1. medieval theories of free will

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Medieval Theories of Free Will

Why do human beings perform the actions they perform? What moves them to act? Why do weblame a human being for knocking over the vase and not the family dog? What gives us the ideathat we are free to choose as we wish, that we have free will? These and other questions about

human action have fascinated philosophers for centuries. Throughout the thousand year periodof the Middle Ages, scholars provided a wide variety of different answers to these questions.These thinkers developed theories both remarkable and original in their own right thatcontinue to be of interest to scholars working in this area today. While they shared anunderstanding of human psychology and enjoyed a common intellectual heritage, theynevertheless maintained a lively and diverse conversation on this topic throughout the whole ofthe Middle Ages, providing us with a sophisticated intellectual inheritance.

This article considers a wide range of theories written throughout the Middle Ages, from thefoundational work ofAugustinein the early part of the period through that ofJohn DunsScotusat the end. It notes the ways in which later work on the topic builds upon that developedearlier, shows the lively disagreements that often arose on the topic, and, although medievalthinkers worked within a different framework than philosophers do today, reveals how theirdiscussions share certain affinities.

Table of Contents

1. Medieval and Current Understandings of Free Will2. Individual Theories the Early Middle Agesa. Augustine

b. Anselm of Canterburyc. Bernard of Clairvaux

Individual Theories Sentences Commentaries. Peter Lombarda. Albert the GreatIndividual Theories the High Middle Ages. Thomas Aquinas

a. John Duns ScotusConclusionReferences and Further Reading

. Primary Sourcesa. Secondary Sources

1. Medieval and Current Understandings ofFree Will

Although at first glance it might not seem so, medieval philosophers were concerned with manyof the same issues that interest philosophers today. The current discussion of action focuses onthe topic of free will: whether free will is compatible with causal determinism, and therelationship betweenfree willand moral responsibility. Medieval thinkers also discussed manyof these issues; for example, they accept the common intuition that unless one acts freely, onecannot be held morally responsible for what one does. But the structure of their discussionoften makes it difficult to recognize the extent to which their concerns both resemble anddeviate from the current debate. Thinkers in the early part of the Middle Ages discussed human
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action and freedom in the context of broader theological concerns such as theproblem of evilorthe effects of the Fall, that is, the sin of the first human beings. As the Middle Ages progressed,scholars became more interested in discussing the nature of freedom for its own sake, apartfrom the particular theological problems in which free will forms an important part of theirsolution. Thus, discussions of free will become embedded in larger treatises of humanpsychology. This is not to say that later theorists lost interest in those theological problems;

rather, discussions of the two issues diverged from each other and became discrete subjects ofinvestigation.

Medieval philosophers did not ask the question whether free will was compatible with causaldeterminism, not because they did not understand the ramifications of cause and effect or

because they lacked a scientific notion of the world. They recognized the regularities of theworld and understood the implications of a mechanistic world-view. They did not ask thisquestion because they accepted the position that the freedom of human action is incompatible

with causal determinism and because they believed that human beings in fact do act freely, atleast on some occasions. Thus, in current terms, they were libertarians about human freedom.They argued that human beings are importantly different from other animals and the rest ofcreation. Human beings act freely because they possess rational capacities, which are lacking inother animals. Rational capacities enable human beings to act freely because those capacities

are immaterial. How does the immateriality of those capacities enable human beings to actfreely? The argument, roughly, is as follows: Everything else in the world is made of matter andthus is material or physical. Material things are governed by particular laws and so aredetermined to particular activities. If human beings were wholly material, then their actions

would also be determined and they would not act freely. But because the capacities that bringabout action are immaterial in nature, and hence, not governed by physical laws, actions thatcome about as a result of those capacities will be uncoerced, at least under ordinarycircumstances. According to medieval accounts of freedom, then, freedom is incompatible withcausal determinism (although medieval philosophers would not express the point in theseterms). Since they all agree on this issue, medieval accounts of freedom then attempt to answerthe question how is it that human beings are able to act freely? The answer to this question

was hotly contested.

All medieval theorists agreed that human beings have a soul that enables them to perform theactions that they perform. As the era progressed, theories of human psychology grew more andmore elaborate, but even in the earliest theories, two capacities in particular stood out: theintellect and the will. The intellect is the human capacity to cognize. The will is the humanmotivational capacity; it is the capacity that moves us to do what we do. The will depends uponthe intellect to identify what alternatives for action are possible and desirable. It is on the basisof these intellectually cognized alternatives that the will chooses. Medieval theorists recognizedthat it is the human being who thinks and who acts, but it is in virtue of having an intellect andhaving a will that human beings are able to do what they do. Talk about what the intellectthinks or what the will does is a kind of shorthand for what the individual does in virtue ofthose capacities In light of a common theory of human psychology, the medieval debatecentered upon whether human beings act freely primarily in virtue of their wills or in virtue oftheir intellects. Those who argue that freedom is primarily a function of the intellect are knownas intellectualists while those who argue that freedom is primarily a function of the will areknown asvoluntarists, from the Latin word for will,voluntas.

2. Individual Theories the Early Middle Ages

a. Augustine
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Augustinewas interested in the topic of human action and freedom because he needed toexplain how it is thatGodis not responsible for the presence of evil in the world while at thesame time holding that God sustains and governs the world. On his view, human beings do evilthings when they give in to their desires for the temporal things instead of pursuing eternalthings such as knowledge, virtue, and God. His theory of human nature is rather rudimentary,

but it helps to establish the foundation for later more elaborate accounts. Human beings

possess the rational capacities of intellect and will as well as sensory capabilities and desire.Human beings perceive the world around them, including what things are available to bepursued, through their senses. Such data can also stimulate basic desires. This information isfed to the intellect, which makes judgments about the contents of perception and desire.Choices as to what to do are made in virtue of the will. Augustine argues that desire can neveroverwhelm an agent; because they have intellects and wills, agents are not determined by basic

bodily desires. Rather, an agent gives in to desire in virtue of the will, which operates freely andnever under compulsion. In fact, if a will were ever coerced, Augustine says it would not be a

will. Thus, human beings commit sins freely by giving into the desire for temporal things,which the intellect and will could disregard in favor of the eternal things that human beingsought to pursue. Since human beings act freely, Augustine argues that they, and not God, areresponsible for evil in the world.

Early in his career, Augustine was very optimistic about the human ability to resist temptationand sin. He argued that all one had to do in order to avoid sin was simply to will against it. Thisgot him into a bit of trouble with a particular heresy of the time Pelagianism. Pelagius was acontemporary of Augustines who held that human beings are able to bring about their ownsalvation and do not require grace from God. This position contradicts the traditional Christian

view of the Fall of Adam and Eve and the need for the Incarnation of Jesus and grace from God.Not surprisingly, Pelagius took Augustines early writings to be favorable to his own position.

Augustine argued that Pelagius misinterpreted his early views, and in his later writings, he wasmuch more careful to insist upon the pernicious effects of sin upon human behavior and theneed for Gods grace in order to avoid sin and achieve salvation. This sets up a tension with hisinsistence upon free will that exercised the minds of later theorists and one that Augustinehimself did not entirely resolve.

b. Anselm of Canterbury

Anselms account of action and freedom reflects a broadly Augustinian framework. LikeAugustine, Anselm describes human action in terms of the workings of intellect and will.Anselm also accepts the view that unless human beings act freely, they cannot be heldresponsible for their actions and God will be blamed for sin. Worries over the effect of sin andgrace also help to structure his account.

Anselm rejects the notion that one must be able to act in ways other than they do in order to befree. If freedom had to be defined in these terms, then God, the good angels, the blessed inheaven, the bad angels, and the damned in hell could not be free since they lack this ability to

do otherwise. God, the good angels, and the blessed cannot bring about evil while the badangels and the damned cannot bring about the good. In the medieval theological tradition, Godis perfectly good so it is not possible for God to will or perform evil. Medieval theologians alsoargued that rational beings (human beings, angels) admitted into heaven are confirmed in thegood in such a way that they are unable to choose what is bad, while rational beings who aresent to hell are confirmed in evil in such a way that they are unable to chose what is good. But

Anselm believes that all of these individuals act freely even though they cannot act in waysother than they do. This is especially the case for God, who is the freest of them all. Therefore,

Anselm argues freedom cannot consist in the ability to do otherwise; another account of
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freedom must be developed. The question, then, is how does Anselm understand the notion offreedom?

Anselm presents two different accounts of freedom, which nevertheless are related. In Delibertate arbitrii (commonly translated as On Freedom of Choice), he defines freedom as theability to preserve uprightness of will for its own sake. He argues that rational beings have

this ability insofar as they possess intellects by which they come to understand how to preserveuprightness of will and insofar as they possess the will itself in virtue of which they will topreserve that uprightness. This might seem like a strange definition of freedom, but given theconnection to moral responsibility, Anselm understands freedom not in terms of being able toact differently than one does. Rather, he understands freedom in terms of whether one has theability to do the right thing for the right reason. It is obvious that God, the good angels, and the

blessed in heaven all possess this ability, but what about sinners in this life, who from theChristian perspective are now slaves to sin in virtue of their sin? One can raise an analogous

worry about the demons and the damned in hell, both of whom are confirmed in evil. Anselmneeds to explain how they retain the ability to do the right thing given that they are unable todo the right thing.

Anselm explains this seemingly contradictory situation by drawing upon a distinction between

possessing an ability and exercising that ability. Because sinners, demons, and the damned allpossess intellect and will, they retain the ability to preserve uprightness of will. They are,however, unable to exercise that ability because of the hindrance of sin. Anselm explains this byanalogy with sight. One retains the ability to see a mountain even though on a cloudy day, onecannot in fact see it due to the hindrance of the clouds. Similarly, one who is a slave to sin or

who is confirmed in evil retains the ability to maintain uprightness of will even though onecannot actually maintain that uprightness because being a slave to sin or confirmation in evilhinders one from doing so. Thus, Anselm agrees with Augustine that it takes an act of God torestore the sinner to a state of grace, although human beings are capable of losing that grace bytheir own evil (and free) choices.

Anselms secondaccount of freedom can be called the two-wills account. In his treatise, Onthe Fall of the Devil, he develops a thought-experiment in which he imagines that God iscreating an angel from scratch. At the point where God has given the angel under constructiononly a will for happiness, the angel cannot act freely. For at this point, the angel is necessitatedto will happiness and those things required for its happiness and is not able to refrain from

willing happiness. Thus, the angels act of willing happiness is not free, for the angel could willnothing but happiness. Anselm then asks whether the situation would be any different shouldGod give the angel only a will for justice, In this case, Anselm insists that the angel does not will

justice freely since the angel is necessitated to will justice and is not able not to will justice.Only when God gives the angel both a will for happiness and a will for justice does the angel

will freely. For now the angel is not necessitated to will happiness, for he could will justice; noris the angel necessitated to will justice, for he could will happiness.

There are several questions that come to mind about this second account of freedom. First,

there is the worry that Anselm is now relying on a principle that he rejected in the first accountof freedom, that is, the idea that freedom requires the ability to do otherwise. Secondly, one canask about the relationship between the two accounts. This second issue is easier to addressthan the first. One can see in Anselms two-wills account of freedom a further development ofhow the will of the first account is able to maintain uprightness of will for its own sake. If the

will had only the will for justice, it would will justice, not because it is the right thing to do, butbecause it must do so. If the will had only the will for happiness, then it could not will justice atall. Thus, it is only when the will has both the will for justice and the will for happiness that the


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will has the ability to maintain uprightness for the sake of uprightness. That is to say that thewill has the ability to will the right thing (that is, justice) for the right reason.

The first issue is harder to resolve. Anselm implies that having the will for happiness meansthat one need not will justice and vice versa. Thus, one who has both wills is able to will justlyor not, as it pleases the agent. This implies that the one who follows the will for justice could

have abandoned justice to follow the will for happiness and vice versa. But this implies theability to act otherwise and also implies that God and the blessed could abandon justice forhappiness while the demons and the damned could abandon happiness for justice, both of

which Anselm denies. The answer to this conundrum lies in Anselms reply to a third issueraised by his discussion.

This third issue addresses the apparent implication that the pursuit of justice could require anagent to sacrifice her own happiness. For in following the will for justice, the agent turns awayfrom the will for happiness and vice versa. This implies that an agent could be in a situation

where doing what is right will make her unhappy. Anselm responds by arguing that genuinehappiness never conflicts with justice. When agents are struggling between the demands ofmorality and happiness, the happiness in question is only apparent. For example, consider thecollege student who is tempted to spend the scholarship money, not on her tuition, but rather

on a new car. Obviously she ought to pay the tuition bill, but she really, really wants the car andthinks shell be much happier with it. Anselm would argue that in the long run, the education

will make her happier; for one thing, the hope is that it will lead to a better paying job that willenable her to get the car. Thus, doing the right thing in the long run will coincide with herhappiness, regardless of whether she recognizes this in the short run. Anselm characterizes the

will for happiness as a will for our own benefit, what we think will be advantageous toourselves, what appears desirable to us, regardless of whether it in fact will make us happy.

What actually makes us happy is pursuing happiness in the right way, that is, by doing what isin fact the right thing to do. Thus, for Anselm, there is no actual conflict between happiness and

justice.

This answer helps him to resolve the first issue. The agent who acts justly simply because it isthe right thing to do de facto satisfies the will for happiness. Those who act justly for its ownsake recognize the connection between justice and happiness and so would not forsake justicefor the sake of happiness; it would be inconceivable to them to do so. But they act freely insofaras they are not necessitated to justice in virtue of having both wills. Thus, they act freely eventhough they cannot act otherwise. Those who are confirmed in evil fail or failed to takeseriously the connection between justice and genuine happiness. They have chosen to followthe will for happiness and, by pursuing the will for happiness in an unjust manner, forsake

justice. Because they are fixed upon their own happiness, it would be inconceivable to them topursue the will for justice even though they realize that they would be better off to do so. Butthey act freely insofar as they are not necessitated to happiness in virtue of having both wills.Thus, they act freely even though they cannot act otherwise.

c. Bernard of ClairvauxBernard (1090-1153) is not often thought of in connection with philosophy; he was an abbotand an important religious reformer as well as a prominent promoter of the First Crusade. Buthe wrote a short treatise titled On Grace and Free Will that was rather influential during thetwelfth and first half of the thirteenth centuries. Although Bernard is mainly concerned withtheological worries such as the influence of grace upon human freedom, he contributes to the

voluntarist climate of the Middle Ages. He moves the discussion even further than eitherAugustine or Anselm, for he is one of the first medieval theorists to define the will as a rational


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appetite, that is, an appetite that is responsive to reasons. Such an idea is merely nascent inAnselm.

Like Augustine and Anselm before him, Bernard acknowledges that moral responsibilityrequires that human beings perform their actions freely. He argues that human beings actfreely primarily in virtue of the will. The intellect is not entirely irrelevant; Bernard claims that

only those who have an intellect and are capable of engaging in thought are capable of actingfreely. Thus, children, non-rational animals, and the mentally handicapped do not act freely. Asthey mature, however, children become more able to do so, as do those who recover frommental illness. Nevertheless, the intellect is merely an instrument by which the will is able toexercise its primary activity, which is to choose. The will depends upon the intellect to identify

what choices are available from which the will can choose. We cannot choose what we are notaware of. But once the intellect has made apparent potential alternatives for action, its job isfinished. The will makes the final choice of what is to be done. Thus, it is ultimately in virtue ofthe will that human beings perform free actions. Furthermore, on Bernards account, the will isso free that nothing can determine its choices, not even the intellect. He argues that the will isfree to will against a judgment of the intellect. For example, the intellect could judge that someaction is against Gods decrees, and therefore not to be done, yet the will could still choose thisaction. Such cases, of course, happen all the time, and Bernard argues that if the will were not

free to will against a particular judgment of the intellect, that would in essence destroy it. Thisidea that the will is able to will against a judgment of intellect will be an important claim in thelate thirteenth century debates.

3. Individual Theories SentencesCommentaries

a. Peter Lombard

Peter Lombardwas a twelfth-century bishop of Paris and a theologian at what was to becomethe University of Paris. The final edition of his most famous work, Sententiae in IV librisdistinctae, was released for circulation somewhere around 1155-57. This book became thestandard theological textbook at universities throughout Europe from the thirteenth into thesixteenth centuries. It is divided into four books, the first of which has to do with God; thesecond, with creatures, both human and angelic, and their fall from grace; the third, with theincarnation and redemption of Jesus; and the fourth with the instruments of redemption, thatis, the virtues and the sacraments. Writing a commentary on the Sentences became a standardstudent practice at universities during the Middle Ages.

Although use of the Latin phrase, liberum arbitrium, goes all the back to Augustine, Lombardprovides a definition for it that dominates the discussion of freedom in the first half of thethirteenth century: liberum arbitrium is a faculty of intellect and will. This term, for whichthere is no satisfactory English translation, refers to that power or capacity that enables human

beings to perform their actions freely. Lombards definition appears to be fairlystraightforward, but theorists in the first half of the thirteenth century very much disagreedover how it was to be interpreted. Part of the problem is that Lombard himself did not discussthe meaning of the definition in any great detail. Instead, he went on to discuss the place ofliberum arbitrium in a larger theological scheme, addressing such questions as whether Godhas liberum arbitrium, the status of liberum arbitrium both before and after the Fall, and theeffects of grace upon liberum arbitrium.
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Although later theologians make note of Lombards discussion of these topics, they are farmore interested in what he didnt discuss, that is, the basic definition of liberum arbitrium. Inthe first half of the thirteenth century, there occurs a lively discussion on how to interpret thisdefinition. As far as the participants in this discussion are concerned, there are fourpossibilities, and there are texts from this period defending each of these possibilities. To saythat liberum arbitrium is a faculty of intellect and will could mean 1) that freedom is a function

primarily of the intellect and only secondarily of the will 2) that freedom is a function primarilyof the will and only secondarily of the intellect 3) that freedom is equally a function of bothintellect and will and 4) that freedom is a function of a third capacity independently of intellectand will but with both cognitive and appetitive abilities. Because the fourth interpretation is themost implausible (and the rarest and possibly for those reasons the most interesting) and

because it was held by one of the foremost scholars in the medieval period (Albert the Great), itwarrants a further look.

b. Albert the Great

Outside of scholarly circles, Albert the Great is largely a forgotten figure or, at best, is knownmerely as the teacher of Thomas Aquinas. In the thirteenth century, however, he was in factone of the most famous and respected scholars of the period. He published a wide variety of

writings in philosophy, theology, and especially in what we would call natural science. He wrotea number of commentaries on the works of Aristotle and argued for his importance at a time

when many of Aristotles texts were banned from study at Europes universities. Alberts theoryof action is one of the most distinctive parts of his philosophy and one of the most innovativetheories of the Middle Ages.

Albert takes as his starting point Lombards definition of liberum arbitrium and argues that itshould not be interpreted too narrowly. He describes four distinct stages in the production offree human action. First, the intellect identifies viable alternatives for action from which tochoose and makes a judgment about what to do. Secondly, the will develops a preference forone of the alternatives identified by the intellect and inclines toward it. Third, a choice is made

between the alternative judged by the intellect and the alternative preferred by the will. Thecapacity for choice is exercised by a power separate from both intellect and will, which Albertcalls liberum arbitrium. Finally, the choice is carried out by the will, which inclines the agent toperform the action chosen by liberum arbitrium.

One might worry that the aforementioned description of action implies that human beings areat the mercy of their capacities and so are not in charge of their own actions. This is amistaken judgment. Albert is aware that it is human beings who think, judge, prefer, chooseand finally act. What Albert is attempting to explain is how human beings are capable ofengaging in all of these activities. He is providing what we might call a microscopic explanationfor what happens at the macroscopic level. This is analogous to, say, the neuroscientistproviding an explanation for why someone raises her arm in terms of what is happening on thelevel of the nerves firing and the muscles contracting. We of course assume that such an

explanation does not negate our judgment that the agent has control over whether she movesher arm; it is the same in the case of Alberts explanation.

Albert argues that this account is compatible with Lombards definition of liberum arbitrium.He argues that on his account, liberum arbitrium is a faculty of intellect and will, not because itconsists of intellect and will, but because it works with intellect and will. Unless the intellectmakes a judgment about what to do, and unless the will inclines toward a particular alternative(whether it be the same or different from the intellects judgment), there is no choice made byliberum arbitrium. Intellect and will make possible the activity of liberum arbitrium. Thus,


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liberum arbitrium is a power of intellect and will, not because it is composed of intellect andwill, as one might think, but because it operates on the basis what goes on beforehand inintellect and will.

Recall that the whole purpose of liberum arbitrium was to frame the discussion of humanfreedom. Liberum arbitrium is a placeholder for whatever it is that enables human beings to act

freely. Albert argues that liberum arbitrium must be a power distinct from intellect and willbecause of certain deficiencies or constraints in both intellect and will. The intellect cannot bethe source of human freedom, for it is the power by which human beings cognize the world andcome to understand truth. Thus, its judgments are constrained by the way the world is; we arenot free to decide what we will and will not believe if we want to have truth as our goal. Areality that is not of our own making intrudes. By and large, that is how we want our intellectsto operate. Our success in the world depends upon our being able to make accurate judgmentsabout how the world is and what options are open to us. We will return to this view because ithas certain implications for Thomas Aquinass account of freedom, which implications JohnDuns Scotus explicitly draws on in his criticism of Aquinass account. But for now, we want tosee what use Albert makes of this observation. According to Albert, the constraints found in theintellect make it the case that the intellect cannot be the source of human freedom.

But then neither can the will. Albert notes that what distinguishes the actions of human beingsfrom that of other animals is the human ability to contravene felt desires. To take a medievalexample, if a sheep is hungry and spies a lush field of grass, the sheep eats in response to a

brute felt desire for food. If the sheep is not hungry, the sheep does not eat even if it is standingin the pasture. What determine the sheeps activities are the sheeps desires and appetites over

which the sheep has no control. It is different in the human case. A human being can feelhungry but not act on that hunger because she can judge that she has compelling reasons not toeat, say because she is waiting for her blood to be drawn for a fasting glucose level. Thus, shehas a choice; she can choose either to eat or not to eat depending upon her reasons for doingone thing over the other. This ability to act on the basis of reasons, which confers freedom ofaction on human beings, is a cognitive ability. Since the will is an appetitive power, it cannothave this ability. The intellect is a cognitive power but is constrained by the way the world isand so cannot be the source of this ability. Albert concludes therefore that human beings must

have a third power that enables them to have this ability, which power he identifies withliberum arbitrium.

4. Individual Theories the High Middle Ages

a. Thomas Aquinas

Thomas Aquinasdeveloped one of the most elaborate and detailed accounts of action in theMiddle Ages. It is a testimony to his account that not only scholars of medieval philosophy but

also non-historically oriented philosophers remain interested in the details of his view.

Aquinass accountis roughly Aristotelian in character. LikeAristotle, Aquinas argues thathuman beings act for the sake of a particular end that they see as a good. Furthermore, hethinks that all human actions aim (directly or indirectly) at an ultimate end. This ultimate endis the final goal or object that human beings are trying to achieve. Aquinas follows Aristotle inarguing that the ultimate end of human life, that which human beings want most of all, ishappiness. But Aquinas parts company with Aristotle in arguing that what in fact makes human

beings happy is to know and love God.
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Aquinas recognizes that such a definition of happiness is highly controversial. He concedes thatnot everyone agrees that the ultimate goal of human life is union with God. But he takes it asuncontroversial that all human beings desire happiness regardless of whether they agree withhim with respect to what in fact constitutes happiness. Given Aquinass theologicalcommitments, it is not surprising that he would think that what in fact will make human beingshappy (whether they know it or not) is to be in a relationship with the creator and sustainer of

the world.

Aquinas presents a detailed account of what goes on when human beings perform a particularcourse of action. This account reveals a close interaction between intellect and will in bringingabout the action. In considering this account, one must keep in mind that although thedescription that follows is put in terms of a series of steps, these steps have only logical priorityand not necessarily temporal priority. For example, Aquinas cites deliberation and choice asdistinct steps, but he is willing to grant that one might not spend time deliberating over what todo. One might simply recognize what the situation calls for and choose to do it. In that case, the

judgment or recognition of what to do and the choice come about simultaneously. However,Aquinas would insist that the judgment has logical priority insofar as one cannot choose whatone is not at least on some level (and perhaps very quickly) cognizant of.

In bringing about a human action, first, human beings have some goal or end in mind whenthey think about what to do. Without that goal or end, they would in fact never act. Human

beings dont act for the sake of acting; there is always something they are trying to achieve bytheir actions. In other words, human behavior is always motivated. So human beings thinkabout what they want to accomplish and settle upon a goal. This they do in virtue of theirintellects in light of their fundamental desire for the good, which is built into the will. Next theyfeel an attraction or desire for that goal or end; their will inclines them toward it. Then they

begin to think about how to achieve this goal or end; that is to say, they engage in the activity ofdeliberation. They then make a final judgment about what to do and choose what to do on the

basis of that judgment. Aquinas argues that choice is a function of the will in light of ajudgment by the intellect. In other words, the will moves the agent towards a particular action,an action that has been determined by the intellect. The will then moves the appropriate limbsof the bodies at the command of the intellect, thus executing the action. Finally, human beings

feel enjoyment at their accomplishment or achievement of the end in virtue of the will.

Another aspect of human nature influences human action, and that is what Aquinas calls thepassions. Passions are somewhat akin to our conception of emotions. That is, they are feltmotivational states such as anger or joy that can have either a positive or a negative effect upon

what we do. For example, fear and love for a child can move an otherwise timid individual topush the child out of the way of a speeding car. On the other hand, anger can move anotherwise peaceful person to road rage. Nevertheless, on Aquinass account, even thoughpassions are very powerful influences upon actions and can make things appear to us as goodthat ordinarily would not seem good, the passions cannot simply overwhelm a (properlyfunctioning) intellect and will and thereby determine what we do. Aquinas argues that it isalways possible for us to step back and consider whether we should act on our passion as long

as we possess a functional intellect and will. It might be difficult to do, since passions can bevery strong, but it is always open to us to do so.

This of course is a very brief and succinct description of an account to which Aquinas devotes asignificant portion of his texts. What it illustrates though is the complexity of what goes on inthe course of producing an action and the ways in which the intellect and will interact with eachother in producing a human action. We of course are not necessarily conscious of all of thisactivity, but Aquinass account does not depend upon our being so. He relies on the principlethat if a human being is able to do something, there must be some power or capacity that


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enables her to do so. He then considers what goes on in the course of human action andpostulates the kinds of powers or capacities that he thinks human beings must have in order toaccount for what goes on. So while from a strictly empirical or even scientific viewpoint,

Aquinass account might seem rather quaint, still from a heuristic perspective, Aquinassaccount remains quite powerful.

One of the ways in which its power is revealed is in Aquinass account of good and bad action.He uses his basic framework for action to set up the account. Recall that action is ultimately afunction of intellect and will with the potential influence of the passions. Bad action for

Aquinas comes about in light of a breakdown of one of these capacities. Because the intellecthas to do with knowledge and judgment, sins of the intellect have to do with mistakes in

judgment due to ignorance (that is, a lack of knowledge). Aquinas also recognizes thatwrongdoing can come about under the influence of passion. Although on his view, the passionsare not able to overwhelm a properly functioning intellect and will, still the intellect can give into passion under inappropriate circumstances (road rage is an obvious example). And finally,

because the will is a type of (rational) desire, sins due to the will arise when ones desire for thegood is disordered, leading one to prefer a lesser good, forsaking a greater good that ought to

be preferred.

For an action to count as a good action, it must satisfy several conditions. First, it must be amorally acceptable type of action. For Aquinas, such acts as murder, lying, stealing, or adulteryare never right, regardless of, say, the circumstances or the end. They are in themselvesdisordered acts insofar as they, by their very nature, do not promote human flourishing.Secondly, the action must be performed for an appropriate end. Ordinarily, alms-giving is agood act, but it would be a bad action if one were to give alms for the sake of vainglory. Andfinally the act must be performed in the appropriate circumstances. Ordinarily one would bepraised for taking a walk in order to maintain ones health, but not if there is a blizzard ragingoutside. Under ordinary conditions (for example, no ones life is at risk), it would be mor eappropriate under those circumstances to skip the walk.

For Aquinas, although some acts might be morally neutral in nature (that is, neither promotingnor detracting from human flourishing by their nature), because there are no neutral ends orcircumstances, in the final analysis, no actually performed actions are truly morally neutral.Ends are either good or bad for Aquinas. Circumstances are either appropriate or not. Thus, for

Aquinas, the range of actions that are candidates for moral appraisal is much broader than oneoften supposes. Even actions ordinarily considered rather innocuous, such as eating a candy

bar or raking leaves, have moral significance for Aquinas.

Finally, although Aquinas is not a utilitarian, he does think that consequences can have aneffect on the moral appraisal of an action. What matters is whether the consequences thatresult from performing the action are the typical consequences associated with an action of thattype and whether the agent was in a position to know this. If the agent could have foreseenthose consequences, then bad consequences increase the agents blameworthiness and goodconsequences increase the agents praiseworthiness. If the agent could not have foreseen such

consequences, then they have no effect on the moral appraisal of the action.

Aquinas is interested not only in how human action comes about, but also in what enableshuman beings to act freely. Given his emphasis on the intellect in his account of action, it is notsurprising to find Aquinas arguing that the intellect plays the larger role in the explanation offreedom. This is in contrast with the tradition he inherits, which, as we have seen so far, placesthe emphasis on the will in the majority of theories. For Aquinas, the fact that the intellect isable to deliberate, consider, and reconsider reasons for choosing various courses of action opento the agent enables the agent to act freely. The will is free but only insofar as the intellect is


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free to make or revise its judgments. Had the agent decided differently than she did, she wouldhave chosen differently. Thus, freedom in the will is dependent upon and derivative uponfreedom in the intellect. As we shall see, this position raises certain potential worries for

Aquinas.

b. John Duns ScotusJohn Duns Scotus was born in the town of Duns near the English-Scottish boarder sometime inthe 1260s. Educated both in England and at the University of Paris, he died in Cologne,Germany in 1308. Known for the complexity of his thought, he was referred to in the Middle

Ages as the Subtle Doctor.

Scotus argues that if Aquinas is correct, human beings do not act freely. This is because inScotuss view, the intellect is determined by the external environment, a position we saw earlierin Albert the Great. Scotus argues that the content of our beliefs and judgments is a function ofthe world around us and not within our control. If I see a table in front of me and I amfunctioning normally, I cannot help but believe that there is a table in front of me. I have somecontrol over my beliefs; I can choose to acquire beliefs about quantum mechanics that I did nothave before simply by choosing to read a book on the subject. I can take the table out of theroom so that I no longer believe that there is a table in front of me. But even here my beliefs arefixed once I finish my manipulations of the world; ultimately then, I have no control over theircontent. Once I read the book, I have beliefs based upon what I have read and I am not in aposition to alter their content unless I read something further. Once I move the table, the worldas it exists at that point structures my belief about the table. As we mentioned before, this ishow we want the world and our beliefs to function. If we could not arrive at beliefs thataccurately reflected the state of the world around us, we would not survive. Scotus argues thatthis feature of our beliefs and their relationship to the world means that the intellect is not free.Thus, if Aquinas is correct that the movement of the will is determined by activity in theintellect, then if it is true that the intellect is not free, the will is not free either, and human

beings would not act freely.

Scotus denies Aquinass tight connection between the intellect and the will, arguing that thewill is not determined by a judgment of the intellect, a position we first noted in Bernard ofClairvaux. Scotus draws upon our ordinary experience to defend this claim. We have all been insituations where we know what we ought to do and yet we are not moved to do it. The studentknows she ought to study for her exams, but she is so comfortable lying on the couch that shedoes not get up to study. She will get up to study only insofar as she really wants to do so, andno judgment will move her to do so in opposition to her desire. Scotus describes this kind ofcase as one in which the will, the source of her desire to remain on the couch, wills (or in thiscase fails to will) in opposition to the judgment of the intellect. Thus, the will is free ofdetermination by the intellect.

Scotus agrees with Aquinas that the will depends upon the intellect to identify possible courses

of action from which the will chooses, but he rejects Aquinass view that the intellectsjudgment determines the wills choice. For Scotus, the intellect makes a judgment about whatto do, but it is up to the will to determine which alternativeout of all those the intellect hasidentified as possibilitiesthe agent acts upon. Scotus also agrees with Aquinas that human

beings cannot will misery for its own sake, but he denies that this implies that human beingsare necessitated to choose happiness. On Scotuss account, human beings choose happiness ifthey choose anything at all and they cannot will against happiness, but they nevertheless canfail to will happiness.


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5. Conclusion

Thinkers throughout the Middle Ages found the topics of action and free will compelling formany of the same reasons why they remain of perennial interest today. Philosophers find theminteresting in their own right as well as recognizing their implications for moral responsibility,

the concept of personhood, and such important religious issues as the problem of evil and thetension with divine omniscience. The general character of many medieval theories of free will isvoluntarist in nature, with the views of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas the mostsignificant departures from this trend.

The accounts of Thomas Aquinas and of John Duns Scotus are useful paradigms to illustratesome of the advantages and disadvantages of voluntarist and intellectualist approaches toaction and its freedom. We have seen that the determinant nature of our beliefs raises aproblem for Aquinass location of freedom in the intellect. Aquinas also has a harder timeexplaining cases of weakness of will (that is, cases where an agent recognizes the better choice

but chooses the lesser one). These cases are tough for Aquinas to explain because they seem toinvolve a judgment that a particular action is the better thing to do, yet the agent chooses not toperform that action. Instead, the agent chooses some other action that the agent is willing to

grant is worse. Scotus has a much easier time accommodating these cases, since for him, thewill is never necessitated by a judgment of intellect. Yet his theory faces an importantobjection: the arbitrariness objection. Because there is no tight connection between intellectand will on Scotuss account, the will is never determined by the judgment of intellect.Therefore, it is always possible for the will either to will in accordance with the intellects

judgment or against it. This situation raises the question: why does the agent choose as shedoes? It cant be because the intellect made a particular judgment, for the will is notdetermined by that judgment. Scotus argues that there is no further explanation for the willschoice; the will simply chooses. But then the wills choice and the agents subsequent action

become very mysterious. Thus, Scotus loses a rational grounding for understanding why anagent acts as she does. He can no longer appeal to an agents reasons for acting one way ratherthan another, for those reasons do not determine the agents cho ice. Because Aquinasmaintains a tight connection between the intellects judgment and the wills choice, he does not

face this particular objection and can maintain what is known as a reasons-explanation foraction. In the end, what is an advantage for the one theory becomes a difficulty for the other,and vice versa.

See also the articleForeknowledge and Free Willin this encyclopedia.

6. References and Further Reading

a. Primary Sources Albert the Great. Opera Omnia. Augustus Borgnet, ed., Paris: Vives, 1890-9.o Unfortunately, the works of Albert the Great are not yet widely available intranslation.

Albert the Great. Opera Omnia. Bernhard Geyer et al, eds. Bonn: Institum Alerti Magni, 1951-.o A newer and currently incomplete edition of Alberts works.

Anselm of Canterbury. Three Philosophical Dialogues. Thomas Williams, trans. Indianapolis:Hackett Publishing Co., 2002.

o This book includes Anselms treatises, On Freedom of Choice and On the Fall of theDevil.
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Anselm of Canterbury. Truth, Freedom, and Evil. Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson,trans. New York: Harper and Row, 1965.

o This book includes Anselms treatises, On Freedom of Choice and On the Fall of theDevil.

Aquinas, Thomas. Summa theologiae. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, trans. Allen,TX: Christian Classics, 1981 (reprint).

Aquinas, Thomas. Treatise on Happiness. John A. Oesterle, trans. Notre Dame: University ofNotre Dame Press, 1964.

o This book consists of the twenty-one questions from Summa theologiae that have todo with the human ultimate end, and human action and its freedom.

Augustine. On Free Choice of the Will. Thomas Williams, trans. Indianapolis: HackettPublishing Co., 1993.

Bernard of Clairvaux. On Grace and Free Choice. Daniel ODonovan, trans. Kalamazoo, MI:Cistercian Publications, Inc., 1988.

Lombard, Peter. Sententiae in IV libris distinctae. Ignatius Brady, ed. Grottoferrata: EditionesColegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971-81.

o The question on liberum arbitrium is found in book two, distinction 24. Unfortunately,this text is not yet translated into English.

Scotus, John Duns. Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality. Allan B. Wolter, O.F.M., trans.William A Frank, ed. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1997.

o This is a reprint of an earlier (1986) edition in which the Latin text found in the 1986edition has been removed. In addition to primary texts, it contains commentary by Wolter.

b. Secondary Sources Alexander, Archibald. Theories of the Will in the History of Philosophy. New York: Scribner,

1898. Bourke, Vernon J. Will in Western Thought. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1964. Chappell, T.D.J. Aristotle and Augustine on Freedom: Two Theories of Freedom Voluntary

Action, and Akrasia. New York: St. Martins Press, 1995. Colish, Marcia. Peter Lombard. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994. Davies, Brian, ed. Aquinass Summa Theologiae: Critical Essays. Lanham: Rowman and

Littlefield, 2006.o Contains some essays on action and freedom.

Matthews, Gareth B., ed. The Augustinian Tradition. Berkeley: University of California Press,1999.

o A collection of essays on Augustine, some of which deal with his theory of will andfreedom.

Matthews, Gareth B. Augustine. Blackwell Publishing, 2005. McCluskey, Colleen. Intellective Appetite and the Freedom of Human Action. The Thomist 66

(2002): 421-56.o A defense of Aquinass theory of freedom against criticisms raised by ThomasWilliams in the article listed below from The Thomist.

McCluskey, Colleen. Worthy Constraints in Albertus Magnuss Theory of Action. Journal ofthe History of Philosophy 39 (2001):491-533.

MacDonald, Scott, and Stump, Eleonore, eds. Aquinass Moral Theory: Essays in Honor ofNorman Kretzmann. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999.

o This book includes essays on Aquinass theory of the passions as well as his accountof practical reasoning.

Pope, Stephen J., ed. The Ethics of Aquinas. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press,2002.

o This book contains essays on Aquinass theory of action and freedom as well as hisethics. It is organized around the specific questions in Summa theologiae that deal with these issues.

Rogers, Katherin. Anselm on Grace and Free Will. The Saint Anselm Journal 2 (2005): 66-72. Stump, Eleonore. Aquinas. London: Routledge, 2003.o A broad discussion of Aquinass views, including his theory of action and freedom.


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Westberg, Daniel. Right Practical Reason: Aristotle, Action, and Prudence in Aquinas. Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1994.

Williams, Thomas and Visser, Sandra. Anselms Account of Freedom. Canadian Journal ofPhilosophy 31 (2001): 221-244.

Williams, Thomas. The Libertarian Foundations of Scotuss Moral Philosophy. The Thomist(1998): 193-215.

o This article also contains a criticism of Aquinass theory of freedom. Williams, Thomas. How Scotus Separates Morality from Happiness.American Catholic

Philosophical Quarterly 69 (1995): 425-445.

Author Information

Colleen McCluskyEmail:[email protected] Louis University

Last updated: July 5, 2007 | Originally published: July/5/2007

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