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District Disaster Management Authority, Dakshina Kannada

Disaster Management Plan for Dakshina Kannada 1-1

1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 GENERAL

Dakshina Kannada District is located in the southern Indian State of Karnataka along the

western coast of the peninsular India. The district is situated between Arabian Sea on

one side and the Western Ghats on the other. The following surround the district:

• North - Udupi district

• East - Chikmagalur and Hassan districts

• South - Kodagu and Kasargod (Kerala) district

• West - Arabian Sea

The Dakshina Kannada District comprises of five talukas for administrative purpose.

They are:

• Mangalore

• Bantwal

• Belthangady

• Puttur

• Sullia

The maps of the district and talukas are shown in Fig 1.1., 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 & 1.6.

Administrative Headquarters of Dakshina Kannada is located at Mangalore city. The

major rivers of the district, that are Netravati and Gurpur rivers, flow through Mangalore

Taluka. Mangalore in particular and the district in general is well connected by road, rail,

sea and air.

• The national highway NH 17 (Kanyakumari – Mumbai) as well as the Konkan

Railways passes through the length of the district from south to north along the

coast. The NH 48 from Mangalore to Bangalore passes through breadth of the

district from west to east.

Recently, one of the state highways has been upgraded to National Highway No.

13, which extends from Mangalore to Solapur. This passes between Mangalore

and Moodbidri in the district.



• Apart from Konkan railways, there are two major rail lines namely Mangalore –

Bangalore (presently under gauge conversion) and Mangalore – Calicut.

• The Mangalore airport is located at Bajpe about 17km from the city. There are

proposals to upgrade this into an international airport.

Mangalore has a modern all weather port 10 km. north of the town at Panambur, which is

gateway to the state of Karnataka.

Considering the ideal location of the district and presence of good infrastructure facilities

like port, industrialisation has crept in and many major industries like Mangalore

Chemicals and Fertilisers Ltd (MCF), Mangalore Refineries and Petrochemicals Ltd.

(MRPL) and few Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) bottling plants as well as Petroleum Oil

Products (POL) Depots have come up in the district during last few decades. In addition

to these, number of other hazardous chemicals, both toxic and flammable are imported

at New Mangalore Port Trust (NMPT) and distributed to various places both within and

outside the district. This phenomenal growth of the district has brought with it the

possibility of a disaster affecting large area if not controlled immediately.

Besides these hazardous industries in Mangalore Taluka, The Karnataka Forest

Development Corporation has set up a company in Sullia taluka for production of

centrifuged concentrated rubber latex and crepe from rubber latex and scrap. The

process is non-hazardous in nature.

Puttur Products Pvt. Ltd., located in Bantwal taluka, stores LPG in two bullets, each of

30T capacity. In the factory, LPG received by road tankers is bottled in small cylinders.

Proposed Mangalore - Bangalore POL pipeline originates from MRPL and passes

through Mangalore, Bantwal and Belthangady talukas in the district.

The District Disaster Management Plan (DMP) for Dakshina Kannada District has been

prepared for implementation by the Government and other non-Government agencies

who would be involved in execution of the Plan during any disaster in the district. The

plan indicates emergency action plans, roles and responsibilities of key personnel and

suggests mitigation measures during any natural or man made disaster, taking into

consideration the available resources with various agencies involved. The plan evolves



systems to make the plan an effective response mechanism. In short, the plan brings

under one roof, various agencies and departments to control any type of disaster.

No plan is complete without practising it. Therefore periodic mock drills for the DMP

should be conducted at least once in two years involving various agencies mentioned in

the plan. The desktop exercise for the plan may be carried out more frequently say once

in a year to check the flow of information. The DMP needs to be updated every year

based on experience of mock drills as well as to make changes in view of any change in

hazardous potential like commissioning of a new chemical plant in the district etc.

Regular updating of DMP also ensures correct contact details of key persons due to

change in organisation structure of the district, transfer of officials and change in

telephone numbers etc.

1.2 ELEMENTS OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN The DMP for Dakshina Kannada has basically three main elements:

1.1.2.1 Hazard Analysis

The Hazard Analysis comprises of

• Study and identification of various possible hazards in the district.

• Identification of possible failure scenarios having off-site implications.

• Consequence Analysis of the failure scenarios using computer models

2.1.2.2 Emergency Response Planning

The preparation of the Response Plan involves the following:

• Development of Emergency Organisation Structure.

• Fixing the duties and responsibilities of all-key personnel to face any disaster with

the available means.

3.1.2.3 Suggestion of Mitigative Measures

This involves suggestion of various mitigative measures in the aftermath of a disaster

to keep the impact minimal and to normalise the condition in shortest possible time.

This also involves suggestion of various recommendations, both hardware and

software, to improve the preparedness of the district to meet any major disaster.

Formatted: Bullets and Numbering





1.3 METEOROLOGICAL / CLIMATOLOGICAL DATA

Meteorological factors, which govern the dispersion of leaked hazardous chemicals are

temperature, humidity, rainfall, wind speed and wind direction. Since these factors

fluctuate largely with time, it becomes essential to obtain long term data while depicting

the overall meteorological pattern. Climatological data for Dakshina Kannada is included

in this document.

All these meteorological factors are elaborated in the following sub-sections :

1.3.1 Temperature

Table I shows observations over 30 years on meteorology recorded at IMD

station, Mangalore for the period of 1951-80. The table shows that monthly mean

of daily maximum temperature ranges from 28.5 to 32.5oC and monthly mean

daily minimum varies from 21.7 to 24.5oC. Extreme highest temperature observed

in different months varies from 31.7oC in September to 37.8oC in February while

the monthly extreme lowest varies from 16.7oC in December, January and

February to 20.6oC in July and August.

1.3.2 Humidity

Table I shows that the annual mean of relative humidity is 80% in the morning

and 74% in the evening. Monthly mean humidity varies from 69% in December to

91% in July and August both in the morning whereas in the evening it ranges

from 61% in January to 88% in July.

1.3.3 Rainfall

Monthly rainfall data over 10 years (1986 to 1995) for the Panambur station

shows that the average annual rainfall was 3774 mm over 10 years period. The

maximum rainfall was observed in the month of July followed by June and

August. 78% of the total annual rainfall occur in the months of June to August,

16% in September to November and remaining 6% in the months of December to

May. Maximum annual rainfall of 4820 mm was observed in 1992 while a

minimum of 2419 mm in 1987.

1.3.4 Wind Velocity

Table II shows that the wind speed ranges from 0 to 19 kmph. However, wind



speed from 20 to 61 kmph is also reported in the months of March, April, June

and July for a few days.

1.3.5 Wind Direction

The predominant morning and evening wind directions during different months of

the year for the period of 1951-80 has been given under table II. The directions

have been classified as Primary and Secondary depending on the percentage

prevalence.



Table I - Temperature and Humidity

Observations on meteorological data recorded by IMD at Mangalore station (1951-80)

Mean of temperature Extremes Humidity Month Daily

max. deg C

Daily min. deg C

Highest in the month deg C

Lowest in the month deg C

Highest deg C

Lowest deg C

Relative humidity %

Vapour pressure mb

January I 31.4 21.7 34.1 19.5 36.1 16.7 71 21.2 II 61 23.9 February I 31.1 22.8 33.9 20.9 37.8 16.7 75 24.1 II 66 26.0 March I 31.7 24.5 33.7 22.2 37.3 18.3 75 27.2 II 67 27.5 April I 32.4 26.1 33.6 22.9 36.1 20.0 73 28.9 II 69 29.4 May I 32.1 26.0 33.6 22.4 36.7 18.9 77 30.1 II 72 29.9 June I 29.4 23.9 32.1 22. 0 34.4 20.0 89 29.8 II 85 30.5 July I 28.5 23.5 30.7 21.9 35.6 20.6 91 29.6 II 88 30.4 August I 28.5 23.6 30.1 22.1 32.2 20.6 91 29.7 II 87 29.8 September I 28.7 23.5 30.1 22.1 31.7 21.1 89 29.0 II 83 29.6 October I 29.8 23.8 32.0 21.9 34.4 20.0 85 28.7 II 79 29.5 November I 31.1 23.2 33.5 20.7 35.6 18.3 77 25.8 II 69 25.8 December I 31.7 21.9 33.6 9.2 35.6 16.7 69 21.5 II 62 23.7 Annual total or mean I 30.5 23.7 34.9 8.6 37.8 16.7 80 27.1

II 74 28.1

I Morning II Evening



Table II - Wind Speed and Direction

Observations on meteorological data recorded by IMD at Mangalore station (1951-80)

No. of days with wind speed

(km per hour) Percentage number of days with wind from Month 62 or more 20-61 1-19 0 N NE E SE S SW W NW CALM January I 0 0 29 2 2 10 68 18 0 1 0 1 0 II 0 0 29 2 5 0 1 4 0 17 33 39 1 February I 0 0 27 1 2 18 60 14 0 1 0 2 3 II 0 1 27 0 3 1 0 2 0 18 38 38 0 March I 0 0 30 1 5 19 54 13 0 1 2 2 4 II 0 1 30 0 3 0 0 4 0 12 41 39 1 April I 0 0 26 4 10 21 38 11 1 3 3 6 7 II 0 0 29 1 3 1 1 2 1 17 37 38 0 May I 0 0 28 3 12 14 28 13 2 4 5 14 8 II 0 1 29 1 4 1 1 3 3 18 29 41 0 June I 0 0 26 4 3 6 27 21 4 14 13 6 6 II 0 1 27 2 4 2 4 6 5 31 29 17 2 July I 0 0 29 2 4 5 18 13 2 17 23 10 8 II 0 1 29 1 3 1 2 3 2 25 38 21 5 August I 0 0 27 4 8 5 13 10 2 17 21 14 10 II 0 0 29 2 4 1 1 1 1 23 38 29 2 September I 0 0 28 2 8 10 31 19 3 8 6 9 6 II 0 0 30 0 4 1 1 1 3 28 29 33 0 October I 0 0 30 1 8 13 45 20 2 3 2 4 3 II 0 0 31 0 3 1 0 2 4 28 31 28 3 November I 0 0 29 1 2 12 62 19 1 2 0 1 1 II 0 0 29 1 5 2 1 3 3 24 30 32 0 December I 0 0 29 2 1 9 70 18 0 1 0 0 1 II 0 0 30 1 7 1 2 3 0 15 30 42 0 Annual total or mean I 0 0 338 27 5 12 43 16 1 6 6 6 5

II 0 5 349 11 4 1 1 3 2 21 34 33 1

I Morning II Evening



Table III - Predominant Wind Direction during various months

Month Morning Evening

January P E → W NW → SE S SE → NW W → E

February P E → W NW → SE S NE → SW W → E

March P E → W W → E S NE → SW NW → SE

April P E → W NW → SE S NE → SW W → E

May S E → W NW → SE P NE → SW W → E

June S E → W W → E P SE → NW SW → NE

July S W → E W → E P E → W SW → NE

August S W → E W → E P SW → NE NW → SE

September S E → W NW → SE P SE → NW W → E

October S E → W W → E P SE → NW NW → SE

November S E → W W → E S SE → NW NW → SE

December P E → W NW → SE S SE → NW W → E

P – Primary

S - Secondary



MANGALORE

SULLIA

PUTTUR

BELTHANGADY

BANTWAL

UDUPI

KARKALA

UDUPI DISTRICT

KERALA

MAP OF DAKSHINA KANNADA DISTRICT

MADIKERIKODAGU DISTRICT

45'12

13

1315'

7445'

0 5Kilometers

10

MAP PREPARED BY:DK NRDMSMANGALORE

757515'75 30'

1245'

1315'

13

FIG 1.1



FIG 1.2 MANGALORE TALUKA

UC

SASIHITHLU

UC

PAVANJE

KULAI

HOSABETTU

UC

UCMADYA

CHELAIRU

KILPADIUC

KOIKUDE

HALEYANGADIKEMRAL

THOKUR[10]PADUPANAMBUR

BELLAIRU

ATIKARIBETTU

KARNIRE

KATIPALLA

BAIKAMPADI

TALIPADY

ELATHURUSHIMANTHURU

THOKUR[62]

BALA

KUTTETURU

SURINJE

PANJA

ATTURU

BALKUNJE

KAVATHARU

ELINJE

ULEPADI

KOLLURU

KILENJARU

AIKALA

NADUGODU

MENNABETTU

DELANTHABETTU

KENJARU

KALAVARUBAJPE

PERMUDE

MALAVURU

ADYAPADI

BADAGAYEKKURU

KONDEMULA

TENKAYEKKURU

NIDDODI

KOMPADAVU

MOODUPERAR

KOLAMBE

KALLAMUNDKUR

PADUKODY

PANAMBUR

UC

UC

BOLOOR[B]

TANNIRIBHAVI

BANGRAKULUR

PANJIMOGRU

UC

MAROLI

CASBA BAZAR

UC

UC

PANCHANADY

MARAKADAPADUSHEDDE

KUNJATHBAILU

UC

UC

JEPPINAMOGRUMUNNURU

KADRI[B]

BAJAL

URBANCENTRE

TALAPADI

MOODUSHEDDE

TIRUVAIL

KANNURU

MANGALORE THOTA

KUDUPU

ADYARU

KINYA

MANJANADI

KONAJEBELMA

ARKULA

NEERUMARGA

CHELLAIRU

PAVURU

BOLIYARUAMBLAMOGRU

HAREKALA

ADDURU

MULURU

MALLUR

ULAIBETTU

MUCHURU

PUTHIGE

BADAGAMIJAR

TENKAMIJAR

TENKAULEPADY

MOGARUBADAGAULEPADY

MOODUPERAR

KANDAVARA

KADANDALEPALADKA

BELVAI

TENKAYEDAPADAV

MUTTURUKOLAVURU

KILENJAR

HOSABETTU

BADAGAYEDAPADAV

THODARU

IRUVAIL

MOODUBIDRI

PADUMARNADU

KARANJE

KALLABETTU

PUCHAMOGRU

MOODUMARNADU

KELAPUTHIGE

PADUKONAJE

MAROOR

MANTRADI

DAREGUDDE

VALPADY

SHIRTHADY

MOODUKONAJE

PANAPILA NELLIKARU

Map of Mangalore Taluk



FIG 1.3 BANTWAL TALUKA

PAJEERU

NARINGANA

MEERAMAJALU

AMMUNJE

KODMAN

PUDU

SAJIPAPADU

BALEPUNI

KURNADU

KARIANGALA

CHELURU

KARIYANGALA

THUMBE

KALLIGE

SAJIPANADU

KARPE

BADAGABELLURU

ARALA

TENKABELLURUKURIYALA

KAROPADI

SALETHURU

MANCHI

ERA

KOLNADU

MUNNUR

SAJIPAMOODA

BHANTWAL

AMTADI

SANGEBETTU

RAYEE

KOILA

PANJIKALLU

KUKKIPADI

MANILA

PERUVAI

ALIKE

KANYANA

AMTOORU

BALTILA

GOLTHAMAJALU

BOLANTHURU

VITTALPADNURU

SHAMBURU

NAVURU

NARIKOMBU

VEERAKAMBA

ANANTADI

MANI

BUDOLI

ELIYANADUGODU

CHENNAITHODY

PILIMOGRU

KADABETTU

MOODANADUGODI

AJJIBETTU

KAVALAPADURU

SARAPADI

BARIMARU

PUNACHA

VITTAL MUDNURU

KEPU

VITTAL

MOODAPADUKODI

KAVALAMUDURU

KUDAMBETTU

DEVASHYAPADURDEVASHYAMUDUR

EDKIDU

KULA

NETTLAMUDNURU

PERAJE

ERVATHURU

PILATHABETTU

MANINALKURU

ULI

TENKAKAJEKARU

BADAGAKAJEKARU

KEDILA

BILIYURUKADESHAWLYA

PERNE



FIG 1.4 BELTHANGADY TALUKA

HOSANGADI

ARAMBODI

BADAIKODI

KASHIPATNA

MARODI

BAJIRE

GUNDURI

PERADI

KARIMANELU

VENOOR

MOODUKODI

ANDINJE

KUKKALA

THEKKAR

PUTHILA

PARENKEY

MALADI

SULKERI

KUTLURU

NARAVI

SAVYA

KOKRADI

PILYAKUDYADI

BALANJA

GARDADI

NALKURU

KUKKEDI

NITTADE

URUVALUBARYA

ELANTHILA

KARAYA

TANNIRUPANTA

MELANTHABETTU

KUVETTUPADANGADI

TENKAKARANDURUMUDNURU

KARAMBARU

BADAGAKARANADU

UC

LAILA

SHIRLALUNAVARA

SULKERIMOGRU

SAVANALU

NAVOOR

SONANDURUVODINALA

MACHINA NYATERF

KALIYA

KANIYURU

BELALU

KOYYURU

NADAKANYADI

UJIREKALMANJACHIBIDRE

CHARMADI

KADIRUDYAVARA

MALAVAMTHIGE

MITTABAGILU

NERIYATHOTATHADI

MUNDAJE

INDABETTU

MOGRU

BANDARUPATRAME

KOKKADA

NIDDLE

HATYADKASHIBAJE

REKYA

SHISHILA

PUDUVETTUDHARMASTALA

KALANJE



FIG 1.5 PUTTUR TALUKA

KABAKA

KUDIPADI

PADNURU

BALNADU

PUTTUR

NIDPALLI

ERDEBETTAMPADI

PANAJE

KEMMINJE

ARYAPU

BANNURU

41 KODIMBADI

CHIKKAMUDNURU

42BELLIPADI

NARIMOGRU

KURIYA

MUNDURU

PADUVANNURU

VOLAMOGRU

BADAGANNURU

34 NEKKILADI

SHANTHIGODU

HIREBANDADI

UPPINANGADI

KOILA

ARIYADKA

NETTANIGEMUDNA

MODNURU

KEDAMBADI

KEYYURU

SARVE

SAVANOORU

KOLTHIGE

PUNCHAPADI

PALTADI

RAMAKUNJA

BAJATHUR

GOLITHOTTU

HALENERANKI

KAIVANA

BELANDURU

KUDMAR

ALANKARU

PERRABE

KANIYORU

CHARVAKA

KONALU

ALANTAYANELYADI

KUNTURU

DOLPADI

KOWRADI

NOJIBALTHILA

ECHALAMPADI

BALYA

KADABA

KUTRUPADI

RENJILADI

KODIMBALA

BANTRA

102 NEKKILADI

SHIRADI

KONAJE

BILINELE

KOMBARU

SHIRIVAGILU

AITURU

Map of Puttur Taluk



FIG 1.6 SULLIA TALUKA

MANDEKOLU

PERUVAJE

KANAKAMAJALU

ALETTY

JALSUR

AJJAVARA

SULLIA

BALILABELLARE

AIVARNAD

KODIYALAMURULYA

KALANJA

YENMUR

AMARAPADNUR

KALMADKA

YEDAMANGALA

MUPPIRYA

DEVACHALLANELLURKEMRAJE

UBARADAKAMITHUL

AMARAMUNUR

MARKANA

THODIKANA

ARANTHODU

SAMPAJE

BALPAAIVATHOKLU

KENYA

KUTHKUNJAPAMBETHADY

SUBRAMANYA

GUTHIGAR

YENEKAL

HARIHARAPALATHI

AINAKIDU

NALKUR

BALGODU

KALMAKAR

MADAPADY

KOLLAMOGRU

Sullia Taluk


Disaster Management Plan for Dakshina Kannada

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 1

1.1 GENERAL ................................................................................................................... 1

1.2 ELEMENTS OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ............................................................ 3

1.2.1 HAZARD ANALYSIS ................................................................................................ 3

1.2.2 EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING ...................................................................... 3

1.2.3 SUGGESTION OF MITIGATIVE MEASURES ............................................................... 3

1.3 METEOROLOGICAL / CLIMATOLOGICAL DATA ............................................................ 4

1.3.1 TEMPERATURE ...................................................................................................... 4

1.3.2 HUMIDITY .............................................................................................................. 4

1.3.3 RAINFALL .............................................................................................................. 4

1.3.4 WIND VELOCITY .................................................................................................... 4

1.3.5 WIND DIRECTION .................................................................................................. 5



2. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Dakshina Kannada is a highly industrialised district of Karnataka State and is

exposed to multiple hazards, which may result in disaster if they are not

controlled properly. In this section, effort has been made to identify all possible

hazards in the district. These hazards have been studied further in subsequent

chapters to know their possible impact during any disaster.

The various hazards that are possible in the Dakshina Kannada have been

broadly categorised as follows and the mitigative measures for each of these

have been discussed under Chapter 6.

NATURAL DISASTERS

Cyclones / storm

Flood

Earthquake

Forest Fire

Land Slide

INDUSTRIAL DISASTERS

Toxic Release

Fire / Explosion

Oil Spill

TRANSPORTATION DISASTERS

Road Tanker Accident

Rail Accident

Air craft crash

Pipeline failure

MISCELLANEOUS DISASTERS

Building collapse

Stampede

Boat capsize

Epidemic

Cattle disease

Food Poisoning

Bomb Threat



2.2 NATURAL DISASTERS

Dakshina Kannada is located on the western coast of Karnataka and two major

rivers pass through the district namely Netravathi and Gurpur. The district falls

just outside the earthquake fault line along the Sahyadri ranges in neighbouring

state of Maharashtra. Historically the district has been fortunate and has not

encountered any major earthquake disaster so far. However, a natural disaster

striking the district can not be totally ruled out. Following are the possible natural

disasters in Dakshina Kannada.

2.2.1 Cyclones

Cyclone is a vast violent whirl or vortex in the atmosphere following formation of

an intense low-pressure area. The district falls within the cyclone area of storms originating in the Arabian Sea

and those that enter across the Indian Peninsula from the Bay of Bengal.

However, historically it is seen that cyclones are not as severe as and as frequent

as in the Bay of Bengal along the eastern coast of India. Historically, the worst

cyclone to hit the district was during the year 1979. No major damage was

reported during that period. (Refer Fig. 2.1 on page no. 2.4). Mitigative actions are discussed under section 6.2.1 of this report.

2.2.2 Earthquake

Earthquakes are result of tectonic displacement of plates.

The entire Dakshina Kannada falls under the Zone I of the earthquake

classification as per Indian Standards, which is relatively safe. Historically there

has been no incident of earthquake during last one hundred years. However,

there are moves to upgraded the region to Zone II in view of changing geological

patterns, as the possibility of an earthquake in the district can not be totally ruled

out. (Refer Fig. 2.2 on page no. 2.5) Mitigative actions are discussed under section 6.2.3 of this report.

2.2.3 Floods

There are two major rivers flowing in the district namely Netravathi and Gurpur

Rivers. Netravathi river flows through Belthangady, Puttur and Bantwal talukas



before joining the Arabian Sea at Ullal in Mangalore Taluka. Similarly the Gurpur

River flows through Belthangady and Bantwal talukas before joining the Arabian

Sea at Thannirbhavi in Mangalore Taluka. In addition to these, there are other

smaller rivers like Mulki River, Pavanje River etc flowing through the district.

Mitigative actions are discussed under section 6.2.2 of this report.



Fig. 2.1 TROPICAL STORM AND TSUNAMI RISK

Zone 1: Less Risk

Zone 2: Moderate Risk

Zone 3: High Risk

Zone 4: Severe Risk

The figure indicates that Mangalore is in Zone 1 which is safe zone. (Please note that Zones 3,4 5 in the Bay of Bengal are high risk zones).

The figure indicates that cyclones do not directly hit Mangalore Port or Dakshina Kannada District but pass over the Arabian Sea and move towards Gujarat. (Severe activity can be seen in the Bay of Bengal which is a high risk cyclone zone). The passing of the cyclone towards Gujarat could cause strong winds to hit Dakshina Kannada.

The figure indicates that cyclones do not directly hit Mangalore Port or Dakshina Kannada District but pass over the Arabian Sea and move towards Gujarat. (Severe



Fig. 2.2 EARTHQUAKE RISK

The above figure indicates that Mangalore and Dakshina Kannada District lies in Zone 1 (IS code) which is a low earthquake risk zone. But reclassification of earthquake zones in future could change the earthquake rating of Dakshina Kannada to Zone 3.



Historically there have been incidences of floods in the low-lying areas along the

major rivers especially Netravathi and Gurpur. A separate flood disaster

committee formed in the district under the aegis of the Dy. Commissioner have

identified the areas vulnerable to flood.

The list of the flood prone areas in the district along with the population figures is

as given below. (The population figures have been based on 1991 census)

TABLE 2.1 FLOOD PRONE AREAS TALUKA – MANGALORE

Hobli Flood prone areas Total affected population (as per 1991 census)

Mangalore A Jappinamogaru 7077*

Bajal 8145

Boloor 6626

Kasaba Bazar 6197

Mangalore Thota 7027*

Kasaba Bengre 7857

Mangalore B Ullal 31181

Permunnur 9744

Munnur 6690

Harekala 5214

Boliyar 4133

Pavoor 5105

Talapadi 5972

Belman 4245

Kannur 6220

Padukodi 1612

Surathkal Chelaiyur 1788

Madya 1092

Surinje 2010

Delantabettu 1333

Badagayekkaru 2322

Thokur (10) 2315

Thokur (62) 5089




Kenjaru 4312

Malaur 5776

Panjimogaru 3591*

Kunjathbail 2812

Tannirbhavi 909

Marakada 1819

Padushedde 674

Mudushedde 5269

Baikampadi 4441

Panambur 4800

Gurupura Thiruvelu 4420

Ullaibettu 3527

Kandavara 3180

Mallur 2664

Mulur 4490

Adyapadi 2131

Addur 4240

Mogaru 2380

Tankaulipadi 1877

Muthur 1487

Kilenjaru 2607

Kolavur 2455

Mulki Sasihithilu 2192

Pavanje 1695

Haleyangadi 3499

Koyikude 2084

Padupanambur 1316

Panja 514

Attur 873

Kilenjaru -1 658

Chitrapur 988

Nadugodu 1319

Manampadi 1925




Atikaribettu 2532

Balkunje 1668

Ulipadi 1877

Elanje 2232

Iruvailu 2677

Puchchemogaru 1957

Maruru 2345

Shirthadi 2092

Mantradi 1426

Kadandale 3666

Kallamundkur 4031

* Approximate figures. TALUKA - BANTWAL

Hobli Flood prone areas Total affected population(as per 1991 census)

Bantwal Kasba 6197

Jakribatti Not available

Pane Mangalore

Nandavara Not available

Kallige 3450

Brahmarakutla Not available

TALUKA - BELTHANGADY

Hobli Flood prone areas Total affected population

- None - Not applicable



TALUKA - PUTTUR

Hobli Flood prone areas Total affected population(as per 1991 census)

Uppinangady 6151

Hirebandadi 4504

Nekkiladi 3287

Balya 2216

Kutrupadi 3605

TALUKA - SULLIA

Hobli Flood prone areas Total affected population

Kasba Not available

Koiculi Not available



2.2.4 Forest Fire

Dakshina Kannada has dense forests along its eastern border in Belthangady

and Sullia Talukas. Historically there has been no incidence of forest fires in the

district. However, chances of a forest fire or a bush fire in the district can not be

totally ruled out. These types of fire have a devastating effect not only on the

environment but also on the people living in and around the affected area. The

forest areas in the district are identified in attached Figure 2.3.

Mitigative actions are discussed under section 6.2.4.

2.2.5 Landslide Landslide is a natural disaster whose effects are mostly localised. Landslides are

likely especially in the ghat section beyond Shiradi in Belthangady taluka along

the NH 48. This can be attributed to de-forestation in the region. There could be

blockage of traffic and / or a few causalities during any landslide in the district.


2.3 INDUSTRIAL DISASTERS Dakshina Kannada is one of the highly industrialised districts of Karnataka with

12 MAH (Major Accident Hazard) units and 6 Hazardous Industrial units (refer

table 2.2). Most of these units are concentrated around the New Mangalore Port

area at Panambur in the Mangalore Taluka. These units import, store, handle

and export various hazardous chemicals, both flammable and toxic. Any major

accident within the premises of these units may result in a disaster having off-site

implications. These industries fall under the purview of Inspectorate of Factories

and Boilers. These industries have their own On-site Emergency Plans to meet

any disasters, which are confined to their premises.

These industries have been considered in the Consequences Analysis under

Chapter 3 wherein representative failure cases involving these hazardous

chemicals with off-site implications have been considered to know the maximum

impact distances under worst weather conditions. This would ensure proper

planning for mitigating any disaster arising from these industrial units having off-

site implication.

List of various hazardous installations in the district has been given under Table

2.4.



Fig 2.3 forest fire



2.3.1 Toxic Release

Ammonia and Chlorine are the major toxic chemicals handled in the district.

Ammonia is handled in large quantities in the Port and MCF in Panambur area.

MCF has ammonia storage tanks within their premises as well as in Imported

Ammonia Terminal beside NMPT. There is a 1.2 km long pipeline connecting the

two storages, which crosses the NH 17 over a pipe rack. Ammonia is also

transported to Goa by road tankers.

Chlorine is handled in various major industries in small quantities for water

treatment. The chlorine is handled only in tonners, which are transported by truck

from Uttara Kannada district where there is a manufacturing facility for chlorine.

Any release of these chemicals could result in toxic effect on general public over

a large area.

Mitigative actions are discussed under section 6.3.1 and annexure III.

2.3.2 Fire / Explosion

LPG and various POL products are handled in large quantities through out the

district, and their storages are mostly concentrated in and around Panambur

area. LPG is imported at NMPT as well as manufactured by MRPL. The

transportation from the port to various storage tanks at Bala is done through

pipelines. From there LPG is mostly transported to various parts of the state by

road tankers. There are chances of Fire / Explosion involving these hazardous

chemicals whose effects would be localised or widespread depending on various

factors as discussed later in the report.


2.3.3 Oil Spill

Large quantities of petroleum products are handled mostly in the NMPT where

there are chances of oil spill on sea in the region. The port is equipped to handle

any oil spill in their jurisdiction. The chances of oil spill on land or other water



bodies is remote and even if there is one, the effects would be mostly localised.

The oil spill could also take place on high seas affecting the district along the

coastline during which the district administration may take help of Coast Guard to

take corrective steps.




TABLE 2.2 LIST OF MAH UNITS

Sr. no.

Name of unit Activity carried out Contact persons Hazardous Chemicals stored / handled

Type of disaster likely

1 M/s Mangalore Chemicals & Fertilizers Limited, Panambur, Mangalore

Manufacture of Ammonia and other fertilisers like Urea and DAP

General Manager (Production) 24 hrs.no: 2405073 2220602 9845081603 Ammonia Urea Control Room-2220614 (after office hrs.) Shift Co-ordinator- 2220613 Security Gate- 2220676

Ammonia, chlorine, naphtha

• Toxic release of ammonia • Toxic release of chlorine • Fire involving flammable

materials like naphtha.

2. M/s Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (LPG) Bykampady, Industrial area, Mangalore

Storage and Bottling of LPG

Plant Manager 2407793/2407794 2407930(O) 211553 (R)

LPG • Fire / Explosion involving LPG • Release of toxic gases like

Mercaptans

3 M/s Indian Oil Corporation Limited Panambur, Mangalore

Import, Storage and dispatch of various POL products

Sr. Depot Manager 2406178 /2406179 9448286653 (M)

POL products • Fire / Explosion involving petroleum products

4 M/s Mangalore Refinery & Petrochemicals Limited Kuthethur Post, via Katipalla, Mangalore

Refining of crude into various POL products

Vice President (P&A) – 2219112/2236112 24 hrs:2270279

POL products, LPG

• Fire / Explosion involving hydrocarbons

• Releasing of toxic gases



Sr. no.



5. M/s Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (POL Terminal) Bala Village Mangalore

Import, Storage and dispatch of various POL products

Sr. Installation Manager 2270365/2270835 (O) 24 hrs:2270060


6 M/s Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (M’lore LPG Import Facilities) Bala Village Mangalore

Import of LPG from the New Mangalore port by pipeline and its storage

Sr. Installation Manager 24 hrs no:2710832 (O) 2270832 (O) 459883 (R)

LPG, Mercaptan • Fire / Explosion involving LPG

7 M/s Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited(LPG Bottling Plant) Bala Village Mangalore

Bottling of LPG Sr. Regional Manager Plant Manager – 2453118 /2270836 (O)9448143118

LPG • Fire / Explosion involving LPG

8 M/s ELF Gas India Limited Thokur Village, Baikmapady

Import, storage and bottling of LPG cylinders

General Manager 2292505 9845970830 Asst.Operation,Mgr

LPG, Mercaptan • Fire / Explosion involving LPG

9 M/s Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited Near APMC Yard Baikmapady Mangalore

POL product storage Plant Manager 2406467 (O) 24 hrs.no2406309(O)


10 M/S Tanir Bavi Power project Tanir Bavi Village Mangalore

Barge mounted power plant on Gurpur river

Plant Manager 2400830 (O) 9980137400 24 hrs.no: 2400831(O)

Naphtha, Chlorine

• Fire / Explosion, Toxic

11 M/s Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited near Tannir bhavi Power Corporation Site Tannirbhavi Village

Storage of Naphtha for the power plant

Dy. Manager 2408169 (O)

Naphtha, HSD • Fire / Explosion



Sr. no.



BANTWAL TALUKA 12 M/s Puttur Petro

Products Private Limited Mitur, Idkidu Village Bantwal Tq.

Storage and bottling of LPG cylinders

Factory Manager 911-41500 (O) 911-48232 (R)

LPG • Fire / Explosion involving LPG



TABLE 2.3 LIST OF MAIN HAZARDOUS INDUSTRIES Sr. no.



1. BASF India Ltd., Surathkal-Bajpe Road, Bala, Katipalla, Mangalore –575 030

Manufacture of chemicals

Factory Manager 2270045 (O) 9845085751 24 hrs.no. 2270045(O) 24 hrs.no 2270046(O) 9448278046

Styrene, Butyl Acetate, Acrylic Acid, Acrylonitrile Butadiene

Toxic release, Fire, Explosion

2. KISCO (Kudremukh Iron and Steel Co), Panambur

Manufacture of various grades of steel

Factory Manager 2400276 (O) 24 hrs.no.9845720287

Blast furnace gas containing 20% Carbon Monoxide

Toxic release, Fire

3. KFDC (Karnataka Forest Develop. Corp), Alletti, Sulia

Manufacture of rubber Dy. Manager 08257-22414 (O) 08257-20231 (R)

Ammonia Toxic release

4. Petronet MHB PL Ltd

(HPCL - Projects)

Transport of POL products through cross country pipeline (to be commissioned)

Manager - Project (HPCL) 2270730 (o) 459902 (R)

POL products (MS, HSD, SKO, Naphtha)

Fire and Explosion

5. Petronet MHB PL Ltd

Mangalore Pumping Station, Bala, Mangalore

Pumping of POL products through cross country pipeline (to be commissioned)

Manager Terminal 2270365 24 hrs:2270833

Same as above Same as above

6. Petronet MHB PL Ltd Boosting of pressure in cross country pipeline

Manager Works Same as above Same as above



Sr. no.



Nerriya Booster Pumping station, Belthangady Tq

(to be commissioned)

7. Municipal Water Works at Bendoor

Water treatment including chlorine dosing

Jr. Engineer 2443183 Executive engineer 2456700

Chlorine One tonner

Toxic release

8. Municipal Water Works at Thumbe

Water treatment including chlorine dosing

Jr. Engineer 232551/232051 Executive engineer

Chlorine One tonner

Toxic release



In addition to the list of industries mentioned above, the New Mangalore Port handles

various hazardous chemicals like LPG, ammonia etc. There are few tank farm terminals

within the port premises which import and store substantial quantities of hazardous

chemicals. Following is the list of various terminals and chemicals normally stored.

NMPT has prepared a detailed DMP after carrying out Risk Analysis Study for controlling

any disaster within the port. The IAT (Imported Ammonia Terminal) of MCF and the IOCL

Terminals which are just adjacent to NMPT have been considered separately and not

along with the port.

TABLE 2.4 LIST OF HAZARDOUS INSTALLATIONS INSIDE NMPT PREMISES

S. No. Owner/ Operator

No. of tanks

Total Capacity

Liquid Stored Remarks

1. I.M.C. 19 50,000 KL Chemicals In side the port limits

2. I.P.W.C. 7 44,000 KL Kerosene In side the port limits

Besides this, coastal terminals of HPCL and MRPL, which have LPG/POL pipeline

manifolds and monitoring stations, are located within the port.

2.4 TRANSPORT DISASTERS

In Dakshina Kannada, two modes of transport are employed for transfer of

hazardous chemicals in and out of the district. They are by road tankers and

through cross country pipelines which originate mostly from New Mangalore Port

area.

2.4.1 Road Tanker Accident

Dakshina Kannada is located at the strategic location along the western coast.

The location of the New Mangalore Port at Panambur in the district along with

concentration of MAH units around it and passing of three national highways

namely, NH 17, NH 13 and NH 48 through length and breadth of the district has

made it the hub of movement of various hazardous chemicals. Apart from these

national highways, there are other State highways and district roads where there

are tanker movements but to lesser extent as compared to national highways.



Various POL products that are produced at Mangalore Refineries and

Petrochemicals Ltd. are transported to other parts of Karnataka as well as to

neighbouring states by road tankers. Similarly various other hazardous chemicals

imported at NMPT are also transported by road tankers. These tankers mostly ply

on the national highways NH 17, NH 13 and NH 48. As MRPL is not located on

the national highway, the tankers take other district roads to approach the

national highway. Similarly, the tankers may take detour from the national

highway to other roads to reach their final destination in far-flung areas in the

district.

For the purpose of this study, the various major roads in the district have been

divided into different segments to study the traffic pattern as well as the general

road conditions, which would be very useful during emergency.

Mitigative actions are indicated at 6.4.1 and transportation routes in Table 2.5



TABLE 2.5 ROUTES FOR HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS TRANSPORTATION

Sr.

no.

Road

no

Segment

from - to

Important towns /

junctions en route

Details of Hazardous

chemicals movement

Limits of

police station

Chemical Tankers

/ day

1 NH

17

Surathkal – Mulki river

(district border)

Surathkal,

Srinivasnagar,

Mukka, Haleangadi

Ammonia

LPG

POL

Styrene

Monomer

products

Chlorine

Butadiene

15

18

45

Panambur /

Mulki

2 NH

17

Surathkal - Pumpwell

circle

Baikampadi, Kulai,

Hosabettu, Kulur,

Kottara, KPT

LPG

POL

products

48

72

Panambur /

Mangalore

Rural

3 NH

17

Pumpwell - Thalapady

(state border)

Ullala, Paramunur,

Kotekar

LPG

POL

products

3

12

Ullal / Konaje

/ Mangalore

Rural

4 NH

48

Pumpwell - Mani junction BC road,

Panemangalore

LPG

POL

products

45

60

Mangalore

Rural /

Bantwal

Comment [TVN1]: Put a length in km in next column

Comment [UDS2]: Observations on the infrastructure / facilities availability en-route in next column



Sr.

no.

Road

no

Segment

from - to

Important towns /

junctions en route

Details of Hazardous

chemicals movement

Limits of

police station

Chemical Tankers

/ day

5 NH

48

Mani junction –

Uppinangady

-- LPG

POL

products

43

54

Bantwal /

Uppinangady

6 NH

48

Uppinangady – Shiradi –

district border

Golitattu, Yera,

Gundia,

LPG

POL

products

43

54

Uppinangady

/ Shiradi

7 SH Mani Junction - Puttur NerlaKatta, Kadaba LPG

POL

products

2

6

Puttur /

Kadaba

8 SH Puttur–Sullia upto district

border

Valamegru,

Kaniyamale, Muchil

LPG

POL

products

2

6

Sullia /

Subramanya /

Bellare

In addition to details given above, there are other chemicals imported by various Terminals at NMPT and distributed to various places

by using various routes in the districts. The data on such transfers are not available.

Comment [TVN1]: Put a length in km in next column

Comment [UDS2]: Observations on the infrastructure / facilities availability en-route in next column



2.4.2 Rail Accident

There could be two types of rail accident namely the one involving rail tankers

carrying LPG or POL where the consequential impact could be wide spread and

the other being an accident involving passenger train where there could be large

casualties. In either case the district administration would have to play a crucial

role in meeting such emergency.

Mitigative actions are indicated at 6.4.2.

2.4.3 Aircraft Crash

There is only one airport at Bajpe in Mangalore in the district and there are about

5 flights a day. The Mangalore airport is being upgraded as an international

airport and hence, the air traffic may increase in coming years. Any air crash

outside the airport limits would be treated as an off-site emergency and hence

calling for activation of the District Disaster Management Plan.

MRPL is located along the flight path of the aircraft (both during landing and take

off) and any air crash over MRPL could have disastrous consequences.


2.4.4 Pipeline Failure

With advent of industrialisation of Dakshina Kannada, various cross- country

pipelines have been laid, mostly of them link to New Mangalore Port. These

pipelines mainly handle LPG and other petroleum products including crude oil.

More recently, a new pipeline has been laid from Mangalore to Bangalore for

transportation of POL product, which is being commissioned (refer Fig 2.3). There

would be drastic drop in the movement of road tankers along this route once the

pipeline becomes functional.

As the pipelines pass through public domain, any major accident involving a

pipeline would call for activation of the Disaster Management Plan. However

majority of the pipelines are laid below the ground level and suitably protected



against all possible damages. All the underground pipelines have been provided

with cathodic Protection system as protection against corrosion.

The 3.5 km long naphtha and FO pipelines of MCF from NMPT to MCF premises

is laid above ground except at the highway crossing where it is laid underground.

Similarly the 1.6 km long Ammonia pipeline from IAT which is adjacent to NMPT

to MCF is also laid above ground and the line at highway crossing is also laid

over a pipe rack. This pipe rack is properly guarded against possible vehicle

impact. Patrolling of these pipelines is done on a continuous basis whenever

there is transfer operation.

Dakshina Kannada is fairly peaceful and no terrorist activity is reported in the

region so far. Hence, the probability of failure of a cross-country pipeline due to

terrorist activity is remote.

Table 2.6 gives the information about the various pipelines in the district.




TABLE 2.6 LIST OF PIPELINES CARRYING HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS

Sr.

no

Pipeline

From - to Length

diameter

Routing and vulnerable points Chemical

Handled

Operating conditions Comments on routing and safety

features provided Temp -0C Pr – kg/cm2

Mangalore Chemicals and Fertilisers Ltd, Panambur

1 NMPT - MCF 3.5 km,

8” dia

These lines are above ground

run parallel to compound

walls of NMPT and KIOCL on

the southern side crosses NH

17 (below ground) before

entering MCF premises.

Naphtha Ambient 3 kg/cm2 As the lines are above ground

except at the highway crossing,

MCF authorities carry out regular

patrolling during transfer

operation. Protections are given

at the highway crossing.

2 NMPT - MCF 2.6 km

6” dia

Fuel Oil 500C 9 kg/cm2

3 IAT - MCF 8” dia

1.2 km

The above ground pipeline

connects Ammonia import

Terminal adjacent to NMPT

on the northern side. The

pipeline crosses the NH 17

through piperack which is 5 m

high.

Ammonia 0 0C 4 kg/cm2 Surveillance of the line is done

during transfer operation.



Sr.

no

Pipeline

From - to Length

diameter


Handled



Mangalore Refineries and Petrochemicals Ltd, Bala

1 NMPT –

MRPL

12.5 km

36” dia

These pipelines run parallel

to each other originating from

the MRPL terminal within the

port premises and terminate

at MRPL. There are several

road crossings and one rail

crossing enroute.

Crude oil Ambient 7 kg/cm2 All these lines run parallel to each

other as well as other pipelines of

HPCL and ELF. The road and rail

crossings are provided with

protective sleeves. All the lines

are protected by CP system.

2 20” dia FO / LSHS 650C 25 kg/cm2

3 18” dia

( 2 lines )

MS/SKO/

ATF/

HSD

Ambient 25 kg/cm2

4 18” / 12”

dia

Ambient 25 kg/cm2

HPCL MLIF (Mangalore LPG Import Facility), Bala

1 NMPT –

HPCL MLIF

9.8 km

12” dia

The pipeline runs parallel to

MRPL lines for major portion

and terminates at the MLIF

terminal which is adjacent to

MRPL complex at Bala

LPG Ambient 8 kg/cm2 The line is protected by CP

system and road/river crossings

are provided with protective

sleeves.



Sr.

no

Pipeline

From - to Length

diameter


Handled



BPCL Coastal Terminal, Baikampady

1 NMPT - BPCL, Coastal Terminal

24",

7.6 km

There are 3 pipelines from

the NMPT to BPCL Coastal

Terminal at Baikampadi. The

lines run parallel to other

pipelines along the MMPT

compound crosses NH 17

and then turns right and

passes in front of MCF along

the NH upto Baikampadi.

MS Ambient 8 - 10 All these lines are laid

underground and are protected by

CP system. PSVs are provided at

various required locations as per

the standards. Casings are

provided at two railway crossings

and 4 road crossing en route.

2 24",

7.6 km

HSD / SKO Ambient 8 - 10

3 24",

7.6 km

Naphtha Ambient 8 - 10



Sr.

no

Pipeline

From - to Length

diameter


Handled



4 NMPT -

TBPC

16"

2 km

A tapping is taken from the

above mentioned Naphtha

line and goes to BPCL

terminal with in TBPC at Tanir

Bhavi.

Naphtha Ambient 8 - 10 Same as above.

Elf LPG, Thokur

1 NMPT – Elf 6 km,

12” dia

This runs parallel to the

MRPL / HPCL lines before it

takes detour to Elf terminal at

Thokur. The line is

underground except at the

river crossing where it runs

below the private bridge close

to the Elf terminal.

LPG Ambient 12 kg/cm2



Sr.

no

Pipeline

From - to Length

diameter


Handled



Petronet - MHB PL Company

1 Mangalore -

Bangalore

(under

construction)

365 km

20" / 24"

The line extends from Bala

upto Nerriya estate in

Dakshina Kannada dist

before it enters the next

district. Total length of the line

in the dist. 94 Km. The main

pumping station is at

Mangalore and the booster

station is at Nerriya.

POL

products like

MS, HSD,

SKO,

Naphtha

Ambient 60 kg/cm2

(Mangalore)

99 kg/cm2

(Nerriya )

Cathodic Protection Against

Corrosion, SCADA System for

communication/ control/ leak

detection system. Sectionalising

valves at every 15 kms as well as

on either sides at river crossing

(Gurpur and Netravati in DK).

Special casings for protection at

road and rail crossings.



In case of a leak from the pipeline, the control system may not be sophisticated

enough to detect the same. Hence the leak has to be notified by the eyewitness

to the owner who would immediately shut down the pumping operation. This may

not necessarily result in declaration of the disaster. In absence of an eyewitness,

the leak may go undetected in the incipient stages and may result in a major

disaster requiring activation of District Disaster Management Plan. (In case of

Mangalore - Bangalore POL pipeline cathodic protection and SCADA system for

communication and leak detection has been provided).

2.5 MISCELLANEOUS DISASTERS

Emergencies involving building collapse, stampede, food poisoning, epidemic

etc. are categorised as Miscellaneous Disasters.

2.5.1 Building Collapse

During recent years, many multi-storied structures have come up in the district

especially in Mangalore city area. There are chances of these structures collapse

either due to earthquake or due to poor quality of construction leading to large-

scale loss of human life. This may require rescue operation on war footing with

available means and constraints like narrow roads, poor approach etc.


2.5.2 Stampede

The district has many places of worships where there will be large congregation

of people during annual festivals. There could also be a large gathering on other

occasions like election meetings, field dramas or during a sporting event etc.

There are chances of stampede during this period due to failure of crowd control

measures leading to loss of human life mostly of women, children and

handicapped.




2.5.3 Boat Capsize

Boat capsize is normally caused by overcrowding.

In Dakshina Kannada, public transport by waterways is minimal. Fishing is an

important profession in the district and fishing boats venture mostly into the sea.

The effects of a boat capsize would be localised and the district administration

may require help from Navy, Coast Guard or other professional divers to rescue

the people.


2.5.4 Epidemic

The epidemic could be due to water- borne diseases like cholera, hepatitis and

others like malaria which could affect large number of people and calls for a plan

of action by the district administration. The administration would ensure that

necessary steps are taken to control the spreading of disease, and provide

medical help to affected persons.


2.5.5 Cattle Disease

In the event of an outbreak of cattle diseases like foot and mouth disease, large

population of cattle can get affected. Such emergencies will require help of

veterinary doctors and possible disposal of large quantity of milk, milk products

and meat.


2.5.6 Food poisoning

Food poisoning is a phenomenon where a large number of people could get

affected after consuming contaminated food. This happens mostly during

religious and social functions during which food is prepared in make shift kitchen

on mass scale. This calls for immediate action by the district administration to

provide medical attention, identify the source of poisoning and take corrective

actions.




To attach xerox of Mangalore – Bangalore Product pipeline route in DK



TABLE OF CONTENTS

2. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION .......................................................................................... 1

2.1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 1 2.2 NATURAL DISASTERS ........................................................................................... 2 2.2.1 CYCLONES ............................................................................................................ 2

2.2.2 EARTHQUAKE ........................................................................................................ 2

2.2.3 FLOODS ................................................................................................................ 2

2.2.4 FOREST FIRE ...................................................................................................... 10

2.2.5 LANDSLIDE .......................................................................................................... 10

2.3 INDUSTRIAL DISASTERS ..................................................................................... 10 2.3.1 TOXIC RELEASE .................................................................................................. 12

2.3.2 FIRE / EXPLOSION ............................................................................................... 12

2.3.3 OIL SPILL ............................................................................................................ 12

2.4 TRANSPORT DISASTERS .................................................................................... 19 2.4.1 ROAD TANKER ACCIDENT .................................................................................... 19

2.4.2 RAIL ACCIDENT ................................................................................................... 23

2.4.3 AIRCRAFT CRASH ............................................................................................... 23

2.4.4 PIPELINE FAILURE ............................................................................................... 23

2.5 MISCELLANEOUS DISASTERS ........................................................................... 30 2.5.1 BUILDING COLLAPSE ........................................................................................... 30

2.5.2 STAMPEDE .......................................................................................................... 30

2.5.3 BOAT CAPSIZE .................................................................................................... 31

2.5.4 EPIDEMIC ............................................................................................................ 31

2.5.5 CATTLE DISEASE ................................................................................................ 31

2.5.6 FOOD POISONING ................................................................................................ 31



3. CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The industrial and transport hazards in the Dakshina Kannada as discussed

under the Chapter 2 have been studied in greater detail under this chapter for

their consequences. Only representative worst case failure scenarios whose

effects could go beyond the limits of the particular industrial unit have been

considered for preparation of this Disaster Management Plan. For other minor

disasters, the on-site emergency plan of the concerned industrial unit is expected

to take control of the situation. However, in case of transportation, hazard would

normally result in an off-site disaster as the failure could take place in the public

area.

The scenarios so selected for both Industrial and Transportation hazards are the

worst case scenarios, probability of occurrence of which is very low. This is to

ensure proper planning during any worst possible industrial disaster. 3.2 RANKING OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS

Various chemicals handled in Dakshina Kannada have been listed in table 3.1

along with their NFPA rating and various industries handling these chemicals.

The explanation of NFPA classification is given in table 3.2



TABLE 3.1

NFPA RATING OF CHEMICALS HANDLED

Chemical Nf Nh Nr Industries Concerned

HIGH SPEED DIESEL 2 0 0 MRPL, BPCL, HPCL. IOCL

CRUDE OIL 3 1 0 MRPL

SKO 2 0 0 MRPL, BPCL, HPCL, IOC

NAPHTHA 3 1 0 MRPL, BPCL, HPCL, TBPC,

MCF, IOC

MOTOR SPIRIT 3 1 0 MRPL, BPCL, HPCL, IOCL

SULPHUR 1 1 0 NMPT, MRPL

PHOSPHORIC ACID 0 2 0 MCF

AMMONIA 1 3 0 MCF

CHLORINE 0 3 0 MCF, MRPL, Municipal Water

Works

LPG 4 1 0 MRPL, HPCL, ELF, Puttur Petro

COAL 1 0 0 NMPT

BENZENE 3 2 0 IMC

XYLENE 3 1 0 IMC

ACETONE 3 1 0 IMC

METHANOL 3 1 0 IMC

ETHANOL 3 0 0 IMC

CYCLOHEXANE 3 1 0 IMC

STYRENE 3 2 2 IMC / BASF

TOLUENE 3 2 0 IMC

PHENOL 2 3 0 IMC

CUMENE 3 0 0 IMC

BUTADIENE 4 2 2 BASF

ACRYLONITRILE 3 4 2 BASF

ACRYLIC ACID 2 3 2 BASF

Nf = Number of flammability Nh = Number of health hazard

Nr = Number of reactivity



TABLE 3.2

EXPLANATION OF NFPA CLASSIFICATION

CLASSIFICATION DEFINITION

Health Hazard Nh

4 Materials which on very short exposure could cause death or major

residual injury even though medical treatment were given.

3 Materials which on short exposure could cause serious temporary or

residual injury even though medical treatment were given.

2 Materials which on intense or continued exposure could cause

temporary incapacitation or possible residual injury unless medical

treatment is given.

1 Materials which on exposure would cause irritation but only minor

residual injury even if no treatment is given.

0 Materials which on exposure under fire conditions would offer no

hazard beyond that of ordinary combustible material.

Flammability Hazard Nf

4 Materials which will rapidly or completely vapourise at atmospheric

pressure and normal ambient temperature, or which are readily

dispersed in air and which will burn readily.

3 Liquids and solids that can be ignited under almost all ambient

temperature conditions.

2 Materials that must be moderately heated or exposed to relatively high

ambient temperatures before ignition can occur.

1 Material that must be preheated before ignition can occur.

0 Materials that will not burn.



TABLE 3.2 (CONTD.)

EXPLANATION OF NFPA CLASSIFICATION

CLASSIFICATION DEFINITION

Reactivity Hazard Nr

4

Materials which in themselves are readily capable of detonation or of

explosive decomposition or reaction at normal temperature and

pressures.

3 Materials which in themselves are capable of detonation or explosive

reaction but require a strong initiating source or which must be heated

under confinement before initiation or which react explosively with

water.

2 Materials which in themselves are normally unstable and readily

undergo violent chemical change but do not detonate. Also materials

which may react violently with water or which may form potentially

explosive mixtures with water.

1 Materials which in themselves are normally stable, but which can

become unstable at elevated temperature and pressures or which may

react with water with some release of energy but not violently.

0 Materials which in themselves are normally stable, even under fire

exposure conditions, and which are not reactive with water.



3.3 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS - THEORY

The Risk Analysis Study for some of the MAH units have already been carried out

by different agencies using different software packages. To ensure uniformity in

the results of various units, consequence analysis of selected failure cases for

various industrial units and installations have been carried out again using

PHAST Professional software developed by DNV Technica of UK.

3.3.1 PHAST Professional Software Package

PHAST Professional provides the most advanced collection of consequence

models for hazard analysis. This software calculates the consequences of

accidental or emergency releases of toxic or flammable chemicals into

atmosphere. It uses mathematical models for discharge, dispersion, fire and

explosion to predict extent of toxic and flammable effects. The results are

presented in a tabular as well as graphical form.

The software takes into all the aspects like nature of chemical stored/handled,

conditions under which they are stored/handled and the possible weather

conditions at the time of release.

3.3.2 Data Requirements

Following data are collected and used for Consequence Analysis:

1 Data of hazardous chemicals in each industrial unit:

i. Quantity stored and storage details like type of tank, dyke

arrangement

ii. Conditions under which the chemical is stored or handled

iii. Safety features provided in the system like on line detection

system, control system and interlock details

2 Data for various Pipelines transporting hazardous chemicals in the district:

i. Physical data about the pipeline like length, diameter, design

pressure and temperature etc.

ii. Various chemicals transferred through the pipeline

iii. Operating conditions under which the chemical is transferred like

flow rate, temperature and pressure.



iv. Operating philosophy of the pipeline and details of in built safety

features like leak detection and remote isolation facilities etc

v. Safety features like control system and interlock details

3 Meteorological data for Dakshina Kannada based on the historical data

for 30 years published by Indian Meteorological Department (IMD):

i. Wind velocity and direction

ii. Relative humidity

iii. Ambient temperature and pressure

3.3.3 Stages in Consequence Analysis

The main components of Consequence Analysis study are:

1. Failure case identification and definition

2. Simulation of identified scenarios using Simulation software (PHAST-

professional)

3. Analysis of results from consequences calculation

3.3.4 Failure Case Identification and Definition

The first stage in any risk assessment study is to identify the potential accidents

that could result in the release of the hazardous material from its normal

containment. This is achieved by a systematic review of the facilities together with

an effective screening process.

Chemical hazards are generally considered to be of three types:

• Flammable

• Reactive

• Toxic

Where there is the potential for confined gas releases, there is also the potential

for explosions. These often produce overpressures, which can cause fatalities,

both through direct action on the body or through building damage.

The range of possible releases for a given failure case covers a wide spectrum,

from a pinhole leak up to a catastrophic rupture (of a vessel) or full bore rupture



(of a pipeline). However for preparation of the Disaster Management Plan, the

Worst Case Scenarios have been considered for the consequence analysis. This

is to ensure preparedness for worst possible disaster.

For each identified failure case, the appropriate data required to define that case

is input into the PHAST software for consequence modelling.

3.3.5 Dispersion Modelling

Dispersion modelling aims at estimating the distances likely to be affected due to

release of certain quantity of toxic or flammable gas. After release of hazardous

chemical, it mixes with air and forms a flammable or toxic cloud, which could drift

away from the source of release. The flammable cloud could ignite or explode if it

encounters source of ignition. The toxic cloud could affect the site as well as

population in the vicinity. The parameters influencing dispersion are:

1. Density of cloud

In hazard analysis the clouds, which are denser than air are usually of

most concern. Clouds, which are lighter than air will rise upwards and are

therefore likely to disperse faster than denser cloud. Denser cloud would

settle at ground level and travel greater distance before diluting to safe

limits affecting the population in the vicinity.

2. Atmospheric Stability

Atmospheric stability is important with regard to the extent to which it

suppresses or enhances the vertical movement of the cloud in the

atmosphere. Stability is defined in terms of the vertical temperature

gradient in the atmosphere. It is usually described using the system of

categories developed by Pasquill. This system uses 6 categories to cover

unstable, neutral and stable conditions; identified by the letters A - F.

Neutral stability occurs typically when there is total cloud cover and is

designated category D (the temperature gradient = adiabatic lapse rate).

Unstable conditions occur when the sun is shining because the warming

of the ground increases connective turbulence; unstable conditions are

designated by the letters A - C, with A as the least stable condition.



Stable conditions occur on clear, calm nights when the air near the

ground is stratified and free from turbulence, and are designated by the

letters E and F.

For the present study D stability class have been considered.

3. Wind speed and Surface roughness parameter

These factors are discussed together because they combine to influence

local turbulence. The wind usually increases atmospheric turbulence and

accelerates dispersion. The surface roughness of the ground induces

turbulence in the wind, which flows over it, and therefore affects

dispersion.

Since the site is located in industrial zone, but close to coastal area 0.1

Surface Roughness Parameter has been considered for the study.

3.3.6 Flammable consequence Modelling

Consequence modelling for flammable chemicals provides impact distance for

radiation due to pool fire and jet fire.

1. Pool fires & Jet fires

Pool fires and jet fires are common fire types resulting from fires over

pools of liquid of a pressurised release of gas and/or liquid. These

generally tend to be localised in effect and are of concern mainly in

establishing the potential for domino effects and employee safety zones.

Issues relating to spacing of critical equipment, etc. can be addressed on

the basis of specific consequence analysis for a range of possible pool

fires. The effects of a pool fire depend upon factors such as flammability,

combustibility, the amount of material released, temperature, humidity,

the pool size, flame height and tilt of the flame.



2. Flash fire

A Flash fire is a non explosive combustion of a flammable gas-air mixture.

In determining the affected distance for flash fire the ½ LEL dispersion

distance of the flammable cloud is considered.

3.3.7 Consequences of Exposure

Consequential risk zones show the geographical distribution of affected area. The

damage criteria for radiation in case of fire and overpressure effect in case of

explosion have been given in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 respectively.



TABLE 3.3

DAMAGE DUE TO INCIDENT RADIATION INTENSITY

INCIDENT RADIATION

INTENSITY (kW/m2)

TYPE OF DAMAGE

37.5

25

12.5

4.5

1.6

0.7

Sufficient to cause damage to process equipments unless the equipment is fully thermally fire protected (insulation, fire proofing, sprinkler protection etc.). Minimum energy required to ignite wood at infinitely long exposure (non-piloted) and would damage thermally unprotected tanks, equipment, etc. Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood, melting plastic tubing, etc. Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach cover within 20 seconds, blistering of skin (1st degree burns) is likely. Will cause no discomfort to long exposure. Equivalent to solar radiation.



TABLE 3.4 OVERPRESSURE EFFECT OF EXPLOSION

Pressure

(psig) Damage

0.02 Annoying noise (137 dB if of low frequency 10-15 Hz)

0.03 Occasional breaking of large glass windows already under strain

0.04 Loud noise (143 dB), sonic boom glass failure

0.1 Breakage of small windows under strain

0.15 Typical pressure for glass breakage

0.3 “Safe distance” (probability 0.95 no serious damage beyond this value); projectile limit; some damage to house ceiling; 10% window glass broken

0.4 Limited minor structural damage

0.5-1.0 Large and small windows usually shattered; occasional damage to window frames

0.7 Minor damage to house structures

1.0 Partial demolition of houses, made uninhabitable

1-2 Corrugated asbestos shattered; corrugated steel or aluminium panels, fastenings fail followed by buckling wood panels (standard housing) fastening fail, panels blown in

1.3 Steel frame of clad building slightly distorted

2 Partial collapse of walls and roofs of houses

2-3 Concrete or cinder black walls, not reinforced, shattered

2.3 Lower limit of serious structural damage

2.5 50% destruction of brickwork of houses

3 Heavy machines (3000lb) in industrial building suffered little damage; steel frame building distorted and pulled away from foundations

3-4 Frameless, self-framing steel panel building demolished; rupture of oil storage tanks

4 Cladding of light industrial buildings ruptured

5 Wooden utility poles snapped; tall hydraulic press (40,000lb) in building slightly damaged

5-7 Nearly complete destruction of houses

7 Loaded train wagons overturned

7-8 Brick panels, 8-12 in. thick, not reinforced, fail by shearing or flexure

9 Loaded train boxcars completely demolished

10 Probable total destruction of buildings, heavy machines tools (7000lb) moved and badly damaged, very heavy machine tools (12,000lb) survived

300 Limit of crater lip



3.4 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS

The release of hazardous chemical poses fire, explosion or/and toxic hazard.

Chemical release may be due to leakage from gaskets/flange joint, rupture of

pipeline due to over pressure, corrosion or external mechanical impact or liquid

hammer, malfunctioning of equipment or isolation valves, failure of pressure relief

system, failure of unloading hose, etc. These basic causes of failures may be due

to human error, lapse in control system, design error, poor/wrong material of

construction, poor maintenance, wrong operating procedure etc.

The magnitude of consequence depends upon following parameters:

a) Inherent flammable/toxic properties of chemical; for example, propane is

highly flammable but it is relatively non-toxic.

b) Physical state; for example, gaseous chemical releases are more

dangerous than liquid chemical releases (except saturated liquids).

c) Chemicals released at high temperature and pressure could pose severe

risk. For example, consequences arising from release of ammonia from a

storage vessel under pressure and at atmospheric temperature are more

severe than the same release from a storage tank under refrigerated

condition and at atmospheric pressure.

d) The rate of release is proportional to the area of leakage.

e) Inventory of the chemicals; high inventory will pose high risk.

3.4.1 Worst Case Scenarios

Worst Case Scenarios (WCS), which can result into off-site emergencies, were

developed based on the nature and quantity of hazardous chemicals handled in

various industrial units and transported in Dakshina Kannada. The WCS are

listed below with the industries / location handling these chemicals.



TABLE 3.5 – LIST OF WORST CASE SCENARIOS (INDUSTRIAL)

SR.

NAME OF

WORST CASE FAILURE HAZARDOUS

NO. INDUSTRY SCENARIO CHEMICAL 1 NMPT Major LPG leakage at NMPT LPG

2 NMPT Major Ammonia leakage at NMPT Ammonia

3 NMPT/ IOCL

POL fire at IOCL terminal in NMPT Naphtha

4 NMPT/MCF

Ammonia leakage from the storage tank in MCF terminal

Ammonia

5 MCF Failure of Horton sphere of ammonia in MCF Ammonia

6 MCF/ TBPC

Leakage of chlorine tonner in MCF/TBPC Chlorine

7 MCF Naphtha tank fire in MCF Naphtha

8 MRPL Failure of Horton sphere of LPG in MRPL LPG

9 MRPL Multiple failure of Horton spheres of LPG in MRPL

LPG

10 BASF Failure of butadiene storage tank of BASF Butadiene

11 BASF Failure of styrene monomers tank of BASF Styrene

12 KISCO Failure of Blast Furnace Gas pipeline in KISCO

Carbon Monoxide

13 HPCL Failure of MS (petrol) tank in POL terminal of HPCL

Motor Spirit (Petrol)

14 HPCL Failure of HPCL LPG bullet in LPG bottling plant

LPG

15 HPCL Failure of Horton sphere of LPG in MLIF terminal

LPG

16 BPCL Failure of MS (petrol) tank in POL terminal of BPCL


17 BPCL Failure of Horton sphere of LPG in BPCL bottling plant

LPG

18 ELF Failure of Horton sphere of LPG in ELF terminal

LPG

19 Puttur Petro products

Failure of LPG bullet at Puttur Petro Products Pvt. Ltd.

LPG



TABLE 3.5 (CONTD.) – LIST OF WORST CASE SCENARIOS (ROAD / RAIL TRANSPORTATION)

SR.

PROBABLE

WORST CASE FAILURE HAZARDOUS

NO. LOCATION SCENARIO CHEMICAL

1 NH-17 / NH-48

LPG tanker failure LPG

2 NH-17 Ammonia road tanker failure Ammonia

3 All major roads

MS (Petrol) road tanker failure Motor Spirit (Petrol)

4 NH-17 Butadiene tanker failure Butadiene

5 NH-17 Styrene monomer tanker failure Styrene

6 NH-17 Chlorine tonner failure Chlorine

7 Erode line LPG rail tanker failure LPG

8 Selam line MS (Petrol) rail tanker failure Motor Spirit (Petrol)



3.4.2 Consequence Analysis Results

TABLE 3.6 – LIST OF WORST CASE SCENARIOS (INDUSTRIAL)

SR.

NAME OF

WORST CASE FAILURE

HAZARDOUS EFFECTS WIND SPEED /

POOL FIRE / FIRE BALL DIST. IN M

FLASH

FIRE

EXPLOSION EFFECT IN M

IDLH POPUL-ATION

NO. INDUSTRY SCENARIO CHEMICAL CONSIDERED WEATHER CLASS

4 Kw/m2

12.5 kW/m2

37.5 kW/m2

DIST. IN M

0.0207 bar(g)

0.1379 bar(g)

0.2068 bar(g)

DIST IN M

1 NMPT Major LPG leakage at NMPT

LPG Flammable 5 / D 275 159 79 661 571 564 - 563

2 NMPT Ammonia leakage at NMPT

Ammonia Toxic 5 / D - - - - - - - 1872 4136

3 NMPT/ IOCL

POL fire at IOCL terminal in NMPT

Naphtha Flammable 5 / D 58 18 15 - - - - - 30

4 NMPT/MCF

Ammonia leakage from the storage tank in MCF terminal

Ammonia Toxic 5 / D - - - - - - - 6598 51337

5 MCF Failure of Horton sphere of ammonia in MCF

Ammonia Toxic 5 / D - - - - - - - 9990 239529

6 MCF/ TBPC

Leakage of chlorine tonner in MCF/TBPC

Chlorine Toxic 5 / D - - - - - - - 1200 5833

7 MCF/ TBPC

Naphtha tank fire in MCF/TBPC

Naphtha Flammable 5 / D 242 137 79 - - - - - 10

8 MRPL Failure of Horton sphere of LPG in MRPL

LPG Flammable 5 / D 747 427 235 368 840 420 286 - 11854

9 MRPL Multiple failure of Horton sphere of LPG in MRPL

LPG Flammable 5 / D 1086 669 413 462 1082 880 541 - 11854



TABLE 3.6 (CONTD.) – LIST OF WORST CASE SCENARIOS (INDUSTRIAL)

SR.

NAME OF

WORST CASE FAILURE HAZARDOUS EFFECTS WIND

SPEED / POOL FIRE / FIRE BALL

DIST. IN M FLASH FIRE


IDLH POPUL-ATION

NO. INDUSTRY SCENARIO CHEMICAL CONSIDERED

WEATHER CLASS

4Kw/m2

12.5 kW/m2

37.5 kW/m2

DIST. IN M

0.0207bar(g)

0.1379 bar(g)

0.2068bar(g)

DIST IN M

10 BASF Failure of butadiene storage tank of BASF

Butadiene Flammable 5 / D 52 35 23 54 - - - 47 NA

11 BASF Failure of styrene monomers tank of

BASF

Styrene Flammable 5 / D 22 16 6 - - - - - NA

12 KISCO Failure of carbon monoxide pipeline in

KISCO

Carbon Monoxide

Toxic 5 / D -- - - - - - - 237 500

13 HPCL Failure of MS (petrol) tank in POL terminal

of HPCL


Flammable 5 / D 65 22 NR 55 - - - - NA

N.A. = Not Applicable (Within the industry premises) The population figures given in the table indicate the total population in the possible affected zone. Actual affected population during any disaster would be only a fraction of this due to following : 1. Only the population in prevailing wind direction would be affected. 2. The actual failure during any disaster may be less severe although worst case scenarios have been considered for arriving at these figures. 3. It is presumed that none of the mitigative measures work during any disaster. However in practise, these mitigative measures help in reducing the

impact



TABLE 3.6 (CONTD.) – LIST OF WORST CASE SCENARIOS (INDUSTRIAL)

SR.

NAME OF


SPEED / POOL FIRE / FIRE

BALL/BLEVE DIST. IN M

FLASH FIRE


IDLH POPUL-ATION

NO. INDUSTRY SCENARIO CHEMICAL CONSIDERED WEATHER CLASS

4Kw/m2

12.5 kW/m2

37.5 kW/m2

DIST. IN M

0.0207bar(g)

0.1379 bar(g)

0.2068bar(g)

DIST IN M

14 HPCL Failure of HPCL LPG bullet in LPG bottling

plant

LPG Flammable 5 / D 525 298 163 243 928 291 225 - 2511

15 HPCL Failure of Horton sphere of LPG in

MLIF terminal

LPG Flammable 5 / D 987 612 402 465 1023 850 413 - 9915

16 BPCL Failure of MS (petrol) tank in POL terminal

of BPCL


Flammable 5 / D 58 42 31 - - - - - NA

17 BPCL Failure of Horton sphere of LPG in

BPCL bottling plant

LPG Flammable 5 / D 623 410 213 504 1180 302 232 - 6341

18 ELF Failure of Horton sphere of LPG in ELF

terminal

LPG Flammable 5 / D 1023 612 386 694 1270 312 256 - 10216

19 Puttur Petro products

Failure of LPG bullet at Puttur Petro

Products Pvt. Ltd.

LPG Flammable 5 / D 440 298 163 153 720 126 118 - NA

20 Water Works Bendoor

Chlorine tonner failure

Chlorine Toxic 5 / D - - - - - - - 1200 6000

Thumbe Chlorine tonner failure

Chlorine Toxic 5 / D - - - - - - - 1200 2000



TABLE 3.6 (CONTD.) – LIST OF WORST CASE SCENARIOS (TRANSPORTATION)

SR.

PROBABLE


SPEED / POOL FIRE / FIRE BALL

DIST. IN M FLASH FIRE


IDLH

NO. LOCATION SCENARIO CHEMICAL CONSIDERED WEATHER CLASS

4 Kw/m2

12.5 kW/m2

37.5 kW/m2

DIST. IN M

0.0207 bar(g)

0.1379 bar(g)

0.2068 bar(g)

DIST IN M

1 NH-17 / NH-48

LPG tanker failure LPG Flammable 5 / D 410 232 126 125 861 223 173

2 NH-17 Ammonia road tanker failure

Ammonia Toxic 5 / D 169 93 42 37 374 96 74 329

3 All major roads

MS (Petrol) road tanker failure


Flammable 5 / D 76 28 22 55 - - - -

4 NH-17 Butadiene tanker failure

Butadiene Flammable 5 / D 210 117 62 292 570 184 153 864

5 NH-17 Styrene monomer tanker failure

Styrene Flammable 5 / D - - - - 41 20 19 -

6 NH-17 Chlorine tonner failure

Chlorine Toxic 5 / D - - - - - - - 1200

7 Erode line LPG rail tanker failure LPG Flammable 5 / D 478 272 148 142 1021 264 204 -

8 Selam line MS (Petrol) rail tanker failure


Flammable 5 / D 98 36 30 73 - - - -



3.4.3 Discussion on Consequence Analysis

The results of the Consequence Analysis study have been summarised in the

tables given above. This gives the impact distances under worst weather

conditions. The actual impact distances during any emergency would be lesser

depending on the weather conditions prevailing at that time. These impact

distances give an idea to the district administration the extent to which the

evacuation of the general public is required during any toxic gas release. In case

of flammable gas release like LPG, the district authorities should ensure the wind

direction which may keep changing on a continuos basis. This aspect should be

taken into consideration during the evacuation operation.

Attached below is the Mangalore taluka map depicting location and impact

distances for worst case scenario of various MAH units which are concentrated

around Panambur area in the district.

For detailed information on each of the MAH unit, villages that are likely to get

affected during emergency along with exposed population are given under

ANNEXURE – 1 of this report.



To enclose Pouch with map



TABLE OF CONTENTS

3. CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS ..................................................................................... 1

3.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1

3.2 RANKING OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS ........................................................... 1

3.3 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS - THEORY .............................................................. 5

3.3.1 PHAST PROFESSIONAL SOFTWARE PACKAGE .................................................... 5

3.3.2 DATA REQUIREMENTS ........................................................................................ 5

3.3.3 STAGES IN CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS .................................................................. 6

3.3.4 FAILURE CASE IDENTIFICATION AND DEFINITION .................................................. 6

3.3.5 DISPERSION MODELLING .................................................................................... 7

3.3.6 FLAMMABLE CONSEQUENCE MODELLING ............................................................. 8

3.3.7 CONSEQUENCES OF EXPOSURE .......................................................................... 9

3.4 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS .............................................................................. 12

3.4.1 WORST CASE SCENARIOS ................................................................................ 12

3.4.2 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS RESULTS .................................................................. 15

3.4.3 DISCUSSION ON CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS ........................................................ 19


Disaster Management Plan for Dakshina Kannada 4-1�

4. AGENCIES & INFRASTRUCTURE

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The revenue administration for Dakshina Kannada District is headed by the

Dy. Commissioner (D.C.) whose office is based at Mangalore. He is assisted by

the Additional District Magistrate (ADM), also called the Head Quarter Assistant

(HQA) of D.C., stationed at Mangalore. There are two Assistant Commissioners

for the district – one for Mangalore and Bantwal talukas, the other for Puttur,

Sullia and Belthangady talukas.

The talukas are headed by the Tahshildars who are based at the taluka head

quarters and report to respective Assistant Commissioners. Each taluka is further

divided into number of Nadakacheris, which are headed by Dy. Tahshildars.

4.2 AGENCIES INVOLVED IN DISASTER MANAGEMENT

The Dy. Commissioner has the overall responsibility in handling any disaster in

the district and is assisted by his team as described above. However, during any

disaster, many activities have to be carried out at a short notice. Hence, the Dy.

Commissioner needs to be ably assisted by other departments in the district.

Keeping this in view, a District Crisis Management Group has been formed under

the provisions of Environment Protection Act 1986 & Chemical Accidents-

Emergency Planning Preparedness and Response.

The District Crisis Management Group for Dakshina Kannada comprises of

members from various government departments, major industries and institutions

in the district.

The members of District Crisis Management Group are as follows :

1. Sri. V.Ponnuraj., I.A.S

Deputy Commissioner D.K. District, Mangalore

: Chairman 2220588

2. Head Quarters Asst. to Deputy Commissioner Dakshina Kannada, Mangalore

: Emergency Officer 2420550

3. Sri. A.S.Rao., I.P.S : Member 2220503



Superintendent of Police Dakshina Kannada, Mangalore

4. District Commandant Home guards and civil Defence Maidan Road, Mangalore

: Member 2220562

5. Div. Fire Officer Telecom Road, Mangalore

: Member 2441561

6. District Health Officer Maidan Road, Mangalore

: Member 2423168

7. Deputy Chief Controller of Explosives Hampankatta, Mangalore

: Member 2441588

8. Regional Environmental Officer, Baikampady Industrial Area, Mangalore -575011

: Member 2406586/ 2408239

9. Commissioner, Mangalore City Corporation, Lalbagh, Mangalore

: Member 2456557

10. Regional Transport Officer, Maidan Road, Mangalore

: Member 2423476

11. Executive Engineer Public Health Engg. Dept. Maidan Road, Mangalore

: Member 2423168 2425080

12. Information and Publicity Officer, Maidan Road, Mangalore

: Member 2424254

13. Joint Director of Agriculture Maidan Road, Mangalore

: Member 2424003 2423601

14. Trade Union Leader

: Member

15. Vice President MRPL. Kuthethoor, Katipalla

: Member 3955890

16. Professor NITK, Surathkal

: Member 2474000 Exn:3601 9448858691

17. Medical Supdt. KMC. Attavar, Mangalore

: Member 2445851

18. Vice President (Mfg.),

MCF, Panambur, Mangalore

: Member 2220602

19. General Manager, MRPL . Kuthethoor, Katipalla.

: Member 2219101

20. Assistant Commissioner Puttur

: Member 08251-620357

21. Dy.Director of Factories Mangalore

: Member Secretary 2451716



In addition to the above the following authorities have been included as permanent invitees:

1. Asst. Commissioner Mangalore Sub. Dn.

2420187

2. Dist. Surgeon Govt. Wenlock Hospital Mangalore

2445664

3. Executive Engineer National Highways

4. Inspector of Dock Safety Panambur

2407781

5. Supdt. Engineer Public Works Dept.

2423516

6. Supdt. Engineer KEB

2443549

7. Asst. Executive Engineer, KEB 2424149

During any disaster, apart from the above member agencies, help may need to

be mobilised from a number of non-governmental agencies like voluntary

organisations, social service organisations, private hospitals and private transport

operators.

The departments and agencies, which will be involved in execution of the

Disaster Management Plan are:

1. DC Office / Taluka offices.

2. City Corporation

3. Police Department

4. Inspectorate of Factories

5. District Fire Services

6. Home Guard (Civil defence services)

7. Health Department

8. Public Works Department

9. Irrigation Department

10. Food Department

11. Drug Controller

12. Meteorological Department



13. Pollution Control Board

14. Forest Department

15. New Mangalore Port Trust

16. Coast Guard

17. Airport Authority

18. Regional Transport Office

19. Southern Railways

20. KSRTC

21. All Industries – MCF/MRPL/BASF etc.

4.3 INFRASTRUCTURE OF VARIOUS AGENCIES

Under this section, the set up of various agencies involved is elaborated along

with the infrastructure facilities available for facing any disaster. Observations

have also been made about shortcomings or deficiencies under each

department, which may be considered by the district administration. The

information given in this chapter has been collected by the study team during

their visit to various departments and observations made by them.

4.3.1 DC Office / Taluka Offices

(Refer the organisation chart on page no. 4-5)

4.3.2 City Corporation

Mangalore city has a separate corporation headed by the Commissioner. The

elected officials are Mayor/ Dy. Mayor etc.. The contact details of the key

members of the city corporation are as follows.

Sr No. Name Telephone No.

1. Commissioner 2456557 (O)

2457279

2. Mayor 2456457 (O)

5553653 (R)

3. Dy. Mayor 2456567 (O)



DEPUTY COMMISSIONER (DC) OFFICE ORGANISATION CHART

Dy. Commissioner (DC)

Dakshina Kannada 2420140 (0) / 2441944 (R)

Additional District Magistrate (HQ Assistant to DC)

2420550

Asst. Commissioner (AC) Mangalore 2420108

Asst. Commissioner (AC) Puttur

08251-230357

Tahsildar Puttur

08251-230349

Tahsildar Sulia

08257-600330

Tahsildar Beltangady ,08256-302047

Tahsildar Mangalore 2420187

Dy. Tahsildar Office

(2 nos.)

Dy. Tahsildar Mulki

Dy. Tahsildar Pane Mangalore

Dy. Tahsildar Vittla

Dy. Tahsildar Kadaba

Dy. Tahsildar Uppinangudy

Tahsildar Bantwal 232120

Dy. Tahsildar Gurpur

Dy. Tahsildar Moodabidri

Dy. Tahsildar Panja

Dy. Tahsildar Office (3 nos.)

Dy. Tahsildar Venur

Dy. Tahsildar Kokkada






The city corporation has following infrastructure which may be useful for the

district administration in handling any emergency.

Sr

No. Type of Infrastructure No. Location

1. Earth moving equipment. 1 Travellers Bungalow,

Pandeshwar

2. Water Tankers 2 Treatment Plant,

Bendoor Well

In addition to above there are following medical dispensaries where medical

attention to affected people may be provided during any emergency.

Sr no Location Doctors Contact no

1. Lady hill 1

2. Attavar 1

3. Urva stores 1

4. Bejai 1

5. Jeppu (Maternity) 1

6. Bunder (Unani) 1

4.3.3 Police Department

The police department in the district is headed by Superintendent of Police (SP),

Dakshina Kannada. The SP is assisted by one Additional SP who is also

stationed at Mangalore. Under him there are three SDPOs who are based at

Panambur, Mangalore City and Puttur.



Following are the contact numbers of key police personnel in the district

Designation Telephone - Office Telephone – Res.

1. SP 2220503 2220504

2. ASP 2220505 2220506

3. SDPO,

Mangalore Sub-div

2220514 2220515

4. SDPO, Panambur 2220526 2220527

5. SDPO, Puttur 08251-230500 08251-230606



ORGANISATION CHART - DAKSHINA KANNADA DISTRICT - POLICE FORCE Control Room:2220500

SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE Office : 2220503 Resi : 2220504

SDPO .DCRB (O) 2220513

PI.DCIB O: 2220558

PI.DSB Tel. :2220511

PI.FPB Tel.:

RPI.DAR Tel.:2220512

PSI.DSA Tel.:

EXCISE SUPDT

Tel.:2457665

SDPO MANGALORE SUB-DIVISION Office :2220514

Mangalore North PS O: 2220516

BARKE PS Tel.:2220522

Mangalore South PS. O: 2220518

Mangalore Port PS. Tel. :

Mangalore East PS. Tel. : 2220520

Urva PS Tel.: 2220521

Women PS O: 2220525

CPI.Traffic Circle Tel.:2220523

Traffic West.PS Tel.: 2220524

Traffic East PS. Tel.: 2220523

SDPO PANAMBUR SUB-DIVISION O: 2220526 R:2220527

CPI. Mangalore Rural O:2220535 R:2426221

Mangalore Rural PS Tel.:2220535

Ullal PS Tel.: 2466269

Konaje PS Tel.: 2220536

Panambur PS Tel.: 2220530

Bajpe PS Tel.: 220531

CPI.Panambur O:2220528R:2220509

CPI.MulkyCircle O:2290560R:2293133

Mulky PS Tel.: 2290533

Moodabidri PS Tel.: 0858-236333(o) 238743 (R)

Surathkal PS. Tel.:2220540

SDPO PUTTUR SUB-DIVISION 08251-230500

PI. Puttur Town PS. Tel.: 08251-230555

CPI Puttur Rural Circle Tel.: 08251-251055

CPI. Sulia Circle Tel.: 08257-305051

CPI. Bantwal Circle Tel.: 0855-235000

CPI. Belthangady Circle Tel.: 08256-232093

Puttur Rural PS. Tel.:08251-232102

Kadaba PS. Tel.:260044

Uppinangady PS. Tel.: 251055

Nellyadi O.P. Tel.:254101

Subramanya PS. Tel.: 08257-281250

Sulia PS. Tel.:230337

Bellare O.P. Tel.:271995

Bantwal Town PS Tel. :08255-232111

Bantwal Rural PS Tel.: 31000

Vittala P.S. Tel.: 239233

Venoor PS. Tel.: 286232

Belthangady PS. Tel.: 232093

Dhrmasthala O.P. Tel.: 277253

Punjalakatte O.P. Tel.: 259375

ADDITIONAL SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICEOffice : 2220505 Resi : 2220506



The List of Police Stations in the district along with manning details and vehicle availability is as per the list below.

Tel. No. PI SI ASI HC PC No. of Vehicles Jeep Tempo 2 wheeler

Mangalore Taluka Mangalore City Bunder (Mangalore North).

2220516 1 2 5 14 33 1 1 3

Pandeshwar (Mangalore South)

2220518 1 2 6 16 38 1 1 2

Kadri (Mangalore East)

2220520 1 2 4 13 30 1 1 -

Mangalore Port 420496 - 2 2 10 30 - - 1 Urva 2220521 - 2 2 10 34 1 - 1 Kulshekhar (Mangalore Rural)

2220535 - 2 2 7 21 1 - -

Women P.S. 2220525 1 1 2 6 24 1 - 1 Traffic (E) 2220523 - 2 4 10 46 - - 2 Traffic (W) 2220524 - 2 4 10 46 - - 2Barke 2220522 - 2 2 10 30 1 - 1 Panambur 2220526

/220536 - 1 2 7 21 - 1 -

Surathkal 2220540 - 1 2 6 24 1 - 1 Mulky 2220539

2290560- 1 2 7 21 1 - -

Bajpe 2220531 - 1 2 7 21 1 - - Moodabidri 236333 - 1 2 7 21 1 - - Konaje 2220536 - 1 2 6 24 - - 1 Ullal 2466269 - 2 2 10 30 1 - 1 Tel. No. PI SI ASI HC PC No. of Vehicles Jeep Tempo 2

Wheeler Bantwal Taluka Bantwal 232111 - 2 2 10 30 1 - 1 Bantwal Rural 235000 - 1 2 7 21 1 - - Bantwal Vittal 239233 - 1 2 7 21 1 - - Belthangady Taluka Belthangady 232093 - 1 2 9 33 1 - 1 Veneer 286232 - 1 2 7 21 - - 1 Puttur Taluka Puttur Town 230555 1 2 3 11 34 1 - 2 Sampya (Puttur Rural)

232102 251055

- 1 2 7 21 1 - -

Uppinangady 251055 - 1 2 8 25 1 - - Sullia Taluka Sullia 230337 - 2 4 10 29 1 - - Subramaaya 281250 1 2 7 21 1 - - Kadaba 260044 - 1 2 7 21 - - -



Location of Police Stations / Chowkis along the National / State Highways

N.H. 17 1. Mulky P.S. 2290560

2. Surathkal P.S. 2220540

3. Panambur P.S. 2220536 N.H.48 1. Bantwal Town P.S. 232111

2. Uppinangady P.S. 251055

3. Shirady Out post at Udane N.H. 13 1. Mangalore Rural P.S. 2220535

2. Moodabidri P.S. 236333 State Highway to Mysore 1. Puttur Town P.S. 230555

2. Puttur Rural P.S. 232102

251055

3. Sulia P.S. 230337

4. Bantwal Rural P.S. 235000

5. Belthangady P.S. 232093

4.3.4 Inspectorate of Factories & Boilers

This department is headed by Dy. Chief Inspector of factories assisted by

Sr. Factory Inspector and Boiler Inspector. Their primary function is to ensure

safe running of all the industries by ensuring compliance to various applicable

rules and regulations. They also ensure that the MAH units are well prepared to

face any on-site emergency. This is achieved by preparation of On-site

emergency Plan for each of these units and conducting regular mock drills.

The role of Factory Inspector during any emergency would be advisory in nature

and he will help the district administration in co-ordination with various industries

and other experts during any emergency for its effective handling.

Following are the contact details of this department:

Sr no Designation Contact no

1. Dy. Director of Factories 2451716 (O)

2. Sr.Asst. Director of Factories 2451716 (O),

3. Sr. Asst. Director of Boiler 2451716(O)

2458828 (R )



4.3.5 District Fire Services

Divisional Fire Officer heads the District Fire Services Department who reports to

Director - Fire Services based at Bangalore. The Div. Fire Officer for Dakshina

Kannada is stationed at Fire Services Office located at Pandeshwara in

Mangalore and is assisted by one Station Officer who is also the in-charge of the

Pandeshwar fire station.

In all there are five municipal fire stations in the district. The main fire station for

Dakshina Kannada is located at Pandeshwar and other four are located at Kadri

(in Mangalore city), Mudabidri (in Mangalore Taluka), Puttur and Belthangady.

There are no fire stations in Bantwal and Sullia talukas.

Following are the contact details of this department


1. Divisional Fire Officer, Pandeshwar 2441561

2. Fire Station, Mangalore (Pandeshwar) 101, 2423333

3. Fire Station, Mangalore (Kadri) 2213192

4. Fire Station, Moodbidri 08258 - 237021

5. Fire Station, Belthangady 08256 - 232621

6. Fire Station, Puttur 08251- 232101

Manpower

Following are the details of manpower availability at each of the fire station.

1. Mangalore – Pandeshwara Fire Station

Designation No.

Station Officer 1

Sub Officer 1

Asst. Sub Officer 1

Leading Fire Man 8

Driver Mechanic 2



Drivers 13

Fire Men 40

Total 66

2. At each of the other fire stations at Kadri, Moodbidri, Belthangady and

Puttur the man power is

Designation No.

Sub Officer 1

Asst. Sub Officer 1

Leading Fire Man 4

Driver Mechanic 1

Drivers 4

Fire Men 16

Total 27

Facilities Available

The infrastructure available at each of the fire stations are as given below:

Location No. fire

tenders

Other vehicle Water availability

Pandeshwar -

Mangalore

4 Rescue van – 1

Water tankers – 2

Jeep -

Lalbaug,

Netravathi and Gurpur rivers

Kadri - Mangalore 2 Water tankers – 2

Jeep -

MCF Hydrant points

Moodbidri 1 Water tankers – 1

Jeep -

Borewell at Kamchal Katte

and

Hosangady River

Belthangady 1 Water tankers – 1

Jeep -

Layla and

Guruvayankere Rivers

Puttur 2 Water tankers – 1

Jeep -

Well near Arun talkies

Mahalingeswara lake temple



Rescue Vehicle provided at Pandeshwar is equipped with:

1. D. G. Set

2. Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) (3 no)

3. Power operated saw

4. Chain saw

5. Ropes

6. Gas Mask

7. Explosive meter

8. Smoke Extractor

9. Power operated towing machine

Communication

Following are the Communication facilities available at various fire stations :

- The fire station at Pandeshwar, Mangalore is connected to the

Pandeshwar telephone exchange and the Airport through hot lines.

- VHF base station is located at respective fire station and the fire tenders

are equipped with wireless sets.

- All the fire stations are connected by telephone system (EPABX)

4.3.6 Civil Defence - Home Guards

Dakshina Kannada District has 8 units of home guards for the district. The

District Commandant heads the Home Guards Department and is supported by

Dy. Commandant, instructors (two) and about 600 home guards, some of whom

are specially trained in rescue and various other emergency fields of civil

defence.

Following are the contact details of this department:


1. Commandant 2220562 (O), 2220563 (R)

2. Dy. Commandant 2220562 (O), 2420335 (R)



The number of home guards Taluka-wise break-up is as follows:

Taluka M F Total

Mangalore 243 44 287

Bantwal 44 - 44

Belthangady 60 - 60

Puttur 104 - 104

Sullia 104 - 104

Total 599

Communication and Transport

The homeguards depend on police for communication and transportation

requirements.

Roles and Duties

District Commandant/Dy. Commandant will position themselves in the Control

Room and keep themselves in continuous contact with the field officer/units.

Any additional help required would be mobilised from the control room. This help

could be mobilised from the neighbouring districts depending on their proximity to

the site of emergency.

Field Officers

Field Officers would handle the emergency along with their guards, keeping in

mind the safety of persons, property and environment.

Evacuated areas would need to be guarded against looting.

Training

As the home guards form an important wing during any emergency operation,

regular refresher training and mock drills need to be conducted on an annual

basis when the full force compliment should attend compulsorily.

Selected Officers should be sent as observers to other districts and states during

mock drills.



MCF has about 300 persons trained in height rescue, but, this resource may not

be available at the disposal of the Commandant.



The details of trained Personnel are give below :

Statement showing the Homeguard personnel trained in different aspects of Civil

Defence

1. First-Aid Training 37

2. Rescue Course 46

3. Flood Rescue Course 64

4. Fire Fighting Course 28

5. Traffic Control and Crowd Control 26

6. Weapon Training 89

7. Unarmed combat Training 24

8. Wireless Operators Course 26

9. Civil Defence Course 14

10. Leadership Course 27

11. Disaster Management Course 02

12. Camouflage and concealment Course 01

13. Unexploded Bomb detection and disposal Course 01

14. Nuclear, Chemical and Biological warfare Course 01

15. Radiological Monitoring and sheltering course 01

16. Civil Defence Planner’s Course 02

17. Maintenance of Essential Service Course 02

18. Communication Course 02

19. Civil Defence Wardens Course 02

The rescue equipments available with the homeguards are :

Two boats with rescue equipment

one at Head Quarters

one at Bantwal Taluka

Life lines

Life jackets 20 Nos.

Jerseys

Equipment for handling house collapse Crowbars.

Private boats identified for

hire during flood emergency

12



The rescue equipment for handling an emergency should include:

1. Self contained breathing apparatus 8 sets (one hour

capacity along with

spare cylinders).

2. Aluminised fire suits 8 sets

3. Canister gas mask for carbon

monoxide gas, Ammonia gas,

Chlorine gas, Acidic/Organic vapours.

25 Nos. with spare

canisters for each type

of chemical.

4. Dust mask 100 Nos.

5. Ambulance 2 fully equipped with

driver

6. Chemical suits 8 Nos.

7. Search light assembly. 8 sets

8. Portable DG sets 8 sets

9. Aluminium boats with OBMs 8

10. Compact vehicles (12-15 seaters) 8

11. VHF/Mobile telephone sets 8

12. Two wheelers 8

4.3.7 Health Department

Health department plays a very crucial following the aftermath of a disaster as

specialised health care needs to be provided to large number of affected persons

with out wasting valuable time. Hence help may have to be taken from all

hospitals in the District, both government and private, during any emergency.

Following are the contact details of this department


1. District Health Officer 2423168 (O)/2445644

2455216 (R)

2. District Family Welfare Officer 2423632 (O)



Following are the list of Government Hospitals in the district with contact details

Sr. No.

Taluka Hospital Telephone

Mangalore 1. Kateel 2200097 2. Bajpe 2252620 3. Surathkal 2475720 4. Ganjimata 732315 5. Ullal 2466709 6. Ketekar 740426 7. Mulki 722562 8. Moodabidri 60536

Bantwal 1. Bantwal CHC 233332 2. Punjalkatte 279264 3. Vamadapadav 282253 4. Kurnad 5. Manchi 276221 6. Mani 274264 7. Vittal 239366 8. Adyanadka 270308 9. Peruvai 237260

Puttur

1. Puttur G.H. 230338 2. Kadaba 260022 3. Nelyadi 254262 4. Uppinanafgady 251104 5. Keila 258383 6. Thingalady 276214

Sullia

1. Bellare 271096 2. Subramanye 281302 3. Sullia 230479 4. Kellamogaru 232116

Belthangady 1. Naravi 2. Belthangady 232116 3. Dharmasthala 277288 4. Ujire 236350 5. Kekkada



Following is the list of availability of specialists at various government hospitals

Tel. No. Specialist Ambulance X Ray Unit

Mangalore Bajpe Govt. Hospital 2252620 - 1 - Suratkal Govt. Hospital 2475720 1 (Ortho) - - Mulki Govt. Hospital 2922562 - 1 1 Moodabadri Govt. Hospital - 1 - Bantwal Bantwal CHC 233332 1 (Ortho) 1 1 Vamadapadav CHC - 1 - Puttur Puttur G.H. 1 (Ortho) 1 1 Sullia Sullia G.H. - 1 1

Proposed Belthangady Belthangady G.H. - 1 1

Following are the list of Blood Banks in the district

Sr no Blood Bank Telephone Nos.

Mangalore Taluka

1. Wenlock Dist. Hospital, Mangalore 2425038, 2424522 (RMO),

2425038,2410701,2445664

2. University Medical Centre, Jyothi Circle, Mangalore (KMC)

2444590

3. Athena Hospital, Falneer Road, Mangalore

2442834/ 36

4. Father Mullers Hospital, Karkanady 2436301/2434774

5. Mangalore Nursing Home, Balmatta, Mangalore 1

2218568, 2221354

6. City Hospital & Diagnostic and Research Centre, Mangalore 3

2217901 – 06

7. Kshema, Deralakatte, Mangalore Taluk, DK Dist. (attached to Justice K.S. Hegde Memorial Hospital)

2204471

Puttur Taluka

8. Rotary-cum-Blood Bank, Radhakrishna Building. Puttur

234242



Facilities available with Hospitals attached to Medical Colleges :

University Medical Centre K.M.C. Attavar Yenapoya Hospital

Fr. Muller Hospital, Kankanady

Hegde Memorial

1. No. of beds 120 450 220 950 400

2. Number of Doctors/specialists

95 (specialist) 320 support staff

62 200 280

3. Trauma Centre Emergency Section 5 (includes operation theatre)

- 1 -

4. Number of X ray machines

3 8 2 9 2

5. Burn ward Proposed 09 beds. Additionally 03 more beds.

- Available 10 beds

6. Blood Bank Zonal blood testing Centre. - Available -

7. No. of ICUs 26 beds 03 Post operative beds

10 beds 3 2 8 beds

8. Number of Ambulances

Two 1 4 2

9. Laboratory Integrated Lab facility (Pathology, micro biology

and Bio chemistry)

1 Available 1

10. Phone Numbers 444590 to 599 496851 (8 lines) 0824-436301 /432688 704471 - 75

11. Operation Theatres 06 (Total) 4 5 (Total) 9 7 (Total)

12. Scanning Available at sister unit KMC Hospital, Attavar

Yes - Available



Following are the list of Trauma Centres in the district with details

Sr no Trauma Centre Beds Telephone No.

1. Wenlock District Hospital, Mangalore

15 2425038

2. Unity Health Complex, Highland, Mangalore

15 2432771/2/3

3. Highland Hospital, Highland, Mangalore

5 2431025

2437374

4. SCS Hospital, Bendoor, Mangalore 10 2225201/02/03

5. City Hospital, Kadri, Mangalore 4 2217901/02/03

6. Indira Hospital, Falneer, Mangalore 1 2431333, 2431444

7. Vijaya Clinic, Near Bunts Hostel, Mangalore

5

2217978, 2216406

8. Mangalore Nursing Home, Mangalore

3 2218617, 2218568



Following are the list of Private Hospitals / Nursing homes in the district

Sr no Name Doctors Contact no

MANGALORE TALUKA 1. Dr. T.M.A. Pai Rotary Hospital, Bijai 2212744

2. Dr. Boloors Nursing Home, Urva Stores 2459013

3. Mangalore Nursing Home, Balmata 2218316 221354

4. City Hospital, Kadri 2217904/05

5. Kadri Maternity Hospital, Mallikatte

6. Vijaya Clinic, Kadri 2219877

7. Vinaya Clinic, Karangalpady 2494150

8. Krishna Nursing Home, Pinto lane 2494499

2493344

9. Suvarna Nursing Home, Kulshekar 2211651

10. Padmashri Hospital, Nanthur 2211555

11. S.C.S. Hospital, Bendoor 2225201/02/03

12. Sri Sai Nursing Home, Bendoor 2218662

13. Gadiyar Nursing Home, Ballalbaug

14. Devi Nursing Home, Karangalpady 2495660

15. Glen View Nursing Home, Light House Hill, Balmata

16. Jayashree Nursing Home K S Rao Road, Hampankatta 2440263

17. Srinivas Nursing Home, Alake 2495459

18. Bhats Nursing Home, Gandhinagar 2457646

19. Manorama Nursing Home, Alake




20. Dr. Navinchandra Nursing Home, BEM School Street 2492535

21. Surgical Nursing Home, A.B. Shetty Circle 2426699

22. Dr. Adappa Nursing Home, Telecom Hse Road 2441644

23. Mangala Nursing Home, Kadri 2443088/2443446,

24. Vijaya Clinic and Nursing Home, Bunts Hostel Road 2217978/ 2216406

25. Madani Hospital, Ullal

26. J.S. Hospital, Kotekar 2466272/2466548

27. Niyacha Nursing Home, Talapadi


BELTHANGADY TALUKA

1. Raghavendra Nursing Home, Belthangady 302061

2. St. Joseph Health Center, Kakkinji

3. TB Sanatorium, Laila

BANTWAL TALUKA 1. Saraswathi Nursing Home, Bantwal 233247

2. Lavanya Nursing Home, BC Road 233222

3. Parlia Nursing Home, BC Road 233284

4. Somayaji Nursing Home, BC Road 232268

5. Pragathi Nursing Home, Panemangalur

6. Radha Nursing Home, Phirangipet

7. Padma Clinic, Siddakatte

8. Krishna Clinic, Panemangalur

9. Janatha Clinic, Panemangalur



PUTTUR TALUKA 1. St. Martin D Pauras Hospital, Shiradi

2. Bhats Nursing Home, Uppinangady

3. Shenoy Nursing Home, Uppinangady

4. Nisarga Health Center, Puttur

5. Srinivas Nursing Home, Puttur 230985

6. Prathima Nursing Home, Puttur

7. Dhanvantary Clinic, Puttur 230327/238727

8. Girija Clinic, Puttur 230499/236326

9. Satya Sai Hospital, Puttur 230935

10. Patravo Hospital, Puttur 233183

11. Chetna Hospital (08251) 231901/02/03


SULLIA TALUKA 1. Bharadwaj Clinic, Bellare

2. Kurunjanskar Hospital, Sullia

3. N N M Hospital, Sullia

4. Jyothis Hospital, Sullia 230411

5. Dr. Venkappayya Clinic, Navur

6. Kurunjikars General Hospital



4.3.8 Public Works Department (PWD)

Public Works Department have an important role both during handling of an

emergency as well as during restoration phase once the emergency is over.

PWD is responsible for maintaining roads and other infrastructure in the district,

which are very crucial for effective handling of any emergency. PWD would

mobilise earth-moving equipment to help in mitigation of any emergency.

Following are the contact details


1. Supt. Engineer 2423516 (O),

2455626 (R)

2. Executive Engineer 2423169 (O),

2455753 (R)

Following are the contact details of Registered Contractors (Class III and IV)

Sr. no Name & Address of the Contractor Special Equipment Contact No.

1. Sri K. Mahabala, Suvarna, Yeyyadi, Mangalore 575 008

Drilling rig 2211587 9448142587

2. Shri M.G. Hussain, 'Munna Cottage", Chockkabettu, Surathkal

Drilling rig 2476446 9845108446

3. Sri M. Mohammed, Kabaka, Puttur J.C.B.

9448012168

4. Sri Shekar Shetty, 'Devi Prasad', Kinnigoli, Mangalore Tq.

J.C.B., Drilling rig 9448477242

5. Sri G. Balraj, N.G.Road, Attavara, Mangalore

J.C.B., Drilling rig

6. M/s Lof Constructions, Kasaragod J.C.B.

7. Sri T.K. Mahin Haji, Chettanchal, Kasaragod

J.C.B., Drilling rig

8. Sri T.K. Rajan, Surathkal J.C.B., Drilling rig 2407958

4.3.9 Irrigation Department

During the flood emergency in the district, irrigation department monitors the level

in the various rivers and reservoirs and pass on the information to the district



administration for precautionary operations like evacuation of people living in low-

lying area. During the normal times, the irrigation department takes various

preventive steps especially just before the onset of monsoon to minimise the

effects of the flood.



1. Executive Engineer

2440720 (O),

2453945 (R)

2442265 (fax)

4.3.10 Food Department

During any major natural disaster like cyclone or earthquake, many people may

be displaced from their homes and the district administration would rehabilitate

these persons in the temporary shelters as identified by the district

administration. The food Department ensures proper supply of various food

commodities to the affected people. The department may have to mobilise ration

from go-downs in neighbouring districts if sufficient stocks are not available or the

go-down themselves are damaged or destroyed.



1. Deputy Director 2420101 (O),

2459336 (R)

4.3.11 Drug Controller

During any epidemic in the district or during aftermath of any disasters, there is

requirement of life saving medicines, vaccines in large quantities to prevent

spreading to larger areas. The Drug controller of the district in coordination with

the DHO is responsible for maintaining the stock of medicines and make them

available during the time of need.





1. Drug Controller 2218451

2. DHO 2423168(O),2455216 (R)

Following is list of 24 hours Medical Stores

Sr. No. Name and address Telephone No.

1 Fr. Muller’s Hospital & Medical Stores,

Kankanady, Mangalore – 2

2436301

2434774/2435156

2 M/s. High Land Hospital

Research and Diagnostic Centre, Mangalore – 2

2433953 / 2431025

2437347/2437374

3 M/s. Omega Hospital Pharmacy

Omega Hospital Premises, Pumpwell, Mangalore –2

2430000 / 2430188

4 University Medical Centre,

Jyothi Circle, Mangalore-1

2444590

5 Vijaya Clinic Pharmacy

Bunts Hospel Road, Mangalore

2444677 / 2217978

2216406

6 Mangalore Nursing Home

Bendoorwell, Balmatta Road, Mangalore –1

2218316

7 S.C.S Hospital Pharmacy

Near Collectors Gate, Bendoorwell,

Mangalore-2

2225201/02/03

8 M/s KMC Hospital Pharmacy

Attavara, Mangalore-1

2445858 / 2445850

9 Unity Hospital & Research Centre,

Highlands, Felnir, Mangalore.

2432771/72/73

2431025 / 2437374

4.3.12 Pollution Control Board

The pollution control board is responsible for prevention of any damage to

environment during any large-scale release of hazardous chemical from industrial

or other installations. The officials of this department should ensure proper

actions are taken to minimise the effects during any emergency.





1. Executive officer 2406586 (O), 2491579(R)

4.3.13 Forest Department

The District Forest Officer heads the forest department in the district. The district

is divided into 3 sub divisions namely Mangalore, Puttur and Subramanya, which

are headed by an ` Assistant Conservator of Forests (ACF). Under each ACF

there are Range Forest Officers in each sub division. The Forest department may

play an important role during any emergency especially in the forest areas like

forest fires, landslide, earthquake or any road accident in the forest area. The

department has a very good communication net work, which may be very useful

during any emergency.

Following are the contact details :


1. District Forest Officer 2423913(O),2411242 2455648 (R)

2. Assistant Conservator of Forest 2423913 (O)



Following are the various communication facilities available with the forest

department.

Taluka No. of wireless sets Mobile

Wireless sets

Vehicles Static Walki-

Talkie Mangalore - 2 2 3

Bantwal - - - -

Belthangady 2 1 - 1

Puttur 1 1 1 3

Sullia - 2 - 3

Total 3 6 3 10

4.3.14 Coast Guard

Coast Guard is based inside NMPT premises and their primary function is to

protect the coastal area against enemy activities in the territorial waters of the

country. However, Coast guard could be of assistance to district administration

during emergency like large-scale oil spill or a boat capsize etc. in the district.


Sr. no Designation Contact no

1. Executive Officer 2405261

2. Commanding officer 2405260

3. Assistant Commander 2405262

4.3.15 Airport Authority

The Mangalore airport is under the administrative control of Airport Authority of

India (AAI) and they play an important role in assisting the district administration

during any emergency as they have good infrastructure facilities. These facilities

could be availed by the district administration in mitigating any emergency. The

airport is located very close to the industrial area and hence could function as a

mutual aid member for the industrial emergency in the area.

Following are the contact details of AAI



Sr. no Designation Contact no

1. Airport director 2253996/ 2254119 (O), 2485367 (R)

Duties and Responsibility of Airport Director

As soon as the District Disaster Management Plan is activated, the Airport

Director will place the Airport fire services and Security Personnel on full alert.

It may be necessary to move one or two crash fire tenders to the site of

emergency depending on the Air Operational timings.

Depending on the site of emergency i.e. at MRPL the Airport Director may

redirect incoming flights to Bangalore / Kochi / Goa, etc. (Incoming flights fly

directly over MRPL)

Outgoing flights may be suspended if necessary. The ultimate decision lies with

the Airport Director.

Airport Fire Services

The Airport Fire Services is in the ultimate control of Airport Director,

AAI – Mangalore Airport. The equipments available with the Airport Fire Services

are:

Crash fire tenders fully equipped - 3 Nos.

Ambulances - 2 Nos.

First Aid Centre - 3 Cots

Communication

The following mode of communication is available at the Airport:

1. Dedicated Teleprinter Circuit with Bangalore and Trivandrum Airports.



2. Dedicated Speech Circuits with Chennai, Mumbai and Calicut Airports.

3. Wireless sets – (Being of Civil Aviation Frequencies may not be useful

during Disaster).

4. Hot line is provided between Airport and Pandeshwara Fire Station.

Constraints

V-sat terminal facility is not available.

(Proposed to be procured in about one year.)

The Airport Director may not be able to provide active help in case of an

emergency in the form of Fire Engines due to the need for the fire engines to be

at site during air operational timings.

The Airport director may require assistance from the City Fire Services in an

emergency at the Airport. For this purpose, the Airport is linked with the

Pandeshwara Fire Station.

4.3.16 RTO

Regional Transport Officer (RTO) would be responsible for making arrangement

for vehicles required by the district administration during any emergency. The

vehicles may be required for mass evacuation of affected people to safer area or

for movement of men and relief materials to affected area. The vehicles could be

mobilised both from the public transport companies and from private parties.

Following are the contact details of RTO


1. RTO 2423476

2. ARTO 2426778



Following are the contact details of Suppliers of Special Equipment

Nos. Telephone No. Stationed Address

Earth-Moving Equipment 1 Travellers Bungalow, Pandeshwara (City Corporation).

Drilling Rig 9448142587 Sri K. Mahabala Suvarna Yoyyadi, Mangalore 575008

Drilling Rig 9845108446 Sri M. G. Hussain Munna Cottage, Chockkabettu Surathkal

JCB 9448012168 Sri M. Mohamed Kabaka-Puttur

JCB/Drilling Rigs 9448477242

Sri Shekar Shetty, Devi Prasad, Kinnigoli,Mangalore Tq

JCB/Drilling Rigs Sri. Balraj M. G. Road, Attavara-Mangalore

JCB 922-485385 M/s. Lof Constructions Kasaragod

JCB/Drilling Rigs 4338029 (MR) Sri T.K. Mahin Haji Chettanchal, Kasaragod

JCB/Drilling Rigs 2407958 Sri T. K. Rajan Surathkal

List of Privately owned Crane Operators

Sr. No. Name and Address of the owner Regn. No. Tel. No.

1. M/s Associated Co. of Engineers, Industrial Area, Baikampady, Mangalore

KA-19/M-8559 2408214

2. Mr. Denzil Fernandes, Cottage Akashbhavan, Post Kavoor, Mangalore

KA-19/N-2267

3. Manager (Administrative), MRPL, Mangalore

KA-19/N-2292

4. Dix Shipping Company, Beach Road, Panambur, Mangalore

KA-19/N-2586

5. M/s B.B.C.C. Sri Nilayam, 2-140/2, Regent Park Lay-out, Hosabettu, Mangalore

KA-19/ N-2792




6. Shilpa Rathan, Twilight, Opp. Britta Bagh, Heige Bazar, Mangalore

HR38/D-1367

7. Construction Ltd., MRPL, Mangalore

HR-38/9893

8. Roopa Eng. Corpn. Jyothi Bldg, Maidan Road, Mangalore

KA-19/M-9201 426976/425662

9. Roopa Eng. Coprn., Jyothi Bldg., Maidan Road, Mangalore

KA-19/M-9202 426976/ 425662

10. M/s Ashraya Construction Services, Ashraya, Kulai, Hosabettu, Mangalore

KA-19/M-9361 2407170

11. M/s Simla Trading Establishment, New Mangalore Port, Trust Sprt, Panambur, Mangalore

KA-19/N-189 (91-324) 407711

12. Export Trade Link Agencies, Punja Bldg., Lalbagh, Mangalore

KA-19/N-390 -

13. Nivas Structures, 13-4-408, 1st Floor, Nivas Bldg., Opp. Govt. College, Mangalore

KA-19/N-5290

14. M/s Arabian Shopping No.3, Prema Sagar Aprt., Mannugudda, Mangalore

KA-19/N-5951

15. M/s Arabina, No.3, Prema Sagar Aprt, Mannugudda, Mangalore

KA-19/N-5952

16. Export Tradelinks, Lalbagh, Mangalore

CRX-490

17. Export Tradelinks, Lalbagh, Mangalore

CRX-491

18. M/s Kutteis, Behind Post Office, Surathkal, Mangalore

CRX-695

19. M/s P.G. Play Wood Co., N.M.P.T. Yard, Panambur, Mangalore

CRX-696




20. Smt. Prafulla N. Bhandary, No.5-5-280/19, May Flower, Kodialguthi (West), Kodialbail, Mangalore

CRX-1121

21. M/s Karnataka Motors, Dheerajlal Vithalji Building, Bunder, Mangalore

CRX-1798

22. M/s Cargolinks, New Mangala Complex, Kottara Chowki, Mangalore

CTA-6013

23. Export Tradelinks Agencies, Lalbagh, Mangalore

CTA-6740

24. M/s Mohiddin Sawmills, Thumbe, Mangalore

CTA-8814

25. M/s Mohiddin Sawmills, Thumbe, Mangalore

CTA-8815

26. Ocean Crafts Services, Lalbagh, Mangalore

CRX-2653

27. Vijay Industry, Kottara Chowki, Mangalore

KA-19/M-3956

28. Sri B. Kunhi Ahamed, Near Old Municipal Office, Bunder, Mangalore

KA-21/M-3178

29. Engineering Construction, Ananda Griha Kana, Surathkal, Mangalore

KA21-M-2327

30. Smt. Anjaya Y. Suvarna, 21-4-478, Hoige Bazar, Mangalore

KA-21/M-1968

4.3.17 Southern Railways

Railways are an integral part of the district and may assist the district

administration in meeting any emergency. On the other hand there could be a

railway disaster in the district, which could call for activation of District Disaster

Management Plan.



Following are the contact details of the Railways


1. Railway Station (Mangalore) 2423137

2. Railway Station Announcer Circuit 2423606, 2423608, 2427609

3. Chief Station Master - Mangalore 2427359

4. Divisional Manager (signal) 2428779

5. Supt. Of Railway Police 2220559

The Railways have four stations on the Konkan Railway line in the district

namely, Mangalore, Kankanady, Thokur and Suratkal. The other major line

namely Mangalore - Hassan line is presently undergoing gauge conversion.

The infrastructure available with railway includes a Breakdown cum Accident

Relief Train comprising of a mini operation theatre. The Railways also have a

team of medical experts available round the clock to meet any emergency.

4.3.18 KSRTC

The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (KSRTC) would be the main

source of vehicles for movement of public during or immediately after any

emergency in the district. There should be good communication between the

KSRTC authorities and the district administration during any emergency to

ensure prompt mobilisation of vehicles to ensure quick evacuation of the general

public who are affected or likely to get affected during any emergency.

Following are the contact details of the KSRTC


1. Divisional Controller 2212251(O), 2214726 (R)

In addition to KSRTC, the buses may also be mobilised from private bus

operators.



Following is the list of Major Private Bus Operators:

Sr. no Name & Address of Owner Contact no

1. Sri Rajavansa Ballal, Kuntikan, Swayarjith, Bojaj, Mangalore 438077 / 212359

2. Sri Devappa Manai, Jayashree Bajaj, Mairogunte, Mangalore 430585 / 437485

3. Mr. Narayana Shetty, Vijayalaxmi Motors, Kottar Cross, Mangalore 458355 / 212443

4. Mr. P.M. Narayana, Prop. Nishmita Motors, Moodabidri 66395

5. Mr. U.B. Balakrishna Rai, Sri, Navadurga Prasad, M.B. Road, Kannoor, Mangalore

775219 / 33819

6. Mr. U.B. Vittal Rai, S/o U. Bhandary Rai, Vijayalaxmi Nivas, Kadri Kabla, Mangalore

214793 / 212163

7. Mr. Jeevanhar Nazarath, Vishal Travels, Karangalpady, Mangalore 423917

8. Mr. Madhava Nayak, S/o A. Ramayya Nayak, Rajmal, Adayar, Mangalore

427469 / 775109(R) / 775159

9. Mr. Ramoya Saldana, St. Anthony Motors, Mangalore 438976

10. Mr. Jaya Govinda Bhat, S/o Gopal Krishna Bhat, Kakkanjala House, Kadri, Mangalore

438452

11. Mr. Haneef Lobo S/o Simon Lobo, Lobo Road Lines, Vamanjeer, Mangalore

762134

4.3.19 All Hazardous Industries

All MAH units have developed their own on-site emergency plan to enable them

in meeting any major emergency. District administration could mobilise additional

resources from these industries to meet any emergency, which is not directly

related to industries. (Refer Annexure 1 for Fact Sheets for major industries).



4.3.20 Voluntary Organisation

The district administration has to depend on the local voluntary organisations to

effectively meet any emergency. This is because of the less response time

required for mobilisation and also because of the familiarity of the place which is

very important factor.

Following is the list of recognised Voluntary organisations in the district :

Name of the organisation Address Telephone No.

Mangalore Taluka

Dharmajyothi Samsthe ® Vamanjooru Post 574508

0824-762180

Janashikshana Trust ® Field View, C.J.D. Sitla Compound, Pumpwell-575002

Harekala bhoohitha badavara mattu sanna raithara abhivride Society ®

Kisan Nagara, Harekala Village and Post 574181

742393

Vedha

Sri Raj, Munnuru Kuttarapadavu Post, Ranipura Mangalore 574183

465455

Centre for development studies and education

Vamanjoor Post 574508

Rusenf Pakshikere, Kemral Post Via Halengadi

725203

Bantwal Taluka

Sasya Shamala ® Aramane Road Vitla-574243 08255-52221

Belthangady Taluka

Shri Kehethra Dharmasthala Grama Abhivriddi

Dharmasthala Post –574216

08256-77121

Malenadu Vilasa Samithi ® Kakkinje Post-574291 75135

Dakshina Kannada Parisarasaktha Okkuta

C/o.Nagarika Seva Trust Guruvayanakere Post 574217

08256-22019 / 70

D.K. Zilla Krishikarmikara Sangha

Near Belthangady Church Church Road Belthangady Post 574214

08256-72207

Kapuchin Krishi Seva Kendra

Bayalbagh Post Bag No. 1



Name of the organisation Address Telephone No.

Ujjire-574240

Nagarika Seva Trust ® Post Guruvayanakere-574217

08256-22070

Puttur Taluka

Sudan Gramina Abhivriddi and Vidya Samsthe

Nehru Nagar Puttur-574203 08251-21391

Sullia Taluka

Bhantmale Academy of Natural Science

Post Guthigaru-574218 Sullia Taluk



4.4 EMERGENCY CONTROL ROOM (ECR)

To respond to any disaster in the district effectively, the ECR should be located at a

strategic location and should be well equipped. An inventory of certain facilities must

be maintained in the ECR.

4.4.1 LOCATION AND MANNING

The ECR is proposed to be set up in the DC’s Office building located in Mangalore

city so that it is easily approachable during any emergency.

The ECR is normally not manned but the district administration may consider

manning the same with skeleton staff during monsoon period when there are

chances of floods / cyclone in the district. However, during an emergency, members

of Emergency organisation and other supporting staff would man the ECR.

Only a limited and prearranged number of people would be admitted to the ECR

when in use, which would eliminate unnecessary interference and reduce confusion.

Security would be put in-charge of limiting access to the ECR.

There should be an alternate ECR at different location, which could be mobilised in

case the main ECR is directly affected by the accident or too risky to operate. The

Alternate ECR could be Superintendent of Police office building.

4.4.2 FACILITIES TO BE MADE AVAILABLE IN THE ECR

The Emergency Control Centres would be equipped with the following facilities:

1. Maps of the district and individual talukas depicting MAH and hazardous

Industries, village map surrounding the Hazardous Industries

2. Extra copies of the maps to be used for spot marking of affected areas,

movement of vehicles, evacuated areas, etc.

3. Communication facilities consisting of dedicated telephones (STD / ISD),

mobile telephone, satellite telephone, fax machine, wire less sets, radios,

tape recorder and televisions.

4. Personal computer, printer with Internet connection.

5. Backup power generator for lighting and communication system



6. Tel. Nos. of all the co-ordinators (both office and residence), voluntary

organisations, Hospitals, Ambulance services, Blood Banks etc.

7. Telephone directory both local as well as of the surrounding districts.

8. Telephone Nos. of emergency co-ordinators from the MAH and hazardous

Industries

9. Contact details of Transport (both public and private) facility.

10. List of designated Safe Assembly Points along with escape routes to be

highlighted on district map.

11. Details of hazardous substances along with the material safety data sheets.

12. General stationery like paper, pencil, foot rulers, erasure etc.

13. Details on meteorological information during different seasons such as wind

speed, direction, temperature, humidity etc.

4.5 SAFE SHELTERS During aftermath of a natural disaster, large number of general public needs to be

evacuated and provided temporary shelters till the conditions are normalised. Typically

various public buildings like educational institutes with basic civic amenities where large

number of people could be accommodated have been identified as Safe shelters. In

addition to the schools, various religious places could also be used as Safe Shelters

during any emergency.

MANGALORE TALUKA

Village No. of Govt. Govt. Govt. Name Schools LPS HPS HS

Talapadi 1 Kinya 2 Manjanadi 3 Konaje 2 Pavuru 3 Boliyaru 2 Arkula 1 Neerumarga 1 Adduru 1 Tenkaulepady 2 Mutturu 1 Kolavuru 2 Kilenjar 4 Tenkayedapadavu 3 Badagayedapadav 3 Kompadavu 1



MANGALORE TALUKA (Cont’d.)


Muchuru 1 Badagayekkaru 2 Ulepadi 2 Sashihitlu 1 Amblamogru 2 Munnuru 1 Kudupu 1 Kenjaru 3 Thokur(62) 6 Moodushedde 4 Malavuru 3 Badagaulepady 2 Kolambe 1 Adyapadi 2 Paduuperara 4 Bala 1 Kutteturu 2 Madya 2 Surinje 1 Chelairu 3 Haleyangadi 2 Koikude 1 Panja 1 Kilenjuru 1 Nadugodu 2 Kemral 2 Talipady 1 Padupanamburu 2 Mennabettu 1 Kolluru 1 Kavatharu 1 LPS – Lower Primary School HPS – Higher Primary School HS - High School



MANGALORE TALUKA (Cont’d.)


Karnire 1 Kilpadi 3 Bellairu 1 Atikaribettu 1 Delantabettu 1 Aikala 1 Kondemula 1 Harekala 1 Belma 2 Tenkayekkaru 3 Muluru 3 Mallur 1 Ulaibettu 1 Tiruvail 1 Mantradi 2 Nellikaru 3 Kadandale 3 Paladka 2 Puthige 4 Padumarnadu 2 Panapila 1 Moodumarnadu 5 Kelaputhige 2 Daregudde 2 Valpady 1 Shirthady 1 Moodukonaje 2 Padukonaje 2 Kallabettu 1 Maroor 2 Hosabettu 2 Puchamogru 1 Badagamijar 2 Thenkamijar 1 Thodaru 1 Iruvail 3 Kallamundkur 3 Belvai 3 LPS – Lower Primary School HPS – Higher Primary School HS - High School



Following are the list giving details of Government schools in the district with details

BANTWAL TALUKA

Village

No. of schools

Govt. LPS

Govt. HPS

Govt. HS

Naringana 5 2 2 1 Balepuni 3 0 3 0 Manila 2 1 0 1 Punacha 4 0 4 0 Vittalmudnuru 2 1 1 0 Kula 1 1 0 0 Edkidu 3 1 2 0 Kedila 3 1 2 0 Biliyuru 3 1 2 0 Kadeshawlya 4 1 2 1 Maninalkuru 5 0 4 1 Uli 3 1 2 0 Tenkakajekaru 1 0 1 0 Badakajekaru 2 0 2 0 Kavalamuduru 3 1 2 0 Moodapadukodi 2 1 1 0 Pilathabettu 1 0 0 1 Ajjibettu 4 1 2 1 Eliyanadugodu 1 1 0 0 Kurnadu 1 0 0 1 Kanyana 7 3 3 1 Karopadi 4 2 2 0 Salethuru 3 0 3 0 Vittalpadnuru 7 2 4 1 Alike 1 1 0 0 Kepu 5 1 3 1 Vittal 8 0 8 0 Nettlamudnuru 3 2 1 0 Anantadi 2 0 2 0 Perne 1 1 0 0 Peraje 1 1 0 0 Barimaru 1 0 1 0 Mani 1 0 1 0 Pajeeru 2 2 0 0 Era 2 1 1 0 Kolnadu 10 4 5 1 Manchi 4 2 1 1

LPS – Lower Primary School HPS – Higher Primary School HS - High School



BANTWAL TALUKA (Cont’d.)

Village No. of Govt. Govt. Govt. Name schools LPS HPS HS

Bolanthuru 2 0 2 0 Veerakamba 3 1 2 0 Karpe 2 1 0 1 Arala 2 1 1 0 Sangabettu 0 0 0 0 Rayee 1 0 1 0 Kukkipadi 1 1 0 0 Koila 2 0 1 1 Chennaithody 3 0 2 1 Kudambettu 1 1 0 0 Pilimogru 1 0 1 0 Ervathuru 1 1 0 0 Kariyangala 1 0 1 0 Ammunje 1 0 0 1 Kodman 1 0 1 0 Meeramajalu 1 1 0 0 Pudu 3 0 3 0 Sajipanadu 1 0 1 0 Thumbe 2 1 1 0 Amtadi 2 0 2 0 Panjikallu 2 0 2 0 Moodanadugodu 1 0 1 0 Kadabettu 1 0 1 0 Navuru 2 0 1 1 Narikombu 4 2 2 0 Shamburu 1 0 1 0 Kavalapaduru 3 1 1 1 Devashyapaduru 1 0 1 0 Devashya muduru 1 0 1 0 Sarapadi 3 2 1 0 Baltila 3 2 1 0 Sajipamooda 3 1 1 1 Munnur 3 1 2 0 Sajipapadu 2 1 1 0 Golthamajalu 4 0 3 1 Kallige 2 0 2 0 Bantwal 7 3 4 0 LPS – Lower Primary School HPS – Higher Primary School HS - High School



BELTHANGADY TALUKA


Kutluru 1 0 1 0 Sulkerimogru 2 1 1 0 Shirlalu 1 0 1 0 Savanuru 1 0 0 1 Malavamthige 4 3 1 0 Charmadi 2 1 1 0 Neriya 4 0 4 0 Puduvettu 4 2 2 0 Shishila 3 2 1 0 Shibaje 3 1 2 0 Rekya 1 0 1 0 Niddle 5 2 2 1 Kokkada 5 2 2 1 Bandaru 4 0 3 1 Mogru 5 1 3 1 Elantila 3 0 3 0 Hatyadka 2 0 1 1 Kalanja 3 0 2 1 Chibidre 3 0 2 1 Thotathadi 2 1 1 0 Dharmastala 2 1 1 0 Patrame 4 3 1 0 Belalu 2 1 1 0 Ujire 5 3 2 0 Koyyuru 6 2 3 1 Kaniyuru 4 1 2 1 Uruvalu 2 1 1 0 Tannirupanta 4 2 2 0 Karaya 3 1 1 1 Barya 4 2 2 0 Puthila 3 1 1 1 Thekkar 2 0 2 0 Kukkala 3 1 1 1 Maladi 1 0 1 0 Machhina 3 1 2 0 Sonanduru 1 0 1 0 Kaliya 3 1 1 1 Nyaterf 3 1 2 0 Vodilnala 2 0 2 0 Kuvettu 4 1 2 1 Laila 4 0 3 1 Urban centre 4 1 2 1 Melanthabettu 1 0 1 0 Munduru 1 1 0 0 LPS – Lower Primary School HPS – Higher Primary School HS - High School



BELTHANGADY TALUKA (Cont’d.)


Karambaru 1 0 1 0 Tenkakaranduru 1 0 1 0 Kalmanja 4 1 3 0 Mundaje 3 1 2 0 Kukkedi 2 0 2 0 Gardadi 1 1 0 0 Venoor 1 0 0 1 Bajire 2 1 1 0 Karimanelu 1 1 0 0 Arambodi 4 2 2 0 Hosangadi 2 0 2 0 Badakodi 1 0 1 0 Kashipatna 2 0 2 0 Marodi 1 0 1 0 Peradi 1 0 0 0 Moodukodi 1 0 1 0 Nittade 3 1 2 0 Nalkuru 2 2 0 0 Padangadi 2 0 1 1 Balanja 2 1 1 0 Badagakaranduru 2 0 1 1 Naravi 1 0 1 0 Savya 1 0 1 0 Pilya 1 0 1 0 Navoor 2 1 1 0 Nada 4 1 2 1 Mittabagilu 3 1 2 0 Indabettu 4 1 2 1 Kanyadi 2 1 1 0 Kadirudyavara 2 0 2 0 Andinje 2 1 1 0 Kokradi 1 1 0 1 Kudyadi 1 1 0 0 Navara 1 1 0 0 LPS – Lower Primary School HPS – Higher Primary School HS - High School



PUTTUR TALUKA


Bilinele 3 1 1 1 Kombaru 4 1 1 2 Shirivagilu 4 1 1 2 Shiradi 3 1 1 1 Kowkradi 4 1 1 2 Nelyadi 3 1 1 1 Konalu 3 1 1 1 Kabaka 3 1 1 1 Nidpalli 4 1 1 2 Nettanigemudnur 3 1 1 1 Kolthige 3 1 1 1 Kaniyoru 3 1 1 1 Dolpadi 3 1 1 1 Kutrupadi 4 1 1 2 Aituru 4 1 1 2 Paduvannuru 3 1 1 1 Badagannuru 4 1 1 2 Modnuru 4 1 1 2 Ariyadka 3 1 1 1 Keyyuru 4 1 1 2 Kedambadi 3 1 1 1 Sarve 3 1 1 1 Volamogru 3 1 1 1 Erde 4 1 1 2 Aryapu 4 1 1 2 Bettampadi 3 1 1 1 Balnadu 3 1 1 1 Kudipadi 4 1 1 2 Konaje 4 1 1 2 Nojibaltila 3 1 1 1 Renjiladi 4 1 1 2 Balya 4 1 1 2 Charvaka 4 1 1 2 Kunturu 3 1 1 1 Kodimbala 4 1 1 2 Bantra 3 1 1 1 Kadaba 3 1 1 1 Bajathur 3 1 1 1 Golithottu 4 1 1 2 Perrabe 4 1 1 2 Alantaya 4 1 1 2 Haleneranki 4 1 1 2 34 Nekkiladi 4 1 1 2 LPS – Lower Primary School HPS – Higher Primary School HS - High School



PUTTUR TALUKA (Cont’d.)


Hirebandadi 4 1 1 2 Uppinangadi 3 1 1 1 Ramakunja 3 1 1 1 Koila 4 1 1 2 Shanthigodu 4 1 1 2 42 Bellipadi 4 1 1 2 Savanooru 3 1 1 1 Kudmar 4 1 1 2 Alankaru 3 1 1 1 41 Kodimbadi 3 1 1 1 Chikkamudnuru 3 1 1 1 Bannuru 4 1 1 2 Padnuru 6 2 2 2 Puttur 3 1 1 1 Kemminje 6 2 2 2 Kuriya 4 1 1 2 Narimogru 4 1 1 2 Munduru 4 1 1 2 Kaivana 5 1 2 2 Echalampadi 4 1 1 2 Punchapadi 4 1 1 2 Paltadi 4 1 1 2 Belanduru 4 1 1 2 Panaje 3 1 1 1 LPS – Lower Primary School HPS – Higher Primary School HS - High School



SULLIA TALUKA


Aletty 7 3 3 1 Mandekolu 8 7 1 0 Jalsur 5 2 3 0 Aivarnad 6 2 3 1 Bellare 5 1 3 1 Peruvaje 1 0 1 0 Kodiyala 3 2 1 0 Murulya 4 2 2 0 Yedamangala 6 3 2 1 Yenmur 2 1 1 0 Aivathoklu 4 1 2 1 Kenya 3 2 1 0 Balpa 3 2 1 0 Subramanya 2 1 1 0 Ainakidu 2 1 1 0 Balgodu 2 1 1 0 Kalmakar 1 0 1 0 Madapady 3 2 1 0 Sampaje 2 1 1 0 Thodikana 2 1 1 0 Aranthodu 5 3 2 0 Markanja 3 0 2 1 Kollamogru 4 3 1 0 Hariharapalathd 2 0 1 1 Ajjavara 8 3 4 1 Ubaradkamithur 3 1 2 0 Nellurkemraje 2 1 1 0 Balila 0 0 0 0 Muppirya 1 0 1 0 Amarapadnur 2 1 1 0 Kalanja 3 1 2 0 Kalmadka 2 0 2 0 Nalkur 3 2 1 0 Devachalla 9 5 3 1 Guthigar 8 4 3 1 Kuthkunja 1 0 1 0 Pambethady 3 2 1 0 Kanakamajalu 2 1 1 0 Yenekal 4 1 2 1 Sullia 10 0 7 3 Amaramudnur 4 1 3 0 LPS – Lower Primary School HPS – Higher Primary School HS - High School



Following are the list of some of the major private educational institutes in and around Mangalore, which may be used as Safe Shelters during any major disasters in the City.

INSTITUTIONS IN MANGALORE

Sr No

Name Address Phone

1. Mangalore University [email protected] 2287276/ 2287347.

2. Alva's Education Foundation

Moodubidri-08258 – 238104 574227;[email protected]

(08258) 261240

3. A.B Shetty Dental College Kadri Road, Karangalpady, Mangalore 2204963/2204572 4. A B Shetty Nursing

Sciences A B Shetty , Mangalore-1 2202175

5. Beasant Women's College M G Road, Mangalore-3 2492206/5271049 6. Bharthiya Vidya Bhawan Pandeshwar,Mangalore 2427618/ 2429136 7. Canara College M G Road,Mangalore-3 2492366 8. College OF Fisheries Kankandy,Mangalore-575002 2249257/2249258/2249103 9. Islamic Academy Of

Education Kodialbail,Mangalore-575003 2496851

10. Yenopoya Medical College Mangalore 2204668/69/70 11. Yenopoya Dental College Mangalore 2204668/69/70 12. Yenopoya Institute of

Nursing Sciences Mangalore 2204437/2447729

13. K S Hegde Medical Academy

Medical Science Complex, Deralakatte-574160

2441025/2441026/2441029

14. Kasturba Medical College Light House Hill Road,Mangalore-1 2422271 15. Karnathaka Regional

Engineering College Surathkal , Mangalore 2474000

16. Manipal academy Of Higher Education

University Building, Manipal-576119 2571201/2570064/2570224

17. Nitte Education Trust 7th Floor Ram Bhavan Complex Kodialbail, Mangalore

2441025/26, 2440129 2441875

18. Sapthagiri College Of Hotel Management

Kavoor Mangalore-575015 2481672/2481686/2482464,

19. School of Social Work P.O.521 Roshni Nilaya Mangalore-575002

2435791

20. Sri Dharmasthala Manjunatheshwara Law College

Ballal Bagh Mangalore-1 2494186

21. Srinivasa College Of Physiotherapy

G.H.S Road Mangalore-1 2425966/2421566/2444891

22. St. Agnes College Lower Bendoor,Mangalore-1 2218414/2222181/2222527 23. St. Aloysius Day College Light House Hill Road,Mangalore-1 2426143 24. St. Ann's College Of

Education Pandeshwar,Mangalore-1 2444047

25. Unit Academy of Education Post Box No 535,Highlands Mangalore-575002

2432771

26. University College Hampankatta, Mangalore-1 2424760



4.6 PARKING YARDS

During any major industrial disaster having off-site implication, the reserve and

mitigative measures involve operation of various heavy equipment which have to

be parked at a safe location away from the scene of accident. Hence parking

yard has been identified for each of the major industries for the purpose.

PROPOSED PARKING YARDS FOR VARIOUS INDUSTRIES

Sr. no.

Name of unit Suggested Parking yard

1. M/s Mangalore Chemicals & Fertilizers Limited Panambur Mangalore

The vast open area in the NMPT area adjacent to the Custom House or the football ground adjacent to the NMPT Colony to may be used as or as the Parking yard during the emergency.

2. M/s Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (LPG) Bykampady, industrial area Mangalore

The open area with in the industrial area close to this unit may be used as the parking yard. Or the Parking yard for MCF mentioned above could also be used.

3. M/S Indian Oil Corporation Limited Panambur, Mangalore

The open area in the Thanirbhavi close to the beach or the NMPT Guest House may be used as Parking yard.

4. M/s Mangalore Refinery & Petrochemicals Limited Kuthethur Post, via Katipalla, Mangalore

The open area in front of the factory gate could be used as the parking area. The alternate would be the open area in the residential colony.

5. M/s Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (POL Terminal) Bala Village Mangalore

Open area opposite the main gate of the terminal or the open area on either side of the approach road from could be used as the parking yard during any emergency.

6. M/s Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (M’lore LPG Import Facilities) Bala Village Mangalore

The open area in front of the administrative building may be used as parking yard.

7. M/s Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited(LPG Bottling Plant) Bala Village Mangalore

The parking area for the tankers could be used as the parking yard after sending away all the tankers during any emergency.

8. M/s ELF Gas India Limited Thokur Village, Baikampady

Open area in the Thokur village could be used as parking yard during any emergency.



Sr. no.

Name of unit Suggested Parking yard

9. M/s Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited Near APMC Yard Baikmapady Mangalore

The open area in front of the main gate or the tanker parking area could be used as parking yard during any emergency.

10. M/S Tannirubhavi Power project Tannibavi Village Mangalore

The open area on the either side of the main approach road to the facility could be used as the parking yard.

11. M/s Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited near Tannibhave Power Project Same as above.

12. KISCO (Kudremukh Iron and Steel Co), Panambur

Open area in front of the Administration building could be used as parking yard during any emergency.

13. BASF, Bala

The parking lot for employee / visitors parking area could be used as Parking yard during any emergency in the facility.

BANTWAL TALUKA 14. M/s Puttur Petro Products Private

Limited Mitur, Idkidu Village Bantwal Tq.

The open area near the railway crossing on the main approach road could be used as parking yard.

SULIA TALUKA 15. KFDC (Karnataka Forest Develop.

Corp), Alletti, Sulia

Open area outside the main gate could be used as parking yard during any emergency.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

4. AGENCIES & INFRASTRUCTURE ...............................................................................1

4.1 INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................1 4.2 AGENCIES INVOLVED IN DISASTER MANAGEMENT ............................................1 4.3 INFRASTRUCTURE OF VARIOUS AGENCIES ..........................................................4 4.3.1 DC OFFICE / TALUKA OFFICES ....................................................................................4 4.3.2 CITY CORPORATION ....................................................................................................4 4.3.3 POLICE DEPARTMENT..................................................................................................7 4.3.4 INSPECTORATE OF FACTORIES & BOILERS .................................................................12 4.3.5 DISTRICT FIRE SERVICES ..........................................................................................13 4.3.6 CIVIL DEFENCE - HOME GUARDS ...............................................................................16 4.3.7 HEALTH DEPARTMENT ...............................................................................................20 4.3.8 PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT (PWD) ........................................................................30 4.3.9 IRRIGATION DEPARTMENT .........................................................................................31 4.3.10 FOOD DEPARTMENT ................................................................................................31 4.3.11 DRUG CONTROLLER ................................................................................................32 4.3.12 POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD ..................................................................................33 4.3.13 FOREST DEPARTMENT ............................................................................................33 4.3.14 COAST GUARD ........................................................................................................34 4.3.15 AIRPORT AUTHORITY ...............................................................................................34 4.3.16 RTO .......................................................................................................................36 4.3.17 SOUTHERN RAILWAYS .............................................................................................39 4.3.18 KSRTC ..................................................................................................................40 4.3.19 ALL HAZARDOUS INDUSTRIES ..................................................................................42 4.3.20 VOLUNTARY ORGANISATION ....................................................................................42 4.4 EMERGENCY CONTROL ROOM (ECR) ...................................................................44 4.4.1 LOCATION AND MANNING ...................................................................................44 4.4.2 FACILITIES TO BE MADE AVAILABLE IN THE ECR .............................................44 4.5 SAFE SHELTERS ......................................................................................................45 4.6 PARKING YARDS .....................................................................................................51



5. EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS - DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

5.1 OVERVIEW OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

Various aspects of the District Disaster Management Plan have been discussed

below to define the emergency organisation and the duties / responsibilities of

various key personnel and agencies involved in handing any emergency in the

district.

5.1.1 Purpose

A. To provide for the protection of persons and property in Dakshina

Kannada District, in the event of a natural or manmade emergency like

industrial or transportation disaster, in accordance with the Chemical

Accidents (Emergency Planning, Preparedness and Response) Rules

1996.

B. To establish procedures to alert the public and provide information and

appropriate protective action instructions, if necessary. To ensure better

co-ordination for best use of available resources during an emergency.

C. To define the roles and responsibilities of government officials during any

disaster. To define emergency functions of various agencies involved.

D. To assure co-ordination and co-operation with State and Central

Government efforts in meeting any state / national level disaster.

5.1.2 Situations Covered by Plan

A. Hazards that pose the potential threats to Dakshina Kannnada districts

are either natural disasters like flooding, cyclone, earthquake etc.,

industrial / transport emergency resulting in fire, explosion or toxic gas

release. There could be other miscellaneous disasters like food poisoning,

boat capsize, etc where effects are mostly localised.

B. District Disaster Management Plan covers a wide range of possibilities,

from slowly developing emergencies to disaster without warning. It is

intended to cover disasters resulting from any hazard, whether of great

magnitude or localised in their impact.



5.1.3 Direction and Co-ordination

A. District Administration headed by Dy. Commissioner is responsible for the

protection and safety of the public life, property and environment in

Dakshina Kannada district and will exercise direction and control of

various governmental and non- governmental agencies.

B. The DC would be advised by the Crisis Management Group comprising of

experts from various agencies on the matters of chemical disasters in

district.

C. Various emergency procedures and provision of infrastructure facilities

and resources would be controlled from the Emergency Control Room

proposed to be set up at DC’s office.

5.1.4 Concept Of Operations

A. In a disaster emergency, the district administration will stop all other

activities and continue only those functions and services necessary to

protect life and property till normalcy is restored.

B. Emphasis will be to meet basic human needs such as food, shelter, and

medical care, and to resume basic services such as water, electricity, and

sanitation as soon as possible.

C. The Dy. Commissioner will activate the Emergency Control Room (ECR)

at DC’s office at Mangalore when an emergency situation requires it.

D. The Emergency Management Organisation members will follow

prescribed procedures (as given later in the Chapter), which describe in

detail how their functions are co-ordinated, and utilise checklists as

necessary.

E. An alternate ECR should be thought of in case the main ECR is affected

by any disaster or is necessary in case MAH units are involved.

F. During the recovery or normalisation phase, provide generally the same

services as those provided by staff members and forces during the

evacuation. Damage assessment will be expedited and a report forwarded

to Dy. Commissioner.

5.1.5 Emergency Management Organisation

The normal organisation for the district is attached. Three types of emergency

organisation have been defined based on the type of emergency. They are

Emergency Organisation for



i) Natural / Miscellaneous Disaster

ii) Industrial Disaster

iii) Transport Disaster

(Refer organisation charts on page no. 5-4, 5-5, 5-6)

5.1.6 Training and Exercises

A. Dy. Commissioner will ensure proper training program for all the members

of the emergency organisation on their duties and responsibilities in the

District Disaster Management Plan.

B. The above training may be augmented by participating in mock drills

including those for review of plans and procedures. The mock drills serve

as a good learning experience

The training and mock drill aspect of the District Disaster Management

Plan has been discussed in greater detail under Chapter 8.



EMERGENCY ORGANISATION FOR NATURAL / MISCELLANEOUS DISASTER

DIST. DISASTER MANAGER

DY. COMMISSIONER/ ADDITIONAL DISTRICT

MAGISTRATE

LAW AND ORDER

S.P.

FIRE FIGHTING AND RESCUE

DIV. FIRE OFFICER

MEDICAL FUNCTION

D.H.O.

INFORMATION

PWD/ IRRIGATION

COMMUNICATION

DIO / DTO

LOGISTICS

RTO

FOOD & CIVIL

SUPPLIES

DFO

LOCAL DISASTER MANAGER

ASST. COMMISSIONER/ TAHSILDAR

COMMANDANT COAST GUARD

COMMANDANT CIVIL DEFENCE

TALUKA HEADQUARTERS

MUTUAL AID MEMBERS

SITE CONTROLLER

TAHSILDAR/ DY. TAHSILDAR

VOLUNTARY ORGANISATION

POLICE/HOMEGUARD

LOCAL POLICE STATION

FIRE

NEAREST FIRE STATION

MEDICAL/ PARAMEDICAL

NEAREST HOSPITAL

SCENE OF ACCIDENT

DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS



EMERGENCY ORGANISATION FOR INDUSTRIAL DISASTER

DISTRICT DISASTER MANAGER

DY. COMMISSIONER/ ADDITIONAL DISTRICT MAGISTRATE

HEALTH

DHO

LAW AND RESCUE POLICE

FACTORY INSPECTOR

DY. CH. I. F

DISASTER MANAGER

ASSISTANT

COMMISSIONER

MUTUAL

AID MEMBERS

AFFECTED INDUSTRY

ADVISORY GROUP KREC

MET OFFICE

COMMUNICATION

DTO

TRANSPORT

RTO

VOLUNTARY ORGANISATIONS

FIRE

DIV.FIRE OFFICER

CIVIL DEFENCE

AFFECTED AREA



EMERGENCY ORGANISATION FOR TRANSPORT DISASTER

DY.COMMISSIONER/ ADDITIONAL DISTRICT

MAGISTRATE

ASSISTANT

COMMISSIONER

FIRE FIGHTING

FIRE

MITIGATION

RELATED INDUSTRY

RAILWAY DIVISION, MANGALORE

AIRPORT DIVISION,

MANGALORE

MEDICAL

HOSPITAL

RTO CIVIL DEFENCE

LAW AND ORDER

POLICE (NEAREST POLICE)



5.2 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The emergency responsibilities of key persons in the district are listed below.

These duties and responsibilities are common to all types of major emergencies

or disasters, (i.e. Natural or Manmade). The Emergency Organisation Members

will prepare, maintain, and be guided by these during any major disaster in the

district. Individuals assigned to these functions are expected to co-ordinate their

actions with the Dy. Commissioner, who is the District Disaster Manager will co-

ordinate the overall action with all other agencies involved including the district

administration.

It may be noted that depending on the type of emergency and also availability of

staff and resources, functions of various agencies may vary. At times, each

person may be required to assume additional responsibilities in addition to their

normal duties. This would be the prerogative of the Dy. Commissioner to assign

the additonal responsibilities to the members of the emergency organisation.

It may be necessary to develop agreements with neighbouring districts or other

organisations if resources are not available within the district for some of these

functions.

Following are the duties and responsibilities of the members of the emergency

organisation. These are general in nature and applicable to all types of

emergencies.

5.2.1 District Disaster Manager (Deputy Commissioner)

Alternate : HQ. Asst. to D.C.

It is the responsibility of the Dy. Commissioner to prepare, maintain and keep

current the District Disaster Management Plan for the prevention and

minimisation of injury and damage caused by a major emergency or disaster.

Prompt and effective response to a major emergency or disaster, and emergency

relief and recovery, in consonance with the District Disaster Management Plan.

The responsibility also include initiating and maintaining co-ordination and co-

operation with various agencies involved and provide prompt information,

decisions and infrastructure facilities as requested. He should also mobilise,

direct, and co-ordinate the emergency management staff during emergency.



Following are the main functions during any emergency

- Declaration of emergency after confirming the magnitude of the disaster.

- Activate the Emergency Control Room (ECR) at DC’s office and make it

functional.

- Co-ordinate and establish contact with all agency involved in the

emergency actions.

- Ensure setting up of Local Emergency Control Room (LECR) close to the

scene of accident or at Taluka headquarters where the disaster has

struck.

- Ensure actions have been initiated to contain the emergency.

- Have overall supervision of all the emergency relief operations.

- Initiate evacuation of people from affected area with the assistance of

police, fire and other agencies.

- Depending on type of emergency, mobilise additional resources like

heavy lifting gears line cranes, bulldozers for rescue and mitigation

operation.

- Ensure transport vehicles in required numbers have been mobilised for

evacuation of the affected population.

- Set-up safe shelters for evacuated people and ensure they are provided

with food and medical attention as the need be.

- Monitor progress of disaster especially in case of natural disasters like

cyclone or floods by getting information from various agencies involved

and mobilise additional support to mitigate the effects of disaster.

- Keep the state administration informed regarding the disaster and the

steps taken to contain the same.

- Issue statement to the press (both print and electronic media) on the

prevailing conditions and the steps being taken by the district

administration to mitigate effects of the disaster.

- Get mutual aid from neighbouring districts the Major Hazard Industries or

seek the assistance of voluntary organisation.



- If required, set-up mobile first aid centre or temporary health centres in the

affected area or in the safe shelters.

- Visit the scene of the disaster to have first hand information about the

rescue or mitigative operation that are being carried out.

- In case of floods, carry out aerial survey of the affected area to have

preliminary estimates of the extent of damage caused.

- To co-ordinate with the state government through Principal Secretary,

Dept. of Labour, Govt. of Karnataka and mobilise the help of army / navy

/ Air force or other agencies as required.

- Call off emergency after confirming that all the actions have been taken to

normalise the conditions and it is safe for people to re-enter the affected

areas.

5.2.2 DISASTER MANAGER (Assistant Commissioner)

Alternate : Tehsildar

The concerned Assistant Commissioner is the Disaster Manager and he would

rush to the Local Emergency Control Room (LECR) which is set up at the taluka

headquarter of the affected taluka. He would function as the link between the

affected area and the District Disaster Manager based at the main ECR located in

the Dy. Commissioners office at Mangalore.


- Set up the LECR at the concerned Taluka headquarters or at a safe place close

to the scene of the disaster

- Depending on the nature of emergency, co-ordinate with the various agencies at

local level.

- Initiate the rescue operation with the help of local police, fire or other voluntary

organisations and mutual aid members.

- Have close interaction with the Site Controller to ensure proper actions have

been taken.

- Visit the affected area to gain first hand information of various steps being taken

to mitigate the effects of the disaster.



- Keep the main Emergency Control Room at district headquarters informed about

the developments on a regular basis and request for additional help by way of

resources or specialised manpower or equipment.

5.2.3 SITE CONTROLLER (Tehsildar of affected Taluka)

Alternate : Deputy Tehsildar

The Site Controller would be at the scene of the disaster or accident and would

be reporting to the Disaster Manager located in the Local Emergency Control

Room (LECR). He is the person who is dealing with the disaster directly in

association with the various other emergency services. He would be in direct

contact with the Disaster Manager based at the Local Emergency Control Room

(LECR).

His responsibilities vary widely depending on the type of emergency. It could be a

natural disaster like flood the effects are wide spread where rescue work would

be of main concern. It could be a road accident involving a tanker carrying

hazardous chemical where quick action has to be taken to arrest the leakage, if

any, followed by evacuation of people if required.


- Take measures to mitigate the emergency in association with various emergency

services like fire and police.

- Keep in constant touch with the Local Emergency Control Room at Taluka

headquarters with available means of communication and keep Disaster Manager

informed about the developments on a regular basis

- Request for additional help like specialised manpower or equipment to effectively

handle the emergency.

- Rescue and evacuate the people from affected area and shift them to safe

shelters.

- Ensure setting up of safe shelters with basic amenities for food and sanitation.

- Mobilise medical professionals with the help of ECR or LECR and ensure the

affected persons are given medical attentions.

- Arrange to shift the injured or sick to specialised hospitals if need be.



5.2.4 LAW AND ORDER FUNCTION ( Superintendent of Police (SP))

Alternate : Sub-divisional Police Officer (SDPO).

It is observed that the police are the first agency to reach the site during any

emergency. The local police initiates the emergency action even before the

declaration of emergency and setting up of the ECR at Dy. Commissioners Office

at Mangalore. Even though the main function of the Police is to maintain law and

order, it is observed that most of the rescue and relief operation is initiated by the

police before arrival of full-fledged rescue teams.

Following are the main functions of the Police (at various levels) during any

emergency

Superintendent of Police (SP):

After receiving instructions from Deputy Commissioner, the Superintendent of

Police will rush to the ECR and establish contact with the local police station. He

would then direct implementation of the action plan through the police station

nearest to the scene of disaster.

- Depending on the type of disaster, ensure cordoning off the affected area by the

local police

- Mobilise additional police force from various sources depending on the

requirement.

- Ensure co-ordination with various police and other agencies involved in handling

the disaster.

- If necessary mobilise the home guards.

SDPO of the concerned Sub Division: The SDPO of the sub-division where the disaster has struck would get in touch

with the nearest police station and ensure the police team is rushed to the scene

of the emergency. His main function would be to act as link between scene of the

accident and the Emergency Control Room at Mangalore.



- On receiving information from the ECR, he would rush to the site, assess

the situation, obtain first hand information, take control of the overall

situation.

- Alert district administration to mobilise Reserve Police personnel for

deployment for traffic regulations, supervision of evacuation and security

duties.

- Alert area District Commandant of Home guards to mobilise homeguards,

as necessary (and keep the SP informed).

- Arrange for necessary transportation vehicles for rescue operation in

consultation with the RTO.

- Arrange for necessary Ambulances and other medical facilities for the

affected persons in co-ordination with various government and non-

governmental agencies.

- Arrange for removal of the dead bodies, identifications and proper

preservation.

- Prepare list of missing persons and take immediate steps to trace them.

- Communicate the information to other agencies through police control

room.

- Keep in constant touch with ECR to ascertain latest status and intimate

police personnel with upto date information regarding response actions

and further instructions.

- Arrange for relief to policemen handling the emergency situation.

Circle Inspector

The Circle Inspector of the concerned area would also rush to the scene of the

accident and direct the various operations like maintaining law and order,

barricading and diversion of traffic away from the scene of accident. His main

functions would include

- Maintain direct contact with the local police station through the police

mobile van.

- Keep monitoring the progress of various mitigative and rescue measures

being undertaken.



- Ensure police personnel are given updated information for announcement

during the emergency.

- Mobilise government and private buses through RTO for evacuation.

- Ensure that the bus / vehicle drivers are properly instructed regarding

areas to be visited and routes to be taken during evacuation.

- Ensure security duty personnel are at their posts and that only authorised

personnel/vehicles are allowed to enter the emergency / affected area

with proper identity cards.

Police Inspector of nearest Police Station

The local police station plays an important role during any Industrial disaster in

the industrial area around Panambur area as well as during any road accident in

the district involving a tanker carrying hazardous chemicals.

- Divert traffic away from the scene of accident on major roads. Set up

barricades and regulate crowd in affected area.

- Warn and advice people about emergency using vehicle mounted with

Public Address system in the affected area.

- Evacuate people and livestock in affected areas using rescue routes

identified in advance (depending on wind direction in case of gas leak)

- Provide relief to victims till arrival of rescue team.

- Maintenance of law and order at the scene of emergency and prevention

of anti social elements from taking advantage of the situation.

- Ensure law and order and maintain security in evacuated areas.

- Assist in rendering first aid Medical help to those in need.

- Ensure police personnel on emergency duty receive proper briefing about

possible hazardous effects and are provided with personal protective

equipment.

Traffic Police

Depending on the type of disaster, the traffic police would take control of the

traffic movement in the district. During a natural disaster like cyclone or floods the



roads may be cut off for a longer period and hence traffic police play a very

important role in handling any such emergencies. Their duties would include

- Stop traffic approaching the affected area and advise the crew regarding

the impending danger.

- Ensure tankers containing hazardous chemicals are parked in safe

places.

- Check for alternate routes and divert the traffic in a controlled manner to

prevent congestion in diversions.

- Keep close liaison with other police agencies and assist in crowd control

around the affected area.

- Make way for emergency and relief vehicles on priority basis.

- Monitor the condition of the blocked road and resume normal traffic only

when the affected area is declared safe.

5.2.5 FACTORY INSPECTORATE ( Dy. Chief Inspector of Factories)

Alternate : Sr. Inspector of Factories

Factory inspectorate plays an important role during any industrial and

transportation disaster in which there is large-scale release of hazardous

chemicals. In case of such disaster, the Dy. Chief Inspector of Factories or Sr.

Inspector of Factories would position themselves in the ECR and help the district

administration by providing expert advice for minimising the effect of such a

disaster.

Main functions

- Ensure the on-site emergency management plan of the affected industry

(in case of an industrial disaster) has been activated and the mitigative

measures are taken to safeguard the people present in the premises.

- Visit the site of accident to ensure proper measures are taken to control

the situation

- Speed up help from mutual aid members, if required to contain the

emergency



- Mobilise the technical experts for advice if required.

- Inspect the area along with the tech. Co-ordinators and report to D.C. for

giving all clear signal.

5.2.6 FIRE FIGHTING FUNCTION (Divisional Fire Officer)

Alternate : Station Fire Officer, Pandeshwar

The Divisional fire Officer/Station Officer will place himself in the main Emergency

Control Centre and maintain continuous contact on VHF with the Station Officer

at the Site. Depending on the need, the Divisional Fire Officer will place himself at

the site and maintain contact with the Dy. Commissioner in the Main Emergency

Control Centre.

The Station Officer/Sub-Officer/Asst. Sub-Officer of the fire station closest to the

scene of disaster will direct fire fighting operations at the site and keep the

Divisional fire officer/station officer informed of the developments at the site.

Main functions

- Initiate rescue and fire fighting operation with available means. Ensure

that all fire fighters use proper personnel protective equipment while

fighting a fire or controlling gas leak.

- Help the district administration in evacuation of people from affected

zones using escape routes decided in advance depending on the wind

direction.

- Continuously evaluate the situation and decide the necessity to call in

additional Fire Engines from neighbouring Talukas / Districts.

- Mobilise the services of the Home guards for fire fighting through the

Police.

- Additional help may also be summoned from the Airport fire brigade

depending on the location of the disaster / accident.

- He will advice the Dy. Commissioner on the extent of evacuation

necessary.

- Preserve valuable evidences, which may be useful for investigation later

on.



- Ensure availability of water and make arrangement for private water

tanker carriers.

- When the emergency is over, carry out joint inspection of affected areas

along with site controller and Technical experts to ensure that emergency

is under control.

- Send the message of "SAFE" to DC/SP etc to enable him to officially call

off the emergency.

5.2.7 CIVIL DEFENCE FUNCTION - Homeguards (District Commandant)

Alternate :Dy. District Commandant

District Commandant/Dy. Commandant will position themselves in the

Emergency Control Room and assist the district administration in mitigating the

emergency. They would be continuous in contact with the field officer/units.

Main functions

- Assist the Police or Fire personnel in carrying out their duties.

- Carry out rescue and evacuation operation in close association with other

emergency agencies.

- Evacuated areas would need to be guarded against looting.

5.2.8 PUBLIC WORKS / HIGHWAY FUNCTION (Superintendent Engineer)

Alternate : Executive Engineer

Depending on type and location of the disaster, the in-charge of the PWD /

Highway or Irrigation department representatives would make themselves

available at the ECR and maintain close contact with their engineers who would

be at the scene of the disaster.

Main Functions

- Help the police to divert traffic away from the scene of accident along all

the major roads



- Ensure diversion routes are in good condition and traffic does not get

jammed.

- Exhibit proper diversion signs conspicuously at suitable places.

- Provide the mobile crane / heavy earthmoving equipment for the purpose

of salvage operation.

- Provide necessary assistance as required and directed by Dy.

Commissioner / Superintendent of police.

5.2.9 TRANSPORTATION FUNCTION (RTO)

Alternate : ARTO

The transportation department plays an important role during any type of disaster

as it would involve large-scale evacuation of people in the affected area. RTO /

ARTO would be based at ECR and assist the district administration in mitigating

the emergency.

Main Functions

- Deploy required number of buses with drivers to evacuate people to Safe

Shelters.

- Mobilise various earth moving equipment and other heavy machinery from

different sources required for rescue operation.

- Provide mobile workshop if required for urgent repairs/breakdowns.

- Provide assistance as required and directed by Superintendent of Police /

Dy. Commissioner.

5.2.10 HEALTH FUNCTION (District Health Officer)

Alternate : Assistant Health Officer

The DHO / AHO would be based in the ECR and assist the district administration

in ensuring prompt health care to all affected people through their network in

affected areas.

Main Functions



- On receiving the information about the emergency DHO will mobilise all

the available Medical & Paramedical Staff for handling emergency.

- Rush medical teams from the nearby hospitals to the scene of the disaster

or safe shelters nearby.

- Set up first aid centre at the affected area and rescue shelters.

- Mobilise all the available ambulances and assist in shifting the

injured/affected persons requiring additional attention to hospitals.

- Alert all government & private Hospitals to meet any emergency and line

of treatment to be followed.

- Alert blood banks to maximise their stock.

- Set-up temporary emergency wards with medical facilities to receive the

affected victims.

- Inform all the doctors / paramedicals regarding the nature of emergency

as per the message received from the ECR and also inform about the line

of treatment to be followed.

- Ensure sufficient stock of drugs and other medical facilities are available.

- Keep in touch with the district Emergency Control Centre and Deputy

Commissioner and appraise him of the situation and advice him on

additional help required from outside agencies.



5.2.11 WELFARE FUNCTION (Dy. Director (Food and Civil supply)

Alternate : Assistant Director (Food and Civil supply)

The DFO / AFO would be based in the ECR and assist the district administration

in running the Safe Shelters and Relief Centres set up during the disaster.

Main Functions

- Will be overall in-charge of Relief and Rehabilitation activities.

- Identify the rehabilitation centre in advance and establish them in shortest

possible time.

- Arrange for orderly transportation of population from the emergency zone

and adjacent villages in case evacuation has been ordered by Deputy

Commissioner.

- Co-ordinate with other departments connected with relief measures.

- Provide basic amenities such as food, drinking water and sanitation at the

re-habilitation centres.

- Distribute food packets at the affected areas to the people, emergency

services agencies such as police, fire fighting personnel and others.

- Exercise any other powers to seek any assistance from the local

authorities in achieving this objective.

- Establish contact with the voluntary organisations for assistance.

- To ensure that necessary arrangements are made for the orderly return of

all villagers to their respective places once the Deputy Commissioner

informs about the termination of the emergency.

5.2.12 INFORMATION FUNCTION (District Information Officer)

Alternate : Assistant Information Officer

The District Information Officer would be based in the ECR during any disaster

and assist the district authorities in smooth operation.



Main functions - Upon receiving the information from district administration, the information officer

should co-ordinate with media for giving information regarding emergency.

- Co-ordinate with the affected victims' families for giving information of their dear

ones if missing / dead / injured.

5.2.13 POLLUTION CONTROL FUNCTION (Dy.Environment Officer)

Alternate : Assistant Dy. Environment Officer

The representative of the Pollution Control Board would be based in the ECR

during any disaster and ensure the environmental damage is kept minimum.

- Mobilise all possible resources at his disposal and keep the laboratory functioning

for analysis of pollutants and emissions.

- Rush the team to the affected area for collection of samples and analyse the

same.

- Keep the ECR informed about the possible effect on human life as well as

environment and corrective actions taken to minimise the same.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

5. EMERGENCY ORGANISATION - DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES ..................... 1

5.1 OVERVIEW OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN .............................................. 1 5.1.1 PURPOSE............................................................................................................ 1 5.1.2 SITUATIONS COVERED BY PLAN ........................................................................... 1 5.1.3 DIRECTION AND CO-ORDINATION ......................................................................... 2 5.1.4 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS ................................................................................. 2 5.1.5 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ORGANISATION ......................................................... 2 5.1.6 TRAINING AND EXERCISES ................................................................................... 3 5.2 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES ........................................................................ 7 5.2.1 DISTRICT DISASTER MANAGER (DEPUTY COMMISSIONER) .................................... 7 5.2.2 DISASTER MANAGER (ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER) ........................................ 9 5.2.3 SITE CONTROLLER (TEHSILDAR OF AFFECTED TALUKA) ............................... 10 5.2.4 LAW AND ORDER FUNCTION ( SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE (SP)) ............... 11 5.2.5 FACTORY INSPECTORATE ( DY. CHIEF INSPECTOR OF FACTORIES) ............. 14 5.2.6 FIRE FIGHTING FUNCTION (DIVISIONAL FIRE OFFICER) ................................ 15 5.2.7 CIVIL DEFENCE FUNCTION - HOMEGUARDS (DISTRICT COMMANDANT) ........ 16 5.2.8 PUBLIC WORKS / HIGHWAY FUNCTION (SUPERINTENDENT ENGINEER) ....... 16 5.2.9 TRANSPORTATION FUNCTION (RTO) ........................................................ 17 5.2.10 HEALTH FUNCTION (DISTRICT HEALTH OFFICER) ....................................... 17 5.2.11 WELFARE FUNCTION (DY. DIRECTOR (FOOD AND CIVIL SUPPLY) ................. 19 5.2.12 INFORMATION FUNCTION (DISTRICT INFORMATION OFFICER) .................... 19 5.2.13 POLLUTION CONTROL FUNCTION (DY.ENVIRONMENT OFFICER) ............... 20



6. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES AND MITIGATIVE MEASURES

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The district administration would take prompt action in case of any emergency striking

the district to keep the situation under control. The emergency organisation for handling

any emergency is expected to remain same but the procedures for handling different

type of emergency differ substantially.

In this chapter, the emergency procedures for handling various types of emergencies (as

identified in Chapter 2 have been listed.

The District Emergency Control Centre is activated during any emergency and all the

emergency organisation members are notified to take up their position. The

communication plays an important role in initiating the actions to control / mitigate any

emergency without losing valuable time.

6.2 EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURE - NATURAL DISASTERS

The natural disasters have widespread damage potential and may or may not come with

pre-warning. Hence the District Disaster Management Plan should be immediately

activated to ensure minimum loss of life and property.

6.2.1 Cyclones

Preliminary Actions on alert signal from meteorological department:

- Identification of likely affected areas:

- Map of Dakshina Kannada District showing areas that are likely to be affected by

cyclone are identified and divided into three zones, Zone 1, 2 and 3 as shown in

attached map with the population affected1). Evacuation route by rail/road for the

likely affected areas is also shown in the diagram attached.

1) Source: 1991 Census



Likely affected areasLikely affected areas

MA N GA LOR E

SU LLIA

PU TTU R U

B ELTH A N GA D Y

B A N TW A LA

UDUPI

KARKALA

ARABIAN SEA

UDUPI DISTRICT

KERALA


CHIKMANGALUR

DISTRICT

MUDIGERE

SAKALESHPURA

HASSAN

DISTR

ICT

SOM

AWAR

APET

MADIKERI

KODAGU D

ISTRIC

T

45'12

13

1315'

7445'

0 5Kilometers

10


7575 15'75 30'

1245'

1315'

13SU R U TH K A L

K U LA I

PA N A MB U R

MU LK I

H A LEYA N GA D I

B A LK U N JE

K IN N IGOLI

MU K K A

TA N N IR U B H A VI

K A TIPA LLAB A LA

MA N GA LOR E

U LLA L

B A JA PE

YEK K A R

K A TEEL

K OTEK A RSOMESH W A R A

N EER U MA R GA

K A N N U R U

PER A MU N N U R UK ON A JE

PA VOOR UH A R EK A LA

GU R U PU R AK A N D A VA R A

MOGA R U

PILU K U LA

H OSA B ETTU

K A LLA MU N D K U R U

PA LA D K A

PU TH IGE

K U R N A D U

PU D UTH U MB E

POLA LI

K A R IA N GA LA

TEN K A YED A PA D A VU

B A LEPU N I

K A N YA N A

K OLN A D U

SH IR TH A D Y

MOOD B ID R I

K OD A N GIK A LLU

A MTA D I

SA N GA B ETTU

B A N TW A LA

MA N C H I

N A R IK OMB UPA N EMA N GA LOR E

GOLTH A MA JA LU

SA R A PA D I

N A R A H A R I B ETTA

K EPUPER U VA I

VITTA L

H OSA N GA D I

VEN OOR U

A N D IN JE

N A R A VIMA N TR A D Y

K A VA LA MU D U R U

C H EN N A ITH OD I

K A R IN JA

PU TTU R U

K OD IMB A D I

K A B A K A

ID K ID U

PER N E

B A LA N JA

K OLTH IGEB ETTA MPA D I

GU R U VA YA N A K ER E

TH A N N EER U PA N TH A

MA D A N TH YA R U

PA D A N GA D I

K A N IYOOR U

U PPIN A N GA D I

N A R IMOGA R U

FOR T

B ELTH A N GA D Y

LA ILA

U JIR E

JA MA LA B A D

A LA N K A R

N ELYA D I

B ELA N D U R U

K OK K A D A

JA LSU R U

IVA R N A D UK A LA N JA

B ELLA R E

SU LLIA

A LETTY

A JJA VA R A

IN D A B ETTU

MU N D A JE

MITH A B A GILU

D H A R MA STH A LA

N ER IYA

C H A R MA D I

SH ISH ILA

EN MU R UPA N JA

B A N TR AK A D A B A

SH IR A D I

A R A N TH OD U

N ELLU R U K EMR A JE

H A R IH A R A PA LA TH A D K A

GU TH IGA R U

SU B R A H MA N YA

K U MA R A PA R VA TH A

Z 1Z 1Z 2Z 2 Z 3Z 3



LIKELY AFFECTED AREA (ZONE 1)

Sr. no. TALUKA VILLAGE POPULATION1 Mangalore Balkunje 5142 Mangalore Paladka 24113 Mangalore Mulki 20104 Mangalore Kallamundkuru 13855 Mangalore Kinnigoli 32986 Mangalore Haleyangadi 44567 Mangalore Mukka8 Mangalore Puthige 49379 Mangalore Hosabettu 3666

10 Mangalore Kateel 232211 Mangalore Yekkar 121212 Mangalore Suruthkal TMC&OG 2263813 Mangalore Katipalla OG 1848314 Mangalore Bala ba jape 665915 Mangalore Kulai OG 960416 Mangalore Kandavara 55017 Mangalore Gurupura 43618 Mangalore Pilukula 55819 Mangalore Panambur 9320 Mangalore Tannirubhavi 90921 Mangalore Neerumarga 188122 Mangalore Kannuru NMCT 622023 Mangalore Mogaru 123524 Bantwal Pudu NMCT&TMC 1024125 Mangalore Pavooru 510526 Mangalore Harekala 521427 Mangalore Ullal Peramunnuru 3118128 Bantwal Kurnadu 152229 Mangalore Someshwara NMCT 1530230 Mangalore Kotekar nmct 971931 Mangalore Konaje 564532 Bantwal Balepuni 253233 Bantwal Kolnadu 1030334 Bantwal Kanyana 660135 Bantwal Peruvai 284836 Bantwal Kepu 487337 Bantwal Manchi 580238 Bantwal Thumbe 203339 Bantwal Amtadi 532440 Bantwal Kariangala 222241 Bantwal Tenkayedapadavu 515842 Bantwal Polali 102543 Bantwal Kariangala 106344 bantwal Bantwal TMC 3431345 Mangalore Mangalore MC,OG, 234436

Total 497939




Sr. no. Taluka Village Population. 1 Mangalore Shirthady 14922 Mangalore mantrady 24763 Mangalore Kodangikalu 15504 Mangalore Moodbidri nmct 158685 Belthangady Naravi 7046 Belthangady Andinje 10677 Belthangady Hosangadi colony 21178 Belthangady Venooru 28009 Belthangady Balanja 1881

10 Belthangady Sangabettu 386011 Belthangady Chennaithodi 158112 Belthangady Badagakaranadur 138413 Belthangady Madanthayaru 212614 Bantwal Karanje 420215 Belthangady Kavalamuduru 374516 Belthangady Thannirpantha 408217 Belthangady Narikombu 632718 Belthangady Sarapady 328919 Belthangady Panemangalore 655520 Belthangady Narahari Betta 235521 Belthangady Golthamajalu 537622 Bantwala Vittal 1419623 Belthangady Coladu 154824 Bantwal Idkidu 366425 Bantwala Kepu 487326 Belthangady Notal 223527 Belthangady baikampady 444128 Bantwal Perne 199029 Puttur Kodimbala 212630 Puttur Uppinangadi 652131 Puttur Kabakka 122832 Puttur Mitpuri 199533 Puttur Narimogaru 178834 Puttur Belanduru 508235 Puttur Bettampaduru 258036 Puttur Kolthige 570837 Sulia Ajjavara 331838 Sulia Alletty 197939 Puttur NMCT Puttur NMCT 1007140 Malpe NMCT 10446

total 141808




Sr. no. Taluka Village Population. 1 Belthangady Mithabagilu 23312 Belthangady Balanja 18813 Belthangady Guruvayanakere 15054 Belthangady Padangadi 8985 Belthangady Shishila 26445 Belthangady Ujire 34766 Belthangady Laila 15637 Belthangady Jamalabad Fort 16558 Belthangady Indabettu 27159 Belthangady Charmadi 2709

10 Belthangady Mundaje 280311 Belthangady Neriya 995412 Belthangady Madanthyaru 444113 Belthangady Dharmasthala 111114 Belthangady Kaniyooru 382115 Belthangady Kokkada 445116 Puttur Shiradi 152217 Puttur Nellyadi 276318 Puttur Alankar 245619 Puttur Bantra 337920 Puttur Kadaba 178521 Sulia Bellare 108422 Sulia Kalanja 178923 Sulia aivaranadu 126224 Sulia Jalsuru 188525 Sulia Sulia 1120726 Sulia Ajjavara 331827 Sulia Nellurukemraje 231128 Sulia Aranthodu 175429 Sulia Guthigaru 109430 Sulia Subrahmanya 433231 Sulia Kumaraparvatha 321232 Sulia Emmuru 145533 Sulia Panja 327434 Sulia Hariharapalathadka 5178

Total 103018



Evacuation Route for likely affected population

MANGALORE

SULLIA

PUTTURU

BELTHANGADY

BANTWALA

SURUTHKAL

KULAI

PANAMBUR

MULKI

HALEYANGADI

BALKUNJE

KINNIGOLI

MUKKA

TANNIRUBHAVI

KATIPALLABALA

MANGALORE

ULLAL

BAJAPE

YEKKAR

KATEEL

KOTEKARSOMESHWARA

NEERUMARGA

KANNURU

PERAMUNNURUKONAJE

PAVOORUHAREKALA

GURUPURAKANDAVARA

MOGARU

PILUKULA

HOSABETTU

KALLAMUNDKURU

PALADKA

PUTHIGE

KURNADU

PUDUTHUMBE

POLALI

KARIANGALA

TENKAYEDAPADAVU

BALEPUNI

KANYANA

KOLNADU

SHIRTHADY

MOODBIDRI

KODANGIKALLU

AMTADI

SANGABETTU

BANTWALA

MANCHI

NARIKOMBUPANEMANGALORE

GOLTHAMAJALU

SARAPADI

NARAHARI BETTA

KEPUPERUVAI

VITTAL

HOSANGADI

VENOORU

ANDINJE

NARAVIMANTRADY

KAVALAMUDURU

CHENNAITHODI

KARINJA

PUTTURU

KODIMBADI

KABAKA

IDKIDU

PERNE

BALANJA

KOLTHIGEBETTAMPADI

GURUVAYANAKERE

THANNEERUPANTHA

MADANTHYARU

PADANGADI

KANIYOORU

UPPINANGADI

NARIMOGARU

FORT

BELTHANGADY

LAILA

UJIRE

JAMALABAD

ALANKAR

NELYADI

BELANDURU

KOKKADA

JALSURU

IVARNADUKALANJA

BELLARE

SULLIA

ALETTY

AJJAVARA

INDABETTU

MUNDAJE

MITHABAGILU

DHARMASTHALA

NERIYA

CHARMADI

SHISHILA

ENMURUPANJA

BANTRAKADABA

SHIRADI

ARANTHODU

NELLURUKEMRAJE

HARIHARAPALATHADKA

GUTHIGARU

SUBRAHMANYA

KUMARAPARVATHA

UDUPI

KARKALA

ARABIAN SEA

UDUPI DISTRICT

KERALA


CHIKMANGALUR

DISTRICT

MUDIGERE

SAKALESHPURAH

ASSA

N D

ISTRIC

TSO

MA

WA

RA

PET

MADIKERI

KODAGU DISTRIC

T

45'12

13

1315'

7445'

0 5Kilometers

10


7575 15'75 30'

1245'

1315'

13VENOORU

MOODBIDRI

SUBRAHMANYA

DHARMASTHALA

MULKI RIVER

PAVANJE RIVER

BELMANROAD

UDUPIROAD

GURUPURA RIVER

HOSANG

ADI R

IVER

KARKALA ROAD

NETHRAVATHI

KASARAGODUROAD

KANHANGADROAD

MADIKERIROAD

PAYASWINI RIVER

NETTANA

KASARAGODUROAD

NETHRAVATHI

SAKALESHPURAROUTE

CHIKAMAGALURROAD

National Highway

Taluk Border

Rivers

Railway Track

State Highway

Major District Roads

Firka/Hobli Centres

Important PilgrimagesPort

Taluk Centres

REFERENCEDeputy Commissioner's Office

Beaches and fishing

0DR

By railway

By Nationalhighway

By state roads



- After receiving alert from meteorological department, broadcast the information

about cyclone strike on Radio, TV channels and loud speakers mounted on

police jeeps.

- Contact Police department and instruct them to inform general public in their

respective areas (beats).

- Move people from high risk areas to identified assembly points in lower risk areas

preferably zone 3 (or zone likely to be least affected).

- Arrange food, water and medicine at designated assembly points.

- Contact NMPT and fishermen association and inform them about the possible

cyclone strike.

- Fishermen should be advised not to go into high sea.

- Ask port authorities to raise the appropriate signal in the port.

Monitoring action during cyclone

- Contact fire brigade control room and collect details of phone calls received

during the cyclone. This will help in assessing the magnitude of damage.

- Contact electricity department and instruct them to cut-off electric supply

wherever there are overhead wires. (Especially in Zone 1 & Zone 2), to prevent

short-circuiting and causalities due to electrocution.

- Contact state telecommunication department to assess any disruption in the

network

- Contact Police to ensure that all roads in zone 1 & 2 are free from obstruction as

far as possible.

- Contact NMPT to assess situation at the port.

Calling off emergency

- Contact Meteorological Department and confirm that cyclone risk is over.

- Have teleconferencing / meeting with Head of fire dept, Head of the District

Electric Supply Board, and take stock of the situation.

- Instruct the Electric Supply Board to resume power supply safely region by region

and give feed back.

- Broadcast/telecast "all clear" on radio/ TV respectively.



6.2.2 Floods

Floods are natural calamities that have the potential to cause widespread

damage to human beings and property. Flood planning is perhaps the best

protection against flood damage. Floods occur after a pre-warning, enabling

advance action.

Some of the important pre-actions are:

- On receiving the flood alert information, the D. C. should issue a flood alert to all

the police thanas (stations).

- The tehsildars should be asked to immediately appraise the people living in the

low level areas about the possibility of flood.

- Notify and inform general public about flood situation through radio broadcast or

over local cable TV network.

- Assistant District Magistrate should co-ordinate with the Chief Medical Officer,

DHO, Chief Medical Superintendent-District Hospital, as well as Rural

Development Block Officer alongwith the District Inspector of Schools.

- Ensure that the complete evacuation of the locality / village in low-lying areas has

taken place.

- The tehsildar to ensure that the relief centres have the basic amenities to prevent

spread of diseases as well as give first aid to the injured at the relief centre.

Main actions during flood should be:

- In the event of a flood / inundation due to incessant rains it should be ensured

that the roads leading to the areas where the water accumulation is possible are

completely cordoned off.

- All the entry points i.e. road entry points from the National Highway, should have

names of villages and the areas which are inundated.

- In the event of flood or damage due to heavy rains the traffic suspension signal

should be passed on to the neighbouring districts.

- The information should be relayed well in advance in order to prevent jamming of

the road in any section of the National Highway / District Road.

- Apart from the road network being affected it is also likely that the train traffic

could also get affected. In the event of the same, it should be ensured that



information pertaining to the flood or damage to the bridge or inundation on the

tracks alert should be relayed to the Divisional Railway Manager.

- Cut off electrical supply to prevent electrocution

- Establish contact with the ECR for up-to-date status.

Post Flood actions include:

- Clearing of debris and carcasses of animals and dispose suitably, to prevent

outbreak of epidemic.

- Re-establish communication link and other services like electricity, transport.

- Vaccination to persons against water borne disease.

- Inspect all road and rail bridges for worthiness before opening the same for

general public.

- The railways should inspect the railway lines for their worthiness and for the relief

trains to pass.

6.2.3 Earthquake

Earthquakes present unique problems as they upset the complete infrastructure

necessary for rescue and restoration of normalcy. For example, it could prevent

emergency personnel from reaching victims, it increases the risk of fire and

electrical shock, could result in complete failure of the telephone and other

communication systems, disruption of water supply for fire fighting / other

reasons, and increases the possibility of burst pipelines carrying petroleum oils. It

could, in addition, prevent ambulances from evacuating victims, fire personnel

from reaching the fire affected areas, result in major structural debris causing

secondary damage and most importantly, could affect the entire emergency

organisation that is geared up for handling emergencies.

The main actions for earthquake incidents include preventive (pre-incident),

during incident and post incident actions. Each earthquake, depending upon its

intensity (as measured on the Richer/ modified Mercalli Scale) would have

different extent of damage.

Some of the pre-actions that are important include:

- Basic earthquake related training to staff (behaviour during earthquake, how to



recognise, dos and don’ts)

- As blackout is possible, a kit containing flashlights, portable radio, basic tools,

should be available for emergency.

- Basic precautions such as sitting away from wall hanging items, bolting of

almirahs to the wall rather than loosely lying cupboards, pasting tape to the

glasses to avoid excessive shattering.

Actions immediately after tremors

Actions during an earthquake would depend upon the severity of the quake and the

extent of damage-however, the basic steps for safeguarding life safety (top most

criterion) include:

Activation of the fire orders, for fires are likely in case of major earthquakes. Pipelines

would be expected to rupture as also storage tanks - this would result in a large-scale

spillage and possible fires. The fire fighting system is likely to be incapacitated. In

addition, power supply may be (most likely) cut off.

The main action would involve:

- Stopping any pumping of oil from ship tankers say in NMPT, if in progress

- Stopping oil pumping through the Mangalore-Bangalore pipeline from the main

control room.

- Cutting off the power supply (if not cut off on its own already) to avoid electrical

shocks, fires, etc.

- Halting any road / rail tanker filling operations, if in progress.

- Sending away road tankers to safe zones.

- Any major oil spillage could also overflow the dyke walls and spread around. Halting

or minimising this flow of oil may be attempted where practical and without

endangering human life.

- Set up a call-receiving centre in addition to the DECR.

- Flash the telephone number over the local cable TV as well as the Doordarshan

Channel.

- Issue a warning over the Radio regarding the earthquake and the future possibility of

after shocks.

- Rush rescue team to affected area to retrieve entrapped persons with the means

available.

- Rush the injured to hospitals

- Get feedback from the Municipal Corporation regarding the affected areas and



Colonies.

- Get a feed back from the District Education Officer on the conditions of the schools

- Call all the doctors and put them on Standby alert.

- Recall all the vehicle of the district and use them for reaching the various affected

areas.

- Interact with the Red Cross organisation for mobilising the doctors in Dakshina Kannada and neighbouring district like Udupi.

- Contact the DG set operators and ask them to be on Standby for supplying the

generators.

- Dispatch the Police units to the worst affected areas.

- Request the Army to help in the relief operations.

- Get the searchlight operators to supply the searchlights.

- Tents and Plastic sheets suppliers should be contacted to keep the same ready.

- Medical Outpost should be set up near the affected area with

- First Aid facility

- Splints

- Neck Collars

- Immobilising stretcher - The Triage area should be marked clearly so as to enable the ambulance staging

- The fire tender approach area as well as the other relief material vehicle area should

also be identified

- All the approach roads to the major collapsed structures should be kept / made free.

- Crack teams should be identified which have probe Cameras for locating the dead

and the injured in the rubble

- Sniffer dogs should also be called from the neighbouring district to locate the injured

- Concrete cutters should be brought for cutting through the concrete rubble to reach

the injured in the collapsed building

- The highway should be sealed.

- The neighbouring district administration should be told about the disaster

- The power supply should be immediately cut-off in the affected area

- The water mains should be blocked to ensure that the collapsed structures do not get

flooded as a result of breakage of water pipeline.

- Information should be gathered from the Civil Hospital about whether it has suffered

any structural damage or weakening.

- All the private clinics / hospitals should be asked to keep the beds empty so as to

ensure that the patients can be received for medical treatment.



For general public, important instructions should include:

• Get under a heavy table or desk and hold on, or sit or stand against an inside wall if

inside the building and if unable to come out. If possible to come out without

difficulty, assemble outside the building to avoid fatality due to structural collapse.

• Keep away from windows as these may shatter/crack resulting in possible injury.

• If outdoors, stay away from tall objects (lighting poles, pipe racks, structural roofs)

falling debris, trees and power lines.

• Tanker Trucks drivers should drive to a clear spot and stay in the vehicle.

Post earthquake actions

Post earthquake actions are extremely important and these include:

- Cleanup of the debris and rescue of people who are alive

- Making arrangement for the Morgue

- Siting in the open area where the tents can be put up

- Expect aftershocks. They are just as serious as the main earthquake.

- Put on shoes to protect from broken glass, chappals are to be avoided at any cost.

- Check for causalities and fires (secondary fires could be raging).

- Use a flash light to inspect for damage.

- Do not go into damaged areas unless specifically trained to do so.

- Do not use telephones except in emergencies.

- Do not use vehicles except in emergencies.

- Use a portable radio for obtaining information

- Assist in rescue of co-workers and other persons who could be present at the

installation as per the Fire Orders.

6.2.4 Forest Fire

Historically there has been no major forest fires in the district except for few bush

fires in the densely forested areas of Belthangady, Puttur and Sullia talukas.

Precautionary measures are taken during summer months by appointment of

temporary fire watches in vulnerable areas. All the roads through forests are

maintained with a clearance of 4 metres on either side. In an unlikely event of a

forest fire in Dakshina Kannada District, following broad guidelines is to be

followed :

• On an intimation of forest fire, an aerial survey should be carried out.



• Estimate burning / fire spread and evacuate people dwelling in the vicinity.

• After aerial surveillance, identify the area for creating fire breaks. Spread of

fire can be controlled by cutting /eliminating vegetation and spreading with

mud/sand.

• Cool the fire break area with water.

• Take necessary assistance from home guard, army, airforce depending upon

the intensity of the fire.

6.2.5 Land Slide

Over the past few decades, an array of techniques and practices has evolved to

reduce and cope with losses from landslide hazards. Careful development can

reduce losses by avoiding the hazards or by reducing the damage potential.

Following approaches can be used individually or in combination to reduce

landslide risk or eliminate losses.

• Restricting Development in Landslide Prone Areas – Land use planning is

one of the most effective and economical ways to reduce landslide losses by

avoiding the hazard and minimising the risk. This is accomplished by

removing or converting existing development or discouraging or regulating

new development in unstable areas.

• Excavation, Construction, and Grading Codes - Excavation, construction,

and grading codes should be developed for construction in landslide-prone

areas (National Building code).

• Protecting Existing Development - Control of surface water and

groundwater drainage is the most widely used and generally the most

successful slope-stabilisation method. Stability of a slope can be increased by

removing all or part of a landslide mass, or by adding earth supports placed at

the toes of potential slope failures. Restraining walls, piles or rock anchors

are commonly used to prevent or control slope movement. In most cases,

combinations of these measures are used.

• Monitoring and Warning Systems - Monitoring and warning systems are

utilised to protect lives and property, not to prevent landslides. However,



these systems often provide warning of slope movement in time to allow the

construction of physical measures that will reduce the immediate or long-term

hazard. Site-specific monitoring techniques include field observation and the

use of various ground motion instruments.

6.3 EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURE - INDUSTRIAL DISASTERS

In Dakshina Kannada District most of MAH units are concentrated around the New

Mangalore Port at Panambur. Following are the emergency response plan for various

type of industrial disasters as identified in Chapter 2.

6.3.1 Toxic Release

The emergency procedures address to large-scale release of toxic chemical like

ammonia having widespread impact.

• Assess the situation in consultation with industries handling toxic chemicals

like ammonia, Cl2, H2S. Depending on the situation, determine the action to be

taken.

• Inform general public with the help of police, Radio broadcast or TV channel

about required precaution to be taken.

• In case of ammonia leakage, instruct general public to cover their nose with

wet cloth and move towards safe location notified (crosswind direction).

• Ask them to evacuate or remain indoors as per the situation.

• Instruct the villagers to free all the live-stocks to enable them escape. They will

move out to safe place by their natural instinct.

• If evacuation is required, determine the area to be evacuated in downwind

direction to designated Safe Assembly points.

6.3.2 Fire / Explosion

Leakage of LPG from storages or tankers and subsequent fire / explosion can

cause widespread damage. Emergency response action for tackling LPG leaks

are given below.

• Leaks from LPG storages, tankers, LPG pump glands, pipes flanges or

pipeline ruptures or from vent emissions due to cargo tank over-pressure or



relief valve failure will initiate a vapour cloud. Therefore, in case of release of

large quantity of flammable vapour, immediate effort should be directed to

eliminate source of ignition. In such event, eliminate all sources of ignition i.e.

open flames, welding, cutting, operation etc.

• If possible, isolate the vessel involved in the incident.

• Direct or disperse the vapour cloud away from such sources by means of fixed

and/or mobile water sprays or by water fog arrangement.

• If ignition does occur, there are chances of flash back to the source of leak.

Leaks from pipelines are likely to be under pressure and these, if ignited, will

give rise to a jet flame.

• In such a case it may be safer to allow the fire to burn out while protecting

surroundings by copious cooling water rather than to extinguish the fire and

risk a further vapour cloud which may result in explosion or flash back on

encountering ignition source again.

Spillage of POL products in the industry will generally be contained in dyke

resulting in confined pool. Leakages from road/rail tankers will result into

unconfined pool. Emergency response actions for tackling such leaks are given

below.

• A liquid spillage on land from tank or pipeline ruptures may be in large

quantities and will generally be contained in bunded areas or culverts. The

ignition of the ensuing vapour cloud would then result in a pool fire.

• If possible, isolate the vessel involved in the incident.

• Fire fighting operation should be carried from upwind direction.

• The hydrocarbon liquids like POL burn with a production of soot. Hence fire

fighting operation should be carried out using respiratory personal protective

equipment and / or fire proximity suits.

• Cool surrounding area exposed to heat radiation or flame impingement, with

water in order to prevent secondary fire. It is suggested that fire fighters

should maintain safe distances from fire (4 kW/m2 distances given in

chapter 3).

• The bunds or dykes are provided around the storage tanks storing flammable

materials to limit the size of any pool fires. The storage tanks containing Class

'A' products are normally provided high expansion foam pouring arrangement

to control the rate of burning. This is to be activated in the event of a fire.



• If there is no fire, arrangement should be made to pump out / transfer spilled

material to safer place e.g. into another tank or tankers.

6.3.3 Oil Spill

Large quantity of petroleum products and other hazardous chemicals are handled

in the district. Any spillage of these materials will result into large pool of chemical

on land and water bodies. This section addresses contingency plan for dealing

with such potential large-scale oil spills.

• Establish type of oil spilled so that its fate can be predicted and the

appropriate clean-up techniques employed. Data on the types of oil handled

can enable predictions to be made regarding the lifetime of slicks and the

quantity and nature of the residue, which may require a clean-up response. It

will also assist in the selection of appropriate clean-up equipment to be held

in readiness for spills.

• Having determined priorities for protection, attention can be given to

designating appropriate clean-up measures. Assess employing various

techniques for containing and cleaning of oil spills.

• The containment of floating oil for subsequent recovery or its diversion away

from sensitive areas is most important task to reduce the impact. This calls for

the use of some form of barrier for spill containment. Many different types of

oil barriers like commercially available floating booms, netting systems,

sorbent booms, improvised booms and barriers, bubble barriers and chemical

barriers can be utilised. Commercially available floating booms are the most

common form of barrier used in oil spill control.

• Floating booms can be made out of wood, bamboo, oil drums, hoses and

rubber tyres, and sorbent booms constructed from fishing nets or wire mesh

filled with straw, coconut husks or other indigenous materials.

• In shallow waters, stakes may be driven into the bottom to support screens or

mats made from sacking, reeds, straw bales, bamboo or other such material.

• On long sandy beaches bulldozers can be used to construct sand bunds out

into shallow water to intercept oil moving along the shoreline. A similar

approach can sometimes be used to block off narrow estuaries or lagoons to

prevent the ingress of oil although the ecological consequences of such

temporary measures should be considered carefully.



• The rapid recovery of contained oil is vital to prevent its escape and the

contamination of other areas. Recovery can be achieved using skimmers,

pumps, sorbents, manual techniques and non-specialised mechanical

equipment, such as vacuum trucks.

6.4 EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURE - TRANSPORTATION DISASTERS

6.4.1 Road Tanker Accident

Various hazardous chemicals are transported along the major roads in the

district. Any accidents involving these tankers may or may not result in release of

hazardous chemicals.

Following procedures is formulated to deal with such emergencies

• It should be the endeavour of the first observer to immediately inform the

nearest Police Station clearly indicating the location of the accident and the

number of vehicles affected.

While talking to the caller the following information should be sought from him:

- Where has the accident occurred?

- Where is the accident location i.e. nearest village / town etc?

- How many people are hurt?

- Is the driver alive and is he around?

- What is material involved in the accident, is it hazardous? And has

he initiated any action? (if driver is calling)

- How many vehicles are involved in the accident?

- Is the road blocked due to accident?

- Is it a tanker or trailer?

- Can you sight any fire?

- Is any leakage observed from tanker?

- Do you feel any irritation in your throat or eyes?

Instructions by Police to be given immediately to the caller / Informer are:

- Ask no one to go near the tanker.

- Do not try to plug the leak.



- Try to instruct people to move away from the downwind direction

of the leak (in the direction of wind).

- Stay clear from the road

• The Police should immediately rush to the site and cordon off the accident

site from either side of the State Highway/District road and stop the traffic on

either side.

• Request for ambulance and heavy equipment like crane for rescue operation

and normalisation.

• Police should ascertain the chemical in the tanker based on HAZCHEM code

on the tanker or from the tremcard. The information may also be obtained

from tanker crew, if not seriously injured.

• Inform the District Administration, fire brigade and nearby industry who are

supplier / user of these chemicals, if information available. Industry to be

contacted for specific chemicals is given below. The table also gives the

distance to be barricaded on either side of the scene of accident.

Sr.

No.

Chemical

Involved

Distances to

be barricaded

Industry to be

contacted

Contact Telephone

no.

1. Ammonia 400 m MCF 2220602

2. Chlorine 1200 m MCF

MRPL

220602 / 2710400

3. LPG 800 m HPCL

MRPL

ELF

2710832

2270832/2292505

4. POL (e.g. Petrol,

diesel)

100 m HPCL

IOCL

BPCL

2270365/2270835

2406178

2407930

5. Styrene,

Butadiene,

Acrylonitrile

200 m BASF 2270045/46

6. Benzene, Xylene,

Toluene, Phenol,

Cumene, Ethanol

200 m IMC

IPWC

(in NMPT)

2420496



• Depending on nature of chemicals, action should be initiated to evacuate the

persons in downwind direction. If chemical is flammable like LPG, Petrol or

others, effort should be made to put-off all ignition sources like open flame,

bidis, cigarettes etc.

• All the vehicles in vicinity should be asked to stay put and with their ignition

off.

• Using proper personal protective equipment, rescue of affected persons

should be initiated. Proper medical attention should be provided.

• On arrival of expert help and depending on the situation, efforts should be

made to contain the leak or transfer into another tanker or to neutralise the

leak.

6.4.2 Rail Accident

Rail Tanker Accident

LPG and POL products are transported to Erode in Tamil Nadu by rail tankers.

Accidents or leakage involving these tankers may result in large-scale release of

flammable materials. The actions to be taken are slightly different from the road

tanker accident but the basic actions are the same.

Following procedure is formulated to deal with such emergencies

• It should be the endeavour of the first observer to immediately inform the

nearest Railway Station clearly indicating the location of the accident site.

• Railway authority should suspend the rail traffic on the route and inform the

District Administration and police.

• The Police should immediately rush to the site and cordon off the accident

site. (The observer may also call the nearest police station, in which case the

police should try to get maximum information in the pattern mentioned above

under Road tanker accident.)

• Police should barricade the area (dependent on the chemical involved) and

try to evacuate people living in the down wind direction.

• The Station Master in turn should inform the other stations located both at the

downstream as well as upstream of the accident site.



• The police should preventing the crowd moving very close to the scene of

accident and ensure there is proper access to the fire fighting and other

rescue vehicles to the scene of accident.

• Depending on the chemical involved, inform the nearby industry or agencies

as listed above and ask for specialised help for arresting the leak if any.

• Action should be taken to put-off all ignition sources like open flame, bidis,

cigarettes etc in the prevalent wind direction.

• Using proper personal protective equipments, rescue of affected persons

should be carried out. Proper medical attention should be provided.

• On arrival of expert help and depending on the situation, efforts should be

made to contain the leak or transfer into another tanker.

Passenger train derailment:

Derailment can take place at any place in the district along the main trunk rail

line.

It is important for the observer to immediately inform the nearest Railway Station.

The Station Master of the nearest railway station to inform the Railway Divisional

Controller and District Emergency Control Centre about the accident location as

well as the extent of damage.

The DC will :

• Alert all hospitals and doctors in Mangalore city / affected Talukas and ask

them to proceed to the scene of accident for rendering medical help.

• Take charge of dead bodies for post-mortem and necessary legal procedures.

• Arrange to provide police protection at the accident site.

The train on either side should be stopped at least one station prior to the

accident site, so that the track is kept free for the Accident Relief train to reach

the accident area.

The Accident Relief train should be given priority clearance to reach the accident

site for rescue operation.



In addition to the gas cutters in the Accident Relief train, the Station Master

should be asked to keep a list of the gas cutters who can be called up on short

notice.

Initiate rescue operation and shift injured persons to nearest hospitals for

immediate medical attention. Temporary morgue arrangements should be made

for keeping the dead.

The information of train accident should be relayed to all the stations where the

train was to pass through and a "call centre" telephone number should be

arranged so that information can be given to the passenger's next of kin about

the accident.

On hearing about the derailment the Station Master should set up a call receiving

centre. The telephone numbers as designated should be flashed on the

Television Sets i.e. by using the Doordarshan as well as the other private

Channels and the radio.

6.4.3 Air craft Crash

Mangalore has an airport at Bajpe at around 20 kms from the city centre.

Presently there are around 5 flights daily from here to various parts of the

country. There is a proposal to upgrade this airport to international level and the

air traffic is expected to increase there after.

The Mangalore Airport is located just adjacent to MRPL and the aircrafts fly over

the refinery both during take off and landing.

Procedures to deal with emergency related to aircraft crash:

Action by Airport Authority

• Initiate airport emergency response by using the alarm communications

system

• Immediately provide information to the DC and District Emergency Control

Centre on the possible location of the accident

• Notify the regulatory authorities like the Ministry for Civil Aviation.



• Subsequent calls may elaborate this information by providing details on the

number of passengers, aircraft operator and any dangerous goods

(hazardous materials) on board, including quantity and location.

• Alert the airport rescue and fire fighting service, police and security services,

airport authority, and medical services in accordance with the procedure in

the airport emergency plan and mutual aid agreements.

• Inform the concerned airline operator

• Inform the Administrative department for initiating setting up of a press

information room.

• Ensure that bulletin boards are put up at the entrance with the Flash news

about the accident.

• The Airport authority is to ensure that the damaged aircraft and the debris are

secured for pending investigations.

• Extend as much emergency aid as requested by the jurisdiction agency in

command of the off-airport accident/incident

According to the mutual aid emergency agreement, the airport authority may

provide, if requested and if available, a part of its medical equipment (i.e. first aid

equipment, stretcher, body bags mobile shelters, etc) and the assistance at the

accident site of doctors and personnel teams qualified in emergency first aid

Action by District Emergency Control Centre

• Establish the location of accident site with the help of police

• Inform the Police department to ensure that the roads leading to the accident

site are kept free from traffic.

• The accident site should be completely sealed off to ensure no person other

than the rescue, fire or paramedics are allowed near the aeroplane.

• Establish communication between the Mutual Aid parties once the Air Traffic

Controller (ATC) has notified the accident.

• If possible suggest the route to be taken to reach the site to all Mutual Aid

parties.

• Notify the Hospitals of the anticipated casualty.

• Co-ordinate with the Airport authority to ensure that they have the following

services made available for the staff attending to the emergencies.

Portable emergency shelters



Lavatories

Drinking water

Ropes, barrier tapes, road markers

Food services

Mobile or portable lighting

Cones stakes flags and sign boards

Machinery, heavy equipment and extraction tools

Communication equipment like megaphone and portable

telephones, FM sets and VHF sets.

Fuel removal/containment equipment like surface boom

Action by Medical Services

The medical co-ordinators should co-ordinate with the medical services to :

• Verify that mutual aid medical and ambulance services have been alerted and

verify their subsequent arrival at the rendezvous point or staging area and

that a medical communication network is established.

• Provide control and dispatch of the casualties to the appropriate hospitals by

land, sea or air.

• Maintain an accurate list of the casualties including their names and their

destination for treatment

• Arrange for the restocking of the medical supplies, if necessary

Action by Hospitals Hospitals listed in the emergency plan should:

• Ensure that the doctors are on standby to receive various types of injured /

casualty.

• Provide doctors and trauma teams in accordance with the emergency plan

Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting Services

• A call for an aircraft accident off the airport normally is received from the air

traffic control services, local police, or local fire departments. Designated

vehicles should be sent in accordance with the existing mutual aid

department agreements.



• They should be in touch with the police department in order to ascertain

which route should be taken to reach the aircraft should the accident take

place outside the airport boundary.

• Proceed to the incident site

• They should be in touch with the local fire station and tell them of the exact

nature of requirement i.e. if it is Foam or Water or any cutting tool.

• The senior airport fire officer should report to the senior fire officer of the fire

department having jurisdiction over the area and request orders.

Prior agreement should be achieved between the on-airport rescue and fire

fighting service and the local fire department in command and mutual aid fire

departments as to who is best equipped to fight fires involving aircraft.

Additionally, there should be prior agreement as to which agency will act in

command when an accident involves an aircraft.

Action by Police/Security Services

• Establish exact location of accident site. Notify District Emergency control

centre about the location and routes to reach the accident site.

• Ensure cordoning off the accident site

• Mark out the traffic lanes on ingress and egress roads for emergency

vehicles.

• The security personnel and police would have to direct the traffic in the

vicinity of the accident site to prevent the disturbance of material scattered

over the accident site.

• Markings depicting the possible hazards like fire should be displayed to

advise all people not to encroach the area.

• All security staff and personnel should be provided identification arm bands

and issue site passes by the controlling authority.

• Special security provisions are necessary to protect the flight data and cockpit

voice recorders, any mail involved, or dangerous goods (hazardous materials)

that may be present.

• It would be the responsibility of the maintenance crew as well as the

communication team to extricate the flight data recorder as well as the cockpit

voice recorder.



Action by Aircraft Operators

• The Senior aircraft operator representative should provide information

regarding passenger load, flight crew complement, and dangerous goods

(hazardous materials) on the aircraft.

• Where necessary, the aircraft operator should provide notification of the

aircraft accident to :

- Health and welfare agencies

- Customs, where applicable

- Immigration, where applicable

- International Airport Authority of India (IAAI)

• The aircraft operator official should be responsible for the initial notification of

relatives and friends.

• News releases by aircraft operators should be prepared in conjunction with

the Agencies from District Emergency control and airport public information

officer.

• The aircraft operator is responsible for the removal of the wrecked or disabled

aircraft, as soon as authorised by the aircraft accident investigation authority.

• Give support and comfort to relatives and friends of person on board the

aircraft involved

• Register relatives and friends waiting at the airport for information about

persons on board

• Assist in the provision and serving of refreshments to waiting relatives and

friends.

6.4.4 Pipeline Failure

Dakshina Kannada District has many pipelines for carrying various hazardous

chemicals likes like LPG, Naphtha, POL products, Ammonia etc. The details

about these pipelines have been identified in a table in Chapter 2. Most of the

pipelines are laid underground in public domain and are protected against

corrosion by cathodic protection system. The failures of the pipelines are possible

if there is abnormal activity like sabotage or attempt to pilferage.

Any emergency involving pipeline results in an off-site emergency. It should be

ensured by the district administration that the following actions are taken during

any emergency involving a cross-country pipeline.



• First information is normally from the witness who informs the owner of the

pipeline regarding the leakage. It is therefore essential to educate the general

public regarding the routing of the pipeline and nature of chemicals that are

being transported.

• There are number of pipelines running parallel to each other from NMPT to

MRPL. It is therefore essential to keep the contact numbers of all the pipeline

owners at key locations in each village like Panchayat offices, schools etc

along the lines. This is in addition to the warning sign posts provided along

the pipeline.

• It should be ensured that there is continuos monitoring / communication

between both ends whenever there is transfer operation in progress. On

detection of any abnormality, the pumping operation should be stopped

immediately and valves on both sides should be closed immediately. In case

of LPG pipeline, efforts may be made to depressurise the line safely before

isolating the line.

• Next step would be identification of point of leak. If the information is received

from the witness to the leak, then the point of leak could be easily located.

Other wise a line- walk may be required to locate the point of leak.

• The area around the leak should be barricaded and the curious onlookers

should be kept at a distance.

• Efforts should be made to contain the spillage by providing temporary bunds.

This would ensure prevention of chemicals entering into water bodies like

rivers or nalas.

• The people living in down wind area around the leak should be evacuated

and all sources of ignition should be put off.

• Efforts should be made to cover the hazardous chemicals using suitable foam

to prevent formation of flammable vapour cloud which could travel to long

distance and explode on getting a source of ignition in the down wind

direction.

• In case of a leak on the proposed Mangalore - Bangalore POL pipeline the

SCADA system will indicate the leak, then the pumping should be stopped

and all valves closed.



6.5 EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURE - MISCELLANEOUS DISASTERS

6.5.1 Building Collapse

Rescue guidelines for building collapse are as under:

• As one might expect, immediately after a collapse, the debris of the building is

very unstable and prone to additional movement. Rescuers must assess the

nature of the scene and the pattern of the collapse before entering onto a pile

of rubble to ensure their own safety and that of those potentially buried in it.

Shoring may be necessary to prevent movement, before attempting rescues.

• Gather as much information as is possible at the onset of the incident. ".

Concentrate preliminary efforts on areas where people were last seen or

known to be. It is suggested that a "Command" person be designated to

interview those that may have escaped the collapse, were eyewitnesses, or

were in the building and rescued early in the effort. Obtain a list of the people

normally in the building, if one is available.

• After ensuring rescuer safety and minimal movement of the debris, send

small organised teams to the top of the pile and systematically search the

surface in specific grids. Use barricade tape and markers to visually

demonstrate the areas that have been searched and those that could

potentially contain victims. Concentrate efforts on those areas that are

believed to be the last known locations of people, when the collapse

occurred.

• Activate District Disaster Management Plan to have full-fledged rescue

operation. This type of rescue is very manpower intensive and may require

large numbers of extrication and medical personnel. The rescue operation

may call for specialised equipment like cranes / earth moving equipment and

gas cutting and concrete cutting equipment. The Rescue Vehicle available at

Pandeshwar Fire Station in Mangalore comprises of some of these critical

equipment.

• During rescue operations, sound detection devices can be used to "listen" for

movement or sounds deep within the debris. Call for "Search Dogs" and

handlers from nearest available source.

• Once it is confirmed there is nobody trapped below is alive, continue to

remove debris carefully and vertically, searching each "void" or entrance to a

"void" as it becomes available to the rescuer. People have continually and



historically been found alive many hours and days into the rescue. Have

command, media relations, and logistics officers plan for a multiple day

operation when people are still suspected of being missing and their bodies

have not been recovered.

• Help from external agencies like Army or other professional bodies should be

mobilised at shortest possible notice to ensure saving of human life.

• Great care must be taken when a person is located, either dead or alive, to

ensure that additional collapse doesn't occur in the area of their entrapment.

Rescuers should use their hands and small tools to remove the remaining

debris surrounding a person. The victims condition may dictate the speed with

which rescue efforts progress. Consideration should be given to early

application of Military Anti-Shock Trousers for viable persons that have

"crushing" injuries.

• Be prepared for the emotional and psychological implications of the incident.

Prepare early for Critical Incident Stress debriefing sessions for rescuers,

victims and families. It is strongly suggested that mental health professionals

and crisis intervention be made available to the families of those believed

trapped, at the earliest opportunity. The stress of protracted digging,

discovery of disfigured remains, odd smells and sights can affect even the

most hardened of rescue professionals. Supervisory personnel may want to

set aside a special place for families and psychological care near to, but, off

of the rescue site. To do otherwise will invite charges of insensitively, and

probably prompt the families to attempt to enter or stay in the rescue area.

• Relief for both supervisory and field rescue personnel must be forthcoming.

Even though most rescuers will insist in continuing their efforts for many

hours, they lose a large part of their effectiveness after 18-24 hours or less.

Ensure that all rescuers eat and rest at frequent intervals, as circumstances

permit. Prepare to (and do) call in off-duty or mutual aid personnel as they are

needed. Stage all extraneous units in a planned way and avoid having more

personnel on-site than can effectively work at one time.

• Anticipate the need for additional resources that you haven't thought of prior

to this event. Be prepared to obtain architectural drawings of the building(s)

affected. How about gas lines, water pipes, or electrical services that are

disrupted? You may want an aerial perspective of the scene...do you know

where and how to get overhead photos of the collapse? How are you going to

feed "hundreds" of construction workers, rescue workers, families, and



others, who may be there for days? Who's going to pay for what? Ensure that

you have planning and logistics officers who can anticipate these needs and

fulfil them within a moments notice. Often... the difference between what is

perceived as a completely successful rescue and a "disorganised" one is the

quality of your planning and the careful execution of your contingency plans.

• Particularly in multi-story buildings, be prepared for the possibility and

likelihood of underground or cave- type rescue procedures. This type of

specialised rescues requires those experienced with climbing (ascending and

descending) manoeuvres and the use of technical rappelling methods. Each

rescue team (minimum of two rescuers) going "underground" should have a

safety rope attached and be in constant communications by radio with the

surface. They should also possess a minimum of three viable light sources.

Hose rollers and other types of "rope slip devices" must be used, as to avoid

the sharp edges of concrete that will abrade normal rescue ropes.

6.5.2 Stampede

In case of a stampede may people especially the children and aged get trampled

and may get badly injured which may even result in death if first-aid / medical

attention is not provided immediately. Like in any emergency planning, the

affected persons should be given immediate medical attention. Various

precautionary measures should be taken to prevent any stampede wherever there

is assembly of large crowd.

Following are various such measures for the consideration of the district

administration.

• Identify and list the events wherein a large group of people gathers at one

place.

• Survey the gathering site for confinement I.e. inside temple, auditorium, building, structure etc.

• Study the layout and identify stampede prone pockets i.e. staircases, entry /

exit point, narrow lobby etc.

• Estimate size of population going to gather. If the site area is not adequate to

control an expected number of people, do not allow them to gather at first

place. This can be achieved by informing people well in advance, staggering

the visitors by issuing passes / identity cards.

• Study the layout and maintain adequate space between two clusters of people.



• Build temporary watchtowers for monitoring.

• Ascertain adequate ventilation in the area.

• Ascertain uninterrupted power supply in the area. Make arrangement for stand

by power supply. As far as possible allow event to be conducted in day time.

• Inform people by Public address System and Close circuit TV to avoid any

misunderstanding, rumour, panic situation.

• Post adequate staff to control mob.

• Segregation of male and female / children in the mob.

• Adequate arrangement for drinking water, food etc. As far as possible provide

such facilities on mobile van, trolley instead of fixed counter/ stall.

6.5.3 Boat capsize

In the event of boat capsize, following action plan is to be activated.

• On receipt of information on boat capsize incident, inform coast guard, home

guard or NMPT to mobilise their teams to carry out search operation. If

required, necessary help may be taken from NAVY for aerial search.

• Identify the spot of accident and direct rescue team there. This operation may

require under water cameras for locating drowned people.

• Rescue team of coast guard / NAVY should consist of divers, swimmers, and

should have rescue equipment I.e. life buoy, divers’ kit, medical first aid kit.

• Besides this, the rescue boat should be equipped with communication

equipment.

• Doctor /first-aiders should provide first aid to victims.

6.5.4 Epidemic

The District Health Officer is the overall in charge of prevention and control of out

break of any epidemic in the district in addition to his normal duties. District

Malaria Officer, District TB Officer (with additional charge of AIDS prevention and

control) assists him in the above task.

Malaria, Filaria, Laptophyrosis, Dengi fever are the common diseases in the

district which could assume epidemic levels if not controlled in time. However

outbreak of Cholera and other water borne diseases can not be ruled out

especially in the aftermath of a major flood in the district.



On detection of out break of any epidemic in the district, the administration should

investigate the root cause of the epidemic and initiate the action to mitigate the

same as follows :

• The people affected should be immediately shifted to hospitals for medical attention and kept isolated to prevent spread of disease.

• Additional medical help/ medicines may be mobilised from neighbouring districts.

• Vaccination should be given to all unaffected persons and the general public should be educated about the precautionary steps to be taken against the prevailing epidemic.

• Steps should be taken to decontaminate the source of epidemic like water bodies (lake, wells etc.).

• There should be proper temporary morgue arrangement for safe preservation and disposal of corpses of persons died of epidemic.

• Clean up drive should be taken in the affected area as filth is the major source of contamination.

• Depending on prevailing situations, the administration should take action to close all the road side eateries/ food stalls and advise them to destroy all stale food. Strict control should be exercised on the licensed restaurants.

• Decision may be taken to close down all schools, colleges and other places of mass congregation like cinema halls etc.

Please refer Annexure-IV for medical emergency response

6.5.5 Cattle Disease

Cattle epidemic like foot and mouth disease is highly contagious and may affect

large cattle population. Hence effective emergency planing is required to control

such an event.

• On getting intimation, send a team of veterinary doctors and experts to the

affected area for investigation and assessment of the situation.

• Stop sale of milk and meat from all outlets. Instruct people to dispose off

unused stock of milk & meat at home.

• On investigation by the expert team, following may be considered:

Quarantining of the affected animals. Making arrangement for treating the affected animals.



Vaccinating them, if applicable to the disease. Implementation of virus spread control program. Elimination of affected live stock. Disposal of carcasses.

6.5.6 Food Poisoning

Food poisoning is a probable phenomenon in religious or social functions where

there is mass feeding of people by setting up of temporary or make shift

community kitchens. This problem is mainly due to use of sub-standard materials

and the unhygienic conditions in which the food is prepared.

On receipt of the information of the food poisoning in the district, the district

administration should take following actions to instil confidence in the people

• Rush the food inspectors to the place of food poisoning for collection of

sample and sealing of the kitchen.

• Identify the source of food poisoning and destroy the remaining stock of the

contaminated food.

• Rush the affected persons to nearest hospitals for first aid / medical

treatment.

• Additional medical / para-medical personnel and additional stock of essential

medicines may be mobilised from various hospitals to meet the increased

demand.

• Proper information should be passed on to general public using various

means of communication to prevent spread of rumours, which may result in

panic situation.

• Take preventive measures to avoid re-occurrence of such food poisoning in

future.

• There should be proper control over quality control (by way of sampling /

analysis or by tasting) of food samples before they are fed to masses.

6.5.7 Bomb Emergency Management

To-day industrial installations, sensitive sites, public gatherings are becoming

targets of the terrorist groups. Therefore the possibility of receiving bomb threats



cannot be ruled out. The golden rule is consider all bomb threats as genuine and

act accordingly keeping in mind the safety of the people and the property.

The objective is:

a. To avoid/minimise any loss or damage to lives and property.

b. To eliminate panic and build up confidence.

c. To be prepared for proper handling of any critical situation.

Many of to-day's bombing incidents involve improvised explosive devices or

home made bombs.

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

a. Bomb threats may be received in writing or may be received on phone.

b. Keep the caller on the line as long as possible. Request him to repeat the

message, listen carefully as every word spoken by the person has to be

recorded mentally or penned down.

c. If the caller does not indicate the location of the bomb or the time of

possible detonation, it is advisable to try to ask him for this information.

d. Inform the caller that the building is occupied and the detonation of a

bomb would result in death or serious injury to many innocent persons.

e. Pay particular attention to peculiar background noises such as motors

running, background music, traffic, aircraft, voices and any other noise

which may give a clue as to from where the call is being made.

f. Listen closely to the voice (male, female), voice quality (calm, excited),

accents and speech impediments. Immediately after the caller hangs up

report should be made to the immediate senior manager or security officer

on duty, nearest police station.

g. Fill up the bomb threat call details in the format as given below.



BOMB THREAT REPORT

ACTIONS ON RECEIVING BOMB THREAT CALL

1. Do not put down receiver or cut off caller.

2. Put on tape-recorder, if available.

3. Alert nearest colleague.

4. Keep Form and pen ready to fill.

5. Note time and duration correctly.

6. Obtain as much information as possible.

7. Keep caller engaged in conversation as long as possible

(Apologise for bad line, ask him to speak up etc.)

Time of call......... Date............ Exact words of caller........................

Was any one called for by name or designation ()Yes ()No. If so, who?

QUESTIONS TO ASK CALLER 1. Who is calling, from where?

2. When is it set to go off?

3. Where is the bomb placed?

4. What kind of bomb is it?

5. How does it look like?

6. Why are you doing this?

7. Whom do you represent?

8. How do you know so much about the bomb?

9. How can we get rid of the bomb?

10. Do you know that the bomb will kill innocent people?



DETAILS OF CALLER

* Sex: () Male () Female Approximate age: ......years.

* Origin of call: () inside plant, () outside local, () outside long

distance.

* Voice characteristic: () fast, () slow, () stutter, () distinct,

() disguised, () educated, () uneducated, () loud, () soft.

* Language used ..............., accent .............., manner: () calm,

() angry, () emotional, () laughing, () deliberate, () normal,

() abnormal, () other

* Is voice familiar? () yes, () no.

* Background sound: () street, () telephone booth, () airport,

() railway stn, () residence, () cannot identify, () others

Security Manager / Police station informed at :....................Name

of the person receiving call ............... signature.............

Keep this form with all Telephone Operators, Duty/ Security

Managers, General Manager, Manager Operations, Shift In-Charge and

all those with a direct line.

h. Call all identified personnel (On-site / Off-site).

i. As soon as an emergency is envisaged /occurs the Emergency chief or

his alternate shall promptly communicate the information by a telephone

or any other quickest mode of communication to the Police, highest

District administrative officer (DC) / fire brigade. The information should

include the location and the degree of emergency (anticipated, eminent or

actual).

RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SECURITY OFFICER IN-CHARGE OF THE INDUSTRIAL INSTALLATION (IF THE CALL IS MADE TO ANY OF THE INDUSTRIES):

a. Advise the Emergency chief and keep him appraised of the actions being

taken.

b. Immediately make elaborate preparations near the threatened area for

(i) Fire fighting



(ii) Casualty handling

(iii) Rescue operations

(iv) Search operations

c. Prepare for partial/total evacuation if required. Also prepare for

evacuation if required. Emergency chief or his alternate will authorise

both these activities.

d. Designate the team for bomb search. Initiate search operations with

safety/security officers / police if time is available.

ACTION PLAN

Two situations are possible.

a. When no time limit is given.

b. When bomb threat call has time limit specified.

As soon as the call is received the concerned area-in-charge will make fire

fighting/first aid preparations immediately.

a. In the first case if there is no time limit specified for bomb explosion, as

soon as the Emergency chief gives a clearance the following action

should be initiated.

• Emergency shut down of the plant sections likely to be affected.

• Evacuation of the employees and visitors to safer locations.

• Bomb search taking all the precautions.

b. Action plan when time limit is specified:

In such case the concerned officers should search the area along with

safety and security officers.



c. Search procedures:

• Search must be conducted by persons who live or work in the involved

area alongwith the police since they are familiar with the area and

would be in a better position to notice a foreign object faster.

• Two teams could be formed to search various parts of the room/area.

Stand quietly for some moments to listen for any clock work device

before starting the search.

• As far as practical do not cause any disturbance in the environment till

the search is over.

• Do not go into dark rooms and turn on lights. Use a flash light instead.

• If any foreign or suspicious object is located, do not move or touch it.

The removal/disarming of a bomb must be left to professionals.

Report the location and description of the object immediately to the

police.

• If possible place sand bags or mattresses around the bomb. Do not

cover it.

• Identify the danger area and block it off with clear zone of atleast

100 m.

• Check that all doors and windows are open.

• Evacuate the area.

6.5.8 Conducting a search (Industry / Police)

1. Rules to be followed

a. Never use Search more than Necessary.

b. Use maximum 2 men/room or an area up to 250 Sq.ft.

c. Use searches in alternative room.

d. Never assume only one device

e. Clearly Mark the area Searched.

f. Give rest every after 10 minutes.

g. Clearly mark and report area found.

h. Do not touch or handle suspicious object.

i. Trust nothing and assume nothing safe.



2. What to look for

a. Recently disturbed area.

b. Saw dust, Brick dust and wood chips.

c. Greasy paper wrapping.

d. Objects out of place.

e. Disturbed Carpets.

f. Tin Foils.

g. Pantry door, window, drawers.

h. Fresh Plaster/cement.

i. Loose electric fitting.

j. Fish line wire hooks.

k. Cut vegetation.

l. Dusty foot prints.

m. Scratches or new points.

n. Containers, fridge, dust bin.

3. What to search

(outside the building)

a. All drainage pipes.

b. Mail boxes

c. Shrubs.

d. Trash cans.

e. Vehicles.

f. Gas connections.

g. Electricity boards.

h. DG sets.

i. Transformers.

j. Boiler rooms.

(In hotels & public places like halls)

a. Hallways.

b. Lobbies.

c. Rest rooms.

d. Trash containers.

e. Removable ceiling panels.

f. Under carpets, furniture.

g. Behind curtains.



h. Window ledges.

(In searching vehicles)

a. Look under fenders and under vehicles.

b. Trip wires to a hood, door or trunk.

c. Latches on car parts can be opened remotely by taping open the latches and using rope to pull them open.

3. Points to Remember

a. Do not touch or remove the packet.

b. Do not touch or remove with hands.

c. Do not touch submerge in water the packet.

d. Do not accept identification mark at face value.

e. Do not bring suspicious bomb in the police station.

f. Evacuate the people to the safe area.

g. Do not use radio, mobile phone.

h. Open window and doors.

i. Do not tilt and roll the object.

j. Barricade to be made around the object.

k. Do not cut any wire/ strings.

l. Do not try to be dead hero.

4. Equipment for building search

a. Extension mirror.

b. Chalk piece.

c. Torch (Periscope).

d. Screw Driver Set.

e. Explosive Detector.

f. Metal detector.

g. Audio check detector.

h. Metallic and Non Metallic tools.

i. Fishing hooks tied to fishing line to open doors and drawers remotely.

Leave bomb disposal to the bomb disposal squad.



6.5.9 In case of bomb explosion in industrial installations / general public area activate

the District Disaster Management Plan.

The bomb explosion could cause building collapse, leak of toxic gas, fires,

injuries to persons including fatalities.

The agencies on the scene would be :

a. Police (4.4.4).

b. Fire brigade (4.3.5).

c. First aiders / Homeguards (4.3.6).

The DC will be kept informed of all developments.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

6. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES AND MITIGATIVE MEASURES ............................... 1

6.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1 6.2 EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURE - NATURAL DISASTERS .................. 1 6.2.1 CYCLONES ......................................................................................................... 1 6.2.2 FLOODS ............................................................................................................. 8 6.2.3 EARTHQUAKE ..................................................................................................... 9 6.2.4 FOREST FIRE ................................................................................................... 12 6.2.5 LAND SLIDE ...................................................................................................... 13 6.3 EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURE - INDUSTRIAL DISASTERS ............ 14 6.3.1 TOXIC RELEASE ............................................................................................... 14 6.3.2 FIRE / EXPLOSION ............................................................................................ 14 6.3.3 OIL SPILL ......................................................................................................... 16 6.4 EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURE - TRANSPORTATION DISASTERS 17 6.4.1 ROAD TANKER ACCIDENT ................................................................................. 17 6.4.2 RAIL ACCIDENT ................................................................................................ 19 6.4.3 AIR CRAFT CRASH ............................................................................................ 21 6.4.4 PIPELINE FAILURE ............................................................................................ 25 6.5 EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURE - MISCELLANEOUS DISASTERS .. 27 6.5.1 BUILDING COLLAPSE ......................................................................................... 27 6.5.2 STAMPEDE ....................................................................................................... 29 6.5.3 BOAT CAPSIZE .................................................................................................. 30 6.5.4 EPIDEMIC ......................................................................................................... 30 6.5.5 CATTLE DISEASE .............................................................................................. 31 6.5.6 FOOD POISONING ............................................................................................. 32 6.5.7 BOMB EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT .................................................................... 32 6.5.8 CONDUCTING A SEARCH (INDUSTRY / POLICE) ................................................... 37



7. TERMINATION OF EMERGENCY

Calling off an emergency or recovery following aftermath of an emergency is a crucial

phase in emergency planning as the district administration has to make sure that

affected areas are safe to re-enter. The recovery and re-entry phase will begin after

the declaration of termination of emergency situation. This decision would be made

by the Dy. Commissioner who is the District Disaster Manager. The recovery plan

would be flexible enough to adapt to the prevailing conditions. The district

administration should instil confidence in the minds of people for restoration of

normal life. Following aspects need to be addressed in developing this:

Sr. no.

Description Remarks

1. A detailed report from the Site Emergency Co-

ordinator at the Industry (in case of an industrial

disaster) or from local administration / police in

case of other type of disasters should be asked.

2. De-escalation for the emergency should be done

gradually and correct procedures should be

written for various activities to address following:

- Organising a re-entry team

- Inspecting the damaged area

- Assessing the damage to the facility

- Decontaminating the affected area

- Clearing up the debris

- Restoring services to the affected area

3. Public notification also needs to be done with

available means of communication.

Declaring the emergency concluded and making

the "all clear" known to the community may also

be done through media



Sr.

no.

Description Remarks

4. Dy. Commissioner is responsible for restoring

rehabilitation centres to their pre-emergency

condition.

5. Who will assess property damage? Is litigation a

possibility? Against whom and by whom?

6. How will the relief assistance be distributed?

7. Beginning an investigation into the causes of the

emergency

These are few areas that need to be addressed in planning for recovery. The

planning team may visit the community where an accident has previously occurred to

learn from them what recovery problems they faced, and how these were resolved.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

7. TERMINATION OF EMERGENCY 1



8. TRAINING AND MOCK DRILLS

8.1 TRAINING

8.1.1 Requirement for Training

The functional responsibilities of various key personnel as well as functions in the

emergency organisation has been defined in the earlier chapters which describe

the policies, procedures and roles before, during and after an emergency. They

should be sufficient to cope with any unforeseen emergency.

One of the main features of the District Disaster Management Plan is the training

to all the personnel identified in the emergency organisation as well as bringing

about awareness in the general public who may be affected by any disaster.

The following functional aspects have to be included in a training programme.

• Initial Notification

• Communication

• Public Alert and Warning

• Fire and Rescue Services

• Emergency Public Information

• Evacuation

• Protective Shelter

• Enforcement of Law and order (Police Services)

• Public Works and Resource Services

• Recovery / Re-entry

Detailed and user-friendly, checklist type instructions may be prepared for the

various agencies / segments of the emergency response organisation to execute

the functions during the training program.

8.1.2 Emergency Response Training

Extensive planning will be effective only if people are properly trained in all

aspects of the plan, the role in its implementation, and how the tasks are to be

co-ordinated. The development and conduct of a training program for the



emergency organisation is vital to emergency preparedness. Emergency

response teams, and medical personnel must all be trained. Classroom type

lectures, demonstrations, and participation in exercises that test the adequacy of

the plan are essential to maintenance of a well-prepared team of emergency

response personnel.

To minimise the extent of the training needed, the emergency organisation

position has been developed so as to keep the emergency duties parallel to the

individual's day-to-day responsibilities wherever possible. Initially, the in charge of

emergency services like the Fire Chief or Police Chief would be the head of the

first responder organisation. However, as the full emergency response

organisation is deployed, the responsibility and function of the Emergency

Management Co-ordinator is transferred to the Deputy Commissioner of the

district.

It is the responsibility of the district administration to identify the training needs of

the various members of the emergency organisation. It is best achieved by

comparing the normal duty of the person and the duties he is expected to carry

out during any emergency.

One weakness common to many training programs is the inadequate attention

paid to personnel changes in the emergency organisation through local transfers

and new appointments and transfer of personnel. Training for volunteer

emergency responders like Homeguards and other social service organisation

also presents more difficulties than for paid full-time emergency workers, because

of the time restrictions and lack of funds.

The goals of any training program are to ensure that participants obtain a

thorough understanding of their plans and procedures, and develop the

leadership and communication skills necessary for confident decision making

during stressful situations.

A well-developed and coordinated training program is required. Co-ordination of

training programs conducted by corporate, plant, local, and possibly State

organisation is recommended, to avoid costly duplication of effort. The frequency

of emergency response personnel training greatly influences the capability to

respond during a test or actual emergency.



The main elements of a good training program are :

• The development of training program goals. • The identification of target (common) training groups • The establishment of group-specific, task-oriented training objectives • The preparation of student training manuals and visual aids. • The preparation of individual lesson plans, including hands-on

experience, if appropriate. • The establishment of a training schedule. • The evaluation and correction of the training program.

A good training program provides initial training for all tasks, it should provide

periodic refresher training for those who have been given the initial training, and

also should provide for the training of new personnel who may be inducted from

time to time.

8.2 MOCK DRILLS 8.2.1 Provision for Mock Drills

By far the best training is received from participation in the enactment of mock

accident scenarios during drills and exercises. These serve as positive training

experiences and are also advantageous to public relations, once the appropriate

level of training and readiness is achieved. Their purpose is to give people

confidence that the contingency plan works, and to identify those areas of

improvement that, once corrected, will ensure that properly implemented plans

and procedures can adequately protect public health and safety.

There are two major considerations in the preparation and implementation of a

successful drill to test the ability of all personnel and resources to respond to an

emergency:

1) The formation of a competent, knowledgeable, and highly motivated planning

and co-ordination exercise committee, and



2) The development of a scenario that induces drill participants - the "players" -

to fully demonstrate their knowledge and capabilities, and that demonstrates

the readiness level of emergency response facilities and equipment.

It is advisable to test small parts of the contingency plan frequently, through

tabletop exercises and minidrills, in such important areas as notification and

communication. Full-scale field exercises once in two yeas involving various

government agencies, industrial facilities and local responders are

recommended.

Whether the exercise is a limited or full-scale test of the contingency plan, the

development process is essentially the same, though the planning for (and

expense of) a full field exercise is considerably greater. In particular, as a part of

this process, one should :

• Define the goals and objectives :

The general objectives (overall, applicable to all).

The specific objectives - for each participating function/ group/

organisation.

• Identify the participants :

The players - key and alternate(s) for each function

The moderators/controllers to keep the scenario going

Evaluators

• Develop the scenario :

Prepare a draft scenario abstract for comment/approval

Draft a full scenario, with specific activities to test objectives

Obtain required comments/ approval of the draft scenario

Finalise the scenario.

• Develop supporting materials (Note : the following apply to a tabletop

exercise; the list would necessarily be expanded for a full field exercise)

Initial conditions



Maps of :

a. affected areas

b. evacuation routes

c. vulnerable zones

Data tables :

a. meteorological

b. release/activity levels

c. doses (if appropriate)

Emergency organisation charts

Messages or questions to guide responses

Notification message forms

Exercise description :

a. purpose

b. agenda

c. scope

d. methodology

e. player "ground rules"

• Make logistic arrangements

Establish date, time, duration (include time for the critique session).

Arrange for the use of location facility(ies) and/or room(s) at a selected

time.

Invite participants

Establish a readily observable identification scheme (arm bands, caps,

jerseys, signs) for players, controllers, evaluators, and observers

• Prepare scenario packages and handouts

• Conduct the exercise and critique session

• Prepare a written critique - ensure that the identified improvement action

items are entered into a tracking system.

The post-exercise critique session is ideally held immediately following the drill or

exercise involving all participants. It provides feedback to those involved, while

events and their response actions are fresh in their minds. A follow-up written



evaluation, summarising the carefully considered comments of the participants, is

also important, since an exercise of the plan uncovers it deficiencies. These may

be found, for example, in equipment (most important being the communications

equipment), operating procedures, protocol, or interagency relationships. Often,

they signify training program improvement areas. To correct the deficiencies, it is

important to establish an Action Item Tracking System, wherein identified problem

areas are defined, responsibility for and expected date of completion designated,

and accomplishment noted. This is all a part of plan maintenance.

8.3 PLAN MAINTENANCE

As emphasised earlier, an emergency preparedness program must be dynamic,

with the contingency plan maintained as a living document. This means continual

updating and revision. 8.3.1 Updating

Keeping a plan up-to-date is normally neglected, or at least is often assigned a

low priority. One organisation should be responsible for the co-ordination of this

task and overall stewardship of the plan.

Some of the important aspects are :

• regular review period

• record of amendments and changes

• "where to report changes" notice

• current distribution list of plan holders

The plan should contain easily replaceable sections accompanied by clear

directions for insertion into the plan and an acknowledgement form to be

returned. The use of electronic word processing and computer-developed tables

and figures is also recommended and has been provided with the plan.

Information given in the softcopy of the report / action

The Disaster Management Plan updation should be done at least annually, and

whenever applicable conditions change. This means reviewing the hazards

analysis process to see whether additions or deletions are appropriate, and

changing the contingency plan when they are, the incorporation of resolved

action items, and revisions to training programs, where needs are identified.



Some data in the plan must be updated more often than annually. Telephone

numbers, for example, should be checked at least quarterly. When new

equipment is acquired or old equipment retired, these resource listings must be

changed. All changes must be distributed to holders and potential users of the

plan.

8.3.2 Public Information

Public information has two phases in contingency planning: education about the plan

itself and why it was developed, and notification of an emergency condition. The first

is a public relations function; the second, a necessary part of the plan itself.

1. Public Information Prior to an emergency

Residents of the district especially in industrial areas are aware of potential

threats to their well being from industrial and transportation accidents. They are

more concerned about major disasters than the host of minor incidents that

occur. The more information citizens have about environmental conditions in their

communities, the better equipped they are to participate in mitigation measures

for their own protection from unacceptable safety and health risks. The hazards in

a community, and what both industry and the administration are doing to

minimise the risks and manage emergency situation that may arise, must be

made known to them clearly and explicitly.

Perception and truth can be, sometimes, the same in the public eye, however

subjective, inconsistent, and irrational this may be. People may react differently to

the same risk, depending on their backgrounds and their level of risk acceptance.

Voluntary risks, such as smoking or road accident, are usually accepted, whereas

the involuntary risks of exposure to industrial hazards like contaminated drinking

water, or a toxic plume, are not. While risk comparison may be valid, it is better to

focus discussion on preventive measures, emergency preparedness, and

containment and remediation procedures.

The public gets most of its information through the media. Therefore, when

interacting with the media, the key is to present essential factual information

positively, in readily understood terms (i.e. without technical jargon or exponential

numbers). Unless this groundwork is laid, particularly with local media



representatives (both print and electronic) It is unlikely that they will be friendly in

a crisis situation. Rapport should be built ahead of time, for fair treatment during

an emergency. Press releases and conferences during the planning process can

help to accomplish this goal.

2. Emergency Information

When an emergency does occur, prompt notification of the local emergency

response team is vital, as it the dissemination of the warning to the public who

may be affected. Initial notification of a problem to the emergency response team

may be by telephone. The Initial Notification and Public Alert may be done with

the help of vehicle mounted with Public Address system belonging to emergency

services like Fire or Police.

The notification could also be done with the help of emergency sirens of the

industry in and around which the emergency has struck. The meaning of varying

siren tones must be clearly defined and understood by general public to avoid

any confusion during an actual emergency. Periodic training and mock drills

involving general public could achieve this.

A standardised notification message form should be available to both the sender

and receiver of the initial information. Such notification should contain following

information

• The date and time of the call (24-hour clock).

• The exact location of the emergency with name and address

• The caller's name, title, and telephone number (for verification purposes).

• The current emergency classification (such as Alert, Site Emergency, or

General Emergency).

• The date and time of classification (24-hour clock).

• Whether or not a release has occurred. If yes, the name of the substance,

its CAS number, whether it is toxic or flammable, any anticipated health

hazards, what time it started, whether it is continuing or stopped, and

whether it is a gas or liquid release.



• Whether any / what precautions should be taken when responding.

(SCBA, protective clothing, etc.).

• A brief description of the problem.

• The assistance requested for mitigation.

• The public protective actions recommended.

• The preparer's name, title, and telephone number.

3. Public Information during Emergency

During any natural disasters having wide spread damages, the public notification

could be achieved through radio broadcast or other electronic media like local

Cable TV etc. The media plays an important role in conveying the correct

information to the general public. This would prevent spread of rumours, which

may result in panic situation and may become difficult for district administration to

control.

The establishment of a media briefing centre or public information centre has

been described earlier in the report. Only the Dy. Commissioner or any

responsible spokesperson appointed by him is authorised to deal with the press

and provide accurate, detailed and meaningful information to media

representatives who, because they are familiar with the contingency plan through

advance preparation, will present the situation more fairly than if they had no prior

knowledge.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

8. TRAINING AND MOCK DRILLS ................................................................................ 1

8.1 TRAINING .............................................................................................................. 1 8.1.1 REQUIREMENT FOR TRAINING ............................................................................. 1 8.1.2 EMERGENCY RESPONSE TRAINING ..................................................................... 1 8.2 MOCK DRILLS ....................................................................................................... 3 8.2.1 PROVISION FOR MOCK DRILLS ............................................................................ 3 8.3 PLAN MAINTENANCE .......................................................................................... 6 8.3.1 UPDATING .......................................................................................................... 6 8.3.2 PUBLIC INFORMATION ......................................................................................... 7



9. OBSERVATIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

Following are the various observations and recommendations for the consideration of the

district administration to improve the emergency preparedness of the district machinery

to face any disaster in the district. These recommendations are based on the Risk

Analysis Study and extensive field survey carried out by the study team. The

recommendations have been categorised location wise and facility wise for clarity.

9.1 INFRASTRUCTURE

9.1.1 Dy. Commissioner’s Office

1. Presently there is a control room in the DC’s office, which will be manned round the

clock by one employee whenever there is threat of flood in the district. This room is

provided with a P&T telephone.

There should be full-fledged Control Room in the DC office, which should become

operational once any disaster has been declared in the district. The Control Room

should have following facilities and infrastructure to handle any emergency in the

district.

1. Maps of the district and individual talukas depicting MAH and hazardous

Industries, village map surrounding the Hazardous Industries

2. Copy of On-site emergency plan of all the industries

3. Extra copies of the maps to be used for spot marking of affected areas,

movement of vehicles, evacuated areas, etc.

4. Communication facilities consisting of dedicated telephones (STD / ISD),

mobile telephone, satellite telephone, fax machine, wire less sets, radios,

tape recorder and televisions.

5. Personal computer, printer with Internet connection.

6. Backup power generator for lighting and communication system

7. Tel. Nos. of all the co-ordinators (both office and residence), voluntary

organisations, Hospitals, Ambulance services, Blood Banks etc.

8. Telephone directory both local as well as of the surrounding districts.

9. Telephone Nos. of emergency co-ordinators from the MAH and hazardous

Industries

10. Contact details of Transport (both public and private) facility.



11. List of designated Safe Assembly Points along with escape routes to be

highlighted on district map.

12. Details of hazardous substances along with the material safety data sheets.

13. General stationery like paper, pencil, foot rulers, erasure etc.

14. Details on meteorological information during different seasons such as wind

speed, direction, temperature, humidity etc.

2. The ECR at Dy. Commissioners office may become inoperative if the area itself is

affected by any disaster. Hence there is requirement for an alternate ECR which

should be made function during such an eventuality. All the infrastructure facility in

the Main ECR as mentioned above may also be made available in this alternate

ECR.

Alternate Emergency Control Centre proposed are: Circuit House / Karnataka Polytechnic and Training Centre (KPT) in Kadri area.

Advantages:

• Away from the shore

• At high elevation

• Good infrastructure

• The telecom office is nearby

• Good safe shelters like schools and colleges nearby

9.1.2 Proposed Industrial Disaster Control Centre (DCC) in Panambur Area

1. Various MAH units like Mangalore Chemicals and Fertilisers Ltd., Mangalore

Refineries Ltd., New Mangalore Port and the POL depots of IOCL, HPCL & BPCL as

well as other Hazardous units are located with in a radius of around 10 km from the

port area. The area is also densely populated with many residential colonies. The

busy national highway no. 17 passes through the area between the New Mangalore

Port and the Mangalore Chemicals and Fertillisers Ltd. and the Ammonia storage

tank is located just by the side of the highway.



Considering these aspects, it is strongly recommended to set up a local Disaster

Control Centre at a suitable location near this cluster of industries. This centre could

be maintained by the DC with support and co-operation from all the industries.

Suggested Location for the Proposed Disaster Control Centre:

Option 1 The open area in front of the foot ball stadium of NMPT Advantages:

• Good approach as it is located right on the highway.

• Response time to all the industries would be minimum and it would be

uniform.

• Infrastructure of NMPT could be made use of.

• Good safe shelters nearby by way of schools auditorium etc.

• Up wind direction of MCF during most part of the year hence may not be

affected by an ammonia leak there.

Disadvantages:

• The facility has to be built from scratch hence higher cost implication.

• May get affected during any cyclone as very close to the seashore.

• Medical facilities nearby is minimum.

Option 2 Kadri fire station on NH - 17

Advantages:

• Good approach as it is located right on the highway.

• Basic infrastructure already in place.

• Good medical facilities nearby.

Disadvantages:

• Response time may be more as it is more than 6 km from NMPT and MCF.

2. The proposed Industrial Disaster Control Centre should have following infrastructure

to meet any emergency in the area without loosing time

• Hot line with all the major industries in the area as well as with the main and

alternate ECR.

• There should be pool of all critical PPEs, which may be required to meet any

emergency situation.



• There should be list of all volunteers from various industries with contact

details to enable the DCC to summon them during any requirement.

• Area maps to be used for spot marking of affected areas, movement of vehicles,

evacuated areas, etc.

• Communication facilities consisting of dedicated telephones (STD / ISD), mobile

telephone, satellite telephone, fax machine, wire less sets, radios, tape recorder

and televisions.

• Personal computer, printer with Internet connection.

9.1.3 Fire Services

1. The increase in high rise buildings in Mangalore city reduces the fire fighting

capability of the city fire services. The fire services are not equipped to handle

emergencies in buildings above 40 feet. Hence two snorkels are to be provided for

Mangalore city. The existing fire hydrant system in Mangalore city needs to be

upgraded.

2. Fire hydrants and water storage need to be provided in Bikampadi Industrial Area to

meet the requirement of the industrial area..

3. Water source need to be provided in MRPL, HPCL area and also along the national

highway NH 17 between Surathkal and Kulur. Arrangements could also be made to

pump water from the river to fire water tanker for supply to fire tenders.

4. Bantwal and Sullia do not have fire fighting capabilities, which needs to be

considered urgently.

5. Hotline is suggested between Main Emergency Control Centre in DC’s Office,

Industrial Disaster Control Centre (Proposed) and Fire Stations.

6. Gas cutting set should be placed on the Rescue Vehicle at Pandeshwar fire station.

7. The fire services should have one ambulance each at the fire station.

9.1.4 Civil Defence - Homeguards

1. There are around 600 homeguards in the district and at any given time, 50% may be

mobilised for emergency action, which is inadequate. A total strength of about 1000

home guards is recommended for the district. The additional 400 guards could be

drawn from the industrial belt and trained for handling any Chemical/Fire/Explosion

Emergency.



2. The homeguards depend solely on the police for communication and transport. It is

recommended to provide independent communication facility to the homeguards.

Each unit of the homeguard could be provided with VHF / Mobile telephones

3. Similarly, homeguards may be provided with few 12-15 seater vehicles for

transportation purpose. Smaller vehicles are suggested keeping the taluka roads in

mind. Smaller vehicles would have better mobility than huge trucks.

9.1.5 Municipal Water works

1. Chlorine kit should be provided at Bendoor and training to be given to the operators

for use of the kit.

2. SCBA (Self Contained Breathing Apparatus) should be in good operating condition

which is essential during any chlorine leakage.

3. Chlorine tonners should be placed on rollers with ball bearing so that tonners can be

rotated to change liquid leak into gas leak.

4. Provide caustic pit near the tonner area for neutralisation of leaking chlorine. A hose

may be provided to route leaking chlorine to the caustic pit. The pit should have

barrier guard around it to prevent accidental fall of tonner into it.

9.2 ROADS AND BRIDGES 1. Following are the various vulnerable locations along the major roads where there

could be mishaps.

a. JUNCTION NEAR MCF/NMPT ON NH – 17 BEFORE THE KULUR BRIDGE

This is one of the most vulnerable areas for accident and roads from IOCL Terminal

(as well as other Terminals in the NMPT area) and the Elf Terminal having

substantial traffic of hazardous cargo join here. In addition to these, the various

pipelines cross the highway at this junction. All the pipelines are mostly underground

except those for Naphtha and Fuel oil for MCF which are above ground. These

vulnerable pipelines are suitably protected on either side of the road crossing by

provision of crash guards. The high-tension cables passing through the area pose

additional hazard, as this could be a possible source of ignition for a vapour cloud

escaping from a leak.



Movement of traffic is haphazard at times and it is common to find many tankers

parked in the area resulting in further traffic congestion in the area. The overhead

conveyor of KIOCL passes over the area.

There is urgent need to regularise traffic in the area by suitable means say by having

suitable fly-overs or by providing a traffic island (like in Pump Well circle). Parking of

tankers in the region should be discouraged.

b. ROAD FROM MRPL TO NH – 17 ( AT SURATHKAL)

The LPG tanker traffic in this road is maximum as all the tankers from MRPL / HPCL

pass through this road before joining the NH – 17.

This stretch is around 6 km long and it is recommended to make this into a 4 lane

road with dividers to ensure smooth flow of traffic.

Other observation specific to this stretch of this road is the haphazard parking of

Tankers just by the side of the road at several locations especially in front of BASF.

Action may be initiated to discourage this practice and specify more parking areas in

isolated places away from the population pockets.

c. KOTTARA CROSS ON NH – 17

This is basically by-pass for Mangalore city just before Kottara. The point is

vulnerable, as the flow of traffic is not smooth. A traffic island may be provided in the

area to ensure smooth flow to traffic.

d. PUMP WELL CIRCLE ON NH – 17 / NH – 48

This is another point at the entry point of Mangalore city where there is heavy

movement of traffic including the tankers. This is the junction of two national

highways namely NH–17 and NH–48. The flow of traffic is relatively smooth in view

of traffic island provided.

e. BRIDGE OVER NETRAVATHI AT PANEMANGALORE

This is a very old bridge on the Netravathi River, which is single lane. There is police

manning on either sides of the bridge to ensure smooth movement of traffic by

ensuring unidirectional flow. The policemen manning the bridge are provided with



wireless sets for communication, which are also connected to the police control

room.

Any accident involving a road tanker could result in blockage of the bridge there by

cutting off the Mangalore from rest of the state. The second bridge on the river is

under construction since long and it should be ensured that it is completed at the

earliest. Single lane approach to the bridge on either side of the bridge should be

strongly enforced by way of suitable road dividers or other deterrents.

f. NARROW BRIDGE AT THE ENTRY OF SULLIA TOWN ON STATE HIGHWAY

This could be another point of bottleneck on the state highway going towards

Madikeri. The bridge is in very bad shape and could be accident-prone. There

should be enough signboards and speed breakers on either side to prevent accident.

The single lane approach to the bridge should be enforced.

2. All police station to have detailed road map to enable them to decide alternate routes

during emergencies like bridge collapse or wash-off of roads during flood.

9.3 MAJOR INDUSTRIES 1. All industries to have public awareness program for people living in the vulnerable

area as given in Fact Sheets, which should cover the steps to be taken during

Industrial emergency.

2. Specialised training may be given to police, fire brigade etc to handle chemical

emergencies. This would very be very useful during transportation emergencies.

MRPL

1. The MRPL is located very close to the Airport at Bajpe and aircrafts do fly over the

Refinery complex during take off and landing, which is an unsafe condition. Even

though probability of an air crash is very low it can not be totally ruled out. In case of

such an eventuality i.e. an aircraft crashing on a refinery, the effect could be

disastrous.

It is recommended to make the refinery a no fly zone. This aspect should be taken

into consideration during design of proposed International Airport when the air traffic

to the city is expected to increase.

NMPT



2. There are Chemical Terminals within the port area where number of hazardous

chemicals are received stored and dispatched in road tankers. These terminal

owners have been given permit for import of chemicals. Hence a wide range of

hazardous chemicals are imported depending on the prevailing market conditions.

NMPT should ensure that the MSDS of all these chemicals are available before

permitting the unloading of these hazardous chemicals. They should also ensure that

antidotes are available at the port dispensaries so that any person affected by the

chemical during handling is treated promptly with out any delay.

3. Wooden logs are stored/stacked in haphazard way without proper approach in large

quantities in open area belonging to port along the NH 17. This is a potential fire

hazard and some incidences of fire have been reported in the past.

In order to prevent recurrence of such incidences, following should be ensured

• The area should be barricaded and vigil maintained to prevent unauthorised

entry into the area.

• There should be proper stacking arrangement plan in place, which would

ensure segregation and maintenance of safe distances between stacks to

prevent spread of fire as well as to gain easy access during fire fighting.

• There should be sufficient storage of water in the vicinity and hydrant system,

which would be useful to fight any fire.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

9. OBSERVATIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................. 1

9.1 INFRASTRUCTURE .............................................................................................. 1 9.1.1 DY. COMMISSIONER’S OFFICE ............................................................................. 1 9.1.2 PROPOSED INDUSTRIAL DISASTER CONTROL CENTRE (DCC) IN PANAMBUR AREA 2 9.1.3 FIRE SERVICES .................................................................................................. 4 9.1.4 CIVIL DEFENCE - HOMEGUARDS .......................................................................... 4 9.1.5 MUNICIPAL WATER WORKS ................................................................................. 5 9.2 ROADS AND BRIDGES ......................................................................................... 5 9.3 MAJOR INDUSTRIES ............................................................................................ 7

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