1 chapter 11: monopoly we are now back in partial equilibrium. so far we assumed perfect...

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1 Chapter 11: Monopoly We are now back in partial equilibrium. So far we assumed perfect competition. In this chapter, we study the other extreme, when there is only one seller. Why do we care about monopoly? Because as monopoly is the only seller, it can influence the market equilibrium, i.e., they have market power. The monopoly equilibrium is often inefficient. Perfect competiti on Monopoly/ Monopsony Oligopoly/ Oligops ony

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Page 1: 1 Chapter 11: Monopoly We are now back in partial equilibrium. So far we assumed perfect competition. In this chapter, we study the other extreme, when

1

Chapter 11: Monopoly• We are now back in partial equilibrium.

• So far we assumed perfect competition. In this chapter, we study the other extreme, when there is only one seller.

• Why do we care about monopoly? Because as monopoly is the only seller, it can influence the market equilibrium, i.e., they have market power. The monopoly equilibrium is often inefficient.

Perfect competition

Monopoly/ Monopsony

Oligopoly/ Oligopsony

Page 2: 1 Chapter 11: Monopoly We are now back in partial equilibrium. So far we assumed perfect competition. In this chapter, we study the other extreme, when

2

Monopoly Profit Maximization• Being the only seller, monopoly can set price or quantit

y to influence the market equilibrium.

• We know that all firms maximize their profits by setting MR=MC (as π=R-C).

• Monopoly’s MC curve can be obtained in the same way as the competitive firms.

• Difference is that monopoly faces a downward-sloping demand curve, thus it faces a different MR curve.

: ( )

: ( ) ( )

competitive firm P Q C Q

monopoly P Q Q C Q

Page 3: 1 Chapter 11: Monopoly We are now back in partial equilibrium. So far we assumed perfect competition. In this chapter, we study the other extreme, when

3

Marginal Revenue

• Marginal revenue is the revenue the firm obtains from one more additional q.   The MR is p for a competitive firm.

• For monopoly:

Thus, MR>0 if demand is elastic (ε<-1)

MR<0 if demand is inelastic (-1<ε≤0).

• If demand is inelastic, MR=MC is not optimum for a monopolist since MR<0. Come back to this point later.

( )R P Q Q dR P dQ Q dP

11 1 , 0.

R P P QMR P Q P P where

Q Q Q P

Page 4: 1 Chapter 11: Monopoly We are now back in partial equilibrium. So far we assumed perfect competition. In this chapter, we study the other extreme, when

4

B = P* Q△

C = Q* P△MR = B +(-C)

MR= B

= P* Q =P△

Page 5: 1 Chapter 11: Monopoly We are now back in partial equilibrium. So far we assumed perfect competition. In this chapter, we study the other extreme, when

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Unit Elastic Demand: What is MR?

Price

Quantity

4

3

2

1

1 2 3 4

Example: Q = 4P -1

Page 6: 1 Chapter 11: Monopoly We are now back in partial equilibrium. So far we assumed perfect competition. In this chapter, we study the other extreme, when

6

Linear Demand Curve and MRFor linear demand functions:

p = a – bq, where a>0, b>0.

R = pq = aq – bq2

MR= a – 2bq.

• Thus, MR curve and demand curve have the same intercept, but MR is twice as steep as demand curve.

• Elasticity at the mid-point is unity.

• The demand is elastic when price is higher and inelastic when price is lower.

Page 7: 1 Chapter 11: Monopoly We are now back in partial equilibrium. So far we assumed perfect competition. In this chapter, we study the other extreme, when

7

Elasticity of a Linear Demand Curve

Price

Quantity

a/2

a/2b

a

ε< -1: elastic

ε= -1

-1 < ε≤ 0: inelastic

a/b

Demand: P = a - bq

Marginal Revenue:P = a - 2bq

Page 8: 1 Chapter 11: Monopoly We are now back in partial equilibrium. So far we assumed perfect competition. In this chapter, we study the other extreme, when

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• Monopoly profit is maximized in the elastic portion of the demand.

• A monopoly never operates in the inelastic portion of the demand.

• A monopoly shuts down:– in LR if Pm<AC– In SR if Pm<AVC

Page 9: 1 Chapter 11: Monopoly We are now back in partial equilibrium. So far we assumed perfect competition. In this chapter, we study the other extreme, when

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Effects of a Shift of the Demand Curve• Unlike a competitive firm, a monopoly does not have a supply

curve. Monopoly’s MC is not enough to know how much a monopoly will sell at any given price.

Page 10: 1 Chapter 11: Monopoly We are now back in partial equilibrium. So far we assumed perfect competition. In this chapter, we study the other extreme, when

10

Market Power

• Market power: the ability of a firm to charge P above MC and earn a positive profit.

Q: Can a monopoly always set a very high price?• At profit-maximizing optimum:

i.e., The ratio of P to MC depends only on the elasticity of demand at the optimum.

1 11

11

pMR p MC

MC

Page 11: 1 Chapter 11: Monopoly We are now back in partial equilibrium. So far we assumed perfect competition. In this chapter, we study the other extreme, when

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• Lerner Index: the ratio of the difference between P and MC to the P (0≤LI ≤1).

– The larger the LI, the greater the difference between p and MC, and thus the greater the monopoly’s market power.

– LI=0 for competitive firm as it faces a perfectly elastic demand curve (ɛ=-∞).

1p MCLI

p

Page 12: 1 Chapter 11: Monopoly We are now back in partial equilibrium. So far we assumed perfect competition. In this chapter, we study the other extreme, when

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Welfare Effects of Monopoly

• Ch.9 showed that competitive equilibrium maximizes social welfare.

• By setting higher price than MC, monopoly causes consumers to buy less than competitive equilibrium, which creates deadweight loss (DWL).

• Thus, monopoly creates inefficiency.

Page 13: 1 Chapter 11: Monopoly We are now back in partial equilibrium. So far we assumed perfect competition. In this chapter, we study the other extreme, when

13

Deadweight Loss of Monopoly

Page 14: 1 Chapter 11: Monopoly We are now back in partial equilibrium. So far we assumed perfect competition. In this chapter, we study the other extreme, when

14

• Since MC<Pm*, if the transaction of extra output (from Qm* to Qc*) takes place at MC<P<Pm*, both consumers and producer can be made better-off theoretically.

• This is a Pareto improvement.

• Why doesn’t monopolist do this, i.e. set different prices for the sale of extra output?

• Monopolist cannot set different price levels for different consumers since resale is possible (but we study exceptions in the next chapter).

Page 15: 1 Chapter 11: Monopoly We are now back in partial equilibrium. So far we assumed perfect competition. In this chapter, we study the other extreme, when

15

Imposing a tax on q

Page 16: 1 Chapter 11: Monopoly We are now back in partial equilibrium. So far we assumed perfect competition. In this chapter, we study the other extreme, when

16

Imposing Ad Valorem (Sales) tax

Because of the sales tax, the demand curve tilt

Page 17: 1 Chapter 11: Monopoly We are now back in partial equilibrium. So far we assumed perfect competition. In this chapter, we study the other extreme, when

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Effect of Ad Valorem Tax (1)

MC

Demand

MR

e* before taxpmb

qmb

e* for competitive market

Price

Quantity

Page 18: 1 Chapter 11: Monopoly We are now back in partial equilibrium. So far we assumed perfect competition. In this chapter, we study the other extreme, when

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Effect of Ad Valorem Tax (2)

( 1-τ) D

MC

D

MR( 1-τ) MR

e* after tax

pmb

pma_consumer

qma

Price

Quantity

Page 19: 1 Chapter 11: Monopoly We are now back in partial equilibrium. So far we assumed perfect competition. In this chapter, we study the other extreme, when

19

Effects of Taxes on Welfare

1. Specific tax of t per q on monopolist:

2. Ad valorem tax of (τ×100)%:

3. Profit tax of (x×100)%

( ) ( )

( ) ( ): 0

set

Max P q q C q t q

P q C qFOC P q t MR MC t

q q

(1 ) ( ) ( )

( ) ( ): (1 ) 0 (1 )

set

Max P q q C q

P q C qFOC P q MR MC

q q

(1 ) ( ) ( )

( ) ( ): (1 ) 0

set

Max x P q q C q

P q C qFOC x P q MR MC

q q

Page 20: 1 Chapter 11: Monopoly We are now back in partial equilibrium. So far we assumed perfect competition. In this chapter, we study the other extreme, when

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What Create Monopolies?

Why does monopoly exist?1. Natural monopoly: Small market demand relative to

minimum efficient scale. One firm can produce the total output of the market at lower cost than several firms could. With a natural monopoly, it is more efficient to have only one firm produce than more firms.

2. Barriers to enter: Government grants monopoly rights to operate through licenses and restrictions.

3. Patent protection: Government provides monopoly right to use new idea for a certain period, to provide incentives to innovate.

Page 21: 1 Chapter 11: Monopoly We are now back in partial equilibrium. So far we assumed perfect competition. In this chapter, we study the other extreme, when

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Demand Relative to Minimum Efficient Scale (MES)

Output

Price

Demand

Output

P*

AC

Price

DemandP*

ACs

MESMES

Panel A: typical one firm’s AC curveIf one firm produce Q*, the cost is too high.

Panel B: there is a firm withSuperior technology (ACs)

Q*Q*

Page 22: 1 Chapter 11: Monopoly We are now back in partial equilibrium. So far we assumed perfect competition. In this chapter, we study the other extreme, when

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Cost Advantages that Create Monopolies

• Scale economies: Where MC curve =market demand curve, AC of a firm is still decreasing (see natural monopoly).

• Scale economies can rise when production function is subject to increasing returns to scale.

• Scale advantage can rise when fixed cost is large and MC is small.

• Examples are electricity, gas, telephone, and so on requiring a lot of fixed costs. Other cases include superior technology (e.g., patent) and management ability.

Page 23: 1 Chapter 11: Monopoly We are now back in partial equilibrium. So far we assumed perfect competition. In this chapter, we study the other extreme, when

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A Natural Monopoly Price

Loss to the firm from marginal cost pricing (p=MC)

PAC

Demand

Quantity

MC

PMC

AC

qAC qMC

PM

qM

MR

Page 24: 1 Chapter 11: Monopoly We are now back in partial equilibrium. So far we assumed perfect competition. In this chapter, we study the other extreme, when

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• Dilemma is if p=MC by policy, profit is negative (purple area).

• Solution I: Set p=MC and provide subsidy by the same amount as the deficit.

• Solution II: Let public corporations supply.

• “Solution” III: Permit the company which is willing to set the lowest price. This should be close to PAC.