1 theory of networked computation? joan feigenbaum delis workshop; barcelona; february 2008
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Theory of Networked Computation?
Joan Feigenbaumhttp://www.cs.yale.edu/homes/jf
DELIS Workshop; Barcelona; February 2008
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Future of Distributed Computing?
Conjecture: “Distributed-computing research” will be more like “networking research.”
What characterizes “networking research”?
• “Sacrifice strict semantics for scalability.”[Scott Shenker, PODC 2003]
• “Evolutionary fitness trumps elegance.”[Jonathan Smith, Colloquium talk 2007]
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Why is this Plausible?
• It’s already happening; see PODC and EC proceedings of the last five years.
• Cultural trend: “networkization” of CS• Funding trend: various “Clean-Slate Design”
initiatives, many 100s M$ worldwide• Networks provide real-world examples of
distributed computations.• Intellectually compelling
Role of the theory community?
4
Elements of a “Theory of NC”
• Model(s) of computation• General network-algorithmic techniques• Algorithms for concrete problems of
interest• Lower-bound techniques, reductions• Hardness results for concrete problems
of interest Descriptive results and interpretation
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Examples of “Networked Comp.”
• Routing, congestion control, and other “network-layer” computations
• WWW search• Auctions• P2P file sharing• Blogs, wikis, MySpace, and other
“web-mediated communities”• Yahoo! questions, ESP, del.icio.us, and
other “human-aided computations”
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Properties to Model
• Massive scale• User self-interest• Subnetwork autonomy• Emergent behavior• Extreme heterogeneity (of devices, uses,
subnetworks, …) Results without convergence Agents, data, resources, and network
conditions that change during computation
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Outline
• Theory of incentive-compatible IDR
• What IDR has contributed to ToNC• What IDR has not (yet?) contributed
to ToNC• More ToNC-agenda items
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Interdomain Routing
Establish routes between autonomous systems (ASes).
Currently done with the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP).
AT&T
Qwest
Comcast
Verizon
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Why is Interdomain Routing Hard?
• Route choices are based on local policies.
• Autonomy: Policies are uncoordinated.
• Expressiveness: Policies are complex.
AT&T
Qwest
Comcast
Verizon
My link to UUNET is forbackup purposes only.
Load-balance myoutgoing traffic.
Always chooseshortest paths.
Avoid routes through AT&T ifat all possible.
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BGP Route Processing (1)
• The computation of a single node repeats the following:
Receive routes from neighbors
UpdateRoutin
g Table
Choose“Best”Route
Send updatesto neighbors
• Paths go through neighbors’ choices, which enforces consistency.
• Decisions are made locally, which preserves autonomy.
• Uncoordinated policies can induce protocol oscillations. (Much recent work addresses BGP convergence.)
• Recently, private information, optimization, and incentive-compatibility have also been studied.
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Apply Policy =filter routes & tweak attributes
BGP Route Processing (2)
Routing Table
Apply Import Policies
Best Route Selection
Apply Export Policies
Install forwardingentries for best routes
ReceiveBGPupdates
Storageof routes
TransmitBGP updates
Based onattributevalues
IP Forwarding Table
Apply Policy =filter routes & tweak attributes
Open-ended programming:constrained only by vendor configuration language
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Example: Convergence
1 2
d
Prefer routes
through 2
Prefer direct route
to d
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Example: Oscillation
1 2
d
BGP might oscillateforever between
1d, 2dand
12d, 21d
Prefer routes
through 2
Prefer routes
through 1
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Example: Convergence
1 2
d
Prefer routes
through 2
Prefer routes
through 1
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Dispute Wheels
Nodes ui, hub routes Ri, and spoke routes Qi.
Each ui prefers RiQi+1 to Qi.
“No dispute wheel” —>robust convergence
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Gao-Rexford Framework (1)
Neighboring pairs of ASes have one of:– a customer-provider relationship
(One node is purchasing connectivity fromthe other node.)
– a peering relationship(Nodes have offered to carry each other’stransit traffic, often to shortcut a longer route.)
peer
providers
customerspeer
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Gao-Rexford Framework (2)
• Global constraint: no customer-provider cycles• Local preference and scoping constraints, which are
consistent with Internet economics:
• Gao-Rexford conditions => BGP always converges [GR01]
Preference Constraints
. . . . . .
. . . . . .i
dR1
R2
k2
k1
• If k1 and k2 are both customers, peers, or providers of i, then either ik1R1 or ik2R2 can be more valued at i.
• If one is a customer, prefer the route through it. If not, prefer the peer route.
Scoping Constraints
d
k
i
j
• Export customer routes to all neighbors and export all routes to customers.
• Export peer and provider routes to all customers only.
m
. . . .. . . .
. . . .peer
customer
provider
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Open Problem 1: Convergence
Fully characterize the conditions under which BGP converges (robustly).
• “No dispute wheel” is sufficient but not necessary. Is it enforceable?
• Develop game-theoretic and algorithmic frameworks that explain how dispute wheels form and how to avoid them. (See Levin-Schapira-Zohar in STOC ’08.)
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Open Problem 2: Round Complexity
On those instances on which BGP is guaranteed to converge, how many rounds does it take to converge?
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Economic Mechanism Design
Agents: 1, …, nStrategies: s1, …, sn
Types: t1, …, tn
Actions: a1, …, an
Outcome: oValuation functions: v1, …, vn
Payment functions: p1, …, pn
Utility functions: u1, …, un
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Classical, One-Round Mechanisms (1)
o
Agent 1
a1 s1(t1)
Agent n
an sn(tn) • • •
a1 p1 • • • an pn
t1 tn
Mechanism
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Classical, One-Round Mechanisms (2)
• Action vector (a1, …, an) is “consistent with selfishness.”– ai maximizes ui(o, ti) vi(o, ti) + pi.
– Meaning of “maximize” depends on “solution concept,” e.g., NE, BNE, DSE, epNE, …
• Mechanism-design goal: o(a1, …, an) G(t1, …, tn)
• Classical economic-MD question: For a given solution concept, which design goals can be achieved?
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Solution Concepts (1)• (a1, …, an) is a Nash Equilibrium (NE) if
i and ai : ui(o(a1, …, ai, …, an), ti)
ui(o(a1, …, ai, …, an), ti)– Given other agents’ actions, agent i is best off playing
ai.
• (a1, …, an) is a Dominant-Strategy Equil. (DSE) if i, ai, and (a1, …, ai-1, ai+1, …, an):
ui(o(a1, …, ai, …, an), ti) ui(o(a1, …, ai, …, an), ti)– Regardless of other agents’ actions, agent i is best off
playing ai.
‘‘‘,
,
,
,
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• (s1, …, sn) is an ex-post Nash Equil. (epNE) if
i, si, and (t1, …, tn):
ui(o(s1(t1), …, si(ti), …, sn(tn)), ti)
ui(o(s1(t1), …, si (ti), …, sn(tn)), ti)
– Given that other agents follow the prescribed strategy, agent i is best off doing so, too, regardless of the other players’ types.
Solution Concepts (2)
,
,
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Algorithmic Mechanism Design [NR01]
• Required polynomial-time o( ) and p( ).
• Focused on strategyproof, direct-revelation mechanisms.
• Put forth polynomial-time, strategyproof LCP-routing MD as a good abstraction of Internet routing.
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P-Time VCG Mech. for LCP [NR01]
• •x y
ei
ej
Agent i edge ei
Type ti cost(ei)
Outcome o LCP from x to y (wrt reported costs)
0 if ei o
cost(o(Gi <- )) - cost(o(Gi <- o)) if ei o{pi(o)
G
vi(o) { 0 if ei o
-cost (ei) if ei o
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Moving Closer to Real IDR [FPSS02, SP04]
• Nodes (ASes), not edges, are the agents.
• All-source, LCP tree Td to each destination d.
• No trusted center; ASes compute the routes themselves.
• Use BGP as an algorithmic substrate to preserve “evolutionary fitness” and encourage adoption.
BGP-compatible VCG mechanism for LCP trees that is incentive-compatible in
epNE
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“Optimality” wrt LCP is too narrow.
• More generally, seek Td = {R1, …, Rn} that maximizes Σi vi(Ri).
• Fully general vi (routing policies)• Next-hop policies: For all i and j,
vi(ijk3…kmd) = vi(ijl3 …ltd)• Forbidden-set policies: For every
source i, there is a set Si of transit nodes such that vi(R1) > vi(R2) if R2 contains a node in Si but R1 doesn’t.
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Policy Consistency
. . .
. . . .
d
k i
IFvk(R1) ≥ vk(R2)
R2
R1
THENvi((i,k)R1) ≥ vi((i,k)R2)
Valuations are policy consistentiff, for all routes R1 and R2
(whose extensions arenot rejected),
(analogous toisotonicity [Sobrino])
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Requirements
Results References
Lowest-cost routes BGP-compatible VCG computation
FPSS02, SP04
Fully general routing policies
NP-hard even to approximate
FSS04
Next-hop routing policies
Centralized, ptime VCG computation. Not BGP compatible
FSS04
Forbidden-set routing policies
NP-hard even to approximate
FKMS05
Gao-Rexford + policy consistency
BGP is inc.-comp. in collusion-proof epNE w/o payments
FRS06, FSS07
Gao-Rexford + route verification
BGP is inc.-comp. in collusion-proof epNE without payments.
LSZ08
Linear utilities Uncapacitated links
BGP-compatible VCG computation
HNP07
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Open Problem 3: Equilibrium
Fully characterize the conditions under which epNE is reached simply by executing BGP.
• No dispute wheel plus policy consistency are sufficient but not known to be necessary.
• No complete characterization is known even if we ignore collusion and/or allow payments.
• Related to security problems in [LSZ08]
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Open Problem 4: Better Computational Models
• “Results without convergence” (Kearns 2006)
• No fixed instance: Policies, AS graph, and network conditions change during the computation.
• Develop measures of “network complexity” that deal successfully with these and other important features of networked computation.
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Open Problem 5: Better Economic Models
• Is epNE (or even “equilibrium”) the right “solution concept” for IDR?
• The role of money- Do without payments altogether?- Incorporate payment protocols?
• Mechanisms with partially known, dynamically changing strategy spaces
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Outline
• Theory of incentive-compatible IDR• What IDR has contributed to
ToNC• What IDR has not (yet?)
contributed to ToNC• More ToNC-agenda items
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Contributions
• Pushes the envelope on incentives in computation.
• Combines the relevant research areas (algorithms, networking, and economics) in a serious way.
• Helps explains why interdomain routing “works,” despite the “proofs” that BGP is “wrong.”
• Exemplifies “protocol-based algorithms design.”
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Unresolved Issues
• Computational modeling challenges, e.g.,- Results without convergence
- AS graphs, policies, and loads that change during the computation
• Is epNE (or even “equilibrium”) really a useful concept in networked computation?
• Are there any general techniques or insights here, or is IDR unique?
• Interaction with AS-graph formation
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Talk Outline
• Theory of incentive-compatible IDR• What IDR has contributed to ToNC• What IDR has not (yet?) contributed
to ToNC• More ToNC-agenda items
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Open Problem 6: Integrating Diverse
Theories• We’ve seen the influence of TCS, Game
Theory, Distributed Computing, Networking, Cryptography, Model Checking, …
• If we try to combine all of the formalism and assumptions of these diverse fields, we will NOT be able to prove (or even state) meaningful theorems.
For each networked-computational problem, figure out what you need to be precise about and what you can fudge or ignore.
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Open Problem 7: Go Beyond TCS-Style Theorems
• We will NEVER have a fixed IDR “instance.” So what do “BGP-convergence” theorems mean?
• NC problems that are provably hard for networking reasons (i.e., not because they’re NP-hard) are few and far between.
Develop a complexity theory of networked computation: Relevant computational resources, “results without convergence,” general algorithmic techniques, canonical hard problems and reductions, …
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Open Problem 8: How General is Protocol-based
Alg. Design?• “BGP-compatible” algorithmic mechanisms
can leverage the evolutionary fitness of today’s IDR framework and would be easier to deploy than algorithmic mechanisms designed from scratch.
• Are there other pieces of the computational infrastructure that can be used in this way? Candidates: Search, keyword auctions, …
Consider the use of widely deployed, successful protocols as “computational substrates” for novel network algorithms.
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Conclusions
• Good opportunity to do novel theoretical work that has practical impact
? IDR is fascinating, but unfortunately it may be unique.
• Multidisciplinarity is exciting but creates technical challenges.
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References
• “Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design,’’ by F., Schapira, and Shenker [A chapter in Algorithmic Game Theory, Nisan, Roughgarden, Tardos, Vazirani (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2007]
• “Theory of Networked Computing” webpage: http://www.cs.yale.edu/homes/jf/ToNC.html