1

Sing Ming

Sept 18, 2004

Executive-legislative Relations, Political Institutions &

Democratic Survival: Lessons from Comparative Studies

1. Objectives 1.1 To explain democratic survival around the world between 1950

and 2000 with a wide range of possible institutional and non-institutional causes.

• largest updated sample to-date.

Through combining many cross-national databases, I will test various models covering every regime that has been democratic for some time between 1950 and 2000, worldwide, with a population of no less than one million.

1.2 To test whether parliamentary democracy is more capable of enhancing democratic survival than presidential democracy around the world between 1950 and 2000.

1.3 To assess whether other institutional and non-institutional causes have shaped democratic survival around the world.

1.4 To draw initial implications on the design of Hong Kong’s political institutions should it become fully democratic.

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2. Introduction

Original title “Balancing the Executive and Legislative Branches of

Government” is not clear

“Balance” is too vauge a concept to be useful”

Dynamic Probit analysis is used to explain the annual probability of democratic breakdowns of presidential or parliamentary democracies in the period with some theory-driven explanatory variables.

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Dynamic Probit Specification

Probability (Rt | Rt- 1 = 0) = F (Xt- 1)

The model examines the transition from a lagged one year R of zero or one to a current year R of zero or one, where R is political regime with coding 1 refers to autocracy and 0 refers to democracy, X represents the vector of the exogenous variables at one-year lagged time, t – 1.

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Some of those variables have been ignored in the most well-known recent works (Boix, 2003; Cheibub, 2002), including institutional, historical, political , cultural and socio-economic ones.

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2.1 Independent variables involved and their presumed effects on democratic breakdowns

Institutional VariablesExpected

Sign Cultural VariablesExpected

SignEffective Numbers of Party (ENPP) + Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization +Square of ENPP - UK Colony -Presidential Regime (Ref: Parliamentary) + Protestant, % in Population -Party Coalition + Muslim, % in Population +Presidential Runoff + Latin Dummy +Ineffective Legislature (Ref: Effective) + Socio-Economics VariablesPartially Effective Legislature + Openness to Trade (Log) +Deadlock Government + Real GDP per capita (Log) -PR Electoral System + or - Real GDP per capita Growth Rate -

Political & Historical Variables Inflation Rate (Log) +Military Personnel (Log) -Cumulative Breakdown in the Past +World Democratic Proportion -

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2.2 Hypotheses about Institutional Factors

H1: Presidential regime (vs. Parliamentary) Democratic Breakdown

Many cross-national findings show presidential democracies are more prone to collapses than parliamentary ones in the last few decades

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H2: Larger number of (Effective) Parties (ENPP)----- Democratic Breakdown

When a president does not have a “legislative majority” or “near- legislative majority” in the legislature, his/her motions/bills are more likely to fail to secure passage.

The repeated failures favor democratic breakdowns in presidential democracies. When number of “effective parties” or mutlipartyism is increased in legislatures, the failures to secure at least a “near- legislative majority” are more likely than the otherwise.

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H3: Proportional Representation (PR) System (vs. non-PR) (ENPP) Democratic Breakdown

H4: Ineffective or Partially effective legislature Democratic Breakdown

H5: Legislative Deadlocks Democratic Breakdown

(deadlock: the largest party controls more than 1/3 but <= to 1/2 of seats)

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H6: Party Coalition Whether the government is a coalitional one formed by various parties has negative effect on democratic breakdown. 

H7: Presidential Runoff (two-round voting system) is more likely than plurality method (one round) Democratic Breakdown 

Plurality method is less associated with multipartism than the two-round system in various parts of the world (Jones, 1995).

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3. Findings

Given the quasi-presidential political structure of Hong Kong, and the importance of inertia on institutional designs (Foweraker, 1998, 652; Sadurski, 2001, 459), this paper focuses on conditions for adopting the presidential system in Hong Kong.

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Full Samples

Presidential Regimes

Parliamentary Regimes

Number of Nations:

79 33 46

Number of Observations:

1708 582 1126

Samples

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# of Years From To # of Years From ToTotal: 33 Natons 582 years 1952 2000 Total: 46 Natons 1126 years 1952 2000

Argentina 30 1952 1999 Australia 48 1952 2000Benin 9 1992 2000 Austria 44 1957 2000Bolivia 16 1980 2000 Bangladesh 9 1992 2000Brazil 22 1959 2000 Barbados 9 1980 1988Chile 29 1952 2000 Belgium 47 1952 2000Colombia 42 1959 2000 Bulgaria 9 1991 2000Costa Rica 36 1964 2000 Canada 48 1952 2000Cyprus 13 1971 1983 Cape Verde Is. 9 1992 2000Dominican Rep 12 1967 1978 Czech Republic 4 1993 1999Ecuador 24 1961 2000 Denmark 48 1952 2000El Salvador 15 1986 2000 Dominican Rep 22 1979 2000Ghana 2 1980 1981 Estonia 7 1994 2000Guatemala 29 1952 2000 France 5 1952 1957Guyana 8 1993 2000 Germany 10 1991 2000Honduras 20 1959 2000 Germany West 19 1971 1990Indonesia 1 2000 2000 Greece 41 1952 2000Korea South 12 1989 2000 Hungary 10 1991 2000Malawi 3 1995 1998 India 43 1954 2000Namibia 6 1995 2000 Ireland 48 1952 2000Nicaragua 6 1991 2000 Israel 46 1955 2000Nigeria 5 1980 2000 Italy 48 1952 2000Panama 15 1964 2000 Jamaica 38 1963 2000Peru 21 1957 1990 Japan 43 1953 1999Philippines 23 1952 2000 Latvia 7 1994 2000Russia 7 1994 2000 Luxembourg 44 1955 2000Sierra Leone 1 1997 1997 Macedonia 4 1995 1998Switzerland 38 1962 2000 Malta 4 1996 1999Uganda 5 1981 1985 Mauritius 19 1977 2000Ukraine 6 1995 2000 Moldova 2 1999 2000United States 48 1952 2000 Nepal 9 1992 2000Uruguay 33 1952 2000 Netherlands 46 1952 2000Venezuela 36 1964 2000 New Zealand 49 1952 2000Zambia 9 1992 2000 Nigeria 2 1965 1966

Norway 33 1968 2000Pakistan 10 1989 1998Papua New Guinea 21 1978 1998Sierra Leone 4 1964 1967Slovakia 4 1995 2000Slovenia 8 1993 2000Spain 23 1978 2000Sri Lanka 6 1972 1977Sweden 42 1958 2000Thailand 17 1976 2000Trinidad 32 1967 2000Turkey 36 1962 2000United Kingdom 49 1952 2000

NationsPresidential Regimes

NationsParliamentary Regimes

Nations

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3.1 Full Samples Probit Estimates

Full Samples DV: Democratic Breakdown

Probit estimates Number of obs = 1708Pseudo R2 = 0.3663 Wald chi2(21) = 296.57Log likelihood = -98.223043 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Std. RobustCoef. Coef. Std. Err. Sig. P>|z|

Effective Numbers of Party (ENPP) 0.72 0.78 0.27 *** 0.70%Square of ENPP -0.06 -0.92 0.03 * 7.50%Presidential Regime 0.47 0.13 0.32 13.60%Party Coalition 0.10 0.03 0.23 67.70%Presidential Runoff -0.14 -0.03 0.24 55.50%Ineffective Legislature (Ref: Effective) 0.88 0.06 0.40 ** 2.70%Partially Effective Legislature 1.13 0.28 0.30 *** 0.00%Deadlock Government 0.24 0.07 0.23 29.90%PR Electoral System -0.79 -0.22 0.31 *** 1.00%Military Personnel (Log) -0.16 -0.16 0.08 * 5.60%Cumulative Breakdown in the Past 0.05 0.02 0.14 70.00%World Democratic Proportion -5.88 -0.35 1.22 *** 0.00%Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization -0.84 -0.12 0.51 9.80%UK Colony -0.43 -0.11 0.34 20.30%Protestant, % in Population -1.00 -0.14 0.57 * 7.70%Muslim, % in Population 0.19 0.02 0.43 66.20%Latin Dummy -0.28 -0.07 0.30 34.70%Openness (Log) -0.63 -0.23 0.33 ** 5.50%Real GDP per capita (Log) -0.61 -0.36 0.21 *** 0.30%Real GDP per capita Growth Rate -2.35 -0.08 1.35 8.10%Inflation Rate (Log) 0.10 0.09 0.07 12.20%Constant 1.86 . 1.45 20.00%

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Presidential Probit Estimates

Presidential Samples DV: Democratic Breakdown

Probit estimates Number of obs = 582Pseudo R2 = 0.3513 Wald chi2(20) = 433.10Log likelihood = -62.832083 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Std. RobustCoef. Coef. Std. Err. Sig. P>|z|

Effective Numbers of Party (ENPP) 1.34 0.86 0.62 ** 3.10%Square of ENPP -0.14 -1.56 0.08 * 8.80%Party Coalition -0.44 -0.06 0.29 13.80%Presidential Runoff -0.08 -0.01 0.25 75.30%Ineffective Legislature (Ref: Effective) 0.53 0.03 0.54 32.10%Partially Effective Legislature 1.18 0.16 0.34 *** 0.10%Deadlock Government 0.40 0.05 0.23 * 8.60%PR Electoral System -0.80 -0.10 0.49 * 9.80%Military Personnel (Log) -0.25 -0.12 0.14 * 6.80%Cumulative Breakdown in the Past -0.24 -0.06 0.28 38.50%World Democratic Proportion -6.84 -0.20 2.28 *** 0.30%Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization -0.99 -0.05 0.80 21.80%UK Colony -1.21 -0.12 0.64 * 5.90%Protestant, % in Population -1.32 -0.06 2.41 58.50%Muslim, % in Population 3.46 0.06 1.85 * 6.10%Latin Dummy -0.32 -0.04 0.40 42.50%Openness (Log) -1.34 -0.22 0.47 *** 0.40%Real GDP per capita (Log) -0.59 -0.16 0.29 ** 4.10%Real GDP per capita Growth Rate -4.15 -0.07 2.17 * 5.50%Inflation Rate (Log) 0.10 0.05 0.08 20.10%Constant 5.16 . 2.47 ** 3.70%

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Parliamentary Probit Estimates

Parliamentary Samples

Probit estimates Number of obs = 966Pseudo R2 = 0.5422 Wald chi2(17) = 99225.64

Log likelihood = -21.202633 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000Prob > chi2 = 0.0000Std. Robust

Coef. Coef. Std. Err. Sig. P>|z|Effective Numbers of Party (ENPP) 0.52 0.14 0.37 15.70%Square of ENPP 0.00 0.00 0.02 98.10%Party Coalition 2.20 0.18 0.75 *** 0.30%Partially Effective Legislature 3.43 0.18 1.53 ** 2.50%Deadlock Government -1.22 -0.10 0.84 14.70%PR Electoral System 3.11 0.26 1.85 * 9.20%Military Personnel (Log) -0.11 -0.03 0.18 52.70%Cumulative Breakdown in the Past 0.45 0.04 0.43 28.90%World Democratic Proportion -6.15 -0.11 2.16 *** 0.40%Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization -1.97 -0.09 0.90 ** 2.90%UK Colony 1.80 0.14 1.30 16.60%Protestant, % in Population -15.97 -0.80 10.23 11.90%Muslim, % in Population -0.74 -0.03 0.69 28.70%Openness (Log) -0.01 0.00 0.70 99.30%Real GDP per capita (Log) -1.85 -0.34 0.53 *** 0.00%Real GDP per capita Growth Rate 1.18 0.01 2.76 67.00%Inflation Rate (Log) 0.17 0.04 0.36 63.90%Constant -4.64 . 4.55 30.80%Presidential Runoff is excluded in parliamentary study. Latin dummy and Ineffective Legislature are dropped due to perfect prediction.

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There is no evidence that presidential regimes are by themselves more favorable for democratic breakdown than parliamentary ones. This finding has contradicted many recent research papers (Przeworski, 2000).  

But we need to heed under what conditions presidential regimes will be more likely to “survive”.

3.2

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3.3 ENPPThere are several competing interpretations of the effects of ENPP on democratic survival:

a. Mainwaring (1993; 1999): “multipartism exacerbates the problems of presidentialism by increasing the probability of immobilism in executive/legislative relations, by promoting ideological polarization and by making inter-party coalition-building difficult to observe. He argued for two-party system.  

He has more or less assumed a positive linear relationship between ENPP and democratic survival (consolidation).

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b. Lijphart (1999): multipartism can cater for multiple cleavages or issue dimensions among plural societies marked by regional, ethnic, linguistic, religious or political divisions. 

c. Cheibub (2001; 2002): argue for a quadratic relationship with their descriptive statistics, and that probabilities of breakdown were the highest when 3< ENPP <4. 

Yet, their descriptive statistics were not conclusive, as they have not statistically controlled the effects of other factors.

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Findings• For the sub-samples of presidential regimes, when ENPP reaches 4.93, the probability of breakdown becomes the highest, after controlling the effects of other factors at their means).  

• ENPP increases the probability of breakdown when the former rises initially, then falls off when it increases further, i.e., an inverted quadratic relationship is found with respect to the breakdown of democracies.

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Bre

akdo

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Pro

babi

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Figure 2: Presidential Samples (Holding all other IVs at their means)Effective Number of Parties

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

0

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

1

1.1

1.2

1.3

Breakdown Probabilities by ENPP: highest when ENPP reaches 4.93

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Full Samples Presidential SamplesENPP <=1 0.001% --1 > ENPP <=1.5 0.002% 0.00%1.5 > ENPP <=2 0.01% 0.02%2 > ENPP <=2.5 0.01% 0.05%2.5 > ENPP <=3 0.03% 0.17%3 <= ENPP < 3.5 0.05% 0.39%3.5 <= ENPP < 4 0.09% 0.68%4 <= ENPP < 4.5 0.14% 0.94%4.5 <= ENPP < 5 0.20% 1.10%5 <= ENPP <= 5.5 0.26% 1.08%ENPP > 5.5 0.24% 0.35%

Table: Breakdown Probabilities by ENPP

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Interpretation:

When ENPP rises from 2 to 4.93, controlling other variables at their means, the probability of democratic breakdown escalates with a sharply increased slope.

WHY?

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Within the range of 2< ENPP < 4.93, when ENPP rises or multipartism intensifies, it engenders a greater likelihood for the governing parties to

i./ have smaller share of seats in legislature, and

ii./the largest party in the legislature to have <= ½ of total seats in legislature (minority).  

Strong initial evidence that greater ENPP increases the chance for a Minority 

As ENPP and PR are regressed on “minority”, a very good model of fit has been found. The result may imply that when ENPP and PR increase, the chance for the forming of a minority govt. may rise.

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DV: Minority

Probit Estimates Number of obs = 2432Pseudo R2 = 0.4352 Wald chi2(2) = 93.44Log likelihood = -941.02787 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Coef. Robust Std. Error Sig. LevelEffective Number of Parties 1.04 0.13 ***PR Electoral System 0.53 0.17 ***Constant -3.1 0.34 ***

DV: Minority Government

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Another explanation: when there are about 3 to 4 parties with more or less equal strengths, it would be difficult for regime stability when each of which tries to implement their own programs by itself or in coalitions.  

Coalitions under such conditions may not be stable under the fear that their partners may defect to shifting coalitions (Cheibub, 2002).

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3.4 Electoral SystemThree competing hypotheses:

a. Boix (2003) - electoral systems exert little effect 

b. Mainwaring (1993) – PR will increase ENPP, and thus jeopardize democratic stability especially when presidentialism coexists with a legislature produced via Proportional Representation system (PR). 

c. Lijphart (1992): PR will encourage multipartism and will suit societies with more cleavages or issue-dimensions.

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Findings

PR favors democratic stability than non-PR in full sample at 1% level of sig. For the presidential sample, it is sig. at 10% of level of sig. (9.8%).

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Bre

akd

own

Pro

babi

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s %

Figure 4: Presidential Samples (Electoral System)Effective Number of Parties

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

0

.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

Breakdown Probabilities by Electoral System: highest when ENPP reaches 4.93

Non-PRPR

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Table: Breakdown Probabilities by Electoral System

Full Samples Presidential SamplesPR Electoral System

0.10% 0.22%

Non-PR Electoral System

0.45% 0.92%

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For both presidential and parliamentary democracies, when there are multiple cleavages or issue-dimensions, PR can enhance the formation of different parties to address those issue-dimensions and raise their chance of democratic survival  

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ENPP & PR: Effects on Democratic Survival

As PR will raise the ENPP, and greater ENPP reduces chances of democratic survival, how can we reconcile the seemingly contradictory findings that both PR and larger ENPP will enhance Democratic Survival?

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This argument is partly borne out by that PR *ethno-linguistic fractionalization is significant in the full sample, though not in the sub-samples for presidential and parliamentary regimes.  

More data on the number and nature of cleavages and PR system are needed to confirm their joint effect on Democratic Survival.

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3.4 Importance of Deadlock

a. Conventional explanation: deadlocks in presidential democracies explain the higher percentage of their democratic breakdown. 

b. Cheibub rejected the claim by arguing coalitions can help resolve deadlocks or make minority governments work  

• I use a proxy: it is significant for presidential regime.

• How to explain deadlock : ENPP and PR: limited model fit.

• More work needs to be done in future.

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3.5 Effective Legislature

Democracies with ineffective or partially effective legislature are more likely than effective one to suffer from democratic brakdowns

A legislature is effective if it has significant autonomy, including the power to tax, spend, and override executive vetoes.  

A legislature is partially effective if it lacks one or more of the powers needed to be an effective legislature.

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Breakdown Probabilities by Effectiveness of Legislature and Electoral System

Bre

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Pro

babi

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Figure 6: Presidentiall Samples, by Partially Effective LegislatureEffective Number of Parties

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

Non-PR & Partially Effective

PR & Partially Effective

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Table: Breakdown Probabilities by Effectiveness of Legislature and Electoral System

Full SamplesPresidential

SamplesPR Electoral System and Partially Effective Legislature

0.31% 0.62%

Non-PR Electoral System and Partially Effective Legislature

2.47% 4.59%

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Whether the governing party is a coalitional one, and whether the president is chosen by one-round or two-round elections exert no appreciable effect on Democratic Survival.

3.6 Party Coalition and Presidential Runoff: No Effect on Survival

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3.7 Level of Economic Development

Level of economic development measured by GDP per capita and openness of trade both favor democratic survival, which generate very positive implications on Hong Kong’s democratic development.

Figure 7: Predicted Probabilities by Real GDP per capita

0.77%

2.95%

0.55%

1.37%

0.00%

0.50%

1.00%

1.50%

2.00%

2.50%

3.00%

GDP <=$0.5K

$0.5K <GDP <= $1K

$1K < GDP<= $1.5K

$1.5K <GDP <= $2K

$2K < GDP<= $3K

$3K < GDP<= $4K

$4K < GDP<= $5K

$5K < GDP<= $6K

$6K < GDP<= $7K

$7K < GDP<= $8K

$8K < GDP<= $9K

$9K < GDP<= $10K

GDP> $10K

Prob

abili

ties

Full Samples Presidential Samples

Breakdown Probabilities by Real GDP per capita

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Table Breakdown Probabilities by Real GDP per capita

Full SamplesPresidential

SamplesGDP <= $0.5K 2.95% 1.37%$0.5K < GDP <= $1K 0.77% 0.55%$1K < GDP <= $1.5K 0.31% 0.22%$1.5K < GDP <= $2K 0.16% 0.11%$2K < GDP <= $3K 0.08% 0.06%$3K < GDP <= $4K 0.04% 0.03%$4K < GDP <= $5K 0.02% 0.02%$5K < GDP <= $6K 0.01% 0.01%$6K < GDP <= $7K 0.01% 0.01%$7K < GDP <= $8K 0.01% 0.00%$8K < GDP <= $9K 0.00% 0.00%$9K < GDP <= $10K 0.00% 0.00%GDP> $10K 0.00% 0.00%

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4. Lessons on Hong Kong’s Executive-legislative Relations & Institutional Design

4.1 Hong Kong’s level of economic development is big enough to secure democratic survival – the probability of breakdown is virtually zero at Hong Kong’s average GDP per capita between 1975 and 2000, that exceeds $10,000 per capita!

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The optimism for democratic survival is further enhanced by Hong Kong’s relatively large degree of openness to trade and the presence of British heritage.

4.2 To reduce the risk of democratic breakdown even further, presidential regime should not encourage the creation of too great the effective number of parties (4.93 > ENPP> 2.5).

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4.3 Electoral System

• Finding: PR favors democratic stability in all three samples.

• How to reconcile contradictory findings between ENPP and PR?

• PR suits many plural societies (Lijphart, 1992; Jones, 1995).

• Though PR raises ENPP a bit, PR enhances more parties to address multiple issue dimensions/ cleavages in PLURAL SOCIETIES .

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4.4 Overall Recommendations:  

4.4.1. Hong Kong should have 2 and at most, 2.5 effective number of parties. 

Justifications:

 

• Hong Kong lacks the ethnic, regional and religious cleavages, as found in some plural societies adopting presidential regimes in Latin American  

• Hong Kong has the cleavage surrounding i./ socio-economic redistribution; ii./ pacing and desirability of democracy; and arguably iii./ the center-periphery (Beijing-Hong Kong cleavage).

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• If and when full democracy is allowed to implement, only 1 or arguably 2 major cleavages or issue-dimensions remain.

• We may thus just adopt majority electoral system, or mixed members system to produce the 2 party system or 2.5 ENPP, to maximize the chance of democratic survival.

• Adopting PR may unnecessarily raise the number of ENPP and reinforce some cleavages that should have been subsiding when full democracy is implemented in the non-plural society of Hong Kong

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4.4.2 Adopting the mixed-member system, i.e., with both simple majority system and the PR carries the following advantages:  

• Reduce the danger of multipartism (Norris, 2004) and the danger of executive-legislative deadlocks. 

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Strengths of Mixed Members Electoral System Encourage the dual emphasis of city-wide

and individual geographical constituencies’ interests, and hence the deepening of policy research (Shugart & Wattenberg, 2001).

  Favor professionals who do not want to

spend too much time on electoral campaigns in geographical constituencies to stand for elections via the party-nominated party list.

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4.4.3: If no full democracy will be implemented in the political reform of 2007/2008, the reform should Dovetail with Full Democracy in future in the following way: 

• HKSAR Govt. should reduce the fragmentation of the existing political parties further by increasing the threshold under the existing PR formula.  

• Better still, HKSAR Govt. should replace the PR with either the simple majority or mixed-member electoral system.

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• In case Functional Constituencies (FC) are to be retained, and/or that its total number of seats rises further in 2008, each FC has to be chosen by: 

i/ individual vote &  

ii./ a reasonably “large” and broad-based electorate to enhance their representativeness and the promotion of party development. Or else, ENPP may rise, reducing the chance of democratic survival and “public satisfaction with democracy” in future (Norris, 1999).

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Definition:

Presidential Regime: a presidential regime is a democracy in which the govt. serves at the pleasure of the elected president. The president may be directly elected or indirectly elected; the important feature is that the president selects and determines the survival of the government.

Parliamentary Regime: is a democracy in which the govt. must enjoy the confidence of the legislature. The legislature can dismiss the government.

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Variables: Sources:Regime Type: Autocracy = 1 and Democracy = 0 Golder (2004), Electoral System Around the

World, 1946-2000, Banks (2000) Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive, Przeworski et al (2000) ACLP Database, and Polity IV (2003)

Parliamentary Regime, t-1 (Ref: Presidential Regime) Golder (2004), Electoral System Around the World, 1946-2000

Proportional & Multi-tier Electoral System, t-1 (Ref: Majority & Mixed)

Golder (2004), Electoral System Around the World, 1946-2000

Effective Party Fractionalization, t-1 Banks (2000) Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive

Deadlock, dummy variable of 1 when the largest legislative party controls more than 33.33% and less than or equal to 50% of seats, and 0 otherwise.

Banks (2000) Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive

Party Coalition: dummy variables = 1 where there are more than one party, government coalition, opposition OR more than one party, government coalition, no opposition, and 0 otherwise (Reference: more than one party, no coalitions OR no coalition and no opposition)

Banks (2000) Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive

Legislative Effectiveness: dummy variables of 4 categories: (a) none (exclude from the analysis), (b) ineffective, (c) partially effective, and (d) effective (reference group).

Banks (2000) Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive

Presidential Runoff: dummy variable of 1 and 0 otherwise. Golder (2004), Electoral System Around the World, 1946-2000

Latin Dummy United NationsReal GDP per capita (US$ Current Prices), t-1Real Growth Rate of GDP per capita, t-1Openness, trade as a share of GDP (% in Current Prices), t-1Inflation Rate, t-1 World Economic Outllook, IMF and Przeworski

et al (2000) ACLP DatasetMilitary Personnel, t-1 Correlate of Wars2, National Material

Capabilities (v3.01)Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization La Porta (1998) and Roeder (2001) ELF Indices,

1961 and 1985. Percentage of Protestant in the Population La Porta (1998)Percentage of Muslim in the Population La Porta (1998)British Heritage --Democratic Neighbor in the Region, t-1 Derived from the Regime Data# of Past Breakdown Record, t-1 Derived from the Regime Data

Penn World Table, Version 6.1 and 5.6

Data Source

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~~End~~