1 price cartel of paper phenol copper clad laminates (toshiba chemical case) kaoru sekiba harada...

22
1 Price Cartel of Paper Phenol Price Cartel of Paper Phenol Copper Clad Laminates Copper Clad Laminates (Toshiba Chemical Case) (Toshiba Chemical Case) Kaoru SEKIBA HARADA Deputy Director, International Affairs Division Fair Trade Commission of Japan (JFTC) OECD-Korea RCC, Regional Cartel Workshop April 7, 2006

Upload: aileen-norman

Post on 04-Jan-2016

213 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: 1 Price Cartel of Paper Phenol Copper Clad Laminates (Toshiba Chemical Case) Kaoru SEKIBA HARADA Deputy Director, International Affairs Division Fair Trade

11

Price Cartel of Paper Phenol Price Cartel of Paper Phenol Copper Clad LaminatesCopper Clad Laminates

(Toshiba Chemical Case)(Toshiba Chemical Case)

Kaoru SEKIBA HARADADeputy Director, International Affairs Division

Fair Trade Commission of Japan (JFTC)

OECD-Korea RCC, Regional Cartel Workshop

April 7, 2006

Page 2: 1 Price Cartel of Paper Phenol Copper Clad Laminates (Toshiba Chemical Case) Kaoru SEKIBA HARADA Deputy Director, International Affairs Division Fair Trade

22

1.1. BackgroundBackground

2.2. Tacit agreement among Tacit agreement among members? – court rulingmembers? – court ruling

3.3. Argument by Toshiba Argument by Toshiba ChemicalChemical

Page 3: 1 Price Cartel of Paper Phenol Copper Clad Laminates (Toshiba Chemical Case) Kaoru SEKIBA HARADA Deputy Director, International Affairs Division Fair Trade

33

1. Background1. Background

Page 4: 1 Price Cartel of Paper Phenol Copper Clad Laminates (Toshiba Chemical Case) Kaoru SEKIBA HARADA Deputy Director, International Affairs Division Fair Trade

44

Product characteristics

Component of household electronic appliances (TV, tape recorders, etc.)

Mass-producedNot product-differentiated

Paper Phenol Copper Clad Laminates

Page 5: 1 Price Cartel of Paper Phenol Copper Clad Laminates (Toshiba Chemical Case) Kaoru SEKIBA HARADA Deputy Director, International Affairs Division Fair Trade

55

Three major companies

Share of the relevant market

70%

30%

Toshiba Chemical

and 4 other companies

3 major companies

Page 6: 1 Price Cartel of Paper Phenol Copper Clad Laminates (Toshiba Chemical Case) Kaoru SEKIBA HARADA Deputy Director, International Affairs Division Fair Trade

66

Trade Association

All 8 companies were membersFrequent meetingsStrong relationship among members

The Japan Thermosetting Plastics Industry Association

Page 7: 1 Price Cartel of Paper Phenol Copper Clad Laminates (Toshiba Chemical Case) Kaoru SEKIBA HARADA Deputy Director, International Affairs Division Fair Trade

77

2. Tacit agreement among 2. Tacit agreement among members? – court rulingmembers? – court ruling

Page 8: 1 Price Cartel of Paper Phenol Copper Clad Laminates (Toshiba Chemical Case) Kaoru SEKIBA HARADA Deputy Director, International Affairs Division Fair Trade

88

Tacit agreement among 8 companies?

07/01/1987~07/15/1987

Price-raising by 3 major companies

08/21/1987~09/01/1987

Price-raising by 5 other companies

Explicit agreement

Tacit agreement ?

Page 9: 1 Price Cartel of Paper Phenol Copper Clad Laminates (Toshiba Chemical Case) Kaoru SEKIBA HARADA Deputy Director, International Affairs Division Fair Trade

99

Points of the Tokyo High Court Ruling for the Toshiba Chemical Case

A) Is explicit agreement necessary to prove the existence of a cartel? Is tacit agreement sufficient?

B) If tacit agreement is sufficient, how can it be proven?

Page 10: 1 Price Cartel of Paper Phenol Copper Clad Laminates (Toshiba Chemical Case) Kaoru SEKIBA HARADA Deputy Director, International Affairs Division Fair Trade

1010

A)Is explicit agreement necessary to prove the existence of a cartel? Is tacit agreement sufficient?

Proof of explicit agreement is not necessary

Showing a tacit agreement is sufficient

Page 11: 1 Price Cartel of Paper Phenol Copper Clad Laminates (Toshiba Chemical Case) Kaoru SEKIBA HARADA Deputy Director, International Affairs Division Fair Trade

1111

Tokyo High Court ruling noted… By nature of a cartel agreement, companies

usually try to avoid making a cartel agreement explicitly known to the public

If we interpreted that explicit agreement is necessary to prove a cartel, the companies could easily hide the existence of a cartel.

Why is proof of tacit agreement sufficient?

Page 12: 1 Price Cartel of Paper Phenol Copper Clad Laminates (Toshiba Chemical Case) Kaoru SEKIBA HARADA Deputy Director, International Affairs Division Fair Trade

1212

No!

: intention of collaboration is necessary

Is passive acceptance of price-raising by another company also sufficient enough to prove a cartel?

“The said “liaison of intention” means that an entrepreneur recognizes or predicts implementation of the same or similar kind of price-raising among entrepreneurs, and accordingly intends to collaborate with such price-raising. In order to prove “liaison of intention,” "it is not sufficient to show the recognition or acceptance of an entrepreneur’s price-raising by another entrepreneur. “

Page 13: 1 Price Cartel of Paper Phenol Copper Clad Laminates (Toshiba Chemical Case) Kaoru SEKIBA HARADA Deputy Director, International Affairs Division Fair Trade

1313

B) If tacit agreement is sufficient, how can it be proven?

Holistic approach

(look at all the evidence!)“We should consider recognition and intention of the entrepreneurs by examining various circumstances before and after the price-raising, and then evaluate whether there is a mutual recognition or acceptance among entrepreneurs regarding the price-raising or not. “

Page 14: 1 Price Cartel of Paper Phenol Copper Clad Laminates (Toshiba Chemical Case) Kaoru SEKIBA HARADA Deputy Director, International Affairs Division Fair Trade

1414

a. Existence of previous exchange of their information and opinions

b. Information and opinions which had been exchanged were related to the price-raising of the relevant products

c. Concerted act as a result

Three criteria to prove a tacit agreement

In Toshiba Chemical Case

Page 15: 1 Price Cartel of Paper Phenol Copper Clad Laminates (Toshiba Chemical Case) Kaoru SEKIBA HARADA Deputy Director, International Affairs Division Fair Trade

1515

Members exchanged their opinions regarding the price of the product concerned at the meetings of the trade association.

a. Existence of previous exchange of their information and opinions

Evidence

Statement of participants in the meetings

The trade association meeting’s participants list

Page 16: 1 Price Cartel of Paper Phenol Copper Clad Laminates (Toshiba Chemical Case) Kaoru SEKIBA HARADA Deputy Director, International Affairs Division Fair Trade

1616

Three major companies expressed their intention to raise the price.

Three major companies requested that the other five companies follow their price-raising.

No objection by the other five companies was made at the meeting.

b. Information and opinions which had been exchanged were related to the price-raising of the relevant products

Evidence

Statements of participants in the meetings

Page 17: 1 Price Cartel of Paper Phenol Copper Clad Laminates (Toshiba Chemical Case) Kaoru SEKIBA HARADA Deputy Director, International Affairs Division Fair Trade

1717

All the eight companies gave instructions in their office to raise the price.

All the eight companies announced and carried out the price-raising for users.

c. Concerted act as a result

Evidence

Statements of persons involved

Press release of price-raising

Notice of price-raising sent to their customers

Page 18: 1 Price Cartel of Paper Phenol Copper Clad Laminates (Toshiba Chemical Case) Kaoru SEKIBA HARADA Deputy Director, International Affairs Division Fair Trade

1818

3. Argument made by 3. Argument made by

Toshiba ChemicalToshiba Chemical

Page 19: 1 Price Cartel of Paper Phenol Copper Clad Laminates (Toshiba Chemical Case) Kaoru SEKIBA HARADA Deputy Director, International Affairs Division Fair Trade

1919

A) Participants from Toshiba Chemical made an objection to a concerted price-raising at the meeting of the trade association.

Points of argument by Toshiba Chemical

Court Ruling:

According to the other participants’ statements, nobody remembered such a remark being made by Toshiba Chemical.

Page 20: 1 Price Cartel of Paper Phenol Copper Clad Laminates (Toshiba Chemical Case) Kaoru SEKIBA HARADA Deputy Director, International Affairs Division Fair Trade

2020

B) Because of several reasons (plan to list the stock, violation of a COCOM regulation by Toshiba group), Toshiba Chemical tried to ensure compliance with the Antimonopoly Law at that time.

Points of argument by Toshiba Chemical

Court Ruling:

To list the stock, Toshiba Chemical had to achieve a rapid earnings recovery at that time. Price-raising was necessary.

If Toshiba Chemical had sincerely wanted to avoid taking part in collusion, it should not have participated in meetings where the companies exchange opinions and information relating to price.

Page 21: 1 Price Cartel of Paper Phenol Copper Clad Laminates (Toshiba Chemical Case) Kaoru SEKIBA HARADA Deputy Director, International Affairs Division Fair Trade

2121

C) The actual price-raising by eight companies was disorganized.

Points of argument by Toshiba Chemical

Court Ruling:

It is natural that price-raising may not necessarily be carried out as planned because of the power balance between manufacturers and users, worldwide price trends, etc.

Regardless of the subsequent circumstances, we can presume that the companies collaborated to raise the price if there was a concerted act.

Page 22: 1 Price Cartel of Paper Phenol Copper Clad Laminates (Toshiba Chemical Case) Kaoru SEKIBA HARADA Deputy Director, International Affairs Division Fair Trade

2222

• Explicit agreement is not necessary to prove the existence of a cartel agreement.

A tacit agreement is sufficient.• Passive acceptance is not enough. Intention of

collaboration is necessary.• In order to prove that there was a tacit

agreement, you should take a holistic approach.

Conclusion