1 alarp recover hemp identify assess control hemp and alarp training

1

ALARP

Recover

HEMP

Identify

Assess

Control

HEMP and ALARP Training

2

Objectives of HEMP & ALARP Training

• Increase Awareness of HEMP Concepts

• Develop a common understanding of ALARP Principles

These topics are covered in more detail in:HSE 0026 – Hazards and Effects Management Process

(HEMP and ALARP)

3

Hazards and Effects Management Process (HEMP)

4

HSE Management System

Policy and Strategic Objectives

Organization, Responsibilities, Resources, Standards and Doc.

Hazards & Effects Management

Planning & Procedures

Implementation & Monitoring

Audit

Review

LEADERSHI P AND COMMI TMENT

Element 8

Element 7

Element 6

Element 5

Element 4

Element 3

Element 2

Element 1

Corrective Action

5

Individual HEMP Responsibilities

All Employees

Responsible and accountable for conducting their work in such a manner which reduces to ALARP or eliminates risk to their own personal health and safety and that of their fellow employees and that ensures the protection of the environment, company assets, and company reputation.

Technical Staff

Participate in HEMP efforts for your Area, including asset integrity

Achieve a competent level of understanding concerning your Area’s HSE Case and Activity Specification Sheets

Comply with strict adherence to the organization’s MOC policy

6

Hazards and Effects Management Process

When a hazard is released, what are the recovery measures in place? How can the consequences be mitigated or minimized?

Recover

How are the hazards and their risks managed? What are the controls and barriers? How effective are the barriers and controls?

Control

Can the hazard be eliminated or minimized? What are the threats that can release the hazard? What are the credible scenarios and how likely are they? What are the potential consequences? What is the potential likelihood of the hazardous event? What is the risk?

Assess

What hazards are present? Are people, the environment, Shell’s reputation, or assets exposed to these hazards?

Identify

When a hazard is released, what are the recovery measures in place? How can the consequences be mitigated or minimized?

Recover

How are the hazards and their risks managed? What are the controls and barriers? How effective are the barriers and controls?

Control

Can the hazard be eliminated or minimized? What are the threats that can release the hazard? What are the credible scenarios and how likely are they? What are the potential consequences? What is the potential likelihood of the hazardous event? What is the risk?

Assess

What hazards are present? Are people, the environment, Shell’s reputation, or assets exposed to these hazards?

Identify

Recover

HEMP

Identify

Assess

Control

What are the Hazards?

How likely is it?

Risk Reduction Ideas

HSE Critical Procedures, Equipment

& Tasks

What could happen?

How serious will it be?

Is there a better way?

What if it happens?

How to recover?

How to prevent it?

Recover

HEMP

Identify

Assess

Control

Recover

HEMP

Identify

Assess

Control

What are the Hazards?

How likely is it?

Risk Reduction Ideas

HSE Critical Procedures, Equipment

& Tasks

What could happen?

How serious will it be?

Is there a better way?

What if it happens?

How to recover?

How to prevent it?

7

CONSEQUENCES INCREASING LIKELIHOOD

A B C D E

Se

ver

ity

Peo

ple

As

sets

En

viro

n-

me

nt

Re

pu

tati

on

Neverheard of

in EPindustry

Heard ofin EP

industry

Incidenthas

occurredin

SEPCo

Happensseveral

times peryear inSEPCo

Happensseveral

times peryear in alocation

0 No healtheffect/injury

No damage No effect No impact

1 Slight healtheffect/injury

Slightdamage

Slight effect Slightimpact

2 Minor healtheffect/injury

Minordamage

Minor effect Limitedimpact

3 Major healtheffect/injury

Localiseddamage

Localisedeffect

Consider-able impact

LowRisk

4 PTD* or 1 to3 fatalities

Majordamage

Major effect Nationalimpact

MediumRisk

5 Multiplefatalities

Extensivedamage

Massiveeffect

Internationalimpact

HighRisk

PTD = Permanent Total Disability

Risk Assessment Matrix & Major Hazards

A5 B5

Major Hazards are those that have high risk or high potential consequences

8

Major Hazards & HSE Cases

SEPCo Policies require that operations and facilities with Major Hazards have documented HSE Cases.

An HSE Case is a facility or operation-specific demonstration that the HSE risks from Major Hazards are managed to As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) and a description of how SEPCO’s HSE Management System is applied to HSE hazards.

Management Summary_____________________

9

Bow Tie Terminology

Threat 1Overpressure

Threat 2 Top Event

Threat 3

UNDER

PRESSURE

HYDROCARBONS

PSVsSSDS

Hydro testing

Material Construction Consequence 1

Fire/Explosion

Consequence2

Consequence3

Detection Systems

Surveillance

Design

Fire-fighting Equipment

Barriers Recovery Measures

Term Definition

Top Event the loss of control or release of the hazard.

Threats “release mechanisms” of the hazard.

Barriers •prevent the release of a hazard (i.e. top event) and act directly on the threat •are the hardware and procedures in place to prevent the threat from leading to the top event. •appear on the left hand side of the bow-tie.

Consequences •the effects of a hazard once it has been released. •appear on the right hand side of the bow-tie.

Recovery Measures

•mitigate a hazard’s potential to cause harm, damage, and environmental impacts. •are similar to barriers, but act on the consequences•appear on the right hand side of the bow-tie.

10

Bow-Tie Example

Loss of Containment

Threat: Corrosion

H-

01

.06 H

ydro

carb

on

Gas

Threat 2

Threat 3

Consequence 2

Consequence 3

Consequence: Explosion

ESCALATION FACTOR

ESCALATION FACTOR CONTROLS

Change in operating

environment

MOC Process

Inspection Program

Co

rrosio

n

Ma

na

gem

en

t P

roc

es

s

BARRIER

Installation of

Temporary Equipment

Temporary Equipment Standard

Field Inspection

Ign

ition

S

ou

rce

C

on

trol


FACTOR

RECOVERY MEASURE

Loss of Containment

Threat: Corrosion

H-

01

.06 H

ydro

carb

on

Gas

H-

01

.06 H

ydro

carb

on

Gas

Threat 2

Threat 3

Consequence 2

Consequence 3

Consequence: Explosion

ESCALATION FACTOR


Change in operating

environment

MOC Process

Inspection Program

Co

rrosio

n

Ma

na

gem

en

t P

roc

es

s

BARRIER

Installation of

Temporary Equipment

Temporary Equipment Standard

Field Inspection

Ign

ition

S

ou

rce

C

on

trol


ESCALATION FACTOR

RECOVERY MEASURE

11

Best Practice Bow Ties

There will be a single bow tie for each major hazard in SEPCo that sets the minimum required barriers/recovery measures to manage risks.

These are Best Practice Bow Ties.

Each Asset or Operation will:

• review applicable best practice bow ties to consider and document any unique threats/consequences that may exist at their location.

• benchmark the effectiveness of the barriers at their location against the performance expectation included in the best practice bow ties.

• Identify gaps and implement remedial actions to improve the barriers / recovery measures and reduce the risk to ALARP.

12

Hazard Description Potential Consequences

Sources of expsoure

Health People - Safety

Assets Environment

Reputation

Overall Risk

Controls

H-01.01 Crude oil under pressure

unignited releasefirespill / environmental impactpersonnel injuries/fatalitiesloss of asset / asset damageproduction loss

for health effects of flammable hydrocarbons, see the listings under H-21/22 General Chemicals

Mmajor H Mmajor M H For locations where this is a major hazard, see the HSE Case. For other locations, see Table 5.1 in SEPCo HSE MS Part 5.

H-19.07A Carbon monoxide (Gas)

Acute: chemical asphyxiant causing carboxyhaemoglobin Chronic: Category 1 Teratogen, may cause harm to unborn child, unconsciousness, fatality

Power generation unit; engine exhausts, emergency generators, boilers, fired equipment

M L N N N M 1. CO monitor in temporary quarters where combustion emission may occur.

H-20.01 H2S (hydrogen sulphide, sour gas)

personnel injury / fatalityminor environmental impactHealth:Acute: Irritant to eyes, skin and respiratory tract. Chemical asphyxiant causing respiratory paralysis, irritant; unconsciousness, fatality Chronic: prolonged contact may lead to dermatitis

Raw Material. Sour crude.

Examples include rich and fat DEA, sour water, fuel gas streams, sour hydrogen, acid gas, spent caustic stripper overhead

Mmajor

M L N M Mmajor For locations where this is a major hazard, see the HSE Case. For other locations, see Table 5.1 in SEPCo HSE MS Part 5.

For Health, Refer to generic Chemical Minimum Controls in Table 5.1 of SEPCo HSE MS Part 5.

1. MMS Contingency Plan for Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)2. Local Emergency Response Plan

Hazard Register

Those items with an Environment rating are E-aspects. Those that are Major in the Environment column are “Significant E-aspects”

The Hazard Register describes hazards, their associated risks, and how the hazards are managed.

Those items with in the Health column were identified during health risk assessments, and consider chronic and acute health exposures

13

HEMP Tools

Tool Acronym

Concept Risk Assessment CRA

Dropped Object Assessment DOA

Emergency Response Plans ERP

Environmental Impact Assessment

EIA

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

FMEA

Fire, Explosion and Escape Assessment

FEEA

Hazard Identification HAZID

Health Impact Assessment HIA

Health Risk Assessment HRA

HSE Performance Criteria (minimum standards) Assessment

Human Factors Engineering Tools

HFE

Tool Acronym

Instrumented Protective Function

IPF

Job Safety Analysis JSA

Performance Standards PS

Permit to Work (See JSA) PTW

Physical Effects Modeling PEM

Process Hazards Analysis PHA HAZOP What If Check List

Quantitative Risk Assessment QRA

Risk-based Corrective Action RBCA

Risk Reduction Idea (RRI) Ranking Tool

Social Impact Assessment SIA

Sustainable Development 3-D Tool

3DSD

Wells Hazard Analysis WHA

The most commonly used HEMP tools are highlighted

14

Risk Management Hierarchy

1) Eliminate – remove the risk altogether

2) Substitute – use a lower risk alternative

3) Isolate / Separate – keep the hazard

away from where it can cause harm

4) Engineering Controls – Prevention –

design such that the risk of an incident is

minimal

5) Engineering Controls – Mitigation –

design such that if an incident occurs, it

is mitigated

6) Procedural Controls – provide

procedures to reduce risk

7) Personnel Protective Equipment –

provide protection to reduce potential for

injury

In order of preference:

Recover

HEMP

Identify

Assess

Control

15

HEMP Study Interactions

HEMP Study

MOCProcess

HSE Case

Audits

Variances

Incident Investigation

Project HSE Plan

Regulations

Designs

Procedures

16

Asset Responsibilities for HEMP Studies

• The owner of the HEMP study is the accountable party for the asset or operation covered by the study. The owner is accountable for:– Maintaining the study– Updating the study at the requisite frequency– Making sure actions from the study are documented and

closed• Studies done for design considerations are kept by

engineering.• Studies done for operational considerations are kept

by Operations. • Action items resulting from SEPCo HEMP studies

shall be tracked and closed out using IMPACT.

17

Human Factors Engineering

Organizational Structure(job design, communication, task)

Work Environment(lighting, noise, chemical exposures, climate)

Individual Constraints(age, size, training, skills, intelligence)

Human

Displays Controls

Sensory Information Action

TASK

InputOutput

Machine

Organizational Structure(job design, communication, task)

Work Environment(lighting, noise, chemical exposures, climate)

Individual Constraints(age, size, training, skills, intelligence)

Human

Interfaces - Displays Interfaces - Controls

Sensory Information Action

TASK

InputOutput

Machine

The Group Minimum Health Management Standard states: Human factors engineering principles are to be considered and applied during the early design stage of new facilities projects where design can have a critical impact on equipment usability and user safety or health.

The following picture illustrates how a human interacts with a technical component and the factors that can influence his/her performance.

18

As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)

19

ALARP TRIANGLE

T h e le v e l o f H S E r is k is g e n e r a l ly s u f f ic ie n t ly lo w th a t s o c ie t y w i l l n o t h a v e c o n c e r n s a n d r e s o u r c e s r e q u ir e d to r e d u c e r is k a r e l ik e ly to b e g r o s s ly d is p r o p o r t io n a te t o th e b e n e f i t s .

H S E r is k s a r e to le r a b le i f f u r th e r r is k r e d u c t io n is im p r a c t ic a l o r r e q u ir e s a c t io n th a t is g r o s s ly d is p r o p o r t io n a te in t im e , t r o u b le a n d e f f o r t to th e r is k r e d u c t io n a c h ie v e d .

T h e g r e a te r th e r is k , th e g r e a te r th e b e n e f i t s th a t a r e l ik e ly to r e s u l t f r o m r is k r e d u c t io n m e a s u r e s , h e n c e th e m o r e l ik e ly th a t e f f o r ts w i l l n o t b e d is p r o p o r t io n a te . T h e m a jo r i t y o f th e H S E r is k s a s s o c ia te d w ith S E P C o ’s a c t iv i t ie s l ie in th is r e g io n .

H S E r is k s a r e to o h ig h to n o r m a l ly b e to le r a te d . F u n d a m e n ta l im p r o v e m e n ts n e e d e d a n d r is k s o n ly c o n s id e r e d w h e n th e r e a r e n o a l te r n a t iv e s a n d p e o p le a r e w e l l in f o r m e d .

T h e le v e l o f H S E r is k is g e n e r a l ly s u f f ic ie n t ly lo w th a t s o c ie t y w i l l n o t h a v e c o n c e r n s a n d r e s o u r c e s r e q u ir e d to r e d u c e r is k a r e l ik e ly to b e g r o s s ly d is p r o p o r t io n a te t o th e b e n e f i t s .

H S E r is k s a r e to le r a b le i f f u r th e r r is k r e d u c t io n is im p r a c t ic a l o r r e q u ir e s a c t io n th a t is g r o s s ly d is p r o p o r t io n a te in t im e , t r o u b le a n d e f f o r t to th e r is k r e d u c t io n a c h ie v e d .

T h e g r e a te r th e r is k , th e g r e a te r th e b e n e f i t s th a t a r e l ik e ly to r e s u l t f r o m r is k r e d u c t io n m e a s u r e s , h e n c e th e m o r e l ik e ly th a t e f f o r ts w i l l n o t b e d is p r o p o r t io n a te . T h e m a jo r i t y o f th e H S E r is k s a s s o c ia te d w ith S E P C o ’s a c t iv i t ie s l ie in th is r e g io n .

H S E r is k s a r e to o h ig h to n o r m a l ly b e to le r a te d . F u n d a m e n ta l im p r o v e m e n ts n e e d e d a n d r is k s o n ly c o n s id e r e d w h e n th e r e a r e n o a l te r n a t iv e s a n d p e o p le a r e w e l l in f o r m e d .

Incr

easin

g In

dividu

al Ri

sks a

nd S

ociet

al Co

ncer

ns

T o le r a b i l i t y T h r e s h o ld

Incr

easin

g In

dividu

al Ri

sks a

nd S

ociet

al Co

ncer

ns

T o le r a b i l i t y T h r e s h o ldT o le r a b i l i t y T h r e s h o ld

20

Risk Perception - Types of Fatalities, US, 2001

Number of deaths /year

47,288

20,308

15,019

14,078

3,309

3,281

396

61

44

Match the causes to the listed number of deaths/year(data from the National Safety Council).

Cause

Accidental Drowning (Non Transport)

Transport Accidents

Contact with venomous animals & Plants

Lightning

Legal Intervention

Falls

Assault

Accidental Poisoning

Exposure to smoke, fire and flames

Answers

Transport Accidents

Assault

Falls


Exposure to smoke, fire and flames

Accidental Drowning (Non Transport)

Legal Intervention

Contact with Venomous animals & plants

Lightning

21

Relative Risk

Tolerability Threshold

Incre

asin

g I

nd

ivid

ual

Ris

ks a

nd

Socie

tal

Con

cern

s

Tolerability ThresholdTolerability Threshold

Lightning

Venomous animals & plants

Legal Intervention

Drowning


Falls

Oil and Gas ExtractionTransport Accidents

Assault

22

Actual Vs Perceived Risks

45 Deaths in 1996

59 Deaths in 1995

76 Attacks Worldwide49 Attacks USA1 Death USA 2001

Which “hazard” results in more deaths per year?

23

Risk Misperception

.. Mountaineering Council for Scotland said

“These two men were very aware of safety issues and did not have a reputation for taking any sort of risks”

24

Problem Framing

An outbreak of disease is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs have been proposed:

If you choose. . . Then. . .

Program A 200 people will be saved

Program B 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved 2/3 probability that no people will be saved

Which program would you select?

25

Rephrasing the Problem

Program A 200 people will be saved

72% Program C 400 people will die 22%

Program B

1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved 2/3 probability that no people will be saved

28% Program D

1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved 2/3 probability that no people will be saved

78%

Depending on the problem phrasing, people made different decisions:

26

ALARP Definition

To reduce a risk to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable involves balancing reduction in risk against time, trouble, difficulty and cost of achieving it.

This level represents the point, at which time, trouble, difficulty and cost of further reduction measures become unreasonably disproportionate to the additional risk reduction obtained.

••

••

•

•

Risk Cost

Screening Criteria

ALARP ?

From quantitativerisk analysis

27

ALARP: Road Transport ExampleALARP: Road Transport Example

When does the cost of further reduction measures become disproportionate to the additional risk reduction obtained?: • No specification• Does not meet legal requirements• No regular vehicle maintenance• Provide recovery measures,

e.g. roll-bars, seat belts• Provide mitigation, e.g., speed limiter,

4WD• Provide driver training• Provide safe driving incentives• Journey management system• Road transport management system• Avoid journeys by planning• Build black-top roads• Use aircraft transport only• Automate production facilities -

eliminate routine driving• Stop production

Intolerable

SCREENING CRITERIA

ALARP region

ALARPprobablyin this area

28

ALARP and Risk Tolerability – 4 Levels of RiskALARP and Tolerability

Principle

Does the design, operation and maintenance of each systemreduce the HSE risk from each failure mode so that it is both tolerable and ALARP?

Failure Modes

Are there sufficient barriers and recovery preparedness measures (either hardware or operational) to reduce the HSE risk from each threat / consequence so that it is both tolerable and ALARP?

Threats / Consequences

Are the HSE risks from each hazard tolerable? Can the hazard be eliminated or the source of the hazard minimized? If not, is the resulting risk ALARP?

Hazards

Are the HSE risks arising from the cumulative exposure to all HSE hazards both tolerable and ALARP?

Cumulative

Risk

ALARP and Tolerability Principle

Does the design, operation and maintenance of each systemreduce the HSE risk from each failure mode so that it is both tolerable and ALARP?

Failure Modes

Are there sufficient barriers and recovery preparedness measures (either hardware or operational) to reduce the HSE risk from each threat / consequence so that it is both tolerable and ALARP?

Threats / Consequences

Are the HSE risks from each hazard tolerable? Can the hazard be eliminated or the source of the hazard minimized? If not, is the resulting risk ALARP?

Hazards

Are the HSE risks arising from the cumulative exposure to all HSE hazards both tolerable and ALARP?

Cumulative

Risk

Etc.

Etc.Threat 3: Fatigue Damage

Hazard 3: H-09.01 Weather

Hazard 1: H-08.04

Boat collision hazard to offshore structures

Hazard 2: H-01.06

Hydrocarbon Gas

Failure Mode 1: Surface

Corrosion

Failure Mode 2:Galvanic Corrosion

Failure Mode 3:Stress

Corrosion Cracking

Threat 2: Corrosion

Threat 1: Overpressure

Etc.

Consequence 1: Fire

Threat 3: Fatigue Damage

Hazard 3: H-09.01 Weather

Hazard 1: H-08.04

Boat collision hazard to offshore structures

Hazard 2: H-01.06

Hydrocarbon Gas

Failure Mode 1: Surface

Corrosion

Failure Mode 2:Galvanic Corrosion

Failure Mode 3:Stress

Corrosion Cracking

Threat 2: Corrosion

Threat 1: Overpressure

Etc.

Consequence 1: Fire

The HEMP Standard describes the Tolerability Threshold, Evaluation requirements and Demonstration requirements for each of these levels of risk.

29

ALARP and Risk Tolerability Decision-Making

For example:•Variances to SEPCo requirements

•Identification of a new hazard, or a change in risk of an existing hazard

•Operating without barriers/recovery measures or operating in a way that deteriorates a barrier

•Making a change that impacts an existing barrier

•Selecting a new concept

•Adding additional risk such that the cumulative risk threshold may be approached

ALARP and risk tolerability decisions are required when changes affect hazard management.

30

Decision Making Framework Outline

TechnologyBased

Values Based

Drivers

Means of Calibration

Codes and Standards

Peer Review

Verification

Benchmarking

Internal StakeholderConsultation

External StakeholderConsultation

Well establishedsolution

Well understood risks

Very novel

Significant trade-offs

Strong viewsand perceptions

Higher level of M

anagem

ent

DecisionLevel

31

Decision Making Framework

Lifecycle implicationsSome risk trade-offs/transfersSome uncertainty or deviation from standard or best practiceSignificant economic implications

Significance to DecisionMaking Process


Codes and Standards

Peer Review

Verification

Benchmarking



Decision Context Type

A

B

C

Nothing new or unusualWell understood risksEstablished practiceNo major stakeholder implications

Very novel or challengingStrong stakeholder views and perceptionsSignificant risk trade-offs or risk transferLarge uncertaintiesPerceived lowering of safety standards

Codes & Standards

Societal Values

CompanyValues

Risk Based Analysis

e g CBA Q

RA

Goo

d Pra

ctice

Engineering/E

xpert Judgem

ent

SEPCo Decision Making Framework




Codes and Standards

Peer Review

Verification

Benchmarking




A

B

C



Codes & Standards

Societal Values

CompanyValues

Risk Based Analysis

e g CBA Q

RA

Goo

d Pra

ctice

Engineering/E

xpert Judgem

ent




Codes and Standards

Peer Review

Verification

Benchmarking




A

B

C



Codes & Standards

Societal Values

CompanyValues

Risk Based Analysis

e g CBA Q

RA

Goo

d Pra

ctice

Engineering/E

xpert Judgem

ent


Higher level of M

anagem

ent

DecisionLevel

32

Following the Decision-Making Process

Define decision

Evaluate at the Cumulative, hazard, threat, and failure mode levels

Demonstrate the decision as defined in the HEMP Standard

Type A? Type B? Type C? Use the right-hand side of the framework.

Use the left-hand side of the framework.

Determine decision type

Evaluate

Calibrate

Demonstrate

What do you need to decide?




Codes and Standards

Peer Review

Verification

Benchmarking




A

B

C



Codes & Standards

Societal Values

CompanyValues

Risk Based

Analysis

e g C

BA QRA

Goo

d Pra

ctice

Engineering/E

xpert Judgem

ent





Codes and Standards

Peer Review

Verification

Benchmarking




A

B

C



Codes & Standards

Societal Values

CompanyValues

Risk Based

Analysis

e g C

BA QRA

Goo

d Pra

ctice

Engineering/E

xpert Judgem

ent




Codes and Standards

Peer Review

Verification

Benchmarking




A

B

C



Codes & Standards

Societal Values

CompanyValues

Risk Based

Analysis

e g C

BA QRA

Goo

d Pra

ctice

Engineering/E

xpert Judgem

ent





Codes and Standards

Peer Review

Verification

Benchmarking




A

B

C



Codes & Standards

Societal Values

CompanyValues

Risk Based Analysis

e g CBA Q

RA

Goo

d Pra

ctice

Engineering/E

xpert Judgem

ent





Codes and Standards

Peer Review

Verification

Benchmarking




A

B

C



Codes & Standards

Societal Values

CompanyValues

Risk Based Analysis

e g CBA Q

RA

Goo

d Pra

ctice

Engineering/E

xpert Judgem

ent




Codes and Standards

Peer Review

Verification

Benchmarking




A

B

C



Codes & Standards

Societal Values

CompanyValues

Risk Based Analysis

e g CBA Q

RA

Goo

d Pra

ctice

Engineering/E

xpert Judgem

ent


T h re a t 3 : F a tig u e

D a m a g e

H a z a rd 3 : H -0 9 .0 1 W e a th e r

H a z a rd 1 : H -0 8 .0 4

B o a t c o llis io n h a za rd to o ffs h o re s tru c tu re s

H a z a rd 2 : H -0 1 .0 6

H yd ro c a rb o n G a s

Failure Mode 1: S urface

C orros ion

Failure Mode 2:G alvanic C orros ion

Failure Mode 3:S tress

C orros ion C racking

T h re a t 2 : C o rro s io n

T h re a t 1 : O v e rp re s s u re

E tc .

C o n s e q u e n c e 1 : F ire


D a m a g e

H a z a rd 3 : H -0 9 .0 1 W e a th e r

H a z a rd 1 : H -0 8 .0 4


H a z a rd 2 : H -0 1 .0 6



C orros ion






E tc .


33

Type A Decision Example

The decision context is Type A because this decision is well-understood.

The decision bases are Codes and Standards (ASME, SEPCo design schedules), Good Practice, and Engineering/Expert judgment of the designer. cumulative risk level – N/A

hazard level - consider whether a new hazard is being added or a change in risk is being proposed for an existing hazard. Consider the risk management hierarchy.

threat/consequence level - verify against the personnel at heights bowtie.

failure mode level – N/A

Since this decision is well understood (Type A), the means of calibration is Codes and Standards, so no additional consultation is required Since this decision is well understood (Type A) reference is made to the Hazards and Effects Register, and no additional demonstration is required other than the normal project documentation such as as-built drawings and calculations.

You have to design a new ladder to access a work platform.

How are ALARP principles applied?

How to design a ladder for accessing a work platform. Define

decision


Evaluate

Calibrate

Demonstrate




Codes and Standards

Peer Review

Verification

Benchmarking




A

B

C



Codes & Standards

Societal Values

CompanyValues

Risk Based

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34

ALARP Thinking

The picture shows an example of a ladder and cage. Has it been designed to reduce the risk to ALARP?

35

ALARP Thinking - Risk Reduction Ideas (RRIs)

Develop Risk Reduction Ideas for the preceding example.

Remember the Risk Management Hierarchy!

Evaluate hazard level - consider whether a new hazard is being added or a change in risk is being proposed for an existing hazard. Consider the risk management hierarchy.

Consider the Evaluate step.

• Eliminate • Substitute • Isolate / Separate• Engineering Controls – Prevention & Mitigation• Procedural Controls• Personnel Protective Equipment

36

Ranking Tool for selecting optionsXX

Cost multiplier

Cost of Implementation

Cost

1 Low <$50k

2 Medium $50k -$500k

3 High >$500k

Benefit multiplier

Benefit Examples

1 High Move one or more boxes on risk assessment matrix.Reduction of likelihood of a magnitude or more (failure goes from 1/10 to 1/100), consequences are reduced significantly (from potential fatality to minor injury), benefit due to lower penalties/cost of absence/injuries, significant positive reputation impact

2 Medium Reduction of likelihood less than magnitude (from 1/10 to 1/50), consequences are reduced, benefit due to lower penalties/cost of absence/injuries

3 Low Limited reduction in likelihood, limited reduction in consequence

Effort multiplier

Effort of Implementation

Activities examples

1 Low Quick fix, simple to do, applicable to a specific location (no SEPCo wide impact). Little planning required, one person or small team can execute RRI. No shutdown or downtime required.

2 Medium Simple fix but with Asset or Operation-wide implications. Complex, site specific activity. Some planning required. Involvement of local contractors. Small team to carry RRI out. May extend a shutdown.

3 High Complex activity with SEPCo wide implications. Major planning involved. May involve larger contracts. Specific SEPCo team required. Requires a dedicated shutdown to implement.

Range Proposed Action

1-4 Do

6-9 Study

12+ Pass

Sample Score assignments

Cost multiplier Benefit multiplier Effort multiplier Score=

37

Selected Option

38

Type B Decision Example

Define decision Is a pressure vessel fit for service based on changes in wall thickness from corrosion?


The decision context is Type B since it is a deviation from codes and standards or good practice (API RP 579)

Evaluate cumulative risk level – N/Ahazard level – evaluate based on the vessel contents for considerations regarding environmental effects, flammability or health hazards. The risk management hierarchy should be used. threat/consequence level - An analysis should be conducted for overpressure and any other threats that might be impacted by reduced wall thickness (corrosion, vibration, etc.). failure mode level – conduct a detailed analysis for each failure mode.

Calibrate The means of calibration is peer review, so consultation is made with:•Technical Authorities•Regulatory Affairs•Workforce•Senior Leadership

Demonstrate Consult the HEMP Standard for demonstration requirements! Since this is a Type B decision, demonstration shall be made using the report format in Attachment B of the HEMP Standard. Reference the hazard management hierarchy and the Engineering Analyses from Fitness for Service reviews.

A pressure vessel has been noted to have a reduction in wall thickness from corrosion. Should it be kept in service? How would you make this decision?

39

HEMP Web Site

Available via the HSE in SEPCo Web Portal or directly athttp://sepco3.shell.com/sites/hse/hemp/

40

Summary of HEMP & ALARP Training

• You should now be aware of HEMP Concepts

• We all should have a common understanding of the ALARP Principle

1 alarp recover hemp identify assess control hemp and alarp training

Documents

alarp slide

hse hazards

alarp training slide

hse management system

single bow tie

bowtie example

hazards potential

hse risks