10-1-1971 aerial protection of mekong river convoys in cambodia

8/3/2019 10-1-1971 Aerial Protection of Mekong River Convoys in Cambodia

1/54

OFELASSIFIEI Iy AF/lOIIAW .IM H A i Df )IAIE "dillf I

APPggyIEg FIlIpUl"t RELEASE, PROJECT PI/ iiS

SOUTHEAST ASIAEDEDIIAERIAL PROTECTION OFMEKONG RIVER CONVOYSIN CAMBODIA

SPECIAL REPORT

20080910319_ _

K717.0414-23c.2. Are-bw


2/54

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704-0188

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response. including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources,gathering and maintaining the date needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regerding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collectionof Information, including suggestione for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations end Reports(0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of lew. no person shall besubject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display e currently valid OMB control number.PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.1. REPORT DATE (LID-MM-YYYY) 12. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED (From - Tol

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATIONREPORT NUMBERDepartment of the Air ForceHeadquarters Pacific Air Forces, CHECO DivisionHickam AFB, HI9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORTNUMBER(S)

12 . DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENTA -- Approved for Public Release

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14 . ABSTRACTProject CHECO was established in 1962 to document and analyze air operations in Southeast Asia. Over the years the meaning ofthe acronym changed several times to reflect the escalation of operations: Current Historical Evaluation of CounterinsurgencyOperations, Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations and Contemporary Historical Examination of CurrentOperations. Project CHECO and other U. S. Air Force Historical study programs provided the Air Force with timely and lastingcorporate insights into operational, conceptual an d doctrinal lessons from the war in SEA.

15. SUBJECT TERMSCHECO reports, Vietnam War, War in Southeast Asia, Vietnam War- Aerial Operations, American

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSONa. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE ABSTRACT OFPAGES 19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)

Standard Form 29 8 (Rev. 8/98)Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18


3/54

PROJ ECIJ~C ontemporaryHisoioExamination ofC urrent

AERIAL PROTECTION OF MEKONG RIVER CONVOYSINCAMBODIA

I OCTOBER 191HQ PACAF

Directorate of Operations AnalysisCHECO/CORONA HARVEST DIVISION

Prepared by.CAPT WILLIAM A. MITCHELLI Proiect CHECO 7th AF, DOAC

K717.0414-23


4/54

UNCLASSIFIEDDEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

HEADQUARTERS PACIFIC AIR FORCESAPO SAN FRANCISCO 96553

PROJECT CHECO REPORTS

The counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare environment ofSoutheast Asia has resulted in the employment of USAF airpower to meeta multitude of requirements. The varied applications of airpower haveinvolved the full spectrum of USAF aerospace vehicles, support equip-ment, and manpower. As a result, there has been an accumulation ofoperational data and experiences that, as a priority, must be collected,documented, and analyzed as to current and future impact upon USAF poli-cies, concepts, and doctrine.

Fortunately, the value of collecting and documenting our SEA expe-riences was recognized at an early date. In 1962, Hq USAF directedCINCPACAF to establish an activity that would be primarily responsive toAir Staff requirements and direction, and would provide timely and analyti-cal studies of USAF combat operations in SEA.

Project CHECO, an acronym fo r Contemporary Historical Examination ofCurrent Operations, was established to meet this Air Staff requirement.Managed by Hq PACAF, with elements at Hq 7AF and 7AF/13AF, Project CHECOprovides a scholarly, "on-going" historical examination, documentation,and reporting on USAF policies, concepts, and doctrine in PACOM. ThisCHECO report is part of the overall documentation and examination whichis being accomplished. It is an authentic source for an assessment ofthe effectiveness of USAF airpower in PACOM when used in proper context.The reader must view the study in relation to the events and circumstancesat the time of its preparation--recognizing that it was prepared on acontemporary basis which restricted perspective and that the author'sresearch was limited to records available within his local headquartersarea.

ERNEST C. HARIN, JR., Major General, USAFChief of Staf

ii

UNCLASSIFIED


5/54

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCEHEADQUARTERS PACIFIC AIR FORCES

APO SAN FRANCISCO 96553P EPLY TOAITNOF DOAD 1 October 1971

SUPIE" Project CHECO Report, "Aerial Protection of Mekong River Convoys inCambodia" (U)TO SEE DISTRIBUTION PAGE

1. Attached is a SECRET document. It shall be transported, stored,safeguarded, and accounted for in accordance with applicable securitydirectives. Each page is marked according to its contents. Retainor destroy in accordance with AFR 205-1. Do not return.2. This letter does not contain classified information and may bedeclassified if attachment is removed from it.FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

MIKE DELEON, Colonel, USAF I AtchChief, CHECO/CORONA HARVEST Division Proj CHECO Rprt (S),Directorate of Operations Analysis 1 Oct 71DCS/Operati ons

iii

quism-


6/54

UNCLASSIFIEDTABLE OF CONTENTS

1. SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE J. AFPDC(1) FDPW............ 1a. SAFAA ... ......... 1b. SAFLL ....... .. 1 k. AFRDc. SAFOI ........... ... 2 (1) AFRDP. ........... 1d. SAFUS . . . . . . . .1 2 AFRDQ .. .... . 13 AFRDQPC.... . . .2. HEADQUARTERS USAF (4 AFRDR ...... . . .1(5) FRDQL . . . . 1a. AFNB............. 1 1. AFSDCb. AFCCS (1) FSLP............ 11 AFCCSSA .......... 1 2 AFSME ............ 12) AFCVC . . . . . . . 1 (3) FSMS. .. .. .. ... 13 AFCAV ..........1 4 AFSSS. . . . . . . . .1(4) FCHO ....... 2 5 AFSTP............ 1

c. AFCSA m. AFTAC. .......... 1(1) F/SAG ...... .. 1(2) F/SAMI. .. . .1 n. AFXO ..............(1 AFXOB ........... 1d. AF/SAJ. . . . . . . .. 1 (2) FXOD. .. .. .. ... 13 AFXODC . . . ..... 1e. AFIGO (4) FXODD ..... . . .1(1 OSIIAP. ...... 3 5) FXODL ...... ... 1(2)GS . . . . . . .1 6 AFXOOG ........ 17 AFXOSL ..... . . . 1f. AFSG.......... 1 18 AFXOOSN........... 1(9) FXOOSO ....... 1g. AFINATC ... ........ 5 (10) AFXOOSS .......... 111 AFXOOSV........... 1h. AFAAC ... ........ 1 12 AFXOOTR ....... 1(1) FACMI. . . . . .. 1 13 AFXOOTW . . . . 114 AFXOOTZ. . . . . . . . 1i. AFODC 15 AF/XOX . . . . . . . . 6

S1 AFPRC ......... 1 AFXOXXG.E............I3AFPRM .. .. . .. I

iv

UNCLASSIFIED


7/54

UNCLASSIFIED3. MAJOR COMMAND b. SAC

a. TAC (1) HEADQUARTERS(a) DOX ... ........ I(1) HEADQUARTERS (b) XPX ... ........ 1

(a) O ............ 1 (c DM............ I(b) XP............ (d) IN .............(c)DOCC..... .....1 (e) N 1R.....(d)DREA. .. . .. . .HO.......1.(d) IN ........... 1 (2) AIR FORCES(2) AIR FORCES (a) 2AF(INCS) .. .....1(a) 12AF (b) 8AF(DOA). ..... 21. D0 .......... (c) 15AF(INCE)..... l2. IN ....... 1(b) T9AF(IN). ...... c. MAC(c) USAFSOF(DO) .... 1

(1) HEADQUARTERS(3) WINGS (a) DOI ........ 1(a) ISOW(DOI) ....... (b) O0 ... ........(b) 23TFW(DOI) ....... 1 (c CSEH.........(c) 27TRW(DOI) ......... 1 d MACOA ......... 1(d) 33TFW(DOI) ..... .. 1(e) 64TAW(DOI) ..... . 1 (2) MAC SERVICES(f) 67TRW(DOI).. ... 1 (a) AWS(HO) . ..... 1(g) 75TRW(DOI) .... . l. (b) ARRS(XP) ........ 1(h) 316TAW(DOX) . . . . 1 (c) ACGS(CGO) .......(i) 363TRW(DOI) . . . . 1(j) 464TFW(DOI) . . . . 1 d. ADC(k) 474TFW(DOI) . . . . 1(1) 479TFW(DOI) . . . . 1 (1) HEADQUARTERS(m) 516TAW(DOX) .. .. 1 a DO............ 1(n) 4403TFW(DOI). . o . 1 b DOT ... ........ 1(o) 58TAC FTR TNG WG. 1 c)XPC ... ........ 1(p) 354TFW(DOI) . . . 1(q) 0MAWG(DOOXI) . . . 1 (2) AIR DIVISIONS

(a) 25AD(DOI) ....... 1(4) TAC CENTERS, SCHOOLS (b) 23AD(DOI) ..... 1(c) 20AD(DOI)..... l(a) USAFTAWC(DRA) . . . 1(b) USAFTFWC(DRA) . . . 1 e. ATC

(c) USAFAGOS(EDA) . . . 1 (1) DOSPI ... ......... 1

UNCLASSIFIED


8/54

UNCLASSIFIEDf. AFLC j. PACAF

(1) EADQUARTERS (1) EADQUARTERS(a) OX ... ......... 1 (a) P.......... 1(b) IN . ....... 1

g. AFSC (c) P............ 2(d)CSH. .. .. ..... 1(1) EADQUARTERS (e DOAD........... 6(a) RP.. ............ 1 (f) C ............ 1(b) RLW ........... 1 (g) DM ............ 1(c) AMSO(XRS)........(d) DA ... ......... 1 (2) IR FORCES(e) SH ......... 1 (a) AF(f) SD(RWST). ...... 1 1. CSH..........W ESD(XR).):.. ...... 1 '. P .......... 1

RADC(DOTL) ....... 1 3. DO . . 1(i) DTC(CCN) ........ 1 (b) et 8, ASD(DOASD) . 1(ji ADTC(DLOSL) ....... 1 (c) AFk ESD(YW) ... ...... 1 1. O ... ....... 11 AFATL(DL) ........ 1 T. IN . ...... 13xP...........h. USAFSS' . DOCT ........ 1.DOAC ........ 2

(1) EADQUARTERS (d) 3AF(a) FSCC(SUR) ..... .. 2 1. CSH ......... 1Ce) 7/13AF(CHECO) ... 1(2) UBORDINATE UNITS

(a) ur Scty Rgn(OPD-P) . 1 (3) IR DIVISIONS(a) 13AD(DOI) .......i. USAFSO (b) 14AD(XOP). . . . . 2

(1) EADQUARTERS 1. IN ... ..... 1-(a) SH ........... ..1 (d) 34AD(DO) . .... 2

vi

UNCLASSIFIED


9/54

UNCLASSIFIED(4) INGS 4. SEPARATE OPERATING AGENCIES(a) TFW(DOEA). .. .. ... 1 a. ACIC(DOP).. .. .. ... 2(b) 6SOW(WHD). .. .. . ... b. AFRES(XP).. .. .. ... 2(c) 66TFW(DO). .. .. . .. 1 c. AU(d) 88TFW(DO). .. .. ... 1 1. ACSC-SA. ..... 1(e) 05TFW(DOEA). .. .. .. 1 ~ AUL(SE)-69-U8 .. . 2(f) 432TRW(DOI).. .. .. .. 1 3.ASI(ASD-1) .. .. ... 1(g) 83TAC ALFT WG. .. ... 1 4.ASI(HOA).. .. .... 2(h) 475TFW(DCO).. .. .... 1 d. ANALYTIC SERVICES, INC . 1(i) st Test Sq(A) .. .. .. 1 e. USAFA1. FH. .. ... . ... 1(5) THER UNITS T.AG(THAILAND) .. .. ...(a) ask Force ALPHA(IN) 1I-(b) 04TASG(DO).. .. .... 1(c)Air Force Advisory Gp. 1

k. USAFE(1) EADQUARTERS(a) OA. .. .. ........(b) OLO .. .. .... ... 1(c) 00. .. .. . ...... 1(d) DC. .. .. . ...... 1(2) IR FORCES(a) AF(DO) .. .. .. .... 2(b) 6AF(DO). .. ... ... 1(c) 7AF(IN). .. ... ... 1(3) INGS(a) 6TFW(DCOID). .. .... 1(b) OTFW (DOA). .. .. ... 1(c) OTFW (D0I). .. .. . .. 1(d) 0ITFW(DCOI). .. .. .. 1(e) 13TAW(DOI).. .. .....

vii

UNCLASSIFIED


10/54

UNCLASSIFIED5. MILITARY DEPARTMENTS, UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS, AND JOINT STAFFS

a. COMUSJAPAN ......... ......................... . .b. CINCPAC (SAG). .... ......................... 1c. CINCPAC (J301) ..... ......... .............. 1d. CINCPACFLT (Code 321) . ..... .................... . ..e. COMUSKOREA (ATTN: J-3). . . . 1

w0"T. COMUSMACTHAI ..................... 1g. cOMUSMACV (TSCO) . . . . . . . ... . . . .. ..h. COMUSTDC (J3)..................... . . . . 1i. USCINCEUR (ECJB) . . ........... 1j USCINCSO (J-31) . . . .k. CINCLANT (N31) .... .................1. CHIEF, NAVAL OPERATIONS:..................... 1m. COMMANDANT, MARINE CORPS (ABQ) ................n. CINCONAD (CHSV-M) . . . . ............ 1o. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (TAGO) . . . .. ....... 1p. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (J3RR&A) . . ........... 1q. JSTPS .... ........ ........r. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (OASD/SA) ...........s. CINCSTRIKE (STRJ-3) .... ................. 1t. CINCAL (HIST).. .... . . 1u. MAAG-CHINA/AF Section (MGAF-O). . . . 1v. HQ ALLIED FORCES NORTHERN EUROPE (U.S. DOCUMENTS OFFICE) ...w. USMACV (MACJ031) . . . . . . . . .

6. SCHOOLSa. Senior USAF Representative, National War College ...... ..b. Senior USAF Representative, Armed Forces Staff College .......c. Senior USAF Rep, Industrial College of the Armed Forces .. . 1d. Senior USAF Representative, Naval Amphibious School..........e. Senior USAF Rep, U.S. Marine Corps Education Center.......1f. Senior USAF Representative, U.S. Naval War College . . . o .g. Senior USAF Representative, U.S. Army War College. . ......h. Senior USAF Rep, U.S. Army C&G Staff College ............i. Senior USAF Representative, U.S. Army Infantry School.........j. Senior USAF Rep, U.S. Army JFK Center for Special Warfare. . 1k. Senior USAF Representative, U.S. Army Field Artillery School . 11. Senior USAF Representative, U.S. Liaison Office. ........... 1

7. SPECIALa. The RAND Corporation ............. . . .........b. U.S. Air Attache, Vientiane .................... 1

viii

UNCLASSIFIED


11/54

UNCLASSIFIED

A NOTE ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Captain William A. Mitchell is an Instructor in Geography at theUnited States Air Force Academy. He has served one tour in the Republicof Vietnam. Captain Mitchell has done extensive research in the MiddleEast and has published in the Professional Geographer, Journal of Ge"g-graphy, Middle East Journal, an the R Mountain Social Science Journal.

ix

UNCLASSIFIED


12/54

UNCLASSIFIEDTABLE OF CONTENTS

EaeFOREWORD .......................................................... xiiCHAPTER I - BACKGROUND ...................................... 1

Composition of Surface Security Forces ............ 2Air Support ....................................... 3CHAPTER II THE MEKONG RIVER CONVOY ROUTE ....................... 5CHAPTER III- ORGANIZATION OF AIR SUPPORT ......................... 6

USAF, USA, and USN Coverage C......... 6...6Centralized Control of Assets ..................... 8Rules of Engagement ............................... 8Transfer of AC-ll9Gs to the VNAF ................. 9Command, Control and Tactics ...................... 10

CHAPTER IV - EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR COVERAGE FOR MEKONG RIVERCONVOYS ............................................. 13An Analysis of Effectiveness ...................... 13

CHAPTER V - CONCLUSION ................................... 16APPENDIX

I. DATA ON ENEMY ATTACKS ON THE MEKONG RIVER CONVOYS ......... 18FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I ...................................................... 22CHAPTER II .................................................. .. 22CHAPTER III .................................................... 22CHAPTER IV .................................................. .. 23CHAPTER V ...................................................... 24

X

UNCLASSIFIED


13/54

FIGURES Follows Page1. POL Supplies in Phnom Penh, Cambodia on 7 January 1971 ...... 22. General Location Map of Mekong River Convoys from

Tan Chau to Phnom Penh ..................................... 53. Convoy Attacks on the Mekong: Tan Chau to Phnom Penh ....... 54. Mekong River Convoy with Vietnamese Navy Escort ............. 75. Mekong River Convoy Sailing Up-River to Phnn Penh .......... 76. USAF 0-2 .................................................... 77. USAF OV-l0 ................................. 78. USAF AC-119G over a Tributary of the Mekong ................. 79. U.S. Army Cobras Flying Cover for a Mekong Convoy ........... 7

10. U.S. Army LOHS Flying Cover for a Mekong Convoy ............. 711. U.S. Navy Sea Wolf on the Mekong ............................ 712. U.S. Navy Black Pony over the Mekong Delta ................. 713. VNAF AC-ll9Gs are Scheduled for a More Active Role .......... 1114. Hypothetical Daytime Convoy with Surface and Air Support .... 11

xi


14/54

FOREWORD

In early January 1971, the American Embassy in Phnom Penh expressedconsiderable concern over the critical petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL)shortages in the Khmer Republic (Cambodia) which had resulted from success-ful enemy attacks on commercial shipping vessels sailing the Mekong River_/inside Cambodia. These attacks, combined with the closure of landRoute 4 from the port city of Kompong Som, led to an agreement among theUnited States, the Khmer Republic and the Republic of Vietnam for protec-tion of Mekong River convoys from Tan Chau, Republic of Vietnam (RVN) to2/Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

This report reviews significant events leading up to the CombinedConvoy Security Plan and examines protective air coverage provided bythe Cambodian, RVN, and U.S. forces from January to September 1971.

xii


15/54

CHAPTER IBACKGROUND

The Combined Convoy Security Plan for Mekong River security wasdevised in response to an increasing number of effective enemy attackson merchant shipping on the Mekong between the Cambodian-Republic ofVietnam border and Phnom Penh. In response to these attacks, the Govern-ment of the Khmer Republic (GKR) established a military command entitledZone Special Mekong (ZSM) for insuring security along the Cambodian portion3/of the Mekong River. Concern over the grave situation was expressed on7 January 1971 by the American Embassy in Phnom Penh to the Secretary of4/State in Washington. The U.S. Embassy was specifically concerned aboutthe fact that from 26 November 1970 through 6 January 1971, there were eightattacks on civilian petroleum, oil, and lubricant tankers transiting theMekong between Phnom Penh and the Cambodian-RVN border. The Viet Congsuccess on the Mekong threatened to seal off the vital input of POL and5/military cargo into Cambodia.

POL supplies reached a critical point on 7 January 1971. (See Figure 1.)With only a few days reserve of most POL products, immediate replenishment6/was paramount. Under these conditions, to ensure that the Mekong Rivershipping channel remained open for POL and military cargo, and to preventisolation of Phnom Penh and large parts of Cambodia, the Combined MekongConvoy Security Plan was implemented on 12 January 1971. Basically, theplan called for air and surface protection to military and commercial


16/54

convoys proceeding from Tan Chau, RVN to Phnom Penh, Cambodia, along theMekong River.

TRAN HUNG DAO XVIII was the code name selected by the VietnameseNavy (VNN) to represent the combined naval operation of both VNN andthe Khmer Republic. The plan permitted tankers, barges, and merchantships to assemble at Tan Chau and form into convoys which sailed underthe command of the Vietnamese Convoy Operations Commander (COC). The7/COC was responsible for coordinating river, air, and bank defenses.

Composition of Surface Security ForcesThe composition of surface security forces for Mekong River convoys

varied with the convoy size. For a representative convoy of 10 ships,the VNN vessels were divided into three groups: Advance, Escort, andReaction. The Advance group composition included: four Mechanized Land-

ing Craft (LCM) which were modified for use as minesweepers; two RiverPatrol Boats (PBR) for escorting the Advance group; one Command andControl Boat (CCB) for the COC; one monitor boat (LCM converted into agunship) for heavy firepower; and three Amphibious Assault Patrol Boats(ASPB). These 11 VNN vessels were used to provide a minesweeping capabilityand a blocking unit. The blocking unit moved ahead of the commercialconvoy and faced the banks at likely ambush points. After the convoy hadpassed, they again moved ahead to assume another blocking or flankingposition.

The Escort group consisted of one Large Landing Support Ship (LSSL)used as the convoy flagship and four Fast Patrol Craft (PCF) for speed

2InMMW


17/54

POL SUPPLIES IN PHNOM PENH, CAMBODIA ON 7 JANUARY 1971

TYPE DAYS OF SUPPLIES ON HANDMOGAS 10Kerosene 0JP-l 3

.JP-4 31AVGAS 100/130 3AVGAS 115/145 30Gasoil 21Diesel 5Fuel Oil 0

SOURCE: (S) essage, American Embassy, Phnom Penh, toSecretary of State, 071310Z Jan 71, Subj: MekongAccess (U).

FIGURE 1


18/54

and maneuverability. Additionally, there were two PBRs assigned to eachcommercial vessel in he convoy. Thus, for a convoy of 10 ships, 20 PBRswould provide escort protection.

The Reaction group was composed of one CCB for the Deputy COC,two ASPBs, and five Armored Troop Carriers (ATC). These vessels carriedthe Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and Forces Armees NationaleKhmer (FANK) ground units which could be placed along the banks if needed.In addition to these reaction units, the ARVN units secured the riverbanks from Tan Chau to Neak Luong while the FANK units monitored the8/banks from Neak Luong to Phnom Penh.

A summation of VNN vessels involved in the above example illustratethat 46 vessels were used to ensure that 10 merchant vessels safely sailedthe Mekong River.

The Mekong River convoy designation procedures were a modificati6nof those used in WW I and WW II. Commercial convoys between Tan Chau andPhnom Penh were designated TP-1, TP-2, etc., while the return convoy fromg/Phnom Penh to Tan Chau simply had the letters reversed.

Air SupportAs originally conceived, air support was to be provided by the

Vietnamese, Cambodian, and United States Armed Forces. USAF and U.S.Army assets were specifically included, but in the basic plan no referenceswere made to U.S. Navy air assets. The Seventh Air Force (7AF) was tasked

3


19/54

with providing continuous air coverage for all convoys from the Cambodian--Republic of Vietnam border to Phnom Penh. The 7AF's role of providingcontinuous air coverage began on 17 January 1971.

In actuality, the Cambodians provided no air support while the RVNcontributed occasionally. It as possible that this role would changein the last month of 1971 or in early 1972. The concluding chapter dis-cusses future trends for the Mekong River air coverage.

4


20/54

lo-CHAPTER II

THE MEKONG RIVER CONVOY ROUTE

The enemy, with relatively free movement throughout the area, waswithin rocket and recoilless rifle range of all river traffic alongthe approximately 70 miles of meandering river between Tan Chau and PhnomPenh. Width along this portion of the river varies from 2,000 to 400meters--depending on the season--and permits access for ships from 6,000to 4,000 tons, accordingly. The Mekong River flow begins decreasing inNovember and reaches its lowest level in May. Terrain along the riveris flat to gently rolling and is covered by light vegetation in mostplaces. Primarily due to the lack of drainage, there are many swampsalong the river. Extensive rice fields were the predominant landscapefeature. (See Figure 2.)

In early January 1971, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) wasadvised that the Mekong River could be blocked along several areas inI_/the river, probably with the wreck of a single vessel. Evidentlyoperating with this same knowledge, the enemy chose for ambushes thosenarrow choke ...eviously identified by the DIA. (See Figure 3.)

5


21/54

UNCLASSIFIEDGENERAL LOCATION MAP OF MEKONG CONVOYSFROM TAN CHAU TO PHNOM PENH

"",j"" CAMBDA' ' - -, "

MBODIA/

~~PHNOM PENH "EK".-,.PNOo,PENN EAK REPUBLICWONGS OF,'.n VIETNAM

FIGURE 2

UNCLASSIFIED


22/54

CONVOY ATTACKS ON THE MEKONG*TAN CHAU TO PHNOM PENHPHNOMPENH

ATTACKSI.17 JAN 71NEKW G2. 17 JAN 71&. 186JAN 714, 19 JAN 71&~ B3JAN 716. 2JAN 717 23 JAN 71a. 25 JA N 719. 26 JAN 7110 . 29 JA N 7111 . 30 JA N 7112. 10 FIES71

14 . 10 071 10OMLES (APPROX)15. 22 Ml 71le . 22 FEIB711T. 16 MAR 71S.17 MAR 711.31 MAR 71Pn29APR 71S17 MAY 7117 JUN 71 4424 JUN 7123JUL 71 o25. 13AUG 71 c26. 22AUG 7127 3 SEP 7128. 12SEP 7129. 24SEP710

Figure 3


23/54

CHAPTER IIIORGANIZATION OF AIR SUPPORT

The Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam(COMUSMACV), tasked the Seventh Air Force to arrange for continuous aircoverage for convoys on the Mekong River from the Cambodian border toPhnom Penh, employing air assets as available and specifically directedthe use of Vietnamese, Cambodian, and 7AF tactical air forces. In addition,12/U.S. Army rotary wing aircraft were also obligated for river coverage.Because of nonavailability of Khmer air assets, their contribution to theconvoy security was primarily in ground operations. The Vietnamese AirForce (VNAF) contribution will be discussed later.

USAF, USA, and USN CoverageUnder the above guidelines, 7AF established that USAF Forward Air

Controller (FAC) OV-lOs and O-2As would provide continuous day and nightcoverage, respectively. Further, 7AF assets would be used to provide13/AC-119Gs for continuous day and night coverage. The U.S. Army assetstasked by 7AF for continuous day coverage were one Light Fire Team (LFT),normally consisting of one UH-lH Command and Communications helicopter(C&C); two OH-6A Light Observation helicopters (LOH-Scout); and two AH-lGs

(Cobra). An Army C&C was also assigned for continuous night coverage.Three LFTs were required to ensure that one was on continuous coverage.

In he formative stages of determining the most economical combinationL4Jof aircraft for adequate coverage, several mixes of aircraft were tried.

6


24/54

A team consisting of one USAF FAC and one gunship was tried first, then amore effective combination of several U.S. Army and USAF aircraft wasintroduced. The combination discussed in the preceding paragraph provedto be the most effective combination of air coverage and was used forthe majority of convoys.

It is now appropriate to discuss the evolution of the U.S. Navy'srole in air coverage. In February 1971, the U.S. Navy was requested toprovide UH-l helicopters (Sea Wolves) for night alert. Thus, the initialcoverage included an active role for the USAF and U.S. Army while the U.S.Navy air assets were on standby alert.

Only three days after the Combined Convoy Security Plan was directedby COMUSMACV, the U.S. Navy requested an active role in providing air15/coverage when USAF and VNAF assets were not available. Seventh AirForce claimed sufficient air assets were available and declined the

16 /assistance of the Navy.Approximately three weeks later, 7AF air resources were being severely

strained because of its assigned task to also provide air cover for allroad convoys in Cambodia. This necessitated a request to COMUSMACVon 9 February 1971 for U.S. Navy rotary and fixed wing tactical air sup-17/port for the Mekong convoy coverage. Approval for employment of U.S.Navy rotary wing (UH-lB) and heavily armed fixed wing light attack aircraft(OV-1O Black Pony) in support of the convoys was received on 28 February18/1971.

7


25/54

Mekong River Convoywith Vietnamese Navy Escort

FIGURE 4


26/54

Mekong River Convoy Sailing VUp-River to Phnom Penh

FIGURE 5


27/54

UNCLASSIFIED

USAF 02FIGURE 6

USAF FACs Provided Continuous Air CoverageFIGURE 7

UNCLASSIFIED


28/54

UNCLASSIFIED

USAF C-119G over Tributary of the Mekong River

FIGURE 8

UNCLASSIFIED


29/54

UNCLASSIFIED

U.S. Army Cobras FlyingCover for a Mekong Convoy

FIGURE 9

UNCLASSIFIED


30/54

US Army LOHs flying along the riverbank covering for a Mekong convoy


31/54

UNCLASSIFIED

U.S.NalfheknveFIUR 1UNCLASS IF IED


32/54

UNCLASSIFIED

-IL

U.S. Navy Black Pony over the Mekong DeltaFIGURE 12UNCLASSIFIED


33/54

Centralized Control of Air AssetsCentralized control of air coverage for Mekong River convoys was

provided by 7AF Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations. The Special OperationsDivision (DOXS) and Fighter Division (DOXF) received air coverage requestsapproximately 48 to 24 hours in advance of convoy movements, in messagesfrom the Combined Task Force 218 (CTF 218). Fragmentary (frag) orderswere then issued by DOXS directing air support assignments for U.S. AmyLFTs and USAF gunships. USAF FACs were notified about pending convoysby CTF 218; however, DOXF accomplished their frag orders. Similarly,the VNAF assets were identified by VNAF frag orders which were latercoordinated with DOXS. Support for unannounced convoys was to be

19/diverted from 7AF air assets which had -been originally fragged to Cambodia.Rules of Engagement

In January 1971, the rules of engagement permitted gunships, FACs orfighter aircraft controlled by FACs to return fire for the purpose ofprotecting convoys. Initially, when the convoy was under attack, air toground fire was approved by the surface commander (COC) and FANK liaisonofficer (both were aboard the COC command ship) without specific approvalof the 7AF Tactical Air Control Center. In cases where no radiocommunications between aircraft and the COC was possible, gunships and FACswere permitted to expend to break contact; however, the origin of fire musthave been unquestionably pinpointed. Subsequently, the authority to validatetargets for air strikes was withdrawn from the FANK liaison officer and COC.This authority was then vested in the FANK liaison officer aboard an airborne

8


34/54

21/tactical air control center and in the TACC at 7AF.

Even further control was established on 27 March 1971. As a result ofincreased friendly ground forces along the banks of the Mekong, the entireroute from Tan Chau to Phnom Penh was declared a "no-fire" zone. No air22/to ground firing was allowed unless it as cleared by TACC.

As expected, the enemy took advantage of the allied "no-fire" zoneprovisions. For example, on Convoy TP-17, B-40 launchers seemed to bein three groups of two each, along and within the settlements on theriver banks. U.S. Navy Sea Wolves observed the second and third attacksfrom directly overhead and claimed to have the source of fire pinpointed.They claimed to be in a position to accurately return the fire, but theAir Mission Commander in he C&C helicopter could not recommend clearancebecause the Cambodian Liaison Officer in he C&C could not accuratelydetermine where the civilians were. Thus, the FAC and Light Fire Teamswere not used. It is interesting to note that an ARVN company commanderwas in the area 30 minutes prior to the attack and had announced the areawas "all quiet."Transfer of AC-119Gs to the VNAF

A possible void in air coverage was suggested by the 7AF on 18 August24/1971. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, 7AF, was concerned over

the transfer of AC-119Gs to the VNAF scheduled for 10 September and suggestedthat the U.S. Navy Sea Wolves would be needed for a more active role. TheSea Wolves had been participating from an alert posture, while the Black

9


35/54

Ponies were seldom tasked. The question was whether the VNAF would beable to provide gunship coverage, during the transition, although they

had signed a letter of agreement to provide one AC-47 from Binh Thuy for25/three hours of night coverage.

To prevent any possible void in air coverage, COMUSMACV directedon 28 August 1971 that U.S. Navy OV-lOs would be fragged and placed onalert for immediate scramble.2-6 In the same directive, an additionalfive USAF aircrews were provided to ensure that five VNAF AC-119G sortieswere flown daily (five in Cambodia--three of these-were tasked in sup-port of the convoys) until the VNAF capability was adequate to assumecontinuous night coverage.

The VNAF representatives on the Mekong River Tripartite Study Grouphad stated their desire to provide AC-119 and AC-47 convoy coverage.

Since their desires were verbal, COMUSMACV directed that a continuingeffort be made to finalize the agreements.

Command, Control, and TacticsTo illustrate the complexity and intricacy of actually expending air

assets in support of Mekong convoys, it is best to look at a hypotheticalexample. One should realize that there were numerous variables affectingair coverage, and the following explanation could have been modified depend-ing on severity of attack, location of the enemy, etc.

When a convoy came under attack, the COC may have requested airsupport to suppress the enemy fire. If so, the COC contacted the C&C

10


36/54

which, in urn, relayed the request to the FAC or Airborne BattlefieldCommand and Control Center (ABCCC). The FAC or ABCCC contacted the TACC

and requested clearance to fire.Upon receiving the request for permission to expend, TACC carefully

reviewed the attack area for cultural centers, populated settlements, etc.If it appeared to be a clear area, the TACC contacted the 7AF FANK LiaisonOfficer who either granted or denied permission to expend. The seniorduty officer in TACC then made the final decision.

Once TACC approval was granted (assuming the FANK Liaison had agreedto expend), the FAC or ABCCC was contacted by TACC and granted clearanceto expend. The FAC or ABCCC then relayed the clearance to the C&C. Ifthe C&C still desired to expend, it directed the FANK and ARVN ground unitsto identify their unit locations.

At the first sign of enemy fire, the LOHs had cleared the area.The C&C flew off to about 1000 meters and circled the "hot" area. Thelead Cobra attacked and pulled off about 900 to 1,200 feet above thetarget. The "cover" Cobra followed closely behind, expended, and pulledup about 1,500 to 2,000 feet above the target.

The FAC and C&C observed and monitored the entire operation. If morefirepower was needed, the AC-119G, Sea Wolf or Black Pony were used. FACsdirected and monitored the additional tactical assets, in addition to mark-ing targets.

11


37/54

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED


38/54

VI Nq-

_u) Cz\C1 m

S-41

.- C

'4

\ -.zoo.oI .

rz!,,; ,, I' .rnk \

> , , -

: ,'031AISS,,OINn


39/54

USAF AC-119Gs, flying at an elevation of approximately 3,500 feet,circled over the convoys in a large elliptical orbit, day and night, forthe duration of the transit. Their heavy fire capability provided by the7.62mm mini-guns, combined with their extended fuel range of six andone-half hours, made them ideally suited for convoy escorting.

12


40/54

CHAPTER IVEFFECTIVENESS OF AIR COVERAGE FOR MEKONG RIVER CONVOYS

The original objective of the Mekong River convoy operation was toensure that POL and military cargo vessels continued transportingcritically required supplies into Phnom Penh. Surface arteries, in-cluding both rail lines and roads, were not sufficiently secured. Route 4remained only marginally open and even when open its contribution wasminimal since each Mekong River convoy consistently carried 10 times asmuch POL as a regular 30 truck convoy. Nevertheless, air support wasoccasionally requested for road convoys. Air support for rail and roadconvoys is explained in a CHECO report covering Air Operations inCanodia. Requests were infrequent.

POL consumption in Phnom Penh was approximately 20,000 tons per monthprior to the closing of Route 4. By February 1971, consumption had droppedto 5,000 tons. With the uninterrupted arrival of Mekong River convoys,by July 1971, approximately 25,000 tons of POL products were shipped intothe capital city each month.3_L/

An Analysis of EffectivenessThe effectiveness of air coverage for the Mekong River convoys can

not be quantitatively measured with available data, but a perusal ofAppendix I reveals significant data for an overall summary. At the endof September 1971, 32 convoys had attempted the round trip from Tan Chauto Phnom Penh. This exposed approximately 640 vessels (commercial tankers,

13


41/54

tugs, and barges) to enemy fire, since each convoy averaged a minimum of10 commercial vessels. Even though there were 29 separate enemy attackson the convoys, and 21 ships received some degree of damage, only fourvessels were moderately to heavily damaged. Only convoy TP-12 wassignificantly delayed by enemy action, but it reached its destination--without damage--16 hours late. The convoy was halted while air strikescleared an ambush point.

Complete data for identifying air strikes in direct support of allconvoys is not available, but records do reveal that U.S. Army gunshipsexpended 14 times on the enemy; USAF gunships expended a minimum ofseven times; and Navy Sea Wolves and/or Black Ponies expended tjo times.

Convoys gradually expanded, and on 5 July TP-25 carried an unpre-cedented 2 1/2 million gallons of POL. This particular convoy consisted3/of 17 vessels, including tugs, barges, and tankers.

Obviously, continuous air coverage required a large number of sorties.For example, TP/PT-27 against which no enemy action was initiated, required71 sorties to be flown. As of 2 August 1971, 76 sorties were requiredfor each convoy with an average sailing time of 26 hours.-

Success of the first mission was recognized on 18 January 1971, whenVice Admiral King, Commander, Naval Forces, Vietnam, sent the following36/message to 7AF and others praising the contribution of air coverage.

14


42/54

Yesterday 's successful Mekong River convoy (TP-1,17 January) operation provides amp e evidence ofbenefits attainable from intereervice and alliedcooperation, and will provide an example of futuresuch operations. The air coverage provided theconvoy left nothing to be desired. Please extendmy congratulations to aZ concerned.

A few months later, on 24 April, Commodore Phu, VNN Convoy OperationsCommander, continued to praise the air coverage, particularly with hiscomment that no major attacks had been attempted since approximately1 April. He attributed this to the high degree of cooperation and planning

3Z/between the U.S. and Vietnamese forces.The most recent recognition of air coverage to the success of the

Mekong River convoys was on 18 August when the Tripartite Deputies Groupacknowledged that "air coverage had been a key factor in the security of38/convoy operations."

15


43/54

CHAPTER VCONCLUSION

The Mekong River convoy operation originated as a short term programto ensure the continuing arrival of POL and general supplies into theKhmer capital city. It as extended for two more months as of 1 May* 39/1971. On 24 June 1971, the Chief, Vietnamese Joint General Staff,issued instructions to again extend the convoy coverage until 31 August1971. / A meeting of the Tripartite Deputies Study Group met again on16 August.1971 and agreed to continue coverage until 1 November 1971.In all probability, commitments then existing would extend well into 1972.

A primary objective was the turn-over of operational control of MekongRiver convoys to the Khmer Republic's navy at the earliest date. TheGovernment of the Khmer Republic (GKR) voiced its intentions of assumingcommand of all Mekong River operations effective 1 September 1971.Intelligence estimates had predicted that elements of the 96th NVA, 211thViet Cong Artillery Regiment, and the 88th NVA'Regiment would continue tooperate in the Mekong area probably for the purpose of disrupting friendlyshipping. This high threat to shipping coupled with the inability toperform air support coordination functions--which had been a criticalfactor in successful convoy operations--required COMUSMACV on 22 August1971 to advise the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC) thatFANK was not capable of providing adequate security to Mekong River convoysat that time. 4The Tripartite Deputies Study Group on 16 August 1971 alsorecommended deferral of Khmer assumption of the Mekong River convoy security.

16


44/54

Reduction in U.S. air assets, particularly with the transfer ofAC-119Gs to the VNAF on 10 September 1971, required a more activerole by the VNAF and Khmer Air Force. The basic change was the transferof AC-119Gs night coverage to the VNAF (VNAF AC-47s were occasionallyavailable for gunship coverage, but documentation on sorties flown indirect support of the Mekong operation was not available). The KhmerAir Force FACs and Khmer tactical fighters were expected at some future

46 /date to provide air coverage. Plans called for the Khmer Air Forceto assume night coverage when they reach their full complement of eightAC-47s for FY 1972, scheduled for June 1972. The Khmer AC-47 force isscheduled to grow to 11 in Y 1973 and reach its maximum of 12 aircraft47/in Y 1974.

The Combined Convoy Security Plan had tested USAF ability to over-come complex communications and coordination problems. Through "trialand error," a sophisticated communications system between the FANK, ARVN,VNAF, and U.S. Forces had become operationally effective.

Considering the critical shortage of POL in Phnom Penh when theair coverage began, and the fact that only one tug and one barge weredestroyed out of the approximately 640 commercial vessels that attemptedthe round trip to and from Phnom Penh, there can be no doubt that themission was successfully accomplished. To insure the success of themission, over 2,240 sorties were flown in direct support of the convoys.Out of this number, strike aircraft expended 23 times.

17


45/54

0

0 0 r00 SI 1-444

0000 I I S0.0. y-4 r

pa to I Sz I Iz.0

S~ I SI 14 0to bo IO oo CI 100 00- 00r 0 104U) 00ca

I 0 0 0 9 0 10 01

00 4)~zo v4 00z z 0"

I0Lin0 5044 5 10 0 rtn4 0M 40I 4S'4 S(D 00 10 0

u I~. toS 1 400 CCI04 0~ 4)41-in lo P, 41 41 g31 0.0

0 I2! I C. g I LM I W1 0 044 144ca

bo z M0 4 %or 4 Mr. O -1 S .14 c 00Z ~04)404 0 0 0 Md 003

H NC '0k 04~ S-a 0r4' I 005j r cn1-4- LM 1-4 01J g 4 -A g44 r.zt cAr~ 0n 50dI OD U4 80 I1 Sf I "40-v C 4 0 u-4d ua-4 i-N

E-4r 0 w-4 r4 4 4 -4 u-4 044I C,H0c: CI -0 -0V-0 -444 z 4 S4 *40

0 r r-4 r-4 r-I r- r4 I* 00 04 0S- S- I- cc

cn I %D I %4Cs.4 cn,( . 4 Ln 0)

IISn SINM


46/54

Go w 0 :I3~C6 1 4- I II I-r)4 ) r )a 4 -v 40 1 bo x bo .xox 1"4 1 1 6 1 c * "

I Pr 444 rE- 44~J~I- < 1co

0 U

-14 Atl*C/ U X* 0 0 # *. 1

z z It I~'0Go x 0 S I ',I

z 1(0 b v> AZI I I I boM J cc. . aV 91E-4~~ ~~ ~ ci IsI4 14

>w oz o I vIC"jco z 00 *0

0 ON -.4

Lr) 00Ir-44 0) I

I L I o 144oXI-4-0 r o 9wI .0o I

oL C"4f J 4100nNt4J004 r n041r r- po-0 I I n c

0Z -4 11-I 0 w..0I0C

Ln1 'n C4 4)0 -1* 0 o w.- CV P- r-I A S-)c

-4 -C)- C) 114 1-4 I 104~~r r- s 8C-400 D0m0% 00P

a C8a0 Ln 0 Ln 0 a4n "1- 4*40 4C I 0I en %I I

E- 0 %D C) Ln40 %0 C15-4 -4 fI I 4 - 0z 10 -

194


47/54

*~ ~ 10i~S&a Ia) 4 r(a3 co a 9~~4)~I ca4 I(~ I~ ra Ic o I I V)0 . 1

I* -O I r*4X * 4aI 1 ) 11 0 a a I I 4 1-1

"i ~ V-4

0~~1 4* .dr 4) a)vU)a50I.4 r4C,

4). 4 114j 141 o 1a.)

0 0to 30 ()a cc 4j 0

rw 0 41p4

0 4)u3 j1 : :1 aa- av s ~0 1.4 >4

44 04j*~4 r04 ~ ~~ 04L04 4)

I0 z% 0 1 1"4 # r4 " 00- 1w - 'A Ie acc- I44ja m a1 41 1g S 1 a1 a

Saa4 E *a4 -E>aE4.ta1414 1C) I 0 1 ,4201


48/54

a4 aJ 4J

.,- I Ii "X ,-4 w..-. a I ra 1 0 D

4JICL I 04 1 M 4J1

W I-4d0 0 I rX0

Cd wH 'oE-4

>--- 1w a c w 14 Cw

-A 0 a- - 0 o

U S I 60 0 S 0 60Z Z

,.111 1 -4 c-z I -

g I 6-6 I I

1- . o4 C) C-) -

x I I I I I -I I

1-4 a q cw 6w I PCI w

P41

z bJ 0co Il b

I- Zd 1 '0 1 0 1 '0'0 *,- 0 0 to0 l 0w- *4 *a ~ r I 4ofz to C I EA I E C IlC 6 IE-- 'I I C I II

-- w 6 U0 1H~~~ I oI

Zv I S II I a,I C, -SZ I I I~ I I I IaJI I '-04-4 P4 0L 04I~~ H6

21CO ~


49/54

UNCLASSIFIEDFOOTNOTESCHAPTER I

1. (S) Message, American Embassy Phnom Penh to Secretary of State,Washington, Subj: Mekong Access (U), 071310Z Jan 71. (Citedas: Am Emb 071310Z Jan 71, Msg.)

2. (S) Message, COMUSMACV/CMDR JGS, RVNAF to Cdr 7AF et. al., Subj:Combined Convoy Security Plan (U), 121158Z Jan-'7.-(Cited as:Basic Plan 121158Z Jan 71.)

3. (S) Basic Plan 121158Z Jan 71.4. (S) Am Emb 071310Z Jan 71.5. (S) Basic Plan 121158Z Jan 71.6. (S) Am Emb 071310Z Jan 71.7. (S) Basic Plan 121158Z Jan 71.8. (S) Message, COMUSMACV to JCS, Subj: MNK Relief of VNN of MekongRiver Convoys (U), 221040Z Aug 71. (Cited as COMUSMACV 221040ZAug 71, Msg.)9. (C) USNAVFORV Monthly Intelligence Summary, May 1971, pp. 63-67.(Cited as USNAVFORV MIS MAY 71.)

CHAPTER II10. (S) Ltr, 7AF (INOXC) to 7AF (DOPS), Subj: Area Assessment (U),9 Jan 1971.11. (S) Message, USDAO/Phnom Penh to DIA, Subj: Navigation on Mekong (U),120415Z Jan 71. (Cited as: USDAO 120415Z Jan 71, Msg.)

CHAPTER III12. (S) Basic Plan 121158Z Jan 71.13. (S) Message, 7AF (TACC) to various air units, Subj: Air OperationsCambodia (U), 120800Z Jan 71.14. (S) Message, CTF 218, Subj: Mekong Convoy Number 7 Air Request (U),191145Z Feb 71.

22

UNCLASSIFIED


50/54

UNCLASSIFIED15. (S) Message, COMUSNAVFORV to COMUSMACV, Subj: Employment of USNGunships in Cambodia (U), 152250Z Jan 71.16. (S) Message, 7AF (DO) to COMUSMACV, Subj: Air Support for CombinedConvoy Security Operations (U), 170930Z Jan 71.17. (S) Message, 7AF to COMUSMACV, Subj: Employment of U.S. NavyAircraft (U), 090545Z Feb 71.18. (S) Message, CTF 218 to 7AF, Subj: Mekong River Air Cover Assets (U),280200Z Feb 71.19. (S) Message, 7AF to various air units, Subj: Convoy Escort (U),171105Z Jan 71. (Cited as: 7AF 171105Z Jan 71, Msg.)20. (S) Ibid.21. (S) Message, 7AF to COMUSMACV, Subj: Mekong River Security Operations(U), 131030Z May 71. (Cited as: 7AF 131030Z May 71, Msg.)22. (S) Message, CTF 218 to 7AF, Subj: Mekong River No Fire Zone (U),270715Z Mar 71.23. (S) Message, CTG 116.15/SA CTF 218 to Dep Cmdr THO, Subj: MekongConvoy No. 17 (U), 021033Z May 71.24. (S) Message, 7AF to COMUSMACV, Subj: Air Cover for Mekong River

Convoys (U), 181130Z Aug 71.25. (S) Ibid.26. (S) Message, COMUSMACV to 7AF, Subj: Air Cover for Mekong RiverConvoys (U), 281052Z Aug 71.27. (S) Ibid.

CHAPTER IV28. (C) USNAVFORV MIS May 71, p. 63.29. (S) Msg, COMUSMACV to Am Emb Phnom Penh, Subj: HGCFR4C (S), 111128ZMay 71. Road convoys are discussed in the CHECO Rpt on AirOps in Cambodia.

23

UNCLASSIFIED


51/54

UNCLASSIFIED30. (C) USNAVFORV Monthly Intelligence Summary, Feb 1971, pp. 43-44.31. (S) Message, 7AF to AAG7910, Subj: 7AF Cambodia Intelligence Brief-

ing (U), 020531Z Jul 71.32. (C) These statistics are based on the NAVFORV Monthly IntelligenceSummaries for Jan, Feb, May, and Jul and informal logs maintainedin 7AF (DOXS).33. (C) USNAVFORV Monthly Intelligence Summary, Jul 71, p. 42.34. (S) Message, CTF 218, Subj: Mekong TP/PT-27 Summary Report (U),261430Z Jul 71.35. (S) Report, JGS/RVNAF, Research of Firepower Support to the InlandWater Transport Group of Mekong Special Zone, 2 Aug 71.36. (S) Message, COMNAVFORV to 7AF, Subj: Convoy Operations (U), 181525ZJan 71.37. (C) Message, CTF 218 to 7AF, Subj: Mekong River Convoys (U), 240805ZApr 71.38. (S) Report of Tripartite Deputies Study Group for Mekong RiverSecurity, 18 Aug 1971, p. 5. (Cited as: Rprt of TDS, 18 Aug 71.)

CHAPTER V39. (C) USNAVFORV MIS May 71, p. 63.40. (S) Message, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, Subj: Protection of RiverConvoys to Phnom Penh (U), 301139Z Jun 71.41. (S) Rprt of TDS, 18 Aug 71, p. 6.42. (S) Message, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, Subj: MNK Relief of GVN on MekongRiver Convoys (U), 072313Z Aug 71.43. (S) Rprt of TDS, 18 Aug 71, p. 1.44. (S) Message, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, Subj: MNK Relief of VNN ofMekong River Convoys (U), 221040Z Aug 71.

24

UNCLASSIFIED


52/54

UNCLASSIFIED45. (S) Rprt of TDS, 18 Aug 71, p. 6.46. (S) Message, American Embassy Phnom Penh to CINCPAC, Subj: MNKRelief of VNN Mekong River Convoys (U), 141400Z Aug 71.47. (S) Rprt of TDS, 18 Aug 71, p. 7; and(S) PACAF XPXS Ltr, Subj: Project CHECO Report "Aerial Protection

of Mekong Convoys in Cambodia," 10 Dec 71;(S) Plan, Subj: Military Assistance Plan Cambodia, dated 1 Sep 71,p. 18.

25

UNCLASSIFIED


53/54

UNCLASSIFIEDGLOSSARY

ABCCC Airborne Battlefield Command and Control CenterARVN Army of the Republic of VietnamASPB Amphibious Assault Patrol BoatATC Armored Troop CarrierBLACK PONY A heavily armed U.S. Navy OV-lO used on Mekong River convoysfor tactical air support.C&C Command and Communications helicopterCCB Command and Control BoatCOC Convoy Operations Commander for Mekong convoysCOMUSMACV Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, VietnamCMRSP Combined Mekong River Security PlanCTF 218 Combined Task Force 218 operated out of the Mekong DeltaDIA Defense Intelligence AgencyDOXF Fighter Division, Dir of Ops Plans, Dep Chief of Staff,Operations, Seventh Air ForceDOXS Special Operations Div, Dir of Ops Plans, Dep Chief ofStaff, Seventh Air ForceFAC Forward Air ControllerFANK Forces Armees Nationale Khmer (Cambodia)Frag Fragmentary ordersGKR Government of the Khmer RepublicGOC Government of CambodiaLCM Landing Craft, MechanizedLFT Light Fire Team, consisting of 1 C&C Helo, 2 Cobras and2 ScoutsLSSL Support Landing Ship, LargePBR Patrol Boat, RiverPCF Patrol Craft, FastPOL Petroleum, Oil, and LubricantsRVN Republic of VietnamSEA WOLF Heavily armed UH-1 helicopters, used by the U.S. Navy insupport of Mekong convoys.

26

UNCLASSIFIED


54/54

7

UNCLASSIFIEDTACC Tactical Air Control CenterTDSG Tripartite Deputies Study Group for Mekong convoysTRAN HUNG Vietnamese code name assigned to naval operations for theDAD XVIII convoys.VNAF Vietnamese Air ForceVNN Vietnamese NavyZSM Zone Special Mekong was a Cambodian operation for MekongSecurity.

10-1-1971 aerial protection of mekong river convoys in cambodia

Documents