen. In this respect it is on par with defensive force, whichcovers a variety of ways force can be used to save people from aggressors, some permissible and some not.

Structurally, assistance force might have things in common with coercion,where people are compelled by force or threats to do things against theirwill.

Assistance to foreign people, if given at all, should be minimaland have a clear cut-off point.Henry S. Richardson, Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University, November 2005http://www.iep.utm.edu/rawls/In The Law of Peoples [LP] (1999), Rawls relaxes the assumption that society is a closed system that coincides with

a nation-state. Once this assumption is dropped, the question that comes to the fore is: upon whatprinciples should theforeignpolicy of a decent liberal regime be founded?Rawls first looks at this question from the point of view of ideal theory, which supposes that all peoples enjoy adecent liberal-democratic regime. At this level, with reference to a rather thinly-described global original position,

Rawls develops basic principles concerning non-intervention, respect for

human rights, and assistance for countries lacking the conditionsnecessary for a decent or just regime to arise. These principles govern one nation in itsrelations with others. He next discusses the principles that should govern decentliberal societies in their relations with peoples who are not governed bydecent liberalisms. He articulates the idea of a decent consultation hierarchy to illustrate the sort ofnon-liberal society that is owed considerable tolerance by the people of a decent liberal society. In a part of thebook devoted to non-ideal theory, Rawls impressively defends quite restrictive positions on the right of war and on

the moral conduct of warfare. Surprisingly, questions of global distributive justiceare confined to one brief section of LP. In that section, Rawls treats quite dismissively two earlier attempts to

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extend his theoretical framework to questions of international justice, those of Beitz (1979) and Pogge (1994).Drawing on the ideas of TJ, these philosophers had developed quite demanding principles of international

distributive justice. In LP, Rawls instead favors a relatively minimal duty ofassistance, with a definite target and a cut-off point. LP at 119.

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destructiveness. They typically involve many parties and concern an intricate set of historical, religious,cultural, political, and economic issues. These matters are central to human socialexistence and typically resist any attempts at resolution.In fact, partiesoften refuse to negotiate or compromise with respect to such issues. As aresult, each side views the rigid position of the other as a threat to its

very existence. They may develop a mutual fear of each other and aprofound desire to inflict as much physical and psychological harm oneach other as possible. This sense of threat and hostility often pervades the everyday lives of theparties involved and overrides their ability to recognize any shared concerns they might have. Additional insights

into the underlying causes of intractable conflicts are offered by Beyond Intractability project participants. Asconflict escalates, any tangible issues may become embedded within alarger set of values, beliefs, identities, and cultures. Disputes about land, money, orother resources may take on increased symbolic significance. Over the course of conflict, the original issues caneven become irrelevant as new causes for conflict are generated by actions within the conflict itself. Those onopposing sides come to view each other as enemies and may resort to highly destructive means. Eventually, theparties become unable to separate different issues and may see no way out of the conflict other than through total

victory or defeat. Why do some conflicts become intractable? Many describe intractabilityin terms of the destructive relationship dynamics that govern the adversaries' interaction. For example, if one partyresorts to inhumane treatment in waging conflict, this deepens antagonism and may lead the opposing side to seekrevenge. Likewise, when extremist political leaders appeal to ethno-nationalist ideology to arouse fear, this mayincrease support for the use of violence and contribute to intractability. Other factors that make some conflictsextremely difficult to resolve include the vast numbers of people involved, the large number of complex issues to

be resolved, and a previous history of violent confrontation. But what are the underlying causesof these destructive conflict dynamics? What is common to all intractableconflicts is that they involve interests or values that the disputants regardas critical to their survival. These underlying causes include parties' moralvalues, identities, and fundamental human needs. Because conflicts grounded in theseissues involve the basic molds for thought and action within givencommunities and culture, they are usually not resolvable by negotiation orcompromise. This is because the problem in question is one that cannot be resolved in a win-win way. If onevalue system is followed, another is threatened. If one nation controls a piece of land, another does not. If onegroup is dominant, another is subordinate. While sharing is possible in theory, contending sides usually regard

compromise as a loss. This is especially true in societies where natural fear and hatred is so ingrained that opposinggroups cannot imagine living with or working cooperatively with the other side. Instead, they are often willing totake whatever means necessary to ensure group survival and protect their way of life.

Morals and values are constructed by man and can be twistedinto whatever the wielder wants for personal gain.Dale Wilkerson, Professor at University of North Texas, Denton, August 2009http://www.iep.utm.edu/nietzsch/#H4

Nietzsches philosophy contemplates the meaning of values and their significance to human existence. Giventhat no absolute values exist, in Nietzsches worldview, the evolution of values onearth must be measured by some other means. How then shall they be understood? Theexistence of a value presupposes a value-positing perspective, and values are created by human beings (and

perhaps other value-positing agents) as aids for survival and growth. Because values are important

for the well being of the human animal, because belief in them is essentialto our existence, we oftentimes prefer to forget that values are our owncreations and to live through them as if they were absolute. For these reasons,social institutions enforcing adherence to inherited values are permittedto create self-serving economies of power, so long as individuals livingthrough them are thereby made more secure and their possibilities for lifeenhanced. Nevertheless, from time to time the values we inherit are deemed no longer suitable and thecontinued enforcement of them no longer stands in the service of life. To maintain allegiance to

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such values, even when they no longer seem practicable, turns what once served theadvantage to individuals to a disadvantage, and what was once the prudent deployment ofvalues into alife denying abuse of power. When this happens the human being must reactivate its creative,value-positing capacities and construct new values.

All values are constructed and meaningless, only actionmatters.

Alan Pratt, Professor of Philosophy at Embry-Riddle University, May 2005http://www.iep.utm.edu/nihilism/#H3

For Nietzsche, there is no objective order or structure in the world except whatwe give it. Penetrating the faades buttressing convictions, the nihilist discovers that all values arebaseless and that reason is impotent. Everybelief, every considering something-true,Nietzsche writes, is necessarily false because there is simply no true world (Will to Power[notes from 1883-1888]). For him, nihilism requires a radical repudiation of all imposed values and meaning: Nihilism is . . . not onlythe belief that everything deserves to perish; but one actually puts ones shoulder to the plough; one destroys(Will to Power). The caustic strength of nihilism is absolute, Nietzsche argues, and under its withering scrutiny

the highest values devalue themselves. The aim is lacking, and Whyfinds no answer (Will to Power). Inevitably, nihilism will expose all cherishedbeliefs and sacrosanct truths as symptoms of a defective Western mythos.

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TO HAVE A SOCIETY THAT WORKS, THE COMMONGOOD CANNOT COME BEFORE INDIVIDUALS

1. WE MUST DEFINE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS PRIOR TO THE GOODCarlos A. Ball, Associate Professor, University of Illinois College of Law, CORNELLLAW REVIEW, January 2000, p. 444.State neutrality regarding different, and often conflicting, conceptions of whatconstitutes a "good life" is important to liberals because it allows individuals tochoose the lives that they think are best for them. A state that is neutral as to endsdoes not impose its version of the good on its citizens. An impartial state also actsas a neutral arbiter in resolving disputes among citizens. Thus, liberals demand thatthe state separate issues of morality from political debates and definitions of rights.In other words, we must define rights prior to, and independently of, the good.

2. COMMUNITARIANISM DOESNT WORK IN A PLURALISTICSOCIETY

Linda Fisher, Associate Professor of Law and Director, Center for Social Justice,Seton Hall University School of Law, YALE LAW AND POLICY REVIEW, 2000, p. 354.Etzioni's premise in The New Golden Rule, the earlier of the two works, is that a

communitarian society flourishes when the inevitable tension between socialresponsibility and individual autonomy is maintained in suitable equilibrium. The"New Golden Rule" - "respect and uphold society's moral order as you would havesociety respect and uphold your autonomy" - is his general formulation of theproper relationship between these two values. As expressed, the rule is a maxim anindividual can use as a guideline to appropriate behavior. Because the rule is very

broadly phrased, however, further culturally shared principles are needed to guideits application to particular situations, especially when the values of order andautonomy clash. Those values clash most acutely in diverse, pluralistic societies.Etzioni sets forth a number of core values shared by Americans, such as acommitment to democracy and the Constitution, but those values are often toogeneral and abstract to support actual resolutions of contentious issues. Moreover,power disparities between groups exacerbate the negative consequences ofunresolved values conflicts.

3. THE IDEA OF A COMMON GOOD IS INCONSISTENT WITH APLURALISTIC SOCIETY

Claire Andre and Manuel Velasquez, NQA, ISSUES IN ETHICS, Spring 1992, p. 3.First, according to some philosophers, the very idea of a common good isinconsistent with a pluralistic society like ours. Different people have different ideasabut what is worthwhile or what constitutes "the good life for human beings,"differences that have increased during the last few decades as the voices of moreand more previously silenced groups, such as women and minorities have beenheard. Given these differences, some people urge, it will be impossible for us toagree on what particular kind of social systems, institutions, and environment we

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will all pitch in to support. And even if we agree upon what we all valued, we wouldcertainly disagree about the relative values things have for us. While a may agree,for example, that an affordable health system a healthy educational system, and aclean environment are all parts of the common good, some will say the, moreshould be invested in health than in education, while others will favor directing

resources to the environment over both health and education. Such disagreementsare bound to undercut our ability to evoke a sustained and widespread commitmentto the common good. In the face of such pluralism, efforts to bring about thecommon good can only lead to adopting or promoting the views of some, whileexcluding others, violating the principle of treating people equally. Moreover, suchefforts would force everyone to support some specific notion of the common good,violating the freedom of those who do not share in that goal, and inevitably leadingto paternalism (imposing one group's preference on others), tyranny, andoppression.

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A GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF COMMON GOOD IS ANTI-DEMOCRATIC

1. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT VALUES INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIESABOVE THE COMMON GOOD

Shelly Woodward, J.D. candidate, Georgetown University Law Center, GEORGETOWNLAW JOURNAL, December 1996, p. 464.A third liberal rationale for free speech protection, closely intertwined with themarketplace of ideas and self-government rationales, is the idea of negative liberty.

This approach posits that the importance of individual rights, such as freedom ofexpression, lies in the ability to prohibit the state from interfering in the exercise ofindividual autonomy. The philosophical roots of this approach may be traced to thesocial contract model of society. Under this model, presocial individuals in the stateof nature enter society voluntarily, consenting to form a society that will protect

individual rights. Individual rights, then, serve a "checking value," which ensuresthat the state does not overstep its legitimacy by encroaching on the individual'sability to make autonomous choices.

2. THE RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH IS BASED ON THE VALUE OFAUTONOMY

Shelly Woodward, J.D. candidate, Georgetown University Law Center, GEORGETOWNLAW JOURNAL, December 1996, p. 458.

The marketplace of ideas theory asserts that the search for truth is best served bya free exchange of ideas. The philosophical roots of this idea can be traced to theliberal political philosophy of John Locke, John Milton, and John Stuart Mill. JusticeHolmes further enunciated this philosophy in his famous dissent in Abrams v. UnitedStates, noting that "the theory of our Constitution" is that "the ultimate gooddesired is better reached by free trade in ideas -- that the best test of truth is thepower of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."According to this rationale, the importance of protecting free speech rests on theimportance of individual liberty to make autonomous choices and to formulate and"pursue a rational plan of life" free from constraint. Only by ensuring thatindividuals have access to competing ideas -- even "false" ideas -- can we ensurethat public discourse is robust enough to produce the truth. Thus, the right haspriority over the good. That is, encouraging the free expression of ideas withoutgovernment restraints protects the individual's capacity to choose her ownconception of the good.

3. DEMOCRACY INEVITABLY ENGENDERS INDIVIDUALISMGeorge Kateb, ANNUAL REVIEW OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 2003, v. 6, i. 1, p. 275.Where democracy exists, there will be individualism. The historical record showsthat democracy inevitably engenders individualism. This proposition will bechallenged by those who think either that individualism can obtain innondemocratic cultures or that democracy can exist without engendering

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individualism. The paper rejects both contentions. The defining characteristic ofdemocracy is freedom, and the oldest democratic concept of freedom is the Greekone: To be free is to live as one likes. Versions of that definition are found whereverpeople are or aspire to be democratic. To live as one likes means that one isallowed to try out various roles in life. Each person is more than any single role,

function, or place in society. Individualism consists in that idea. Only democracyinspires it. It is also true that democracy, in reaction, produces antidemocraticindividualism.

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