1

Ward PageCPOF Program Manager

DARPA

Richard HayesPresident

Evidence Based Researchwww.ebrinc.com

William WrightPrincipal

InvestigatorDARPA CPOF

Visual Insights Inc.

By Permission

Command Post of the FutureLimited Objective Experiment - One (LOE-1)

Some Results

2

Most of the presentation materials herewere provided by Ward Page and Dick Hayes.

Acknowledgement

3

• Command Post of the Future

• Limited Objective Experiments

• Scenario Space

• Data Collection

• Significant Findings

• Summary

Overview

4

Command Post of TodayCommand Post of Today(What the services are developing)

4th Infantry Division

Ft. Hood, TX

Forward TAC

Division Advanced

WarfightingExperiment

Main TOC Planning Cell

5

Command Post of TodayCommand Post of TodayCurrent Limitations

• Characteristics– 60+ Workstations, 100+ people– People are flooded by individual data streams– Disjointed data systems; fragmented pictures of the battlefield– No portrayal of uncertainties, inconsistencies or unknowns– Requires too many people, too much communication

• Consequences– Disjointed systems can cause negative situational awareness– Increased time to comprehend significance on information– Incomplete, inaccurate understanding of the battlefield– Delayed decisions while waiting for more data, understanding

Mismatch between available data and Commander’s cognitive model.

Mismatch between available data and Commander’s cognitive model.

6

Command Post of the FutureCommand Post of the FutureOperational Impact

• Increased Operational Tempo– Faster recognition and better understanding of significant

battlefield changes

– Faster and more complete exploration of available courses of action

– More rapid and more accurate dissemination of commands

• Smaller, More Mobile Command Structures– Fewer staff members

– Smaller support trail & reduced deployment requirements

– More mobile, distributed command organizations

• Increased Span of Control

7

• Command Post of the Future (CPOF) is a DARPA program that aims to:

• Increase Speed and Quality of Command Decisions– Faster recognition and better understanding of changing battlefield situation– Faster and more complete exploration of available courses of action

• Provide More Effective Dissemination of Commands– COA capture for dissemination of commander’s intent– Status and capability feedback from deployed operators

• Enable Smaller, More Mobile and Agile Command Structures– More mobile, distributed command element– Smaller support tail & reduced deployment requirements

The goal of CPOF is to shorten the commander’s decision cycle to stay ahead of the adversary’s ability to react.

Command Post of the Future

8

CPOF Will Create Design Rules Enabling a New Interface Metaphor for C2 After Next

Visualization and Human-Visualization and Human-Computer InteractionComputer Interaction

From Other Programs:

Analysis Tools and Planning Aids;

Information Management;Networking and Comms

18”18”

“We Own The Last 18 Inches”

9

Command Post of the FutureCommand Post of the FutureTailored Visualizations

• Immediate Understanding– Match user’s cognitive model– Data => Information => Knowledge– Intuitive visual presentations

• Abstract as well as geospatial• Temporal as well as static

• Decision-Centered– Information tailored to decisions– Show decision-relevant details – Highlight relevant changes,

anomalies, exceptions– Uncover battlespace patterns– Portray uncertainties

• Tailored to User– Current echelon, task & situation– User’s functional role – User’s background & preferences

10

CPOFCPOFTechnologyTechnology

CPOFCPOFTechnologyTechnology

ControlControlConditionConditionControlControl

ConditionCondition

Known Situation

AsymmetricAsymmetric• Threat (IW or BIO)Threat (IW or BIO)• Chem/Bio attackChem/Bio attack• Info warfare attackInfo warfare attack

GuerrillaGuerrilla• Dispersed guerilla forceDispersed guerilla force• Threatened urban attackThreatened urban attack

HADRHADR• Urban disasterUrban disaster

Peace KeepingPeace Keeping• StabilityStability• Imminent attackImminent attack

SustainedSustainedEngagementEngagement• Opportunity to attackOpportunity to attack• Multiple avenues of attackMultiple avenues of attack• Random forcesRandom forces

Noise

PedigreePedigreeCompletenessCompletenessAccuracyAccuracyConsistencyConsistencyPerishabilityPerishability

xx

• CPOF Aces (8-15)CPOF Aces (8-15)• Battle Lab Students (40)Battle Lab Students (40)

UsersUsers

Decision PerformanceDecision Performance

TimeTime

Situation

Situation

Awareness

Awareness

S

M

L

C1 C2 T1 T2 T3

Trial MatrixTrial Matrix

Trial Conditions

Tim

eC

on

dit

ion

s

ExpertsStudents Core HypothesesCore Hypotheses

Improve Decision Speed & QualityImprove Decision Speed & Quality• H1: Improve Situation AwarenessH1: Improve Situation Awareness• H2: Improve COA GenerationH2: Improve COA Generation• H3: Improve COA SelectionH3: Improve COA Selection• H4: Improve COA CommunicationH4: Improve COA Communication

CPOF Experiments

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Hypothesis: • Tailored visualizations will improve Situation Awareness

MOE:• Correctness of Situation Awareness comprehension

• Quality of Pattern Recognition

• Greater Entity Retention

Limited Objective Experiment - 1(LOE -1)

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Force-on-ForceForce-on-Force

InsurgencyInsurgency

LOE-1 Scenario SpaceLOE-1 Scenario Space

Situation 13Situation 13Situation 10Situation 10

Situation 5Situation 5Situation 4Situation 4

Less Less ComplexComplex

More More ComplexComplex

13

F on FTreatment BBlobs, 3D

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Bn - enemy

Co - enemy

Pt - enemy

Bn - friend

Co - friend

Pt - friend

Legend

F on FTreatment AColor Coded

15Haiti Sit4B - 5 Critical Events

InsurgencyTreatment BTime-Space-Event View

16

Insurgent activity in Haiti by category and region

•Significant preparatory activity in Port-au-Prince •Military activity only in the North•Dormant South

CivilPreparatoryMilitary

InsurgencyTreatment ADrill Down

17

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

C-140C-133

C-126C-119

C-112C-105

C-98C-91

C-84C-77

C-70C-63

C-56C-49

C-42C-35

C-28C-21

C-14C-7

Current

Week

Nu

mb

er o

f in

cid

ents

Civil

Preparatory

Military

Insurgent activity in Haiti by week and category

•Increase in preparatory activity (last 9 weeks)•Decrease in civil activity•Low level military activity

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Preparatory incidents by week and type

•Very active recruiting•Increasing propaganda and logistics•Leadership activity throughout the period

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Week

Nu

mb

er o

f in

cid

ents

Recruiting

Leadership

Logistics

Arms shipment

Propaganda

Pre

par

ato

ry t

ype

C-140C-133

C-126C-119

C-112C-105

C-98C-91

C-84C-77

C-70C-63

C-56C-49

C-42C-35

C-28C-21

C-14C-7

Current

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• Visualization technologies generated better Situation Awareness– CPOF strongest in complex situations– CPOF strongest in force-on-force situations– CPOF strongest in understanding adversary’s situation

• Different Strengths Emerged from Alternative CPOF technologies– Treatment B strongest where force ratio is important in force-on-force

scenarios– Treatment A strongest in overall sketch scores in insurgency situations– Treatment A strongest in overall Situation Awareness scores in

insurgency situations

Significant Findings

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• Time Issues and Others– Some changes due to control scores getting worse rather than

CPOF scores greatly improving

– Time appeared to help in case where visualization technique introduced new concept

– Longer viewing time did not always result in higher scores

Significant Findings (cont.)

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Interpretation• CPOF Technologies generated:

– Better situation awareness (higher mean or x)– CPOF Technologies performance improves for prompted

CPOF Technologies SignificantlyOutperform Control in Overall

Scores

CPOF Technologies SignificantlyOutperform Control in Overall

Scores

Prompted

23.8923.89 25.6225.62

21.4121.41

33.8633.86

N=157 p=.007

Unprompted

22.3022.30 23.4023.40

17.77 17.77

25.8025.80

N=157 p=.058

ss

xx

ControlCPOF Technologies

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CPOF Technologies SignificantlyOutperform Control in Complex

Situations

CPOF Technologies SignificantlyOutperform Control in Complex

Situations

Interpretation• CPOF Technologies generated:

– Better situation awareness (higher mean or x) in complex situations

Unprompted Prompted

6.286.28 18.5318.53

3.953.95

17.2417.24

N=78 p=.000

8.858.85 18.2818.28

5.105.10

19.9619.96

N=78 p=.000

ss

x

ControlCPOF Technologies

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Unprompted

11.8711.87 16.9516.95

10.10 10.10

18.5518.55

N=78 p=.020

Prompted

19.3719.37 21.5121.51

16.7316.73

29.6929.69

N=78 p=.019

ss

xx

ControlCPOF Technologies

CPOF Technologies SignificantlyOutperformed Control inForce-on-force Situations

CPOF Technologies SignificantlyOutperformed Control inForce-on-force Situations

Interpretation• CPOF Technologies generated:

– Significantly better situation awareness than Control for both prompted and unprompted in Force-on-Force situations

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CPOF Treatments Vs.Control for Enemy Representation in

Insurgency

CPOF Treatments Vs.Control for Enemy Representation in

Insurgency

Treatment A Vs. Control

17.58 18.20

33.13

22.25

Treatment B Vs. Control

17.58 21.55

35.13

22.25

Control

Treatment A/B

Interpretation• Treatments A and B significantly outperformed control

in representing enemy force information

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Treatment B outperforms Treatment A in Overall Situation Awareness in

Situation 13

Treatment B outperforms Treatment A in Overall Situation Awareness in

Situation 13

15.93 15.00

22.93 22.93

12.2112.21

14.85 12.06

29.66

12.7112.71

ss

xx

Treatment BTreatment A

Interpretation• Treatment A used icon visualization scheme (color coded) that subjects stated was confusing.

Unprompted Prompted

N=29 p=.073 N=29 p=.002

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30.9330.93 24.8824.88

30.8330.83

N= 59 p=.05

45.4845.48

Differences between Treatments A & B

in Insurgency Situations

Differences between Treatments A & B

in Insurgency Situations

Overall Sketch Score Prompted Situational Awareness

s

x

Treatment BTreatment A

N=59 p=.07

Interpretation• In Insurgency Situations:

• Treatment A outperforms Treatment B in overall sketch score• Treatment A significantly outperforms Treatment B in prompted overall Situational Awareness

17.1317.13

72.272.200

16.2116.21

64.8764.87

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Situation 10

8%8%

Situation 13

23%23%

39%39%

20%20%

Situation 4 Situation 5

More Time is Not Always Better

More Time is Not Always Better

(Percent of instances where time did not help, when significant differences between times were found)

Interpretation• In less complex situations, more reversals in performance between times were found

(subjects performed worse when given 5 minutes when compared with 3 minutes) with force on force, situation 10, containing the highest percentage of instances.

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More Time Helped Only in More Complex SituationsMore Time Helped Only in More Complex Situations

Simple

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

1 3 5

Minutes

% C

orre

ct

Treatment A Treatment B Control

Complex

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

1 3 5

Minutes

% C

orre

ct

Treatment A Treatment B Control

29

Situation 4Situation 4

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

1 3 5

Minutes

% C

orre

ct

Treatment A Treatment B Control

30

Situation 5Situation 5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1 3 5

Minutes

% C

orre

ct

Treatment A Treatment B Control

31

Situation 10Situation 10

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

1 3 5

Minutes

% C

orre

ct

Treatment A Treatment B Control

32

Situation 13Situation 13

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1 3 5

Minutes

% C

orre

ct

Treatment A Treatment B Control

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• CPOF technologies appear to make a difference

• CPOF experimental approach captures the strengths and weaknesses

• CPOF technologies appear to improve subjects’ overall Situation Awareness when compared to traditional methods

• CPOF experimental approach captures strengths and weaknesses of each treatment

Summary