1. article_espluga et al

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CJCS 2 (2) pp. 231251 Intellect Limited 2010

Catalan Journal of Communication & Cultural Studies

Volume 2 Number 2

2010 Intellect Ltd Article. English language. doi: 10.1386/cjcs.2.2.231_1

KEYWORDS

risk communicationrisk perceptionrisk governancepetrochemical

industriesinterpretative approach

social accountingpractices

JOSEP ESPLUGAUniversitat Autnoma de Barcelona

ANA PRADESCIEMAT, Sociotechnical Research Centre

JAN GONZALOUniversitat Rovira i Virgili

Communicating at the

edge: Risk communication

processes and structuralconflicts in highly

industrialized petrochemical

areas

ABSTRACT

This article, grounded in an empirical study carried out in the Tarragona petrochem-ical complex (Spain), explores how key actors operating in this specific social andorganizational context perceive petrochemical communication activities. Data compiledfrom a set of interviews with stakeholders and focus group discussions with citizenswere analysed from an interpretative perspective in an effort to capture underlyingsituationally specific logics. The results enabled us to discuss the advantages and limi-

tations of different theoretical models of petrochemical communication, providing ele-ments for a critique of overly simplistic normative models of risk communication. We


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highlight the potential contribution of interpretative research to the social perceptionof petrochemical risk and its implication in petrochemical communication processes.

INTRODUCTION

The area of Tarragona (Catalonia, northeastern Spain) is a densely populatedregion in which chemical and petrochemical industries play an importanteconomic role. Twenty-seven chemical and petrochemical companies, includ-ing leading international companies such as Bayer, Basf, Dow Chemical andRepsol (Spains largest petrochemical company), occupy a total of 1,200 hec-tares. The plants are distributed between two distinct industrial estates (thesouthern and northern estates), 10 kilometres apart (Figure 1). The 27 com-panies occupying the northern and southern industrial estates belong to theAssociation of Chemical Companies of Tarragona (AEQT), an organizationthat oversees the sector. The companies annually process some 20,000 tonnesof various products fundamentally petroleum products and byproducts such

as fuel, plastics and plastic derivatives, water treatment products, dissolvents,detergents, asphalt, adhesives, gases for domestic use, lubricants and textilefibres. Around 44 per cent of all plastics produced in Spain are manufacturedin Tarragona (AEQT 2005). The chemical companies are organized spatiallyin three different zones: processing, packaging and pipe racks. These chem-ical plants provided 30,000 jobs in 2002, 6,000 of which represented directemployment (AEQT 2005; for more details see Farr and Fernndez (2007)).

Source: Departament dInterior, Relacions Institucionals i Participaci de la Generalitatde Catalunya & Ajuntament de Tarragona (2007).

Figure 1: Map of the Tarragona region showing the northern and southernindustrial estates (encircled) and major cities and towns.

Source: De artament dInt


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1. This is defined asthe global chemicalindustrys own uniqueinitiative whichhelps the worldwidechemical industryto drive continualimprovement

in all aspects ofhealth, safety andenvironmentalperformance and to beopen in communicationabout its activities andachievements (CEFIC,European ChemicalIndustry Council2005: 3).

The manufacture, handling, transport and storage of chemical substancesimply the possible occurrence of serious accidents that can have an immedi-ate adverse effect on human and environmental health (acute petrochemicalrisk) and cause contamination over time via water, air and soil (chronic pet-rochemical risk) (Horlick-Jones 1998). European public authorities have mademajor efforts to regulate these risks over the last two decades; the Seveso II

Directive 96/82/EC (on acute risk) and Directive 96/61/EC (on chronic risk)have both been adapted to the legislation of member states. In Spain theregulations have been adapted at both the national and regional level. TheEuropean directives and voluntary programmes of the chemical industry itself(for example, the Responsible Care programme1) establish two main lines ofaction for companies in relation to petrochemical risk, namely managementand communication. Management refers to the development of processes andmeasures to prevent, minimize and control both acute and chronic chemi-cal risk. Communication refers to the establishment of mechanisms for com-municating with the different stakeholders affected by chemical risk (Heath1997; Renn and Kastenholz 2000). By reinforcing consultation with stakehold-

ers (operators, elected representatives, public authorities, associations andthe local population), the Seveso directive, as revised in 1996, democratizesterritorial chemical management to a greater extent than before and forcesbusiness organizations to open up to their social environment. This directivealso obliges petrochemical companies to draw up an external emergency planjointly with the public authorities. This plan obliges them to actively informthe population as to the procedure to follow in the event of an accident, andto run emergency simulations involving local people. Furthermore, legislationderiving from the Aarhus Convention enhances the right of citizens to obtainquality environmental information, and has direct implications for both com-panies and public authorities. In general, therefore, there is a worldwide ten-dency towards improving public information and communication regardinghighly industrialized petrochemical management.

Our aim in this article is to explore, with a view to highlighting mutualinterdependence relationships and power relations, how risk communicationactions and processes implemented by companies and state agencies in theTarragona area (Spain) are experienced and perceived by the companies andstate agencies themselves and by the local population.

THE STUDY OF RISK COMMUNICATION

Research into risk communication in the strictest sense began in the late 1970sand early 1980s, when studies of perception regarding risk issues provided suf-ficient evidence that perceptions are complex phenomena that depend on manymore factors than a mere passive reception of information by individuals. Riskcommunication can be defined in two main ways. One places the emphasison the way the information is provided to the public, and the other considersinformation to be a more general and interactive interchange between all theparties involved. In the former model, experts considered the main actors assume the role of transmitting and elaborating information for a passive pub-lic. In the latter model, the public and other actors and experts play important(if different) roles in an interdependent interchange of information and opin-

ions, while strengthening appropriate channels for consultation, response anddialogue (OECD 2002, 2003). In the former model, communication occurs ina single top-to-bottom direction; whereas the latter model emphasizes greater


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participation by the general public and contributions from non-experts, thatis, lay people (Bennet and Calman 1999). In practice, both perspectives coex-ist, although one or the other may dominate in certain situations dependingon decision-making traditions, the resources available, and political and socialconditions. We could say that the adoption of one perspective or the otherdepends largely on the objectives of whoever is communicating. Risk commu-

nication objectives may involve several types and levels of action:

To inform the public in order to educate people and improve knowledgeof risks, circulate information, put peoples minds at ease and warn themabout possible risksTo change or reinforce peoples behaviour with respect to risks, either toreduce risky behaviour or to promote appropriate behaviour in emergen-ciesTo obtain a consensus or undertaking regarding controversial technolo-gies, implying the use of many different kinds of actions, ranging fromconsulting to effectively including the general public in the decision-mak-

ing process(Gray et al. 1998)

Communication underlies the risk management process and varies overtime depending on changes in interest groups and problems as processesdevelop. The risk communication process involves all individual and collec-tive actors with an interest in evaluating the risk. Broadly speaking, a generaltypology that distinguishes between risk promoters, the potentially affectedpopulation and regulators is useful for classifying the many actors involvedin any risk management and communication process, namely, companies,workers, trade unions, public authorities at different levels, scientific experts,the media, local people, ecological associations and the general public.According to a large part of risk literature, it is clear that there is a needfor government and businesses to gain a much better understanding of layaudiences, how they make sense of risk issues and what they value (Horlick-Jones et al. 2003; Otway 1992; Petts 2001; Renn 2003, etc.). This implies aneed for a design-based and user-centred approach to risk communication(Murdock et al. 2003).

In recent years there have been some theoretical and practical models thattry to classify and manage operations to ensure effective communication ofrisk. For example, the model of Multiple Stages of Risk Communication Process

(ERIK), developed by the Federal Institute for Risk Assessment in Germany(Hertel and Hensel 2007), emphasizes the opportunities afforded by partici-pation in decisions about risk, and it understands risk communication as thewhole exchange of information between political institutions, private compa-nies, civil society representatives, experts and media.

This model assumes that risk communication occurs in a context wheremultiple players offering pluralistic values come into conflict when definingthe risk at different levels. This is a theoretical and practical model structuredin different communication scenarios and with the involvement of publicinstitutions. It distinguishes between horizontal communication (between theactors traditionally involved in the regulatory process of the risk) and verti-

cal communication (which allows the integration of arguments of people andinstitutions outside the traditional regulatory processes), two aspects that helpto bring concerns and values to ensure the plurality of process and improve


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its legitimacy. On the other hand, the ERIK model identifies four main stages:communication within and between public agencies; communication withexperts; communicating with stakeholders; and communication with thegeneral public. This design should enable a process of risk communication tointegrate the different points of view, values and interests, and has an impor-tant participatory dimension.

Another model of this kind is called Stakeholders in Risk Communication(STARC) (Wright 2006); this proposes a framework in which stakeholders, themedia and the public can advance and participate in the development of amore dynamic management and governance to ensure dialogue among allthe stakeholders. For this purpose, a corporate strategy of risk communicationthat goes beyond the simple transmission of information is deployed, since itis considered that risk communication is not effective without an effort to inte-grate, assimilate and understand the point of view of the other. The ultimategoal is to generate a culture of understanding, integration and involvement ofdifferent actors. From this point of view, a good risk communication processinvolves a series of structured stages in a loop (from analysis to improvement,

through design, implementation or monitoring) that can be learned withinspiral management, in which new experiences are added in order to improvethe whole process.

Perhaps the most well-known theoretical model in risk communicationis theSocial Amplification of Risk Framework(SARF) (Kasperson et al. 1988), amodel based on the idea that risk events interact with a wide range of psy-chological processes and social, institutional and cultural factors that trans-form and determine the behaviour of the public in terms of amplification orattenuation. Thus, the experience of risk not only refers to physical risk, butalso represents a process of interpretation through various social and indi-vidual filters. The signs of risk, defined as messages about a hazard or a dan-gerous event and its severity affecting the public perception (Pidgeon et al.2003), including images, signs or symbols of real or hypothetical accidents,can be attenuated, remaining unnoticed as irrelevant or, conversely, receiv-ing a substantial enlargement that leads to unexpected social alarm. Theintensification or attenuation of the risk occurs when risk signals are sociallyprocessed and filtered through different stations amplifiers, which can includeactors such as scientists, risk management institutions, the media, activistsfrom social organizations, opinion leaders and public agencies (Kasperson etal. 1988: 1056).

Therefore, the social amplification of risk refers to the interpretations and

transformations that the images of the risk experience within the dynamic andinteractive social processes. Each group or station can filter different aspectsof risk or its related events. The importance of this model is that each of itssegments can be studied through a part of the tradition on risk communica-tion. Individual stations, for example, are related to the psychometric traditionand risk perception heuristics, but, in turn, are embedded in social groupswith different cultural world views that ultimately influence the processes ofsocial perception of risk. In this way, it is also stated that the institutionalcharacteristics of the stations are not only influenced by the characteristicsand values of its components, but also because of the cultural biases of theirown organizations. Moreover, beyond an integration of psychological and

cultural perspectives on risk, the SARF model also begins to integrate the con-stituent elements of communication processes to explain their influence, byincorporating the sources, channels and information flows, as well as culture


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and social institutions, as factors influencing the increase or attenuation ofconcrete risk signals (Taylor-Gooby and Zinn 2005: 16).

We are aware that these are not the only existing models, but rather thatthey are probably representative of the main trends in risk communication.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY

Our theoretical and methodological approach is based on what is called inter-pretative perception research (Horlick-Jones and Prades 2009), which accordsa central role to meaning and interpretation when structuring social beingand social interacting. This is an approach founded in perspectives that rec-ognize the central roles of meaning and interpretation in structuring socialinteractions and being (Gadamer 1976; Schutz 1970), with some tradition inrisk research (Molotch and Boden 1985; Perin 1995; Vaughan 1996; Horlick-Jones et al. 2001). According to this approach, it might be anticipated thatthe risk concept could assume complex roles and multiple and symbolicmeanings in lay and expert discourse and action. From this point of view, theresponse to risk issues by people is not simply instrumentally calculative, but,rather, reflects the specificity of the risk issue in question and of the settingsin which the risk issue is encountered. These settings include the matrix ofsocial expectations, commitments and understandings in which people findthemselves.

The interpretative approach draws attention to the evidence of situation-ally specific logics in risk reasoning and practice across a range of organiza-tional and social contexts. Research from the interpretative perspective hasprovided important insights into the nature of practical reasoning about riskissues, namely:

1. A recognition of the importance of social accounting practices in shapingthe production of risk-related accounts (the need, in socially problematicsituations, for people to present themselves as reasonable and the relatedpolitics of blame and responsibility)

2. A recognition of the need to understand that risk reasoning typically takesplace in situations characterized by imperfect knowledge and that modesof reasoning may shift as levels of understanding change (low informa-tion rationality)

3. A recognition of the signature of technologies or specific ways in whichthe material features of technologies are articulated in practical reasoning.

(Horlick-Jones and Prades 2009: 420)

A qualitative approach was implemented in order to obtain what Geertz(1973) called a thick description of the circumstances in which given riskissues come to be identified and understood. A thick description providessituationally specific insights into the underlying social significance of givenactions (Horlick-Jones and Prades 2009). In this way, in terms of makingsense of petrochemical communication activities and practices, we attemptto understand the interpretative processes deployed, on the one hand, byexperts representing the companies and state agencies, and, on the otherhand, by the lay public. The in-depth interviewing technique was used tocompile information from stakeholders, mainly representatives of companies

and of state agencies responsible for ensuring safety in the Tarragona area,whereas the focus group technique was used to generate public discourse.


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In-depth interviews

Regarding the present data, we conducted a total of eight in-depth interviews.Four of these stakeholders were chemical and petrochemical plant managersspecifically responsible for petrochemical communication on the Tarragonaindustrial estates (Bayer, Dow Chemical, Repsol-YPF and AEQT). The inter-views were conducted face-to-face between November 2005 and February

2006 at the interviewees workplace. All interviews were audio recorded andthen transcribed for analysis. The interviewees were asked about the follow-ing: (1) how they defined petrochemical risks; (2) what role they attributed tocommunication in petrochemical risk management; (3) what communicativestrategies they used and the advantages and limitations of each; and (4) whatrole they attributed to the other social actors (public authorities, civil societyand the media) involved in petrochemical processes.

We conducted another four interviews with selected managers ofpublic authorities responsible for chemical safety and emergencies in theregion. These interviewees included an emergency expert working in theGeneralitats Department of the Interior (regional government); an expertfrom the Catalan Emergencies Centre in Tarragona; a manager from theGeneralitats General Subdirectorate for Industry (regional government);and a manager from the regional Government Delegation in Tarragona.These interviews were conducted face-to-face between November 2005 andFebruary 2006 at the interviewees workplace. All interviews were audiorecorded and then transcribed for analysis. The interviews were semi-struc-tured with a short thematic list with no definite order. Interviewees wereasked the following questions: (1) what risks are generated by the chemicaland petrochemical companies in Tarragona; (2) how do you evaluate therole of risk communication within the field of risk management; (3) what

mutual relationships exist between companies and public authorities interms of risk management and communication; (4) what is the medias rolein risk management and communication; and (5) what relationship do youhave with the general public (individuals and organizations) in terms of riskmanagement and communication?

Such types of interviews allow for the development of long conversationswith members of the study population, which expose signs of thematic ele-ments. The interview is seen as a communicative process through which onecan extract information from a person information that is in his or her biog-raphy, that is, the vivid set of representations associated with events (Alonso1998). This generates a discourse much less fragmented than those generated

with questionnaires, which allows people to describe experiences and opinionsand talk about their own lives using their own words. It should be assumedthat the information has been experienced in some way by the interviewee.This situation provides a specific bias consistent with the experience and thecognitive and emotional knowledge of that person. This interpretive bias ofthe information, far from being an obstacle, is significant because it allows forthe reconstruction of the various social discourses on the theme of the researchobject. It should be noted, however, that the speeches are problematic becausethey are not independent of the structures of social interaction: the result ofthe interviews themselves are considered as communicative constructs and notmere records of speeches. The speeches are not an existing data collection, but

appear as a forced response to a question by the researcher in a conversationalsituation, where each participant (researcher and interviewee) co-constructed


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that discourse moment by moment. It is important to consider all these virtuesand limitations of the technique in order to be able to make as consistent ananalysis as possible. In the results section, to ensure anonymity, the fragmentscorresponding to these interviewees are coded.

Focus group discussions

A total of eight focus groups were organized, composed of individuals recruitedon the basis of the proximity of their home to the petrochemical complex.More distant neighbourhoods were Tarragona Centre I and II, Reus and Vila-seca, and closer neighbourhoods were Bonavista, La Canonja, Constant andLa Pobla de Mafumet. Socio-economic activities with a direct bearing on theindustrial sector predominate in the areas closest to the complex, whereas activ-ities associated with the services sector tend to predominate in Tarragona cityand Reus. Meanwhile, although Vila-seca has an important industrial sector, italso has a growing tourist sector. Recruitment was based on random telephonecalls to the selected municipalities, combined with the snowball technique. A

total of 50 people with a mean age of 51 years (range 1692 years) participated(thirty women and twenty men). In terms of education, four of the participantshad no education, eighteen had primary education, 21 had secondary educationand seven had attended university. Employment status varied greatly. The sam-ple was, as far as possible, structurally representative of the population understudy, and we ensured that each focus group would have men and womenand would reflect different ages, education and occupations. An effort was alsomade to achieve relative internal homogeneity within each group by dividingthe sample using a territorial variable (presence of people living near to or farfrom the petrochemical plants), which, a priori, could provide more similarexperiences with regard to these petrochemical issues. In order to minimize bias

during recruitment (avoiding people too worried about risk) the participants inthe focus groups were told that they were going to talk, in a broad sense, aboutthe quality of life in the territory. In the same sense, the focus group modera-tor did not introduce the main objective of the research (to discuss the pet-rochemical risk perception) instead the moderator waited until the issue wasraised spontaneously. Discussions started with an initial question, From yourpoint of view, what are the things you like the most and the least about livingin your city/neighbourhood? In fact, in all of the groups a similar spontaneousprocess took place: during the first 30 minutes the participants discussed thethings they liked most (sea, sun, people, etc.) and then least (traffic, garbagecollection, local politicians, etc.); after this they began to discuss the presence of

the petrochemical plants and their implications, and they did not stop until theend of the session (discussions lasted approximately two hours). The modera-tor then had a brief list of relevant issues to talk about (only to be used if theywere not addressed by the participants), namely perceptions, experiences andexpectations about: (1) the petrochemical industries of the area; (2) the riskslinked to these industries; (3) the risk control; (4) the social actions of the popu-lation (behaviours, strategies and tactics); and (5) the interactions among actors(companies, public authorities, social movements, media and scientific experts).Later we search for communication issues through all these topics.

Data analysis

The interviews and the discussions of the focus groups were transcribed andanalysed using procedures based on grounded theory, a qualitative analysis


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methodology based on constant comparisons and the use of coding paradigmsto ensure conceptual development and density (Glaser 1978; Strauss 1987). Inthis approach the important link between data and theory is based on con-ceptual codes that make it easier to search for patterns that give the empiricalindicators meaning. The process brings confirmation, correction and satura-tion (eventually the data saturate all the categories and all data seem to fit).

All data were coded for analysis, which avoids or at least attenuates the prob-lem of only selecting data that fit the hypotheses. The data collection phaseresulted in 157 pages of interviews and 188 pages of focus group transcrip-tions (345 pages of text in total). Linking the codes and categories developedin each interview and in each focus group discussion, we tried to re-elaboratethe central issues that could help us to explain the discourses and groundhypotheses from the whole set of data. For these purposes we read every text,carefully taking sentences one by one, in order to subdivide the contents intoclasses. We discussed and compared our suggestions. Systematic comparisonsmade it possible to subdivide the classes further, and new classes were cre-ated and others integrated into existing ones. As the process advanced, fewer

and fewer revisions were made. The next step in our work was to search forverbal expressions (quotations) that indicated possible logical contradictionsand modes of reasoning in the participants discourses. We used this analysisstrategy because we felt that the participants (especially those of the focusgroups) would not like to talk too much about the petrochemical risks theywere exposed to, but, at the same time, that they would want to express theirfears and worries. During this process we added codes and categories, tryingto re-elaborate the central issues that could help us to explain the participantsdiscourses, grounding hypotheses from the whole set of data (both the inter-views and the focus groups).

HOW IS RISK COMMUNICATED?

Risk communication by companies

According to the research carried out in this area (Farr and Fernndez 2007),the most popular communication channels used by the companies in the petro-chemical area of Tarragona are websites, information bulletins, press releases,advertisements in local press and radio, and regular talks with citizen asso-ciations (mainly neighbourhood associations) and in primary and secondaryschools. The companies use these instruments to channel all information thatwill transmit a favourable image to the public. With regard to this information,

the companies tend to focus on aspects such as investments in preventativemeasures, the technical resources at their disposal, and the social and eco-nomic value of their production, but avoid making explicit mention of risks.

The AEQT, in representing its member companies, implements a numberof regular communication activities regarding aspects of risk, as follows:

Presentations to political partiesPresentations to neighbourhood associations (especially those in the vicin-ity of industrial estates)An agreement with the Department of Education to train primary and sec-ondary teachers

An agreement with the Government Delegation to train journalists regarding the external emergency plan (called PLASEQTA, External ChemicalSecurity Plan of Tarragona)


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Open daysSchool visits to companiesThe issue of an annual report with a section devoted to safetyThe organization of a public advisory panel

In accordance with the data collected in our interviews, risk communication,

as conceived by the companies, can be characterized as proactive, in the sensethat companies prefer to take the initiative rather than wait for an incidentor accident to occur before distributing information. This implies permanentand planned communications and also the provision of financial and humanresources for this purpose. This proactive approach obliges companies to bepresent in many public forums and to forge relationships with other actors,such as public authorities, citizen associations, etc.

Concern for the companys public image was a common thread in the inter-views held with communication heads. Risk communication was viewed mainlyas an instrument for both transmitting an image of transparency and for winningthe public trust. For this reason, communication is mainly one-way, because,

despite recognizing the need to involve the public in risk management and com-munication, the interviews reveal that the communicative priority was to transmitmessages with as few impediments as possible. By far the most important thingwas for the message to be transmitted and understood (Company A interview).

However, communication activities other than the typical one-way instru-ments (public presentations, conferences, annual reports, etc.) and training(educating teachers and journalists) are implemented. The main example of acommunicative activity that aspires to greater public participation is the publicadvisory panel implemented by the AEQT and some of the larger companies(Basf, Bayer and Dow). Such public advisory panels are composed of non-expertswho are relatively representative of the population of an industrialized area.

The panel meets regularly to learn about the functioning of the local indus-tries and to give to the members an opportunity to express opinions. In the caseof the AEQT panel, it has been reported that the public authorities complainedabout being excluded, but the AEQT maintains that public authorities alreadyhave other channels through which to voice their opinions. The intervieweesconfirm the two primordial aims of these panels: to project an image of want-ing to draw closer to the people (Company D interview) and to obtain insightsinto the true concerns of the population regarding petrochemical risk while thecompany and the population learn in tandem (Company A interview).

Although the interviewees defend the usefulness of these people panels,

from their statements it would seem that the companies do not always knowhow to integrate participant feedback. Even some people within the companyitself have to be convinced of the usefulness of these initiatives:

The panels are complementary. [] Im a bit of a romantic about this, Ithink that you have to keep [] you have convince people in the com-pany to keep the game going.

(Company A)

Or as another interviewee argued:

To the question whether the panels work well, the answer is yes. Wheredo we need to improve? I think we need to ensure that panel memberopinions are shared by more people. I mean to say, in the meetings we


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share things [] but we should write these opinions down and sharethem with our managers, our bosses.

(Company B)

In other words, despite the fact that the interviewees responsible for commu-nication in their companies insist that the panels work well, they concede the

difficulty of integrating them into routine company management. The mainobstacle, it seems, is persuading senior company managers, which demon-strates that organizational inertia leads to few changes in decision making.

One of the communication obligations imposed on companies by publicauthorities is the communications protocol for minor incidents, by means ofwhich companies must inform the public authorities of any unexpected eventthat affects normal production operations. In the interviews, the companiesrepresentatives generally try to transmit a positive view of the protocol, whichhas the aim of improving preventative management. However, intervieweesalso expressed concern that, if made public, the information could be misin-terpreted.

The concept of minor incident We need to rethink this, the minorincident ... it could be a positive thing as information or it could be neg-ative. [] Because the report on the minor incident doesnt go to themedia, but goes immediately to neighbouring local authorities, etc. Ifanyone lets something slip to a journalist, the fats in the fire, becausetheyre on to you like a ton of bricks, all for reporting a minor incident[] because a minor incident, depending on how its read or inter-preted, can be alarmist and a catastrophe, depending on who reads it.

(Company B)

The above interviewee, of the opinion that the current definition is overly broadand includes events that only make sense for internal company management,would be in favour of modifying the definition of a minor incident. Companiesare reluctant to notify the public authorities about minor incidents, and espe-cially for these to be made public, because they could cause what they wouldconsider to be unnecessary panic. Despite initiating a discourse consistingof a positive evaluation, in the end the interviewees showed themselves to bein favour of restriction. It should be noted that although the interviewees didnot like the notion of publicly explaining incidents, they did not dare to dis-parage the protocol directly before the interviewer, possibly because they did

not wish to transmit a poor image of their company. In this regard, the impor-tance attached to a companys public image, or, at least, the priority granted tobattling against public stigmatization of the chemical industry in general, isnoteworthy. This dynamic affects the entire discourse of the interviewees.

Risk communication by the public authorities

Public authorities have the function of guaranteeing minimum safety levelsand controlling risk for the population, and thus they need to communicateregarding risk and risk prevention. Communications of this nature have beenorganized to date by authorities responsible for the Tarragona industrial area.

They have mainly been based on one-off or periodic information campaignsdesigned jointly with the petrochemical plants. Occasionally campaigns areimplemented typically annually through the local press or using printed


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materials (leaflets, calendars, etc.) distributed to associations and in neigh-bourhoods close to the industries. Another important communication channelis through schools, where experts hold regular workshops and talks on risk,and emergency measures. Finally, there are several websites with informationon risk and describing what to do in the event of an emergency.

The interviewees expressed their frustration at peoples lack of interest in

attending events specifically aimed at neighbourhood associations. Associationsare offered the opportunity to organize talks, conferences and workshops onrisk prevention, but very few take up the offer and the few events that are heldare poorly attended, according to the opinions of the interviewees:

At first they responded, but increasingly less, and lately very few peoplehave been coming to the information sessions. The attendees were out-numbered by the talkers.

(Public Authority B)

One interviewee was shocked at the populations lack of interest in the

risks they are living with, assuming that this was due to the perception of ahigh level of safety, which, in fact, contradicts the general idea that the publicis increasingly demanding regarding risk.

The neighbourhood associations, for example [] this year only one hasrequested an information session, whats more, to make it a bit more inter-esting, weve told them they can come and visit the place and we will holdthe information session there. We fit in with whatever they want, if theywant well go there [] only one has responded [] But nobody is ask-ing, there are hardly any requests. Either its that [] things are very safe,a sensation that things are very safe, or people simply trust in God [].

(Public Authority B)

As we can see, the interviewee has the initial expectation that people wouldlike information on risks and emergencies, but then their own experience tellshim otherwise, from which it follows that people are not sufficiently con-cerned (feeling safe or believing in God too much). The interviewees con-sider that communication strategies often do not achieve the expected successbecause people have a poor image of the authorities and this affects cred-ibility. In other words, public authorities think that they are perceived by thepeople to be aligned with the companies, and (they suppose) this is reflected

in the image that the public has of the authorities and of their acts.

People have the idea that the public authorities, in certain situations,defend the companies because they generate wealth [] they dontwant them to get annoyed and leave and so they are handled withcare. Because of this, the people draw their own conclusions and say tothemselves: In these conditions, the likelihood of the authorities tellingthe truth is quite a bit lower than the likelihood of them telling a lie, if arisk-producing event does take place. Naturally, bit by bit, I think thatthe public authorities have been learning [] are learning, that sayingthat we dont want to alarm people actually has catastrophic effects.

[] There is inertia in the public authorities in terms of correct manage-ment, but the tendency is to improve.(Public authority C)


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Reiterated here and even acknowledged by insiders is the idea of stigmaassociated with chemical risk management, which not only affects theindustrial sector, but also the authorities in charge of regulating and con-trolling risk, possibly by association with the stigma of the companies.

Even though the companies may comply with safety and risk preventionstandards, the comments of the interviewees tend to confirm that they are not

sufficiently transparent regarding inspections or investigations by the authori-ties, and tend to conceal incidents and other risk data.

The public authorities play a major role, its the public authorities thathave to look out for the general good, thats our main function andthats what the people want us to do. But if we cant convince compa-nies that they have to have a more open attitude, to be more willing tobe audited, to be controlled and not to fear inspections and [] well, ifthis attitude is missing then things just get complicated.

(Public Authority D)

Note that this interviewee uses the conditional verbal form (if we cant con-vince and if this attitude is missing ), which denotes a normative dis-course that is not met. In the background this can be a way of acknowledginga difficult responsibility to fulfil in practice. Essentially, the idea is that riskcommunication requires greater involvement by both the public authori-ties and the private sector in cooperation. In a way, this is recognition of themutual interdependence between both (even if this is not entirely symmetricalgiven that they do not have the same effective power).

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF RISK COMMUNICATION

To begin with, people tend to say they do not receive sufficient informationon risk, risk prevention and emergency plans. Not only is more informationcalled for with accusations of secretiveness in passing but also more intel-ligible and more accessible information. As can be seen in the extract below,participants 2 and 3 call for clearer and more accessible information, partici-pant 6 comments that the petrochemical industries generate much employ-ment in the area and participant 3 responds that there is too much secrecy.Significantly, the (perceived) lack of information is linked with the possibilityof losing jobs. This conceptual association is typical of contexts where peoplesee themselves as very dependent on risk promoters.

3.: If there was a[n official] report that was easily [] that could beunderstood by everybody, I mean.

M. Would that be of interest to those of you here?

2.: Yes, absolutely

3.: Of course. There are lots of people like us who dont have access.

6.: You know what though? A lot of people are employed by the petro-chemical plants.

7.: Sure.

6.: What would they do?


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3.: All those people [] If they cover up, its for a reason, because if every-thing was clean and working right, theyd tell us and theyd be informingus continually about how great everything is and how little pollution theyare creating [] Theyre saying nothing, thats a bad sign.

7.: Us? All the people in the petrochemical plants in Tarragona.

3.: That means that they are keeping quiet because they are hidingsomething.

(Excerpt 1, Tarragona Centre II Group)

We have found here a thinking model based on the idea that absence of infor-mation means bad news (no news equals bad news model). In this way,people seem to want to be seen by others as exposed at constant risk untilproven otherwise. At least, this seems to be the social accounting practice theyrefer to when speaking of their risk exposure.

People suspect that the official institutions and councils have informationon petrochemical risk, but it is assumed to be unintelligible for the public in

general. In fact, in the next extract participant 5 suggests that the official insti-tutions should distribute some kind of newsletter or regular publication toprovide information on risk (in this case, pollution). Nevertheless, other par-ticipants were of the opinion that nobody would read them. In other words,it is claimed that there is a lack of information and that people need to beinformed (and ways of informing people are proposed), but it is also acknowl-edged that the effort would be wasted in the current context and circumstances(there will be people who wont read it and most people wont read it).

M.: Do the people want it? [Information on petrochemical risks.]

5.: I think so, yes.

3.: Id say they do, dont they?

5.: If they sent me a newsletter or delivered a newsletter to each house []knowing the pollution levels, whats being contaminated, whats not beingcontaminated, what Repsol is doing, what another company is doing []You may not be more at ease, but you know. This doesnt mean that theydont know, they have some kind of control, thats for sure, I suppose.After what happened with ETA [terrorists], I doubt that a town councilwould fail to deal with these things and more so with the responsibilitiesthey face now. But sure, not getting to the people [] orperhapswe dont

want information, but of course the easiest thing would be an informationbulletin, every year, like they do [] just like they send you a propagandabulletin for the town festival [] well, another one for pollution.

4.: Obviously, there will be people who wont read it.

5.: There will be people who wont read it. There would be [] mostpeople wouldnt read it, but of course, it would have to be a clear bul-letin, so people could understand it, because once they start using tech-nical words []

(Excerpt 2, Constant Group)

These people see that having information will mean that they will have tobehave in a certain way, and this is a responsibility that not all are willing to


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assume. Notable is the comment by participant 3 (next extract) in a conversa-tion on the lack of information, who says that although they inform you []you wont do what they tell you:

M.: [] Do you consider yourselves well informed about the risks orpotential risks?

4.: You know, to tell the truth, truly well informed, no. When that[explosion] happened, people got worried, you know, but we are notinformed.

3.: And the truth is, although they inform you [] you wont do whatthey tell you.

(Excerpt 3, Constant Group)

This position contributes to explaining the calculated ambiguity among thepublic regarding information on risks.

Although the participants admit they are aware that the companies holdregular talks with neighbourhood associations, their opinions regarding thesetalks reveal a calculated ambiguity. They can say that they are informed, but atthe same time they claim that almost no information on risk is provided. As canbe observed in the following extract, participant 3 states that the annual talks arevery informative but do not cover topics that could create a sensation of panic orfear. Another participant also commented that many facts are not revealed (againthere is a suspicion of secrecy, again the no news equals bad news model).

M.: Do you think you should be better informed?

3.: We already are.

M.: Because you say they hold talks and []

2.: Yes.

3.: Yes.

5.: Dow holds a talk every year.

3.: The thing is, they cant alarm people over a triviality.

8.: Right, and there are a lot of trivialities you dont hear anything about.(Excerpt 4, La Pobla de Mamufet Group)

On the other hand, all participants in the focus groups are aware of the exist-ence of a communication channel called open days, although only those liv-ing near the industrial zones appear to have access to it. Those living furtheraway criticize the fact that the open days only admit people linked directly tothe companies, that is, employees and their families and people living in theimmediate vicinity (it appears that one must be registered as a resident withthe local authority). The open days generally consist of a guided visit to acompany; people are shown around, attend a talk and are invited to a drink ormeal. From the comments of the focus group participants, it can be deduced

that the communication is very much one-way it being difficult to ask whatmight be awkward questions about risk. The context of the open day thefact that it takes place on the companys premises the courtesy extended


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to the visitors, the meal, etc. undoubtedly has an impact on the behaviour ofvisitors (as revealed in the extract below). It seems, furthermore, that risk isnever discussed.

M.: Have you recently attended an open day?

5.: Every year

9.: Every year theres one or two.

M.: And can anyone go who wants to?

8.: The whole town, people from the town.

2.: People registered as resident in the town.

9.: They show you the section here, the section in La Canonja andtheres a reception as if you were the king of Spain. [] I think []well, they talk to you, making you feel at home. We go to the assemblyhall and they tell us how many workers they took on that year, theirearnings, their current situation, the founding spirit of the firm [] Imean, you can go anywhere you want there

8.: You can talk if you want to []

9.: No, no [] They ask you to, they do, but since we are all very shy,we say nothing. We dont say about that smoke []

2.: And you cant very well complain [] because afterwards they giveyou lunch [] and you complaining?

8.: If we sell out for as little as a lunch, what do we amount to, eh?

(Excerpt 5, La Pobla de Mafumet Group)

In their discourses these people show a lot of indications of the distribution ofpower relationships, of how power is distributed in this society, which prob-ably refers to a context of high social dependence on institutions and compa-nies within this population.

Other communication possibilities mentioned by the participants in thefocus groups are the local media (press, radio and television). However, someof these participants voice the suspicion that even though there is a wealthof media available to transmit information, economic interests interfere. Theparticipants discussed at length whether information on risk did not appear

in the local media because the companies were trying to conceal informa-tion (as claimed by participant 3) or because people are not asking for it (assuggested by participant 1). Note that the two hypotheses are not mutuallyexclusive.

M.: And how can this information be transmitted to the people? Throughthe press? Or will it be given out to whoever phones? Because maybethere are people who dont want to know []

1.: Everyone wants to know.

2.: Yes, I think that the press is the most convenient and the easiest for

everyone.

3.: But they wont allow that, theyll cover up.


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8.: Whats happening here in Tarragona, and this is a strong point, is thattheres a strong cultural movement. Three or four cultural bulletins arepublished, there are activities, short films, documentaries, cinema []So, ways of including education regarding the petrochemical industryexist. These channels can be used for [] All the culture that there is inTarragona, its amazing, every day theres something to do or a film to see.

They could show documentaries or news bulletins [] They could []

3.: So why dont they? Because theyre hiding something [] Whenthings dont come out in the light of day, its because theres acover-up.

2.: But then [] maybe a citizen platform or something similar will bestarted.

1.: And thats the issue, are people interested?

3.: If there was a report that was easy [] that could be understood byeverybody, if you know what I mean []

(Excerpt 6, Tarragona Centre II Group)

Once again people talk about the absence of information (no news equalsbad news model), and about the possible public reluctance to admit informa-tion just after saying that everyone wants to know.

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

Risk communication by the petrochemical companies analysed for the pur-poses of our research is mainly centred around and planned in accordancewith two interrelated factors: legal requirements, and the desire of compa-nies to develop and maintain a good public image (in the framework of bat-tling the stigma attached to the chemical industry by public opinion). In theinterviews we held with people in charge of communications in these com-panies, although the interviewees were at pains to show that their companiesassumed their legal obligations positively, indirectly these obligations weredisparaged. Communications are basically one-way, that is, aimed at trans-mitting information to the people with as few obstacles as possible. Two-waycommunication mechanisms seem to be rarely used, and the few that are (forexample, the public advisory panels) tend to be integrated, with great diffi-culty, into routine risk management. This also points to how risk communica-

tion roles are subordinate to other company roles.In the case of the public authorities, many of their communications aredesigned in cooperation with the chemicals sector. Indeed, the authoritiesattribute their problems of credibility to this perceived closeness to the chem-icals sector. The public authorities are thus trapped in an interdependencyrelationship: they need to control companies that often do not cooperate, butcannot always publicly reveal the obstacles posed by companies as this couldfurther deteriorate their public image and negatively affect their role as theguarantors of the safety of the population.

As for the public in general, several contradictions can be observed thatcould be explained by the social, economic and political contexts in which the

local people live out their lives. On the one hand, the population points to adearth of information on risk and on preventative measures, while insistingon the need for clear information, and even proposing means for providing it.


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On the other hand, however, they claim that the information is not very use-ful, and that the public are not interested in seeking information. As indicatedby the public authorities, the talks given to neighbourhood associations tendnot to be well attended, and company representatives say that even activi-ties like open days tend to leave the public quite indifferent, with the peopleseemingly unconcerned about risks.

This unwillingness to obtain information can be interpreted as socialaccounting practice in shaping the production of risk-related accounts, inthe sense that people need to present themselves as reasonable persons inorder to avoid blame (by other people and/or institutions). This is congruentwith the statement of the risk scholar Marc Poumadere, who suggests that

local populations in the neighbourhood of industries form a minority,both in quantitative terms (only a fraction of the general populationlives in the neighbourhood of industries), and in terms of cognitions(they find themselves doing what the overall population declare theywould refuse to do), which leads to a complex social order where people

need to present themselves in public strategically.(Poumadere 2008: 5)

On the other hand, this reluctance to obtain information can be linked to thegreat dependence of the people on the other actors in this risk context. Thisdependence may be economic or employment related, or may be linked to alack of alternatives in terms of action, in the sense that acquiring informationon risks may require the assumption of certain responsibilities regarding areaswhere a person does not have decision-making powers.

These results allow us to judge the communication models pointed outabove (STARC, ERIK or SARF). On the one hand, both STARC and ERIKare based on the idea that public institutions are in charge of implementing arisk communication process that is plural and inclusive, where all participantscan speak and be heard, so as to collect and integrate a wide range of values,interests and viewpoints. In fact, these are two strong normative models thatestablish what should be done (to achieve good risk communication). It iscertainly a valuable proposal to achieve fairer and better risk management.However, the case study discussed here illustrates some of the practical diffi-culties for the implementation of such models as the STARC or ERIK. Perhapsthe most difficult obstacles are those related to the context in which actorsrelate to each other, which are normally very marked power relations spaces

that prevent actors expressing their preferences directly (attending to circum-locutions, metaphors, models of discursive thought or conditional formulasthat indicate dissatisfaction with the present).

As we pointed out in our theoretical framework, it is important to recog-nize the (often tacit) political role of all accounts when seeking to interpretrisk perception data. In this sense, interpretative research indicates that activework is required to make sense of risk issues, and that this work is collective,and draws on stocks of shared interpretative resources. This is a point oftenneglected in the theoretical models of risk communication: not just in STARCor ERIK, but also in the more theoretical and integrative approach of SARF(Kasperson et al. 1988), where the reception and interpretation of information

by the communication agencies or amplificationstationsis usually conceived asa kind of mechanical arrival and processing of a packet of knowledge byindividuals (Horlick-Jones et al. 2003: 284).


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In conclusion, the analysis of risk communication can be a crucial elementwhen designing governance risk models, as communication plays a central rolein accounting for the interaction between actors. In this text we have noted theexistence of several descriptive (such as SARF) or normative (such as STARCor ERIK) theoretical models that are very useful to take into account the com-municative dimension of risk processes. But we have also observed how cer-

tain crucial aspects of these processes can remain hidden if they do not addressthe interpretive dimensions of human behaviour, such as the social account-ing practices, the risk reasoning in contexts of low information rationality, andthe presence of some kind of stigma related to technologies. In any case, theresearch shows that the practice of risk communication in the petrochemicalarea of Tarragona is still far from the normative models mentioned above.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This article is based on two research projects funded by the Spanish Ministryof Science and Innovation. References: SEJ2004-00892 and SEJ2007-63095/

SOCI. We would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their veryuseful comments and suggestions.

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SUGGESTED CITATIONEspluga, J., Prades, A. and Gonzalo, J. (2010), Communicating at the edge:

Risk communication processes and structural conflicts in highly indus-trialized petrochemical areas, Catalan Journal of Communication & CulturalStudies2: 2, pp. 231251, doi: 10.1386/cjcs.2.2.231_1

CONTRIBUTOR DETAILS

Josep Espluga teaches environmental and health sociology at the AutonomousUniversity of Barcelona. He is senior researcher of the Public Policies andGovernment Institute (IGOP), and his research work is particularly concerned

with social aspects of risk perception.

Contact: Facultat de CCPP i Sociologia. Edifici B, Campus de la UAB; 08193Bellaterra (Barcelona-Spain).E-mail: [email protected]

Ana Prades is Head of the Socio-Technical Research Unit (Centro deInvestigacin Sociotcnica) of the Spanish Government Agency CIEMAT,based in Barcelona.Her research is mainly concerned with risk perception, riskcommunication and public engagement, as they relate to energy technologies.

Contact: Centro de Investigacin Sociotcnica. CIEMAT Barcelona; Gran Via

de les Corts Catalanes 604. 4 -2; 08007 Barcelona.E-mail: [email protected]

Jan Gonzalo has degrees in both Geography and History and in Journalism.He is a member of the research group Asterisc and his main topics ofinterest are risk communication issues. He is currently finishing his Ph.D. onCommunication Studies at the Universitat Rovira i Virgili.

Contact: Department of Communication Studies; Avd. Catalunya, 35; 43002Tarragona (Spain).E-mail:[email protected]

1. article_espluga et al

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