1 colombia firm energy auction peter cramton (joint with steven stoft) 18 december 2006
Post on 22-Dec-2015
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TRANSCRIPT
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Outline• Purpose of market• Why forward procurement?• Key features
– Product– Planning period– Commitment period– Cost of new entry (CONE)– Demand curve– Descending clock auction– Price formation– Performance incentives– Fail-safe mechanism– Secondary market
• Transition• Supplier concerns
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Purpose of market
• Induce just enough investment to maintain adequate resources
• Induce efficient mix of resources
• Reduce market risk
• Avoid market power in firm energy market
• Reduce market power in energy market
• Pay no more than necessary
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Why forward procurement?
• New projects compete in advance of entry– Coordinated entry
• Less uncertainty in achieving target• Avoid boom/bust• New resources set price directly• Less reliance on demand curve for price setting
• Long-term commitment for new resources– Reduced investor risk– Better price signal for new investment
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Key Features
• Product• Planning period• Commitment period• Cost of new entry (CONE)• Demand curve• Descending clock auction• Price formation• Performance incentives• Fail-safe mechanism• Secondary market
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Product
• Firm energy ― availability of energy during scarcity events– Dry year (seasonal scarcity)– Outages (spot scarcity)
• Scarcity event defined by high energy price– Energy price is a transparent trigger– Energy price is a reliable trigger
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Product
• Physically-backed energy option• Firm energy defined by delivery capability in worst-case
benchmark ― a very dry year– Nameplate capacity (maximum output rate)– Firm energy (average energy output rate in worst-case
benchmark)• Thermal example: 92% of nameplate due to outages• Hydro example: 35% of nameplate due to limited water
• Strike price = Gas index high heat rate + other VC– Gas index = New York Harbor residual fuel oil– High heat rate = 12.482 MBTU/MWh– Other variable cost = $15.20/MWh
• This is less than the heat rate of all existing gas units• New thermal peakers have heat rates of 9-10
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2010 target
2005 actual
0% 50% 100%
2
4
6
8
10
0
Duration
Load(GW)
Firm Energy Target
Load Duration Curve and Firm Energy Target
growth
Target peak load
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Single product; single price
• In a hydro-dominated system, there is a single reliability constraint:firm energy to cover dry year
• Single constraint implies single product and single price
• Each new resource is rated for its incremental contribution to the firm energy constraint
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Product is:• Firm energy + mandatory hedge• Firm energy =
– Expected annual drought-year energy contribution to system (if unit disappeared, how much less energy would the system have—same for hydro and fossil)
• Mandatory hedge = – Obligation follows load in aggregate
• Unit’s daily obligation based on its firm energy• Obligation over day tied to dispatch• Matching obligations with dispatch improves the performance
of the spot energy market– Rewarded by spot price if produce more than
obligation in scarcity hours
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Obligation
• Purchase by load is translated into an obligation for each supplier– If 98% of target is purchased, then aggregate supplier
obligation is 98% of load in each hour• Load is unhedged for 2% of load that is not purchased
– True-up at end of each month to adjust for deviation between monthly target and actual monthly load
• If actual load is 102% of month’s target, then obligations are scaled down by 100/102. Penalties/rewards are calculated on this basis.
– Risk from unanticipated load growth is born by load, not suppliers
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Settlement
• Settlement is just like settling a conditional contract for differences in each hour
• If spot price < strike price, then no obligation• If spot price > strike price, then settle
differences: reward or penalty =(Q supplied – Q obligation) (P spot - P strike)Same as supplier buying from spot market to satisfy obligation.
• Same outcome if done on unit basis or portfolio basis
• Supplier optimizes portfolio just as without option
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Planning period
• Time between auction date and start of commitment
• 4 years ― long enough for new entry to occur (except large hydro projects)
• Makes firm energy market contestable and allows new entry to set the price– Existing resources would set the wrong price
because of sunk costs and market power
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Long lead-time projects
• 4-year planning period may be too short for large hydro projects (6-8 years to build)
• Allow large hydro projects to lock in auction price from 4-year ahead auction seven years (or less) ahead
• Large hydro project is price taker• Decides after auction a fraction of its firm energy to lock
in at 4-year ahead auction price• Total quantity of firm energy in years > 4 that load
purchases is limited by a percent of new firm energy required in that year based on planning projections
Years ahead 7 6 5Percent limit 40% 50% 60%
Load's Limit on Forward Purchase
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Planning period
• First auction Nov 2007 (2011): 3 year
• Second auction Jun 2008 (2012): 3.5 year
• Third auction Nov 2008 (2013): 4 year
• All later auctions (2014…): 4 year
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Commitment period
• New resources ― up to 20 years– Supplier selected at qualification– Long commitment lets new resources lock-in firm
energy price, reducing risk and encouraging investment
– Price is in constant $ (adjusted for inflation)
• Existing resources ― one year– Does not need long commitment, since costs are
already sunk– Short commitment reduces risk (more draws from
price distribution)
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Demand curvePrice offirm energy
Firm energyTarget
CONE
2 CONE
CONE = Cost of New Entry (marginal unit)
0
Curve reflects marginal value of firm energy
Able to withstand scarcity events worse than worst-case benchmark
½ CONE
Price ceiling
Price floor
4%
Load not fully hedged
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Descending clock auction
• Auctioneer announces high starting price
• Suppliers name quantities
• Excess supply is determined
• Auctioneer announces a lower price
• Process continues until supply equals demand
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Starting price
• Starting price must be set sufficiently high to create significant excess supply
• Setting too high a starting price causes little harm– Competition among potential projects determines clearing price;
high start quickly bid down
• Setting too low a starting price destroys auction– Inadequate supply or insufficient competition
• Price of 2 times Cost of New Entry is recommended• Note that clearing price will exceed CONE in some years
to the extent it is below CONE in other years (of surplus)
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CONE updates
• If auction in year t is successful,CONE in year t+1 = .7 CONE in year t
+ .3 clearing price in year t
• If auction in year t fails,
CONE in year t+1 = CONE in year t
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Mechanics
• Clock auction done in discrete rounds• In each round,
– Auctioneer announces• Excess supply at end of prior round• Start of round price (higher price)• End of round price (lower price)
– Each bidder submits a supply curve at all prices between start of round price and end of round price
– Auctioneer determines excess supply at end of round price
• If no excess supply, clearing price determined
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Price
$7.00
$6.63
$6.17
$6.00
Quantity (MW)
175 300 400
start-of-roundprice
end-of-roundprice
Individual Supply Bid, Round 6
• Activity rule– Bidders can only maintain or reduce quantity as price falls
(upward sloping supply curve)• “Intraround bids”
– More accuracy without too many rounds– Better control of pace of auction– Ties are reduced
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Price
$12.00 = P0
P1
P2
P3
QuantityDemand
Round 5
Round 4
starting price
clearing price
Aggregate supply curve
P4
P5 $6.17 = P6
Round 3
Round 2
Round 1 excess supply
$6.00 = P6’
Descending clock auction
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P
Q
D
PC
S
1. P
Q
D
PC
S
2.(a) P
Q
D
PC
S
2.(b)
Unit accepted
Unit rejected
Clearing rule: maximize net value
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Information policy
• Demand curve and starting price announced before auction
• After every round, auctioneer reports– Aggregate supply by hydro, baseload, peaker– Excess supply at end of round price– End of round price for next round
(determined from extent of excess supply)
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New projects are all or nothing
• Lumpy investment respected; investor does not fear partial acceptance
• If multiple bidders drop at the clearing price, the group of bids are accepted that minimizes excess supply
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Market power
• Addressing market power in firm energy market is essential
• Strong incentive to exercise market power– Existing resources have substantial sunk costs– New resources are only a tiny fraction of total– Market is concentrated
• Any of top-4 suppliers could unilaterally set price
• Long-term price signals are more stable and efficient if determined from competitive forces, rather than market power
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Market power solution• New resources
– Bids are not mitigated in any way– Assumes competition for new resources
• Existing resources– Resources can opt out of market with either an opt-out bid or retirement bid– Opt-out bid
• Not revealed during auction• Cannot impact the price for existing supply• May be rejected for reliability reasons; gets reliability must run payment if rejected
– Retirement bid ― permanent opt out of firm energy market• Submitted four weeks before start of auction• Accepted retirements excluded from any future firm energy payments• Retirements may be rejected for reliability reasons, but only if the reliability problem cannot be
resolved during the planning period with alternative actions, such as transmission upgrades or new resources
• Retirements are posted as soon as they are accepted• Retirements are replaced with new resources in the auction
(represented as a shift to right in the demand curve for all prices below the retirement bid)
• Repower bids– Replacement of generating unit(s) at existing plant– Replacement unit is bid as new resources– Existing unit is a conditional-retirement
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Repowering bids
• Easily accommodated in auction
• Two types:– Quick switchovers (down time less than 1
year)• Repower bid is a new entry bid and a conditional
retirement
– Extended down time (more than 1 year)• Retirement followed by new entry bid 1 or more
years later
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Market power solution
• New resources almost always set the price
• Demand curve sets the price in surplus years in which new entry is not needed
• Retirements occasionally set the price
• Other than retirements, existing resources never impact the price
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Replacing accepted opt-outs
• Opt-outs are replaced by new resources– March up the supply curve revealed in the
clock auction• But not more than a 30% increase in price• Any additional replacements occur in
reconfiguration
– All new resources receives this higher price
• Existing resources receive the original clearing price
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Incentives and hedge
• Performance incentive comes primarily from energy spot price; this is not changed by hedge
• Hedge assures that normal performance will receive normal reward in wet and dry years alike
• Every extra MWh of energy is rewarded the same with or without hedge
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Energy price motivates performance
• Hedged resources still face the energy spot price at all times– Those that perform better receive more– Those that perform worse receive less
• An additional incentive to perform is impact on firm energy qualified for sale in auctions in future years
• Under performing units are downgraded• Over performing units are upgraded
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Inadequate supply
• If, at the starting price, there is insufficient supply of firm energy– New resources are paid starting price– Existing resources are paid 1.1 CONE
• Rule does not discourage new projects
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Insufficient competition
• Existing resources, less retirements, are less than demand at the starting price,
• At the starting price, the firm energy bid exceeds demand but less than 4% excess, or a supplier’s new resources are pivotal, and
• At qualification, quantity of new projects from small players (those with less than 15% maximum firm-energy market share) > 50% of required new firm energy
• Otherwise insufficient competition:– Auction held– New entry paid clearing price– Existing capacity paid 1.1 CONE (or clearing price if less)
• Rule does not discourage new projects
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Reconfiguration auction
• Takes place at same time as primary auction– Primary: 4 years ahead– Reconfiguration: 3, 2, 1, 0 years ahead
• Reconfiguration includes– Adjustment of firm energy target for current
forecast– Supplier’s buy/sell to balance position
(including dispatchable load)
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Reconfiguration auction
• Standard sealed-bid clearing-price auction
• Same demand curve as in primary auction, netting out resources already purchased
• No bid mitigation
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Monthly spot exchange
• Monthly simultaneous clearing– Standard sealed-bid clearing-price auction– Suppliers buy/sell to balance positions– Demand curve same as in primary auction
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Transition and timing
• Transition period 2007-2010– Administrative firm energy price includes a premium
for cost of energy option– Existing contracts are modified to subtract the same
premium since prices above the strike price are now covered by the firm energy payment, not the contract
2011 Primary auction
… 2030 … 2031
Planning period
2012 Primary auction
New resource commitment period
Existing resource commitment period
2009
Existing resource commitment period
New resource commitment period
Planning period
Administrative Pricing for New and Existing Based on CONE
2007 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013
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Reducing risk in early years• Early years of auction
– Ceiling and floor on firm energy payment to existing suppliers
– Spread between ceiling and floor expands after each competitive auction
– Spread starts at 0 (transition years)– Increases to
• Ceiling = 2 CONE• Floor = .5 CONE
Transition 0 1 2 3 4Ceiling = CONE 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
Floor = CONE 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5
Number of competitive auctionsCeiling and Floor for Existing Suppliers in Early Years
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MWDemand
Transition
Auction date
Firm energy to be auctioned
20072008
20092010
20112012
20132014
2015
Existing supply
New supply
Nov Jun Nov Nov Nov2007 2007 2008 2009 2010
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Supplier concerns
• Please note that these concerns were as expressed to CREG on Monday, 5 June 2006, in response to the original CREG proposal. These concerns may not apply to proposal presented here, which is significantly different from the original proposal.
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1. Approach not used elsewhere
• Similar approach was adopted in New England (32 GW peak load) in March 2006– Approach currently being implemented– Approach endorsed by FERC
• All elements of proposal are commonly used in markets around the world– Options are used everywhere– Clock auctions used for many years in US, UK,
France, Germany, Belgium, Hungary, Denmark, …
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2. Call option increases risk
Price Coverage
Forward Energy Contract
US$100
US$250
US$0 US$0
US$250
Forward Energy Contract
Energy Option
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3. Consumers will pay more
• Minimizing risk while addressing market power and performance incentives means that consumers will pay less
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4. Price not a reliable measure of scarcity
• High prices come from two sources– Scarcity– Market power
• Option fully addresses market power in spot market; thus, high prices can only come from scarcity
• If spot prices are still unreliable, then market must have another flaw. Fix it!
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5. Strike price is too high
• Why not have a very high strike price?(US$250 or more)– Benefits of call option are largely lost
• Load hedge• Mitigation of market power in spot energy market• Mitigation of market power in contract market• Risk reduction
– No reason to set strike price higher than marginal cost of an expensive thermal unit
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6. Approach is complex
• Effective firm energy markets are necessarily complex because the economic challenges are great, especially market power
• Proposal uses clear and simple market-based methods