(11) 2011 nlrc rules of procedure.docx

7/25/2019 (11) 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure.docx

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TOPIC 11: NLRC RULES OF PROCEDURE

MINDANAO TIMES CORP. VS. CONFESSOR;G.R. No. 183417; Februr! "# $%1$

F&'(:Mitchel Confesor (respondent) was employed by petitioner in 1998, publisher of anewspaper of general circulation in Mindanao and Davao City !e becamepetitioner"s #ssociate $ditor in si% months

&espondent resigned 'une * +n #ugust *, he led a veried complaintbefore the -abor #rbiter for payment of separation pay and pro.rated 1* thmonthpay for * !e later amended his complaint from one of money claims to illegaldismissal, averring that petitioner"s /resident forced him to resign after hepublished articles which appeared in petitioner"s newspaper accusing politicalgures of being involved in some anomalies0 and that he did resign as he was toldthat he would be entitled to separation pay and other benets, but that the

promised benets were not forthcoming, hence, his ling of the complaint

he -abor #rbiter nds that respondent was constructively dismissed 2oth partiesappealed to the 3-&C /etitioner, on the other hand, 4uestioned the -abor #rbiter"snding of constructive dismissal 5n compliance with the appeal bond re4uirement,petitioner deposited the amount of /61,9966 with 7C/2 and surrendered to the3-&C the passboo covering the deposit, along with a Deed of #ssignment

he 3-&C reversed the ruling of the -abor #rbiter and dismissed respondent"scomplaint, holding that there was no constructive dismissal since respondenteectively resigned from his employment 3-&C also held that the ban depositcomplied with the appeal bond re4uirement and is a substantial compliance with

:ec ;, &ule ; of the 3-&C &ules of /rocedure

he Court of #ppeals, to which respondent assailed the 3-&C resolution via petitionfor certiorari, dismissed said petition +n respondent"s Motion for &econsideration,C# set aside the 3-&C &esolution and reinstated the -abor #rbiter"s Decision whichit declared to have become nal and e%ecutory 5t held that the ban deposit ofpetitioner failed to substantially comply with the appeal bond re4uirement, notingthat its Deed of #ssignment


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)e*+:he petition is bereft of merit #rticle * of the -abor Code provides that an appealby the employer to the 3-&C from a >udgment of a labor arbiter which involves amonetary award may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or suretybond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the 3-&C, in anamount e4uivalent to the monetary award in the >udgment appealed from udgment in their favor upon the dismissal of the employer"sappeal 5t is intended to discourage employers from using an appeal to delay or


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evade their obligation to satisfy their employees" >ust and lawful claims


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% % % !ence, even if the order of reinstatement of the -abor #rbiter isreversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstateand pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appealuntil reversal by the higher court +n the other hand, if the employee hasbeen reinstated during the appeal period and such reinstatement order isreversed with nality, the employee is not re4uired to reimburse whatever

salary he received for he is entitled to such, more so if he actually renderedservices during the period

5t is not disputed at this point that the -# erred in ordering respondentFsreinstatement as Dean he 3-&C ruled that respondent should have been merelyreinstated as a full.time law professor, because the term of his appointment asDean had long e%pired !owever, such mistae on the part of the -# cannot, in anyway, alter the fact that during the pendency of the appeal of his decision, his orderfor respondentFs reinstatement as Dean was immediately e%ecutory #rticle * ofthe -abor Code e%plicitly provides thatA

#rt * . #ppeal % % %

% % % %5n any event, the decision of the -abor #rbiter reinstating a dismissed orseparated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shallimmediately be e%ecutory, even pending appeal he employee shall eitherbe admitted bac to wor under the same terms and conditions prevailingprior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merelyreinstated in the payroll he posting of a bond by the employer shall not staythe e%ecution for reinstatement provided therein ($mphasis supplied)

herefore, petitioner could not validly insist that it is entitled to reimbursement forthe payment of the salaries of respondent pursuant to the e%ecution of the -#Fsdecision by simply arguing that the -#Fs order for reinstatement is incorrect hepertinent law on the matter is not concerned with the wisdom or propriety of the-#Fs order of reinstatement, for if it was, then it should have provided that thependency of an appeal should stay its e%ecution #fter all, a decision cannot bedeemed irrefragable unless it attains nality

he Court went on to discuss the illogical and un>ust eects of the Jrefund doctrineJas it easily demonstrates how a favorable decision by the -abor #rbiter could harm,more than help, a dismissed employee he employee, to mae both ends meet,would necessarily have to use up the salaries received during the pendency of theappeal, only to end up having to refund the sum in case of a nal unfavorabledecision 5t is mirage of a stop.gap leading the employee to a risy cli ofinsolvency 5t also disregards the social >ustice principles behind the rule, but alsoinstitutes a scheme unduly favorable to management 7nder such scheme, thesalaries dispensed pendente lite merely serve as a bond posted in installment bythe employer or in the event of a reversal of the -abor #rbiter"s decision orderingreinstatement, the employer gets bac the same amount without having to spendordinarily for bond premiums his circumvents, if not directly contradicts, theproscription that the Jposting of a bond Keven a cash bondL by the employer shallnot stay the e%ecution for reinstatementJ


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ORIENTAL S)IP MANAGEMENT CO. VS. ASTOL;G.R. No. 18,$8%; /u0e $# $%1$

F&'(:+:C5 hired &omy 2 2astol (2astol) as bosun evidenced by a Contract of$mployment and was deployed on board the vessel M elicita ?hile on board the

vessel, 2astol suered chest pains and cold clammy perspiration !e washospitali@ed in #lgiers and found to be suering from anterior myocardialinfarction 5n short, he had a heart attac !e was subse4uently repatriated due tohis illness he company referred 2astol for medical treatment to the Metropolitan!ospital under the care of company.designated physician Dr &obert D -im7nsatised with the treatment by Dr -im and seeing a second opinion, he went toDr $fren & icaldo, a Cardiologist and Congenital !eart Disease :pecialist of the/hilippine !eart Center, who diagnosed him to be suering from JCoronary #rteryDisease and $%tensive #nteriorseptalmiaJ with the corresponding remarsA JorDisability, 5mpediment Nrade 1 (1O)= eeling abandoned and aggrieved, 2astol,through counsel, sent a letter on the /resident of +:C5, for a possible settlement ofhis claim for disability benets !e attached the Medical Certicate issued by Dr

icaldo !is letter did not merit a response from +:C5 2astol was compelled to le aComplaint before the -abor #rbiter but +:C5 countered that 2astol is not entitled tohis indemnity claims, among others, for disability benets on account of non.compliance with the re4uirements of the 199P revised :tandard $mploymentContract (:$C) by failing to properly submit himself for treatment and e%aminationby the company.designated physician who is the only one authori@ed to set thedegree of disability

-abor #rbiter Mayor, 'r rendered a Decision based on the parties" respectiveposition papers and the documentary evidence presented in 3-&C in favor of 2astol

he -abor #rbiter saw no need to conduct formal hearings !e found that 2astol washealthy when deployed but subse4uently contracted or suered heart ailmentduring his period of employment with +:C5 !e also found that 2astol did not showany appreciable improvement despite treatment by the company.designatedphysician, thus ruling that the fact that Dr -im had not issued a certication as to2astol"s condition did not negate his claim for disability indemnity, as thedetermination of the degree thereof by Dr icaldo of the /hilippine !eart CentersuBced 3-&C ruled in favor of +:C5 in that 2astol should have presented himselfbefore the -abor #rbiter for the latter to properly assess his condition, and that Dr-im and Dr icaldo should be presented to determine with certainty the status of2astol"s heart ailment he C# ruled that the 3-&C gravely erred in construing theproviso that it is only the company.designated physician who could declare thetness of the seafarer to wor or establish the degree of his disability for it does notprohibit a second medical opinion

I((ue:?hether the Complaint led before the -abor #rbiter ought to be dismissed for lacof certication against forum shopping as re4uired by the &ules and ?E3 seeing asecond opinion and the certication of Dr icaldo is suBcient

)e*+:2astol should not be denied his claims


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or the e%peditious and ine%pensive ling of complaints by employees, the &egional#rbitration 2ranch () of the 3-&C provides pro.forma complaint forms his is tofacilitate the e%ercise and protection of employees" rights by the convenientassertion of their claims against employers untrammeled by procedural rules andcomple%ities o comply with the certication against forum shopping re4uirement,

a simple 4uestion embodied in the Complaint form answerable by JyesJ or JnoJsuBces $mployee.complainants are not even re4uired to have a counsel beforethey can le their complaint #n oBcer of the , duly authori@ed to administeroaths, is readily available to facilitate the e%ecution of the re4uired subscription or

juratof the complaint 5t is thus clear that the strict application of :ec P, &ule 6 ofthe &ules of Court does not apply to labor complaints led before the 3-&C -abor arbiters given full discretion whether to conduct a hearing or not and todecide the case before him through position papersA he foregoing provisosmanifestly show the non.litigious and the summary nature of the proceedingsbefore the -abor #rbiter, who is given full discretion whether to conduct a hearing ornot and to decide the case before him through position papers # hearing cannot bedemanded by either party as a matter of right he rationale behind this is to avoid

delay and curtail the pernicious practice of withholding of evidence heproceedings before the -abor #rbiter are non.litigious in nature and thetechnicalities of law and procedure, and the rules obtaining in the courts of law arenot applicable hus, the rules allow the admission of aBdavits by the -abor #rbiteras evidence despite the fact that the aBants were not presented for cross.e%amination by the counsel for the adverse party o re4uire otherwise would be tonegate the rationale and purpose of the summary nature of the administrativeproceedings and to mae mandatory the application of the technical rules ofevidence he belated submission of additional documentary evidence by 2astolafter the case was already submitted for decision did not mae the proceedingsbefore the -abor #rbiter improper he basic reason is that technical rules ofprocedure are not binding in labor cases

2astol had been treated by these company.designated doctors for a periodspanning around seven months and days or for appro%imately $3% +!( Clearlythen, the ma%imum period of 1 days stipulated in the :$C for medical treatmentand the declaration or assessment by the company.designated physician of eitherbeing t to wor or the degree of permanent disability had already lapsed hus, bylaw, if 2astol"s condition was with the lapse of the 1 days of post.employmentmedical e%amination and treatment, without his being employed at his usual >ob,then it was certainly total permanent disability5t has been held that disability is intimately related to one"s earning capacity 5tshould be understood less on its medical signicance but more on the loss ofearning capacity otal disability does not mean absolute helplessness 5n disabilitycompensation, it is not the in>ury which is compensated, but rather the incapacity towor resulting in the impairment of one"s earning capacity hus, permanentdisability is the 20b2*2'! o or5er 'o 6eror -2( ob or ore '-0 1$%+!(, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body

?e can say that 2astol had the right to see medical treatment other than thecompany.designated physician after the lapse of the 1.day considering that saidphysician, within the ma%imum 1.day period stipulated in the :$C neither


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declared him t to wor or gave the assessment of the degree of his permanentdisability which he is incumbent to do Dr icaldo"s diagnosis and assessmentshould be accorded greater weight considering that he is a Cardiologist andCongenital !eart Disease :pecialist of the /hilippine !eart Center

MILLENNIUM ERECTORS CORP. VS. MAGALLANES;

G.R. No. 1843,$; No9eber 1"# $%1%

F&'(:&espondent Magallanes started woring in 1988 as a utility man for -aurencito iu(iu), Chief $%ecutive +Bcer of Millennium $rectors Corporation (petitioner), iu"sfamily, and Qenneth Construction Corporation !e was assigned to dierentconstruction pro>ects undertaen by petitioner in Metro Manila, the last of which wasfor a building in -ibis, Rue@on City 5n 'uly of P he was told not to report for woranymore allegedly due to old age, prompting him to le on #ugust ;, P an illegaldismissal complaint before the -abor #rbiter

/etitioner claimed that respondent was a pro>ect employee, that respondent"s

services were terminated as the pro>ect was nearing completion /etitioner liewisesubmitted a termination report to the D+-$ dated #ugust 16, P

he -abor #rbiter ruled in favor of petitioner and dismissed the complaint, holdingthat respondent new of the nature of his employment as a pro>ect employee

+n appeal, the 3-&C set aside the -abor #rbiter"s Decision holding that respondentwas a regular, not a pro>ect employee, as the employment contract he supposedlysigned contained the date of commencement but not a specic date when it wouldend, contrary to the rule that the duration and scope of similar contracts should beclearly set forth therein

/etitioner moved for reconsideration of the 3-&C decision, contending thatrespondent"s motion for reconsideration which it treated as an appeal was notperfected, it having been belatedly led0 that there was no statement of the date ofreceipt of the appealed decision0 and that it laced verication and copies thereofwere not furnished the adverse parties /etitioner"s motion was denied he Courtof #ppeals, to which petitioner appealed, aBrmed the 3-&C"s ruling by Decision

I((ue:?+3 the 3-&C erred in treating the respondent"s motion for reconsideration as anappeal despite its technical Saws

)e*+:he 3-&C did not err in treating respondent"s motion for reconsideration as anappeal, the presence of some procedural Saws including the lac of verication andproof of service notwithstanding

5n labor cases, rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid and technicalsense hey are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of >ustice, andwhere their strict application would result in the frustration rather than promotion of


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substantial >ustice, technicalities must be avoided echnicalities should not bepermitted to stand in the way of e4uitably and completely resolving the rights andobligations of the parties ?here the ends of substantial >ustice shall be betterserved, the application of technical rules of procedure may be rela%ed

#s to the defective verication in the appeal memorandum before the 3-&C, the

same liberality applies #fter all, the re4uirement regarding verication of apleading is formal, not >urisdictional :uch re4uirement is simply a conditionaecting the form of pleading, the non.compliance of which does not necessarilyrender the pleading fatally defective #s for the re4uirement on proof of service, itmay also be dispensed with since in appeals in labor cases, non.service of copy ofthe appeal or appeal memorandum to the adverse party is not a >urisdictionaldefect which calls for the dismissal of the appeal

+n the merits of the case, the Court nds that, indeed, respondent was a regular,not a pro>ect employee#ssuming arguendo that petitioner hired respondent initially on a per pro>ect basis,his continued rehiring, as shown by the sample payrolls converted his status to that

of a regular employee

ISLRI TRADINGLU VS. CAPADE;G.R. No. 1,8"%1; /0ur! 31# $%11

F&'(:&espondents were employees of 5slri@ rading, a gravel and sand business ownedand operated by petitioner ictor !ugo -u Claiming that they were illegallydismissed, respondents led a Complaint for illegal dismissal and non.payment ofovertime pay, holiday pay, rest day pay, allowances and separation pay againstpetitioner +n his part, petitioner imputed abandonment of wor againstrespondents

he -abor #rbiter rendered >udgment declaring 5slri@ rading guilty of illegaldismissal and ordered the latter to reinstate the respondents and for payment ofbacwages until actual reinstatement 7pon appeal, the 3-&C set aside the Decisionof -abor #rbiter inding that respondents" failure to continue woring for petitionerwas neither caused by termination nor abandonment of wor, the 3-&C orderedrespondents" reinstatement but without bacwages !owever, pending appeal,respondents moved for the e%ecution of the reinstatement aspect of the -abor#rbiter"s decision !owever, until the issuance of the 3-&C &esolution overturning-abor #rbiter Nan"s decision, petitioner still failed to reinstate respondents or eectpayroll reinstatement his prompted respondents to apply for a ?rit of $%ecution toenforce the monetary award # ?rit of $%ecution was issued by -abor #rbiterCastillon he proceedings thereafter were liewise upheld by the C#

I((ue:?hether respondents may collect their wages during the period between the -abor#rbiter"s order of reinstatement pending appeal and the 3-&C &esolutionoverturning that of the -abor #rbiter

)e*+:he petition is not meritorious


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/etitioner contends that the C#"s act in upholding the issuance of the 4uestioned?rit of $%ecution for the enforcement of respondents" accrued salaries, saidDecision and &esolution, in eect, altered the 3-&C &esolution which only decreedrespondents" reinstatement without bacwages/aragraph * of #rticle * of the -abor Code readsA

T5n any event, the decision of the -abor #rbiter reinstating a dismissed or separatedemployee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately bee%ecutory, pending appeal he employee shall either be admitted bac to worunder the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separationor, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll he posting of abond by the employer shall not stay the e%ecution for reinstatement providedherein"

hus in several cases, it has maintained that even if the order of reinstatement ofthe -abor #rbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employerto reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of

appeal until reversal by the higher court +n the other hand, if the employee hasbeen reinstated during the appeal period and such reinstatement order is reversedwith nality, the employee is not re4uired to reimburse whatever salary he receivedfor he is entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered services during the period5n other words, a dismissed employee whose case was favorably decided by the-abor #rbiter is entitled to receive wages pending appeal upon reinstatement, whichis immediately e%ecutory 7nless there is a restraining order, it is ministerial uponthe -abor #rbiter to implement the order of reinstatement and it is mandatory onthe employer to comply therewith

o come up with the answer to the present issue, we shall apply the two.fold testused in Narcia ?as there an actual delay or was the order of reinstatementpending appeal e%ecuted prior to its reversalG #s can be recalled, until theissuance of the :eptember I, 3-&C &esolution overturning -abor #rbiter Nan"sDecision, petitioner still failed to reinstate respondents or eect payrollreinstatement in accordance with #rticle * of the -abor Code his was whatactually prompted respondents to move for the issuance of a computation of theaward of bacwages and #lias ?rit of $%ecution for its enforcement 5t cannottherefore be denied that there was an actual delay in the e%ecution of thereinstatement aspect of the Decision of -abor #rbiter Nan prior to the issuance ofthe 3-&C &esolution overturning the same

3ow, the ne%t 4uestion isA ?as the delay not due to the employer"s un>ustied actor omissionG 7nlie in Narcia where /#-, as the employer, was then undercorporate rehabilitation, 5slri@ rading here did not undergo rehabilitation or wasunder any analogous situation which would >ustify petitioner"s non.e%ercise of theoptions provided under #rticle * of the -abor Code /etitioner, without anysatisfactory reason, failed to fulll its obligation and respondents remained to be notreinstated until the 3-&C resolved petitioner"s appeal $vidently, the delay in thee%ecution of respondents" reinstatement was due to petitioner"s un>ustied refusalto eect the same


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!ence, the conclusion is that respondents have the right to collect their accruedsalaries during the period between the -abor #rbiter"s Decision ordering theirreinstatement pending appeal and the 3-&C &esolution overturning the samebecause petitioner"s failure to reinstate them either actually or through payroll wasdue to petitioner"s un>ustied refusal to eect reinstatement 5n order to enforcethis, -abor #rbiter Castillon thus correctly issued the ?rit of $%ecution dated March

9, P as well as the +rder dated 'une *, P denying petitioner"s Motion toRuash ?rit of $%ecution and granting respondents" 7rgent Motion for 5ssuance of2rea.+pen +rder Conse4uently, we nd no error on the part of the C# inupholding these issuances and in dismissing the petition for certiorari before it

o clarify, respondents are entitled to their accrued salaries only from the timepetitioner received a copy of -abor #rbiter Nan"s Decision declaring respondents"termination illegal and ordering their reinstatement up to the date of the 3-&C&esolution overturning that of the -abor #rbiter his is because it is only duringsaid period that respondents are deemed to have been illegally dismissed and areentitled to reinstatement pursuant to -abor #rbiter Nan"s Decision which was theone in eect at that time 2eyond that period, the 3-&C &esolution declaring that

there was no illegal dismissal is already the one prevailing rom such point,respondents" salaries did not accrue not only because there is no more illegaldismissal to spea of but also because respondents have not yet been actuallyreinstated and have not rendered services to petitioner

PANLILIO ET AL. VS. RTC R. "1# CIT< OF MANILA;G.R. No. 17384,; Februr! $# $%11

F&'(:+n +ctober 1I, P, 'ose Marcel /anlilio, $rlinda /anlilio, 3icole Morris and MarloCristobal (petitioners), as corporate oBcers of :ilahis 5nternational !otel, 5nc (:5!5),led with the &egional rial Court (&C) of Manila, 2ranch P, a petition for:uspension of /ayments and &ehabilitationKPL in :$C Corp Case 3o P.11118

+n +ctober 18, P, the &C of Manila, 2ranch P, issued an +rder staying allclaims against :5!5 upon nding the petition suBcient in form and substance

#t the time, however, of the ling of the petition for rehabilitation, there were anumber of criminal chargesK6L pending against petitioners in 2ranch I1 of the &Cof Manila hese criminal charges were initiated by respondent :ocial :ecurity:ystem (:::) and involved charges of violations of :ection 8 (h)K8L of &epublic #ct88, or the :ocial :ecurity #ct of 1996 (::: law), in relation to #rticle *1I (1) (b)K9L of the &evised /enal Code, or $stafa Conse4uently, petitioners led with the&C of Manila, 2ranch I1, a Manifestation and Motion to :uspend /roceedingsK1L/etitioners argued that the stay order issued by 2ranch P should also apply to thecriminal charges pending in 2ranch I1 /etitioners, thus, prayed that 2ranch I1suspend its proceedings until the petition for rehabilitation was nally resolved

2ranch I1 issued an +rderK11L denying petitioners" motion to suspend theproceedings 5t ruled that the stay order issued by 2ranch P did not cover criminalproceedings, to witA


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U%%%

he Court shares the view of the private complainants and the ::: that the saidstay order does not include the prosecution of criminal oenses /recisely, the law


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for claims against the distressed corporation

ANDO VS. CAMPO;G.R. No. 184%%7; Februr! 1,# $%11

F&'(:

/etitioner was the president of /remier #llied and Contracting :ervices, 5nc (/#C:5),an independent labor contractor &espondents were hired by /#C:5 as haulerstased to manually carry bags of sugar from the warehouse of ictorias MillingCompany and load them on trucs he respondents were dismissed fromemployment and thereafter, led a case for illegal dismissal and some moneyclaims with the 3-&C -abor #rbiter promulgated a decision, ruling in respondents"favor

/etitioner and /#C:5 appealed to the 3-&C and the 3-&C ruled that petitioner failedto perfect his appeal because he did not pay the supersedeas bond 5t also aBrmedthe -abor #rbiter"s decision and upon nality of the decision, respondents movedfor its e%ecution

o answer for the monetary award, 3-&C #cting :heri &omeo /asustento issued a3otice of :ale on $%ecution of /ersonal /roperty over the property in the name ofect of the e%ecutionsale 2ut the &C issued an order denying the prayer for a &+, holding that the trialcourt had no >urisdiction to try and decide the case he &C ruled that, pursuant tothe NLRC Manual on the Execution of Judgment, petitioner"s remedy was to le athird.party claim with the 3-&C :heri/etitioner led a petition for certiorari under &ule ;I before the C# contending thatthe &C acted without or in e%cess of >urisdiction or with grave abuse of discretionamounting to lac or e%cess of >urisdiction in issuing the +rder he C#, however,aBrmed the &C +rder in so far as it dismissed the complaint on the ground that ithad no >urisdiction over the case, and nullied all other pronouncements in thesame +rder /etitioner moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied

)e*+:&egular courts have no >urisdiction to hear and decide 4uestions which arise fromand are incidental to the enforcement of decisions, orders, or awards rendered inlabor cases by appropriate oBcers and tribunals of the Department of -abor and$mployment o hold otherwise is to sanction splitting of >urisdiction which isobno%ious to the orderly administration of >ustice

he 3-&C Manual on the $%ecution of 'udgment governs any 4uestion on thee%ecution of a >udgment of that body(3-&C) he &ules of Court apply only byanalogy or in a suppletory character

3-&C Manual on the $%ecution of 'udgment deals specically with third.party claims


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in cases brought before that body 5t denes a third.party claim as one where aperson, not a party to the case, asserts title to or right to the possession of theproperty levied upon 5t also sets out the procedure for the ling of a third.partyclaim, to witA

:$C5+3 /roceedings W 5f property levied upon be claimed by 0!

6er(o0 o'-er '-0 '-e *o(20= 6r'! or -2( =e0', such person shall maean aBdavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating thegrounds of such right or title and shall le the same with the sheri andcopies thereof served upon the -abor #rbiter or proper oBcer issuing the writand upon the prevailing party 7pon receipt of the third party claim, allproceedings with respect to the e%ecution of the property sub>ect of the thirdparty claim shall u'o'2&**! be (u(6e0+e+and the -abor #rbiter orproper oBcer issuing the writ shall conduct a hearing with due notice to allparties concerned and resolve the validity of the claim within ten (1)woring days from receipt thereof and his decision is appealable to theCommission within ten (1) woring days from notice, and the Commissionshall resolve the appeal within same period

here is no doubt in our mind that petitioner"s complaint is a third. party claimwithin the cogni@ance of the 3-&C /etitioner may indeed be considered a ect of the e%ecution vis.X.vis the -abor#rbiter"s decision here is no 4uestion that the property belongs to petitioner andhis wife, and not to the corporation 5t can be said that the property belongs to thecon>ugal partnership, not to petitioner alone hus, '-e 6ro6er'! be*o0=( 'o '-2r+ 6r'!# 2.e.# '-e &o0u=* 6r'0er(-26 #t the very least, the Court canconsider that petitioner"s wife is a third party within contemplation of the law

here is no denying that the present controversy arose from the complaint for illegaldismissal he sub>ect matter of petitioner"s complaint is the e%ecution of the 3-&Cdecision $%ecution is an essential part of the proceedings before the 3-&C

'urisdiction, once ac4uired, continues until the case is nally terminated, and therecan be no end to the controversy without the full and proper implementation of thecommission"s directivesurther underscoring the &C"s lac of >urisdiction over petitioner"s complaint is#rticle IP of the -abor Code, to witA

#& IP 53'73C5+3 /&+!525$D 3o temporary or permanent in>unctionor restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputesshall be issued by any court or other entity, e%cept as otherwise provided in#rticles 18 and ;P of this Code

Moreover, the power of the 3-&C, or the courts, to e%ecute its >udgment e%tendsonly to properties un4uestionably belonging to the >udgment debtor alone #sheri, therefore, has no authority to attach the property of any person e%cept thatof the >udgment debtor -iewise, there is no showing that the sheri ever tried toe%ecute on the properties of the corporation

he C of the property bears out that, indeed, it belongs to petitioner and his wifeand the latter stands to lose the property sub>ect of e%ecution without ever being a


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party to the case his will be tantamount to deprivation of property without dueprocess

E>ODUS INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORP. VS. ISCOC)O;G.R. No. 1,,1%; Februr! $3# $%11

F&'(:/etitioner $%odus 5nternational Construction Corporation ($%odus) is a duly licensedlabor contractor for the painting of residential houses, condominium units andcommercial buildings /etitioner #ntonio / 'avalera is the /resident and NeneralManager of $%odus

$%odus obtained from Dutch 2oy /hilippines, 5nc (Dutch 2oy) a contract for thepainting of the 5mperial :y Narden Dutch 2oy awarded another contract to $%odusfor the painting 5n the furtherance of its business, $%odus hired respondents aspainters on dierent dates

Nuillermo 2iscocho (Nuillermo) was assigned at the 5mperial :y Narden from

ebruary 8, 1999 to ebruary 8, ernando /ereda (ernando) wored in thesame pro>ect from ebruary 8, 1999 to 'une 16, -iewise, erdinand Mariano(erdinand) wored there from #pril 1, 1999 to ebruary 16, #ll of them werethen transferred to /acic /la@a owers

Nregorio : 2ellita (Nregorio) was assigned to wor at the house of Mr eolo Vap in#yala #labang, Muntinlupa City from May , 1999 to December P, 1999#fterwards he was transferred to /acic /la@a owers

Miguel 2 2obillo (Miguel) was hired and assigned at /acic /la@a owers on March1,

+n 3ovember 6, , Nuillermo, ernando, erdinand, and Miguel led acomplaint for illegal dismissal and non.payment of holiday pay, service incentiveleave pay, 1*th month pay and night.shift dierential pay

+n December 1, , Nregorio also led a complaint !e claimed that he wasdismissed from the service on :eptember 1, while Nuillermo, ernando,erdinand, and Miguel were orally notied of their dismissal from the service on3ovember I,

/etitioners denied respondents" allegations #s regards Nregorio, petitioners averredthat on :eptember 1I, , he absented himself from wor and applied as apainter with :#$5.$$5 which is the general building contractor of /acic /la@a

owers :ince then, he never reported bac to wor

Nuillermo absented himself from wor without leave on 3ovember 6, ?henhe reported for wor the following day, he was reprimanded for being #bsent?ithout +Bcial -eave (#?+-) 2ecause of the reprimand, he wored only half.dayand thereafter was unheard of until the ling of the instant complaint

+n March 1, , the -abor #rbiter rendered a Decision e%onerating petitioners


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from the charge of illegal dismissal as respondents chose not to report for worhe -abor #rbiter ruled that since there is neither illegal dismissal nor abandonmentof >ob, respondents should be reinstated but without any bacwages :hedisallowed the claims for premium pay for holidays and rest days and nightshiftdierential pay as respondents failed to prove that actual service was rendered onsuch non.woring days !owever, she allowed the claims for holiday pay, service

incentive leave pay and 1*th month pay

/etitioners sought recourse to the 3-&C limiting their appeal to the award of serviceincentive leave pay, 1*th month pay, holiday pay and 1O attorney"s fees in thesum of /6,18** 3-&C dismissed the appeal 5t ruled that petitioners, who havecomplete control over the records of the company, could have easily rebutted themonetary claims against it #s to the award of attorney"s fees, the 3-&C found thesame to be proper because respondents were forced to litigate in order to validatetheir claim

he C# also aBrmed -# and 3-&C decision, hence this petition

)e*+:No illegal dismissal.

he rule is that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it0 thus, petitionerswere burdened to prove their allegation that respondents dismissed them from theiremployment 5t must be stressed that the evidence to prove this fact must be clear,positive and convincing he rule that the employer bears the burden of proof inillegal dismissal cases nds no application here because the respondents denyhaving dismissed the petitioners

5n this case, petitioners were able to show that they never dismissed respondents#s to the case of ernando, Miguel and erdinand, it was shown that on 3ovemberI, , at around 6A* am, the petitioners" foreman, ?enifredo -alap(?enifredo) caught the three still eating when they were supposed to be woringalready ?enifredo reprimanded them and, apparently, they resented it so they nolonger reported for wor 5n the case of Nregorio, he absented himself from wor on:eptember 1I, to apply as a painter with :#$5.$$5, the general contractor of/acic /la@a owers :ince then he never reported bac to wor -astly, in the caseof Nuillermo, he absented himself without leave on 3ovember 6, , and so hewas reprimanded when he reported for wor the following day 2ecause of thereprimand, he did not report for wor anymore

Respondents must be reinstated and paid their holida pa! service incentive leavepa! and "#th month pa.

!owever, petitioners are of the position that the reinstatement of respondents totheir former positions, which were no longer e%isting, is impossible, highly unfairand un>ust !aving completed their tass, their positions automatically ceased toe%ist Conse4uently, there were no more positions where they can be reinstated aspainters

/etitioners are misguided hey forgot that there are two types of employees in the


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payment of their holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, and 1*th month pay he-abor #rbiter, the 3-&C and the C# were one in ruling that petitioners did not paythe respondents their holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, and 1*th month payas mandated by law or sure, this un>ustied act of petitioners had compelled therespondents to institute an action primarily to protect their rights and interests

%s to &ac'(ages

5n cases where there is no evidence of dismissal, the remedy isreinstatement but without bacwages 5n this case, both the -abor #rbiter and the3-&C made a nding that there was no dismissal much less an illegal one udicial agencies are generally accordedrespect and nality so long as these are supported by substantial evidence= hus,inasmuch as no nding of illegal dismissal had been made, and considering that theabsence of such nding is supported by the records of the case, this Court is boundby such conclusion and cannot allow an award of the payment of bacwages

PFIER# INC. VS. VELASCO;

G.R. No. 1774,7; Mr&- # $%11

F&'(:/rivate respondent Neraldine - elasco was employed with petitioner /5H$&, 53Cas /rofessional !ealth Care &epresentative since 1 #ugust 199 :ometime in #pril*, elasco had a medical wor up for her high.ris pregnancy and wassubse4uently advised bed rest which resulted in her e%tending her leave ofabsence elasco led her sic leave for the period from ; March to 18 'une *,her vacation leave from 19 'une to 'une *, and leave without pay from *

'une to 1P 'uly *

+n ; 'une *, while elasco was still on leave, /5H$& through its #rea :alesManager, herein petitioner erdinand Corte@, personally served elasco a J:how.cause 3oticeJ dated I 'une * #side from mentioning about an investigation onher possible violations of company wor rules regarding Junauthori@ed deals andEordiscounts in money or samples and unauthori@ed withdrawal andEor pull.out ofstocsJ and instructing her to submit her e%planation on the matter within P8 hoursfrom receipt of the same, the notice also advised her that she was being placedunder Jpreventive suspensionJ for * days 5n response, elasco sent a letteraddressed to Corte@ dated 8 'une * denying the charges

+n 1 'uly *, elasco received a J:econd :how.cause 3oticeJ informing her ofadditional developments in their investigation #ccording to the notice, a certainCarlito 'omen e%ecuted an aBdavit pointing to elasco as the one who transactedwith a printing shop to print /5H$& discount coupons elasco sent a letter to/5H$& via #boiti@ courier service asing for additional time to answer the second:how.cause 3otice

hat same day, elasco led a complaint for illegal suspension with money claimsbefore the &egional #rbitration 2ranch he following day, 16 'uly *, /5H$& senther a letter inviting her to a disciplinary hearing to be held on 'uly * +n I

'uly *, elasco received a Jhird :how.cause 3otice,J together with copies of theaBdavits of two 2ranch Managers of Mercury Drug, asing her for her comment


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within P8 hours inally, on 9 'uly *, /5H$& informed elasco of itsJManagement DecisionJ terminating her employment

+n I December *, the -abor #rbiter rendered its decision declaring thedismissal of elasco illegal, ordering her reinstatement with bacwages and furtherawarding moral and e%emplary damages with attorney"s fees +n appeal, the 3-&C

aBrmed the same but deleted the award of moral and e%emplary damages

7ndaunted, /5H$& led with the Court of #ppeals a special civil action for theissuance of a writ of certiorariunder &ule ;I of the &ules of Court to annul and setaside the aforementioned 3-&C issuances 5n a Decision dated 3ovember *, I,the Court of #ppeals upheld the validity of respondent"s dismissal fromemployment, the dispositive portion of which reads as followsA53 5$? ?!$&$+, the dismissal of private respondent Neraldine elasco is#5&M$D, but petitioner /5H$&, 53C is hereby ordered to pay her the wages towhich she is entitled to from the time the reinstatement order was issued until3ovember *, I, the date of promulgation of +ur Decision11

I((ue:?hether or not the Court of #ppeals committed a serious but reversible error whenit ordered /@er to pay elasco wages from the date of the -abor #rbiter"s decisionordering her reinstatement until 3ovember *, I, when the Court of #ppealsrendered its decision declaring elasco"s dismissal valid1*

)e*+Ahe petition is without merit

#t the outset, we note that /5H$&"s previous payment to respondent of the amountof /1,9;*,8II (representing her wages from December I, *, or the date ofthe -abor #rbiter decision, until May I, I) that was successfully garnished underthe -abor #rbiter"s ?rit of $%ecution dated May ;, I cannot be considered in itsfavor 3ot only was this sum legally due to respondent under prevailing

>urisprudence but also this circumstance highlighted /5H$&"s unreasonable delay incomplying with the reinstatement order of the -abor #rbiter

#s far bac as 1996 in the seminal case of )ioneer *exturizing Corporation v.National Labor Relations Commission, the Court held that an award or order ofreinstatement is immediately self.e%ecutory without the need for the issuance of awrit of e%ecution in accordance with the third paragraph of #rticle * of the-abor Code 5n that case, we discussed in length the rationale for that doctrine, towitA

he provision of #rticle * is clear that an award Kby the -abor #rbiterL forreinstatement shall be immediatel executor even pending appeal and the postingof a bond b the emploer shall not sta the execution for reinstatement helegislative intent is 4uite obvious, i.e., to mae an award of reinstatementimmediately enforceable, even pending appeal o re4uire the application for andissuance of a writ of e%ecution as prere4uisites for the e%ecution of a reinstatementaward would certainly betray and run counter to the very ob>ect and intent of #rticle*, i.e., the immediate e%ecution of a reinstatement order he reason is simple
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#n application for a writ of e%ecution and its issuance could be delayed fornumerous reasons # mere continuance or postponement of a scheduled hearing,for instance, or an inaction on the part of the -abor #rbiter or the 3-&C could easilydelay the issuance of the writ thereby setting at naught the strict mandate andnoble purpose envisioned by #rticle * 5n other words, if the re4uirements of#rticle P Kincluding the issuance of a writ of e%ecutionL were to govern, as we so

declared in Marana(, then the e%ecutory nature of a reinstatement order or awardcontemplated by #rticle * will be unduly circumscribed and rendered ineectual5n enacting the law, the legislature is presumed to have ordained a valid andsensible law, one which operates no further than may be necessary to achieve itsspecic purpose :tatutes, as a rule, are to be construed in the light of the purposeto be achieved and the evil sought to be prevented % % % 5n introducing a new ruleon the reinstatement aspect of a labor decision under &epublic #ct 3o ;61I,Congress should not be considered to be indulging in mere semantic e%ercise % %%*(5talics in the original0 emphasis and underscoring supplied)5n the case at bar, /5H$& did not immediately admit respondent bac to worwhich, according to the law, should have been done as soon as an order or award ofreinstatement is handed down by the -abor #rbiter without need for the issuance of

a writ of e%ecution hus, respondent was entitled to the wages paid to her underthe aforementioned writ of e%ecution #t most, /5H$&"s payment of the same canonly be deemed partial complianceEe%ecution of the Court of #ppeals &esolutiondated +ctober *, ; and would not bar respondent from being paid her wagesfrom May ;, I to 3ovember *, I

o reiterate, under #rticle * of the -abor Code, an employee entitled toreinstatement Jshall either be admitted bac to wor u0+er '-e (e 'er( 0+&o0+2'2o0(prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of theemployer, merely reinstated in the payrollJ

he view as maintained in a number of cases is thatA

% % % ?E@9e0 2 '-e or+er o re20(''ee0' o '-e Lbor Arb2'er 2(re9er(e+ o0 66e*# 2' 2( ob*2='or! o0 '-e 6r' o '-e e6*o!er 'ore20(''e 0+ 6! '-e =e( o '-e +2(2((e+ e6*o!ee +ur20= '-e6er2o+ o 66e* u0'2* re9er(* b! '-e -2=-er &our'.+n the other hand,if the employee has been reinstated during the appeal period and suchreinstatement order is reversed with nality, the employee is not re4uired toreimburse whatever salary he received for he is entitled to such, more so ifhe actually rendered services during the period($mphasis in the original0italics and underscoring supplied)

5n other words, a dismissed employee whose case was favorably decided by the-abor #rbiter is entitled to receive wages pending appeal upon reinstatement, whichis immediately e%ecutory 7nless there is a restraining order, it is ministerial uponthe -abor #rbiter to implement the order of reinstatement and it is mandatory onthe employer to comply therewith

LUNA VS. ALLADO CONSTRUCTION CO.# INC.;G.R. No. 17"$"1; M! 3%# $%11
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F&'(:/etitioner -una was the employee of the constructions company of the &espondent!e was assigned in :aranggani /rovince #s he was caught pilfering therespondent"s property, he was dismissed from his employment, and thereby led acase of illegal dismissal against the respondent

he -abor #rbiter ruled that there was no illegal dismissal, but awarded nancialassistance in favour of the petitioner he respondent then appealed to the 3-&C4uestioning solely the -#"s decision in awarding nancial assistance he 3-&Creversed the -#"s decision, nding out that there was illegal dismissal and awardedthe bacwages to the petitioner

#ggrieved by such an unfavourable decision, the respondent via &ule ;I posed in itsappeal the validity of the 3-&C"s decision on the ground that it has no >urisdiction toentertain 4uestions not alleged in the appeal he respondent"s ground was only4uestioning the propriety of the award of the nancial assistance, yet 3-&Centertained issues other than that posed in the appeal ?ith the same adversedecision by the C#, the respondents came before the :C via petition for certiorari

still 4uestioning the validity of the decision &espondent argued that the 3-&C doesnot have authority to review issues not brought before it for appeal

I((ue:?+3 the 3-&C has >urisdiction to review issues not brought before it for appeal

)e*+:3+

:ection P(c), &ule 5 of the &ules of /rocedure of the 3-&C, which was in eectat the time respondents appealed the -abor #rbiter"s decision, e%pressly providedthat, on appeal, the 3-&C shall limit itself only to the specic issues that wereelevated for review, to witA&7-$ 5#ppeals

:ection P &e4uisites for /erfection of #ppeal % % %% % % %(c) :ub>ect to the provisions of #rticle 18, once the appeal is perfected inaccordance with these &ules, the Commission shall limit itself to reviewingand deciding specic issues that were elevated on appeal

#s a testament to its eectivity and the 3-&C"s continued implementation of thisprocedural policy, the same provision was retained as :ection P(d), &ule 5 of theI &evised &ules of /rocedure of the 3-&C5n the case at bar, the 3-&C evidently went against its own rules of procedure whenit passed upon the issue of illegal dismissal although the 4uestion raised byrespondents in their appeal was concerned solely with the legality of the laborarbiter"s award of nancial assistance despite the nding that petitioner waslawfully terminated

#n appeal from a decision, award or order of the labor arbiter must be brought tothe 3-&C within ten (1) calendar days from receipt of such decision, award or


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order, otherwise, the same becomes nal and e%ecutory K#rt *, -abor Code0 &ule555, :ec 1(a), &evised &ules of the 3-&CL Moreover, the rules of the 3-&C e%presslyprovide that on appeal, the Commission shall limit itself onl to the speci+c issuesthat (ere elevated for revie(, all other matters being nal and e%ecutory K&ule 555,:ec I(c), &evised &ules of the 3-&C, italics suppliedL

5n the present case, petitioner, aggrieved by the labor arbiter"s decision orderingthe e%tension of nancial assistance to Nalagar despite the nding that histermination was for >ust cause, specically limited his appeal to a single legal4uestion, ie, the validity of the award of nancial assistance to an employeedismissed for pilfering company property +n the other hand, private respondentdid not appeal

-e0 6e'2'2o0er *22'e+ '-e 2((ue o0 66e*# 0e&e((r2*! '-e NLRC !re92e o0*! '-' 2((ue r2(e+. A** o'-er ''er(# 20&*u+20= '-e 2((ue o '-e9*2+2'! o 6r29'e re(6o0+e0'B( +2(2((*# re 0*. I 6r29'e re(6o0+e0'0'e+ 'o &-**e0=e '-e 0+20= o 9*2+ +2(2((*# -e (-ou*+ -9e66e*e+ -2( &(e (e(o0b*! 'o '-e NLRC. ! r2(20= 0e 2((ue( 20 '-e

re6*! 'o 66e*# 6r29'e re(6o0+e0' 2( 20 ee&' appealing hiscase*'-ou=- -e -(# 20 &'# **oe+ -2( &(e 'o be&oe 0* b! 0o'66e*20= 2'-20 '-e re=*ee0'r! 6er2o+.# replyEopposition to appeal cannottae the place of an appeal herefore, in this case, the dismissal of the complaintfor illegal dismissal and the denial of the prayer for reinstatement, having becomenal, can no longer be reviewed

T-e Lbor Co+e 6ro92(2o0# re+ 20 2'( e0'2re'!# (''e( '-' '-e NLRCB(6oer 'o &orre&' error(# -e'-er (ub('0'2* or or*# ! be eer&2(e+o0*! 20 '-e +e'er20'2o0 o ue('2o0# ''er or &o0'ro9er(!within its

jurisdiction ?Ar'. $18# Lbor [email protected], by considering the argumentsand issues in the replyEopposition to appeal which were not properly raised bytimely appeal nor comprehended within the scope of the issue raised in petitioner"sappeal, public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting toe%cess of >urisdiction

he contention that the 3-&C may nevertheless loo into other issues although notraised on appeal since it is not bound by technical rules of procedure, is liewisedevoid of meritT-e * +oe( 0o' 6ro92+e '-' '-e NLRC 2( 'o'**! ree ro 'e&-02&*ru*e( o 6ro&e+ure# bu' o0*! '-' '-e ru*e( o e92+e0&e 6re92*20= 20&our'( o * or eu2'! (-** 0o' be &o0'ro**20= 20 6ro&ee+20=( beore '-eNLRC ?Ar'. $$1# Lbor Co+e@. T-2( 2( -r+*! *2&e0(e or '-e NLRC 'o+2(re=r+ 0+ 92o*'e '-e 26*ee0'20= ru*e( 2' -( 2'(e*6rou*='e+.!aving done so, the 3-&C committed grave abuse of discretion

ANA)A ROADCASTING CORP. VS. PACANA III;G.R No. 171,73; M! 3%# $%11

F&'(:+n #ugust 9, 199I, the DU?N personnel (/acana 555 et al) led with the -abor#rbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, reimbursement of


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unpaid Collective 2argaining #greement (C2#) benets, and attorney"s fees against52C and 22C

+n 'une 1, 199;, -abor #rbiter #bdullah - #lug rendered his Decision awarding theDU?N personnel a total of/1,,1I68 as unpaid C2# benets consisting ofunpaid wages and increases, 1*th month pay, longevity pay, sic leave cash

conversion, rice and sugar subsidy, retirement pay, loyalty reward and separationpay he -abor #rbiter denied the other claims of the DU?N personnel for Christmasbonus, educational assistance, medical chec.up and optical e%penses 2oth sets ofparties appealed to the 3ational -abor &elations Commission (3-&C)

he 3-&C issued a resolution vacating the decision of the -abor #rbiter andremanded the case to arbitration branch of origin +n +ctober 1I, 1998, -abor#rbiter 3icodemus N /alangan rendered a Decision ad>udging 22C to be liable forthe same amountin the vacated Decision of -abor #rbiter #lug

2oth 22C and respondents appealed to the 3-&C anew 5n their appeal, the DU?Npersonnel reasserted their claim for the remaining C2# benets not awarded to

them, and alleged error in the reconing date of the computation of the monetaryaward 22C, in its own Memorandum of #ppeal, challenged the monetary awarditself, claiming that such benets were only due to 52C, not 22C, employees 5n thesame Memorandum of #ppeal, 22C incorporated a Motion for the &ecomputation ofthe Monetary #ward (of the -abor #rbiter), in order that the appeal bond may bereduced

he 3-&C issued an +rder denying the Motion for the &ecomputation of theMonetary #ward #ccording to the 3-&C, such recomputation would result in thepremature resolution of the issue raised on appeal The NLRC ordered BBC to

post the required bond within 1 da!s "rom receipt o" said #rder$ with awarning that noncompliance will cause the dismissal o" the appeal "ornon%per"ection. 5nstead of complying with the +rder to post the re4uired bond,22C led a Motion for &econsideration, alleging this time that since it is whollyowned by the &epublic of the /hilippines, it need not post an appeal bond

I((ue:?hether or not 2anahaw 2roadcasting Corporation (22C), a Novernment +wnedand Controlled Corporation is e%empt from posting an appeal bond

)e*+:?e can infer from the foregoing >urisprudential precedents that, as a general rule,the government and all the attached agencies with no legal personality distinct fromthe former are e%empt from posting appeal bonds, whereas government.owned andcontrolled corporations (N+CCs) are not similarly e%empted his distinction isbrought about b! the &er! reason o" the appeal bond itsel"' to protect the

presumpti&e judgment creditor against the insol&enc! o" the presumpti&ejudgment debtor.?hen the :tate litigates, it is not re4uired to put up an appealbond because it is presumed to be always solvent his e%emption, however, doesnot, as a general rule, apply to N+CCs for the reason that the latter has apersonality distinct from its shareholders


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5n the case at bar, BBC was organi(ed as a pri&ate corporation$se4uestered inthe 198"s and the ownership of which was subse4uently transferred to thegovernment in a compromise agreement urther, it is stated in its #mended#rticles of 5ncorporation that 22C has the following primary functionA*o engage in commercial radio and television broadcasting! and for this purpose! toestablish! operate and maintain such stations! both terrestrial and satellite or

interplanetar! as ma be necessar for broadcasting on a net(or' (ide orinternational basis.

5t is therefore crystal clear that 22C"s function is purely commercial or proprietaryand not governmental #s such, 22C cannot be deemed entitled to an e%emptionfrom the posting of an appeal bondConse4uently, the 3-&C did not commit an error, and much less grave abuse ofdiscretion, in dismissing the appeal of 22C on account of non.perfection of thesame

SOCIAL SECURIT< COMMISSION VS. RIAL POULTR< ET AL.;G.R. No. 1,7%"%; /u0e 1# $%11

F&'(:he instant case stemmed from a petition led by #lberto #ngeles (#ngeles) beforethe :ocial :ecurity Commission (::C) to compel respondents &i@al /oultry and-ivestoc #ssociation, 5nc (&i@al /oultry) or 2:D #gro 5ndustrial DevelopmentCorporation (2:D #gro) to remit to the :ocial :ecurity :ystem (:::) all contributionsdue for and in his behalf

#ngeles had earlier led a complaint for illegal dismissal against 2:D #gro andEor itsowner, 2en>amin :an Diego (:an Diego) he -abor #rbiter initially found that#ngeles was an employee and that he was illegally dismissed +n appeal, however,the 3-&C reversed the -abor #rbiter"s Decision and held that no employer.employee

relationship e%isted between #ngeles and respondents he ruling was anchored onthe nding that the duties performed by #ngeles, such as carpentry, plumbing,painting and electrical wors, were not independent and integral steps in theessential operations of the company, which is engaged in the poultry business#ngeles elevated the case to the Court of #ppeals via petition for certiorari heappellate court aBrmed the 3-&C ruling and upheld the absence of employer.employee relationship #ngeles moved for reconsideration but it was denied by theCourt of #ppeals 3o further appeal was undertaen, hence, an entry of >udgmentwas made on ; May 1

#t any rate, the ::C did not tae into consideration the decision of the 3-&C 5tdenied respondents" motion to dismiss in an +rder dated 19 ebruary he::C ratiocinated, thusA

Decisions of the 3-&C and other tribunals on the issue of e%istence of employer.employee relationship between parties are not binding on the Commission #t most,such nding has only a persuasive eect and does not constitute res >udicata as aground for dismissal of an action pending before 7s ?hile it is true that the partiesbefore the 3-&C and in this case are the same, the issues and sub>ect matter areentirely dierent he labor case is for illegal dismissal with demand for bacwages


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and other monetary claims, while the present action is for remittance of unpaid::K:L contributions 5n other words, although in both suits the respondents invoelac of employer.employee relationship, the same does not proceed from identicalcauses of action as one is for violation of the -abor Code while the instant case isfor violation of the ::K:L -aw

&espondents sought recourse before the Court of #ppeals by way of a petition forcertiorari he Court of #ppeals reversed the rulings of the ::C and held that thereis a common issue between the cases before the ::C and in the 3-&C0 and it iswhether there e%isted an employer.employee relationship between #ngeles andrespondents hus, the case falls s4uarely under the principle of res >udicata,particularly under the rule on conclusiveness of >udgment, as enunciated in :mith2ell and Co v Court of #ppeals

I((ue:?+3 the decision of the 3-&C and the Court of #ppeals, nding no employer.employee relationship, constitutes res >udicata as a rule on conclusiveness of

>udgment as to preclude the relitigation of the issue of employer.employee

relationship in a subse4uent case led before the petitioner

)e*+:he elements of res >udicata areA (1) the >udgment sought to bar the new actionmust be nal0 () the decision must have been rendered by a court having

>urisdiction over the sub>ect matter and the parties0 (*) the disposition of the casemust be a >udgment on the merits0 and (P) there must be as between the rst andsecond action, identity of parties, sub>ect matter, and causes of action :houldidentity of parties, sub>ect matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases,then res >udicata in its aspect as a Jbar by prior >udgmentJ would apply 5f asbetween the two cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but not identicalcauses of action, then res >udicata as Jconclusiveness of >udgmentJ applies

erily, the principle of res >udicata in the mode of Jconclusiveness of >udgmentJapplies in this case he rst element is present in this case he 3-&C ruling wasaBrmed by the Court of #ppeals 5t was a >udicial aBrmation through a decisionduly promulgated and rendered nal and e%ecutory when no appeal was undertaenwithin the reglementary period he >urisdiction of the 3-&C, which is a 4uasi.

>udicial body, was undisputed 3either can the >urisdiction of the Court of #ppealsover the 3-&C decision be the sub>ect of a dispute he 3-&C case was clearlydecided on its merits0 liewise on the merits was the aBrmance of the 3-&C by theCourt of #ppeals

?ith respect to the fourth element of identity of parties, we hold that there issubstantial compliance

he parties in ::C and 3-&C cases are not strictly identical &i@al /oultry wasimpleaded as additional respondent in the ::C case 'urisprudence however doesnot dictate absolute identity but only substantial identity here is substantialidentity of parties when there is a community of interest between a party in the rstcase and a party in the second case, even if the latter was not impleaded in the rstcase


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# case in point is :mith 2ell and Co v Court of #ppealsI which, contrary to ::C, isapt and proper reference :mith 2ell availed of the services of private respondentsto transport cargoes from the pier to the companyFs warehouse Cases were ledagainst :mith 2ell, one for illegal dismissal before the 3-&C and the other one withthe ::C, to direct :mith 2ell to report all private respondents to the ::: for

coverage ?hile the ::C case was pending before the Court of #ppeals, :mith 2ellpresented the resolution of the :upreme Court in N& 3o -.PP;, which aBrmedthe 3-&C, :ecretary of -abor, and Court of #ppeals" nding that no employer.employee relationship e%isted between the parties, to constitute as bar to the ::Ccase ?e granted the petition of :mith 2ell and ordered the dismissal of the case?e held that the controversy is s4uarely covered by the principle of res >udicata,particularly under the rule on Jconclusiveness of >udgmentJ herefore, the

>udgment in N& 3o -.PP; bars the ::C case, as the relief sought in the lattercase is ine%tricably related to the ruling in N& 3o -.PP; to the eect thatprivate respondents are not employees of :mith 2ell

UNIVERSIT< PLANS# INC. VS. SOLANO;

G.R. No. 17%41,; /u0e $$# $%11

F&'(:&espondents led before the -abor #rbiter complaints for illegal dismissal, illegaldeductions, overriding commissions, unfair labor practice, moral and e%emplarydamages, and actual damages against petitioner 7niversity /lans 5ncorporated

he -abor #rbiter found petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal and orderedrespondentsF reinstatement as well as the payment of their full bacwages,proportionate 1*th month pay, moralEe%emplary damages, and attorneyFs fees

/etitioner appealed the Decision of the -# to the 3-&C and led its Memorandum on#ppeal as well as a Motion to &educe 2ond :imultaneous with the ling of saidpleadings, it posted a cash bond in the amount of /*,

5n its Motion to &educe 2ond, petitioner alleged that it was under receivership andthat it cannot dispose of its assets at such a short notice 2ecause of this, it couldnot post the re4uired bond 3evertheless, it has /*, available for immediatedisposition and thus prayed that said amount be deemed suBcient to satisfy there4uired bond for the perfection of its appeal he 3-&C denied petitionerFs Motionto &educe 2ond and directed it to post an additional appeal bond in the amount of/*,1*,I99I within an une%tendible period of 1 days from notice, otherwise theappeal shall be dismissed for non.perfection

he 3-&C denied petitionerFs motion for reconsideration ratiocinating that while ithas the discretion to reduce the appeal bond, it is nevertheless not persuaded thatpetitioner was incapable of posting the re4uired bond 5t noted that petitioner failedto submit any nancial statement or provide details anent its alleged receivership orits sources of income

7nsatised, petitioner went to the C# through a /etition forCertiorari he C#upheld the 3-&C &esolution


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I((ue:?hether or not the 3-&C erred in not considering the merit or lac of merit ofpetitioner"s Motion to &educe 2ond

)e*+:

here is merit in the petition

The NLRC erred in not considering the merit or lac) o" merit o" petitioner*s+otion to Reduce Bond./etitioner attached to its Motion to &educe 2ond the :$C +rders dated #ugust *,1999 and May *, he +rder of #ugust *, 1999 is a Cease and Desist +rderwhich, among others, prohibited the oBcers and agents of petitioner fromwithdrawing from its trust funds or from maing any disposition thereof and,ordered the free@e of all its assets and properties +n the other hand, the May *, +rder placed 7/5, 5nc under the management and control of a &$C$5$&

rom the said :$C +rders, it is unmistaable that petitioner was under receivership

#nd from the tenor and contents of said +rders, it is possible that petitioner has noli4uid asset which it could use to post the re4uired amount of bond #lso, it is 4uiteunderstandable that because of petitionerFs nancial state, it cannot raise theamount of more than /* million within a period of 1 days from receipt of the -abor#rbiterFs >udgment

!owever, the 3-&C ignored petitionerFs allegations and instead remained adamantthat since the amount of bond is %ed by law, petitioner must post an additionalbond of more than /* million his, to us, is an utter disregard of the provision of the-abor Code and of the 3-&C &evised &ules of /rocedure allowing the reduction ofbond in meritorious cases ?hile the 3-&C tried to correct this error in its March 1,* &esolution by further e%plaining that it was not persuaded by petitionerFsalleged incapability of posting the re4uired amount of bond for failure to submitnancial statement, list of sources of income and other details with respect to thealleged receivership, we still nd the hasty denial of the motion to reduce bond notproper

3otwithstanding petitionerFs failure to submit its nancial statement and list ofsources of income and to give more details relative to its receivership, it wasnevertheless able to show through the abovementioned :$C +rders that it wasindeed under a state of receivership his should have been suBcient reason for the3-&C to not outrightly deny petitionerFs motion #s to the lacing documents anddetails on the receivership, it is true that they are needed by the 3-&C indetermining petitionerFs capacity to post the re4uired amount of bond !owever,their absence should not lead to the outright denial of the motion since as earlierdiscussed, the 3-&C is not precluded from conducting a preliminary determinationon the merit or lac of merit of a motion to reduce bond !ere, considering the clearshowing of petitionerFs state of receivership, the 3-&C should have conducted suchpreliminary determination and therein re4uire the submission of said documentsand other necessary evidence before proceeding to resolve the sub>ect motion#fter all, the present case falls under those cases where the bond re4uirement onappeal may be rela%ed considering that (1) there was substantial compliance with


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the &ules0 () the surrounding facts and circumstances constitute meritoriousgrounds to reduce the bond0 and (*) the petitioner, at the very least, e%hibited itswillingness andEor good faith by posting a partial bond during the reglementaryperiod #lso, such a procedure would be in eeping with the -abor CodeFs mandateto use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedilyand ob>ectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the

interest of due process ?e thus nd error on the part of the 3-&C when it deniedpetitionerFs Motion to &educe 2ond and liewise on the part of the C# when itaBrmed said denial

5n view of the foregoing, a remand of this case to the 3-&C for the conduct ofpreliminary determination of the merit or lac of merit of petitionerFs Motion to&educe 2ond is proper

PI EMPLOob allegedly because of insubordination, disrespect and absence without leave :hetogether with the 7nion, led a case for illegal dismissal against respondent in theoluntary #rbitrator he # ruled in favour of her, ordering the respondent toreinstate her and award full bacwages

2oth appealed to the C# which aBrmed the #"s decision with modications :tillunsatised, 7y and the 7nion went to :C and alleged that 2/5"s remedy is nota certioraripetition under &ule ;I of the &ules of Court but an appeal from

>udgments, nal orders and resolutions of voluntary arbitrators under &ule P* of the&ules of Court hey also contended that 2/5"s petition is wanting in substance

I((ue:?+3 2/5"s remedy of certiorari petition under &ule ;I is proper

)e*+:V$::ection 1, &ule P1 of the &ules of Court e%plicitly provides that no appeal may betaen from an order of e%ecution, the remedy of an aggrieved party being anappropriate special civil action under &ule ;I of the &ules of Court hus, 2/5correctly availed of the remedy of certiorari under &ule ;I of the &ules of Courtwhen it assailed the December ;, I order of e%ecution of the oluntary#rbitrator

DUP SOUND P)ILS. VS. CA;G.R. No. 1,8317; No9eber $1# $%11

F&'(:/rivate respondent, /ial is an employee of herein petitioner D7/ :ound /hils (D7/)0petitioner an is the owner and manager of D7/ /ial was given the >ob ofJmastering tapeJ0 his main function was to ad>ust the sound level and intensity ofthe music to be recorded as well as arrange the se4uence of the songs to be


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recorded in the cassette tapes /ial got absent from wor because he got sic hefollowing day when he was ready for wor, he was informed by the oBce secretarynot to report for wor until such time that they will advise him to do so #fter threewees without receiving any notice, /ial again called up their oBce his time theoBce secretary advised him to loo for another >ob because, per instruction of an,he is no longer allowed to wor at D7/ /ial led a complaint for illegal dismissal and

prayed for the payment of his unpaid service incentive leave pay, full bacwages,separation pay, moral and e%emplary damages as well as attorneyFs fees

/etitioners D7/ and an denied the material allegations of /ial0 that the latter failedto report for wor following an altercation with his supervisor the previous day andthat /ial called up their oBce and informed the oBce secretary that he will be goingbac to wor on :eptember 16, 1 !owever, he failed to report for wor on thesaid date /etitioners were subse4uently surprised when they learned that /ial leda complaint for illegal dismissal against them0 /ial was never dismissed, instead, itwas his unilateral decision not to wor at D7/ anymore

he -abor #rbiter rendered a decision declaring /ial to have been illegally dismissed

and ordering D7/ and an to reinstate him to his former position and pay himbacwages, cost of living allowance, service incentive leave pay and attorneyFs fees+n appeal, the 3-&C modied the decision by deleting the award of bacwages andattorneyFs fees he 3-&C ruled that there was no illegal dismissal on the part ofD7/ and an, but neither was there abandonment on the part of /ial /ial then leda special civil action forcertiorari with the C# he C# set aside the decision of the3-&C and reinstated the decision of the -#

I((ue:?hether or not /ial was illegally dismissed

)e*+:

his Court cannot give credence to petitionersF claim that private respondentabandoned his >ob /ial was illegally dismissed

he settled rule in labor cases is that the employer has the burden of proving thatthe employee was not dismissed, or, if dismissed, that the dismissal was not illegal,and failure to discharge the same would mean that the dismissal is not >ustied and,therefore, illegal 5n the instant case, what betrays petitionersF claim that privaterespondent was not dismissed from his employment but instead abandoned his >obis their failure to prove that the latter indeed stopped reporting for wor without any

>ustiable cause or a valid leave of absence

5f private respondent indeed abandoned his >ob, petitioners should have aordedhim due process by serving him written notices, as well as a chance to e%plain hisside, as re4uired by law 5t is settled that, procedurally, if the dismissal is based on a

>ust cause under #rticle 8 of the -abor Code, the employer must give theemployee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if re4uestedby the employee before terminating the employmentA a notice specifying thegrounds for which dismissal is sought, a hearing or an opportunity to be heard and,after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss #gain,petitioners failed to do these hus, the foregoing bolsters private respondentFs


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claim that he did not abandon his wor but was, in fact, dismissed

3either may private respondentFs refusal to report for wor subse4uent to the -#Fsissuance of an order for his reinstatement be considered as another abandonmentof his >ob 5t is a settled rule that failure to report for wor after a notice to return towor has been served does not necessarily constitute abandonment #s dened

under established >urisprudence, abandonment is the deliberate and un>ustiedrefusal of an employee to resume his employment 5t is a form of neglect of duty,hence, a >ust cause for termination of employment by the employer or a validnding of abandonment, these two factors should be presentA (1) the failure toreport for wor or absence without valid or >ustiable reason0 and () a clearintention to sever employer.employee relationship, with the second as the moredeterminative factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may bededuced that the employee has no more intention to wor he intent to discontinuethe employment must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate andun>ustied 5n the instant case, private respondent claimed that his subse4uentrefusal to report for wor despite the -abor #rbiterFs order for his reinstatement isdue to the fact that he was subse4uently made to perform the >ob of a

,bodegero, of which he is unfamiliar and which is totally dierent from his previoustas of Jmastering tapeJ Moreover, he was assigned to a dierent worplace, whichis a warehouse, where he was isolated from all other employees he Court notesthat petitioners failed to refute the foregoing claims of private respondent7nder the e%isting law, an employee who is un>ustly dismissed from wor shall beentitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights #rticle 69 of the -aborCode clearly provides that an employee who is dismissed without >ust cause andwithout due process is entitled to bacwages and reinstatement or payment ofseparation pay in lieu thereof #rticle * of the same Code also provides that anemployee entitled to reinstatement shall either be admitted bac to wor under thesame terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation, or, at theoption of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll 5t is established in

>urisprudence that reinstatement means restoration to a state or condition fromwhich one had been removed or separated he person reinstated assumes theposition he had occupied prior to his dismissal &einstatement presupposes that theprevious position from which one had been removed still e%ists, or that there is anunlled position which is substantially e4uivalent or of similar nature as the onepreviously occupied by the employee

his Court has ruled in many instances that reinstatement is no longer viable where,among others, the relations between the employer and the employee have been soseverely strained, that it is not in the best interest of the parties, nor is it advisableor practical to order reinstatement, or where the employee decides not to bereinstated 5n the instant case, the resulting circumstances show that reinstatementwould be impractical and would hardly promote the best interest of the parties&esentment and enmity between petitioners and private respondent necessarilystrained the relationship between them or even provoed antipathy and antagonismas shown by the acts of the parties subse4uent to the order of reinstatement2esides, private respondent e%pressly prayed for an award of separation pay in lieuof reinstatement from the very start of the proceedings before the -abor #rbiter 2yso doing, he forecloses reinstatement as a relief by implication


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?here reinstatement is no longer viable as an option, separation pay e4uivalent toone (1) month salary for every year of service should be awarded as an alternative

his has been the consistent ruling in the award of separation pay to illegallydismissed employees in lieu of reinstatement

AU/ERO VS. P)IL. COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORP.;

G.R. No. 13484; /0ur! 18# $%1$

F&'(/etitioner started woring for /hilcomsat in 19;6 as an accountant +n #ugust 1I,1 or after *P years of service, he applied for early retirement and the same wasapproved on :eptember 1I, 1 During that time, he was the :enior ice./resident !e e%ecuted a Deed of &elease and Ruitclaim in /hilcomsat"s favor on:eptember 1, with a receipt from the latter of a chec in the amount of /9,P*9, *691#fter almost * years, petitioner led a complaint for unpaidretirement benets claiming that the actual amount of his retirement pay is / 1P,1I, II and the / 9, P*9, *691 that he received as supposed settlement isunconscionable hus, his 4uitclaim must be declared as null and void !e said that

he had no choice but to accept said amount because he was in dire need thereofand he was ready to return to his hometown so he signed the 4uitclaim despite thedeciency as no money would be released if he did not e%ecute a release andwaiver in /hilcomsat"s favor #ccording to him, the letter of /hilcomsat"s chairmanand president addressed to 7C/2 for the release of / 9,P*9,*691 to him and /P,I6I,669 to /hilcomsat, which predated the e%ecution of his 4uitclaim, indicatesthe company"s pre.conceived plans to deprive him of a portion of his retirement pay

he -# decided in favor of the petitioner and ordered /hilcomsat to pay him /P,I6I,669and / 6P,8I as balance of his retirement benets and salary forthe period from #ugust 1I to :eptember 1I, 1 /etitioner"s complaint for unpaidretirement benets and salary was dismissed because he failed to provethat /hilcomsat employed means to vitiate his consent to the 4uitclaim/hilcomsat"s appeal to the 3-&C from -#"s decision was led and its surety bondposted beyond the prescribed period of 1 days but since it was only one daydelayed, the 3-&C disregard the procedural lapse Y proceeded with the appeal/etitioner later led for a petition for certiorari accusing 3&-C with grave abuseof discretion for proceeding despite respondent"s belated appeal !e claimed thatwhen /hilcomsat led its appeal and posted its surety bond, -#"s decision becamenal and e%ecutory and the failure of /hilcomsat"s counsel to verify the copy doesnot constitute e%cusable negligence he C# however, found no merit in the claim ofpetitioner and ruled that the 3-&C was correct in upholding the validity of the4uitclaim because the terms of the Deed of &elease and Ruitclaim were reasonableand there was no showing that /hilcomsat employed coercion, fraud or undueinSuence upon petitioner to compel him to sign the same

I((ue(:1 ?hether or not the delay in the ling of /hilcomsat"s appeal and posting of suretybond is ine%cusable0 and ?hether or not the 4uitclaim e%ecuted by the petitioner in /hilcomsat"s favor isvalid, thereby foreclosing his right to institute any claim against /hilcomsat

)e*+:


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he Court rules in /hilcomsat"s favor since procedural rules may be waived ordispensed with in absolutely meritorious cases #ccording to /hilcomsat, whenpetitioner made the e%ecution of the 4uitclaim, it was voluntary !is educationalattainment and the position he occupied also militate against his claim that hewas pressured or coerced into signing the 4uitclaim #bsent any evidence that anyvices of consent is present and considering the petitioner"s position and education,

the 4uitclaim e%ecuted by the petitioner constitutes a valid and binding agreement

:ince petitioner"s claim of fraud and bad faith against /hilcomsat isunsubstantiated, this Courtthus, nds the 4uitclaim to be legitimate waiver he factual issues were determinedby the 3-&C and were aBrmed by the C# /etition is denied

SARONA VS. NLRC;G.R. No. 18"$8%; /0ur! 18# $%1$

F&'(:/etitioner, a security guard in :ceptre since #pril 196;, was ased by :ceptre"s

operations manager on 'une *, to submit a resignation letter as a re4uirementfor an application in &oyale and to ll up an employment application form for thesaid company !e was then assigned at !ighlight Metal Craft 5nc from 'uly 9 to#ugust 8, * and was later transferred to ?ide ?ide ?orld $%press 5nc +n:eptember *, he was informed that his assignment at ???$ 5nc waswithdrawn because &oyale has been allegedly replaced by another security agencywhich he later discovered to be untrue 3evertheless, he was once again assignedat !ighlight Metal sometime in :eptember * and when he reported at &oyale"soBce on +ctober 1, *, he was informed that he would no longer be given anyassignment as instructed by :ceptre"s general manager !e thus led a complaintfor illegal dismissal he -# ruled in petitioner"s favor as he found him illegallydismissed and was not convinced by the respondent"s claim on petitioner"sabandonment&espondents were ordered to pay bacwages computed from the day he wasdismissed up to the promulgation of his decision on May 11, Ihe -# alsoordered for the payment of separation pay but refused to pierce &oyale"s corporateveil

&espondents appealed to the 3-&C claiming that the -# acted with grave abuse ofdiscretion upon ruling on the illegal dismissal of petitioner 3-&C partially aBrmedthe -#"s decision with regard to petitioner"s illegal dismissal and separation pay butmodied the amount of bacwages and limited it to only * months of his last monthsalary reducing /9I, ; to /1I, ; since he wored for &oyale for only 1 monthand * days/etitioner did not appeal to -# but raised the validity of -#"s ndings on piercing&oyale"s corporate personality and computation of his separation pay and suchpetition was dismissed by the 3-&C/etitioner elevated 3-&C"s decision to the C# on a petition for certiorari, and the C#disagreed with the 3-&C"s decision of not proceeding to review the evidence fordetermining if &oyale is :ceptre"s alter ego that would warrant the piercing of itscorporate veil


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I((ue(:1) ?hether or not &oyale"s corporate ction should be pierced for the purpose ofcompelling it to recogni@e the petitioner"s length of service with :ceptre and forholding it liable for the benets that have accrued to him arising from hisemployment with :ceptre0 and) ?hether or not petitioner"s bacwages should be limited to his salary for *

months

)e*+:he doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is applicable on alter ego cases, where acorporation is merely a farce since it is a mere alter ego or business conduit of aperson, or where the corporation is so organi@ed and controlled and its aairs are soconducted as to mae it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or ad>unct ofanother corporation he way on how petitioner was made to resign from :ceptrethen later on made an employee of &oyale, reSects the use of the legal ction of theseparate corporate personality and is an implication of continued employment&oyale is a continuation or successor or :ceptre since the employees of :ceptre andof &oyale are the same and said companies have the same principal place of

business

2ecause petitioner"s rights were violated and his employer has not changed, he isentitled to separation pay which must be computed from the time he was hired untilthe nality of this decision &oyale is also ordered to pay him bacwages from hisdismissal on +ctober 1, * until the nality of this decision !owever, the amountalready received by petitioner from the respondents shall be deducted !e is alsoawarded moral and e%emplary damages amounting to / I, each for hisdismissal which was tainted with bad faith and fraud /etition is granted C#"sdecision is reversed and set aside

SALENGA ET AL. VS. CA;G.R. No. 17441; Februr! 1# $%1$

F&'(:/residentEChief $%ecutive +Bcer (C$+) &ufo Colayco issued an +rder informingpetitioner that, pursuant to the decision of the board of directors of respondentCDC, the position of head e%ecutive assistant the position held by petitioner wasdeclared redundant /etitioner led a Complaint for illegal dismissal with a claim forreinstatement and payment of bac wages, benets, and moral and e%emplarydamages against respondent CDC and Colayco &espondents, represented by the+Bce of the Novernment Corporate Counsel (+NCC), alleged that the 3-&C had no

>urisdiction to entertain the case on the ground that petitioner was a corporateoBcer and, thus, his dismissal was an intra.corporate matter falling properly withinthe >urisdiction of the :ecurities and $%change Commission (:$C) -# Darluciorendered a Decision in favor of petitioner rom the decision, the +CNCC led anappeal with the 3ational -abor &elations Commission (3-&C) via a Memorandum of#ppeal veried and certied by !ilana imbol.&oman, the e%ecutive vice presidentof respondent CDC he petitioner opposed the appeal on the ground that theMemorandum of #ppeal and 'oint #Bdavit were not accompanied by a boardresolution from respondent"s board of directors authori@ing either imbol.&oman or#tty Mallare, or both, to pursue the case or to le the appeal on behalf of


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respondent

I((ue:?hether or not the 3-&C has >urisdiction to entertain the appeal

)e*+:

3-&C has no >urisdiction to entertain the appeal 5t is clear from the 3-&C &ules of/rocedure that appeals must be veried and certied against forum.shopping by theparties.in.interest themselves # corporation can only e%ercise its powers andtransact its business through its board of directors and through its oBcers andagents when authori@ed by a board resolution or its bylaws #bsent the re4uisiteboard resolution, neither imbol.&oman nor #tty Mallari, who signed theMemorandum of #ppeal and 'oint #Bdavit of Declaration allegedly on behalf ofrespondent corporation, may be considered as the urisdiction

LOC)EED DETECTIVE J ATC)MAN AGENC

(11) 2011 nlrc rules of procedure.docx

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