1 comparative politics of development why are some states poor?
TRANSCRIPT
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Comparative Politics of Development
Why are some states poor?
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I. The Development Paradox: How can wealth become poverty and poverty become wealth?
A. Poor countries in 1000 become rich ones later. Why don’t China and India rule the world?
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Rise of the West
In 1750, China and India were the largest producers of manufactured goods (including crafts), accounting for more than half of global manufacturing.
The countries that would later constitute the Third World accounted for 73% of global manufacturing, including crafts.
But by 1913 the Third World accounted for only 7.5% of global manufacturing.
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World Wealth, Year 1
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World Wealth, Year 1900
% World Production, 1500-2000
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I. The Development Paradox: How can wealth become poverty and poverty become wealth?
A. Poor countries in 1000 become rich ones later. Why don’t China and India rule the world?
B. Colonies (USA), fragmented states (German Confederation), resource-poor states (Japan) and late developers (NICs) all ended up more prosperous than many countries (Mexico, Brazil, African states) rich in natural resources and provided with aid from rich countries. Why?
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II. Modernization Theory
…aka Neoclassical or Development EconomicsA. Western-centric “stages of development”
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II. Modernization Theory
…aka Neoclassical or Development EconomicsA. Western-centric “stages of development”B. Implications
1. S-Shaped Growth Curve
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Predicted Growth Over Time
Diminishing Returns to Capital
Capital-Fueled Growth
Lack of Capital
TIMEPer
Cap
ita G
DP
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II. Modernization Theory
…aka Neoclassical or Development Economics
A. Western-centric “stages of development”
B. Implications1. S-Shaped Growth Curve
2. Convergence – Size of national economies will eventually be determined only by population (more or less equal GDP per capita)
C. Recommendations: Agricultural surpluses, resource extraction, foreign investment, loans and aid, monetary stability, free capital markets, “modern” (Western) values, political stability (possibly authoritarianism)
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D. Problems with modernization theory
1. Authoritarian regimes often renege on promises of development, become corrupt
2. West used state intervention to developa. Only the UK relied on free trade, because
only the UK could be the first to industrializeb. Germany and France needed industrial banks
to direct investment to growth industriesc. Russia and Japan needed massive state
involvement and protectionismd. NICs used “developmental state” approach to
target export sectors
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3. Modernization stalls
a. Capital wasn’t reinvested in industry
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3. Modernization stalls
a. Capital wasn’t reinvested in industry
b. Developed countries refused to lower barriers on textiles and other goods
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3. Modernization stalls
a. Capital wasn’t reinvested in industry
b. Developed countries refused to lower barriers on textiles and other goods
c. Debt crisis: burdens accumulated when commodity prices fell
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Commodity prices stall while the cost of living rises….
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3. Modernization stalls
a. Capital wasn’t reinvested in industry
b. Developed countries refused to lower barriers on textiles and other goods
c. Debt crisis: burdens accumulated when commodity prices fell
d. Capitalist countries intervened against state involvement in economies (most common before 1960s)
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E. Neoliberalism: An update to modernization theory
1. New Institutionalism: Institutions must create incentives for investment (transparency, prevent corruption, prevent rent-seeking) embrace democracy and limited government
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E. Neoliberalism: An update to modernization theory
1. New Institutionalism: Institutions must create incentives for investment (transparency, prevent corruption, prevent rent-seeking) embrace democracy and limited government
2. Embrace export-led development: invest in infrastructure relevant to modern industries
3. Structural Adjustment: Austerity programs to reduce government spending and tax burden (increasing private investment, preventing debt spiral)
4. Focus on “micro” incentives to individuals/firms rather than “macro” national development projects (dams, power plants, railroads, etc.)
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F. Evidence against Neoliberalism
1. Sill cannot explain NICs: autocracy “worked” in Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong
a. “Developmental State” – government picked winners and losers
b. Export-led industrialization did not emerge “naturally”
2. Difficult to sustain free market and democracy in poor states
3. Self-serving: All recommendations tend to help foreign investors, but many harm domestic poor
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III. Dependency Theory
A. Overview – Underdevelopment is perpetuated by the global economic order; prosperity will require empowerment of poor people in poor countries
B. History matters -- Past events influence present options (path dependence)
1. Europe: UK, France, Prussia, Russia all followed different paths, because only the UK could be first
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2. Colonialism
a. Economic effect: Colonial powers exploited colonies, siphoned wealth to home countries (slave labor, trade monopolies, head taxes, etc)
b. Institutional Effects: Recall the 1500 population-development trade-off from slavery-based institutions
c. Social effects: i. Development of pro-colonial local elites: (collaborators
and administrators) sympathetic to ideology and culture of colonial power
ii. Divide-and-Conquer: Colonial power makes itself “necessary” for stability
iii. Metropole-satellite division: Within-country division between “developed” urban areas for elites and resource-producing rural areas for exploitation
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iv. Colonial predictors of present-day economic inequality Former slave society (esp. tropical colonies) European settlement:
More Europeans = more inequality (if a minority) “New Europes” (European colonists become
majority) = less inequality Conclusion: Privileged minority in colonial period
= inequality in present day These two variables account for more than half
of the variation in inequality between nations today
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Inequality and European Settlement
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3. Post-colonial development
a. Neo-colonialism: Local elites of colonial era installed as government
b. Dependent development: Former colonies have lost indigenous economic structures, possess infrastructure and economic systems geared to production of primary exports (mining, cash crops, etc.)
c. Key idea: Underdevelopment ≠ Undevelopment – Dependent countries don’t need to “catch up” by following the paths of rich countries
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C. How is dependency perpetuated?
1. Global economic system: Divided into core and periphery. Periphery’s function is to export cheap raw materials to core, then import expensive processed goods back
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Core – Periphery: 1800
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Core – Periphery: 1900
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Core – Periphery: 2000
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Primary Exports, 1990
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Primary Exports, 2002
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Secondary Exports, 1990
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Secondary Exports, 2002
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High-Tech Exports, 1990
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High-Tech Exports, 2002
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C. How is dependency perpetuated?
1. Global economic system: Divided into core and periphery. Periphery’s function is to export cheap raw materials to core, then import expensive processed goods back
2. Unfair terms of trade: Primary commodities lose value relative to manufactures
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Terms of Trade Decline, 1980-2001
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Terms of Trade Improvement, 1980-2001
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3. Why don’t dependent countries just industrialize like the core states?
a. Lacking capital, peripheral states require foreign investment and loans strings attached
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FOREIGN AID, DEBT, AND INTEREST PAYMENTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1992 AND 1997 (IN $US BILLIONS)
65 53.7116.7 165.3
1666.8
2361.6
0
400
800
1200
1600
2000
2400
1992 1997
aidinterest (estimated at 7%)debt
$US Billions
Year
Aid as percentof interest: 55.7%
Aid as percentof interest: 32.5%
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Total Debt Service, 1990
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Total Debt Service, 2002
Votes in the IMF
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3. Why don’t dependent countries just industrialize like the core states?
a. Lacking capital, peripheral states require foreign investment and loans strings attached
b. Profits are used to buy imports rather than re-invest in the country
c. Local elites are part of the exploitive system – Exploited metropoles themselves exploit satellite areas
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The Triangle of Dependence
Local ElitesDominate Masses,
Pay OffMilitary Elites
Military Force ProtectsElites and MNCs. Foreign
military intervention backs up local military
MNCs and Foreign Investors
Pay Off Local Elites
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d. The Role of MNCs: perpetuation of “core” dominance MNCs outcompete local firms through
economies of scale or dumping MNCs repatriate profits instead of investing
them in-country MNCs construct alliances with local elites
(bribes, or simply offers of jobs and capital) MNC mobility creates “race to the bottom” in
labor standards Threats to MNCs are international threats
more likely to trigger military intervention
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D. Policy Recommendations: It’s not about “catching up” – periphery must follow a different path to prosperity1. Radical Variant: De-Linking (Autarky) and
South-South Links. Example = Maoisma. Emphasize industrialization at expense of
agriculture (esp. Great Leap Forward)
b. Prevent foreign investment, capital transfers
c. Focus on domestic “market” instead of trade
d. Avoid dependence or vulnerability: Redundant autarkic development in regions
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Performance: Maoism in ChinaCHINA: Real GDP Growth Rates, 1953-2003
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
Year
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2. Moderate variant: Import-Substituting Industrialization (ISI)
a. Tariffs and Subsidies directed to replacing imports with domestically-produced goods
b. Shift from primary to manufactured products
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C. Evidence for Dependency Theory
1. Mild de-linking (devaluation and tariffs) protected some Latin American states from Great Depression
2. Explains different paths of Australia, Argentina from 1913 to present
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Argentina in 1913: Nearly “Developed” – Compare to 1987…
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Argentine Capital Dependence Hobbles Economy From 1913 On Capital scarcity during/after WW I and Great
Depression undermines development
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Latin America: Exporters relying on foreign investment performed poorly
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C. Evidence for Dependency Theory
1. Mild de-linking (devaluation and tariffs) protected some Latin American states from Great Depression
2. Explains different paths of Australia, Argentina from 1913 to present
3. Recent neoliberal programs have had mixed results:
a. China – Apparently works (but still high state control – see textbook for economic “Eras”)
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CHINA: Real GDP Growth Rates, 1953-2003
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
1953
1956
1959
1962
1965
1968
1971
1974
1977
1980
1983
1986
1989
1992
1995
1998
2001
Year
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Real GDP Growth Rates, 1953-2003
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
1953
1957
1961
1965
1969
1973
1977
1981
1985
1989
1993
1997
2001
Year
China
USA
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C. Evidence for Dependency Theory
1. Mild de-linking (devaluation and tariffs) protected some Latin American states from Great Depression
2. Explains different paths of Australia, Argentina from 1913 to present
3. Recent neoliberal programs have had mixed results:
a. China – Apparently works (but still high state control – see textbook for economic “Eras”)
b. Mexico and Brazil – Structural adjustment has not produced growth
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MEXICO: Real GDP Growth Rates, 1953-2003
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Year
65
BRAZIL: Real GDP Growth Rates, 1953-2003
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Year
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D. Shortcomings of Dependency Theory
1. ISI = inefficiency. Worse products for the price (poor states’ markets are too small to support economies of scale) subsidies are expensive and undermine incentives to expand size of domestic market
2. Consumers rejected protectionism -- Even dependency theorist Cardoso governed Brazil as a neoliberal!
3. Urban focus undermines farming: All those city workers need cheap food…. price controls and perverse incentives OR urban revolutions
4. The problem of the NICs… Investment increased growth!
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Dependency in Taiwan: Investment increased during “take-off” period
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V. Selectorate Theory: Institutions First
A. Division of society:1. Leader: Decides public policy
2. Selectorate: set of people with legal right to participate in selection of the government
a. Democracies: Adult citizens
b. Monarchies: Royalty or nobles
c. Some autocracies have large selectorates (single-party states, rigged elections, etc.) Why…?
3. Winning Coalition: Number of selectorate actually needed to gain/retain power
a. Democracies: About half of S
b. Autocracies: Military leaders, governors, key nobles, election supervisors (to fix the vote), etc.
4. Disenfranchised: Powerless
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Selectorate Theory’s Division
Society’s Disenfranchised
Selectorate
Winning Coalition
Leader
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B. Regime Types: Three combinations
W = Size of winning coalition
S = Size of selectorate
W/S = Regime Type
Typical Regimes:Winning Coalition Size
Small Large
Selectorate Size
SmallMonarchy/
JuntaN/A
Large Autocracy Democracy
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C. Policy Tools
1. Allocation of resourcesa. Public Goods
i. Benefit the entire selectorate (S) – both supporters and opponents/defectors
ii. Collective in nature: non-rivalrous (I can enjoy the good without taking any away from you) and nonexcludable (providing for one provides for all). Classic examples = economic growth, peace, absence of crime, clean air, etc.
b. Private Goods: Benefit supporters only (W) – Implies excludability
2. Leaders prefer to use private goods to remain in power (punish defection)
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D. The loyalty norm: effects of S and W
1. W/S is Large: Chance of selector being needed in next coalition is high defect if private goods at less than maximum
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Large W/S: Democracy and Monarchy/ Junta (Chance of being needed is high)
Selectorate Winning Coalition
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D. The loyalty norm: effects of S and W
1. W/S is Large: Chance of selector being needed in next coalition is high defect if private goods at less than maximum
2. W/S is Small: Chance of selector being needed in next coalition is low defection offers little prospect of increased private goods
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Small W/S: Autocracy (Chance of being needed is low)
Selectorate Winning Coalition
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D. The loyalty norm: effects of S and W
1. W/S is Large: Chance of selector being needed in next coalition is high defect if private goods at less than maximum
2. W/S is Small: Chance of selector being needed in next coalition is low defection offers little prospect of increased private goods
3. Small W: Easy to reward/punish with private goods
4. Large W: Hard to reward/punish with private goods
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5. Institutions and Incentives
a. Leaders want: Small W (easy to bribe if desired) and large S (very small W/S means defection is unattractive). Result: Corruption possible but not required
b. Members of the winning coalition want: Small W (more private goods) and small S (large W/S means leader must devote most resources to bribes). Result: Corruption required.
c. The selectorate wants: Large W (focus on public goods) implies Large S. Result: Corruption difficult.
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E. Evidence for Selectorate Theory
1. Explains many previous failuresa. Agrarian elite coalitions reduced productivity
(large estates, agricultural protectionism) but…b. Urban elite coalitions also reduced productivity
(food subsidies, Big Development and patronage, “the Iron Triangle” of rent-seeking)
c. State control patronage and kickbacks (emphasis on private goods simply takes different forms in “socialist” or “capitalist” autocracies)
2. Economic/Political freedom associated with greater prosperity (weakly) and life expectancy (moderately)
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3. Evidence for Selectorate Theory: Democracy (Large W) and Public Goods
Economic Growth Trade Policy
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4. Limits of selectorate theory
a. No advice for democrats: “Pursue public goods so people re-elect you” is vague
b. Growth is only part of development – government may opt for social insurance, education, social welfare programs, etc in lieu of economic growth (trade-offs between public goods)
c. Independent economic institutions (central banks) seem to work in industrialized democracies
d. Most NICs had Small W polities
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V. Conclusions: The puzzle of poverty
A. Overview:Modernization Dependency Selectorate
Core Assumption
Economies naturally progress through stages
Structure of world economy prevents peripheral development
Leaders choose public or private goods depending on their incentives
Economic policies
Free trade: Sell primary commodities, then industrialize
Reduce dependence (autarky or ISI)
Vague: Free trade and other “good of the many” policies like education
Politics Insulate economic policy from public (autocracy or independence)
Prevent foreign-domestic alliances and empower urban workers
Democracy more important than specific policies
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B. No Panaceas
1. No theory completely explains NICs: Autocracy and Protection Export-led growth
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Per-Capita GDP, 1954-2003
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
4000019
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1957
1960
1963
1966
1969
1972
1975
1978
1981
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
Year
Brazil
China
South Korea
Mexico
USA
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B. No Panaceas
1. No theory completely explains NICs: Autocracy and Protection Export-led growth
2. No clear solution to “path dependence” – Different policies needed in LDCs, but which policies will work (path dependence discounts other countries’ experiences)?
3. Are institutions and economic policies the only independent variables that matter? For example…
C. The Puzzle of Gender Inequality
Gender inequality can impede development (economically inefficient, underutilization of talents, etc – recall the evidence from Scandinavia)
But where does gender inequality come from?
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