1 1

Safety aspects of Indian advanced reactors

K.K. Vaze,Director

Reactor Design and Development GroupBhabha Atomic Research Centre,Trombay, Mumbai 400085 India

Post Fukushima Scenario

Fukushima Accident

On March 11th, 2011, a gigantic earthquake with a magnitude 9 on the Richter scale shook Japan. The earthquake triggered a tsunami, which was exceptionally high, reached the Fukushima coast about one hour after the earthquake.

All reactors in operation at Fukushima shut down automatically. While the offsite external power source was lost due to the earthquake, emergency diesel generators (EDG) started up properly

Even though the earthquake was of a magnitude far greater than anticipated, there is today no evidence that it produced mechanical or structural damage which would have, in the absence of the tsunami, caused a severe accident. The seismic response analysis and the visual investigations conducted so far did not seem to show major damage to safety-related equipment.

Fukushima Accident - contd

The majority of the damage was caused by the tsunami. At Fukushima Daiichi it caused complete loss of AC power, loss of ultimate heat sink and serious degradation of DC power sources. This led to the loss of decay heat removal at three NPP units, to severe reactor core damage, to the loss of containment integrity and to significant radioactive releases to the environment. In addition, the upper part of the fourth unit reactor building was destroyed by hydrogen explosion and the spent fuel pool structures of that unit suffered mechanical damages.

Some reassuring thoughts as far India is concerned

Huge earthquakes and huge tsunamis are not commonplace

Comparative Seismic Hazard

Status of Seismicity – Indian NPPs

Site Seismic Zone

Narora IVRawatbhataII

Kakrapar IIITarapur IIIJaitapur IIIKaiga IIIKalpakkam IIKudankulam II

• Criteria - No Active fault within 5 km

Tsunamigenic locations for Indian coast

KALPAKKAM

TARAPUR

KUDANKULAM

TECTONIC PLATE BOUNDARIESTECTONIC PLATE BOUNDARIES

ONLY FAR FIELD ONLY FAR FIELD SOURCESSOURCES

18 March 2011

How does this benefit us?

Fukushima• Earthquake knocked out Class 4 supply• Tsunami knocked out other supplies

India• EQ and tsunami don’t occur together• Ground motion due to an earthquake causing tsunami

is negligible• Earthquakes causing significant ground motion do not

cause tsunami• We get warning (~ 2 hrs)

Fukushima AccidentLessons Learnt

The key criterion of success:

- recovery of power supply- water feed for the decay heat removal

As prompt as possible! Availability of undamageable portable

engineering means for power and water supply in the conditions of NPP isolation

Accident prevention and accident mitigation:

- implementation of design fundamental;- emergency preparation;

- Severe Accident management.

Source: Prevention and Mitigation — Equal Priorities

Prof. Vladimir Asmolov, WANO President

ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT GOAL ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT MEASURES

To prevent the core melting (To keep the integrity of the Ist and IInd physical barriers – Fuel & Clad)

The recovery of the core cooling

To retain melt inside the RPV (To keep the integrity of the IIIrd physical barrier - RPV)

In-vessel cooling Ex-vessel cooling

To prevent the containment failure (To keep the integrity of the IVth physical barrier - Containment)

Core catcher Hydrogen managementFiltered venting system

Source: Prevention and Mitigation — Equal PrioritiesProf. Vladimir Asmolov, WANO President

Genesis for development for advanced reactors

12

India alone would need around 40% of present global electricity generation to be added to reach average 5000 kWh per capita electricity generation

World OECD Non-OECD India India

(developing world) of our dream

Population (billion) 6.7 1.18 5.52 1.2 1.6

(stabilised)

Annual av. per ~2800 ~9000 ~1500 ~780 5000capita Electricity (kWh)

AnnualElectricityGeneration 18.8 10.6 8.2 0.835 8.0 (trillion kWh)

Carbon-di-oxideEmission 30 13 17 1.8 ?(billion tons/yr)

Securing energy for India’s future is a major challenge

Dr. Kakodkar “Atoms for Prosperity

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Global climate change is an immediate threat

Just ten years from now, greenhouse emissions from developing nations will equal the emissions from the countries we now call developed. After that, emissions from the developing world will be the major driver of global climate change.

While energy conservation, windmills, and solar panels may help, we cannot hope to rely on such measures alone to meet our world’s expanding appetite for more energy.

John Ritch, Director General of the World Nuclear Association, 15th Pacific Basin Nuclear Conference, Sydney, 15-20 Oct. 2006

Comparison of sea-ice from 1979 and 2003.

1979 2003

Source: http://www.nasa.gov/centers/goddard/news/topstory/2003/1023esuice.html

Safety Goals for Advanced Reactors

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CNS Extraordinary Meeting Summary Report

The displacement of people and the land contamination after the Fukushima Daiichi accident calls for all national regulators to identify provisions to prevent and mitigate the potential for severe accidents with off-site consequences. Nuclear power plants should be designed, constructed and operated with the objectives of preventing accidents and, should an accident occur, mitigating its effects and avoiding off-site contamination. The Contracting Parties also noted that regulatory authorities should ensure that these objectives are applied in order to identify and implement appropriate safety improvements at existing plants.

Dr. Kakodkar

An essential goal for nuclear safety is “Never Again” should there be any significant off site emergency

Dual level design basis

Design Basis

• Risk Lowered to an acceptable level

• No impact in public domain

Extreme Event

• Maximum potential

• No significant off-site emergency Extra margin between design and ultimate load capacity should be

sufficient to cope with this

Can the nuclear community set for itself an ambitious goal to meet the challenge of the numbers?

“Four decades from now, in any country of the world, it should be possible to start replacing fossil fuelled power plants, at the same urban or semi-urban site where these are located, with advanced NPPs that would, more economically, deliver at least twice the power that was being produced by the replaced plants”

R.K. Sinha, “The IAEA’s Contribution to the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Power”, Nuclear Power Newsletter, Vol. 3, No. 3, Special Issue, Sept. 2006

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Level of safety goals increases with multi-fold increase in deployment of nuclear reactors

Number of reactors in operation

SafetyGoals

Siting criteriaDose Criteria

Reactors under

operation (existing technolog

y)

Advanced reactors under

construction

Special Siting Criteria

(may/may not); CDF, LERF

Advanced future

Reactor Systems

Special Siting

Criteria, Risk

approach

Achievement of safety goals through enhanced levels of Defence-In-Depth

Strategy for safety measures and features of nuclear installations is two-fold: To prevent accidents

• Preventing the degradation of plant status and performance

If prevention fails, limit their potential consequences and prevent any evolution to further serious conditions

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Alarm setting

Steady state operation

Operational limit

Safety system setting

Monitored Process parameter

Design Basis Safety limit

Time

Level 4 of DiD

Level 3 of DiD

Level 2 of DiD

Level 1 of DiD

CHALLENGE

Mon

itore

d P

rocess

Para

mete

r

21

Passive and Inherent Safety Features are Instrumental in Meeting New Safety Criteria

The conventional reactors or so called “Traditional ones” have seen an extensive use of “active” engineering safety systems for reactor control and protection in the past.

• These systems have certain potential concerning termination of events or accidents that are effectively coped with by a protective system limited by the reliability of the active safety systems or prompt operator actions.

Since the reliability of active systems can not be improved above a threshold and that of the operator’s action is debatable, there is growing concern about the safety of such plants due to the large uncertainty involved in Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) particularly in analyzing human faults.

• In view of this, a desirable goal for the safety characteristics of an innovative reactor is that its primary defence against any serious accidents is achieved through its design features preventing the occurrence of such accidents without depending either on the operator’s action or the active systems.

• That means, the plant can be designed with adequate passive and inherent safety features to provide protection for any event that may lead to a serious accident.

Such robustness in design contributes to a significant reduction in the conditional probability of severe accident scenarios arising out of initiating events of internal and external origin.

Example of Applications Passive Systems and Inherent Safety Features in Defence-In-Depth in AHWR

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The Indian Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR-Pu)

AHWR is a 300 MWe vertical pressure tube type, boiling light water cooled and heavy water moderated reactor using 233U-Th MOX and Pu-Th MOX fuel.

•Design validation through extensive experimental programme.

•Pre-licensing safety appraisal by AERB

•Site selection in progress.

•Detailed engineering consultancy in progress

AHWR Fuel assembly

AHWR Fuel assembly

Bottom Tie Plate

Top Tie Plate

Water Tube

Displacer Rod

Fuel Pin

Major design objectives

65% of power from Th Several passive features

7 days grace period No radiological impact

Passive shutdown system to address insider threat scenarios.

Design life of 100 years. Easily replaceable coolant

channels.

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AHWR-Pu is a Technology demonstrator for the closed thorium

fuel cycle

AHWR-LEU extends the AHWR technologies with LEU-Th MOX Fuel

for the global market

External events

AHWR incorporates several technolological solutions to a higher level of safety and security against both internal and external threats

No unacceptable radiological impact outside the plant boundary with

(a) Failure of all active systems, and(b) Failure of external infrastructure to provide coolant, power and other services,

and(c) Malevolent acts by an insider, one of the consequences of which is the failure of

instrumentation signal initiated shutdown actions, and(d) Inability of plant operators to manage the events and their consequences, for a

significantly long time.

Ultimate heat sink

(Cooling tower or

sea)

Ultimate heat sink

(Cooling tower or

sea)

Control room and

auxiliary

systems

Pneumatic supply

Instrumentation & control

signals

Electrical power(Class 1 to 4)

Turbine

Turbine

PumpPump

Condenser

Condenser

Control and S/D

systems

Control and S/D

systems

CoreCore

Malevolent act

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Some important passive safety features of AHWR –1/4

 Heat removal from core under both normal full power operating condition as well as shutdown condition is by natural circulation of coolant.

26

Some important passive safety features of AHWR –2/4

Passive injection of cooling water, initially from accumulator and later from the overhead GDWP, directly into fuel cluster.

(Th-Pu) MOX Fuel pins

(Th-233U) MOX Fuel pinsCentral Tube for

ECCS water

AHWR FUEL CLUSTER

Passive Containment isolation

Passive Containment Cooling

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Some important passive safety features of AHWR –3/4

Passive Poison Injection System actuates during very low probability event of failure of wired shutdown systems (SDS#1 & SDS#2) and non-availability of Main condenser

Passive Poison Injection in moderator during overpressure transient

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Some important passive safety features of AHWR –4/4

Use of moderator

as heat sink

Water in calandria

vault

Flooding of reactor cavity following LOCA

Fukushima and AHWR

AHWR has been assessed for TMI as well as Chernobyl type of accidents

Critics comments: It is easy to become wise after the event (TMI, Chernobyl)

Fukushima type event (Extended SBO) was anticipated even before it happened

Practically no change required in AHWR design to meet Fukushima event

GDWP and passive systems adequate to cater to the extended SBO

No impact in public domain, No need of evacuation

No need of exclusion zone, sterilized zone

Prolonged Station Black Out in AHWR Decay heat removal by Isolation Condensers

0 20 40 60 80 1000.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

2.0

2.2

2.4

2.6

2.8

Pre

ssur

e (b

ar)

Time (days)

Containment Pressure

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Leve

l (m

)

Time(days)

GDWP Level

GDWP water removes decay heat for ~110 days with periodic containment venting allowed after 10 days.

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110

120

140

160

180

200

220

240

260

280

300

320

Tem

pera

ture

(0 C

)

Time (days)

Clad Surface Temperature

A strong earthquake with/without Tsunami causing prolonged SBO for several days. Reactor tripped on seismic signal.

Gravity Driven Water Pool is intact.

Heat is removed by Isolation Condensers

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Passive Systems in Defense-In-Depth of AHWR

Level 1 DID: Elimination of the hazard

of loss of coolant flow:• Heat removal from

the core under both normal full power operating condition as well as shutdown condition is by natural circulation of coolant.

Reduction of the extent of overpower transient:• Slightly negative void co-efficient of reactivity.• Low core power density.• Negative fuel temperature coefficient of reactivity.• Low excess reactivity

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Passive Systems in Defense-In-Depth of AHWR (Contd.)

Level 2: Control of abnormal operation and detection of failure• An increased reliability of the control system achieved with the use of

high reliability digital control using advanced information technology.• Increased operator reliability achieved with the use of advanced displays and

diagnostics using artificial intelligence and expert systems.• Large coolant inventory in the main coolant system.

Level 3: Control of accidents within the design basis• Increased reliability of the ECC system, achieved through passive injection

of cooling water directly into a fuel cluster through four independent parallel trains.

• Increased reliability of a shutdown, achieved by providing two independent shutdown systems. Further enhanced reliability of the shutdown, achieved by providing a passive shutdown device

• Increased reliability of decay heat removal, achieved through a passive decay heat removal system, which transfers the decay heat to GDWP by natural circulation.

• Large inventory of water inside the containment (about 8000 m3 of water in the GDWP) provides a prolonged core cooling meeting the requirement of grace period.

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Passive Systems in Defense-In-Depth of AHWR (Contd.)

Level 4: Control of severe plant conditions, including prevention of accident progression and mitigation of consequences of severe accidents

• Use of moderator as heat sink.• Presence of water in the calandria vault• Flooding of reactor cavity following a LOCA.

Level 5: Mitigation of radiological consequences of significant release of radioactive materials

• The following features help in passively bringing down the containment pressure and eliminates any releases from the containment following a large break LOCA:

• Double containment;• Passive containment isolation • Core catcher• Filtered vent

Peak Clad Temp v/s frequency of occurrence – a quantitative probabilistic safety criteria

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1E-111E-10 1E-9 1E-8 1E-7 1E-6 1E-5 1E-4 1E-3 0.01 0.1 1 10200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1100

1200

1300

DBEs

200 % LOCA

AOO & NO

BDBEs

Large Break LOCA without ECCS

Tem

pera

ture

(0 C)

Frequency

Decrease in coolant inventory Increase in coolant inventory Increase in heat removal Increase in system pressure/Decrease in heat removal Decrease in coolant flow Reactivity anamolies Operational occurances/transients Multiple failure events Wires system failure events

Core Damage Frequency Per Year

35

AHWR

~ 1x10-8

Ref: Lecture on Near Term Advanced Nuclear Reactors and Related MIT Research, by Prof. Jacopo Buongiorno, MIT, USA, June 16, 2006.

Severe Accident Management

• Hard Vent system is designed to prevent the over pressurization of the containment beyond design pressure occurring due to failure of multiple safety systems because of an extreme event such as prolonged SBO with non-availability of GDWP water or large seismic event causing cracks in GDWP along with LOCA.

• Also retains the radio-activity in the scrubber and minimize activity release beyond the containment boundary.

• Scrubber tank contains water + NaOH solution (ph = 8.5).

• NaOH combines with Iodine whereas Cs which is in form of CsI, CsOH, CsO2, Cs2CO3 is soluble in water.

• A 4 inch Dia pipe is provided at the top of primary containment for venting, which will be connected to scrubber tank.

Incorporation of Hard vent

3 I2 + 6 NaOH = 3 H2O +5 NaI + NaIO3

To Stack

From Containme

nt

Passive Autocatalytic ReCombiner System (PARCS)

The released hydrogen will be combined by Passive Autocatalytic Recombiners (PARCS) located at several locations in the containment designed in such a way to reduce the hydrogen concentration in the containment below the flammability limits.

Experiments are being carried out for demonstration of hydrogen removal using PARCS

Recombination rate ~ 0.1 kg/hr/m2 (for 2 - 4% H2 conc.)Overall box size : 1000 x 400 x 1000 (L X B X H)

(8.29 m2 of Catalyst Deposited area) Estimated Conversion rate : 0.83 kg/hr

No. of Recombiners for one Plant ~ 100 (Total Conversion Rate = 83 kg/hr)

Postulated Accidents

DBA : Single failure (LB LOCA): No hydrogen generationBDBA : Multiple failure (LBLOCA and non-availability of Wired Shutdown System) ~ 30 kg in 300 s.Prolonged SBO + non-availability of GDWP ~ 450 Kg in 2 hr starting after 40hrs of transient (~5000 m3 at ambient)

• Peak H2 generation rate ~ 0.3 kg/s

Sacrificial concrete layer mixes with the melt, reduces its temperature, solidus temperature (typically from 2800oC to 1500oC) and helps in spreading the melt over large surface area

Poison added in sacrificial concrete prevents recriticality

High porosity concrete layer below the sacrificial concrete helps in flooding water from below

Riser tubes inject water within the melt-concrete mixture

The downcomers supply water to the water pool from GDWP passively

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Design of Core Catcher

• Retention of the melt in the cavity

• Quenching it within 30 minutes

• Stabilize it for substantial period of time (several days)

Design objective of the core catcher

Sacrificial Concrete(300 mm depth)

High porosity concrete(300 mm depth)

Water pool(500 mm depth)

Riser Tubes( 100mm)

Structure of core catcher

7.4 m

Water from GDWP

Sacrificial concrete composition

Indian High Temperature Reactor Programme

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Indian High Temperature Reactor Programme

41 41

Compact High Temperature Reactor (CHTR)- Technology Demonstrator

•100 kWth, 1000 °C, TRISO coated particle fuel•Several passive systems for reactor heat removal •Prolonged operation without refuellingInnovative High Temperature Reactor for

Hydrogen Production (IHTR)•600 MWth , 1000 °C, TRISO coated particle fuel

•Small power version for demonstration of technologies

•Active & passive systems for control & cooling•On-line refuelling

Status: Design of most of the systems worked out. Fuel and materials under development. Experimental facilities for thermal hydraulics setup. Facilities for design validation are under design.Status: Optimisation of reactor physics and thermal hydraulics design, selection of salt and structural materials in progress. Experimental facilities for molten salt based thermal hydraulics and material compatibility studies set-up.Indian Molten Salt Breeder Reactor

(MSBR)•Large power, moderate temperature, and based on 233U-Th fuel cycle

•Small power version for demonstration of technologies

•Emphasis on passive systems for reactor heat removal under all scenarios and reactor conditions

Status: Initial studies being carried out for conceptual design

Technology for fuel kernel by sol-gel technique is well established – Focus is on technologies for TRISO coating and fuel compact

Initial trials with zirconia kernels completed

Fabrication trials of TRISO fuel using natural UO2 kernel carried out

Fuel compact prepared by two different techniques

High packing density (45-50%) achieved

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X-ray radiographic image of TRISO particle with Zirconia

kernel

Radiograph and tomograph of fuel compact made by different technique

OPyCSiC

IPyC

Buffer PyC

Zirconia

Fuel Compacts

SEM images of particle with Nat. UO2 kernel

Fabrication of C/C composite tubes and coating with SiC

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•High density C-C composite fuel tube samples fabricated in collaboration with National Physical Laboratory, New Delhi

•Pre-form was made using high strength carbon fibers

•Pre-form subjected to multiple cycles of resin impregnation and hot iso-static pressing with intermediate machining cycles

High Temperature Fluidized bed Coater

(Inset shows fluidized bed distributor assembly)

Cooling tower

Induction

heating system

Sample with

graphite fixtures

and graphite suscepto

r

Fluidized Bed

Distributor

Heated graphite

being dipped in fluidized

bed

Ar rotameter

Machining trials of graphite components

(AFD)

Fluidised bed based SiC coating method

developed

44

Thermal hydraulic studies for liquid metal (Pb-Bi)

Comparison of steady state correlation

[Vijayan, 2002] with experimental data

YSZ based oxygen sensor

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Major areas of development•Analytical studies and development of computer codes•Liquid metal loop for experimental studies

•Loop at 550 °C in operation since 2009•Loop at 1000 °C under commissioning

•Steady state and transient experiments carried out •In-house developed code validated•Experimental and analytical studies for freezing and de-freezing of coolant

•Test bed for development of instrumentation –level probes, oxygen sensor, EM pump and flowmeters

Major areas of development•Analytical studies and development of computer codes•Liquid metal loop for experimental studies

•Loop at 550 °C in operation since 2009•Loop at 1000 °C under commissioning

•Steady state and transient experiments carried out •In-house developed code validated•Experimental and analytical studies for freezing and de-freezing of coolant

•Test bed for development of instrumentation –level probes, oxygen sensor, EM pump and flowmeters

Liquid Metal Loop (2009)

Sufficient time margin before shutdown or passive alternate heat removal system needs to act

Case-1 250% step

increase in power

LOCA No heat sink

Case-2 Similar to

case-1, but with a 300% “spike” in power before stabilizing at 250%

45

Sufficient time available to activate primary and/or secondary shutdown system, or passive gas-

gap filling system

~40 min

~58 min

Negligible rise in peak temperatures after shutdown due to decay heat

46

Minimum temperatures well above freezing point of coolant even after 1 hour

Central Reflector

De-Fuelling Chute

Side Reflector

Bottom Reflector

Core Barrel Support

Fuelling pipe

Coolant Outlet

Pebble Retaining MeshPebbles and Coolant

Coolant Inlet

Reactor Vessel

Coolant

Central Reflector

De-Fuelling Chute

Side Reflector

Bottom Reflector

Core Barrel Support

Fuelling pipe

Coolant Outlet

Pebble Retaining MeshPebbles and Coolant

Coolant Inlet

Reactor Vessel

Coolant

47

Innovative High Temperature Reactor (IHTR) for commercial hydrogen production

600 MWth, 1000 °C, TRISO coated particle fuel

Pebble bed reactor concept with molten salt coolant

Natural circulation of coolant for reactor heat removal under normal operation

Current focus on development: Reactor physics and thermal

hydraulic designs – Optimisation Thermal and stress analysis Code development for simulating

pebble motion Experimental set-up for tracing path

of pebbles using radio-tracer technology

Pebble feeding and removal systems

PebbleTRISO coated particle fuel

•Hydrogen: 80,000 Nm3 /hr•Electricity: 18 MWe, Water: 375 m3/hr

•No. of pebbles in the annular core ~150000•Packing fraction of pebbles ~60%•Packing fraction of TRISO particles ~ 8.6 %•233U Requirement 7.3 %

48

Thermal hydraulic studies and material compatibility studies for molten salt coolant

MELT TANK

COOLER

EXPANSION TANK

HEATER

FILTER

SAFETY TANK

CONTROL VALVE

Molten salt loop

48

Major areas of development•Analytical studies and development of computer codes

•Molten salt natural circulation loop for experimental studies

•Molten fluoride salt corrosion facility using FLiNaK

•Experiments being carried out upto 750 °C mainly on Inconel materials

Major areas of development•Analytical studies and development of computer codes

•Molten salt natural circulation loop for experimental studies

•Molten fluoride salt corrosion facility using FLiNaK

•Experiments being carried out upto 750 °C mainly on Inconel materials

Molten salt corrosion test facility

Design features of Indian HTRs leading to inherent safety

TRISO coated fuel particles: Retention of fission products up to 1600 °C

High thermal inertia of ceramic core and low power density

Sufficient margin between reactor operation and boiling point of the coolant

Negative temperature coefficient of the core and coolant

Natural circulation of liquid metal / molten salt coolant in single phase • Low pressure of the system

Passive removal of heat under normal operation and postulated accident scenarios• High temperature heat pipe for CHTR

Chemical inertness of the lead based coolant with air/water

49

Molten Salt Breeder Reactor (MSBR)

This concept is attractive to India because of large thorium reserves and possibility of breeding 233U in thermal spectrum – For the third stage of Indian Nuclear Power Programme

50

Schematic of Indian MSBR

51

Fuel Salt

Fertile Salt

Fertile salt drain tank

Fissile salt drain tanks

Helium bubbling and Redox control(Fuel Salt)

IHX

Turbine

Condenser

Pump

Coolant salt drain tank

Redox control(Fertile Salt)

Design guidelines1.Heat removal by natural circulation of molten salts2.Avoid moderator to reduce solid high level waste generation3.Ability to tolerate outage of reprocessing plant4.Enhanced safety as compared to current reactors for possible deployment near population centres

Selection of salts,

materials and

conceptual design in progress

Inherent safety features of MSBR (1/2)

Continuous addition of fuel to maintain criticality Less initial reactivity

Fission products, including xenon and krypton, are continuously taken out of the system, No excess reactivity reaquired for xenon override No danger of their release under accident condition

Entire fuel salt inventory can be dumped into smaller subcritical dump tanks, through freeze valves, Reducing the chances of any untoward incidents.

The molten salt has a high boiling point (~1400°C), hence there is a very low vapor pressure Normal operating temperatures ~ 700 to 800 C

52

Inherent safety features of MSBR (2/2)

The density of fuel salts decreases with increase in temperature, With increase in temperature fuel salt is pushed out of the

core leading to reduction of reactivity No scenario for ‘fuel melt down’

Modification of existing safety codes required for defining CDF Molten fluorides are simple ionic liquids

Stable to the irradiation Do not undergo any violent chemical reactions with air or

water Fuel has no burnup limits

Life is dictate by life of moderator and structural materials

53

Accelerator Driven Systems

54

Major Role: Accelerator-driven Sub-critical reactor system High conversion sub-critical blanket with thorium for producing 233U Incineration of minor actinides and some fission products

BARC is developing technologies for Accelerator Driven System (ADS) mainly for Thorium utilization and waste transmutation

55

Sub-critical reactor core

Steam generator plant

Turbo-electrical generation plant

Accelerator-driven Sub-critical reactor system

Generation of fissile materials from thorium by spallation reaction using high energy proton accelerators

56

ADS Concept,and sub-systems

Spallation

Breeding Th-232 to U-233

Collimator

Fuel

Beam Channel

Window(Solid: W-Rh,SS etc)

Coolant: Pb,LBE, Na, HeavyWater etc.

Spallation target region:liquid lead, LBE, solid W, etc

High Energy & High Current Proton Beam from Accelerator (Cyclotron/LINAC)

233U Fission fragments

ADS Concept,and sub-systems

Spallation

Breeding Th-232 to U-233

Collimator

Fuel

Beam Channel

Window(Solid: W-Rh,SS etc)

Coolant: Pb,LBE, Na, HeavyWater etc.

Spallation target region:liquid lead, LBE, solid W, etc

High Energy & High Current Proton Beam from Accelerator (Cyclotron/LINAC)

233U Fission fragments

Spallation

Breeding Th-232 to U-233

Collimator

Fuel

Beam Channel

Spallation

Breeding Th-232 to U-233

Collimator

Fuel

Beam Channel

Window(Solid: W-Rh,SS etc)

Coolant: Pb,LBE, Na, HeavyWater etc.

Spallation target region:liquid lead, LBE, solid W, etc

High Energy & High Current Proton Beam from Accelerator (Cyclotron/LINAC)

233U Fission fragments

•Inherently safe, flexible fuel cycle

•Higher burn-up

•Reduced doubling time for ADS-breeders

•Intense, low-energy-cost neutron source

•Fissile factory for U-233 from Th-232

•Suitability for transmutation & burning nuclear waste

ADS for Transmutation & with Th-fueled reactor

57

In the Indian context, large scale deployment of nuclear reactors is required, with possible deployment near population centres

Enhanced level of safety is one of the primary goals for advanced reactors under design in BARC Defence-in-depth Passive safety devices PSA studies Margin assessment Advanced materials Advanced Reactor concepts

Summary

58

Thank You

59

Modification to Strengthen “Severe Accident Prevention Features”

Improving availability of onsite power supply - Providing back up emergency DG (air cooled) at a higher location - Providing a smaller/mobile DG to power essential loads and charge

station batteries Improving steam generator heat sink - Securing FFW diesel engines pumps from external flood and margins w.r.

t earthquake evaluated- Additional diesel engine operated pumps to transfer deaerator storage

tank inventory to steam generator- Provision of hook up connections outside reactor building, qualified for

maximum anticipated earthquake and flood- Provision for Passive Decay Heat Removal (PDHR) system for 700 MWe Improving onsite water storage for one month

SBO period- Augmentation of water inventory- Sources of water near stations are identified for fire tenders Hook upto Primary Heat Transport System /ECCS- Injection into PHT system for making up leakage during SBO- Injection into PHT for unsuccessful long term ECCS operation

Other measures

Introduction of Seismic Trip (already exists in NAPS & KAPS)

Strengthening provision for monitoring of critical parameters under prolonged loss of power

Creation of an emergency response facility capable of withstanding severe flood, cyclones & earthquake

Provision for Tsunami early warning system