1 objective and secure reputation-based incentive scheme for ad-hoc networks dapeng oliver wu...
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Objective and Secure Reputation-Based Incentive Scheme for Ad-Hoc Networks
Dapeng Oliver WuElectrical and Computer Engineering
University of Florida(Joint work with Qi He and Pradeep Khosla
at Carnegie Mellon University)
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What’s the Problem?
• Mobile ad hoc network (MANET) has no fixed infrastructure
• Communications rely on intermediate nodes
But why should intermediate nodes relay?• Need incentive mechanism for packet
forwarding in non-cooperative MANET
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Outline
Problem and motivationPrevious work
Reputation-based schemes Pricing-based schemes
Our scheme Design objective Basic scheme Security enhancement
Conclusion
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Watchdog: identifies selfish nodes
Mitigating Routing Misbehavior(S. Marti et al, Stanford University, 2000)
S A B C DX
S A B C D
X Y
Pathrater: gets around identified selfish nodes
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Pros and Cons
Pros: Improve throughput
Cons: Unfairly makes well behaving nodes
busier Indirectly encourages misbehavior
(S. Marti et al, Stanford University, 2000)
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Detect misbehavior of neighbors
Share reputation information with friends
Punish selfish nodes based on the shared information
CONFIDANT Protocol System(S. Buchegger and J-Y Le Boudec, IBM and EPFL, 2002)
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Pros and Cons
Pros Use keys to authenticate nodes Identify and punish misbehavior
Cons How to build a network of friends is not clear Key distribution is not addressed Globally shared reputation makes it not scalable
(S. Buchegger and J-Y Le Boudec, IBM and EPFL, 2002)
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Where are we?
Problem and motivationPrevious work
Reputation-based schemes Pricing-based schemes
Our scheme Design objective Basic scheme Security enhancement
Conclusion
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Enforcing Service Availability
Scheme Virtual currency (nuglet) Centralized authority issuing nuglets Same amount of packets to forward Tamper-resistant hardware
Problem: Require balanced traffic
(L. Buttyan and Hubaux, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology -- EPFL, 2000)
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Micro-payment Scheme Encouraging Collaboration
Multi-hop Cellular Networks (hybrid network)
Mobile nodes form ad-hoc networks
Base stations are connected to a backbone network
M. Jakobsson, J-P Hubaux, and L. Buttyan RSA Lab, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, 2003
backbone
backbone
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$
Micro-payment Protocol
1. Select a reward
Forward the packetKeep the MAC for reward
1. Check MAC2. Send service record
to clearing house
Accounting Center(Clearing house)
backbonebackbone
M. Jakobsson, J-P Hubaux, and L. Buttyan RSA Lab, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, 2003
Registers to home network which shares a secret key
move
MAC
2. Generate an MAC3. Send out the packet
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Pros and Cons
Pros Symmetric key crypto: reduce computational cost Payment aggregation: lower communication cost
Cons Substantial communication overhead Requirement of infrastructure Centralized trust authority
M. Jakobsson, J-P Hubaux, and L. Buttyan, RSA Lab, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology 2003
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Where are we?Problem and MotivationPrevious work
Reputation-based schemes Pricing-based schemes
Our scheme Design objective Basic scheme Security enhancement
Conclusion
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Our Design Objectives
Practicality
Available technologies
Realistic context of ad-hoc networks
Efficiency
Affordable computational cost
Moderate communication overhead
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Assumptions Nodes are non-cooperative
No collusion among nodes
Broadcast transmission
All participating nodes desire to communicate
Invariant identity
Selfish but not malicious
Promiscuous mode (listening mode)
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Where are we?Problem and motivationPrevious work
Reputation-based schemes Pricing-based schemes
Our scheme Design objectives Basic scheme Security enhancement
Conclusion
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Neighbor Monitoring
Each node N maintains a Neighbor Node List (NNLN)
RFPN(X): (Requested to Forward Packets)The number of packets N requests X to forward
HFPN(X): (Has Forwarded Packets)
The number of packets that have been forwarded by X and noticed by N
LERN(X): Local Evaluation Record {GN(X), CN(X)}
)(
)()(
XRFP
XHFPXG
N
NN )()( XRFPXC NN GenerosityGenerosity ConfidenceConfidence
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Reputation Propagation Every neighbor has its local evaluation record about X.
node i earned from N.
Everyone periodically broadcasts its LER(X).
GB(X), CB(X)GB(X), CB(X)
Compute Overall Evaluation Record OERN(X)
XN
A
B
CA(X), GA(X) CA(X), GA(X)
CB(X), GB(X)CB(X), GB(X)
CN(X), GN(X)CN(X), GN(X)
CA(X), GA(X)CA(X), GA(X)
*
*
*
)(NN)(AN)(BN
*
*
*
)(0)( iG
NNi if RFPN(X) 0
otherwiseCredibilityCredibility
Everyone periodically broadcasts its LER(X).
Compute Overall Evaluation Record OERN(X)
)(0)( iG
NNi if RFPN(X) 0
otherwiseCredibilityCredibility
XiNNNNLiN
XGXCiXCk
XOER iiN
XkNNNLk kNN
},{
)()()()()(
1)(
},{
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Remarks
Quantified by objective observations
Weighted by confidence for accuracy
Weighted by credibility to limit impact of selfish nodes
e.g., fake a non-existing node to broadcast information
XiNNNLi
iiN
XkNNNLk kNN
NN
XGXCiXCk
XOER},{},{
)()()()()(
1)(
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Punishment Action
if
otherwise
q
p0
q
Drop packets from X with a probability p :
SelfishnessSelfishness q = 1 - OERN(X)
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Simulation Setup Network Simulator (NS-2)
Total number of nodes: 50 (5 selfish nodes)
Area: 670X670m2
IEEE 802.11 for medium access control
DSR for routing
CBR traffic: 1 packet/s
No. of connections: 10
Connection duration: 10s
Random waypoint mobility model
Max speed of movement: 20m/s
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Simulation Results
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 1000
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Ave
rage
thr
ough
put
(pac
kets
/sec
)
Dropping probability of selfish nodes (%)
Well-behaving nodeSelfish node
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Where are we?Problem and motivationPrevious work
Reputation-based schemes Pricing-based schemes
Our scheme Design objectives Basic scheme Security enhancement
Conclusion
![Page 24: 1 Objective and Secure Reputation-Based Incentive Scheme for Ad-Hoc Networks Dapeng Oliver Wu Electrical and Computer Engineering University of Florida](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070400/56649ef55503460f94c08cfd/html5/thumbnails/24.jpg)
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Potential Vulnerability
Impersonate a
node with a
good reputation
to propagate
fake observation
information
XN
A
B
CA(X), GA(X) CA(X), GA(X)
CA(X), GA(X) CA(X), GA(X)
CB(X), GB(X) CB(X), GB(X)
CB(X), GB(X)CB(X), GB(X)
CA(X), GA(X)CA(X), GA(X)
CA(X), GA(X) CA(X), GA(X)
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Identification and Authentication
r … )(rhn)(rh )(rh din … …)(rh in
ID
)(1 rhn
… ……
1nK iKdiK nK 1K
f f f f f
)}(|),(|{ rhMKMACM inydiy
)}(|),(|{ rhMKMACM din
xix
iin Krhf ))((
Computationally infeasible to impersonate other nodes without knowing their keys
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Conclusion Incentive scheme with punishment mechanism
• Reputation objectively quantified by observations
• Punishment action quantitatively suggested by reputation
• Effectively identify and punish selfish nodes
Security enhancement
• Identification and authentication constructed collectively
• Protection from impersonation
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Thank you!