· 1.1 introduction to put into perspective, the effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies (...

Arabic Articles

English Articles

Dhivehi Articles

The lifecycle of ACAS: insights to inform anti-corruption strategyMohammed Veqar Ashraf-Khan

15

Election, democratic legitimacy and regime stability: A case study on the 10th general election in BangladeshS M Abdul Quddus

49

تخريج النوازل املالية وأثرها يف الزكاة بني النظرية والتطبيق

لدكتور السيد الشحات مصيلحي إبراهيم

103

املرافعات الرشعية: دراسة مقارنة بالقانون املالديفي

لدكتور إبراهيم زكريا موىس

134

ދވހރއޖގއ ޙއޖގ އނތޒމތއ ކރމގއ އތބރކރވ ދފށފނނ ނޒމއ ޤއމކރނ: މއސލތކއ ޙއލތއ

އކލލ އސމޢލ، މރޔމ ލއޝ، ފތމތ އބނ، އލ އދމ، އބރހމ ޢލ

153

އޑޓރއލ 155

قواعد النرش 158

ލޔނތއ ޝއޢ ކރމގ އޞލއ އރޝދ 161

Editorial board 8

Editorial Guidelines and Notes to Contributors 10

Editorial 13

Contents

Al-Manhaj: A Journal of Multidisciplinary Research

6

Editorial board

Advisor

Dr. Mohamed Shaheem Ali Saeed ChancellorIslamic University of Maldives

Chief Editor

Al Usthaza Aishath Khaleela Abdul Sattar,Vice Chancellor, Islamic University of Maldives

Board Members

Dr. Mariyam Shahuneeza Naseer, Deputy Vice Chancellor (Research and Innovation), Islamic University of Maldives

Ustaza Hawwa LatheefDeputy Vice Chancellor (Academic Affairs)Islamic University of Maldives

Dr. Aishath Reesha Dean, Kulliyyah of EducationIslamic University of Maldives

Ustaz Ahmed SaleemDean, Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences, Islamic University of Maldives

Ustaz Mohamed Shujau Abdul HakeemDean, Kulliyyah of Shariah and LawIslamic University of Maldives

Ustaz Ishaq Mohamed FulhuDean, Kulliyyah of Arabic LanguageIslamic University of Maldives

Dr. Hassan Mohamed Al KordiSenior Lecturer, Kulliyyah of Shariah and LawIslamic University of Maldives

Dr. Ali ShameemPresident, Civil Service Commission

Dr. Mizna MohamedENDEVOR (NGO) and an environment consultant for ADB

Editor

Dr. Dheeba MoosaDean, Center for Research and Publication Islamic University of Maldives

Islamic University of Maldives

Volume 2 Number 1September 2018

7

International Advisory Board

Dr. Katherine BullockCanada

Dr. Manzoor AlamIndia Dr. Fathi Malkawi Jordan

Center for Research and PublicationIslamic University of MaldivesKing Fahd BuildingViolet Magu, HenveiruMale’, MaldivesFax:+(960) 3317660Phone: +(960) 3022150Email: [email protected]

Dr. Anas Zarka Kuwait

Professor Ibrahim Zakyi USA Professor Anis Ahmad Pakistan


8

Overview. Al-Manhaj is the double-blind peer reviewed academic journal published by Center for Research and Publication, Islamic University of Maldives. Al-Manhaj aims to publish high quality research that can disseminate and advance knowledge in diverse areas and fields. The journal allows submission of research articles in three language; English, Dhivehi and Arabic so as to reach both the local community and the international community.

Purpose. The purpose of Al-Manhaj is to disseminate timely knowledge from a broad range of disciplines including Islamic studies and social sciences. The reason for keeping this broad spectrum is to provide a platform for the University postgraduate students and staff to publish and engage in scholarly academic discussions relevant to the local community as well as internationally. The generalist approach also aims to appeal to a wider audience with sub-disciplinary interests.

Frequency. The journal will be published once a year in March, initially only in print form.

Criteria for publication. To be published in Al-Manhaj, a manuscript must meet the following general criteria;

− Provide strong evidence for its conclusions − Novel or original ideas − Must be of extreme significance to the specific field − Interesting to other researchers in the field − Advance understanding to influence thinking in the field

Manuscript submission. Manuscripts for publication should be sent to [email protected]. Manuscripts should have one and a half line spacing, with ample margins and should be written

Editorial Guidelines and Notes to Contributors



9

in Microsoft word or Rich Text Format. To enable us to anonymize for reviewing please highlight any reference to the author and any acknowledgements that may indicate the author’s identity. If there multiple authors, indicate the author who will check proofs and receive correspondence. All pages must be numbered and avoid footnotes to the text wherever this is reasonably possible.

Content. Al-Manhaj seeks to publish a wide range of scholarly contributions including;

Research Reports. Original research reports that advance our knowledge of a given field. These articles should be no longer than 9000 words in length, including abstract of between 100-150 words, key words, footnotes, references and also approximations for figures and tables . Articles submitted for publication should not have been published elsewhere.

Review Articles. Articles providing an overview of existing literature in a field, often identifying specific problems or issues and analyzing information from available published work.

Perspective, opinion and commentary. Perspective articles provide scholarly discussions and reviews regarding key concepts and most prevalent ideas in various fields. Opinion articles provide constructive criticism to promote discussion concerning current issues in different fields. Commentary are short articles that draw attention to or present a criticism of a previously published article, book, or report, explaining why it interested them and how it might be illuminating for readers. Perspective, opinion and commentary articles should be between 1000 to 1500 words long. An abstract is not required in articles submitted to the perspective, opinion and commentary section and it will also not be peer reviewed. Referencing style.Al-Manhaj uses the referencing and style conventions of the American Psychological Association.


10

Peer Review.Al-Manhaj is a double-blind peer reviewed journal, therefore, all manuscripts submitted to the journal are reviewed by two referees with the exception of submissions to section dealing with perspectives, opinion and commentary.

Copyright. Authors must vest or license copyright in their articles (abstracts included) in Al-Manhaj to enable us to have full copyright protection. If authors are to use any of the materials elsewhere thereafter, permission from Al-Manhaj must be sought. The authors also must get necessary permission if they are to reproduce materials already published.

Language Editing. Prior to submitting the manuscript be edited for language. This is to ensure that the academic content of your paper is fully understood by journal editors and reviewers. Language editing does not guarantee that your manuscript will be accepted for publication.



11

In the name of Allah, the entirely merciful, the especially merciful

All praise to Allah who revealed the true path supported with firm evidence. Peace and blessings be upon our prophet Muhammad who guided us to that path; and upon his family and companions.

It is a great pleasure to see this current issue of Al-Manhaj – the annual research journal of the Islamic University of Maldives – published with many important research articles tackling issues relevant to the Maldives. Indeed, this is a sign of the journal maintaining and improving its intellectual standard. It also indicates its growing popularity with scholars and researchers.

This issue includes research on the management of Hajj for Maldivian pilgrims. One major theme centers around the importance of transparent and trustworthy mechanisms related to the management of Hajj. Problems with the allocation of quotas for Hajj organizers, charging of indefinite amounts in fees, and the quality of services that are provided to pilgrims are addressed. In addition, the research also examines the Hajj Corporation’s objectives and the extent to which they have been achieved.

This issue also includes a useful article on Zakah – one of the most important pillars of Islam. It evaluates contemporary issues faced in distributing Zakah to the relevant recipients and the different perspectives on addressing those issues. The current issue of Al- Manhaj is also enriched by a study on the comparison between the civil procedures in Islamic Shariah and civil procedures followed in the Maldivian Judicial justice system. This, and other such studies are of utmost importance – for students of law and jurisprudence, professionals in legal and judicial fields, and the wider community.

Editorial


12

We thank all researchers and scholars who have contributed to this issue. We also thank all staff and members of the editorial board who exerted tremendous effort by the grace of Allah almighty in the initiation of this journal. We express our high hope that Insha Allah, this journal would be a guide for seekers of knowledge via Dhivehi, Arabic and English.

Dr. Ibrahim Zakariyya MoosaDean, Center for Post graduate Studies

The lifecycle of ACAS: insights to inform anti-corruption strategy

MOHAMMED VEQAR ASHRAF-KHAN Open University of Mauritius, Mauritius

Abstract

This article focuses on the lifecycle of anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) to understand the realities of ACAs which can assist in designing suitable strategies to make ACAs effective. A literature review approach was adopted as it assisted in interpreting previous studies and because no such review has been conducted before. Two major studies, namely Doig, Watt and Williams (2005) and Batory (2012), formed the foundation for this article. The main findings from this study are the description of the three main stages that an ACA goes through during its existence. The first stage, Establishment, describes the overall anti-corruption strategy. The second stage describes the Anti-Anti-Corruption Campaign which arises due to retaliation from those who feel threatened by the ACA. Following from the above two stages, the stakeholders start with hopeful feelings to finally resigning to Disillusionment (the third stage). This study concludes by proposing a model that predicts the reactions of stakeholders throughout the different stages of the lifecycle of an ACA. This model is based on the hostilities, volatilities and the different stages of the lifecycle of an ACA with the possible reactions from two types of stakeholders (dishonest and honest). The benefit of using this model rests in providing a different perspective to extend the vision for policy makers to maximise the advantages of combining the ACA lifecycle with the stakeholders’ potential perceptions. This study also recommends further research to identify factors at each stage of the lifecycle and enhance the model.

Keywords: anti-corruption agencies, literature review, lifecycle, stakeholders, disillusionment

*E-mail: [email protected]



13

The lifecycle of ACAS: insights to inform anti-corruption strategy

MOHAMMED VEQAR ASHRAF-KHAN Open University of Mauritius, Mauritius

Abstract

This article focuses on the lifecycle of anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) to understand the realities of ACAs which can assist in designing suitable strategies to make ACAs effective. A literature review approach was adopted as it assisted in interpreting previous studies and because no such review has been conducted before. Two major studies, namely Doig, Watt and Williams (2005) and Batory (2012), formed the foundation for this article. The main findings from this study are the description of the three main stages that an ACA goes through during its existence. The first stage, Establishment, describes the overall anti-corruption strategy. The second stage describes the Anti-Anti-Corruption Campaign which arises due to retaliation from those who feel threatened by the ACA. Following from the above two stages, the stakeholders start with hopeful feelings to finally resigning to Disillusionment (the third stage). This study concludes by proposing a model that predicts the reactions of stakeholders throughout the different stages of the lifecycle of an ACA. This model is based on the hostilities, volatilities and the different stages of the lifecycle of an ACA with the possible reactions from two types of stakeholders (dishonest and honest). The benefit of using this model rests in providing a different perspective to extend the vision for policy makers to maximise the advantages of combining the ACA lifecycle with the stakeholders’ potential perceptions. This study also recommends further research to identify factors at each stage of the lifecycle and enhance the model.

Keywords: anti-corruption agencies, literature review, lifecycle, stakeholders, disillusionment

*E-mail: [email protected]


14

1.1 INTRODUCTION

To put into perspective, the effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies (ACAs), this

study takes a retrospective look at ACAs and their mandates, composition, success

or failure, in short, the lifecycle of ACAs. Doig, Watt and Williams (2005, p 4)

introduced this notion and suggested that most new agencies pass through the

stages of “Initial high expectations...ACC unable to meet unrealistic

expectations...Cuts in funding and impaired organisational development...(and)

Stakeholder disillusionment”. Batory (2012, p. 647) elaborated on the “divergent

outcomes” in the ACA’s lifecycles: “development, stagnation and termination.”

This study elaborates on the stages by bringing in further real examples of the

different events as experienced by ACAs in Asia, Africa, Europe and elsewhere.

This study also introduces the term “anti-anti-corruption campaign” to illustrate

the retaliation faced by almost every performing ACA.

An ACA can become a great weapon in the anti-corruption efforts (TI, 2014).

However, the effects of an ACA’s action may be subtler and may manifest in the

long term, improved perceptions over time by citizens and watchdogs, better

knowledge about the ill-effects of corrupt activities and greater understanding of

the need for longer term impact and planning for the future (Byrne et al., 2010).

There have been many instances of successful ACAs in Australia, Botswana,

Hong Kong, Singapore and South Africa (De Sousa, 2010; De Speville, 2010;

UNDP, 2011). Singapore’s Corrupt Practices and Investigations Bureau (CPIB)

and Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) are

prime examples of successful ACAs (De Sousa 2010; De Speville, 2010).

Moreover, Eastern European countries have focused on strengthening anti-

corruption efforts in public administration. UNDP Country Offices in this region

documented various anti-corruption activities to look into corruption in major

departments (e.g. Kosovo’s judiciary sector), endorse ACAs and encourage

collective activities by utilizing information and communication technologies

(e.g. Albania and Ukraine) (UNDP, 2011).

The essential feature is not that the benefits are derived from one single agency,

but rather that the country and its citizens benefit significantly when there is an

ACA in that country. “No single institution can successfully eradicate corruption

on its own and... combating corruption requires a multi-faceted approach, which

strengthens all pillars of a national integrity system” (Khemani, 2009, p. 33).

Expanding on Doig, Watt and Williams’ (2005, p. 4) notion of the “lifecycle” of

an ACA, the following stages are examined, as illustrated in Figure 1 below: the

Establishment Period (which includes the pre-setup environment, the actual set

up and the ensuing activities), the Anti-Anti-Corruption Campaign (which

includes hostilities and volatilities) and finally the Stakeholders’ Disillusionment

Stage.

Figure 1. Lifecycle of ACAs.

Source: Adapted from Doig, Watt and Williams (2005) and Batory (2012)

This article is organised as follows: Section 2.1 describes the methodology used;

Section 3.1. elaborates the Establishment Period; Section 4.1 describes the Anti-

Anti-Corruption Campaign; Section 5.1 explains the Stakeholders’

Disillusionment Stage and Section 6.1 concludes on how the appreciation of the

lifecycle can be used as a building block in the development of anti-corruption

strategy.

Establishment Anti-Anti-Corruption Campaign

Stakeholders' Disillusionment



15

1.1 INTRODUCTION

To put into perspective, the effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies (ACAs), this

study takes a retrospective look at ACAs and their mandates, composition, success

or failure, in short, the lifecycle of ACAs. Doig, Watt and Williams (2005, p 4)

introduced this notion and suggested that most new agencies pass through the

stages of “Initial high expectations...ACC unable to meet unrealistic

expectations...Cuts in funding and impaired organisational development...(and)

Stakeholder disillusionment”. Batory (2012, p. 647) elaborated on the “divergent

outcomes” in the ACA’s lifecycles: “development, stagnation and termination.”

This study elaborates on the stages by bringing in further real examples of the

different events as experienced by ACAs in Asia, Africa, Europe and elsewhere.

This study also introduces the term “anti-anti-corruption campaign” to illustrate

the retaliation faced by almost every performing ACA.

An ACA can become a great weapon in the anti-corruption efforts (TI, 2014).

However, the effects of an ACA’s action may be subtler and may manifest in the

long term, improved perceptions over time by citizens and watchdogs, better

knowledge about the ill-effects of corrupt activities and greater understanding of

the need for longer term impact and planning for the future (Byrne et al., 2010).

There have been many instances of successful ACAs in Australia, Botswana,

Hong Kong, Singapore and South Africa (De Sousa, 2010; De Speville, 2010;

UNDP, 2011). Singapore’s Corrupt Practices and Investigations Bureau (CPIB)

and Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) are

prime examples of successful ACAs (De Sousa 2010; De Speville, 2010).

Moreover, Eastern European countries have focused on strengthening anti-

corruption efforts in public administration. UNDP Country Offices in this region

documented various anti-corruption activities to look into corruption in major

departments (e.g. Kosovo’s judiciary sector), endorse ACAs and encourage

collective activities by utilizing information and communication technologies

(e.g. Albania and Ukraine) (UNDP, 2011).

The essential feature is not that the benefits are derived from one single agency,

but rather that the country and its citizens benefit significantly when there is an

ACA in that country. “No single institution can successfully eradicate corruption

on its own and... combating corruption requires a multi-faceted approach, which

strengthens all pillars of a national integrity system” (Khemani, 2009, p. 33).

Expanding on Doig, Watt and Williams’ (2005, p. 4) notion of the “lifecycle” of

an ACA, the following stages are examined, as illustrated in Figure 1 below: the

Establishment Period (which includes the pre-setup environment, the actual set

up and the ensuing activities), the Anti-Anti-Corruption Campaign (which

includes hostilities and volatilities) and finally the Stakeholders’ Disillusionment

Stage.

Figure 1. Lifecycle of ACAs.

Source: Adapted from Doig, Watt and Williams (2005) and Batory (2012)

This article is organised as follows: Section 2.1 describes the methodology used;

Section 3.1. elaborates the Establishment Period; Section 4.1 describes the Anti-

Anti-Corruption Campaign; Section 5.1 explains the Stakeholders’

Disillusionment Stage and Section 6.1 concludes on how the appreciation of the

lifecycle can be used as a building block in the development of anti-corruption

strategy.

Establishment Anti-Anti-Corruption Campaign

Stakeholders' Disillusionment


16

2.1 METHODOLOGY

This article examines the lifecycle of ACAs, so as to establish insights into its

relevance in devising strategies for managing ACAs effectively. To offer insights,

a literature review approach was adopted because “the most common technique

in management research is the traditional literature review in which the researcher

summarises and interprets previous contributions in a subjective and narrative

fashion” (Denyer & Tranfield, 2006, p. 216). The value of this approach lies in

the fact that to date there has been no other comprehensive literature review

focused on describing the lifecycle of an ACA.

The literature search involved the selection of academic articles from

internationally recognised databases: EBSCO, Emerald, ProQuest, Sage, JSTOR,

Taylor and Francis. The search was conducted using the terms “anti-corruption

agencies” (in a variety of diverse forms, for instance, authorities, bodies,

commissions etc.) appearing in the title, abstract or keywords of the article.

Moreover, there are numerous key authors who regularly research on ACAs and

hence, another line of action involved searching the names of authors such as Alan

Doig, Luis de Sousa and Gabriel Kuris. The titles, abstracts and keywords of all

the retrieved articles were perused to ensure the articles were relevant and hence

included in the study.

Two major studies, namely Doig, Watt and Williams (2005) and Batory (2012),

(with Google Scholar citations of 66 and 25 respectively), formed the foundation

of this article and drove this research as they described the lifecycle in detail. The

other selected articles were perused thoroughly to get the essence of their findings

and then they were consulted as and when they provided real examples or more

elaboration in respect of a stage of the lifecycle.

Furthermore, as and when ACAs were mentioned by the academic articles, the

official websites of those ACAs were consulted and the relevant documents (like

their legislations and Annual Reports) were downloaded and perused.

3.1 ESTABLISHMENT PERIOD

Usually, ACAs are created with great optimism and fanfare (Byrne et al., 2010).

The initiative is generated by a new government which is elected because of its

focus on reform. The establishment of ACAs is perceived as positive and usually

supported by the citizens.

This section follows the format below and describes the national strategies that

are developed and the ensuing phases as the ACA is set up and begins its various

mandated activities:

3.1.1. Anti-Corruption Strategies

Anti-corruption efforts require approaches which will implement strong

mechanisms to make corrupt behaviours costly and difficult. The main strategies

recognised by most anti-corruption instruments include prevention,

criminalisation, international co-operation and asset recovery (ADB, 2010;

UNCAC, 2003). In respect of asset recovery, Article 53 of UNCAC (2003, pp.

43-44), recommends implementing processes “(a)...to initiate civil action in its

courts to establish title to or ownership of property acquired through the

commission of an offence ...(b)...to order those who have committed offences...to

pay compensation or damages...and (c)...when having to decide on confiscation,

to recognize another State Party’s claim as a legitimate owner of property

acquired through the commission of an offence established in accordance with

Anti-Corruption Strategies → Setup of the ACA → ACA Activities



17

2.1 METHODOLOGY

This article examines the lifecycle of ACAs, so as to establish insights into its

relevance in devising strategies for managing ACAs effectively. To offer insights,

a literature review approach was adopted because “the most common technique

in management research is the traditional literature review in which the researcher

summarises and interprets previous contributions in a subjective and narrative

fashion” (Denyer & Tranfield, 2006, p. 216). The value of this approach lies in

the fact that to date there has been no other comprehensive literature review

focused on describing the lifecycle of an ACA.

The literature search involved the selection of academic articles from

internationally recognised databases: EBSCO, Emerald, ProQuest, Sage, JSTOR,

Taylor and Francis. The search was conducted using the terms “anti-corruption

agencies” (in a variety of diverse forms, for instance, authorities, bodies,

commissions etc.) appearing in the title, abstract or keywords of the article.

Moreover, there are numerous key authors who regularly research on ACAs and

hence, another line of action involved searching the names of authors such as Alan

Doig, Luis de Sousa and Gabriel Kuris. The titles, abstracts and keywords of all

the retrieved articles were perused to ensure the articles were relevant and hence

included in the study.

Two major studies, namely Doig, Watt and Williams (2005) and Batory (2012),

(with Google Scholar citations of 66 and 25 respectively), formed the foundation

of this article and drove this research as they described the lifecycle in detail. The

other selected articles were perused thoroughly to get the essence of their findings

and then they were consulted as and when they provided real examples or more

elaboration in respect of a stage of the lifecycle.

Furthermore, as and when ACAs were mentioned by the academic articles, the

official websites of those ACAs were consulted and the relevant documents (like

their legislations and Annual Reports) were downloaded and perused.

3.1 ESTABLISHMENT PERIOD

Usually, ACAs are created with great optimism and fanfare (Byrne et al., 2010).

The initiative is generated by a new government which is elected because of its

focus on reform. The establishment of ACAs is perceived as positive and usually

supported by the citizens.

This section follows the format below and describes the national strategies that

are developed and the ensuing phases as the ACA is set up and begins its various

mandated activities:

3.1.1. Anti-Corruption Strategies

Anti-corruption efforts require approaches which will implement strong

mechanisms to make corrupt behaviours costly and difficult. The main strategies

recognised by most anti-corruption instruments include prevention,

criminalisation, international co-operation and asset recovery (ADB, 2010;

UNCAC, 2003). In respect of asset recovery, Article 53 of UNCAC (2003, pp.

43-44), recommends implementing processes “(a)...to initiate civil action in its

courts to establish title to or ownership of property acquired through the

commission of an offence ...(b)...to order those who have committed offences...to

pay compensation or damages...and (c)...when having to decide on confiscation,

to recognize another State Party’s claim as a legitimate owner of property

acquired through the commission of an offence established in accordance with

Anti-Corruption Strategies → Setup of the ACA → ACA Activities


18

this Convention.” These strategies aim to reduce the opportunities for corruption,

promote transparency in public and private affairs and raise public awareness

about the dangers of corruption.

3.1.2. Setup of the ACA

As part of the overall strategy, countries establish ACAs to conduct the main

activities (De Sousa, 2010; UNCAC, 2003). The first anti-corruption commission

was set up in Singapore in 1952, followed by Malaysia and Hong Kong, giving

Asia the reputation as the “cradle” of ACAs (TI, 2014). ACAs often emerge in a

context of corruption scandals and are regarded by most stakeholders as the

ultimate response to corruption (TI, 2014).

ACAs function successfully together with effective and complementary public

bodies (Doig, Watt & Williams, 2005). The most basic requirements include:

clear and relevant mission, appropriate business planning, budgeting and

performance measurement systems, adequate resources and enabling legal

frameworks which provide the ACAs with powers for investigative and

preventive functions (Doig & Norris, 2012).

3.1.2.1. Legal Framework

Most ACAs are created through legislations that provide substantive and

procedural rules to address the prevention and detection of corruption (Doig &

Norris, 2012; UNCAC, 2003). These legal frameworks usually include, among

others, definition of corruption offences and the right to access information by the

investigatory bodies.

Table 1 below shows a sample of the ACAs that are used to describe the lifecycle

of ACAs. The laws creating the ACAs are also described and the specific sections

of these laws will be illustrated for each stage of the lifecycle.

Countries Anti-Corruption Agencies Basic Anti-Corruption Laws

1 BHUTAN Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) Anti-Corruption Act, 2011

2 HONG KONG

Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC)

Independent Commission Against Corruption Ordinance, 1997

3 INDIA Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003

4 MALAWI Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) Corrupt Practices Act, 1995

5 MALAYSIA Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC)

Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 2009 (Act 694)

6 MAURITIUS Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC)

Prevention of Corruption Act, 2002

7 PAKISTAN National Accountability Bureau (NAB) National Accountability Ordinance, 1999

8 RWANDA Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman)

Law No. 76/2013 of 11/9/2013

9 SIERRA LEONE

Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) Anti-Corruption Act, 2008

10 SINGAPORE Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB)

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1960, revised 1993

Mauritius’ Prevention of Corruption Act (2002), established the Independent

Commission Against Corruption using Hong Kong’s ICAC’s strategy of “three-

pronged approach...combining investigation, prevention, and education” (Kuris,

2013, p. 4). In Brazil, the National Strategy to Combat Corruption and Money

Laundering (ENCCLA) was established in 2003 through Presidential Decree

(Carson & Prado, 2014).

3.1.2.2. Composition

The way that the ACAs are structured varies. Rwanda’s Ombudsman is composed

of the Chief Ombudsman and two Assistant Ombudsmen who are chosen by the

Cabinet and the choices are submitted to the Senate. After being approved, the

candidates are appointed by Presidential order (Ombudsman-Rwanda, 2017). In

Mauritius, the ICAC is administered by a Board, composed of a Chairperson and



19

this Convention.” These strategies aim to reduce the opportunities for corruption,

promote transparency in public and private affairs and raise public awareness

about the dangers of corruption.

3.1.2. Setup of the ACA

As part of the overall strategy, countries establish ACAs to conduct the main

activities (De Sousa, 2010; UNCAC, 2003). The first anti-corruption commission

was set up in Singapore in 1952, followed by Malaysia and Hong Kong, giving

Asia the reputation as the “cradle” of ACAs (TI, 2014). ACAs often emerge in a

context of corruption scandals and are regarded by most stakeholders as the

ultimate response to corruption (TI, 2014).

ACAs function successfully together with effective and complementary public

bodies (Doig, Watt & Williams, 2005). The most basic requirements include:

clear and relevant mission, appropriate business planning, budgeting and

performance measurement systems, adequate resources and enabling legal

frameworks which provide the ACAs with powers for investigative and

preventive functions (Doig & Norris, 2012).

3.1.2.1. Legal Framework

Most ACAs are created through legislations that provide substantive and

procedural rules to address the prevention and detection of corruption (Doig &

Norris, 2012; UNCAC, 2003). These legal frameworks usually include, among

others, definition of corruption offences and the right to access information by the

investigatory bodies.

Table 1 below shows a sample of the ACAs that are used to describe the lifecycle

of ACAs. The laws creating the ACAs are also described and the specific sections

of these laws will be illustrated for each stage of the lifecycle.

Countries Anti-Corruption Agencies Basic Anti-Corruption Laws

1 BHUTAN Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) Anti-Corruption Act, 2011

2 HONG KONG

Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC)

Independent Commission Against Corruption Ordinance, 1997

3 INDIA Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003

4 MALAWI Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) Corrupt Practices Act, 1995

5 MALAYSIA Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC)

Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 2009 (Act 694)

6 MAURITIUS Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC)

Prevention of Corruption Act, 2002

7 PAKISTAN National Accountability Bureau (NAB) National Accountability Ordinance, 1999

8 RWANDA Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman)

Law No. 76/2013 of 11/9/2013

9 SIERRA LEONE

Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) Anti-Corruption Act, 2008

10 SINGAPORE Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB)

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1960, revised 1993

Mauritius’ Prevention of Corruption Act (2002), established the Independent

Commission Against Corruption using Hong Kong’s ICAC’s strategy of “three-

pronged approach...combining investigation, prevention, and education” (Kuris,

2013, p. 4). In Brazil, the National Strategy to Combat Corruption and Money

Laundering (ENCCLA) was established in 2003 through Presidential Decree

(Carson & Prado, 2014).

3.1.2.2. Composition

The way that the ACAs are structured varies. Rwanda’s Ombudsman is composed

of the Chief Ombudsman and two Assistant Ombudsmen who are chosen by the

Cabinet and the choices are submitted to the Senate. After being approved, the

candidates are appointed by Presidential order (Ombudsman-Rwanda, 2017). In

Mauritius, the ICAC is administered by a Board, composed of a Chairperson and


20

two other members who are appointed by the Prime Minister after consultation

with the Leader of the Opposition (ICAC-Mauritius, 2017). Members of

Slovenia’s Commission are “nominated and appointed by a complex procedure

involving all branches of power (executive, legislative, and judicial) to minimize

the influence of any one political actor” (Batory, 2012, p. 652).

Schütte (2015) posits that appointment and dismissal of the leaders affect the real

and perceived impartiality of ACAs. This aspect is appropriately discussed in the

following section.

3.1.2.3. Independence

“Independence is fundamental for an effective anticorruption agency” and to be

truly independent, the ACAs should be protected from political interference

(Kpundeh & Levy, 2004, p. 266). The level of independence can vary according

to specific conditions: structural and operational autonomy, as well as its legal

basis. Rwanda’s Ombudsman is guaranteed independence by the Constitution of

the Republic (article 182) which stipulates that the Ombudsman shall be an

independent public Institution (Ombudsman-Rwanda, 2017). Correspondingly,

ACAs in Sierra Leone and Malawi enjoy autonomy as provided for by the laws

establishing them (ACB-Malawi, 2017; ACC-Sierra Leone, 2017).

The independence of ACAs is also determined by the way in which their members

are appointed. Rwanda’s Ombudsman and Assistant Ombudsmen are approved

by the Senate and appointed by Presidential order (Ombudsman-Rwanda, 2017)

and in Sierra Leone, the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner are appointed

by the President and approved by the Parliament (ACC-Sierra Leone, 2017).

Independence may also be affected by the way in which members are removed

from office. In Rwanda, the Ombudsman and Assistant Ombudsmen can be

removed by the Senate when requested by the Cabinet or by one third of the

members of the Senate (Ombudsman-Rwanda, 2017) while in Sierra Leone,

members can be removed by the President but all removals must be confirmed by

Parliament (ACC-Sierra Leone, 2017).

However, appointment by a single politician without any determinant conditions,

as it is for the Director of the ACB in Malawi (ACB-Malawi, 2017), can raise

questions about the independence of that agency. Such a practice may be

considered to be an opportunity for abuse where the politician appoints a person

for his own interests, which goes against the spirit of “genuine anti-corruption

measures” (Kpundeh & Levy, 2004, p. 266). When an ACA’s leader is “appointed

and removed at the whim of a political person or party, the appointee has an

incentive to defer to the will of the appointer” (Schütte, 2015, p. 1).

3.1.2.4. Mandates

An independent ACA should be vested with a clear mandate (TI, 2014). Poland’s

CBA has prevention and coordination mission and it is also mandated to fight

“any activity which may endanger the State’s economic interests” (Batory, 2012,

p. 654). Likewise, Slovenia’s Commission has the mandate to analyse and prevent

corruption and even though “it was not granted power to investigate individual

cases, it was given administrative powers with respect to officials’ asset

declarations and conflicts of interest” (Klemenčič and Stusek, 2008, p. 125).

Rwanda’s Ombudsman is mandated to fight injustice, corruption and related

offences and acts as a connection between institutions and citizens, receive

citizen’s complaints, receive assets declarations and provide advice to the Cabinet

and other institutions (Ombudsman-Rwanda, 2017). Pakistan’s National

Accountability Bureau (NAB) obtains its mandate from the National

Accountability Ordinance which empowers it “to take cognizance of acts

constituting offences of corruption and corrupt practices, eradication of corruption



21

two other members who are appointed by the Prime Minister after consultation

with the Leader of the Opposition (ICAC-Mauritius, 2017). Members of

Slovenia’s Commission are “nominated and appointed by a complex procedure

involving all branches of power (executive, legislative, and judicial) to minimize

the influence of any one political actor” (Batory, 2012, p. 652).

Schütte (2015) posits that appointment and dismissal of the leaders affect the real

and perceived impartiality of ACAs. This aspect is appropriately discussed in the

following section.

3.1.2.3. Independence

“Independence is fundamental for an effective anticorruption agency” and to be

truly independent, the ACAs should be protected from political interference

(Kpundeh & Levy, 2004, p. 266). The level of independence can vary according

to specific conditions: structural and operational autonomy, as well as its legal

basis. Rwanda’s Ombudsman is guaranteed independence by the Constitution of

the Republic (article 182) which stipulates that the Ombudsman shall be an

independent public Institution (Ombudsman-Rwanda, 2017). Correspondingly,

ACAs in Sierra Leone and Malawi enjoy autonomy as provided for by the laws

establishing them (ACB-Malawi, 2017; ACC-Sierra Leone, 2017).

The independence of ACAs is also determined by the way in which their members

are appointed. Rwanda’s Ombudsman and Assistant Ombudsmen are approved

by the Senate and appointed by Presidential order (Ombudsman-Rwanda, 2017)

and in Sierra Leone, the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner are appointed

by the President and approved by the Parliament (ACC-Sierra Leone, 2017).

Independence may also be affected by the way in which members are removed

from office. In Rwanda, the Ombudsman and Assistant Ombudsmen can be

removed by the Senate when requested by the Cabinet or by one third of the

members of the Senate (Ombudsman-Rwanda, 2017) while in Sierra Leone,

members can be removed by the President but all removals must be confirmed by

Parliament (ACC-Sierra Leone, 2017).

However, appointment by a single politician without any determinant conditions,

as it is for the Director of the ACB in Malawi (ACB-Malawi, 2017), can raise

questions about the independence of that agency. Such a practice may be

considered to be an opportunity for abuse where the politician appoints a person

for his own interests, which goes against the spirit of “genuine anti-corruption

measures” (Kpundeh & Levy, 2004, p. 266). When an ACA’s leader is “appointed

and removed at the whim of a political person or party, the appointee has an

incentive to defer to the will of the appointer” (Schütte, 2015, p. 1).

3.1.2.4. Mandates

An independent ACA should be vested with a clear mandate (TI, 2014). Poland’s

CBA has prevention and coordination mission and it is also mandated to fight

“any activity which may endanger the State’s economic interests” (Batory, 2012,

p. 654). Likewise, Slovenia’s Commission has the mandate to analyse and prevent

corruption and even though “it was not granted power to investigate individual

cases, it was given administrative powers with respect to officials’ asset

declarations and conflicts of interest” (Klemenčič and Stusek, 2008, p. 125).

Rwanda’s Ombudsman is mandated to fight injustice, corruption and related

offences and acts as a connection between institutions and citizens, receive

citizen’s complaints, receive assets declarations and provide advice to the Cabinet

and other institutions (Ombudsman-Rwanda, 2017). Pakistan’s National

Accountability Bureau (NAB) obtains its mandate from the National

Accountability Ordinance which empowers it “to take cognizance of acts

constituting offences of corruption and corrupt practices, eradication of corruption


22

and corrupt practices and hold accountable accused persons and matters ancillary

thereto” (NAB, 2016, p. 13).

3.1.2.5. Organisation

ACAs can play their role in the anti-corruption strategies, “provided they have

certain structures, functions and characteristics” (Khemani, 2009, p. 4). It is

crucial to establish “building blocks of effective organisations” such as

“conditions of service, standing orders, operating procedures, financial control

systems and enabling legislation” (Doig, Watt & Williams, 2005, p. 36).

Rwanda’s Ombudsman operates five units: Declaration of Assets Unit verifies the

declarations; Fighting Against Corruption Special Unit investigates corruption

cases; Monitoring of Interdictions and Incompatibilities of Senior Officials Unit

ensures the implementation of the Leadership Code of Conduct; Preventing and

Fighting Injustice Unit prevents injustice by analysing complaints and the

Preventing and Fighting Corruption and Related Offences Unit prevents

corruption by evaluating the functioning of public and private institutions

(Ombudsman-Rwanda, 2017).

Based on their local contexts, ACAs decide on the suitability of centralisation or

decentralisation. For instance, Rwanda’s Ombudsman is centralised, whereas

Malawi’s ACB and Sierra Leone’s ACC have established branch offices,

respectively in Blantyre and Mzuzu (ACB-Malawi, 2017) and Bo and Makeni

region (ACC-Sierra Leone, 2017). Similarly, Pakistan’s NAB has established

regional bureaus in Multan, Karachi, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Rawalpindi and

conducts inspections to “assess system performance...and to measure the degree

of efficiency of work” (NAB, 2016, p. 148).

3.1.2.6. Accountability

An ACA has to be accountable for its actions and one way of achieving this is for

the ACA to be answerable to its parliament because “due to its representative role,

parliament’s legitimate expectations necessarily overlap with those of citizens in

general” (Stone, 2015, p. 163).

Mauritius’ ICAC is accountable, both administratively and judicially. The

Parliamentary Committee ensures administrative accountability of the ICAC by

monitoring and reviewing its activities but does not monitor matters related to any

investigation (ICAC-Mauritius, 2017). The ICAC accounts for its investigative

decisions through a separate mechanism (the judiciary). In matters where the

ICAC considers that an investigation has disclosed prima facie evidence and

considers prosecution, the matter is referred to the Director of Public

Prosecutions. Moreover, cases which are prosecuted before the courts come

naturally under judicial scrutiny and are therefore subject to the Court’s judgments

(ICAC-Mauritius, 2017).

The requirement that ACAs submit their annual reports ensures accountability and

transparency in their operations (Stone, 2015). This is the best tool to establish

and maintain public trust in the agency. Mauritius’ ICAC must submit to the

Parliamentary Committee (ICAC-Mauritius, 2017), Rwanda’s Ombudsman must

submit to both the President and Parliament (Ombudsman-Rwanda, 2017) while

Malawi’s ACB must submit to the National Assembly, the President and the

Cabinet (ACB-Malawi, 2017).

Apart from these formal procedures, the reporting mechanisms also include

sharing information on investigations, through issuing statements to the media,

even at the start of an investigation, as exemplified by the UK’s Serious Fraud

Office, which posted on its website on 1 August 2017 that it “confirms it is



23

and corrupt practices and hold accountable accused persons and matters ancillary

thereto” (NAB, 2016, p. 13).

3.1.2.5. Organisation

ACAs can play their role in the anti-corruption strategies, “provided they have

certain structures, functions and characteristics” (Khemani, 2009, p. 4). It is

crucial to establish “building blocks of effective organisations” such as

“conditions of service, standing orders, operating procedures, financial control

systems and enabling legislation” (Doig, Watt & Williams, 2005, p. 36).

Rwanda’s Ombudsman operates five units: Declaration of Assets Unit verifies the

declarations; Fighting Against Corruption Special Unit investigates corruption

cases; Monitoring of Interdictions and Incompatibilities of Senior Officials Unit

ensures the implementation of the Leadership Code of Conduct; Preventing and

Fighting Injustice Unit prevents injustice by analysing complaints and the

Preventing and Fighting Corruption and Related Offences Unit prevents

corruption by evaluating the functioning of public and private institutions


Based on their local contexts, ACAs decide on the suitability of centralisation or

decentralisation. For instance, Rwanda’s Ombudsman is centralised, whereas

Malawi’s ACB and Sierra Leone’s ACC have established branch offices,

respectively in Blantyre and Mzuzu (ACB-Malawi, 2017) and Bo and Makeni

region (ACC-Sierra Leone, 2017). Similarly, Pakistan’s NAB has established

regional bureaus in Multan, Karachi, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Rawalpindi and

conducts inspections to “assess system performance...and to measure the degree

of efficiency of work” (NAB, 2016, p. 148).

3.1.2.6. Accountability

An ACA has to be accountable for its actions and one way of achieving this is for

the ACA to be answerable to its parliament because “due to its representative role,

parliament’s legitimate expectations necessarily overlap with those of citizens in

general” (Stone, 2015, p. 163).

Mauritius’ ICAC is accountable, both administratively and judicially. The

Parliamentary Committee ensures administrative accountability of the ICAC by

monitoring and reviewing its activities but does not monitor matters related to any

investigation (ICAC-Mauritius, 2017). The ICAC accounts for its investigative

decisions through a separate mechanism (the judiciary). In matters where the

ICAC considers that an investigation has disclosed prima facie evidence and

considers prosecution, the matter is referred to the Director of Public

Prosecutions. Moreover, cases which are prosecuted before the courts come

naturally under judicial scrutiny and are therefore subject to the Court’s judgments

(ICAC-Mauritius, 2017).

The requirement that ACAs submit their annual reports ensures accountability and

transparency in their operations (Stone, 2015). This is the best tool to establish

and maintain public trust in the agency. Mauritius’ ICAC must submit to the

Parliamentary Committee (ICAC-Mauritius, 2017), Rwanda’s Ombudsman must

submit to both the President and Parliament (Ombudsman-Rwanda, 2017) while

Malawi’s ACB must submit to the National Assembly, the President and the

Cabinet (ACB-Malawi, 2017).

Apart from these formal procedures, the reporting mechanisms also include

sharing information on investigations, through issuing statements to the media,

even at the start of an investigation, as exemplified by the UK’s Serious Fraud

Office, which posted on its website on 1 August 2017 that it “confirms it is


24

investigating suspicions of corruption in the conduct of business by BAT plc., its

subsidiaries and associated persons” (SFO investigating British American

Tobacco, 2017). Likewise, Macao’s Commission Against Corruption (CAC)

initiated an investigation into allegations that the ex-director of the

Meteorological and Geophysical Bureau had violated rules about typhoon

forecasts, which resulted in 10 deaths. The anti-graft agency said in a statement it

was also reviewing the Bureau's typhoon forecasting procedures and management

(Typhoon Hato, 2017).

3.1.3. ACA Activities

The major activities conducted by ACAs have been grouped below.

3.1.3.1. Education

Byrne et al. (2010, p. 14) assert that “failure to explain the distinct types of

corruption has prevented the wider public from recognizing the importance of

systemic and institutional corruption. As a result, we have a flawed focus on

sensational and personality-driven accounts of unethical behaviour.” Raising

awareness about corrupt behaviour and practices can generate public opposition

to corruption and enhance the ACA’s activities (Byrne et al. 2010; Kuris, 2014).

Rwanda’s Ombudsman sensitises the population through sign-posts, billboards,

public conferences and the distribution of brochures (Ombudsman-Rwanda,

2017). Similarly, the Anti-Corruption Act mandates Sierra Leonean ACC to

educate the public on the dangers of corruption and enlist public support. The

ACC educates students to foster in them the values of integrity, accountability and

transparency (ACC-Sierra Leone, 2017).

3.1.3.2 Prevention

Prevention is always better than cure. ACAs prevent corruption in the first place

by disseminating information about the nature, occurrence and seriousness of

corrupt behaviour (Byrne et al. 2010). Prevention also extends to reviewing the

bureaucratic systems which may be breeding grounds for corrupt transactions.

Kuris (2014, p. 12) relates the case of Mauritius where its ICAC “secured

cooperation in preventive efforts by emphasizing efficiency gains from the

installation of systems and procedures to lessen corruption risks.” Kpundeh and

Levy (2004, p. 261) consider that ACAs’ prevention activities “help public and

non-state actors identify strategies for reducing corruption; fund studies of

corruption; establish community relations highlighting awareness, prevention and

sanctions.”

Rwanda’s Ombudsman evaluates procedures and systems of institutions to

discover the practices that are conducive to corruption (Ombudsman-Rwanda,

2017). Similarly, Malawi’s ACB examines the practices and procedures of

institutions and drafts legislations that have corruption as an area of concern

(ACB-Malawi, 2017).

3.1.3.3 Asset Declarations

Asset declarations are important tools for prevention of corruption “to introduce

integrity in public life” (Byrne et al., 2010, p. 46). Rwanda’s Ombudsman verifies

the declarations of public officials and high-ranking officials, including the

President and Prime Minister (Ombudsman-Rwanda, 2017). This aims to prevent

and detect forms of corruption such as embezzlement of public funds and illicit

enrichment of government officials and is a good way to establish transparency

and good management in public finance (Ombudsman-Rwanda, 2017).



25

investigating suspicions of corruption in the conduct of business by BAT plc., its

subsidiaries and associated persons” (SFO investigating British American

Tobacco, 2017). Likewise, Macao’s Commission Against Corruption (CAC)

initiated an investigation into allegations that the ex-director of the

Meteorological and Geophysical Bureau had violated rules about typhoon

forecasts, which resulted in 10 deaths. The anti-graft agency said in a statement it

was also reviewing the Bureau's typhoon forecasting procedures and management

(Typhoon Hato, 2017).

3.1.3. ACA Activities

The major activities conducted by ACAs have been grouped below.

3.1.3.1. Education

Byrne et al. (2010, p. 14) assert that “failure to explain the distinct types of

corruption has prevented the wider public from recognizing the importance of

systemic and institutional corruption. As a result, we have a flawed focus on

sensational and personality-driven accounts of unethical behaviour.” Raising

awareness about corrupt behaviour and practices can generate public opposition

to corruption and enhance the ACA’s activities (Byrne et al. 2010; Kuris, 2014).

Rwanda’s Ombudsman sensitises the population through sign-posts, billboards,

public conferences and the distribution of brochures (Ombudsman-Rwanda,

2017). Similarly, the Anti-Corruption Act mandates Sierra Leonean ACC to

educate the public on the dangers of corruption and enlist public support. The

ACC educates students to foster in them the values of integrity, accountability and

transparency (ACC-Sierra Leone, 2017).

3.1.3.2 Prevention

Prevention is always better than cure. ACAs prevent corruption in the first place

by disseminating information about the nature, occurrence and seriousness of

corrupt behaviour (Byrne et al. 2010). Prevention also extends to reviewing the

bureaucratic systems which may be breeding grounds for corrupt transactions.

Kuris (2014, p. 12) relates the case of Mauritius where its ICAC “secured

cooperation in preventive efforts by emphasizing efficiency gains from the

installation of systems and procedures to lessen corruption risks.” Kpundeh and

Levy (2004, p. 261) consider that ACAs’ prevention activities “help public and

non-state actors identify strategies for reducing corruption; fund studies of

corruption; establish community relations highlighting awareness, prevention and

sanctions.”

Rwanda’s Ombudsman evaluates procedures and systems of institutions to

discover the practices that are conducive to corruption (Ombudsman-Rwanda,

2017). Similarly, Malawi’s ACB examines the practices and procedures of

institutions and drafts legislations that have corruption as an area of concern

(ACB-Malawi, 2017).

3.1.3.3 Asset Declarations

Asset declarations are important tools for prevention of corruption “to introduce

integrity in public life” (Byrne et al., 2010, p. 46). Rwanda’s Ombudsman verifies

the declarations of public officials and high-ranking officials, including the

President and Prime Minister (Ombudsman-Rwanda, 2017). This aims to prevent

and detect forms of corruption such as embezzlement of public funds and illicit

enrichment of government officials and is a good way to establish transparency

and good management in public finance (Ombudsman-Rwanda, 2017).


26

All concerned public officials must declare their properties annually to the

Ombudsman. A person who takes up office must declare his property within one

month and someone who leaves office must declare his property within 15 days

of leaving (Ombudsman-Rwanda, 2017). The declarations are kept confidential

and may be disclosed only for investigative purposes. A person who fails to prove

the licit origin of his property immediately becomes a suspect and thereafter,

criminal proceedings may be undertaken (Ombudsman-Rwanda, 2017).

3.1.3.4 Investigation

During investigations, ACAs “conduct searches, examine bank accounts, audit

private assets, monitor lifestyles” and may even “seize property and incarcerate

individuals” (Kpundeh and Levy, 2004, p. 261). The first action by an investigator

is “to secure the financial records and to identify any suspect transactions” (Doig,

2012, p. 99).

The fight against corruption cannot be successful if the ACAs are not entrusted

with strong investigative powers and these powers need to be statutory powers to

be effective. For instance, the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act

(MACCA) (Section 70) contains a range of investigative tools for bribery cases

which are available to investigators of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption

Commission (MACC, 2017).

India’s bribery offences are found under Chapter III of the Prevention of

Corruption Act 1988 (PCA) and the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC)

exercises superintendence over the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), which

is charged with the investigation of offences under the PCA (CVC, 2017).

Pakistan’s bribery offences are found in the Penal Code 1860 and the National

Accountability Ordinance (NAO) and the NAB investigates and prosecutes

bribery offences (NAB, 2016). The NAO also permits the NAB Chairman to

freeze the property of an accused or property held beneficially by another person

on behalf of the accused (NAB, 2016).

After the completion of an investigation, the next crucial step is sending the case

for prosecution where the case enters the judiciary circuit. As per Article 11 of

UNCAC, the judiciary plays an important role in fighting corruption as well as

being vulnerable to corrupt activities. Hence, member countries are recommended

to “take measures to strengthen integrity and to prevent opportunities for

corruption among members of the judiciary...through rules with respect to the

conduct of members of the judiciary” and implementing measures for the

prosecution service (UNCAC, 2003, pp. 13-14).

In some countries, ACAs possess prosecutorial powers too, for instance, Sierra

Leone’s ACC and Malawi’s ACB (Section 7(1) of the Sierra Leonean Anti-

Corruption Act and Section 10 of the Corrupt Practices Act of Malawi,

respectively). In contrast, Rwanda’s Ombudsman is not empowered to prosecute

corruption and forwards its cases to the Prosecutor-General for prosecution


4.1 ANTI-ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN

Byrne et al. (2010), Kuris (2014) and Schütte (2015) posit that while creation of

ACAs provide an excellent proof of action to address corrupt conduct, a section

emerges in the community which disapproves of the ACA’s anti-corruption

activities and which results in “triggering overwhelming pushback” (Kuris, 2014,

p. 3). Subsequently, ACAs have to deal with a catch-22: “Either they persevere

with high-level investigations and bold reforms—risking crippling pushback or

potential dissolution—or they lower their sights and pursue unobtrusive efforts

that might appear timid or biased. Either outcome imperils the political support

and public trust ACAs need to sustain effective operations” (Kuris, 2014, p. 3).



27

All concerned public officials must declare their properties annually to the

Ombudsman. A person who takes up office must declare his property within one

month and someone who leaves office must declare his property within 15 days

of leaving (Ombudsman-Rwanda, 2017). The declarations are kept confidential

and may be disclosed only for investigative purposes. A person who fails to prove

the licit origin of his property immediately becomes a suspect and thereafter,

criminal proceedings may be undertaken (Ombudsman-Rwanda, 2017).

3.1.3.4 Investigation

During investigations, ACAs “conduct searches, examine bank accounts, audit

private assets, monitor lifestyles” and may even “seize property and incarcerate

individuals” (Kpundeh and Levy, 2004, p. 261). The first action by an investigator

is “to secure the financial records and to identify any suspect transactions” (Doig,

2012, p. 99).

The fight against corruption cannot be successful if the ACAs are not entrusted

with strong investigative powers and these powers need to be statutory powers to

be effective. For instance, the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act

(MACCA) (Section 70) contains a range of investigative tools for bribery cases

which are available to investigators of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption

Commission (MACC, 2017).

India’s bribery offences are found under Chapter III of the Prevention of

Corruption Act 1988 (PCA) and the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC)

exercises superintendence over the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), which

is charged with the investigation of offences under the PCA (CVC, 2017).

Pakistan’s bribery offences are found in the Penal Code 1860 and the National

Accountability Ordinance (NAO) and the NAB investigates and prosecutes

bribery offences (NAB, 2016). The NAO also permits the NAB Chairman to

freeze the property of an accused or property held beneficially by another person

on behalf of the accused (NAB, 2016).

After the completion of an investigation, the next crucial step is sending the case

for prosecution where the case enters the judiciary circuit. As per Article 11 of

UNCAC, the judiciary plays an important role in fighting corruption as well as

being vulnerable to corrupt activities. Hence, member countries are recommended

to “take measures to strengthen integrity and to prevent opportunities for

corruption among members of the judiciary...through rules with respect to the

conduct of members of the judiciary” and implementing measures for the

prosecution service (UNCAC, 2003, pp. 13-14).

In some countries, ACAs possess prosecutorial powers too, for instance, Sierra

Leone’s ACC and Malawi’s ACB (Section 7(1) of the Sierra Leonean Anti-

Corruption Act and Section 10 of the Corrupt Practices Act of Malawi,

respectively). In contrast, Rwanda’s Ombudsman is not empowered to prosecute

corruption and forwards its cases to the Prosecutor-General for prosecution


4.1 ANTI-ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN

Byrne et al. (2010), Kuris (2014) and Schütte (2015) posit that while creation of

ACAs provide an excellent proof of action to address corrupt conduct, a section

emerges in the community which disapproves of the ACA’s anti-corruption

activities and which results in “triggering overwhelming pushback” (Kuris, 2014,

p. 3). Subsequently, ACAs have to deal with a catch-22: “Either they persevere

with high-level investigations and bold reforms—risking crippling pushback or

potential dissolution—or they lower their sights and pursue unobtrusive efforts

that might appear timid or biased. Either outcome imperils the political support

and public trust ACAs need to sustain effective operations” (Kuris, 2014, p. 3).


28

Entities, whose bottom lines (personal and institutional) would be affected by the

prevention and investigation actions of ACAs, strive to discredit the ACAs

(Batory, 2012). This opposition deprives ACAs “of their zealous heads of agency

through all sorts of ploys. Several ACA heads have been dismissed or imprisoned.

Others have resigned or retired, thereby leaving the ACA in a state of decay or

paralysis” (De Jaegere, 2012, p. 85). This present study calls this opposition “the

anti-anti-corruption campaign” to better describe the actions initiated by those

feeling threatened by anti-corruption efforts. This concept is derived through

expansion of Doig, Watt and Williams’ (2005, p. 4) notion of the lifecycle of a

new ACC (Anti-Corruption Commission).

Opponents of reform subtly counter the anti-corruption efforts in general and

specifically targeting the ACA (Schütte, 2015). They point out the unfair financial

and logistical burden on the entire system when they inevitably are called by the

ACA to respond to allegations. These people also warn of the damage that would

be caused if the ACA is given too much power, potentially damaging the

international image of the country to attract investors. Kuris (2014, p. 4) relates

the cases of ACAs in Botswana, Croatia, Indonesia, Mauritius and Slovenia which

“encountered pushback from antagonists who felt threatened by anti-corruption

activities. The antagonists’ responses ranged from whisper campaigns and

behind-the-scenes lobbying to dramatic legal and legislative battles. Several ACA

leaders faced threats to their jobs, reputations, or personal security.” The media

closely watches the proceedings of the ACA and becomes emotionally opposed

to anything embraced by the ACA (Byrne et al. 2010; De Sousa, 2010). This

opposition against anti-corruption efforts are examined below in terms of

hostilities and volatilities.

4.1.1. Hostilities

Those individuals who are called by the ACA for investigations retaliate against

ACAs in orchestrated efforts to resist this attempt and vocally push for the repeal

of the ACA, calling the ACA as a serious mistake with negative and unintended

consequences (Kuris, 2014). Subsequently, as it pursues its mission, the ACA

makes “many powerful enemies” (Batory, 2012, p. 655).

Slovenia’s Commission was set up as an “independent constitutional body (a

status similar to that of an ombudsman) reporting to parliament” (Batory, 2012,

p. 652). When this Commission came into existence, in October 2004, it

encountered “what proved to be a very rocky start, almost at the same time that a

parliamentary election replaced a centre-left government with a centre-right

coalition” (Batory, 2012, p. 652). In the very first period of the new parliament,

there was a call by the opposition party to close down the Commission and transfer

its resources to a parliamentary body. It was observed that, “the initiative in fact

originated from the government, wishing to remove a source of external oversight

into its affairs, although the reason publicly cited to support the move was the

Commission’s alleged ineffectiveness.” To stop the Commission’s mission, the

government united with the opposition and ensured that the parliament approved

the Commission’s termination. This trend continued until the “Constitutional

Court suspended the bill and allowed the Commission to resume operation”

(Batory, 2012, p. 653).

However, in 2007, another attempt was made “to extend the Commission’s

operations only until 2009” (Batory, 2012, p. 653). The bill for this extension was

not approved but it created a period of uncertainty for the Commission. The year

2008 was possibly the worst possible time for the Commission to be in an

indeterminate state because during that year, “just a few weeks before the

parliamentary elections, Slovenia’s biggest corruption scandal (“the Patria



29

Entities, whose bottom lines (personal and institutional) would be affected by the

prevention and investigation actions of ACAs, strive to discredit the ACAs

(Batory, 2012). This opposition deprives ACAs “of their zealous heads of agency

through all sorts of ploys. Several ACA heads have been dismissed or imprisoned.

Others have resigned or retired, thereby leaving the ACA in a state of decay or

paralysis” (De Jaegere, 2012, p. 85). This present study calls this opposition “the

anti-anti-corruption campaign” to better describe the actions initiated by those

feeling threatened by anti-corruption efforts. This concept is derived through

expansion of Doig, Watt and Williams’ (2005, p. 4) notion of the lifecycle of a

new ACC (Anti-Corruption Commission).

Opponents of reform subtly counter the anti-corruption efforts in general and

specifically targeting the ACA (Schütte, 2015). They point out the unfair financial

and logistical burden on the entire system when they inevitably are called by the

ACA to respond to allegations. These people also warn of the damage that would

be caused if the ACA is given too much power, potentially damaging the

international image of the country to attract investors. Kuris (2014, p. 4) relates

the cases of ACAs in Botswana, Croatia, Indonesia, Mauritius and Slovenia which

“encountered pushback from antagonists who felt threatened by anti-corruption

activities. The antagonists’ responses ranged from whisper campaigns and

behind-the-scenes lobbying to dramatic legal and legislative battles. Several ACA

leaders faced threats to their jobs, reputations, or personal security.” The media

closely watches the proceedings of the ACA and becomes emotionally opposed

to anything embraced by the ACA (Byrne et al. 2010; De Sousa, 2010). This

opposition against anti-corruption efforts are examined below in terms of

hostilities and volatilities.

4.1.1. Hostilities

Those individuals who are called by the ACA for investigations retaliate against

ACAs in orchestrated efforts to resist this attempt and vocally push for the repeal

of the ACA, calling the ACA as a serious mistake with negative and unintended

consequences (Kuris, 2014). Subsequently, as it pursues its mission, the ACA

makes “many powerful enemies” (Batory, 2012, p. 655).

Slovenia’s Commission was set up as an “independent constitutional body (a

status similar to that of an ombudsman) reporting to parliament” (Batory, 2012,

p. 652). When this Commission came into existence, in October 2004, it

encountered “what proved to be a very rocky start, almost at the same time that a

parliamentary election replaced a centre-left government with a centre-right

coalition” (Batory, 2012, p. 652). In the very first period of the new parliament,

there was a call by the opposition party to close down the Commission and transfer

its resources to a parliamentary body. It was observed that, “the initiative in fact

originated from the government, wishing to remove a source of external oversight

into its affairs, although the reason publicly cited to support the move was the

Commission’s alleged ineffectiveness.” To stop the Commission’s mission, the

government united with the opposition and ensured that the parliament approved

the Commission’s termination. This trend continued until the “Constitutional

Court suspended the bill and allowed the Commission to resume operation”

(Batory, 2012, p. 653).

However, in 2007, another attempt was made “to extend the Commission’s

operations only until 2009” (Batory, 2012, p. 653). The bill for this extension was

not approved but it created a period of uncertainty for the Commission. The year

2008 was possibly the worst possible time for the Commission to be in an

indeterminate state because during that year, “just a few weeks before the

parliamentary elections, Slovenia’s biggest corruption scandal (“the Patria


30

affair”) broke, involving allegations that a Finnish company bribed senior Slovene

officials to secure a large military procurement contract” (Batory, 2012, p. 653).

Following the Finnish investigation, the Prime Minister was implicated and his

party lost the parliamentary elections. Then, the centre-left coalition which came

in power clashed with the Commission. An opposition member of parliament led

a parliamentary commission which “demanded to have access to all reports filed

to the Commission, or in effect, the identity of any potential whistleblower

disclosing acts of corruption” (Batory, 2012, p. 653).

Political hostilities not only restricted the Commission’s mandate but also

constrained its budget through cuts and hindered its activities through “a lack of

co-operation (almost amounting to a boycott) by other agencies essential for the

Commission’s effective operation” (Batory, 2012, p. 653). Ujoodha, head of

Mauritius’ ICAC stated that “when a high-profile person is investigated or

arrested, he’s going to use every means to undermine the [investigative]

organization” (cited in Kuris, 2014, p. 16).

Batory (2012, p. 653) noted that the Commission’s 2008 annual report stated (on

page 37) that “due to very serious issues with the budget which almost led to the

staff of the Commission not receiving their monthly salaries, the Commission had

serious staff deficiency problems.” The Commission obtained “only 50% of the

necessary financial resources and employed only 11 staff instead of the 25 that

would have been needed.” Moreover, the parliament of Slovenia “cut the salaries

of the top officials by 25–35%” (Dionisie & Checchi, 2008, p. 15). Despite all

these obstacles and hindrances, the Commission continued its activities and the

number of complaints actually increased. It is safe to infer that the political attacks

on the Commission “seemed only to send a message to the public about its

independence”. It seems that the society as a whole were “overwhelmingly in

favour not only of keeping the Commission but also of boosting its powers”

(Batory, 2012, p. 653).

This positive public opinion came about due to the strong leadership at the helm

of the Commission. Drago Kos, the Commission’s first president, was a well-

respected public figure who insistently pursued his organisation’s mission. Kos

was seen as “a thorn in the side of the politicians and public officials...which a

priori suggests that he is executing his duties...professionally and lawfully”

(Batory, 2012, pp. 653-654). Moreover, Kos’ other affiliations boosted his

persona as he was chairman of the Council of Europe’s GRECO, and this

international professional association helped to garner strong support for him and

his Commission.

Similarly, Malawi’s ACB “operated in an unfriendly and hostile political

environment” and there were “several changes of Director and the unexpected

sacking of Gilton Chiwaula in 2002” which led to an environment of insecurity

(Doig, Watt & Williams, 2005, p. 62). This insecurity extended to the funding of

the ACB, when its major donor, DANIDA, “withdrew its funding and, whatever

the motives, the result has been discontinuities in the development and

promulgation of community anti-corruption programmes” (Doig, Watt &

Williams, 2005, p. 64).

Thailand’s National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) (formed in 1999)

came under increasing pressure in a tense political situation because it named the

prime minister in a corruption case (TI, 2014). It was alleged that the National

Rice Pledge Scheme, which was headed by the prime minister, was involved in a

scam that cost Thai taxpayers US$15 billion. In retaliation, government

supporters claimed the NCCC was biased and even barricaded its offices. The

NACC had to protect its staff from grenade attacks and issue a statement

explaining it was acting as a neutral entity (TI, 2014).



31

affair”) broke, involving allegations that a Finnish company bribed senior Slovene

officials to secure a large military procurement contract” (Batory, 2012, p. 653).

Following the Finnish investigation, the Prime Minister was implicated and his

party lost the parliamentary elections. Then, the centre-left coalition which came

in power clashed with the Commission. An opposition member of parliament led

a parliamentary commission which “demanded to have access to all reports filed

to the Commission, or in effect, the identity of any potential whistleblower

disclosing acts of corruption” (Batory, 2012, p. 653).

Political hostilities not only restricted the Commission’s mandate but also

constrained its budget through cuts and hindered its activities through “a lack of

co-operation (almost amounting to a boycott) by other agencies essential for the

Commission’s effective operation” (Batory, 2012, p. 653). Ujoodha, head of

Mauritius’ ICAC stated that “when a high-profile person is investigated or

arrested, he’s going to use every means to undermine the [investigative]

organization” (cited in Kuris, 2014, p. 16).

Batory (2012, p. 653) noted that the Commission’s 2008 annual report stated (on

page 37) that “due to very serious issues with the budget which almost led to the

staff of the Commission not receiving their monthly salaries, the Commission had

serious staff deficiency problems.” The Commission obtained “only 50% of the

necessary financial resources and employed only 11 staff instead of the 25 that

would have been needed.” Moreover, the parliament of Slovenia “cut the salaries

of the top officials by 25–35%” (Dionisie & Checchi, 2008, p. 15). Despite all

these obstacles and hindrances, the Commission continued its activities and the

number of complaints actually increased. It is safe to infer that the political attacks

on the Commission “seemed only to send a message to the public about its

independence”. It seems that the society as a whole were “overwhelmingly in

favour not only of keeping the Commission but also of boosting its powers”

(Batory, 2012, p. 653).

This positive public opinion came about due to the strong leadership at the helm

of the Commission. Drago Kos, the Commission’s first president, was a well-

respected public figure who insistently pursued his organisation’s mission. Kos

was seen as “a thorn in the side of the politicians and public officials...which a

priori suggests that he is executing his duties...professionally and lawfully”

(Batory, 2012, pp. 653-654). Moreover, Kos’ other affiliations boosted his

persona as he was chairman of the Council of Europe’s GRECO, and this

international professional association helped to garner strong support for him and

his Commission.

Similarly, Malawi’s ACB “operated in an unfriendly and hostile political

environment” and there were “several changes of Director and the unexpected

sacking of Gilton Chiwaula in 2002” which led to an environment of insecurity

(Doig, Watt & Williams, 2005, p. 62). This insecurity extended to the funding of

the ACB, when its major donor, DANIDA, “withdrew its funding and, whatever

the motives, the result has been discontinuities in the development and

promulgation of community anti-corruption programmes” (Doig, Watt &

Williams, 2005, p. 64).

Thailand’s National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) (formed in 1999)

came under increasing pressure in a tense political situation because it named the

prime minister in a corruption case (TI, 2014). It was alleged that the National

Rice Pledge Scheme, which was headed by the prime minister, was involved in a

scam that cost Thai taxpayers US$15 billion. In retaliation, government

supporters claimed the NCCC was biased and even barricaded its offices. The

NACC had to protect its staff from grenade attacks and issue a statement

explaining it was acting as a neutral entity (TI, 2014).


32

4.1.2. Volatilities

One effect of all these hostilities is the demand for the closure of the ACA which

creates volatility in respect of the “uncertainty” of the ACA’s existence (Batory,

2012, p. 653). This can be demoralizing due to the anxiety employees experience

by not knowing the course of their professional career.

Poland’s Central Anti-Corruption Bureau was frequently condemned as being

“ineffective and overly partisan” which led in June 2009 to a Constitutional Court

ruling that considered unconstitutional part of the law setting up the Bureau

(Batory, 2012, p. 655). Despite this judgment, the Bureau carried on its tasks

regardless, “including a botched operation in October 2009, which failed to

implicate former President Aleksander Kwasniewski of the Democratic Left

Alliance. However, in the same month, a CBA investigation did implicate several

senior Civic Platform politicians in the so-called Blackjack affair, involving

efforts to tailor legislation to the interests of the gambling industry” (Batory, 2012,

p. 655).

Not everyone was happy with this success. Poland’s Prime Minister initiated “the

procedure to terminate Kaminski’s appointment as head of CBA, claiming that

Kaminski abused his position.” In his defence, Kaminski stated that the Bureau

was carrying out its mission and the criticism as well as the call for his removal

was “nothing but revenge for exposing corruption” and this led the Bureau to

make powerful enemies in the years of its existence (Batory, 2012, p. 655).

Another excellent example of pushback occurred in Nigeria. Byrne et al. (2010,

p. 2) relate the case of Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission

(EFCC) and its former executive chairman, Nuhu Ribadu, who testified in 2009

that “when you fight corruption, it fights back. It will likely have greater resources

than you and it is led by those who operate outside the law and view the fight as

life and death for their survival.” Ribadu was appointed by President Obasanjo in

2003 to manage the government commission tasked with countering corruption.

During Ribadu’s four-year tenure, Nigeria recovered more than $5 billion in

stolen assets and the EFCC charged prominent bankers, high-profile businessmen,

eight former state governors, senators, high-ranking political party members and

advance-fee conmen (known as “419ers”). Most prominent among the 275

convictions were those of banker Emmanuel Nwude and the former inspector-

general of Nigeria’s police service, Tafa Balogum, for allegedly stealing $144

million (Byrne et al., 2010).

However, critics suggested that Ribadu was selective in whom he prosecuted and

that President Obasanjo was using the agency to target his enemies. Thereafter,

Ribadu became a victim of his own success. In 2007, the inspector-general of

police announced that Ribadu would temporarily be removed from EFCC to

follow a mandatory one-year training course. The agency became a political

“football,” and its legitimacy was undermined politically by accusations of

favouritism (Byrne et al., 2010, p. 2). The EFCC weakened after Ribadu’s

removal as its top investigators were transferred out of the EFCC. Hard-earned

reform was undone and the trust between different institutions was weakened

(Byrne et al., 2010).

Moreover, the very existence of the ACA can be uncertain. De Sousa (2010)

relates the following cases: the High Authority against Corruption in Portugal was

dissolved in 1992 by parliamentary vote; the Anti-Corruption Authority in Kenya

was abolished in 2000 by the Kenyan Supreme Court as it was deemed

unconstitutional and the Directorate of Special Operations in South Africa (called

the Scorpions) was abolished in 2008. Hence, this uncertainty can lead the

stakeholders (especially the staff of the ACA) to consider the ACA as a volatile

organisation which in turn can escalate into fear and failure.



33

4.1.2. Volatilities

One effect of all these hostilities is the demand for the closure of the ACA which

creates volatility in respect of the “uncertainty” of the ACA’s existence (Batory,

2012, p. 653). This can be demoralizing due to the anxiety employees experience

by not knowing the course of their professional career.

Poland’s Central Anti-Corruption Bureau was frequently condemned as being

“ineffective and overly partisan” which led in June 2009 to a Constitutional Court

ruling that considered unconstitutional part of the law setting up the Bureau

(Batory, 2012, p. 655). Despite this judgment, the Bureau carried on its tasks

regardless, “including a botched operation in October 2009, which failed to

implicate former President Aleksander Kwasniewski of the Democratic Left

Alliance. However, in the same month, a CBA investigation did implicate several

senior Civic Platform politicians in the so-called Blackjack affair, involving

efforts to tailor legislation to the interests of the gambling industry” (Batory, 2012,

p. 655).

Not everyone was happy with this success. Poland’s Prime Minister initiated “the

procedure to terminate Kaminski’s appointment as head of CBA, claiming that

Kaminski abused his position.” In his defence, Kaminski stated that the Bureau

was carrying out its mission and the criticism as well as the call for his removal

was “nothing but revenge for exposing corruption” and this led the Bureau to

make powerful enemies in the years of its existence (Batory, 2012, p. 655).

Another excellent example of pushback occurred in Nigeria. Byrne et al. (2010,

p. 2) relate the case of Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission

(EFCC) and its former executive chairman, Nuhu Ribadu, who testified in 2009

that “when you fight corruption, it fights back. It will likely have greater resources

than you and it is led by those who operate outside the law and view the fight as

life and death for their survival.” Ribadu was appointed by President Obasanjo in

2003 to manage the government commission tasked with countering corruption.

During Ribadu’s four-year tenure, Nigeria recovered more than $5 billion in

stolen assets and the EFCC charged prominent bankers, high-profile businessmen,

eight former state governors, senators, high-ranking political party members and

advance-fee conmen (known as “419ers”). Most prominent among the 275

convictions were those of banker Emmanuel Nwude and the former inspector-

general of Nigeria’s police service, Tafa Balogum, for allegedly stealing $144

million (Byrne et al., 2010).

However, critics suggested that Ribadu was selective in whom he prosecuted and

that President Obasanjo was using the agency to target his enemies. Thereafter,

Ribadu became a victim of his own success. In 2007, the inspector-general of

police announced that Ribadu would temporarily be removed from EFCC to

follow a mandatory one-year training course. The agency became a political

“football,” and its legitimacy was undermined politically by accusations of

favouritism (Byrne et al., 2010, p. 2). The EFCC weakened after Ribadu’s

removal as its top investigators were transferred out of the EFCC. Hard-earned

reform was undone and the trust between different institutions was weakened

(Byrne et al., 2010).

Moreover, the very existence of the ACA can be uncertain. De Sousa (2010)

relates the following cases: the High Authority against Corruption in Portugal was

dissolved in 1992 by parliamentary vote; the Anti-Corruption Authority in Kenya

was abolished in 2000 by the Kenyan Supreme Court as it was deemed

unconstitutional and the Directorate of Special Operations in South Africa (called

the Scorpions) was abolished in 2008. Hence, this uncertainty can lead the

stakeholders (especially the staff of the ACA) to consider the ACA as a volatile

organisation which in turn can escalate into fear and failure.


34

5.1 STAKEHOLDERS’ DISILLUSIONMENT

All ACAs, more or less, pass through the lifecycle of being set up, starting their

activities and subsequently facing retaliation. All these events affect the way

stakeholders perceive the ACA and its activities. An ACA is considered effective

when it achieves its mission and meets (or exceeds) the expectations of its

stakeholders. The following sections explore how stakeholders form their

opinions about the ACA.

5.1.1. Stakeholders Identification

When considering stakeholders, it is crucial to first determine which groups are

stakeholders and why (Mitchell et al., 1997). Before proceeding further, the

definition of a stakeholder would be helpful. Freeman (1984, cited in Mitchell et

al., 1997 p. 854) defines a stakeholder as “any group or individual who can affect

or is affected by the achievement of the organisation's objectives.” Applying this

definition in an ACA context, anyone who has any kind of interest in the ACA or

is affected by the ACA or its activities is the ACA’s stakeholder.

Some examples of ACA stakeholders are: staff of the ACA, public officers,

private institutions and their employees, donors, watchdogs, media, NGOs and

society as a whole. To successfully achieve its mission, an ACA needs to satisfy

the needs of its stakeholders. An ACA is successful if the stakeholders perceive it

to be successful and as Doig, Watt and William (2005, p. 50) noted “Anti-

Corruption Commission’s success is in the eye of the beholder.”

5.1.2. Disillusionment

The idea of an ACA inspires personal and nationwide optimism. As time passes

and the “anti-anti-corruption campaign” gains momentum, the general attitude

turns to dissatisfaction or disillusionment. “The lifecycle of a newly created ACA

is branded by primarily high potential from governments and donors but the ACA

is a new establishment incapable of meeting the idealistic prospect forced upon it.

This letdown generally means that there is no continual support for the ACA

which restricts its ability to expand as an organisation. This failure ‘to thrive’

promotes cynicism in governments, donors and in ACAs themselves” (Doig, Watt

& Williams, 2005, p. 4).

De Jaegere (2012, p. 86, emphasis added) relates the case of Nepal where “only

two high-level politicians have been convicted during the past 21 years, since the

establishment of the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority

(CIAA) in 1991...It received only 854 complaints in more than ten years,

indicating a serious lack of trust on the part of the public in the institution.”

As noted above, an ACA functions in hostile and volatile environments,

composed of unpredictable events, harsh dynamics, insecurity and instability.

These features of volatilities and hostilities occur because of various factors, for

example, the time taken for cases to be determined for action as well as media

reports of ACAs powerlessness or inability to secure convictions.

5.1.3. ACA Staff’s Morale

The intimidating and energy-draining events negatively influence the operations

and “affect the morale of the ACA’s staff” (Byrne et al., 2010, p. 45) influencing

the workforce’s confidence, fortitude, motivation and enthusiasm to pursue the

fight against corruption. High morale can be inferred through an organisation with

a positive spirit, where employees are connected with their organisation and are

supportive of its objectives and philosophy (Miller, 1981). Similarly, low morale

can be inferred by a series of factors such as job security (Gerberich et al., 2004)

which can be a major source of low morale when media and other interests call

for the closure of an ACA. Future uncertainty, a colossal mission of eradicating



35

5.1 STAKEHOLDERS’ DISILLUSIONMENT

All ACAs, more or less, pass through the lifecycle of being set up, starting their

activities and subsequently facing retaliation. All these events affect the way

stakeholders perceive the ACA and its activities. An ACA is considered effective

when it achieves its mission and meets (or exceeds) the expectations of its

stakeholders. The following sections explore how stakeholders form their

opinions about the ACA.

5.1.1. Stakeholders Identification

When considering stakeholders, it is crucial to first determine which groups are

stakeholders and why (Mitchell et al., 1997). Before proceeding further, the

definition of a stakeholder would be helpful. Freeman (1984, cited in Mitchell et

al., 1997 p. 854) defines a stakeholder as “any group or individual who can affect

or is affected by the achievement of the organisation's objectives.” Applying this

definition in an ACA context, anyone who has any kind of interest in the ACA or

is affected by the ACA or its activities is the ACA’s stakeholder.

Some examples of ACA stakeholders are: staff of the ACA, public officers,

private institutions and their employees, donors, watchdogs, media, NGOs and

society as a whole. To successfully achieve its mission, an ACA needs to satisfy

the needs of its stakeholders. An ACA is successful if the stakeholders perceive it

to be successful and as Doig, Watt and William (2005, p. 50) noted “Anti-

Corruption Commission’s success is in the eye of the beholder.”

5.1.2. Disillusionment

The idea of an ACA inspires personal and nationwide optimism. As time passes

and the “anti-anti-corruption campaign” gains momentum, the general attitude

turns to dissatisfaction or disillusionment. “The lifecycle of a newly created ACA

is branded by primarily high potential from governments and donors but the ACA

is a new establishment incapable of meeting the idealistic prospect forced upon it.

This letdown generally means that there is no continual support for the ACA

which restricts its ability to expand as an organisation. This failure ‘to thrive’

promotes cynicism in governments, donors and in ACAs themselves” (Doig, Watt

& Williams, 2005, p. 4).

De Jaegere (2012, p. 86, emphasis added) relates the case of Nepal where “only

two high-level politicians have been convicted during the past 21 years, since the

establishment of the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority

(CIAA) in 1991...It received only 854 complaints in more than ten years,

indicating a serious lack of trust on the part of the public in the institution.”

As noted above, an ACA functions in hostile and volatile environments,

composed of unpredictable events, harsh dynamics, insecurity and instability.

These features of volatilities and hostilities occur because of various factors, for

example, the time taken for cases to be determined for action as well as media

reports of ACAs powerlessness or inability to secure convictions.

5.1.3. ACA Staff’s Morale

The intimidating and energy-draining events negatively influence the operations

and “affect the morale of the ACA’s staff” (Byrne et al., 2010, p. 45) influencing

the workforce’s confidence, fortitude, motivation and enthusiasm to pursue the

fight against corruption. High morale can be inferred through an organisation with

a positive spirit, where employees are connected with their organisation and are

supportive of its objectives and philosophy (Miller, 1981). Similarly, low morale

can be inferred by a series of factors such as job security (Gerberich et al., 2004)

which can be a major source of low morale when media and other interests call

for the closure of an ACA. Future uncertainty, a colossal mission of eradicating


36

corruption and the ensuing work load, coupled with lack of support at work as

well as from the public, can potentially build up and ultimately result in regression

in motivation and low staff morale (Byrne et al., 2010). Accumulation of these

factors can have short and long term effects on the staff’s physical, emotional and

professional facets, which can lead to resignations, causing other staff to take on

even more work load and thus creating a snowball effect. Moreover, particularly

where ACAs investigate criminals, the staff may encounter work-related violence

(physical assault or non-physical forms of violence like threat and verbal abuse)

which “affects the employee, the employer, others in the work environment, and

significant others outside the work setting” and can have serious consequences:

“family disruption, career change, fear of recurrent assault, anxiety, helplessness,

irritability, depression, shock, disbelief that the assault occurred” among others

(Gerberich et al., 2004, p. 502).

Based on media reports about the ineffectiveness of the ACA’s activities, the staff

(as well as citizens) start to underestimate the ACA. It can be quite unpleasant,

frustrating and annoying for employees if the media speaks negatively about their

ACA all the time. Then, the employees and other stakeholders may question the

values, mission and goals set by ACA management and consider them useless,

unsustainable and even unethical. At organisation-level, this “spiral of doom”

occurs “in times of economic and business uncertainty where bad news piles on

bad news which causes loyalty and commitment to give way to anxiety and fear”

(MacDonald, 2002, p. 220).

5.1.4. VUCA

To better understand this intricate and complex setting, the various elements of

the situation are considered in conjunction. In this study’s context, the notion of

VUCA (volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity) is utilised, which is an

acronym that helps to explain these elements of common environment and state

of affairs (Heidbreder, 2016). The concept of VUCA was initially set up by the

U.S. Army War College to portray the extremely unstable, ambiguous, vague and

intricate environment prevailing in the world during the late 80s and early 90s.

Even though the VUCA term was derived for military vocabulary, it was widely

used in the 1990s and became a common term that entered the business lexicon

and was later used for developing creative ideas for strategic leadership (Bennett

& Lemoine, 2014). In-depth examination of each element of the VUCA concept

helps to identify the strategic, economic, operational and other elements which

are required to gain and maintain advantage and ultimately increase the likelihood

of success in projects (Bennett & Lemoine, 2014).

Bennett and Lemoine (2014, pp. 313-316) provide key thoughts in respect of

volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity. Volatility refers to a situation

with “relatively unstable change; information is available and the situation is

understandable, but change is frequent and sometimes unpredictable.”

Uncertainty arises due to “a lack of knowledge as to whether an event will have

meaningful ramifications; cause and effect are understood, but it is unknown if an

event will create significant change.” Complexity refers to “many interconnected

parts forming an elaborate network of information and procedures; often

multiform and convoluted, but not necessarily involving change.” Ambiguity

indicates “a lack of knowledge as to ‘the basic rules of the game’; cause and effect

are not understood and there is no precedent for making predictions as to what to

expect.”

From the above discussions, the four elements of VUCA provide a basis to

analyse the ACA context and assess the present status as well as predict future

conditions for the ACA (see model in Table 2 below). When these conditions exist

in conjunction, it can be forecasted that, ultimately, the stakeholders will become

disillusioned and the ACA’s legitimacy would be greatly damaged, in turn



37

corruption and the ensuing work load, coupled with lack of support at work as

well as from the public, can potentially build up and ultimately result in regression

in motivation and low staff morale (Byrne et al., 2010). Accumulation of these

factors can have short and long term effects on the staff’s physical, emotional and

professional facets, which can lead to resignations, causing other staff to take on

even more work load and thus creating a snowball effect. Moreover, particularly

where ACAs investigate criminals, the staff may encounter work-related violence

(physical assault or non-physical forms of violence like threat and verbal abuse)

which “affects the employee, the employer, others in the work environment, and

significant others outside the work setting” and can have serious consequences:

“family disruption, career change, fear of recurrent assault, anxiety, helplessness,

irritability, depression, shock, disbelief that the assault occurred” among others

(Gerberich et al., 2004, p. 502).

Based on media reports about the ineffectiveness of the ACA’s activities, the staff

(as well as citizens) start to underestimate the ACA. It can be quite unpleasant,

frustrating and annoying for employees if the media speaks negatively about their

ACA all the time. Then, the employees and other stakeholders may question the

values, mission and goals set by ACA management and consider them useless,

unsustainable and even unethical. At organisation-level, this “spiral of doom”

occurs “in times of economic and business uncertainty where bad news piles on

bad news which causes loyalty and commitment to give way to anxiety and fear”

(MacDonald, 2002, p. 220).

5.1.4. VUCA

To better understand this intricate and complex setting, the various elements of

the situation are considered in conjunction. In this study’s context, the notion of

VUCA (volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity) is utilised, which is an

acronym that helps to explain these elements of common environment and state

of affairs (Heidbreder, 2016). The concept of VUCA was initially set up by the

U.S. Army War College to portray the extremely unstable, ambiguous, vague and

intricate environment prevailing in the world during the late 80s and early 90s.

Even though the VUCA term was derived for military vocabulary, it was widely

used in the 1990s and became a common term that entered the business lexicon

and was later used for developing creative ideas for strategic leadership (Bennett

& Lemoine, 2014). In-depth examination of each element of the VUCA concept

helps to identify the strategic, economic, operational and other elements which

are required to gain and maintain advantage and ultimately increase the likelihood

of success in projects (Bennett & Lemoine, 2014).

Bennett and Lemoine (2014, pp. 313-316) provide key thoughts in respect of

volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity. Volatility refers to a situation

with “relatively unstable change; information is available and the situation is

understandable, but change is frequent and sometimes unpredictable.”

Uncertainty arises due to “a lack of knowledge as to whether an event will have

meaningful ramifications; cause and effect are understood, but it is unknown if an

event will create significant change.” Complexity refers to “many interconnected

parts forming an elaborate network of information and procedures; often

multiform and convoluted, but not necessarily involving change.” Ambiguity

indicates “a lack of knowledge as to ‘the basic rules of the game’; cause and effect

are not understood and there is no precedent for making predictions as to what to

expect.”

From the above discussions, the four elements of VUCA provide a basis to

analyse the ACA context and assess the present status as well as predict future

conditions for the ACA (see model in Table 2 below). When these conditions exist

in conjunction, it can be forecasted that, ultimately, the stakeholders will become

disillusioned and the ACA’s legitimacy would be greatly damaged, in turn


38

decreasing the enthusiasm for the anti-corruption efforts. This general feeling of

disappointment gradually increases from the discovery that the country may not

be serious about fighting corruption, with ensuing opinions reflecting the citizens’

growing cynicism of the ACA. Indices like Corruption Perception Index pick on

these opinions and further damage the country’s profile (Byrne et al., 2010; Kuris,

2014).

6.1 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This section discusses the findings of the study. First, stakeholders’ attitudes

towards ACAs are discussed, followed by a proposal for a model of stakeholders’

perceptions and reactions. This is followed by a discussion of the lifecycle’s

implications for the anti-corruption strategy. Finally, some recommendations for

future research are made.

6.1.1 Stakeholders’ Attitudes

This study demonstrated that due to urgent calls for action from a number of

stakeholders, much progress has been made by almost all the countries to devise

and implement effective strategies for combating corruption. A series of regional

(e.g. African and Asian) and international initiatives have addressed the issues of

corruption and related crimes (e.g. money laundering) and have produced a

framework for action.

One aspect of this strategy is the creation of ACAs. A “standard” ACA goes

through the stages of creation, activity, positive reactions as well as negative

responses in the form of retaliation and possible decline due to disillusionment of

stakeholders. However, not all ACAs follow the standard life cycle and some may

consolidate their position by actively identifying their effectiveness and by getting

involved with the stakeholders so that the ACAs are better able to cope with the

stakeholders’ reactions.

6.1.2. Stakeholders’ Perceptions and Reactions

The present study proposes a model predicting stakeholders’ intermittent support

for ACAs. Grounded in the realities encountered by ACAs, the model attempts to

assess how stakeholders perceive each event in the life of an ACA.

Based on the above discussion of hostilities and volatilities which lead to

stakeholders’ disillusionment, this study postulates the reactions from

stakeholders. The stages of the lifecycle of an ACA are examined together with

the possible reactions from two types of stakeholders (dishonest and honest). The

possible reactions are hypothetical but they take no liberties with the essential

requisites of actual events as they are based on a compilation of reactions observed

by various authors, namely: Batory, 2012; Byrne et al., 2010; Doig, Watt &

Williams, 2005; Schütte, 2015). The stakeholders’ reactions during the various

stages are illustrated as follows in Table 2:

Stages Dishonest stakeholders Honest stakeholders Pre-setup Happy Angry ACA is set up Concerned Hopeful ACA starts activities – education

“Happy” Happy

ACA starts activities – prevention

Angry Happy

ACA starts activities – investigation

Very angry Very happy

Anti-Anti-Corruption Campaign Active Concerned Negative perceptions ensue Happy Disapproving Internal/external clashes Very happy Disillusioned Advice for reform Very active Active

Table 2. A hypothetical model to illustrate stakeholders’ perceptions and reactions Compiled from Batory, (2012); Byrne et al. (2010); Doig, Watt and Williams (2005) and Schütte (2015) The above model illustrates a simple pattern of how a potential stakeholder

weighs his perceived benefits or potential threats from the existence and activities

of an ACA.



39

decreasing the enthusiasm for the anti-corruption efforts. This general feeling of

disappointment gradually increases from the discovery that the country may not

be serious about fighting corruption, with ensuing opinions reflecting the citizens’

growing cynicism of the ACA. Indices like Corruption Perception Index pick on

these opinions and further damage the country’s profile (Byrne et al., 2010; Kuris,

2014).

6.1 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This section discusses the findings of the study. First, stakeholders’ attitudes

towards ACAs are discussed, followed by a proposal for a model of stakeholders’

perceptions and reactions. This is followed by a discussion of the lifecycle’s

implications for the anti-corruption strategy. Finally, some recommendations for

future research are made.

6.1.1 Stakeholders’ Attitudes

This study demonstrated that due to urgent calls for action from a number of

stakeholders, much progress has been made by almost all the countries to devise

and implement effective strategies for combating corruption. A series of regional

(e.g. African and Asian) and international initiatives have addressed the issues of

corruption and related crimes (e.g. money laundering) and have produced a

framework for action.

One aspect of this strategy is the creation of ACAs. A “standard” ACA goes

through the stages of creation, activity, positive reactions as well as negative

responses in the form of retaliation and possible decline due to disillusionment of

stakeholders. However, not all ACAs follow the standard life cycle and some may

consolidate their position by actively identifying their effectiveness and by getting

involved with the stakeholders so that the ACAs are better able to cope with the

stakeholders’ reactions.

6.1.2. Stakeholders’ Perceptions and Reactions

The present study proposes a model predicting stakeholders’ intermittent support

for ACAs. Grounded in the realities encountered by ACAs, the model attempts to

assess how stakeholders perceive each event in the life of an ACA.

Based on the above discussion of hostilities and volatilities which lead to

stakeholders’ disillusionment, this study postulates the reactions from

stakeholders. The stages of the lifecycle of an ACA are examined together with

the possible reactions from two types of stakeholders (dishonest and honest). The

possible reactions are hypothetical but they take no liberties with the essential

requisites of actual events as they are based on a compilation of reactions observed

by various authors, namely: Batory, 2012; Byrne et al., 2010; Doig, Watt &

Williams, 2005; Schütte, 2015). The stakeholders’ reactions during the various

stages are illustrated as follows in Table 2:

Stages Dishonest stakeholders Honest stakeholders Pre-setup Happy Angry ACA is set up Concerned Hopeful ACA starts activities – education

“Happy” Happy

ACA starts activities – prevention

Angry Happy

ACA starts activities – investigation

Very angry Very happy

Anti-Anti-Corruption Campaign Active Concerned Negative perceptions ensue Happy Disapproving Internal/external clashes Very happy Disillusioned Advice for reform Very active Active

Table 2. A hypothetical model to illustrate stakeholders’ perceptions and reactions Compiled from Batory, (2012); Byrne et al. (2010); Doig, Watt and Williams (2005) and Schütte (2015) The above model illustrates a simple pattern of how a potential stakeholder

weighs his perceived benefits or potential threats from the existence and activities

of an ACA.


40

At the Pre-setup stage, no ACA exists but there may be other mechanisms such

as the legal system and anti-fraud institutions (e.g. the Police). A weak legal

system and ineffective anti-fraud agencies lower the risk of detection and

prosecution. This makes the dishonest stakeholder Happy as he can continue to

exploit the corrupt systems for personal gain. The honest stakeholder is Angry due

to his sense of (in)justice and is apprehensive about the flawed governance system

and the resulting cronyism which hamper progress.

As a result of various factors (one of them being a new government coming to

power), the ACA is set up and equipped with strong leadership. The dishonest

stakeholder is Concerned as his means to get benefits (e.g. living an extravagant

life) are threatened. The honest stakeholder is Hopeful as he considers this a

significant step forward to fight corruption and related crimes e.g. organized

crime.

When the ACA starts its education activities and organises community meetings

to sensitise the public about the dangers of corruption and the value of integrity

and transparency, the dishonest stakeholder sits in the audience feeling smug and

“Happy” as he considers these education campaigns to be not directly a threat to

him. The honest stakeholder is Happy as he relates to these efforts in the reduction

of corruption and fostering the values he deems necessary for good governance.

When the ACA starts its prevention activities by reviewing the bureaucratic

systems which may be breeding grounds for corrupt transactions, the dishonest

stakeholder feels Angry as these preventive efforts create obstacles for him to

receive benefits (e.g. through illegal kickbacks). The honest stakeholder is Happy

as he realises the efficiency gains from the installation of systems and procedures

which lessen corruption risks.

As soon as the ACA starts its investigation activities, the dishonest stakeholder

is Very Angry as he is worried about the possibility of him being under

investigation and all the ensuing issues (guilt, fear, humiliation, fines,

imprisonment etc.). The honest stakeholder is Very Happy that finally the corrupt

persons will be brought to justice and the corrupt money could be recouped.

Inevitably, the Anti-Anti-Corruption Campaign stealthily starts with the

dishonest stakeholder being Active in voicing out his opinion on how the authority

and influence of the ACA can be worrisome, where the powers of the ACA are

very strong with the risk that the ACA can do what it wants. The honest

stakeholder is Concerned as he sees the retaliation actions to be undue pressure

on the ACA and its staff which will negatively affect the anti-corruption efforts.

As the Negative perceptions ensue, with other stakeholders joining in (e.g.

donors and international organisations), the dishonest stakeholder feels Happy as

the bad reviews contribute to discredit the ACA and which potentially disrupt its

activities, at least in the short term. The honest stakeholder is Disapproving of

these negative developments knowing distinctly how these will weaken the ACA

and undo the hard-earned reform.

Adding to this, there may be Internal and external clashes within the ACA and

between the ACA and other agencies (e.g. the Police). The dishonest stakeholder

is Very Happy from these “bonus” incidents which add fuel to fire and greatly

damage the reputation of the ACA. The honest stakeholder starts to feel

Disillusioned as these clashes, in conjunction with the other negative events, are

recipes for failure for the ACA and its mission of fighting corruption.

When these copious events lead to the ACA being disbanded, there is a plethora

of Advice for reform where the honest stakeholder is Active. Strangely, the

dishonest stakeholder is Very Active in proposing new laws and even political



41

At the Pre-setup stage, no ACA exists but there may be other mechanisms such

as the legal system and anti-fraud institutions (e.g. the Police). A weak legal

system and ineffective anti-fraud agencies lower the risk of detection and

prosecution. This makes the dishonest stakeholder Happy as he can continue to

exploit the corrupt systems for personal gain. The honest stakeholder is Angry due

to his sense of (in)justice and is apprehensive about the flawed governance system

and the resulting cronyism which hamper progress.

As a result of various factors (one of them being a new government coming to

power), the ACA is set up and equipped with strong leadership. The dishonest

stakeholder is Concerned as his means to get benefits (e.g. living an extravagant

life) are threatened. The honest stakeholder is Hopeful as he considers this a

significant step forward to fight corruption and related crimes e.g. organized

crime.

When the ACA starts its education activities and organises community meetings

to sensitise the public about the dangers of corruption and the value of integrity

and transparency, the dishonest stakeholder sits in the audience feeling smug and

“Happy” as he considers these education campaigns to be not directly a threat to

him. The honest stakeholder is Happy as he relates to these efforts in the reduction

of corruption and fostering the values he deems necessary for good governance.

When the ACA starts its prevention activities by reviewing the bureaucratic

systems which may be breeding grounds for corrupt transactions, the dishonest

stakeholder feels Angry as these preventive efforts create obstacles for him to

receive benefits (e.g. through illegal kickbacks). The honest stakeholder is Happy

as he realises the efficiency gains from the installation of systems and procedures

which lessen corruption risks.

As soon as the ACA starts its investigation activities, the dishonest stakeholder

is Very Angry as he is worried about the possibility of him being under

investigation and all the ensuing issues (guilt, fear, humiliation, fines,

imprisonment etc.). The honest stakeholder is Very Happy that finally the corrupt

persons will be brought to justice and the corrupt money could be recouped.

Inevitably, the Anti-Anti-Corruption Campaign stealthily starts with the

dishonest stakeholder being Active in voicing out his opinion on how the authority

and influence of the ACA can be worrisome, where the powers of the ACA are

very strong with the risk that the ACA can do what it wants. The honest

stakeholder is Concerned as he sees the retaliation actions to be undue pressure

on the ACA and its staff which will negatively affect the anti-corruption efforts.

As the Negative perceptions ensue, with other stakeholders joining in (e.g.

donors and international organisations), the dishonest stakeholder feels Happy as

the bad reviews contribute to discredit the ACA and which potentially disrupt its

activities, at least in the short term. The honest stakeholder is Disapproving of

these negative developments knowing distinctly how these will weaken the ACA

and undo the hard-earned reform.

Adding to this, there may be Internal and external clashes within the ACA and

between the ACA and other agencies (e.g. the Police). The dishonest stakeholder

is Very Happy from these “bonus” incidents which add fuel to fire and greatly

damage the reputation of the ACA. The honest stakeholder starts to feel

Disillusioned as these clashes, in conjunction with the other negative events, are

recipes for failure for the ACA and its mission of fighting corruption.

When these copious events lead to the ACA being disbanded, there is a plethora

of Advice for reform where the honest stakeholder is Active. Strangely, the

dishonest stakeholder is Very Active in proposing new laws and even political


42

change as well as ideal ACA models and the incessant search for a better

alternative.

6.1.3. Aid for strategy

The above model aims to provide a different perspective which can extend the

vision beyond the present. It offers a basic framework for policy makers (as well

as ACA practitioners) to at least consider these perceptions and maximise the

advantages of combining the ACA lifecycle with the stakeholders’ potential

perceptions, as described in the model.

It is acknowledged that what occurs in a stakeholder’s mind is much more subtle

and complex than any model can fully explain, as the stakeholder will assess

numerous factors subjectively based on his perception of the realities of his world.

Nevertheless, for the sake of providing a simple construct, and based on the

observations of real ACAs, it is still possible to discern some recurring patterns

in the mental process that can be used as a building block in the development of

anti-corruption strategies.

6.1.4. Future research

In the quest to enhance effectiveness of ACAs, there is a need to identify the

factors that play important roles in each stage of the ACA’s lifecycle. Hence, more

conscious thought is required to find ways to link the factors of effectiveness with

the ACA lifecycle. A call for more focused studies may address the present

limitations and explore the identified factors in greater depth. Further research can

use historical data to link the factors among themselves and polish up the stages

as well as enhance their value for designing anti-corruption efforts.

REFERENCES

ACB-Malawi (Anti-Corruption Bureau of Malawi). (2017, December 10). Retrieved from http://www.acbmw.org/

ACC-Sierra Leone (Anti-Corruption Commission of Sierra Leone). (2017, December 10). Retrieved from http://www.anticorruption.gov.sl/

ADB (Asian Development Bank). (2010). The Criminalization of Bribery in Asia and the Pacific Frameworks and Practices in 28 Jurisdictions – Thematic Review – Final Report. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Batory, A. (2012). Political cycles and organizational life cycles: delegation to anticorruption agencies in Central Europe. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, 25(4), 639-660.

Bennett, N. and Lemoine, G. J. (2014). What a difference a word makes: Understanding threats to performance in a VUCA world. Business Horizons, 57(3), 311-317.

Byrne, E., Arnold, A. K., & Nagano, F. (2010). Building public support for anti-corruption efforts: Why anti-corruption agencies need to communicate and how. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The World Bank, Washington DC.

Carson, L., & Prado, M. M. (2014). Brazilian anti-corruption legislation and its enforcement: Potential lessons for institutional design. IRIBA Working Paper: 09. Manchester. UK.

CVC (Central Vigilance Commission). (2017, November 10). Retrieved from http://www.cvc.nic.in/

CPIB (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau). (2017, December 10). Retrieved from https://www.cpib.gov.sg/

De Jaegere, S. (2012). Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies: A Game Changer. Jindal Journal of Public Policy, 1(1), 90-102.



43

change as well as ideal ACA models and the incessant search for a better

alternative.

6.1.3. Aid for strategy

The above model aims to provide a different perspective which can extend the

vision beyond the present. It offers a basic framework for policy makers (as well

as ACA practitioners) to at least consider these perceptions and maximise the

advantages of combining the ACA lifecycle with the stakeholders’ potential

perceptions, as described in the model.

It is acknowledged that what occurs in a stakeholder’s mind is much more subtle

and complex than any model can fully explain, as the stakeholder will assess

numerous factors subjectively based on his perception of the realities of his world.

Nevertheless, for the sake of providing a simple construct, and based on the

observations of real ACAs, it is still possible to discern some recurring patterns

in the mental process that can be used as a building block in the development of

anti-corruption strategies.

6.1.4. Future research

In the quest to enhance effectiveness of ACAs, there is a need to identify the

factors that play important roles in each stage of the ACA’s lifecycle. Hence, more

conscious thought is required to find ways to link the factors of effectiveness with

the ACA lifecycle. A call for more focused studies may address the present

limitations and explore the identified factors in greater depth. Further research can

use historical data to link the factors among themselves and polish up the stages

as well as enhance their value for designing anti-corruption efforts.

REFERENCES

ACB-Malawi (Anti-Corruption Bureau of Malawi). (2017, December 10). Retrieved from http://www.acbmw.org/

ACC-Sierra Leone (Anti-Corruption Commission of Sierra Leone). (2017, December 10). Retrieved from http://www.anticorruption.gov.sl/

ADB (Asian Development Bank). (2010). The Criminalization of Bribery in Asia and the Pacific Frameworks and Practices in 28 Jurisdictions – Thematic Review – Final Report. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Batory, A. (2012). Political cycles and organizational life cycles: delegation to anticorruption agencies in Central Europe. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, 25(4), 639-660.

Bennett, N. and Lemoine, G. J. (2014). What a difference a word makes: Understanding threats to performance in a VUCA world. Business Horizons, 57(3), 311-317.

Byrne, E., Arnold, A. K., & Nagano, F. (2010). Building public support for anti-corruption efforts: Why anti-corruption agencies need to communicate and how. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The World Bank, Washington DC.

Carson, L., & Prado, M. M. (2014). Brazilian anti-corruption legislation and its enforcement: Potential lessons for institutional design. IRIBA Working Paper: 09. Manchester. UK.

CVC (Central Vigilance Commission). (2017, November 10). Retrieved from http://www.cvc.nic.in/

CPIB (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau). (2017, December 10). Retrieved from https://www.cpib.gov.sg/

De Jaegere, S. (2012). Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies: A Game Changer. Jindal Journal of Public Policy, 1(1), 90-102.


44

De Sousa, L. (2010). Anti-corruption agencies: between empowerment and irrelevance. Crime, Law and Social Change, 53 (1), 5-22.

De Speville, B. (2010). Anticorruption commissions: the “Hong Kong model” revisited. Asia-Pacific Review, 17(1), 47-71.

Denyer, D., & Tranfield, D. (2006). Using qualitative research synthesis to build an actionable knowledge base. Management Decision, 44(2), 213-227.

Dionisie, D., & Checchi, F. (2008). Corruption and anti-corruption agencies in Eastern Europe and the CIS: A practitioners’ experience. Bratislava: United Nations Development Programme.

Doig, A. (Ed.). 2012. Fraud: The Counter Fraud Practitioner's Handbook. Gower Publishing Limited.

Doig, A., & Norris, D. (2012). Improving anti-corruption agencies as organisations. Journal of Financial Crime, 19(3), 255-273.

Doig, A., Watt, D., & Williams, R. (2005). Measuring “Success” in Five African Anti-Corruption Commissions. U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre.

Gerberich, S. G., Church, T. R., McGovern, P. M., Hansen, H. E., Nachreiner, N. M., Geisser, M. S., Ryan, A. D., Mongin, S. J. and Watt, G. D. (2004). An epidemiological study of the magnitude and consequences of work related violence: the Minnesota Nurses’ Study. Occupational and environmental medicine, 61(6), 495-503.

Heidbreder, C. A. (2016). Volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity: The evolution of warfare through the process of globalization. University of Colorado at Denver.

ICAC-Hong Kong (Independent Commission Against Corruption of Hong Kong). (2017, December 10). Retrieved from http://www.icac.org.hk/en/home/index.html

ICAC-Mauritius (Independent Commission Against Corruption of Mauritius). (2017, December 10). Retrieved from https://www.icac.mu/

Khemani, M. (2009). Anti-Corruption Commissions in the African State: Burying the Problem or Addressing the Issue?

Kpundeh, S., & Levy, B. (Eds.). (2004). Building state capacity in Africa. The World Bank.

Kuris, G. (2013). From a rocky start to regional leadership: Mauritius’s anti-corruption agency, 2006-2012. Princeton University.

Kuris, G. (2014). From underdogs to watchdogs: How anti-corruption agencies can hold off potent adversaries. Princeton, NJ: Innovations for Successful Societies.

MACC (Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission). (2017, December 10). Retrieved from http://www.sprm.gov.my/index.php/en/

MacDonald, M. (2002) "How companies can find renewed focus during uncertain times", Journal of Communication Management, 6(3), 220-226

Mitchell, R. K., Agle, B. R., & Wood, D. J. (1997). Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts. Academy of management review, 22(4), 853-886.

Miller, W. C. (1981). Staff Morale, School Climate, and Educational Productivity. Educational leadership, 38(6), 483-86.

NAB (National Accountability Bureau). (2016). Annual Report 2016.

NCCC (National Counter Corruption Commission). (2017, November 10). Retrieved from https://www.nacc.go.th/main.php?filename=index_en

Ombudsman-Rwanda (Office of the Ombudsman of Rwanda). (2017, November 10). Retrieved from http://www.ombudsman.gov.rw/en/

Klemenčič, G., & Stusek, J. (2008). Specialised anti-corruption institutions: review of models. OECD Publishing.

Schütte, S. A. (2015). The fish’s head: Appointment and removal procedures for anti-corruption agency leadership. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute.

SFO investigating British American Tobacco plc. (2017, August 1). Retrieved from https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2017/08/01/sfo-investigating-british-american-tobacco-plc/



45

De Sousa, L. (2010). Anti-corruption agencies: between empowerment and irrelevance. Crime, Law and Social Change, 53 (1), 5-22.

De Speville, B. (2010). Anticorruption commissions: the “Hong Kong model” revisited. Asia-Pacific Review, 17(1), 47-71.

Denyer, D., & Tranfield, D. (2006). Using qualitative research synthesis to build an actionable knowledge base. Management Decision, 44(2), 213-227.

Dionisie, D., & Checchi, F. (2008). Corruption and anti-corruption agencies in Eastern Europe and the CIS: A practitioners’ experience. Bratislava: United Nations Development Programme.

Doig, A. (Ed.). 2012. Fraud: The Counter Fraud Practitioner's Handbook. Gower Publishing Limited.

Doig, A., & Norris, D. (2012). Improving anti-corruption agencies as organisations. Journal of Financial Crime, 19(3), 255-273.

Doig, A., Watt, D., & Williams, R. (2005). Measuring “Success” in Five African Anti-Corruption Commissions. U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre.

Gerberich, S. G., Church, T. R., McGovern, P. M., Hansen, H. E., Nachreiner, N. M., Geisser, M. S., Ryan, A. D., Mongin, S. J. and Watt, G. D. (2004). An epidemiological study of the magnitude and consequences of work related violence: the Minnesota Nurses’ Study. Occupational and environmental medicine, 61(6), 495-503.

Heidbreder, C. A. (2016). Volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity: The evolution of warfare through the process of globalization. University of Colorado at Denver.

ICAC-Hong Kong (Independent Commission Against Corruption of Hong Kong). (2017, December 10). Retrieved from http://www.icac.org.hk/en/home/index.html

ICAC-Mauritius (Independent Commission Against Corruption of Mauritius). (2017, December 10). Retrieved from https://www.icac.mu/

Khemani, M. (2009). Anti-Corruption Commissions in the African State: Burying the Problem or Addressing the Issue?

Kpundeh, S., & Levy, B. (Eds.). (2004). Building state capacity in Africa. The World Bank.

Kuris, G. (2013). From a rocky start to regional leadership: Mauritius’s anti-corruption agency, 2006-2012. Princeton University.

Kuris, G. (2014). From underdogs to watchdogs: How anti-corruption agencies can hold off potent adversaries. Princeton, NJ: Innovations for Successful Societies.

MACC (Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission). (2017, December 10). Retrieved from http://www.sprm.gov.my/index.php/en/

MacDonald, M. (2002) "How companies can find renewed focus during uncertain times", Journal of Communication Management, 6(3), 220-226

Mitchell, R. K., Agle, B. R., & Wood, D. J. (1997). Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts. Academy of management review, 22(4), 853-886.

Miller, W. C. (1981). Staff Morale, School Climate, and Educational Productivity. Educational leadership, 38(6), 483-86.

NAB (National Accountability Bureau). (2016). Annual Report 2016.

NCCC (National Counter Corruption Commission). (2017, November 10). Retrieved from https://www.nacc.go.th/main.php?filename=index_en

Ombudsman-Rwanda (Office of the Ombudsman of Rwanda). (2017, November 10). Retrieved from http://www.ombudsman.gov.rw/en/

Klemenčič, G., & Stusek, J. (2008). Specialised anti-corruption institutions: review of models. OECD Publishing.

Schütte, S. A. (2015). The fish’s head: Appointment and removal procedures for anti-corruption agency leadership. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute.

SFO investigating British American Tobacco plc. (2017, August 1). Retrieved from https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2017/08/01/sfo-investigating-british-american-tobacco-plc/


46

Stone, B. (2015). Accountability and the design of an anticorruption agency in a parliamentary democracy. Policy Studies, 36(2), 157-175.

TI (Transparency International) (2014). Fighting corruption: the role of the Anti-Corruption Commission. Politics and Government.

Typhoon Hato: Macau launches investigation against Chinese Met Office after 10 killed. (2017, December 10). Retrieved from http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/847079/macau-weather-typhoon-china-observatory-investigation-people-dead

UNCAC (United Nations Convention Against Corruption). (2003).

UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). (2011) Practitioners’ Guide: Capacity Assessment of Anti-Corruption Agencies. UNDP.

Election, democratic legitimacy and regime stability: A case study on the 10th general election in Bangladesh

S M ABDUL QUDDUS Associate Professor of Public Policy & Governance & Head, Office of Internalization and Global Governance (KIRKHS), Department of Political Science, KIRKHS, International Islamic University Malaysia, Malaysia.

Abstract

Bangladesh witnessed her 10th General Election with some remarkable incidents such as major political opposition parties did not take part in the polls hence more than 50% candidates of which mostly from the ruling party were elected MPs uncontested; voters turnout was very low - about 22-26% (“Hasina Plan…”, 2014) due to a lack of contesting candidates in some constituencies there was no vote at all!); election ends with chaos; local media, international communities and donor agencies expressed their dissatisfaction about the credibility of the election outcomes and the way election was conducted; and others. However, the ruling Awami League called the election a free and fair one and expressed its satisfaction about the election outcomes. This paper deals with the following research questions: (a) What is the political culture in Bangladesh and how does political culture influence election in the country? (b) Why Bangladeshi regimes feel encouraged to allow ‘electoral engineering’ or fail to meet international standards while conducting elections? (c) What are the consequences when elections fail to meet the necessary level of credibility and how to overcome these problems? The paper is based on empirical data collected mainly from personal observation of the 10th national election in Bangladesh as well as information from the Election Commission’s website and print and electronic media reports about the 10th General Election and democracy in Bangladesh. Data from published secondary sources have also been consulted. This paper argues that Bangladesh democracy is again at the crossroads as the provision of Non-party Caretaker Government (NCG) has been scrapped by the current regime from the Constitution despite resistance from the main opposition block. In fact, the 10th general parliamentary election under party government raised critical questions about the credibility of election, legitimacy of the regime, and stability of the government. The paper further argues that democracy has been provided with little room for expected development by uncouth party politics or political culture in Bangladesh. Although an interim arrangement, called the Caretaker Government system, was introduced for transition from dictatorship into democracy in 1991 and was relatively successful in holding three free and fair elections; it suffered setback in conducting the 4th General Election owing to composition imbroglio and was



47

Stone, B. (2015). Accountability and the design of an anticorruption agency in a parliamentary democracy. Policy Studies, 36(2), 157-175.

TI (Transparency International) (2014). Fighting corruption: the role of the Anti-Corruption Commission. Politics and Government.

Typhoon Hato: Macau launches investigation against Chinese Met Office after 10 killed. (2017, December 10). Retrieved from http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/847079/macau-weather-typhoon-china-observatory-investigation-people-dead

UNCAC (United Nations Convention Against Corruption). (2003).

UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). (2011) Practitioners’ Guide: Capacity Assessment of Anti-Corruption Agencies. UNDP.

Election, democratic legitimacy and regime stability: A case study on the 10th general election in Bangladesh

S M ABDUL QUDDUS Associate Professor of Public Policy & Governance & Head, Office of Internalization and Global Governance (KIRKHS), Department of Political Science, KIRKHS, International Islamic University Malaysia, Malaysia.

Abstract

Bangladesh witnessed her 10th General Election with some remarkable incidents such as major political opposition parties did not take part in the polls hence more than 50% candidates of which mostly from the ruling party were elected MPs uncontested; voters turnout was very low - about 22-26% (“Hasina Plan…”, 2014) due to a lack of contesting candidates in some constituencies there was no vote at all!); election ends with chaos; local media, international communities and donor agencies expressed their dissatisfaction about the credibility of the election outcomes and the way election was conducted; and others. However, the ruling Awami League called the election a free and fair one and expressed its satisfaction about the election outcomes. This paper deals with the following research questions: (a) What is the political culture in Bangladesh and how does political culture influence election in the country? (b) Why Bangladeshi regimes feel encouraged to allow ‘electoral engineering’ or fail to meet international standards while conducting elections? (c) What are the consequences when elections fail to meet the necessary level of credibility and how to overcome these problems? The paper is based on empirical data collected mainly from personal observation of the 10th national election in Bangladesh as well as information from the Election Commission’s website and print and electronic media reports about the 10th General Election and democracy in Bangladesh. Data from published secondary sources have also been consulted. This paper argues that Bangladesh democracy is again at the crossroads as the provision of Non-party Caretaker Government (NCG) has been scrapped by the current regime from the Constitution despite resistance from the main opposition block. In fact, the 10th general parliamentary election under party government raised critical questions about the credibility of election, legitimacy of the regime, and stability of the government. The paper further argues that democracy has been provided with little room for expected development by uncouth party politics or political culture in Bangladesh. Although an interim arrangement, called the Caretaker Government system, was introduced for transition from dictatorship into democracy in 1991 and was relatively successful in holding three free and fair elections; it suffered setback in conducting the 4th General Election owing to composition imbroglio and was


48

replaced by a military-backed Caretaker Government. Therefore, this paper draws the conclusion that though electoral system in Bangladesh has been changed from the Caretaker Government system to election under party government system, little qualitative change has taken place in the country’s political system and electoral arena and culture to have credible election, followed by democratic legitimacy and regime stability.

Key words: Free and fair election; political culture; electoral politics; democratic legitimacy; regime stability *E-mail: [email protected]

1. Introduction

The stability and smooth functioning of a political regime depends on democratic

values i.e. representative attributes which also facilitates the development of

political legitimacy (Dalton, 2004; Easton, 1975). Political legitimacy is also

subjected to citizens’ approval and consent to rule and policies of entire political

system and the decisions of the regime. There is a well-built relationship between

democracy and the political legitimacy. It is because democratic polity is

characterized by (a) the recognition of all citizens as political equals (b) the right

of the citizens to self-rule mainly through the election of their rulers (Warren,

2008). For Aragon (2008), there are five fundamental dimensions of political

legitimacy, which ultimately facilitates the regime stability and success of a

democratic polity; These are (a) support for the political community; (b) support

for the core regime principles, norms and procedures; (c) assessment of the regime

performance; (d) support for the regime institutions; and (e) support for the

authorities. He further adds that regime stability also requires the ability to

demonstrate performance and capacity to find solutions to the problem of society

such as ensuring economic progress with equitable distribution, public order and

security, unbiased and effective rule of law, quality improvement in health,

education, free and fair elections, and so on. It is also mentioned that the

democratic commitment of political elites in a particular society is of utmost

importance for democratic legitimacy hence regime stability (Pharr & Putnam,

2000; Warren, 2006). Democratic project through election has to be mostly state-

centered failing which democratic legitimacy and regime stability will have

unfortunate interference of ‘external actors’ outside the realm of the state

(Aragon, 2008 and quoted in Warren, 2008). Seligson (2000), on the other hand,

pointed out that political culture of a particular society has tremendous influence

on election and democratic legitimacy. He further argues that “if citizens do not

believe their political system is legitimate, its stability will be very much in



49

replaced by a military-backed Caretaker Government. Therefore, this paper draws the conclusion that though electoral system in Bangladesh has been changed from the Caretaker Government system to election under party government system, little qualitative change has taken place in the country’s political system and electoral arena and culture to have credible election, followed by democratic legitimacy and regime stability.

Key words: Free and fair election; political culture; electoral politics; democratic legitimacy; regime stability *E-mail: [email protected]

1. Introduction

The stability and smooth functioning of a political regime depends on democratic

values i.e. representative attributes which also facilitates the development of

political legitimacy (Dalton, 2004; Easton, 1975). Political legitimacy is also

subjected to citizens’ approval and consent to rule and policies of entire political

system and the decisions of the regime. There is a well-built relationship between

democracy and the political legitimacy. It is because democratic polity is

characterized by (a) the recognition of all citizens as political equals (b) the right

of the citizens to self-rule mainly through the election of their rulers (Warren,

2008). For Aragon (2008), there are five fundamental dimensions of political

legitimacy, which ultimately facilitates the regime stability and success of a

democratic polity; These are (a) support for the political community; (b) support

for the core regime principles, norms and procedures; (c) assessment of the regime

performance; (d) support for the regime institutions; and (e) support for the

authorities. He further adds that regime stability also requires the ability to

demonstrate performance and capacity to find solutions to the problem of society

such as ensuring economic progress with equitable distribution, public order and

security, unbiased and effective rule of law, quality improvement in health,

education, free and fair elections, and so on. It is also mentioned that the

democratic commitment of political elites in a particular society is of utmost

importance for democratic legitimacy hence regime stability (Pharr & Putnam,

2000; Warren, 2006). Democratic project through election has to be mostly state-

centered failing which democratic legitimacy and regime stability will have

unfortunate interference of ‘external actors’ outside the realm of the state

(Aragon, 2008 and quoted in Warren, 2008). Seligson (2000), on the other hand,

pointed out that political culture of a particular society has tremendous influence

on election and democratic legitimacy. He further argues that “if citizens do not

believe their political system is legitimate, its stability will be very much in


50

question” (Seligson, 2000, p.7). However, political tolerance and regular election

paves the way for legitimate system of governance, which increase citizens’ trust

in government hence facilitates regime stability (Seligson, 2000). By political

tolerance Seligson refers to respect for the political rights of opponents such as

their right to choose, raise their voices, and go for demonstrations if required

(Seligson, 2000, p. 9) which ultimately warrant accountable, democratic and

transparent governance.

2. How Does Political Culture Influence Election?

In order to understand the nature of the 10th general election and its subsequent

effects on the democratic legitimacy and stability of the current regime, I think

we need to clarify the term “political culture”. The term “political culture” is also

a much debated concept although it is one of the “most popular and seductive

concept in political science…” (Elkins & Simeon, 1979, p. 127). The modern

study of political culture dates back to the middle of the 1950s when Gabriel

Almond and Sidney Verba’s pioneering work The Civic Culture (1963) fleshed

out the properties and types of political culture (i.e. political behaviour and

attitude based on the survey data of five countries). Having compared political

attitude in five countries Almond and Verba concluded that there are cognitive,

emotional, and evaluative components in the pattern of political behaviour, action

and orientations that are embedded in the behaviour and political socialisation of

a particular group. For them, an imitation of the Western democratic institutions

in emerging countries would not be effective to embrace democracy in these

countries. What in this respect is crucial to understand “the inner working and the

cultural dimensions of democracy”, what must be learned about democracy, they

advocated, “is a matter of attitude and feeling, and this is harder to learn” (Almond

& Verba, 1963, p.5). Newly emerging countries (such as Bangladesh), according

to Almond and Verba, have a parochial political culture. A characteristic of their

political systems is that they are “…always threatened by parochial fragmentation,

teeter like acrobats on tight ropes, leaning precariously at one time toward

authoritarianism, at another toward democracy” (Almond & Verba, 1963, p.26).

Dahl (1956) looks at it as peoples’ orientation to problem solving, collective

action, political system and inter-subjectivity. For Lucian Pye (1995, p.965,

quoted in Hague & Harrop, 2004, p.89), it is “the sum of the fundamental values,

sentiments and knowledge that give form and substance to political process”. In

its simple meaning, it refers to “[A] community’s attitudes toward the quality,

style and vigour of its political processes and government operations (Shafritz,

1988, p.412).

The above-mentioned discussion has shown that there is no agreement among

scholars with regard to the definition of the concept political culture. However,

what I understand by the concept political culture is somewhat similar to that of

Brown’s suggestion:

It [political culture] will be understood as the subjective perception of history and politics, the fundamental beliefs and values, the foci of identification and loyalty, and the political knowledge and expectations which are the product of the specific historical experience of nations and groups (1979, p. 1).

I think the above-mentioned definition of political culture provided us a broader

context of the concept and it would help in identifying the crucial elements of the

historically emergent political culture of Bangladesh.

2.1 The Essential Characteristics of Political Culture in Bangladesh

According to Kochanek, the political culture in a given society can be understood

in relation to the configuration of individual and collective attitudes toward

politics and the organisation of society underlying the functioning of the political



51

question” (Seligson, 2000, p.7). However, political tolerance and regular election

paves the way for legitimate system of governance, which increase citizens’ trust

in government hence facilitates regime stability (Seligson, 2000). By political

tolerance Seligson refers to respect for the political rights of opponents such as

their right to choose, raise their voices, and go for demonstrations if required

(Seligson, 2000, p. 9) which ultimately warrant accountable, democratic and

transparent governance.

2. How Does Political Culture Influence Election?

In order to understand the nature of the 10th general election and its subsequent

effects on the democratic legitimacy and stability of the current regime, I think

we need to clarify the term “political culture”. The term “political culture” is also

a much debated concept although it is one of the “most popular and seductive

concept in political science…” (Elkins & Simeon, 1979, p. 127). The modern

study of political culture dates back to the middle of the 1950s when Gabriel

Almond and Sidney Verba’s pioneering work The Civic Culture (1963) fleshed

out the properties and types of political culture (i.e. political behaviour and

attitude based on the survey data of five countries). Having compared political

attitude in five countries Almond and Verba concluded that there are cognitive,

emotional, and evaluative components in the pattern of political behaviour, action

and orientations that are embedded in the behaviour and political socialisation of

a particular group. For them, an imitation of the Western democratic institutions

in emerging countries would not be effective to embrace democracy in these

countries. What in this respect is crucial to understand “the inner working and the

cultural dimensions of democracy”, what must be learned about democracy, they

advocated, “is a matter of attitude and feeling, and this is harder to learn” (Almond

& Verba, 1963, p.5). Newly emerging countries (such as Bangladesh), according

to Almond and Verba, have a parochial political culture. A characteristic of their

political systems is that they are “…always threatened by parochial fragmentation,

teeter like acrobats on tight ropes, leaning precariously at one time toward

authoritarianism, at another toward democracy” (Almond & Verba, 1963, p.26).

Dahl (1956) looks at it as peoples’ orientation to problem solving, collective

action, political system and inter-subjectivity. For Lucian Pye (1995, p.965,

quoted in Hague & Harrop, 2004, p.89), it is “the sum of the fundamental values,

sentiments and knowledge that give form and substance to political process”. In

its simple meaning, it refers to “[A] community’s attitudes toward the quality,

style and vigour of its political processes and government operations (Shafritz,

1988, p.412).

The above-mentioned discussion has shown that there is no agreement among

scholars with regard to the definition of the concept political culture. However,

what I understand by the concept political culture is somewhat similar to that of

Brown’s suggestion:

It [political culture] will be understood as the subjective perception of history and politics, the fundamental beliefs and values, the foci of identification and loyalty, and the political knowledge and expectations which are the product of the specific historical experience of nations and groups (1979, p. 1).

I think the above-mentioned definition of political culture provided us a broader

context of the concept and it would help in identifying the crucial elements of the

historically emergent political culture of Bangladesh.

2.1 The Essential Characteristics of Political Culture in Bangladesh

According to Kochanek, the political culture in a given society can be understood

in relation to the configuration of individual and collective attitudes toward

politics and the organisation of society underlying the functioning of the political


52

system. For him, “these attitude and values help shape the forms, style, and

behaviours of the organisations that groups create” (1993, p. 34). In fact, there are

‘cognitive, emotional, and evaluative’ components in the pattern of political

behaviour, action and orientations that are embedded in peoples’ behaviour and

political socialisation in a given society (Almond & Verba, 1963). Scholars (for

example, Wood, 2000; Khan et al, 1996; Hossain et al, 2002; Lewis & Hossain,

2007) have identified historically derived “deep structures” or critical dynamics

of the emergent political culture of Bangladesh. Some of which are:

Religion and ethnicity have been as sources of political identity

(Kochanek, 1993; Khan et al., 1996) and highly fragmented political

culture (Maloney, 1991);

Intense network of interpersonal patron-client relations (Khan et al, 1996)

and clientelist-based forms of welfare and safety nets (Wood, 2000;

2001);

A “strong reliance for all upon networks linkages” and interlocked

transactions between elites e.g. political, business and high profile

professional groups (Wood, 2000; Khan, 1998);

Highly personalised pattern of authority or patrimonial /neo-patrimonial

political and bureaucratic behaviour (Maloney, 1991; Khan et al, 1996;

Wood, 2000);

Authority derives from individuals’ ascribed social status (e.g. a high-up

position, superior lineage status and so on) rather than rule of law or

official roles (Wood, 2000).

Let us explain briefly the above-mentioned deep-rooted dynamics of political

culture in Bangladesh.

Firstly, the unresolved national identity and social fragmentation: “The two

most important influences responsible for shaping national identity in Bangladesh

have been religion and ethnicity (Kochanek, 1993, p.34). The cultural bedrock of

Bangladesh has been formed by several religious traditions. Following Hinduism

and Buddhism, Jainism had also spread to Bengal by the second century B.C.

(Majumder, 1974). Later followers of the Sufi (saints) doctrine from different

parts of the Muslim Western and Central Asia came to settle in Bengal and preach

Islam (Karim, 1959; Haq, 1975). These Sufis were able to attract large followers

and spread Islam particularly among the peasantry and eventually led to the

establishment of Islam as the dominant religion of Bengal. Moreover, the Sufism

not only resembled in many ways the mystic religious cults of Hinduism and

Buddhism but also contributed to the growth of a pervasive cultural syncretism in

Bengal. Saints provided a psychological relief against threats of nature in the

deltaic ecology of Bengal thus enjoyed the extraordinary power or charisma and

pir-murid (holy master-subordinate) relationships (Roy, 1980; Islam, 1988).

Kochanek (1993, p. 34) argued that religion played a crucial role in shaping

‘Bengali Muslim’ identity from the late nineteenth century until the creation of

the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in 1947. However, with the partition of Pakistan

and creation of independent state Bangladesh in 1971, disputes have come to

centre on the role of religion in shaping national identity, the nature of the state

and the character of the political order.

While Khan et al (1996) argued that the war of independence celebrated Bengali

nationalism with linguistic identity, secularism and liberalism, Kochanek (1993,

p.42) felt that there were many in Bangladesh who felt uncomfortable with the

secular approach of the Awami League and raised fundamental questions about

‘Bengali nationalism’ or heavy emphasis on “Bengaliness” based simply on

linguistic identity. Moreover, this ‘Bengali nationalism’ failed to differentiate



53

system. For him, “these attitude and values help shape the forms, style, and

behaviours of the organisations that groups create” (1993, p. 34). In fact, there are

‘cognitive, emotional, and evaluative’ components in the pattern of political

behaviour, action and orientations that are embedded in peoples’ behaviour and

political socialisation in a given society (Almond & Verba, 1963). Scholars (for

example, Wood, 2000; Khan et al, 1996; Hossain et al, 2002; Lewis & Hossain,

2007) have identified historically derived “deep structures” or critical dynamics

of the emergent political culture of Bangladesh. Some of which are:

Religion and ethnicity have been as sources of political identity

(Kochanek, 1993; Khan et al., 1996) and highly fragmented political

culture (Maloney, 1991);

Intense network of interpersonal patron-client relations (Khan et al, 1996)

and clientelist-based forms of welfare and safety nets (Wood, 2000;

2001);

A “strong reliance for all upon networks linkages” and interlocked

transactions between elites e.g. political, business and high profile

professional groups (Wood, 2000; Khan, 1998);

Highly personalised pattern of authority or patrimonial /neo-patrimonial

political and bureaucratic behaviour (Maloney, 1991; Khan et al, 1996;

Wood, 2000);

Authority derives from individuals’ ascribed social status (e.g. a high-up

position, superior lineage status and so on) rather than rule of law or

official roles (Wood, 2000).

Let us explain briefly the above-mentioned deep-rooted dynamics of political

culture in Bangladesh.

Firstly, the unresolved national identity and social fragmentation: “The two

most important influences responsible for shaping national identity in Bangladesh

have been religion and ethnicity (Kochanek, 1993, p.34). The cultural bedrock of

Bangladesh has been formed by several religious traditions. Following Hinduism

and Buddhism, Jainism had also spread to Bengal by the second century B.C.

(Majumder, 1974). Later followers of the Sufi (saints) doctrine from different

parts of the Muslim Western and Central Asia came to settle in Bengal and preach

Islam (Karim, 1959; Haq, 1975). These Sufis were able to attract large followers

and spread Islam particularly among the peasantry and eventually led to the

establishment of Islam as the dominant religion of Bengal. Moreover, the Sufism

not only resembled in many ways the mystic religious cults of Hinduism and

Buddhism but also contributed to the growth of a pervasive cultural syncretism in

Bengal. Saints provided a psychological relief against threats of nature in the

deltaic ecology of Bengal thus enjoyed the extraordinary power or charisma and

pir-murid (holy master-subordinate) relationships (Roy, 1980; Islam, 1988).

Kochanek (1993, p. 34) argued that religion played a crucial role in shaping

‘Bengali Muslim’ identity from the late nineteenth century until the creation of

the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in 1947. However, with the partition of Pakistan

and creation of independent state Bangladesh in 1971, disputes have come to

centre on the role of religion in shaping national identity, the nature of the state

and the character of the political order.

While Khan et al (1996) argued that the war of independence celebrated Bengali

nationalism with linguistic identity, secularism and liberalism, Kochanek (1993,

p.42) felt that there were many in Bangladesh who felt uncomfortable with the

secular approach of the Awami League and raised fundamental questions about

‘Bengali nationalism’ or heavy emphasis on “Bengaliness” based simply on

linguistic identity. Moreover, this ‘Bengali nationalism’ failed to differentiate


54

between Bangladesh and its neighbour (the Indian province of West Bengal) and

embrace non-Bengali minority community such as tribes in the Hilly districts of

the country. Considering the necessity to find somehow different identity from

the Bengali subculture of the Indian province of West Bengal and potential threat

from India, efforts were made to develop an identity with roots in both Bengali

culture and Islam. For example, General Ziaur Rahman (here after Zia) developed

“Bangladeshi nationalism” that was distinct from “Bengali nationalism”. Zia also

“reinforced …Islam to its rightful place in the society” by the replacement of

variety of references to the Islamic basis of the state for “secularism”—one of the

main constitutional principles adopted by the Awami League (AL) in 1972

(Kochanek, 1993, p.43). The Islamic basis of the state reinforced by Zia has been

replaced again by the principle of “secularism” by the current regime recently.

Although religion and ethnicity have been used to create a national identity but

the intellectuals and political elites of Bangladesh has become divided on the

issue. It is because the two main political camps in the country i.e. Awami League

(AL) and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) have taken two distinct stands in

relation to national identity. For example, the AL and its intellectual circles

continue to stress a secular Bengali nationalism, whereas the BNP and its political

allies and intellectual circles emphasize Islam and Bangladeshi nationalism.

Secondly, intense network of interpersonal patron-client relations. In order to

explain “who gets what” in Bangladesh society many scholars identified the

intense network of interpersonal patron-client relations and clientelist-based

forms of welfare and safety nets. As stated previously, Maloney characterises

interpersonal relationships in Bangladesh as a “complex network of obligations,

dependencies, and expectations, in which people conduct their dealings with each

other” (1991, p. 66). She characterises the notions of social role and obligation in

Bangladeshi society as follows:

Entitlement operates both above and below the self. A man is entitled to subsistence from the big people [patron] he is dependent upon, but similarly there are people entitled to dependence on him, including family members (Maloney, 1991, p. 41).

For Wood (2000; 2001), ‘clientelist-based forms of welfare and safety nets’ and

patron-client mode of politics are key features of social and contemporary

political system in Bangladesh. In fact, there are clearly defined personal bonds/

networks between political leaders and their followers in Bangladesh based on

mutual gains such as— clients provide personal services, attendance at rallies,

votes, taking personal risks and in return patrons guarantee jobs, official positions,

and monetary benefits. Considering the existing ‘client-based forms of safety

nets’ in Bangladesh, Bode and Howes also observed:

…. moral values, rooted in religion and kin-based social institutions, have served to partially constrain the rich; obliging them to engage in redistributive activities and to provide minimal safety nets if they wish to command respect and secure sustained political support (2002, p. VI; also quoted in Lewis & Hossain, 2007).

Baxter and others (1993, p. 278) identified another feature of the network of

patron-client relations in Bangladesh. For them, there are links between civil,

military and business elites. These also maintain transactions with the high profile

“professionals” (for example: medical doctors, university professors) as they need

their services. A study of the World Bank also reveals that “.... the functioning of

the public service reflects a pervasive clientalism operating within clearly defined

hierarchies…” The same report pointed out a number of well organised interest

groups in Bangladesh that according to its finding largely determined political

decisions in the country. These influential groups are political leaders, the

military, the public bureaucracy; private business; professional organizations;

NGOs; and the donors (World Bank, 2002, p. VI). Lewis and Hossain (2007, p.

6) observed that “the rise of a post-1971 elite that has built strong political



55

between Bangladesh and its neighbour (the Indian province of West Bengal) and

embrace non-Bengali minority community such as tribes in the Hilly districts of

the country. Considering the necessity to find somehow different identity from

the Bengali subculture of the Indian province of West Bengal and potential threat

from India, efforts were made to develop an identity with roots in both Bengali

culture and Islam. For example, General Ziaur Rahman (here after Zia) developed

“Bangladeshi nationalism” that was distinct from “Bengali nationalism”. Zia also

“reinforced …Islam to its rightful place in the society” by the replacement of

variety of references to the Islamic basis of the state for “secularism”—one of the

main constitutional principles adopted by the Awami League (AL) in 1972

(Kochanek, 1993, p.43). The Islamic basis of the state reinforced by Zia has been

replaced again by the principle of “secularism” by the current regime recently.

Although religion and ethnicity have been used to create a national identity but

the intellectuals and political elites of Bangladesh has become divided on the

issue. It is because the two main political camps in the country i.e. Awami League

(AL) and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) have taken two distinct stands in

relation to national identity. For example, the AL and its intellectual circles

continue to stress a secular Bengali nationalism, whereas the BNP and its political

allies and intellectual circles emphasize Islam and Bangladeshi nationalism.

Secondly, intense network of interpersonal patron-client relations. In order to

explain “who gets what” in Bangladesh society many scholars identified the

intense network of interpersonal patron-client relations and clientelist-based

forms of welfare and safety nets. As stated previously, Maloney characterises

interpersonal relationships in Bangladesh as a “complex network of obligations,

dependencies, and expectations, in which people conduct their dealings with each

other” (1991, p. 66). She characterises the notions of social role and obligation in

Bangladeshi society as follows:

Entitlement operates both above and below the self. A man is entitled to subsistence from the big people [patron] he is dependent upon, but similarly there are people entitled to dependence on him, including family members (Maloney, 1991, p. 41).

For Wood (2000; 2001), ‘clientelist-based forms of welfare and safety nets’ and

patron-client mode of politics are key features of social and contemporary

political system in Bangladesh. In fact, there are clearly defined personal bonds/

networks between political leaders and their followers in Bangladesh based on

mutual gains such as— clients provide personal services, attendance at rallies,

votes, taking personal risks and in return patrons guarantee jobs, official positions,

and monetary benefits. Considering the existing ‘client-based forms of safety

nets’ in Bangladesh, Bode and Howes also observed:

…. moral values, rooted in religion and kin-based social institutions, have served to partially constrain the rich; obliging them to engage in redistributive activities and to provide minimal safety nets if they wish to command respect and secure sustained political support (2002, p. VI; also quoted in Lewis & Hossain, 2007).

Baxter and others (1993, p. 278) identified another feature of the network of

patron-client relations in Bangladesh. For them, there are links between civil,

military and business elites. These also maintain transactions with the high profile

“professionals” (for example: medical doctors, university professors) as they need

their services. A study of the World Bank also reveals that “.... the functioning of

the public service reflects a pervasive clientalism operating within clearly defined

hierarchies…” The same report pointed out a number of well organised interest

groups in Bangladesh that according to its finding largely determined political

decisions in the country. These influential groups are political leaders, the

military, the public bureaucracy; private business; professional organizations;

NGOs; and the donors (World Bank, 2002, p. VI). Lewis and Hossain (2007, p.

6) observed that “the rise of a post-1971 elite that has built strong political


56

connections with the aid industry”, which has created another type and network

of patron-client relationship in the political arena.

Thirdly, patrimonial/neo-patrimonial political and bureaucratic behaviour.

Weber treated pre-colonial India as predominantly patrimonial. Although

colonialism established a rational-legal bureaucracy, yet the colonial rule can also

be viewed as partly patrimonial (Khan, Islam and Haque, 1996). Bangladesh has

set up a “superstructure” of classical bureaucratic machinery for carrying out its

policies and providing services to the citizens. It is to mention that political culture

in Bangladesh has a deep foundation of patrimonial/neo-patrimonial rule inherited

from the colonial administration. Khan et al., for example, pointed out that

“Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s (the 1st Prime Minister of the country) became

routinised in the direction of patrimonialism and it led to a neo-patrimonial

regime… Zia had an essentially gloried ‘yes-man’s club’… The Ershad regime

can be compared to what Weber (1978) called sultanism - an extremely arbitrary

use of the ruler’s discretion in the administration of this domain” (Khan et al.,

1996, p. 20). I think the ‘yes-madam’ policy continues during the reigns of

Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina. Maloney argues that common attributes of social

behaviour and attitudes of peoples, political and bureaucratic system in

Bangladesh are the principle of hierarchy, personal force, the personalisation of

authority, the reliance on patronage and indulgence, the authoritarian

administration, the opportunistic individualism and the lack of commitment to

abstract objectives and ideologies (1991, p. 66). For Wood (2000), the public and

private realms of the state officials in Bangladesh are blurred when performing as

officials and they exercise personalised power via relationships of patronage and

subjective reasoning, drawing on social norms, values and cultural principles such

as seniority and loyalty. Because of such characteristics of political elites in

Bangladesh there are always room for “exceptions and exemptions” in relation to

public policies and their implementation. These have also paved the ways for

tadbir1 or personal persuasion for individual favours (Kochanek, 1993) as well as

personal interests of the power elites about a particular service sector or group.

Fourthly, the principle of hierarchy and the exercise of inherited authority

and personal force in interpersonal relations are accepted as morally right and

necessary and even ritualized in many ways in South Asian countries, including

Bangladesh (Nicholas, 1967; also quoted in Maloney, 1991). According to

Maloney, “when two people meet in daily intercourse [in Bangladesh] they

commonly establish relative rank one way or another; it may depend on wealth,

lineage, education, rank of employment, or even a small difference in age” (1991,

p. 40). In daily interaction, therefore, one person may be accorded higher rank

than another, which gives him the right to extract service and demand respect; in

return he assumes obligations of patronage and/or dayã (indulgence) vis-à-vis

those of lower rank. This pattern is extended from family relations to those of

workplace and even to society in general (Maloney, 1991, p. 43).

2.2. The Outcomes of the 10th General Election and the Influence of Political

Culture

It has been recognised by experts that election and democracy are intertwined and

main pillars of modern democratic polity. According to experts like MacIver

(quoted in Hakim, 1993) elections confer legitimacy and means for routinised

succession for ruling elites. It is not only considered as the main mechanism that

ensures governing elites remain accountable to their electorate but also

accentuates legitimacy crisis for many regimes. Bangladesh may be portrayed as

a typical case where regimes suffered credibility and legitimacy due to rigged

elections, use of violence and force to win election, lack of elections at periodic

intervals and so on, which have become part of political culture in Bangladesh.



57

connections with the aid industry”, which has created another type and network

of patron-client relationship in the political arena.

Thirdly, patrimonial/neo-patrimonial political and bureaucratic behaviour.

Weber treated pre-colonial India as predominantly patrimonial. Although

colonialism established a rational-legal bureaucracy, yet the colonial rule can also

be viewed as partly patrimonial (Khan, Islam and Haque, 1996). Bangladesh has

set up a “superstructure” of classical bureaucratic machinery for carrying out its

policies and providing services to the citizens. It is to mention that political culture

in Bangladesh has a deep foundation of patrimonial/neo-patrimonial rule inherited

from the colonial administration. Khan et al., for example, pointed out that

“Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s (the 1st Prime Minister of the country) became

routinised in the direction of patrimonialism and it led to a neo-patrimonial

regime… Zia had an essentially gloried ‘yes-man’s club’… The Ershad regime

can be compared to what Weber (1978) called sultanism - an extremely arbitrary

use of the ruler’s discretion in the administration of this domain” (Khan et al.,

1996, p. 20). I think the ‘yes-madam’ policy continues during the reigns of

Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina. Maloney argues that common attributes of social

behaviour and attitudes of peoples, political and bureaucratic system in

Bangladesh are the principle of hierarchy, personal force, the personalisation of

authority, the reliance on patronage and indulgence, the authoritarian

administration, the opportunistic individualism and the lack of commitment to

abstract objectives and ideologies (1991, p. 66). For Wood (2000), the public and

private realms of the state officials in Bangladesh are blurred when performing as

officials and they exercise personalised power via relationships of patronage and

subjective reasoning, drawing on social norms, values and cultural principles such

as seniority and loyalty. Because of such characteristics of political elites in

Bangladesh there are always room for “exceptions and exemptions” in relation to

public policies and their implementation. These have also paved the ways for

tadbir1 or personal persuasion for individual favours (Kochanek, 1993) as well as

personal interests of the power elites about a particular service sector or group.

Fourthly, the principle of hierarchy and the exercise of inherited authority

and personal force in interpersonal relations are accepted as morally right and

necessary and even ritualized in many ways in South Asian countries, including

Bangladesh (Nicholas, 1967; also quoted in Maloney, 1991). According to

Maloney, “when two people meet in daily intercourse [in Bangladesh] they

commonly establish relative rank one way or another; it may depend on wealth,

lineage, education, rank of employment, or even a small difference in age” (1991,

p. 40). In daily interaction, therefore, one person may be accorded higher rank

than another, which gives him the right to extract service and demand respect; in

return he assumes obligations of patronage and/or dayã (indulgence) vis-à-vis

those of lower rank. This pattern is extended from family relations to those of

workplace and even to society in general (Maloney, 1991, p. 43).

2.2. The Outcomes of the 10th General Election and the Influence of Political

Culture

It has been recognised by experts that election and democracy are intertwined and

main pillars of modern democratic polity. According to experts like MacIver

(quoted in Hakim, 1993) elections confer legitimacy and means for routinised

succession for ruling elites. It is not only considered as the main mechanism that

ensures governing elites remain accountable to their electorate but also

accentuates legitimacy crisis for many regimes. Bangladesh may be portrayed as

a typical case where regimes suffered credibility and legitimacy due to rigged

elections, use of violence and force to win election, lack of elections at periodic

intervals and so on, which have become part of political culture in Bangladesh.


58

As stated in the earlier section the political culture in Bangladesh represents the

characteristics such as clear division among political elites especially among two

major rival camps, the ‘yes-madam/ yes-sir’ tradition of political loyalty, the

exercise of ‘inherited authority’ of political elites in interpersonal and official

relations are accepted as morally right and blurring of public and private realms

of the political influential when performing as officials.

2.2.1. Pre-elections Political Scenario in Bangladesh

It should be mentioned here that elections especially during the rule of the military

regime of General Ershad (1982-90) revealed all dysfunctional consequences

(Ahmed, 2004). However, Bangladesh stepped back onto the road to free and fair

election and democracy resulted from an election in 1991 under a unique system,

namely Non-party Caretaker Government (NCG). This caretaker system of

government took a better shape through constitutional modifications in 1996 and,

that, too, following mass movement. This very innovative system of government

ensured three general elections, which were accorded overwhelming appreciation

home and abroad. But as usual, the main opposition party complained of

anomalies, which symbolizes the politics of rivalry and division. It is also to

mention that the ruling party Awami League (AL) was one of the main proponent

and supporters of the NCG during 1990s. Quite dramatically, before the 10th

General Election, the caretaker system had become an anathema for the ruling

party AL. They scrapped the system from the Constitution despite resitance by

main opposition parties i.e. BNP and its allies for which they once paralysed the

country with mass movements. The opposition political camp has been blaming

ruling party for using the country’s highest Court which declared (the judgment

was also dissented by two out of five judges) the ‘Caretaker’ provision for

conducting election unconstitutional though in the verdict there was an option of

holding two more elections under Non-party Caretaker Government. It was not

only the Supreme Court but also international communities were also in opinion

to hold the 10th General Election under the NCG to facilitate all political parties

to participate in the election. The main opposition parties demanded with mass

protests and movements to reinstate NCG system in the constitution before

conducting the election otherwise they threatened to boycott the election. Despite

international persuasions and appeal to have a amicable settlement among rival

political groups to conduct the 10th General Election, AL went on to conduct the

10th General Election under the party system i.e. the control of its own regime

bypassing the directive (i.e. two more elections should be conducted under NCG)

of the Supreme Court. The reason is obvious; healthy competition is not the

political culture and way of life of political elites in Bangladesh. Moreover, there

were widespread allegations that in many occasions both ruling and opposition

alliances were so desperate to go to power and retain it without showing little

interest about some sort of comprise, which was considered to be the cornerstone

of effective democracy. Interesting indeed, a sort of crusade ensued between the

two alliances wherein one alliance committing to hold the 10th General Election

under party control at any cost ‘for the sake of safeguarding the Constitution’

(The Daily Star, “JS polls Bangladesh's constitutional requirement: India, January

06, 2014”. Dhaka) while the other being determined to resist the same tooth and

nail for safeguarding the voting rights of the people.

There have also been alarming reports of pre-election political intimidation, and

human rights abuse, which according to government was an effort to stop the

violence. For example, Ex-Prime Minister and ex-opposition leader, Khaleda Zia,

an identical rival to the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was put under house arrest.

Barry (2014) in The New York Times reported that police officers surrounded Mrs.

Zia’s home on January 3, 2014 when she tried to leave for a rally, and would not

allow her to leave. Since then, she remained blockaded inside the compound, at



59

As stated in the earlier section the political culture in Bangladesh represents the

characteristics such as clear division among political elites especially among two

major rival camps, the ‘yes-madam/ yes-sir’ tradition of political loyalty, the

exercise of ‘inherited authority’ of political elites in interpersonal and official

relations are accepted as morally right and blurring of public and private realms

of the political influential when performing as officials.

2.2.1. Pre-elections Political Scenario in Bangladesh

It should be mentioned here that elections especially during the rule of the military

regime of General Ershad (1982-90) revealed all dysfunctional consequences

(Ahmed, 2004). However, Bangladesh stepped back onto the road to free and fair

election and democracy resulted from an election in 1991 under a unique system,

namely Non-party Caretaker Government (NCG). This caretaker system of

government took a better shape through constitutional modifications in 1996 and,

that, too, following mass movement. This very innovative system of government

ensured three general elections, which were accorded overwhelming appreciation

home and abroad. But as usual, the main opposition party complained of

anomalies, which symbolizes the politics of rivalry and division. It is also to

mention that the ruling party Awami League (AL) was one of the main proponent

and supporters of the NCG during 1990s. Quite dramatically, before the 10th

General Election, the caretaker system had become an anathema for the ruling

party AL. They scrapped the system from the Constitution despite resitance by

main opposition parties i.e. BNP and its allies for which they once paralysed the

country with mass movements. The opposition political camp has been blaming

ruling party for using the country’s highest Court which declared (the judgment

was also dissented by two out of five judges) the ‘Caretaker’ provision for

conducting election unconstitutional though in the verdict there was an option of

holding two more elections under Non-party Caretaker Government. It was not

only the Supreme Court but also international communities were also in opinion

to hold the 10th General Election under the NCG to facilitate all political parties

to participate in the election. The main opposition parties demanded with mass

protests and movements to reinstate NCG system in the constitution before

conducting the election otherwise they threatened to boycott the election. Despite

international persuasions and appeal to have a amicable settlement among rival

political groups to conduct the 10th General Election, AL went on to conduct the

10th General Election under the party system i.e. the control of its own regime

bypassing the directive (i.e. two more elections should be conducted under NCG)

of the Supreme Court. The reason is obvious; healthy competition is not the

political culture and way of life of political elites in Bangladesh. Moreover, there

were widespread allegations that in many occasions both ruling and opposition

alliances were so desperate to go to power and retain it without showing little

interest about some sort of comprise, which was considered to be the cornerstone

of effective democracy. Interesting indeed, a sort of crusade ensued between the

two alliances wherein one alliance committing to hold the 10th General Election

under party control at any cost ‘for the sake of safeguarding the Constitution’

(The Daily Star, “JS polls Bangladesh's constitutional requirement: India, January

06, 2014”. Dhaka) while the other being determined to resist the same tooth and

nail for safeguarding the voting rights of the people.

There have also been alarming reports of pre-election political intimidation, and

human rights abuse, which according to government was an effort to stop the

violence. For example, Ex-Prime Minister and ex-opposition leader, Khaleda Zia,

an identical rival to the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was put under house arrest.

Barry (2014) in The New York Times reported that police officers surrounded Mrs.

Zia’s home on January 3, 2014 when she tried to leave for a rally, and would not

allow her to leave. Since then, she remained blockaded inside the compound, at


60

one point behind five trucks loaded with sand until 10th general election was

finished on January 5, 2014. Ershad, a former dictator who leads the Jatiya Party

(3rd biggest party), had been locked up in the combined military hospital since he

belatedly joined the poll boycott. Another major political party, Jamaat-e-Islami,

which is considered to be 4th largest party in the country was “banned from the

polls for being too religious”. Police arrested and detained large numbers of

opposition activists, including a close adviser to Mrs Zia as he left a meeting with

journalists. Thousands of opposition activists had been detained before 05 January

2014, the scheduled date for the 10th general election. The Daily reports,

On polling day alone, over 20 people were shot by police, or beaten or burned to death as rival goons from the BNP and the League clashed and as opposition thugs petrol-bombed buses, apparently to discourage voting. In some cases, violent attacks appeared staged especially for television and other cameras” (The Daily Star, “Hasina plans to hang on to office after an electoral farce”: Economist (January 10, 2014).

Painfully enough, despite long struggles and repeated rhetorical commitment by

leaders of political parties to uphold democracy, their real activities have

measurably failed to create a democratic society in the country based on the

principles of consensus and compromise and find the ground rules for how to

conduct an election, democratic competition and dissent (Jahan, 2000).

2.2.2. The Outcomes of the 10th General Election and the Legitimacy of the

Regime

Though Bangladeshi leaders tend to pile up arguments as and when situation

demands, they are quite adept in changing positions once they find themselves

cramped in the game; and the only rule of game is to win, even through a

walkover. In fact, the 10th General Election paved the way for AL to have a

walkover win in the election as major opposition parties did not take part in the

polls hence total 153 out of 300 candidates in the parliament (more than 50%) of

which mostly from the ruling AL were elected MPs uncontested (Table 1) and in

the capital voting took place in just nine of 20 parliamentary seats (“Hasina plans

to hang…”, 2014). Voters’ turnout was also very low “about 22-26%” (“The New

Government in Bangladesh Illegal...”, 2014)) and due to a lack of contesting

candidates in some constituencies there was no vote at all. The 10th General

Election also ended with chaos. And local media as well as international

communities such as the UN, Commonwealth, and other donor countries such as

US, UK, Japan, expressed their dissatisfaction about the credibility of the

election’s outcomes and the way the election was conducted (“US, Australia,

Commonwealth, and Japan want immediate talks”, 2014). However, the ruling

Awami League called the election as free and fair and expressed its satisfaction

about the election outcomes.

Table 1: Position of Parties in the 10th General Election

Category Party

AL JP JSD WP JP-M Ind. Others

Win 105 13 2 4 0 13 2

Uncontested 127 20 3 2 1 0 0

Total 232 33 5 6 1 13 2

(The Daily Star, January 06, 2014, Dhaka)

If we look at the figures in the table 1, one might notice that political legitimacy

of the current regime is perhaps very much in question. As stated earlier, the

legitimacy of a regime is subjected to citizens’ recognition and acceptance of the

entire political system as valid one through popular franchise. But the current

regime’s legitimacy to rule is undermined when citizens’ right to choice and self-

rule mainly through the election of their rulers was denied (over 50% candidates

became MP uncontested). Moreover, the Jatiya Party (JP) that is being considered



61

one point behind five trucks loaded with sand until 10th general election was

finished on January 5, 2014. Ershad, a former dictator who leads the Jatiya Party

(3rd biggest party), had been locked up in the combined military hospital since he

belatedly joined the poll boycott. Another major political party, Jamaat-e-Islami,

which is considered to be 4th largest party in the country was “banned from the

polls for being too religious”. Police arrested and detained large numbers of

opposition activists, including a close adviser to Mrs Zia as he left a meeting with

journalists. Thousands of opposition activists had been detained before 05 January

2014, the scheduled date for the 10th general election. The Daily reports,

On polling day alone, over 20 people were shot by police, or beaten or burned to death as rival goons from the BNP and the League clashed and as opposition thugs petrol-bombed buses, apparently to discourage voting. In some cases, violent attacks appeared staged especially for television and other cameras” (The Daily Star, “Hasina plans to hang on to office after an electoral farce”: Economist (January 10, 2014).

Painfully enough, despite long struggles and repeated rhetorical commitment by

leaders of political parties to uphold democracy, their real activities have

measurably failed to create a democratic society in the country based on the

principles of consensus and compromise and find the ground rules for how to

conduct an election, democratic competition and dissent (Jahan, 2000).

2.2.2. The Outcomes of the 10th General Election and the Legitimacy of the

Regime

Though Bangladeshi leaders tend to pile up arguments as and when situation

demands, they are quite adept in changing positions once they find themselves

cramped in the game; and the only rule of game is to win, even through a

walkover. In fact, the 10th General Election paved the way for AL to have a

walkover win in the election as major opposition parties did not take part in the

polls hence total 153 out of 300 candidates in the parliament (more than 50%) of

which mostly from the ruling AL were elected MPs uncontested (Table 1) and in

the capital voting took place in just nine of 20 parliamentary seats (“Hasina plans

to hang…”, 2014). Voters’ turnout was also very low “about 22-26%” (“The New

Government in Bangladesh Illegal...”, 2014)) and due to a lack of contesting

candidates in some constituencies there was no vote at all. The 10th General

Election also ended with chaos. And local media as well as international

communities such as the UN, Commonwealth, and other donor countries such as

US, UK, Japan, expressed their dissatisfaction about the credibility of the

election’s outcomes and the way the election was conducted (“US, Australia,

Commonwealth, and Japan want immediate talks”, 2014). However, the ruling

Awami League called the election as free and fair and expressed its satisfaction

about the election outcomes.

Table 1: Position of Parties in the 10th General Election

Category Party

AL JP JSD WP JP-M Ind. Others

Win 105 13 2 4 0 13 2

Uncontested 127 20 3 2 1 0 0

Total 232 33 5 6 1 13 2

(The Daily Star, January 06, 2014, Dhaka)

If we look at the figures in the table 1, one might notice that political legitimacy

of the current regime is perhaps very much in question. As stated earlier, the

legitimacy of a regime is subjected to citizens’ recognition and acceptance of the

entire political system as valid one through popular franchise. But the current

regime’s legitimacy to rule is undermined when citizens’ right to choice and self-

rule mainly through the election of their rulers was denied (over 50% candidates

became MP uncontested). Moreover, the Jatiya Party (JP) that is being considered


62

as the main opposition party with 33 lawmakers has been playing a double role

by joining the cabinet- which is unprecedented in the country and has raised

questions from different quarters. Some media and experts claimed that the AL

won a one-sided election and created a chaotic and to some extent unconstitutional

and questionable cabinet. “There is no provision in the constitution allowing the

opposition to join the cabinet” says barrister Rafique-Ul Huq- an eminent lawyer

(“New Cabinet Tomorrow…”,2014). The conduct of the 10th general election and

subsequent formation of the cabinet appears to analysts as something along the

lines of "who cares about the constitution?"

It is important to also mention that parliamentary elections under political

governments have always been controversial and not free, fair, and impartial in

Bangladesh. The partisan governments tried to bring the elections results in their

favor. However, the non-party caretaker governments had no stake whatsoever in

the outcomes of elections. Therefore, the elections under them were free from

centrally-designed electoral frauds (Mizi, 2004). It should also be mentioned here

that overall NCG system helped to reduce electoral violence and increase voter

turnout as well as peoples’ trust and confidence in the usefulness of elections

while election under party system such as the 10th General Election increases

violence and reduce voter turnout in Bangladesh (Table 2).

Table 2: Violence and Elections in Bangladesh

General Elections

% of Voter turnout

Election postponed Nature of violence

Constituency Centre2 No. of clashes

(pre-election)

(death3)

No. of deaths (election day)

Tentha 22-26d

(below 40e)

---- 400 500 20

Ninthb 87f ----- ----- ----- -----

Eighthc 74.8 16 90 144 3

Seventhc 74.9 27 123 na 4

Fifthc 55.4 12 30 na 1

Fourthc 52.5 na 23 19 7

Thirdc 61.1 na 284 221 32

Secondc 51.3 na 63 122 18

Firstc 54.9 na 56 85 13

A low turnout (Table 2) could pressure the government to begin preparing for

fresh elections, something that happened after a similar opposition boycott in

1996. The Article 65(2) of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of

Bangladesh stipulates that the members of parliament shall be elected in

accordance with the law from single territorial constituencies by direct election

not selection. But considering the very low turnout in the 10th general election,

some eminent citizens such as the eminent lawyers Dr Kamal and Barrister

Rafique-Ul Huq opined “An election can’t be called an election where 80 percent

voters don’t participate” and “it was rather selection than election as per the

country’s constitution” while placing arguments as amicus curiae before the High

Court during the hearing on a writ petition on a public interest litigation writ



63

as the main opposition party with 33 lawmakers has been playing a double role

by joining the cabinet- which is unprecedented in the country and has raised

questions from different quarters. Some media and experts claimed that the AL

won a one-sided election and created a chaotic and to some extent unconstitutional

and questionable cabinet. “There is no provision in the constitution allowing the

opposition to join the cabinet” says barrister Rafique-Ul Huq- an eminent lawyer

(“New Cabinet Tomorrow…”,2014). The conduct of the 10th general election and

subsequent formation of the cabinet appears to analysts as something along the

lines of "who cares about the constitution?"

It is important to also mention that parliamentary elections under political

governments have always been controversial and not free, fair, and impartial in

Bangladesh. The partisan governments tried to bring the elections results in their

favor. However, the non-party caretaker governments had no stake whatsoever in

the outcomes of elections. Therefore, the elections under them were free from

centrally-designed electoral frauds (Mizi, 2004). It should also be mentioned here

that overall NCG system helped to reduce electoral violence and increase voter

turnout as well as peoples’ trust and confidence in the usefulness of elections

while election under party system such as the 10th General Election increases

violence and reduce voter turnout in Bangladesh (Table 2).

Table 2: Violence and Elections in Bangladesh

General Elections

% of Voter turnout

Election postponed Nature of violence

Constituency Centre2 No. of clashes

(pre-election)

(death3)

No. of deaths (election day)

Tentha 22-26d

(below 40e)

---- 400 500 20

Ninthb 87f ----- ----- ----- -----

Eighthc 74.8 16 90 144 3

Seventhc 74.9 27 123 na 4

Fifthc 55.4 12 30 na 1

Fourthc 52.5 na 23 19 7

Thirdc 61.1 na 284 221 32

Secondc 51.3 na 63 122 18

Firstc 54.9 na 56 85 13

A low turnout (Table 2) could pressure the government to begin preparing for

fresh elections, something that happened after a similar opposition boycott in

1996. The Article 65(2) of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of

Bangladesh stipulates that the members of parliament shall be elected in

accordance with the law from single territorial constituencies by direct election

not selection. But considering the very low turnout in the 10th general election,

some eminent citizens such as the eminent lawyers Dr Kamal and Barrister

Rafique-Ul Huq opined “An election can’t be called an election where 80 percent

voters don’t participate” and “it was rather selection than election as per the

country’s constitution” while placing arguments as amicus curiae before the High

Court during the hearing on a writ petition on a public interest litigation writ


64

petition (PIL) challenging the validity of the Section 19 of the Representation of

the People Order empowering MP candidates to be elected unopposed (“Jan 5

election rather ...”, 2014). In an editorial note one prominent journalist expressed

his frustration about the 10th General Election under the title “State Power vs

People's Power: Engineered election, a bulldozed victory and emergence of one-

person State?” as follows:

The party [Awami League] that has always been known to depend solely on people's power for all its activities since birth in 1949 has brutally, ruthlessly and according to plan used state power to 'hijack' the just concluded election and deny people their right to vote just to ensure its stay in power. What was dubbed as an election was engineered, its results bulldozed and the so-called victory that emanated from it was predetermined as evidenced by the fact that a majority of seats -- 153 out of 300 -- were already 'won' before a single vote was cast…. (Mahfuz Anam, 2014).

3. Why ‘Electoral Engineering’ While Conducting Elections? As stated in Section 1, credible election through political inclusion and tolerance

pave the ways for stable system of governance and warrant accountable,

democratic and legitimate administration. According to scholars, politics must

show ways to integrate people with varied political beliefs and ideologies. If it

promotes only the selfish interest of a leader, party or a regime, then it creates

bloodletting divisions in a given society. Bangladesh is at a crossroad in relation

to its smooth transition of power despite a democratic framework of political

system and election has been in place and practiced since 1990s. It is because in

the post-liberation Bangladesh, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, the Awami

League have been the two main political camps that have had ruled the country

but they are considered arch rivals of each other in the political scenario in

Bangladesh. These two major political camps never recognise each other to even

hold dialogue with one another when there is desperate need for the nation to have

dialogue between these two parties in order to settle national issues such as system

of election or government. As stated earlier the main objectives of these two major

political alliances are only to win and stay in power and healthy competition is

not their political norms.

Jahan has also argued that there are intermediate classes which dominate the

electoral politics of Bangladesh, irrespective of differences in their ideological

positions and social backgrounds. It must be borne in mind that the leadership of

all political parties in Bangladesh belongs to these intermediate classes and most

of them come from wealthy farmer family backgrounds and are themselves by

occupation lawyers, businessmen or civil/ military bureaucrats (Jahan, 2000).

Under the existing “Winner-Takes-All (WTA)” political system in Bangladesh,

party candidature can be purchased at any time before the election and that’s why

businessmen with black money rush to grab the party brand by exploiting the

greed of leadership and winning is the only motto of these ‘new politicians’ cum

businessmen who has no previous political experience! Under the WTA system

of politics, party in power also exercises all the dos and don’ts and they have a

mindset of “who cares?” The elected parliament member of the opposition even

sometimes cannot visit his/ her own constituency due to the unwritten embargo

set by the ruling party. Major pillars of the state such as administration, police and

judiciary has been purposively politicised and tamed to feed the greed of the

leaders of party in power. So, a ‘win’ even by adopting ‘electoral engineering’ is

the ultimate desire of political elites, which is the source of all power particularly

for members of the ruling party. Khan on the other hand, characterises the

Bangladeshi political system as follows:

Successive regimes in Bangladesh have changed the political system [including electoral system] to suit their narrow, individual, sectarian and partisan interests. Mujib, Zia and Ershad have all manipulated the political system in a bid to hold on to power… Individuals became much more important than institutions, resulting the lack of faith in such political



65

petition (PIL) challenging the validity of the Section 19 of the Representation of

the People Order empowering MP candidates to be elected unopposed (“Jan 5

election rather ...”, 2014). In an editorial note one prominent journalist expressed

his frustration about the 10th General Election under the title “State Power vs

People's Power: Engineered election, a bulldozed victory and emergence of one-

person State?” as follows:

The party [Awami League] that has always been known to depend solely on people's power for all its activities since birth in 1949 has brutally, ruthlessly and according to plan used state power to 'hijack' the just concluded election and deny people their right to vote just to ensure its stay in power. What was dubbed as an election was engineered, its results bulldozed and the so-called victory that emanated from it was predetermined as evidenced by the fact that a majority of seats -- 153 out of 300 -- were already 'won' before a single vote was cast…. (Mahfuz Anam, 2014).

3. Why ‘Electoral Engineering’ While Conducting Elections? As stated in Section 1, credible election through political inclusion and tolerance

pave the ways for stable system of governance and warrant accountable,

democratic and legitimate administration. According to scholars, politics must

show ways to integrate people with varied political beliefs and ideologies. If it

promotes only the selfish interest of a leader, party or a regime, then it creates

bloodletting divisions in a given society. Bangladesh is at a crossroad in relation

to its smooth transition of power despite a democratic framework of political

system and election has been in place and practiced since 1990s. It is because in

the post-liberation Bangladesh, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, the Awami

League have been the two main political camps that have had ruled the country

but they are considered arch rivals of each other in the political scenario in

Bangladesh. These two major political camps never recognise each other to even

hold dialogue with one another when there is desperate need for the nation to have

dialogue between these two parties in order to settle national issues such as system

of election or government. As stated earlier the main objectives of these two major

political alliances are only to win and stay in power and healthy competition is

not their political norms.

Jahan has also argued that there are intermediate classes which dominate the

electoral politics of Bangladesh, irrespective of differences in their ideological

positions and social backgrounds. It must be borne in mind that the leadership of

all political parties in Bangladesh belongs to these intermediate classes and most

of them come from wealthy farmer family backgrounds and are themselves by

occupation lawyers, businessmen or civil/ military bureaucrats (Jahan, 2000).

Under the existing “Winner-Takes-All (WTA)” political system in Bangladesh,

party candidature can be purchased at any time before the election and that’s why

businessmen with black money rush to grab the party brand by exploiting the

greed of leadership and winning is the only motto of these ‘new politicians’ cum

businessmen who has no previous political experience! Under the WTA system

of politics, party in power also exercises all the dos and don’ts and they have a

mindset of “who cares?” The elected parliament member of the opposition even

sometimes cannot visit his/ her own constituency due to the unwritten embargo

set by the ruling party. Major pillars of the state such as administration, police and

judiciary has been purposively politicised and tamed to feed the greed of the

leaders of party in power. So, a ‘win’ even by adopting ‘electoral engineering’ is

the ultimate desire of political elites, which is the source of all power particularly

for members of the ruling party. Khan on the other hand, characterises the

Bangladeshi political system as follows:

Successive regimes in Bangladesh have changed the political system [including electoral system] to suit their narrow, individual, sectarian and partisan interests. Mujib, Zia and Ershad have all manipulated the political system in a bid to hold on to power… Individuals became much more important than institutions, resulting the lack of faith in such political


66

institutions as political parties, the legislature, and the judiciary. The political system becomes the shadow of one man [such as Prime Minister or President] as long as he is in power. The executive organ of the government keeps on playing the most dominant role compared with other organs, i.e. the legislative and the judiciary. (1991, p. 27)

In fact, even after restoration of democracy in 1991, democracy has been provided

with little room for expected development by uncouth electoral politics. Though

an interim arrangement, called Non-government Caretaker System, was

introduced for transition from dictatorship into democracy in 1991, the system

had to be continued due to distrust of elections under party governments. Islam

(2011) also argues that there is a firm institutional framework of the electoral

process in Bangladesh characterized by electoral fraud and violence, which

routinely claims lives. Moreover, doubtful results, harassment of political

opponents and no engagement of meaningful political dialogues between two

major political rival parties are some common features of electoral culture in

Bangladesh. As a result, ‘electoral engineering’ has been an inseparable part of

electoral politics in Bangladesh. The general election on January 5, 2014 was not

exception in this respect.

4. 10th General Elections and Aftermath for Political Development in

Future

Democratic process was impeded at the very beginning just after 3 years of the

Independence in Bangladesh. An elected parliamentary system of government

started working with its brutal majority in the legislature. The so called “majority”

misinterpreted the sense “democracy” and the most “popular government”

couldn’t understand the sense of demand of the people and failed to translate

people’s expectations into realities. Subsequently, military intervention in politics

was brought up and the people of the country were disfranchised for a long time.

As mentioned a long battle did occur between the democratic forces and the

undemocratic elements on the vast canvas of the political history of Bangladesh.

After a huge sacrifice presented by her brave people, Bangladesh has rediscovered

the track of democracy at the beginning of the 1990s. However, the resurrection

of democracy could not find its elevator rather its ways are blocked from time to

time due to the fact that major political parties here do not foster the purpose of

democracy through credible elections. One observer, Badiul Alam Majumdar,

secretary of the nonprofit group Citizens for Good Governance, remarked about

the election of January 5, 2014, “The fact that we are having this sort of sham

election, it’s not going to solve our problems. It will push us to an uncertain future.

We will be in unchartered waters.” (Barry, 2014)

There are a few major consequences of elections of January 5, 2014. The first and

foremost is perhaps the 10th general election testified to voters’ frustration at being

denied a choice. It shows destruction of public confidence about their democratic

rights to choose and that citizens’ vote matters and in a regular interval citizens

will have a chance to elect their leaders without any fear and intimidation.

Secondly, given the nature of the country’s long standing political rivalry among

two major political camps, a credible election is impossible under a party

government, be it AL or BNP. Thirdly, it has given passage to move towards a

“one party state” and absolute power in the hands of ruling party leaders in

particular the Prime Minister. One editorial quotes, “The Prime Minister has now

accumulated the enormous power in her hands and the consequent danger she runs

of falling into the trap that Lord Acton had justly warned us of: “power corrupts

and absolute power corrupts absolutely” (Mahfuz Anam, 2014). Fourthly, it has

yielded real threat to the check and balance of power among three branches of the

state: executive, legislative and judiciary. Today, the country’s Prime Minister

unquestionably and effectively controls the executive and legislative branches of

the government. As is the practice in the country, the PM traditionally and totally

controls the executive branch. As for the legislative branch, the PM as the leader



67

institutions as political parties, the legislature, and the judiciary. The political system becomes the shadow of one man [such as Prime Minister or President] as long as he is in power. The executive organ of the government keeps on playing the most dominant role compared with other organs, i.e. the legislative and the judiciary. (1991, p. 27)

In fact, even after restoration of democracy in 1991, democracy has been provided

with little room for expected development by uncouth electoral politics. Though

an interim arrangement, called Non-government Caretaker System, was

introduced for transition from dictatorship into democracy in 1991, the system

had to be continued due to distrust of elections under party governments. Islam

(2011) also argues that there is a firm institutional framework of the electoral

process in Bangladesh characterized by electoral fraud and violence, which

routinely claims lives. Moreover, doubtful results, harassment of political

opponents and no engagement of meaningful political dialogues between two

major political rival parties are some common features of electoral culture in

Bangladesh. As a result, ‘electoral engineering’ has been an inseparable part of

electoral politics in Bangladesh. The general election on January 5, 2014 was not

exception in this respect.

4. 10th General Elections and Aftermath for Political Development in

Future

Democratic process was impeded at the very beginning just after 3 years of the

Independence in Bangladesh. An elected parliamentary system of government

started working with its brutal majority in the legislature. The so called “majority”

misinterpreted the sense “democracy” and the most “popular government”

couldn’t understand the sense of demand of the people and failed to translate

people’s expectations into realities. Subsequently, military intervention in politics

was brought up and the people of the country were disfranchised for a long time.

As mentioned a long battle did occur between the democratic forces and the

undemocratic elements on the vast canvas of the political history of Bangladesh.

After a huge sacrifice presented by her brave people, Bangladesh has rediscovered

the track of democracy at the beginning of the 1990s. However, the resurrection

of democracy could not find its elevator rather its ways are blocked from time to

time due to the fact that major political parties here do not foster the purpose of

democracy through credible elections. One observer, Badiul Alam Majumdar,

secretary of the nonprofit group Citizens for Good Governance, remarked about

the election of January 5, 2014, “The fact that we are having this sort of sham

election, it’s not going to solve our problems. It will push us to an uncertain future.

We will be in unchartered waters.” (Barry, 2014)

There are a few major consequences of elections of January 5, 2014. The first and

foremost is perhaps the 10th general election testified to voters’ frustration at being

denied a choice. It shows destruction of public confidence about their democratic

rights to choose and that citizens’ vote matters and in a regular interval citizens

will have a chance to elect their leaders without any fear and intimidation.

Secondly, given the nature of the country’s long standing political rivalry among

two major political camps, a credible election is impossible under a party

government, be it AL or BNP. Thirdly, it has given passage to move towards a

“one party state” and absolute power in the hands of ruling party leaders in

particular the Prime Minister. One editorial quotes, “The Prime Minister has now

accumulated the enormous power in her hands and the consequent danger she runs

of falling into the trap that Lord Acton had justly warned us of: “power corrupts

and absolute power corrupts absolutely” (Mahfuz Anam, 2014). Fourthly, it has

yielded real threat to the check and balance of power among three branches of the

state: executive, legislative and judiciary. Today, the country’s Prime Minister

unquestionably and effectively controls the executive and legislative branches of

the government. As is the practice in the country, the PM traditionally and totally

controls the executive branch. As for the legislative branch, the PM as the leader


68

of the House normally has a lot of influence. However, the new development after

the 10th general election is that even the opposition is now a handmaiden of the

PM, with part of it being in the cabinet and other part in the opposition (first time

in the country’s history). We all know how the leader of the opposition came into

being and how the so-called opposition is bargaining with the ruling party for

more ministerial berths. Under these circumstances the Leader of the House i.e.

the Prime Minister is likely to have full control of the legislative branch. That

leaves only the judiciary, which the executive branch has always had enormous

influence through the appointment process of the judges. With the highest respect

for the higher judiciary, one still cannot escape the reality of the executive

branch's enormous influence. Moreover, Bangladeshi media recently reported that

the current regime with its brutal majority in the legislature considering

amendment of the Article 96 of the Constitution, which ensures judiciary

independence. Under its new proposal, the regime wants to transfer power in the

hand of legislature to confiscate judges of high court. In addition, the cabinet has

recently approved the new “National Broadcast Policy 2014” despite widespread

reservation from different stakeholders such as media, rights groups and

opposition political parties fearing that it would be used as weapon by the regime

to control media in the country. For example, Madam Sultana Kamal, the

chairperson of Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) and former advisor

of the NCG claimed that the policy aimed at controlling the press in the country.

Sultana expressed her frustration while speaking at a press conference on August

14, 2014 as follows: “The policy is conflicting with the country's constitution,

democratic norms and values, human rights and Right to Information Act,". The

anti-graft watchdog (TIB) also termed the policy as "repressive" and “is unfit for

the 21st century” (“Broadcast policy...”, 2014). There is a fear that the government

will misuse this new broadcast policy in the name of maintaining quality in the

electronic and print media.

Thus it can be mentioned that there is a state structure in Bangladesh, which has

no check upon the government and especially the powers of the ruling elites. “As

experience has shown from governments the world over, the key to good

governance lies in effective distribution of power between the various branches

and 'pillars' of a modern state along with free media and independence of

judiciary. Governments are kept under effective monitoring and oversight by the

legislative branch and on occasions by the judiciary and media. Where there has

been too much concentration of power of one branch of the state over the other

disastrous consequences occurred in the whole process of governance. Without a

'check and balance' of power, governance process in Bangladesh is likely to

degenerate even further. In normal circumstances a party getting a two-thirds

majority in the House has always led to disastrous consequences. South Asia is

rich in such history which is popularly known as the “Curse of Two-Third

Majority” (“State-power vs Peoples power”, 2014). As an outcome of the 10th

general election current regime “with three-fourths majority in the House, a

handpicked and henpecked opposition and the emergence of a leader with

unchecked power and no institution that can hold her accountable, the risk of Lord

Acton's warnings coming true looms large” (“State-power vs Peoples power”,

2014). But history reveals that the people of Bangladesh have shown little

inclination towards autocratic regimes and attempts to install repressive

government. They have shown with overwhelming popular movements for

democracy and rights of citizens (Sengupta, 2007, p. 84). What would then be the

ultimate consequences of the 10th general election for democratic legitimacy and

regime stability in Bangladesh? Gowher Rizvi, former adviser to Prime Minister

Sheikh Hasina, remarked by acknowledging low voter turnout in the 10th GE, “it

was ‘almost without doubt’ that Mrs Hasina would call new elections ahead of

schedule, noting that an election ‘loses its luster’ when a major party does not take

part” (Barry, 2014).



69

of the House normally has a lot of influence. However, the new development after

the 10th general election is that even the opposition is now a handmaiden of the

PM, with part of it being in the cabinet and other part in the opposition (first time

in the country’s history). We all know how the leader of the opposition came into

being and how the so-called opposition is bargaining with the ruling party for

more ministerial berths. Under these circumstances the Leader of the House i.e.

the Prime Minister is likely to have full control of the legislative branch. That

leaves only the judiciary, which the executive branch has always had enormous

influence through the appointment process of the judges. With the highest respect

for the higher judiciary, one still cannot escape the reality of the executive

branch's enormous influence. Moreover, Bangladeshi media recently reported that

the current regime with its brutal majority in the legislature considering

amendment of the Article 96 of the Constitution, which ensures judiciary

independence. Under its new proposal, the regime wants to transfer power in the

hand of legislature to confiscate judges of high court. In addition, the cabinet has

recently approved the new “National Broadcast Policy 2014” despite widespread

reservation from different stakeholders such as media, rights groups and

opposition political parties fearing that it would be used as weapon by the regime

to control media in the country. For example, Madam Sultana Kamal, the

chairperson of Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) and former advisor

of the NCG claimed that the policy aimed at controlling the press in the country.

Sultana expressed her frustration while speaking at a press conference on August

14, 2014 as follows: “The policy is conflicting with the country's constitution,

democratic norms and values, human rights and Right to Information Act,". The

anti-graft watchdog (TIB) also termed the policy as "repressive" and “is unfit for

the 21st century” (“Broadcast policy...”, 2014). There is a fear that the government

will misuse this new broadcast policy in the name of maintaining quality in the

electronic and print media.

Thus it can be mentioned that there is a state structure in Bangladesh, which has

no check upon the government and especially the powers of the ruling elites. “As

experience has shown from governments the world over, the key to good

governance lies in effective distribution of power between the various branches

and 'pillars' of a modern state along with free media and independence of

judiciary. Governments are kept under effective monitoring and oversight by the

legislative branch and on occasions by the judiciary and media. Where there has

been too much concentration of power of one branch of the state over the other

disastrous consequences occurred in the whole process of governance. Without a

'check and balance' of power, governance process in Bangladesh is likely to

degenerate even further. In normal circumstances a party getting a two-thirds

majority in the House has always led to disastrous consequences. South Asia is

rich in such history which is popularly known as the “Curse of Two-Third

Majority” (“State-power vs Peoples power”, 2014). As an outcome of the 10th

general election current regime “with three-fourths majority in the House, a

handpicked and henpecked opposition and the emergence of a leader with

unchecked power and no institution that can hold her accountable, the risk of Lord

Acton's warnings coming true looms large” (“State-power vs Peoples power”,

2014). But history reveals that the people of Bangladesh have shown little

inclination towards autocratic regimes and attempts to install repressive

government. They have shown with overwhelming popular movements for

democracy and rights of citizens (Sengupta, 2007, p. 84). What would then be the

ultimate consequences of the 10th general election for democratic legitimacy and

regime stability in Bangladesh? Gowher Rizvi, former adviser to Prime Minister

Sheikh Hasina, remarked by acknowledging low voter turnout in the 10th GE, “it

was ‘almost without doubt’ that Mrs Hasina would call new elections ahead of

schedule, noting that an election ‘loses its luster’ when a major party does not take

part” (Barry, 2014).


70

5. Conclusion

Bangladesh runs a fragile system of government and it inherited the Winner-

Takes-All (WTA) voting system since it was a British colony before 1947.

Notably, WTA system paves the way for fortune-making politics in Bangladesh.

Especially party in power leaves its pro-people political programmes and deviate

its activities to grab money by any means such as manipulating election and

electoral process. Here party man especially belonging to ruling party becomes

the part of the administration from grassroot level to apex level;Winner Takes All.

On the other hand, opposition parties do not go to parliament and are confined or

sometimes compelled to confine itself (sometimes due to aggressive attitude of

ruling party) in its party office releasing some political programmes using media

or street agitations. Both the regime and opposition aggravate their political

programmes (politics for power) just before the scheduled election. They declare

their manifestos, circulate it and try to explain it through the media. After election

both of them forget the manifesto and pledges that they had promised. Thus, in

Bangladesh, politics simply means election – a means to grave power even by a

work over win. Therefore, to ensure a sound environment of healthy politics and

a true democracy, the reform in voting system is a crying need indeed. It should

also be mentioned here that proportional representation (PR) has been widely

adopted across the globe because it avoids an outcome in which some people win

representation and the rest is left out. Under PR, a legislature will accurately

reflect the voting strength of various parties and difference between the treasury

and the opposition eventually is reduced. Thus the malpractice of boycotting the

parliament and power mongering may be stopped. This may provide an

opportunity to renovate and strengthen the mechanisms of governance, offering

the citizens of Bangladesh a democracy that does not offer the so-called ‘tyranny

of the majority’ but a responsive and accountable government that ensures the

citizens right to chose.

Notes

aElection held under party government after abolition of the NCG systemb“…” means data not available cAhmed (2014, p.92) dIndependent source figure (January 10, 2014, The Daily Amadershomoy)eOfficial (government) source figure (January 10, 2014, The Daily Star)fJanuary 17, 2014, The Daily Star

1 Tadbir is a kind of lobbying to manage a decision taken or to be taken by an authority overruling, breaking, or bending existing norms and practice... a process that leads to corruption because it breaks away the standard bureaucratic norms, values, and impersonla rules...Tadbir is a pathology of Bangladeshi culture...the degree of tadbir has reached to such an exptebnt that one has to resort to tadbir even for routine matters, which are considered due. Tadbir interferes in normal functioning of the bureacracy and decisionmaking through undue influencing” (Jamil and Haque, 2004, p.51).

2Burning down of more than 150 polling stations by opposition activists before polling began at 8:00am Sunday, 05 January, 2014, killing of an assistant presiding officer and snatching of election materials forced the Election Commission to suspend voting in around 400 centres around the country (January 06, 2014, The Daily New Age. Retrieved from http://www.newagebd.com/detail.php?date=2014-01-06&nid=79438)

3According to media reports, in the pre-election year 2013 approximately 500people were killed in political clashes, which is considered as the most violent year since independence (January 10, 2014, The Daily Star).

References:

Ahmed, N. (2004). Non-party Caretaker Government in Bangladesh. Dhaka:University Press.

Almond, G. A. & S. Verba. (1963). The civic culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Anam, M. (2014, January 17). State power vs people's power: engineered election, a bulldozed victory and emergence of one-person state. The Daily Star.Retrieved from http://www.thedailystar.net/editor-s-pick/state-power-vs-peoples-power-7075.



71

5. Conclusion

Bangladesh runs a fragile system of government and it inherited the Winner-

Takes-All (WTA) voting system since it was a British colony before 1947.

Notably, WTA system paves the way for fortune-making politics in Bangladesh.

Especially party in power leaves its pro-people political programmes and deviate

its activities to grab money by any means such as manipulating election and

electoral process. Here party man especially belonging to ruling party becomes

the part of the administration from grassroot level to apex level;Winner Takes All.

On the other hand, opposition parties do not go to parliament and are confined or

sometimes compelled to confine itself (sometimes due to aggressive attitude of

ruling party) in its party office releasing some political programmes using media

or street agitations. Both the regime and opposition aggravate their political

programmes (politics for power) just before the scheduled election. They declare

their manifestos, circulate it and try to explain it through the media. After election

both of them forget the manifesto and pledges that they had promised. Thus, in

Bangladesh, politics simply means election – a means to grave power even by a

work over win. Therefore, to ensure a sound environment of healthy politics and

a true democracy, the reform in voting system is a crying need indeed. It should

also be mentioned here that proportional representation (PR) has been widely

adopted across the globe because it avoids an outcome in which some people win

representation and the rest is left out. Under PR, a legislature will accurately

reflect the voting strength of various parties and difference between the treasury

and the opposition eventually is reduced. Thus the malpractice of boycotting the

parliament and power mongering may be stopped. This may provide an

opportunity to renovate and strengthen the mechanisms of governance, offering

the citizens of Bangladesh a democracy that does not offer the so-called ‘tyranny

of the majority’ but a responsive and accountable government that ensures the

citizens right to chose.

Notes

aElection held under party government after abolition of the NCG systemb“…” means data not available cAhmed (2014, p.92) dIndependent source figure (January 10, 2014, The Daily Amadershomoy)eOfficial (government) source figure (January 10, 2014, The Daily Star)fJanuary 17, 2014, The Daily Star

1 Tadbir is a kind of lobbying to manage a decision taken or to be taken by an authority overruling, breaking, or bending existing norms and practice... a process that leads to corruption because it breaks away the standard bureaucratic norms, values, and impersonla rules...Tadbir is a pathology of Bangladeshi culture...the degree of tadbir has reached to such an exptebnt that one has to resort to tadbir even for routine matters, which are considered due. Tadbir interferes in normal functioning of the bureacracy and decisionmaking through undue influencing” (Jamil and Haque, 2004, p.51).

2Burning down of more than 150 polling stations by opposition activists before polling began at 8:00am Sunday, 05 January, 2014, killing of an assistant presiding officer and snatching of election materials forced the Election Commission to suspend voting in around 400 centres around the country (January 06, 2014, The Daily New Age. Retrieved from http://www.newagebd.com/detail.php?date=2014-01-06&nid=79438)

3According to media reports, in the pre-election year 2013 approximately 500people were killed in political clashes, which is considered as the most violent year since independence (January 10, 2014, The Daily Star).

References:

Ahmed, N. (2004). Non-party Caretaker Government in Bangladesh. Dhaka:University Press.

Almond, G. A. & S. Verba. (1963). The civic culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Anam, M. (2014, January 17). State power vs people's power: engineered election, a bulldozed victory and emergence of one-person state. The Daily Star.Retrieved from http://www.thedailystar.net/editor-s-pick/state-power-vs-peoples-power-7075.


72

Ban calls for halt to violence: US, Australia, Commonwealth, Japan want immediate talks. (2014, January 8). The Daily Star. Retrieved from http://www.newagebd.com/detail.php?date=2014-01-08&nid=79675.

Barber, B. (1983). Some problems in the sociology of the professions, Daedalus,92, 669-88.

Aragon, J. (2008). Political legitimacy and democracy. In Warren,K.F. (Ed)Encyclopedia of campaigns, elections and electoral behavior. London: Sage Publications. Retrieved from http://www.luc.edu/media/lucedu/dccirp/pdfs/articlesforresourc/Article_-_Aragon_Trelles,_Jorge_2.pdf

Barry, E. (2014, January 4). Opposition party boycotting Bangladesh election.The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/05/world/asia/bangladesh-election.html?_r=0

Baxter, C., Y. K. Malik, C. H. Kennedy, & R. C. Oberst. (1993). Government and politics in South Asia, (3rd ed.) Oxford: Eastview Press.

Bode, B. & M. Howes. (2002). The northwest institutional analysis. Dhaka: CARE Bangladesh.

Broadcast policy is a control mechanism, says TIB. ( 2014). bdnews24.com.Retrieved fromhttp://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2014/08/14/broadcast-policy-is-a-control-mechanism-says-tib.

Brown, A. (1979). Introduction. In A. Brown & J. Gray. (Eds). Political culture and political change in communist states. London: Macmillan.

Dahl, R. A. (1956). A preface to democratic theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Dalton, R. J. (2004). Democratic challenges, democratic choices: the erosion of political support in advanced industrial democracies. Oxford: The Oxford University Press.

Easton, D. (1975). A re-assessment of the concept of political support, British Journal of Political Science, 5, 435-457.

Elkins, D.J. & R. E.B. Simeon (1979). A cause in search of its effect, or whatdoes political culture explain, Comparative Politics, 23, 127-145.

Hakim, Muhammad A. (1993). Bangladesh politics: the Shahabuddin Interregnum, Dhaka: University Press Limited.

Hasina plans to hang on to office after an electoral farce: economist. (2014, January 10). The Daily Star. Retrieved http://www.thedailystar.net/hasina-plans-to-hang-on-to-office-after-an-electoral-farce-economist-6281?archieve=2014-01-10.

Haq, M. E. (1975). A history of Sufism in Bengal. Dhaka: Asiatic Society ofBangladesh.

Hold another election or else people would not forgive. (2014, June 5). TheReal-Time News Network. Retrieved from http://www.english.rtnn.net//newsdetail/detail/1/3/58401#.U5AHKXKSzCd

Hossain, N., R. Subrahmanian & N. Kabeer. (2002). The politics of educational expansion in Bangladesh. IDS Working Paper,167, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.

Islam, N. (2011). Can proportional representation help stabilize democracy in Bangladesh?. In Khan, Z. R. and S. S. Andaleeb (Eds). Democracy and security in democracy in Bangladesh: political dimensions of national development.Dhaka: University Press limited.

Islam, N. and S. A. Islam. (1988). The crisis of intellectuals in a peripheral society: the case of Bangladesh, 1947 to 1981. In B. K. Jahangir (Ed).Perspective in social science. Dhaka: Centre for Advanced Research in Social Sciences, University of Dhaka.

Islam, S. S. (1988). Bangladesh in 1987: A spectrum of uncertainties. Asian Survey, 28(2), 163-171.

Jahan, R. (2000). Bangladesh: promise and performance, Dhaka: University Press Limited.



73

Ban calls for halt to violence: US, Australia, Commonwealth, Japan want immediate talks. (2014, January 8). The Daily Star. Retrieved from http://www.newagebd.com/detail.php?date=2014-01-08&nid=79675.

Barber, B. (1983). Some problems in the sociology of the professions, Daedalus,92, 669-88.

Aragon, J. (2008). Political legitimacy and democracy. In Warren,K.F. (Ed)Encyclopedia of campaigns, elections and electoral behavior. London: Sage Publications. Retrieved from http://www.luc.edu/media/lucedu/dccirp/pdfs/articlesforresourc/Article_-_Aragon_Trelles,_Jorge_2.pdf

Barry, E. (2014, January 4). Opposition party boycotting Bangladesh election.The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/05/world/asia/bangladesh-election.html?_r=0

Baxter, C., Y. K. Malik, C. H. Kennedy, & R. C. Oberst. (1993). Government and politics in South Asia, (3rd ed.) Oxford: Eastview Press.

Bode, B. & M. Howes. (2002). The northwest institutional analysis. Dhaka: CARE Bangladesh.

Broadcast policy is a control mechanism, says TIB. ( 2014). bdnews24.com.Retrieved fromhttp://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2014/08/14/broadcast-policy-is-a-control-mechanism-says-tib.

Brown, A. (1979). Introduction. In A. Brown & J. Gray. (Eds). Political culture and political change in communist states. London: Macmillan.

Dahl, R. A. (1956). A preface to democratic theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Dalton, R. J. (2004). Democratic challenges, democratic choices: the erosion of political support in advanced industrial democracies. Oxford: The Oxford University Press.

Easton, D. (1975). A re-assessment of the concept of political support, British Journal of Political Science, 5, 435-457.

Elkins, D.J. & R. E.B. Simeon (1979). A cause in search of its effect, or whatdoes political culture explain, Comparative Politics, 23, 127-145.

Hakim, Muhammad A. (1993). Bangladesh politics: the Shahabuddin Interregnum, Dhaka: University Press Limited.

Hasina plans to hang on to office after an electoral farce: economist. (2014, January 10). The Daily Star. Retrieved http://www.thedailystar.net/hasina-plans-to-hang-on-to-office-after-an-electoral-farce-economist-6281?archieve=2014-01-10.

Haq, M. E. (1975). A history of Sufism in Bengal. Dhaka: Asiatic Society ofBangladesh.

Hold another election or else people would not forgive. (2014, June 5). TheReal-Time News Network. Retrieved from http://www.english.rtnn.net//newsdetail/detail/1/3/58401#.U5AHKXKSzCd

Hossain, N., R. Subrahmanian & N. Kabeer. (2002). The politics of educational expansion in Bangladesh. IDS Working Paper,167, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.

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Jan 5 election rather a selection than election. (2014, June 6). The Real Time News Network . Retrieved fromhttp://www.english.rtnn.net//newsdetail/detail/1/3/58413#.U5KGn3KSzCd.

JS polls Bangladesh's constitutional requirement: India. (2014, January 6). TheDaily Star. Retrieved from http://www.thedailystar.net/js-polls-bangladeshs-constitutional-requirement-india-5683?archieve=2014-01-06.

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Khan, M. M. (1991). Politics of administrative reforms. New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House.

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Khan, S. I., S. A. Islam & M. I. Haque (1996). Political culture, political parties and the democratic transition in Bangladesh. Dhaka: Academic Publishers.

Kochanek, S. A. (1993). Patron-client politics and business in Bangladesh.Dhaka: The University Press Limited.

Lewis, D. & A. Hossain. (2007). Beyond “the net”: an Analysis of the local power structure in Bangladesh. In D. Gellner (Ed). Governance, conflict, and civic action in South Asia. New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Mahfuz Anam, (2014, January 17) Editorial, The Daily Star.

Majumder, R. C. (1974). History of ancient Bengal. Calcutta: F.K.L. Mukherjee.

Maloney, C. (1991). Behaviour and poverty in Bangladesh. Dhaka: the University Press Limited.

Mizi, M. A. H. (2004). Parliamentary elections in Bangladesh under Non-party Caretaker Government, Asian Profile, 32 (5), 461-473.

New cabinet tomorrow: all-party team of around 50. (2014, January 11). TheDaily Star. Retrieved from http://www.thedailystar.net/all-party-team-of-around-50-6321.

Nicholas, R. (1967). Ritual hierarchy and social relations in rural Bengal.Contributions to Indian Sociology, 1, 56-83.

Pharr, S. J. & R. D. Putnam, (2000). Disaffected democracies: what’s troubling the trilateral countries? Princetone: Princeton University Press.

Pye, L.W. (1972). Aspects of political development. New Delhi: Amerind.

Seligson, M. A. (2000). Towards a model of democratic stability: PoliticalCulture in Central America. In Estudios Interdisciplinarios de America y el Caribe, 11 (2), 5-29. Retrieved from http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/multicountry/1991-democraticstability.pdf.

Sengupta, N. (2007). Bengal divided: the unmaking of a nation. New Delhi: Viking

Shafritz, J. M. (1988). Dictionary of American government and politics.Chicago: Dorsey Press.

10th JS polls: AL wins three-fourths of house seats. (2014, Janury 6). The Daily Star. Retrieved from http://www.thedailystar.net/al-wins-three-fourths-of-house-seats-5580?archieve=2014-01-06.

284 MPs take oath: confusion remains over 9th parliament. (2014, January 10). The Daily Star. Retrieved from http://www.newagebd.com/detail.php?date=2014-01-10&nid=79897.

Yun-han Chu. (2005, April 10-11). Identifying Sources of Democratic Legitimacy in Established and Emerging Democracies. Paper presented at theconference on “Election and Democratic Governance”, Taipei. Retrieved fromhttp://www.cses.org/plancom/2005Taipei/Chu&Huang&Chang.pdf.

Warren, M. E. (2006). ‘Democracy and the state’, The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory. London: Oxford University Press.



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Jamil, I. & Haque, M. (2004). The culture of Tadbir: the “building block” of decision making in the civil service of Bangladesh. In Jamil, I, Quddus, S.M.A.and Muriisa, R. K. (Eds) Institutions, civil society and public policies in developing countries (Report No. 85), Bergen: University of Bergen, Department of Administration and Organization Theory.

Jan 5 election rather a selection than election. (2014, June 6). The Real Time News Network . Retrieved fromhttp://www.english.rtnn.net//newsdetail/detail/1/3/58413#.U5KGn3KSzCd.

JS polls Bangladesh's constitutional requirement: India. (2014, January 6). TheDaily Star. Retrieved from http://www.thedailystar.net/js-polls-bangladeshs-constitutional-requirement-india-5683?archieve=2014-01-06.

Karim, A. (1959). Social history of Muslims in Bengal (down to AD 1538).Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh.

Khan, M. M. (1991). Politics of administrative reforms. New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House.

Khan, M. M. (1998). Administrative reforms in Bangladesh. Dhaka: The University Press Limited.

Khan, S. I., S. A. Islam & M. I. Haque (1996). Political culture, political parties and the democratic transition in Bangladesh. Dhaka: Academic Publishers.

Kochanek, S. A. (1993). Patron-client politics and business in Bangladesh.Dhaka: The University Press Limited.

Lewis, D. & A. Hossain. (2007). Beyond “the net”: an Analysis of the local power structure in Bangladesh. In D. Gellner (Ed). Governance, conflict, and civic action in South Asia. New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Mahfuz Anam, (2014, January 17) Editorial, The Daily Star.

Majumder, R. C. (1974). History of ancient Bengal. Calcutta: F.K.L. Mukherjee.

Maloney, C. (1991). Behaviour and poverty in Bangladesh. Dhaka: the University Press Limited.

Mizi, M. A. H. (2004). Parliamentary elections in Bangladesh under Non-party Caretaker Government, Asian Profile, 32 (5), 461-473.

New cabinet tomorrow: all-party team of around 50. (2014, January 11). TheDaily Star. Retrieved from http://www.thedailystar.net/all-party-team-of-around-50-6321.

Nicholas, R. (1967). Ritual hierarchy and social relations in rural Bengal.Contributions to Indian Sociology, 1, 56-83.

Pharr, S. J. & R. D. Putnam, (2000). Disaffected democracies: what’s troubling the trilateral countries? Princetone: Princeton University Press.

Pye, L.W. (1972). Aspects of political development. New Delhi: Amerind.

Seligson, M. A. (2000). Towards a model of democratic stability: PoliticalCulture in Central America. In Estudios Interdisciplinarios de America y el Caribe, 11 (2), 5-29. Retrieved from http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/multicountry/1991-democraticstability.pdf.

Sengupta, N. (2007). Bengal divided: the unmaking of a nation. New Delhi: Viking

Shafritz, J. M. (1988). Dictionary of American government and politics.Chicago: Dorsey Press.

10th JS polls: AL wins three-fourths of house seats. (2014, Janury 6). The Daily Star. Retrieved from http://www.thedailystar.net/al-wins-three-fourths-of-house-seats-5580?archieve=2014-01-06.

284 MPs take oath: confusion remains over 9th parliament. (2014, January 10). The Daily Star. Retrieved from http://www.newagebd.com/detail.php?date=2014-01-10&nid=79897.

Yun-han Chu. (2005, April 10-11). Identifying Sources of Democratic Legitimacy in Established and Emerging Democracies. Paper presented at theconference on “Election and Democratic Governance”, Taipei. Retrieved fromhttp://www.cses.org/plancom/2005Taipei/Chu&Huang&Chang.pdf.

Warren, M. E. (2006). ‘Democracy and the state’, The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory. London: Oxford University Press.


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Warren, K. F. (2008). Encyclopedia of U.S. Campaigns, Elections and Electoral Behavior. New York: Sage Publications, Inc.

Weber, M. (1978). Economy and society. Berkeley: University of California.

Wood, G. (2000). Prisoners and escapees: improving the institutional responsibility square in Bangladesh, Public Administration and Development,20, 221-237.

Wood, G. (2001). Governance and the common man: embedding social policy in the search for security. University of Bath: Department of Economics and International Development.

World Bank. (2002). Taming leviathan-reforming governance in Bangladesh:an institutional Review. Washington DC: The World Bank.

، دار القلم.اإلسالم عقيدة وشريعةحممودح ،شلتوت .2اجمللس العلمي، ،، احملق ح رةي الرمحن األعظمي، اهلنداملصنف حه(1403عةد الرزاقح )

قواعد األركام يف مصاحل األانم ، حتقي ح طه عةد ح م( 1991هل / 1414العز ابن عةد السالمح ) مكتةة الكليات األزهرية. ،الرؤوف سعد، القاهرة

، مكتةة القاهرة، النظام القتصادي يف اإلسالمم(. 1980كرمي )فتحي عةد ال حد، أمحد ،العسال 3

حتقي ح عةد العال أمحد حممد، بروت، دار الكتةة ،أسرار الزكاةح م(1982ه/1403) ال زايل .1العصرية ، حتقي ح اإلحكام يف متييز الفتاوى عن األحكام وتصرفات القاضي واإلمامح ه(1416القرايفح )

.2و غدة، دار الةشاور اإلسالمية، عةد ال تاح أب ، عامل الكت .الفروقالقرايفح

، حتقي ح أمحد الربدوين وإبراهيم أط يش، اجلامع ألحكام القرآنم(. 1964هل /1384القرط ح ) .2دار الكت املصرية، ،القاهرة

.دار الكتاب العر ،، بروتبدائع الصنائع. م(1864الكاساينح ) ، عامل الكت .هتذيب الفروقح م(201 )حممد على ،املالكي

دار احلديث. ،، القاهرةاألحكام السلطانيةاملاورديح (.4/2663الدورة ا امسة )، جبدة ،التابع ملنظمة امل متر اإلسالمي جملة جممع ال قه اإلسالمي

.1 ، املعهد اانسالمى للةحوث،القتصاد اإلسالميم (. 1990منذر قحفح ) .2م سسة الرسالة، ،، بروتأحباث يف القتصاد اإلسالمي ،م(1988حممد فاروقح ) ،النةهان

، دار ال كر.اجملموعالنوويح .2دار ال قافة، ، ،، ق رالنفقات العامة يف اإلسالمم(.1988يوسف إبراهيم يوسفح )



77

Warren, K. F. (2008). Encyclopedia of U.S. Campaigns, Elections and Electoral Behavior. New York: Sage Publications, Inc.

Weber, M. (1978). Economy and society. Berkeley: University of California.

Wood, G. (2000). Prisoners and escapees: improving the institutional responsibility square in Bangladesh, Public Administration and Development,20, 221-237.

Wood, G. (2001). Governance and the common man: embedding social policy in the search for security. University of Bath: Department of Economics and International Development.

World Bank. (2002). Taming leviathan-reforming governance in Bangladesh:an institutional Review. Washington DC: The World Bank.

، دار القلم.اإلسالم عقيدة وشريعةحممودح ،شلتوت .2اجمللس العلمي، ،، احملق ح رةي الرمحن األعظمي، اهلنداملصنف حه(1403عةد الرزاقح )

قواعد األركام يف مصاحل األانم ، حتقي ح طه عةد ح م( 1991هل / 1414العز ابن عةد السالمح ) مكتةة الكليات األزهرية. ،الرؤوف سعد، القاهرة

، مكتةة القاهرة، النظام القتصادي يف اإلسالمم(. 1980كرمي )فتحي عةد ال حد، أمحد ،العسال 3

حتقي ح عةد العال أمحد حممد، بروت، دار الكتةة ،أسرار الزكاةح م(1982ه/1403) ال زايل .1العصرية ، حتقي ح اإلحكام يف متييز الفتاوى عن األحكام وتصرفات القاضي واإلمامح ه(1416القرايفح )

.2و غدة، دار الةشاور اإلسالمية، عةد ال تاح أب ، عامل الكت .الفروقالقرايفح

، حتقي ح أمحد الربدوين وإبراهيم أط يش، اجلامع ألحكام القرآنم(. 1964هل /1384القرط ح ) .2دار الكت املصرية، ،القاهرة

.دار الكتاب العر ،، بروتبدائع الصنائع. م(1864الكاساينح ) ، عامل الكت .هتذيب الفروقح م(201 )حممد على ،املالكي

دار احلديث. ،، القاهرةاألحكام السلطانيةاملاورديح (.4/2663الدورة ا امسة )، جبدة ،التابع ملنظمة امل متر اإلسالمي جملة جممع ال قه اإلسالمي

.1 ، املعهد اانسالمى للةحوث،القتصاد اإلسالميم (. 1990منذر قحفح ) .2م سسة الرسالة، ،، بروتأحباث يف القتصاد اإلسالمي ،م(1988حممد فاروقح ) ،النةهان

، دار ال كر.اجملموعالنوويح .2دار ال قافة، ، ،، ق رالنفقات العامة يف اإلسالمم(.1988يوسف إبراهيم يوسفح )


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، التخريج عند الفقهاء واألصوليني دراسة نظرية تطبيقية أتصيليةه(ح 1414يعقوب )، رسنياالة .1مكتةة الرشد،

ن،لةنا ،بروت، احملق ح حممد عةد القادر ع ا(، السنن الكربى، م 2003 /هل 1424الةيهقي، ) .3 دار الكت العلمية،

، حتقي ح أمحد حممد شاكر، وحممد ف اد عةد الةاقي، السننح م( 1975هل/ 1395الرتمذيح ) .2 شركة مكتةة احلل ، ،وإبراهيم ع وة عوو املدرس يف األزهر الشريف، مصر

عضو جلنة مراجعة -، احملق ح حممد صادق القمحاوي أحكام القرآنهل(ح 1405)ح اجلصاص .الرتاث العر دار إريان ،املصارف ابألزهر الشريف، بروت

.1، إلجارة املنتهية ابلت مليك يف ضوء الفقه اإلسالمياح هل( 1420االدح ) ،احلايف) موسوعة اإلدارة املالية يف اإلسالم( اجملمع امللكي لةحوث احلضارة ،الزكاةعةد العزيزح ،ا يا

اإلسالمية.علي حميي الدين القرهح اإلجارة وا ةيقاعا املعاصرة )اإلجارة املنتهية ابلتمليك( دراسة فقهية ،داغي

جملة جممع ال قه اإلسالمي التابع ملنظمة امل متر اإلسالمي. ، مقارنة، جدة، اإلسكندرية، األحكام اجللية يف زكاة األموال العصرية ،م(2004حممد عةد املقصودح ) ،داوود

.معة اجلديدة للنشردار اجلا ، دار إريان الرتاث العر .جممع األهنردمادا أفنديح

امل ةعة الكربى األمرية، ،بوانق ،القاهرةتبيني احلقائق شرح كنز الدقائق، حهل( 1313الزيلعيح ) 1.

.2دار املعرفة لل ةاعه والنشر، ،، بروتاملبسوطم(ح 1993)، السراسي ،القتصادي يف اإلسالم مدخل للفكرسعيد فررانح ، حتقي ح أبو عةيدة مشهور بن رسن آل سلمان، دار املوافقاتح م(1997هل/ 1417الشاط ح )

.1ابن ع ان، .1مكتةه احلل ، ،، حتقي ح أمحد شاكر، مصرالرسالة م(.1940هل/1358الشافعيح ) ، طةعة بوانق.األمالشافعيح

املراجع رآن الكرميقال

، حتقي ح حممد عةد السالم املوقعني عن رب العاملنيإعالم حم(1991هل / 1411ابن القيمح ) .1دار الكت العلمية، ، ،إبراهيم، يروت، حتقي ح عةد الرمحن بن حممد بن قاسم، اململكة جمموع الفتاوىح م(1995هل/1416ابن ايميةح )

.جممع امللك فهد ل ةاعة املصحف الشريف، املدينة النةوية ، العربية السعودية، حتقي ح شعي األرن و ، عادل مرشد، املسند حم( 2001هل / 1421) أمحد ،بن رنةلا

.1وآارون، م سسة الرسالة، م ةعة احلل . ،ابن عابدينح راشية رد املختار، مصر

اململكة العربية ،أ األشةال الزهري، حتقي ح جامع بيان العلم وفضله (،م1994 )ابن عةد الرب .1 زي، دار ابن اجلو ،السعودية

حممد عةد الكةر الةكري، ،، حتقي ح مص ى بن أمحد العلويالتمهيد حه(1387ابن عةد الربح ) .وزارة عموم األوقاف والش ون اإلسالمية ،امل رب

احملق ح عةد املنعم ، الفتوحات الرابنية على األذكار النوويةح م(2004 / ه1424) ابن عالن .1 ، ر الكت العلميةاد ،اليل إبراهيم دار ال كر. .حتقي ح عةد السالم حممد هارون مقاييس اللغة،ح م(1979هل / 1399ابن فارسح ) .مكتةة الرايو احلدي ة .، الرايواملغينم(. 1981) حابن قدامة

دار صادر. ،ابن منظورح لسان العرب، بروت جامعة الكويت. ح ، البيع ابلتقسيط والبيوع الئتمانية األخرىإبراهيم دسوقيح ،أبو الليل

يف معاجلة التضخم الزكاة وآاثرها القتصادية والجتماعية ،(2005)أبو طه، أمحد حممد أمحد، جامعة األزهر، ،النقدي وإعادة توزيع الدخل دراسة أتصيلية من منظور القتصاد اإلسالمي

م.2005كلية الشريعة، دقهلية، .1 ، دار ال كر،كتاب األموالحم(1981ه/1403أبو عةيد القاسم بن سالمح )



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، التخريج عند الفقهاء واألصوليني دراسة نظرية تطبيقية أتصيليةه(ح 1414يعقوب )، رسنياالة .1مكتةة الرشد،

ن،لةنا ،بروت، احملق ح حممد عةد القادر ع ا(، السنن الكربى، م 2003 /هل 1424الةيهقي، ) .3 دار الكت العلمية،

، حتقي ح أمحد حممد شاكر، وحممد ف اد عةد الةاقي، السننح م( 1975هل/ 1395الرتمذيح ) .2 شركة مكتةة احلل ، ،وإبراهيم ع وة عوو املدرس يف األزهر الشريف، مصر

عضو جلنة مراجعة -، احملق ح حممد صادق القمحاوي أحكام القرآنهل(ح 1405)ح اجلصاص .الرتاث العر دار إريان ،املصارف ابألزهر الشريف، بروت

.1، إلجارة املنتهية ابلت مليك يف ضوء الفقه اإلسالمياح هل( 1420االدح ) ،احلايف) موسوعة اإلدارة املالية يف اإلسالم( اجملمع امللكي لةحوث احلضارة ،الزكاةعةد العزيزح ،ا يا

اإلسالمية.علي حميي الدين القرهح اإلجارة وا ةيقاعا املعاصرة )اإلجارة املنتهية ابلتمليك( دراسة فقهية ،داغي

جملة جممع ال قه اإلسالمي التابع ملنظمة امل متر اإلسالمي. ، مقارنة، جدة، اإلسكندرية، األحكام اجللية يف زكاة األموال العصرية ،م(2004حممد عةد املقصودح ) ،داوود

.معة اجلديدة للنشردار اجلا ، دار إريان الرتاث العر .جممع األهنردمادا أفنديح

امل ةعة الكربى األمرية، ،بوانق ،القاهرةتبيني احلقائق شرح كنز الدقائق، حهل( 1313الزيلعيح ) 1.

.2دار املعرفة لل ةاعه والنشر، ،، بروتاملبسوطم(ح 1993)، السراسي ،القتصادي يف اإلسالم مدخل للفكرسعيد فررانح ، حتقي ح أبو عةيدة مشهور بن رسن آل سلمان، دار املوافقاتح م(1997هل/ 1417الشاط ح )

.1ابن ع ان، .1مكتةه احلل ، ،، حتقي ح أمحد شاكر، مصرالرسالة م(.1940هل/1358الشافعيح ) ، طةعة بوانق.األمالشافعيح

املراجع رآن الكرميقال

، حتقي ح حممد عةد السالم املوقعني عن رب العاملنيإعالم حم(1991هل / 1411ابن القيمح ) .1دار الكت العلمية، ، ،إبراهيم، يروت، حتقي ح عةد الرمحن بن حممد بن قاسم، اململكة جمموع الفتاوىح م(1995هل/1416ابن ايميةح )

.جممع امللك فهد ل ةاعة املصحف الشريف، املدينة النةوية ، العربية السعودية، حتقي ح شعي األرن و ، عادل مرشد، املسند حم( 2001هل / 1421) أمحد ،بن رنةلا

.1وآارون، م سسة الرسالة، م ةعة احلل . ،ابن عابدينح راشية رد املختار، مصر

اململكة العربية ،أ األشةال الزهري، حتقي ح جامع بيان العلم وفضله (،م1994 )ابن عةد الرب .1 زي، دار ابن اجلو ،السعودية

حممد عةد الكةر الةكري، ،، حتقي ح مص ى بن أمحد العلويالتمهيد حه(1387ابن عةد الربح ) .وزارة عموم األوقاف والش ون اإلسالمية ،امل رب

احملق ح عةد املنعم ، الفتوحات الرابنية على األذكار النوويةح م(2004 / ه1424) ابن عالن .1 ، ر الكت العلميةاد ،اليل إبراهيم دار ال كر. .حتقي ح عةد السالم حممد هارون مقاييس اللغة،ح م(1979هل / 1399ابن فارسح ) .مكتةة الرايو احلدي ة .، الرايواملغينم(. 1981) حابن قدامة

دار صادر. ،ابن منظورح لسان العرب، بروت جامعة الكويت. ح ، البيع ابلتقسيط والبيوع الئتمانية األخرىإبراهيم دسوقيح ،أبو الليل

يف معاجلة التضخم الزكاة وآاثرها القتصادية والجتماعية ،(2005)أبو طه، أمحد حممد أمحد، جامعة األزهر، ،النقدي وإعادة توزيع الدخل دراسة أتصيلية من منظور القتصاد اإلسالمي

م.2005كلية الشريعة، دقهلية، .1 ، دار ال كر،كتاب األموالحم(1981ه/1403أبو عةيد القاسم بن سالمح )


80

التوصياتوالرتكيز على دورها ،املختل ةواجلامعات ،واملعاهد التعليمية ،ادريس فقه الزكاة يف املدارس( 1 اقتصادية وليس عةادة فقس. كأداةاملواطنني بقصد اعريف زايدة الوعي الزكوي بني املسلمني من االل وساول اإلعالم املختل ة( 2 .يقتصاداان على املستوىودورها اهلام ،وكي ية أداوها ،أبحتيها ورب ها ابلواقع املعاصر. ،عقد دورات ا قي ية اتعل أبركام الزكاة( 3عن اجلان اانقتصادي يف نظام الزكاة، قيمة إحتاف املكتةة بدراسات فقهية، واقتصادية ( 4جملتمعات املسلمة، من احللول املناسةة للمشكالت اليت حتول دون ا ةيقها، وا عيلها يف ا واقدمي

والة الة، ،فين اتوفر فيه ا ربات الالزمة لتحق األهداف املنشودة بقضاوها على ال قر االل جهازوحماربة اانكتناز، وزايدة اإلنتاج، ورفع معدانت النمو، وحتقي اانستقرار اانقتصادي، وابلتايل حتقي

سكرية.التنمية اانقتصادية واانجتماعية، والسياسية، والع دراسة وضع احملتاجني يف كل من قةو اوفر كوادر مدربة للمساعدة يف ارتساب الزكاة، (5جت فيها الزكاة واإلعالن عنها والةحث عن مايستجد من األموال اليت ،الزكاة ملستحقيها لتصل

واست مارها. ،معرفة أجنح السةل لتوزيع أموال الزكاة، و وحتديد أنصةتها للناس عامة، إنشان م سسة عاملية للزكاة اتكون من م سسات الزكاة يف الةالد اإلسالمية املختل ة اعمل (6

أك ر ونقل ال اوض من أموال الزكاة يف دولة إىل دولة أارى ،على التكامل يف العمل فيما بينها راجة.

اخلامتةعلى النحو والتوصيات ريعة رول موضو الد راسة هكن عرو أهم النتاوج بعد هذه اجلولة الس

التايلح ر ك ويعاق مانعها، ويا ،وركن من أركانه ي اب م ديها ،فراوض الدين الزكاة فريضة منأ( إن

والعلمان يف العصور. ،ال قهان جاردها، اا على اللك ردي ا أفرزه الت ور و، اقليداي أاقديرا أو فعال الزكاة هي احل الواج يف كل مال انم،ب( إن اانقتصادي.على النواري اانقتصادية، واانجتماعية، والسياسية، والعسكرية، للزكاة آاثر واضحة ن ج( إ

،واعاظمت رصيلة الزكاة كنسةة من النااج القومي اإلمجايل ،كلما ازايدت اتعاظم هذه اآلاثر واتزايد .والعيين ،قديوالتوزيع بني الن ،وحتققت هلا املرونة ىف التحصيل

أو الدور اانقتصادي الذي هكن أن اقوم به الزكاة يف هذا العصر، ليس من قةيل التوقع إن د( واقعا معاشا، األوهام، فلقد قامت فريضة الزكاة هبذا الدور ول رتات طويلة يف إلريخ املسلمني، وأصةح

عدم ا ةي اإلسالم على عجزها، بل يرجع اللك إىلوان دليال ،ما نراه اليوم فليس عيةا يف الزكاةا أم .ا ةيقا شامال

اليت استدعي النوازل، واملستجدات يف املعامالت املالية ( إن من مميزات هذا العصر ك رة ه اكيي ا فقهيا، وركما شرعيا هلا.

غرها أتثر واضح على "الزكاة"، مما يستدعي العناية هبذه ال ريضة ذه املستجدات و هلن ( إوالعظيمة، وحبث ما يتعل هبا من مستجدات، وقضااي واقعة مل اكن يف العصور السابقة، أو كانت موجودة إان أن ه استجد ما يستدعي إعادة اانجتهاد فيها، وبيان املنهج املنضةس يف اكيي ها الشرعي،

امها.ونريج أرك



81

التوصياتوالرتكيز على دورها ،املختل ةواجلامعات ،واملعاهد التعليمية ،ادريس فقه الزكاة يف املدارس( 1 اقتصادية وليس عةادة فقس. كأداةاملواطنني بقصد اعريف زايدة الوعي الزكوي بني املسلمني من االل وساول اإلعالم املختل ة( 2 .يقتصاداان على املستوىودورها اهلام ،وكي ية أداوها ،أبحتيها ورب ها ابلواقع املعاصر. ،عقد دورات ا قي ية اتعل أبركام الزكاة( 3عن اجلان اانقتصادي يف نظام الزكاة، قيمة إحتاف املكتةة بدراسات فقهية، واقتصادية ( 4جملتمعات املسلمة، من احللول املناسةة للمشكالت اليت حتول دون ا ةيقها، وا عيلها يف ا واقدمي

والة الة، ،فين اتوفر فيه ا ربات الالزمة لتحق األهداف املنشودة بقضاوها على ال قر االل جهازوحماربة اانكتناز، وزايدة اإلنتاج، ورفع معدانت النمو، وحتقي اانستقرار اانقتصادي، وابلتايل حتقي

سكرية.التنمية اانقتصادية واانجتماعية، والسياسية، والع دراسة وضع احملتاجني يف كل من قةو اوفر كوادر مدربة للمساعدة يف ارتساب الزكاة، (5جت فيها الزكاة واإلعالن عنها والةحث عن مايستجد من األموال اليت ،الزكاة ملستحقيها لتصل

واست مارها. ،معرفة أجنح السةل لتوزيع أموال الزكاة، و وحتديد أنصةتها للناس عامة، إنشان م سسة عاملية للزكاة اتكون من م سسات الزكاة يف الةالد اإلسالمية املختل ة اعمل (6

أك ر ونقل ال اوض من أموال الزكاة يف دولة إىل دولة أارى ،على التكامل يف العمل فيما بينها راجة.

اخلامتةعلى النحو والتوصيات ريعة رول موضو الد راسة هكن عرو أهم النتاوج بعد هذه اجلولة الس

التايلح ر ك ويعاق مانعها، ويا ،وركن من أركانه ي اب م ديها ،فراوض الدين الزكاة فريضة منأ( إن

والعلمان يف العصور. ،ال قهان جاردها، اا على اللك ردي ا أفرزه الت ور و، اقليداي أاقديرا أو فعال الزكاة هي احل الواج يف كل مال انم،ب( إن اانقتصادي.على النواري اانقتصادية، واانجتماعية، والسياسية، والعسكرية، للزكاة آاثر واضحة ن ج( إ

،واعاظمت رصيلة الزكاة كنسةة من النااج القومي اإلمجايل ،كلما ازايدت اتعاظم هذه اآلاثر واتزايد .والعيين ،قديوالتوزيع بني الن ،وحتققت هلا املرونة ىف التحصيل

أو الدور اانقتصادي الذي هكن أن اقوم به الزكاة يف هذا العصر، ليس من قةيل التوقع إن د( واقعا معاشا، األوهام، فلقد قامت فريضة الزكاة هبذا الدور ول رتات طويلة يف إلريخ املسلمني، وأصةح

عدم ا ةي اإلسالم على عجزها، بل يرجع اللك إىلوان دليال ،ما نراه اليوم فليس عيةا يف الزكاةا أم .ا ةيقا شامال

اليت استدعي النوازل، واملستجدات يف املعامالت املالية ( إن من مميزات هذا العصر ك رة ه اكيي ا فقهيا، وركما شرعيا هلا.

غرها أتثر واضح على "الزكاة"، مما يستدعي العناية هبذه ال ريضة ذه املستجدات و هلن ( إوالعظيمة، وحبث ما يتعل هبا من مستجدات، وقضااي واقعة مل اكن يف العصور السابقة، أو كانت موجودة إان أن ه استجد ما يستدعي إعادة اانجتهاد فيها، وبيان املنهج املنضةس يف اكيي ها الشرعي،

امها.ونريج أرك


82

ا أن ا ة على عقد اإلجارة املنتهية ابلت مليك أركام اإلجارة طوال مدة اإلجارة، -5 وأركام الةيع عند متلك العني.

)ان على املستأجر طوال مدة اإلجارة. ، جراكون ن قات الصيانة غر التش يلية على امل - 6 (جملة جممع ال قه اإلسالمي

كاة اإلجارة املنتهية ابلتمليكنريج ز ح سابعااستحقاق ثر يف إن ااناتالف يف حتديد احلكم الشرعي لعقد "اإلجارة املنتهية ابلتمليك" ان ي

ا.أو فساد يحا،العقد صحأكان ر؛ ألن امل ج ر مالك للعني امل جرة سوان زكاة املال الم اج ومن مث هكن نريج

على رة إاارا منتهيا ابلت مليك ج ا زكاة العني امل

- تست ال ركم زكاة امل

.والعلة ،والص ات ،ا واص انشرتاكهما يف ،- واتجدد من عتههي كل أصل اثبت يدر داال و ت وجوب الزكاة يف األرابح والراجح الناجتة دون األصول -أي األجرة -يف زكاة املست اللكون العني امل جرة مل اعد للتقلي ابلةيع والشران، وإ ا لالست الل، مما حيول دون حتق وال وابت؛

يف زكاة األركام اجللية م(،2004داوود، حممد عةد املقصود ). )وصف العروو التجارية فيها (األموال العصرية

بل ت نصااب جرة اليت يستلمها إالا رة وهو امل اج ر زكاة األ ج ا على مالك العني امل ا وعليه من رني ابتدان إنتاجها؛ ألهنا مال وارد يتقل ، والربح فيه إلبع رال عليها احلول بعد قةضهاو

ألصله يف نصابه وروله.

إشكاانت عقد "اإلجارة املنتهية ابلتمليك"اامساح لعقد يتةني أنه قد اشتمل على عدة إشكاانت فقهية منهاحابلتأمل يف صور هذا ا

(املةسو (،م1993) السراسي قهان.)اشرتا عقد يف عقد، وهذا ان اوز عند مجهور ال القرايفح .)عند مجهور ال قهان على شر مستقةل، وهذا ان اوزأو اهلةة ،اعلي عقد الةيع ( ال روق ال تورات الرابنية ،م(2004 )ابن عالن ) .انزم عند اجلمهورالوعد واإللزام به، والوعد غر

(على األالكار النووية احلكم الشرعي لعقد "اإلجارة املنتهية ابلتمليك"سادساح

ااتلف يف حتديد احلكم الشرعي هلذا العقد واالصة األمر أن منها صور جاوزة، وصور ممنوعة، ولكل ضوابس بينها كالتايلح

ضابس املنعح (أ أن يرد عقدان خمتل ان، يف وقت وارد، على عني واردة، يف زمن وارد.

ضابس اجلوازح (ب وجود عقدين من صلني يستقل كل منهما عن اآلار، زماان حبيث يكون إبرام عقد الةيع - 1

بعد عقد اإلجارة، أو وجود وعد ابلتمليك يف هناية مدة اإلجارة، وا يار يوازي الوعد يف األركام. أن اكون اإلجارة فعلية، وليست ساورة للةيع. - 2أن يكون ضمان العني امل جرة على املالك ان على املستأجر، وبذلك يتحمل امل جر ما - 3

املستأجر أو ا ري ه، وان يلزم املستأجر بشين إالا فاات ييلح العني من ضرر غر انشئ من اعد املن عة.ا ان ا إسالمي امل جرة فيج أن يكون التأمني اعاوني إالا اشتمل العقد على أتمني العني - 4 .وليس املستأجر ،له املالك امل جر، ويتحم جتاراي



83

ا أن ا ة على عقد اإلجارة املنتهية ابلت مليك أركام اإلجارة طوال مدة اإلجارة، -5 وأركام الةيع عند متلك العني.

)ان على املستأجر طوال مدة اإلجارة. ، جراكون ن قات الصيانة غر التش يلية على امل - 6 (جملة جممع ال قه اإلسالمي

كاة اإلجارة املنتهية ابلتمليكنريج ز ح سابعااستحقاق ثر يف إن ااناتالف يف حتديد احلكم الشرعي لعقد "اإلجارة املنتهية ابلتمليك" ان ي

ا.أو فساد يحا،العقد صحأكان ر؛ ألن امل ج ر مالك للعني امل جرة سوان زكاة املال الم اج ومن مث هكن نريج

على رة إاارا منتهيا ابلت مليك ج ا زكاة العني امل

- تست ال ركم زكاة امل

.والعلة ،والص ات ،ا واص انشرتاكهما يف ،- واتجدد من عتههي كل أصل اثبت يدر داال و ت وجوب الزكاة يف األرابح والراجح الناجتة دون األصول -أي األجرة -يف زكاة املست اللكون العني امل جرة مل اعد للتقلي ابلةيع والشران، وإ ا لالست الل، مما حيول دون حتق وال وابت؛

يف زكاة األركام اجللية م(،2004داوود، حممد عةد املقصود ). )وصف العروو التجارية فيها (األموال العصرية

بل ت نصااب جرة اليت يستلمها إالا رة وهو امل اج ر زكاة األ ج ا على مالك العني امل ا وعليه من رني ابتدان إنتاجها؛ ألهنا مال وارد يتقل ، والربح فيه إلبع رال عليها احلول بعد قةضهاو

ألصله يف نصابه وروله.

إشكاانت عقد "اإلجارة املنتهية ابلتمليك"اامساح لعقد يتةني أنه قد اشتمل على عدة إشكاانت فقهية منهاحابلتأمل يف صور هذا ا

(املةسو (،م1993) السراسي قهان.)اشرتا عقد يف عقد، وهذا ان اوز عند مجهور ال القرايفح .)عند مجهور ال قهان على شر مستقةل، وهذا ان اوزأو اهلةة ،اعلي عقد الةيع ( ال روق ال تورات الرابنية ،م(2004 )ابن عالن ) .انزم عند اجلمهورالوعد واإللزام به، والوعد غر

(على األالكار النووية احلكم الشرعي لعقد "اإلجارة املنتهية ابلتمليك"سادساح

ااتلف يف حتديد احلكم الشرعي هلذا العقد واالصة األمر أن منها صور جاوزة، وصور ممنوعة، ولكل ضوابس بينها كالتايلح

ضابس املنعح (أ أن يرد عقدان خمتل ان، يف وقت وارد، على عني واردة، يف زمن وارد.

ضابس اجلوازح (ب وجود عقدين من صلني يستقل كل منهما عن اآلار، زماان حبيث يكون إبرام عقد الةيع - 1

بعد عقد اإلجارة، أو وجود وعد ابلتمليك يف هناية مدة اإلجارة، وا يار يوازي الوعد يف األركام. أن اكون اإلجارة فعلية، وليست ساورة للةيع. - 2أن يكون ضمان العني امل جرة على املالك ان على املستأجر، وبذلك يتحمل امل جر ما - 3

املستأجر أو ا ري ه، وان يلزم املستأجر بشين إالا فاات ييلح العني من ضرر غر انشئ من اعد املن عة.ا ان ا إسالمي امل جرة فيج أن يكون التأمني اعاوني إالا اشتمل العقد على أتمني العني - 4 .وليس املستأجر ،له املالك امل جر، ويتحم جتاراي


84

مث بعد اللك انتقل إىل الةالد العربية ،م(1962مث بعد اللك انتقل إىل فرنسا عام ) ،م(1953عام )دحإبراهيم دسوقي أبو الليلح الةيع ابلتقسيس والةيو اانوتمانية )هل(.1397واإلسالمية عام )

(األارى

حاملالية أحية التمويل ابإلجارةاثل اح ابإلجارة للحياة اانقتصادية ادمات عديدة ان ينهض التمويل ب رها بتوفرها ملا ر التمويل وف ي

دح شوقي أمحد دنياح اإلجارة )وال ةاوع بني كل أداة متويلية وأارى ،هنالك من متايز يف ا صاوص، فليس كل فرد يف راجة إىل من عة ما قادر على متلك (املنتهية ابلتمليك دراسة اقتصادية وفقهية

األ (قواعد األركام ،م( 1991العز ابن عةد السالمح ).)نتج هلذه املن عةصل امل

ح "إن هللا اعاىل إ ا شر العقود حلواوج العةاد، وراجتهم إىل اإلجارة هل(587) يقول الكاساينأو أرو مملوكة يزرعها أو دابة مملوكة يركةها، ،ألن كل وارد ان يكون له دار مملوكة يسكنها ؛ةماس

،ألن ن س كل وارد ان اسمح بذلك ؛واإلعارة ،وان ابهلةة ،وقد ان هكنه متلكها ابلشران لعدم ال من (ح بداوع الصناوعم(1864)الكاساين.)م وحنوه"لا زت حلاجة الناس كالس فيحتاج إىل اإلجارة فجو

ابلتمليكح صور اإلاارة املنتهيةرابعاح يحهذا العقد ها يف اداول لإلجارة املنتهية ابلتمليك صور عديدة، ولعل الصور األوسع انتشار

الصورة األوىلح إجارة انتهي ابلتمليك دون دفع مثن سوى األقسا اإلاارية. اقرتان اإلجارة بةيع الشين امل جر ب من رمزي، أو رقيقي. حالصورة ال انية

اقرتان اإلجارة بوعد ابلةيع.الصورة ال ال ةح اقرتان اإلجارة بوعد ابهلةة.الصورة الرابعةح د. علي حميي الدين القره داغيح ) .واإلجارة الات ا يار املتعدد للمستأجر الصورة ا امسةح

(اإلجارة وا ةيقاعا املعاصرة

ص على بقان العاني املعقود عليها يف ملك الةاوع اهلدف منهح احلر املستوى ال ردي وامل سسي؛ إال إىل رني أدان كامل األقسا املستحقة، وأن أيامن املالك من م زامحة غره من ال رامان يف رالة إفالس

املشرتي؛ ألن العاقد إالا كان بصورة اإلاار ماكن اللك املالكا من اسرتداد ملكه. لعقد؟ وما هي صوره ؟وما هو ركمه الشرعي؟ وما ركم الزكاة فيه؟فما املقصود هبذا ا

اعريف "اإلجارة املنتهية ابلتمليك"أوانح هكن اعري ه على النحو التايلح

ستأجر علىملأردحا آلار سلعة معينة مقابل أجرة معينة يدفعها ا ه ي جر فيني طرفنيعقد ب"آلار قسس بعقد دادهللمستأجر عند س السلعةا ملكية هددة ، انتقل بعدحممدة لأقسا اال

( اإلجارة املنتهية ابلتمليك يف ضون ال قه اإلسالميهل( 1420احلايف، االد ) ".)جديد. فهي إجارة منتهية "الةيع"يتةعه متليك العني، هذا هو و "،اإلجارة"ن عة، هذا هو املتمليك ف

ابلتمليك.ذه هستأجر يف ملام يقو نعلى أ نويت قا ،إاار هأبن نتعاقداملا هعقد يص "أبنهح نيو القانون وعرفه

نامثأقسا على تدفع يتاألجرة ال ربواعت ،اا بيع هدة معينة ينقل العقد بعدمالة بدفع أجرة حلا (دح اوفي رسن فرجح عقد الةيع واملقايضة".)للةيع

نشأة عقد اإلجارة املنتهية ابلتمليكحاثنياح ، وأول من اعامل هبذا العقد، أرد جتار "إجنلرتا"يف (م1846) عامظهر العقد أول ظهر هذا

اآلانت املوسيقية يف إجنلرتا، فكان ي جر آاناه املوسيقية إجارة يتةعها متليك العني، وقصد من اللك مث بعد اللك انتشر م ل هذا العقد وانتقل من األفراد إىل املصانع، وكان أول هذه ،ضمان رقه

مث بعد اللك ا ور، وانتشر بص ة ،صانع ا ةيقا هلذا العقد مصنع سنجر آلانت إ ياطة يف إجنلرتااملااصة يف شركات السكك احلديدية، اليت اشرتي املركةات، وا جرها ملناجم ال حم أتجرا ينتهي

ايت املتحدة ابلتمليك. مث بعد اللك انتشر هذا العقد، وانتقل إىل بقية دول العامل، فانتقل إىل الوان



85

مث بعد اللك انتقل إىل الةالد العربية ،م(1962مث بعد اللك انتقل إىل فرنسا عام ) ،م(1953عام )دحإبراهيم دسوقي أبو الليلح الةيع ابلتقسيس والةيو اانوتمانية )هل(.1397واإلسالمية عام )

(األارى

حاملالية أحية التمويل ابإلجارةاثل اح ابإلجارة للحياة اانقتصادية ادمات عديدة ان ينهض التمويل ب رها بتوفرها ملا ر التمويل وف ي

دح شوقي أمحد دنياح اإلجارة )وال ةاوع بني كل أداة متويلية وأارى ،هنالك من متايز يف ا صاوص، فليس كل فرد يف راجة إىل من عة ما قادر على متلك (املنتهية ابلتمليك دراسة اقتصادية وفقهية

األ (قواعد األركام ،م( 1991العز ابن عةد السالمح ).)نتج هلذه املن عةصل امل

ح "إن هللا اعاىل إ ا شر العقود حلواوج العةاد، وراجتهم إىل اإلجارة هل(587) يقول الكاساينأو أرو مملوكة يزرعها أو دابة مملوكة يركةها، ،ألن كل وارد ان يكون له دار مملوكة يسكنها ؛ةماس

،ألن ن س كل وارد ان اسمح بذلك ؛واإلعارة ،وان ابهلةة ،وقد ان هكنه متلكها ابلشران لعدم ال من (ح بداوع الصناوعم(1864)الكاساين.)م وحنوه"لا زت حلاجة الناس كالس فيحتاج إىل اإلجارة فجو

ابلتمليكح صور اإلاارة املنتهيةرابعاح يحهذا العقد ها يف اداول لإلجارة املنتهية ابلتمليك صور عديدة، ولعل الصور األوسع انتشار

الصورة األوىلح إجارة انتهي ابلتمليك دون دفع مثن سوى األقسا اإلاارية. اقرتان اإلجارة بةيع الشين امل جر ب من رمزي، أو رقيقي. حالصورة ال انية

اقرتان اإلجارة بوعد ابلةيع.الصورة ال ال ةح اقرتان اإلجارة بوعد ابهلةة.الصورة الرابعةح د. علي حميي الدين القره داغيح ) .واإلجارة الات ا يار املتعدد للمستأجر الصورة ا امسةح

(اإلجارة وا ةيقاعا املعاصرة

ص على بقان العاني املعقود عليها يف ملك الةاوع اهلدف منهح احلر املستوى ال ردي وامل سسي؛ إال إىل رني أدان كامل األقسا املستحقة، وأن أيامن املالك من م زامحة غره من ال رامان يف رالة إفالس

املشرتي؛ ألن العاقد إالا كان بصورة اإلاار ماكن اللك املالكا من اسرتداد ملكه. لعقد؟ وما هي صوره ؟وما هو ركمه الشرعي؟ وما ركم الزكاة فيه؟فما املقصود هبذا ا

اعريف "اإلجارة املنتهية ابلتمليك"أوانح هكن اعري ه على النحو التايلح

ستأجر علىملأردحا آلار سلعة معينة مقابل أجرة معينة يدفعها ا ه ي جر فيني طرفنيعقد ب"آلار قسس بعقد دادهللمستأجر عند س السلعةا ملكية هددة ، انتقل بعدحممدة لأقسا اال

( اإلجارة املنتهية ابلتمليك يف ضون ال قه اإلسالميهل( 1420احلايف، االد ) ".)جديد. فهي إجارة منتهية "الةيع"يتةعه متليك العني، هذا هو و "،اإلجارة"ن عة، هذا هو املتمليك ف

ابلتمليك.ذه هستأجر يف ملام يقو نعلى أ نويت قا ،إاار هأبن نتعاقداملا هعقد يص "أبنهح نيو القانون وعرفه

نامثأقسا على تدفع يتاألجرة ال ربواعت ،اا بيع هدة معينة ينقل العقد بعدمالة بدفع أجرة حلا (دح اوفي رسن فرجح عقد الةيع واملقايضة".)للةيع

نشأة عقد اإلجارة املنتهية ابلتمليكحاثنياح ، وأول من اعامل هبذا العقد، أرد جتار "إجنلرتا"يف (م1846) عامظهر العقد أول ظهر هذا

اآلانت املوسيقية يف إجنلرتا، فكان ي جر آاناه املوسيقية إجارة يتةعها متليك العني، وقصد من اللك مث بعد اللك انتشر م ل هذا العقد وانتقل من األفراد إىل املصانع، وكان أول هذه ،ضمان رقه

مث بعد اللك ا ور، وانتشر بص ة ،صانع ا ةيقا هلذا العقد مصنع سنجر آلانت إ ياطة يف إجنلرتااملااصة يف شركات السكك احلديدية، اليت اشرتي املركةات، وا جرها ملناجم ال حم أتجرا ينتهي

ايت املتحدة ابلتمليك. مث بعد اللك انتشر هذا العقد، وانتقل إىل بقية دول العامل، فانتقل إىل الوان


86

، فإنه يعيد النظر يف النازلة، مث ازلة فيما سة من ا واتإالا مل اد الةارث ركما للن ( ه) ، "تحرميالكراهة، أو الابرة، أو اإلندب، أو الوجوب، أو "ال حي رتو فيها أقسام احلكم التكلي ي

يرتا عليه من مصاحل وم اسد، ويوازن بينهما، مراعيا عند إجران قد ويةحث يف كل افرتاو ما الك املوازنة النظرات التاليةح

صوص الشرعية.عدم مصادمة الن • .يف احلال واملآل اإلسالمية الشريعة مقاصد اعتةار • .التعارو عند املصاحل جل على مقدم امل اسد درن أن اعتةار • واعد الشرعية الكربى.الق موافقة اعتةار • كل ما يقرر. الكر األدلة على •فيها، لعل هللا يهيئ من العلمان إالا مل يتوصل الةارث إىل ركم شرعي يف النازلة اوقف( و)

مان يتصدى لإلفتان فيها.

.نوذج تطبيقي: رابعاملبحث ال

هنام أنوا ك رة، وأصناف جديدة من األموال انبد أن نضع للزكاة، واللك ابلربس بني هذه يف ن س األموال املستحدثة، ونظاورها من األموال اليت اشرتم يف ن س ا واص والص ات واشرتاكها

وا ورت ،نشأت ردي اهي معاملة و العلة، ومن هذه األموال أموال "اإلجارة املنتهية ابلتمليك"وأرابرها ،سريعا، مما جعلها من أكرب قنوات اانست مار يف العصر احلاضر بضخامة رؤوس أمواهلا

. امع انو أنش تها وأشكاهلا، مما يدعو لرتكيز الةحث عليها واوجيه اجلهد إليه اإلجارة املنتهية ابلتمليك

ة للعقد املعروف يف القانون ال رنسي اإلجارة املنتهية ابلتمليك من املعامالت املعاصراة، وهو ارمجاك رت به التعامالت يف هذا العصر على (، وارمجتهاح إاار بلايعي ، Vent locationابسم )

أم ،كانت يف علوم الشريعةأازلة إن وجدت، سوان ستقصان الدراسات السابقة رول الن ا .يف غرها من العلوم

وإلرخيها، والظروف احملي ة هبا.ازلة الةحث عن ظروف الن حتليل القضية املركةة إىل عناصرها األساسية. (.فقه النوازل ححممد اجليزاين)الرجو إىل أهل ااناتصاص فيها ومشاورعم واللك برد ها إىل أصلها العلمي إن كانت ارجع إىل أصل، اكيي ا فقهيا، ازلةاكييف الن )ج(

ا وكل اللك يعرف إم .جديدةأو اعتةارها مسألة أصول، أو اا ي ل عليها، مجلة أو رد ها إىل، أو اإلمجا ، أو التخريج على انزلة متقدمة، أو فتوى إمام متقدم، أو أو م هوما( )من وقاصابلن

.قاعدة فقهية

عينة يف معرفة احلكم، كما أنه وهذا التكييف ي يد يف حتديد مسار الةحث بتعيني مصادره امل

يضي داورة الةحث يف املصادر واملراجع الواسعة.، وأقوال الصحابة ة واإلمجا ن والس ،الكتاب"من ازلة على املصادر الشرعيةعرو الن )د( فإن مل ،ملسو هيلع هللا ىلصرضي هللا عنه ينظر يف كتاب هللا وسنة رسوله بن ا اب" عمر"فقد كان ،واجتهاداعم

أو ،ابملنصوص من اآلايت والسنناحلكم قد يتأاى ، و رضي هللا عنه "أ بكر"اد نظر يف قضان ، وعليه أن يلنزم يف اللك بعدة ضوابس منهاحمن االل دانانت النصوص وأماراعا على األركام

اعتةار دانانت األل اظ يف فهم النصوص. • ل ة. عدم إاراج النصوص عن ظواهرها ألغراو فاسدة وأتويالت بعيدة ان حتتملها ال •كانت يف الات الدليل، أو م ثرة يف انزيل الدليل على أاعتةار العوارو امل ثرة يف احلكم سوان •

الواقعة. معرفة طرق اجلمع والرتجيح عند اعارو النصوص والدانانت. • اانعتنان اكانة العقل يف فهم النصوص. •



87

، فإنه يعيد النظر يف النازلة، مث ازلة فيما سة من ا واتإالا مل اد الةارث ركما للن ( ه) ، "تحرميالكراهة، أو الابرة، أو اإلندب، أو الوجوب، أو "ال حي رتو فيها أقسام احلكم التكلي ي

يرتا عليه من مصاحل وم اسد، ويوازن بينهما، مراعيا عند إجران قد ويةحث يف كل افرتاو ما الك املوازنة النظرات التاليةح

صوص الشرعية.عدم مصادمة الن • .يف احلال واملآل اإلسالمية الشريعة مقاصد اعتةار • .التعارو عند املصاحل جل على مقدم امل اسد درن أن اعتةار • واعد الشرعية الكربى.الق موافقة اعتةار • كل ما يقرر. الكر األدلة على •فيها، لعل هللا يهيئ من العلمان إالا مل يتوصل الةارث إىل ركم شرعي يف النازلة اوقف( و)

مان يتصدى لإلفتان فيها.

.نوذج تطبيقي: رابعاملبحث ال

هنام أنوا ك رة، وأصناف جديدة من األموال انبد أن نضع للزكاة، واللك ابلربس بني هذه يف ن س األموال املستحدثة، ونظاورها من األموال اليت اشرتم يف ن س ا واص والص ات واشرتاكها

وا ورت ،نشأت ردي اهي معاملة و العلة، ومن هذه األموال أموال "اإلجارة املنتهية ابلتمليك"وأرابرها ،سريعا، مما جعلها من أكرب قنوات اانست مار يف العصر احلاضر بضخامة رؤوس أمواهلا

. امع انو أنش تها وأشكاهلا، مما يدعو لرتكيز الةحث عليها واوجيه اجلهد إليه اإلجارة املنتهية ابلتمليك

ة للعقد املعروف يف القانون ال رنسي اإلجارة املنتهية ابلتمليك من املعامالت املعاصراة، وهو ارمجاك رت به التعامالت يف هذا العصر على (، وارمجتهاح إاار بلايعي ، Vent locationابسم )

أم ،كانت يف علوم الشريعةأازلة إن وجدت، سوان ستقصان الدراسات السابقة رول الن ا .يف غرها من العلوم

وإلرخيها، والظروف احملي ة هبا.ازلة الةحث عن ظروف الن حتليل القضية املركةة إىل عناصرها األساسية. (.فقه النوازل ححممد اجليزاين)الرجو إىل أهل ااناتصاص فيها ومشاورعم واللك برد ها إىل أصلها العلمي إن كانت ارجع إىل أصل، اكيي ا فقهيا، ازلةاكييف الن )ج(

ا وكل اللك يعرف إم .جديدةأو اعتةارها مسألة أصول، أو اا ي ل عليها، مجلة أو رد ها إىل، أو اإلمجا ، أو التخريج على انزلة متقدمة، أو فتوى إمام متقدم، أو أو م هوما( )من وقاصابلن

.قاعدة فقهية

عينة يف معرفة احلكم، كما أنه وهذا التكييف ي يد يف حتديد مسار الةحث بتعيني مصادره امل

يضي داورة الةحث يف املصادر واملراجع الواسعة.، وأقوال الصحابة ة واإلمجا ن والس ،الكتاب"من ازلة على املصادر الشرعيةعرو الن )د( فإن مل ،ملسو هيلع هللا ىلصرضي هللا عنه ينظر يف كتاب هللا وسنة رسوله بن ا اب" عمر"فقد كان ،واجتهاداعم

أو ،ابملنصوص من اآلايت والسنناحلكم قد يتأاى ، و رضي هللا عنه "أ بكر"اد نظر يف قضان ، وعليه أن يلنزم يف اللك بعدة ضوابس منهاحمن االل دانانت النصوص وأماراعا على األركام

اعتةار دانانت األل اظ يف فهم النصوص. • ل ة. عدم إاراج النصوص عن ظواهرها ألغراو فاسدة وأتويالت بعيدة ان حتتملها ال •كانت يف الات الدليل، أو م ثرة يف انزيل الدليل على أاعتةار العوارو امل ثرة يف احلكم سوان •

الواقعة. معرفة طرق اجلمع والرتجيح عند اعارو النصوص والدانانت. • اانعتنان اكانة العقل يف فهم النصوص. •


88

على أتديللة األمللانللة اليت مح لهللا هللا العلمللانا؛ فقللد أاللذ هللا املي للاقا على العلمللان بةيللان احلرص( 7األركام الشلللرعية وعدم كتماهنا، وقد رصلللر التكليف هبم؛ فكان لزاما عليهم التصلللدي لل توى يف

.عدم كتمانهالنوازل ما است اعوا إىل اللك سةيال، واللك إبران للذمة ابلقيام بتكاليف إبالغ العلم و

ضوابط ختريج النموازلاثلثاا:

اظر مراعاعا عند التخريج وهيح هنام بعض الضوابس ينة ي للن أقوال األومة مع وجود النص الشرعي من القرآن والسنة. نأان خير ج احلكم ع .أن يكون للمخر ج دراية كاملة بقواعد املذه وفروعه .أن يكون املخر ج عاملا أبصول ال قه على وجه العموم وابلقياس على وجه ا صوص . أن يكون للمخر ج ملكة اانقتدار على معرفة املآاذ وربس ال رو أبصول املذه رق ال قهية بني ال رو . ال واأن يكون الا دراية ابلعوارو ال اروة على احلكم و ان أومة املذه من مصادره املعتربة عند العلمان. أن يكون التخريج على آر

ازلة:خطوات دراسة النم رابعاا: ح إعالم م(1991م). )ابن القياإلحلاح ابلدعانو ، واإلاالص هلل ازلةالتجرد يف دراسة الن )أ(

املوقعني( ويكون اللك اب وات ،احلكم على الشين فر عن اصوره ألن ؛التصور الصحيح هلا)ب(

التاليةح أحتديد موضع النزا ، وموضع الةحث فيها وطةيعته، سوان. ، أو ل وايش .كان فقهيشا، أو اربوايش

إخل

وهذا التعريف يشمل أنوا التخريج ال الثةح نريج األصول من ال رو ، ونريج ال رو على األصول، التخريج عند ال قهان واألصوليني( ،ه(1414الةارسني، يعقوب )) ونريج ال رو على ال رو .

ريج ال رو من وازل املعاصرة هوح ن عند اجملتهدين يف أركام الن أك ر أنوا التخريج ال قهي عمال و اإلركام يف متييز ال تاوى عن ،ه(1416القرايف )) ".القياس"طري هاأهم طرق نرا، و ال رو

األركام( وازل.أمهية البحث يف أحكام النم اثنياا:

اظهر أحية نريج النوازل، واانجتهاد يف بيان أركامها الشرعية من االل عدة نقا منهاحمن فروو الك اايت، ويتعني على من اد يف ن سه قوة على بيان أركامها اانجتهاد يف كون (1

ظر فيها.اللك، وااصة عند فقد من يست يع الن .ة يف كل عصر من العصورم من ضرورايت إريان الدين وجتديده، وان است ين عنه األ كونه (2هللا على بصلللرة وهدى ونور يف إانرة السلللةيل أمام الناس ايضلللاح ركم هذه النازلة رىت يعةدوا (3

التصللللللللدي لتلك النوازل دون -وهم اجملتهدون -منهج إسللللللللالمي واضللللللللح فلو ارم أهل احلل والعقدإيضلللاح ألركامها لصلللار الناس يف نة س مث اسلللت توا من ان يصلللل إىل راةة اانجتهاد، وهذا قد ي يت

ق هذا الةاب واانستعانة ابهلل.ب ر علم فياضل وي ضل ، وعلى هذا األساس فال بد من طار ها لكل زمان ومكان.يتكمال الشريعة وصالر ( بيان4ا ويت ال رصلللللة على األاذ ابلقوانني الوضلللللعية، ألن ال قهان إن مل يةينوا ركم الشلللللر يف انزلة ( 5

ون إىل أعراف غر مستقيمة... ما، فإن الناس سيتجهون إىل القوانني الوضعية ان حمالة، أو سيلج ويف كل اللك من ال ساد ما ان خي ى..

جتديد ال قه اإلسللللللللللللالمي وانميته، وان خي ى أن األمة اقوى واسللللللللللللتقيم بتقدم اانجتهاد واتأار ( 6بتأاره. ولو اسللللللتعرضللللللنا امل ل ات اليت اتناول إلريخ ال قه اإلسللللللالمي لوجدان أن هنام عالقة وثيقة

بني اانجتهاد وبني اقدم األمة وصالرها.



89

على أتديللة األمللانللة اليت مح لهللا هللا العلمللانا؛ فقللد أاللذ هللا املي للاقا على العلمللان بةيللان احلرص( 7األركام الشلللرعية وعدم كتماهنا، وقد رصلللر التكليف هبم؛ فكان لزاما عليهم التصلللدي لل توى يف

.عدم كتمانهالنوازل ما است اعوا إىل اللك سةيال، واللك إبران للذمة ابلقيام بتكاليف إبالغ العلم و

ضوابط ختريج النموازلاثلثاا:

اظر مراعاعا عند التخريج وهيح هنام بعض الضوابس ينة ي للن أقوال األومة مع وجود النص الشرعي من القرآن والسنة. نأان خير ج احلكم ع .أن يكون للمخر ج دراية كاملة بقواعد املذه وفروعه .أن يكون املخر ج عاملا أبصول ال قه على وجه العموم وابلقياس على وجه ا صوص . أن يكون للمخر ج ملكة اانقتدار على معرفة املآاذ وربس ال رو أبصول املذه رق ال قهية بني ال رو . ال واأن يكون الا دراية ابلعوارو ال اروة على احلكم و ان أومة املذه من مصادره املعتربة عند العلمان. أن يكون التخريج على آر

ازلة:خطوات دراسة النم رابعاا: ح إعالم م(1991م). )ابن القياإلحلاح ابلدعانو ، واإلاالص هلل ازلةالتجرد يف دراسة الن )أ(

املوقعني( ويكون اللك اب وات ،احلكم على الشين فر عن اصوره ألن ؛التصور الصحيح هلا)ب(

التاليةح أحتديد موضع النزا ، وموضع الةحث فيها وطةيعته، سوان. ، أو ل وايش .كان فقهيشا، أو اربوايش

إخل

وهذا التعريف يشمل أنوا التخريج ال الثةح نريج األصول من ال رو ، ونريج ال رو على األصول، التخريج عند ال قهان واألصوليني( ،ه(1414الةارسني، يعقوب )) ونريج ال رو على ال رو .

ريج ال رو من وازل املعاصرة هوح ن عند اجملتهدين يف أركام الن أك ر أنوا التخريج ال قهي عمال و اإلركام يف متييز ال تاوى عن ،ه(1416القرايف )) ".القياس"طري هاأهم طرق نرا، و ال رو

األركام( وازل.أمهية البحث يف أحكام النم اثنياا:

اظهر أحية نريج النوازل، واانجتهاد يف بيان أركامها الشرعية من االل عدة نقا منهاحمن فروو الك اايت، ويتعني على من اد يف ن سه قوة على بيان أركامها اانجتهاد يف كون (1

ظر فيها.اللك، وااصة عند فقد من يست يع الن .ة يف كل عصر من العصورم من ضرورايت إريان الدين وجتديده، وان است ين عنه األ كونه (2هللا على بصلللرة وهدى ونور يف إانرة السلللةيل أمام الناس ايضلللاح ركم هذه النازلة رىت يعةدوا (3

التصللللللللدي لتلك النوازل دون -وهم اجملتهدون -منهج إسللللللللالمي واضللللللللح فلو ارم أهل احلل والعقدإيضلللاح ألركامها لصلللار الناس يف نة س مث اسلللت توا من ان يصلللل إىل راةة اانجتهاد، وهذا قد ي يت

ق هذا الةاب واانستعانة ابهلل.ب ر علم فياضل وي ضل ، وعلى هذا األساس فال بد من طار ها لكل زمان ومكان.يتكمال الشريعة وصالر ( بيان4ا ويت ال رصلللللة على األاذ ابلقوانني الوضلللللعية، ألن ال قهان إن مل يةينوا ركم الشلللللر يف انزلة ( 5

ون إىل أعراف غر مستقيمة... ما، فإن الناس سيتجهون إىل القوانني الوضعية ان حمالة، أو سيلج ويف كل اللك من ال ساد ما ان خي ى..

جتديد ال قه اإلسللللللللللللالمي وانميته، وان خي ى أن األمة اقوى واسللللللللللللتقيم بتقدم اانجتهاد واتأار ( 6بتأاره. ولو اسللللللتعرضللللللنا امل ل ات اليت اتناول إلريخ ال قه اإلسللللللالمي لوجدان أن هنام عالقة وثيقة

بني اانجتهاد وبني اقدم األمة وصالرها.


90

جتارة و ،وحنوها "والةيض ،األلةان"جتارة املنتجات احليوانية ال اورات، الس ن" وحنوها، و السيارات، ، وهذا ي ثر بال شك يف رصيلة الزكاة زايدة، أو نقصاان.ال يور والوروش وحنوها

مصارف جديدة كل"بنان الزكاة أن اصرف فيها ا" اليت صارفكما استجد فيما يتعل بل"امل ةيوت، واملدارس، وإنشان املشاريع الص رة"، وحنوها ملستحقيها، املستش يات، وال

ة العامة وا اصة املنة قة من مصارف م يلح الضرر اصاحل األ ي ثر يف الزكاة؛ إال قد وهذا بال شك ، أو العكس.الزكاة ال مانية

مع ملسو هيلع هللا ىلصول صاب كما فعل الرساعجيل حتصيل الزكاة لعام عند ملك الن وقد استلزم النوازل يث جتىب ىف العام التاىل كما حب، هاأتار أو (،امل ين ،م(1981ابن قدامةح )رضي هللا عنه) العةاسذا ان شك أن هلو (،دمادا أفنديح جممع األهنر")مادةالر "عام "رضي هللا عنهعمر بن ا اب"فعل مستح "واملأاوال له "،صابمالك الن "واملأاوال منه "،قدر الزكاة"كل من املأاوال على ار أتث

واانجتماعى. ،مت رات اتصل ابلنشا اانقتصادى ةوهى ثالث "،الزكاةمما يستدعي العناية فال شك إالن أن لكل هذه املستجدات وغرها أتثر واضح على "الزكاة"،

ابقة، وقضااي واقعة مل اكن يف العصور الس ،وحبث ما يتعل هبا من مستجدات ،هبذه ال ريضة العظيمةاملنهج املنضةس يف اكيي ها ما يستدعي إعادة اانجتهاد فيها، وبيان أو كانت موجودة إان أن ه استجد

والذي هو موضو الس ور التالية إن شان هللا اعاىل.أركامها، الشرعي، ونريج

أمهيته، وضوابطه.النموازل ختريخ املبحث الثالث: : مفهوم التخريجأولاوازل، طري التخريج ال قهي، واملقصللللللود بهح " اسللللللتنةا األركام طرق التعرف على أركام الن من

إعمال القواعد األصولية وال قهية". االل األدلة الشرعية من ل إليها من وما يوص ،الشرعية العملية ح عذي ال روق(م(2001) ) حممد على املالكي

يف كتاب النكاحح واتميز اب ورة؛ ألن األصلللللللللل يف األبضلللللللللا احلظر نوازل يف ركم األسلللللللللرةواملنع، وملا يرتا على إحاهلا من ااتال األنسلللللللللللللللاب، م لح قضلللللللللللللللااي اإلجهاو، وموانع احلمل

، واستئجار األررام، وغرهاكاللول ، وما يتعل أبط ال األانبي انوازل يف اجلناايت واحلدود واألطعمةح م ل إعادة ال ا سللللللللوان ،عضللللللللو املق و ردش أو قصللللللللاصلللللللل

، وغرها.ردة، والقتل ابلصع الكهرابويأو ل ره، واألطعمة املستو ،لصارةه

أثر النوازل يف الزكاةخامساا: يف و علم اانقتصاد اإلسالمي، واوسيع آفاقه واعميقها، الت ور امللحوظ يف هذا العصرساهم

هذه املستجدات ستنعكس واكتشاف م ثرات، وم شرات فيه الات دانلة كةرة األحية؛ وان شك أن ، ومن جت له "األصناف"ما جت فيه ، و "لو صاب واحلا الن "ما جت به على "الزكاة"؛ من ريث

. "املصارف"الديون اانست مارية ما يسمى بل" لوجوب الزكاة"الن صاب" استجد فيما يتعل ابشرتا فقد

وهذه ،" املقدرة للن صابااتالف املآاذ واألقيسة"، و"التضخم النقدي"، و"واإلسكانية، لعدم بلوغ فيه قد يرتا عليه عدم وجوب الزكاة؛ إال املال الزكوياملستجدات هلا أتثر مةاشر يف

.، أو قد ينشأ عنه نقص القدر الواج إاراجه زكاةي املال نصااب ابق، نة الشمسية روان لوجوب الزكاة، اعتةار الس "لو احلا "استجد فيما يتعل ابشرتا كما زكوايش

نة كاملة كل ارم املسلم لزكاة سا ومن مث ا، أتار دفع الزكاة قرابة أرد عشر يوم وهذا يرتا عليه .أو مراني يف أعمارهم ،ريةا، مما يعين ا ويت ماليني املسلمني لزكاة عام مرةثالثني سنة اق

كاألوراق أنوا ك رة من األموال الزكاة اجت فيه اليت "األصناف"بلكما استجد فيما يتعل من املعامالت كاملست الت "املصانع، العقارات، وأصناف جديدةالنقدية والتجارية، وحنوها،



91

جتارة و ،وحنوها "والةيض ،األلةان"جتارة املنتجات احليوانية ال اورات، الس ن" وحنوها، و السيارات، ، وهذا ي ثر بال شك يف رصيلة الزكاة زايدة، أو نقصاان.ال يور والوروش وحنوها

مصارف جديدة كل"بنان الزكاة أن اصرف فيها ا" اليت صارفكما استجد فيما يتعل بل"امل ةيوت، واملدارس، وإنشان املشاريع الص رة"، وحنوها ملستحقيها، املستش يات، وال

ة العامة وا اصة املنة قة من مصارف م يلح الضرر اصاحل األ ي ثر يف الزكاة؛ إال قد وهذا بال شك ، أو العكس.الزكاة ال مانية

مع ملسو هيلع هللا ىلصول صاب كما فعل الرساعجيل حتصيل الزكاة لعام عند ملك الن وقد استلزم النوازل يث جتىب ىف العام التاىل كما حب، هاأتار أو (،امل ين ،م(1981ابن قدامةح )رضي هللا عنه) العةاسذا ان شك أن هلو (،دمادا أفنديح جممع األهنر")مادةالر "عام "رضي هللا عنهعمر بن ا اب"فعل مستح "واملأاوال له "،صابمالك الن "واملأاوال منه "،قدر الزكاة"كل من املأاوال على ار أتث

واانجتماعى. ،مت رات اتصل ابلنشا اانقتصادى ةوهى ثالث "،الزكاةمما يستدعي العناية فال شك إالن أن لكل هذه املستجدات وغرها أتثر واضح على "الزكاة"،

ابقة، وقضااي واقعة مل اكن يف العصور الس ،وحبث ما يتعل هبا من مستجدات ،هبذه ال ريضة العظيمةاملنهج املنضةس يف اكيي ها ما يستدعي إعادة اانجتهاد فيها، وبيان أو كانت موجودة إان أن ه استجد

والذي هو موضو الس ور التالية إن شان هللا اعاىل.أركامها، الشرعي، ونريج

أمهيته، وضوابطه.النموازل ختريخ املبحث الثالث: : مفهوم التخريجأولاوازل، طري التخريج ال قهي، واملقصللللللود بهح " اسللللللتنةا األركام طرق التعرف على أركام الن من

إعمال القواعد األصولية وال قهية". االل األدلة الشرعية من ل إليها من وما يوص ،الشرعية العملية ح عذي ال روق(م(2001) ) حممد على املالكي

يف كتاب النكاحح واتميز اب ورة؛ ألن األصلللللللللل يف األبضلللللللللا احلظر نوازل يف ركم األسلللللللللرةواملنع، وملا يرتا على إحاهلا من ااتال األنسلللللللللللللللاب، م لح قضلللللللللللللللااي اإلجهاو، وموانع احلمل

، واستئجار األررام، وغرهاكاللول ، وما يتعل أبط ال األانبي انوازل يف اجلناايت واحلدود واألطعمةح م ل إعادة ال ا سللللللللوان ،عضللللللللو املق و ردش أو قصللللللللاصلللللللل

، وغرها.ردة، والقتل ابلصع الكهرابويأو ل ره، واألطعمة املستو ،لصارةه

أثر النوازل يف الزكاةخامساا: يف و علم اانقتصاد اإلسالمي، واوسيع آفاقه واعميقها، الت ور امللحوظ يف هذا العصرساهم

هذه املستجدات ستنعكس واكتشاف م ثرات، وم شرات فيه الات دانلة كةرة األحية؛ وان شك أن ، ومن جت له "األصناف"ما جت فيه ، و "لو صاب واحلا الن "ما جت به على "الزكاة"؛ من ريث

. "املصارف"الديون اانست مارية ما يسمى بل" لوجوب الزكاة"الن صاب" استجد فيما يتعل ابشرتا فقد

وهذه ،" املقدرة للن صابااتالف املآاذ واألقيسة"، و"التضخم النقدي"، و"واإلسكانية، لعدم بلوغ فيه قد يرتا عليه عدم وجوب الزكاة؛ إال املال الزكوياملستجدات هلا أتثر مةاشر يف

.، أو قد ينشأ عنه نقص القدر الواج إاراجه زكاةي املال نصااب ابق، نة الشمسية روان لوجوب الزكاة، اعتةار الس "لو احلا "استجد فيما يتعل ابشرتا كما زكوايش

نة كاملة كل ارم املسلم لزكاة سا ومن مث ا، أتار دفع الزكاة قرابة أرد عشر يوم وهذا يرتا عليه .أو مراني يف أعمارهم ،ريةا، مما يعين ا ويت ماليني املسلمني لزكاة عام مرةثالثني سنة اق

كاألوراق أنوا ك رة من األموال الزكاة اجت فيه اليت "األصناف"بلكما استجد فيما يتعل من املعامالت كاملست الت "املصانع، العقارات، وأصناف جديدةالنقدية والتجارية، وحنوها،


92

والوقاوع اجلديدة على اجملتهد كوقع الشلللداود على عامة الناس من ريث كوهنا م اجئة له، وات ل .أو اجتهاد ،فيها نص منه أن يةذل وسعه ويست رغ طاقته انستنةا ركمها، لكوهنا مل يسة

مسات النمازلةاثنياا: ازلة، منهاحلن ا داتمجلة من من هذه التعري ات وهكن أن يستنةس

الكالم عليها قةل أن وا ريع ،استعمال الرأي فيهاكان ، وإان ابل عل يف واقع الناس كوهنا واقعة -1 ( بيان العلم وفضله حجامعم(1994)ابن عةد الرب. )اقع اشت اان اا ان ين ع

وقوعها من قةل، لكنها سة أو ان قليال وان ك را، مل يسة وقوعها من قةلأي كوهنا جديدة.-2 .ا ورت من جهة أسةاهبا والواقع احمليس هبا

ة يف جمموعها، واسللتدعي موق ا اجتهادايش شللرعيشا، ويرتا م حبيث الت ت هلا األ ،كوهنا شللديدة -3 جتهاد فيها ضرر على املسلمني.على ارم اان

وازل أنواع النم اثلثاا: حال قه أبواب عتةاراباتنو ة إالا مللا قورنللت بنوازل املعللامالت، م لللح ا هر امليللاه امللوثللة نوازل يف العةللاداتح واتميز ابلقللل

ال لكية وأثرها يف املراصلللللد غسللللليل الكلى وأثره يف ال هارة ابلوسلللللاول احلدي ة، والصلللللالة يف ال اورة. حتديد أوقات العةادات

،نوازل يف املعامالتح واتميز ابلك رة والتوسلللللللللللللع وكذلك التعقيد، م لح املراحبة ل مر ابلشلللللللللللللران، واانوراق التجارية، وعقود التوريد، وعقود اانسللللللللتصللللللللنا ، واملصللللللللارف اإلسللللللللالمية، واألوراق املالية

والتأمني، وغرها.

النموازل وأثرها يف الزكاة.املبحث الثاين:

: النموازل ةماهيأولاوهيح املصللللليةة الشلللللديدة ، اعىنح هةس ووقع "نزل"مجع انزلة، وأصللللللها من ال عل حالنوازل ل ة

( ةمقاييس الل ،م(1979ابن فارس ) .)من شداود الدهر انزل ابلناس(، أركام القرآن ،هلللللللللللللللللللللللل( 1405اجلصلللللللللاص )، )حلوادثاب علمان الشلللللللللريعةويعرب عنها عند

(. بداوع الصناوعح م(1864الكاساين ). )لوقاوعوا احالنوازل اص الر

اعددت اعري اعا يف اانص الححئلوا عن فع ر فت أبهناح ال تاوى والواقعات، وهي مسلللللاول اسلللللتنة ها اجملتهدون املتأارون لام ا سللللل

اللللك، ومل اللدوا فيهللا روايللة عن أهللل املللذهلل املتقللدمني، وهم أصللللللللللللللحللاب أ يوسللللللللللللللف وحممللد، ( احملتار ردابن عابدينح وأصحاب أصحاهبما، وهلم جرا.)

( الشافعيح األم". )الوقاوع اجلديدة اليت مل يسة فيها نص أو اجتهاد" فت أبهناحر ع و ابن عةللد الرب )."املسلللللللللللللللأللة الواقعللة اجللديلدة اليت ات للل اجتهللادا وبيللان ركم" فلت أبهنلاحر ع و

(.ح جامع بيان العلم وفضله(م1994)ال قهان، وهو الذي يتةادر إىل الذهن عند إطالق ا على ألسللللنة هو األك ر شلللليوع وهذا املعىن

وعليلله اللدور أغللل اعري للات الةللار ني إعالم املوقعني(،ح م(1991ابن القيم )) هللذا املصلللللللللللللل لح املعاصرين.

ويحالعالقة بني املعاين اانص الرية واملعىن الل انزل ابلناس، ومن ة هي املصللللليةة الشلللللديدة من مصلللللاو الدهر سلللللة القول أبن النازلة يف الل

،وقع احلوادث ريث إن وي، أتملللللللللللللللل املعلللللللللللللللىن اانص الري أدرم وجه العالقة بينه وبني املعىن الل



93

والوقاوع اجلديدة على اجملتهد كوقع الشلللداود على عامة الناس من ريث كوهنا م اجئة له، وات ل .أو اجتهاد ،فيها نص منه أن يةذل وسعه ويست رغ طاقته انستنةا ركمها، لكوهنا مل يسة

مسات النمازلةاثنياا: ازلة، منهاحلن ا داتمجلة من من هذه التعري ات وهكن أن يستنةس

الكالم عليها قةل أن وا ريع ،استعمال الرأي فيهاكان ، وإان ابل عل يف واقع الناس كوهنا واقعة -1 ( بيان العلم وفضله حجامعم(1994)ابن عةد الرب. )اقع اشت اان اا ان ين ع

وقوعها من قةل، لكنها سة أو ان قليال وان ك را، مل يسة وقوعها من قةلأي كوهنا جديدة.-2 .ا ورت من جهة أسةاهبا والواقع احمليس هبا

ة يف جمموعها، واسللتدعي موق ا اجتهادايش شللرعيشا، ويرتا م حبيث الت ت هلا األ ،كوهنا شللديدة -3 جتهاد فيها ضرر على املسلمني.على ارم اان

وازل أنواع النم اثلثاا: حال قه أبواب عتةاراباتنو ة إالا مللا قورنللت بنوازل املعللامالت، م لللح ا هر امليللاه امللوثللة نوازل يف العةللاداتح واتميز ابلقللل

ال لكية وأثرها يف املراصلللللد غسللللليل الكلى وأثره يف ال هارة ابلوسلللللاول احلدي ة، والصلللللالة يف ال اورة. حتديد أوقات العةادات

،نوازل يف املعامالتح واتميز ابلك رة والتوسلللللللللللللع وكذلك التعقيد، م لح املراحبة ل مر ابلشلللللللللللللران، واانوراق التجارية، وعقود التوريد، وعقود اانسللللللللتصللللللللنا ، واملصللللللللارف اإلسللللللللالمية، واألوراق املالية

والتأمني، وغرها.

النموازل وأثرها يف الزكاة.املبحث الثاين:

: النموازل ةماهيأولاوهيح املصللللليةة الشلللللديدة ، اعىنح هةس ووقع "نزل"مجع انزلة، وأصللللللها من ال عل حالنوازل ل ة

( ةمقاييس الل ،م(1979ابن فارس ) .)من شداود الدهر انزل ابلناس(، أركام القرآن ،هلللللللللللللللللللللللل( 1405اجلصلللللللللاص )، )حلوادثاب علمان الشلللللللللريعةويعرب عنها عند

(. بداوع الصناوعح م(1864الكاساين ). )لوقاوعوا احالنوازل اص الر

اعددت اعري اعا يف اانص الححئلوا عن فع ر فت أبهناح ال تاوى والواقعات، وهي مسلللللاول اسلللللتنة ها اجملتهدون املتأارون لام ا سللللل

اللللك، ومل اللدوا فيهللا روايللة عن أهللل املللذهلل املتقللدمني، وهم أصللللللللللللللحللاب أ يوسللللللللللللللف وحممللد، ( احملتار ردابن عابدينح وأصحاب أصحاهبما، وهلم جرا.)

( الشافعيح األم". )الوقاوع اجلديدة اليت مل يسة فيها نص أو اجتهاد" فت أبهناحر ع و ابن عةللد الرب )."املسلللللللللللللللأللة الواقعللة اجللديلدة اليت ات للل اجتهللادا وبيللان ركم" فلت أبهنلاحر ع و

(.ح جامع بيان العلم وفضله(م1994)ال قهان، وهو الذي يتةادر إىل الذهن عند إطالق ا على ألسللللنة هو األك ر شلللليوع وهذا املعىن

وعليلله اللدور أغللل اعري للات الةللار ني إعالم املوقعني(،ح م(1991ابن القيم )) هللذا املصلللللللللللللل لح املعاصرين.

ويحالعالقة بني املعاين اانص الرية واملعىن الل انزل ابلناس، ومن ة هي املصللللليةة الشلللللديدة من مصلللللاو الدهر سلللللة القول أبن النازلة يف الل

،وقع احلوادث ريث إن وي، أتملللللللللللللللل املعلللللللللللللللىن اانص الري أدرم وجه العالقة بينه وبني املعىن الل


94

ل نليص اجملتمع من مظاهر األاننية واحلسد الةخل واليت اعترب 2زر احملةة بني الناس . ل 1الزكاة يفح داووا مرضاكم ح"ملسو هيلع هللا ىلصدفع الةالن واملرو لقوله ل 4 ل دفع انتشار اجلرهة. 3. من أك ر املهلكات

(الكربى ح السننم( 2003)الةيهقيرواه )".ابلصدقة

السياسي والعسكري النظامدور الزكاة يف ( 3)

اللك دليل على اعترب الزكاة أداة م ثرة يف حتقي اانستقرار السياسي واألمين للمجتمع، وار نصيص جزن من مصارف الزكاة إىل سهم" ويف سةيل هللا" والذي اعتربه الك ر من العلمان أبنه دعم

ا حي ظ استقرارها السياسي ا اواقوية اجلان العسكري هل ،احل اظ على سالمة الدولة وأمنهاو للجهاد أسهم الزكاة هكن استخدامها دمة بعض األغراو السياسية من اكما أن هنام بعض ،والعسكري

ن ا على أمن الدولة م قد اض ر الدولة إىل أتليف بعض أعداوها ر اظ اليت ندم اجملتمع فم ال (، ابإلضافة اجلامع ألركام القرآن ،م( 1964)القرط ) مكاودهم أو رغةة يف كسةهم إىل ص ها

أن حتقي األهداف السابقة الذكر يف اجملال اانجتماعي واانقتصادي من شأنه أن يقضي على إىل ويساعد يف استقراره.واألمين مظاهر ال ساد يف اجملتمع وهذا بدوره خيدم الوضع السياسي

ور الذي العةه يف التأثر على املت رات الد وأحيتها من االل "الزكاةقيمة "ضح ات كذاهعلى علمان ال قه ابت من الضروريلذا السياسية، والعسكرية"، و ،واانجتماعية ،اانقتصادية"

مة قي ور، والةحث يف كل جان من جوانةه، وإحتاف املكتةة بدراساتذا الد هباانهتمام واانقتصادللمشكالت اليت املناسةةاقدمي احللول و ،واقتصادية عن اجلان اانقتصادي يف نظام الزكاة ،فقهية

وراجتنا له. ه،لعظم أحيت ،، وا عيلها يف اجملتمعات املسلمةهاحتول دون ا ةيق

تقليل الت اوت يف مستوايت الدال وإعادة باملساحة ال اعلة يف إعادة التوازن اانجتماعينقدي متدف من أصحاب الداول املرا عة إىل أصحاب ايار ألهنا يف احلقيقة عةارة عن ؛اوزيعها

وهذا بدوره يساهم يف اقليل ال جوة بني داول األغنيان وال قران فال يزداد ال ين ،الداول املنخ ضةتجز ال روة يف يد فئة قليلة من الناس، بل يصةح املال متداوان بني حت ، واناغىن وان يزداد ال قر فقر

(7اآليةاحلشرحسورة ) ﴾كي ل يكون دولةا بني األغنياء منكم ﴿لقوله اعاىل ا ةيقا مجيع الناس ومما ساعدها على حتقي اللكح

ولكي نعرف مدى أتثر اكرار أاذ الزكاة من ،ودهومة أاذها من ال ين لصاحل ال قر هااكرار قيمة الزكاة ربع قيمة أصل املال اعىن آار اعلاملال، فإن أاذ الزكاة ملدة عشر سنوات من املال

من أصل ال روة أو الدال القومي للمجتمع لصاحل ال قران والوي %25أننا سنكون قد رولنا (عةد العزيز ا يا ح الزكاة) .الداول املنخ ضة وهي أفضل طريقة يف هذا اجملال

عدة ويف النهاية يكون ا رو على مجيع األموال يع يها ص ة الشمول وااسا القا وكوهنا (ح النظام اقتصادي يف اإلسالمم(1980)أمحد العسال)املست يد منها هو ال قر

حتويل ال قران واحملتاجني إىل قوة منتجة قادرة على اوفر مت لةات رياعايف املساحة ال اعلة قه الذي طة (السل انيةاملاورديح األركام )مةدأ "اإلغنان"ألن اوزيعها يقوم على ؛تمعاجمل ةادمو إذا أعطيتم ريث يقول يف اوزيع الزكاة على ال قران ح" بن ا اب" رضي هللا عنه؛ عمر"

على العمل بشران احملتاج أن يعان والذي من صوره صنف(امل ،ه(1403عةد الرزاق ))"فأغنوااآلانت اليت اصلح أدوات اإلنتاج، فيع ى أهل الصناوع كالنجار وا ةاز والقصار ما يشرتون به

،منذر قحف)من اانستهالم إىل اانست مار(؛ ومن مث يتحول الدال النوويح اجملمو ) لصنعتهم (ح اانقتصاد اإلسالميم(1990)

يف املساحة ال اعلة حماربة الك ر من األمراو و ،واألاالق اانجتماعية ال اضلة ،ل حتقي امل؛ ريث اساهم ال قر واحلاجة أا ارا من أا ار اعترب أشد فتك اانجتماعية اليت ي دي انتشارها إىل



95

ل نليص اجملتمع من مظاهر األاننية واحلسد الةخل واليت اعترب 2زر احملةة بني الناس . ل 1الزكاة يفح داووا مرضاكم ح"ملسو هيلع هللا ىلصدفع الةالن واملرو لقوله ل 4 ل دفع انتشار اجلرهة. 3. من أك ر املهلكات

(الكربى ح السننم( 2003)الةيهقيرواه )".ابلصدقة

السياسي والعسكري النظامدور الزكاة يف ( 3)

اللك دليل على اعترب الزكاة أداة م ثرة يف حتقي اانستقرار السياسي واألمين للمجتمع، وار نصيص جزن من مصارف الزكاة إىل سهم" ويف سةيل هللا" والذي اعتربه الك ر من العلمان أبنه دعم

ا حي ظ استقرارها السياسي ا اواقوية اجلان العسكري هل ،احل اظ على سالمة الدولة وأمنهاو للجهاد أسهم الزكاة هكن استخدامها دمة بعض األغراو السياسية من اكما أن هنام بعض ،والعسكري

ن ا على أمن الدولة م قد اض ر الدولة إىل أتليف بعض أعداوها ر اظ اليت ندم اجملتمع فم ال (، ابإلضافة اجلامع ألركام القرآن ،م( 1964)القرط ) مكاودهم أو رغةة يف كسةهم إىل ص ها

أن حتقي األهداف السابقة الذكر يف اجملال اانجتماعي واانقتصادي من شأنه أن يقضي على إىل ويساعد يف استقراره.واألمين مظاهر ال ساد يف اجملتمع وهذا بدوره خيدم الوضع السياسي

ور الذي العةه يف التأثر على املت رات الد وأحيتها من االل "الزكاةقيمة "ضح ات كذاهعلى علمان ال قه ابت من الضروريلذا السياسية، والعسكرية"، و ،واانجتماعية ،اانقتصادية"

مة قي ور، والةحث يف كل جان من جوانةه، وإحتاف املكتةة بدراساتذا الد هباانهتمام واانقتصادللمشكالت اليت املناسةةاقدمي احللول و ،واقتصادية عن اجلان اانقتصادي يف نظام الزكاة ،فقهية

وراجتنا له. ه،لعظم أحيت ،، وا عيلها يف اجملتمعات املسلمةهاحتول دون ا ةيق

تقليل الت اوت يف مستوايت الدال وإعادة باملساحة ال اعلة يف إعادة التوازن اانجتماعينقدي متدف من أصحاب الداول املرا عة إىل أصحاب ايار ألهنا يف احلقيقة عةارة عن ؛اوزيعها

وهذا بدوره يساهم يف اقليل ال جوة بني داول األغنيان وال قران فال يزداد ال ين ،الداول املنخ ضةتجز ال روة يف يد فئة قليلة من الناس، بل يصةح املال متداوان بني حت ، واناغىن وان يزداد ال قر فقر

(7اآليةاحلشرحسورة ) ﴾كي ل يكون دولةا بني األغنياء منكم ﴿لقوله اعاىل ا ةيقا مجيع الناس ومما ساعدها على حتقي اللكح

ولكي نعرف مدى أتثر اكرار أاذ الزكاة من ،ودهومة أاذها من ال ين لصاحل ال قر هااكرار قيمة الزكاة ربع قيمة أصل املال اعىن آار اعلاملال، فإن أاذ الزكاة ملدة عشر سنوات من املال

من أصل ال روة أو الدال القومي للمجتمع لصاحل ال قران والوي %25أننا سنكون قد رولنا (عةد العزيز ا يا ح الزكاة) .الداول املنخ ضة وهي أفضل طريقة يف هذا اجملال

عدة ويف النهاية يكون ا رو على مجيع األموال يع يها ص ة الشمول وااسا القا وكوهنا (ح النظام اقتصادي يف اإلسالمم(1980)أمحد العسال)املست يد منها هو ال قر

حتويل ال قران واحملتاجني إىل قوة منتجة قادرة على اوفر مت لةات رياعايف املساحة ال اعلة قه الذي طة (السل انيةاملاورديح األركام )مةدأ "اإلغنان"ألن اوزيعها يقوم على ؛تمعاجمل ةادمو إذا أعطيتم ريث يقول يف اوزيع الزكاة على ال قران ح" بن ا اب" رضي هللا عنه؛ عمر"

على العمل بشران احملتاج أن يعان والذي من صوره صنف(امل ،ه(1403عةد الرزاق ))"فأغنوااآلانت اليت اصلح أدوات اإلنتاج، فيع ى أهل الصناوع كالنجار وا ةاز والقصار ما يشرتون به

،منذر قحف)من اانستهالم إىل اانست مار(؛ ومن مث يتحول الدال النوويح اجملمو ) لصنعتهم (ح اانقتصاد اإلسالميم(1990)

يف املساحة ال اعلة حماربة الك ر من األمراو و ،واألاالق اانجتماعية ال اضلة ،ل حتقي امل؛ ريث اساهم ال قر واحلاجة أا ارا من أا ار اعترب أشد فتك اانجتماعية اليت ي دي انتشارها إىل


96

موسم زراعي يتيح لالقتصاد اإلفادة من هذا األثر سنواي أو يف هناية كل هااكرار إاراج •خماطر الرتدي يف أزمات ويقيه ،الدورات اانقتصادية اإلنعاشي بص ة منتظمة مما حيميه من مضار

.الكسادحتسن ومن مث ؛ي دي إىل انتظام ما حتصل عليه مصارف الزكاة من داول املتكرر هاإاراج •

األعمال، مما ي دي إىل زايدة الك اية احلدية لرأس املال اليت اعتمد بشكل كةر على اوقعات رجال .التوقعات مع األروال اانقتصادية له األثر العمي يف عدمكما أن جواز أتار الزكاة أو اقدهها جتاواب •

. اعمي التقلةات اانقتصادية

يعاجتمال النظامدور الزكاة يف ( 2)

جوان ك رة من رياة اجملتمع والتأثر على ،أداة الات ك انة عالية يف املساحة "الزكاة"اعترب هأهدافو

اانجتماعية أو ما يسمى ابلضمان تحقيقه هو مةدأ العدالة لاسعى ريث إن أول هدف النحو التايلحمساحة الزكاة يف حتقي هذا املةدأ على هكن عرو جانةا من اانجتماعي، و قادرة يف الضمان رد أدىن" رد الك اية" من مستوى املعيشة لل ئات غر ررصها علىألن ك الة معيشة ال قران هو اهلدف ؛يست ين به الشخص عن احلاجة والعوز على حنو ،اجملتمع

( النظام اانقتصادي يف اإلسالم ،م(1980العسال، أمحد، دح فتحي عةد الكرمي )دح)األكرب للزكاة ابن رواه أمحد" )تؤخذ من أغنيائهم وترد يف فقرائهم"بقولهح ملسو هيلع هللا ىلصعليه الرسول حبس ما نص

حممد فاروق ،النةهان)اانجتماعيلضمان ام هوم هذا هو عني و (يف مسنده م(2001)رنةل، بل اعترب الزكاة أول م سسة للضمان اانجتماعي عرفها (، أحباث يف اانقتصاد اإلسالمي م(،1988)

التاريخ.

وعدم قابليتها ،-"اأو رقم ،نسةة "-اا ه له ثةات واجةات الزكاة امل روضة على األموال ل أن 5إال أن النسةة جتعل احلصيلة ؛يعترب ااصية هلا بعدها اانقتصادى واانجتماعى لإلل ان أو التعديل

فهى اعكس رالة النشا اانقتصادى من مثو ،اتحرم وات ر مع حتلللرم وا ر الداول وال روات ا .أو كساد ،اأو انكماش ،اازدهار

أثر الزكاة على العمل وزايدة التوظيف ب( واضح على زايدة فرص العمل والتقليل من الة الة، واحلد من مشاكلها؛ اكةر اللزكاة أثر إن

أمواهلم، فالزكاة كما عرفنا ا دي إىل زايدة اانست مار، ودفع الناس للةحث عن جماانت يست مرون فيها ممامةاشر، ا أن الزكاة ا دي إىل زايدة اانستهالم بشكلالنقص احلاصل من أدان الزكاة، كم لسد

ومن مث ؛ال ل على األيدي العاملة وهذا من شأنه أن ي دي إىل زايدة ،ي دي إىل زايدة اإلنتاج .على مجيع املستوايتالتنمية وهذا بدوره يدفع عجلةفرص عمل جديدة، اتوفر

أثر الزكاة على الدورات اانقتصاديةج( "ااننتكاس" وااننكماش "،ااننتعاش"ة اانقتصادية على أهنا النمس املعتاد للتوسع ر الدو اعرف

ية أسةاب هذه الدورات يعزى أساسا إىل الت رات الدورية يف الك اية احلد ، و يف النشاطات اانقتصاديةرها اانقتصادية (، الزكاة وآاث2005أبو طه، أمحد حممد أمحد، )اليت اعتمد على التوقعات.) املال لرأس

(واانجتماعيةف ي نردوث األزمات اانقتصادية، و من اانقتصاد اإلسالمي " على أتمني الزكاةوهنا اعمل "

؛ ويساعدها على حتقي اللكحن مسار مستقر متوازناة الدورات اانقتصادية، وضمد ر لالستهالم، مما ي دي الات امليل املرا ع إعادة اوزيع الدال لصاحل ال ةقاتما اقوم به من •

.اإلنتاج مع ارا ا مستوايت التش يل إىل زايدة ال ل ال على على السلع اانستهالكية وزايدة



97

موسم زراعي يتيح لالقتصاد اإلفادة من هذا األثر سنواي أو يف هناية كل هااكرار إاراج •خماطر الرتدي يف أزمات ويقيه ،الدورات اانقتصادية اإلنعاشي بص ة منتظمة مما حيميه من مضار

.الكسادحتسن ومن مث ؛ي دي إىل انتظام ما حتصل عليه مصارف الزكاة من داول املتكرر هاإاراج •

األعمال، مما ي دي إىل زايدة الك اية احلدية لرأس املال اليت اعتمد بشكل كةر على اوقعات رجال .التوقعات مع األروال اانقتصادية له األثر العمي يف عدمكما أن جواز أتار الزكاة أو اقدهها جتاواب •

. اعمي التقلةات اانقتصادية

يعاجتمال النظامدور الزكاة يف ( 2)

جوان ك رة من رياة اجملتمع والتأثر على ،أداة الات ك انة عالية يف املساحة "الزكاة"اعترب هأهدافو

اانجتماعية أو ما يسمى ابلضمان تحقيقه هو مةدأ العدالة لاسعى ريث إن أول هدف النحو التايلحمساحة الزكاة يف حتقي هذا املةدأ على هكن عرو جانةا من اانجتماعي، و قادرة يف الضمان رد أدىن" رد الك اية" من مستوى املعيشة لل ئات غر ررصها علىألن ك الة معيشة ال قران هو اهلدف ؛يست ين به الشخص عن احلاجة والعوز على حنو ،اجملتمع

( النظام اانقتصادي يف اإلسالم ،م(1980العسال، أمحد، دح فتحي عةد الكرمي )دح)األكرب للزكاة ابن رواه أمحد" )تؤخذ من أغنيائهم وترد يف فقرائهم"بقولهح ملسو هيلع هللا ىلصعليه الرسول حبس ما نص

حممد فاروق ،النةهان)اانجتماعيلضمان ام هوم هذا هو عني و (يف مسنده م(2001)رنةل، بل اعترب الزكاة أول م سسة للضمان اانجتماعي عرفها (، أحباث يف اانقتصاد اإلسالمي م(،1988)

التاريخ.

وعدم قابليتها ،-"اأو رقم ،نسةة "-اا ه له ثةات واجةات الزكاة امل روضة على األموال ل أن 5إال أن النسةة جتعل احلصيلة ؛يعترب ااصية هلا بعدها اانقتصادى واانجتماعى لإلل ان أو التعديل

فهى اعكس رالة النشا اانقتصادى من مثو ،اتحرم وات ر مع حتلللرم وا ر الداول وال روات ا .أو كساد ،اأو انكماش ،اازدهار

أثر الزكاة على العمل وزايدة التوظيف ب( واضح على زايدة فرص العمل والتقليل من الة الة، واحلد من مشاكلها؛ اكةر اللزكاة أثر إن

أمواهلم، فالزكاة كما عرفنا ا دي إىل زايدة اانست مار، ودفع الناس للةحث عن جماانت يست مرون فيها ممامةاشر، ا أن الزكاة ا دي إىل زايدة اانستهالم بشكلالنقص احلاصل من أدان الزكاة، كم لسد

ومن مث ؛ال ل على األيدي العاملة وهذا من شأنه أن ي دي إىل زايدة ،ي دي إىل زايدة اإلنتاج .على مجيع املستوايتالتنمية وهذا بدوره يدفع عجلةفرص عمل جديدة، اتوفر

أثر الزكاة على الدورات اانقتصاديةج( "ااننتكاس" وااننكماش "،ااننتعاش"ة اانقتصادية على أهنا النمس املعتاد للتوسع ر الدو اعرف

ية أسةاب هذه الدورات يعزى أساسا إىل الت رات الدورية يف الك اية احلد ، و يف النشاطات اانقتصاديةرها اانقتصادية (، الزكاة وآاث2005أبو طه، أمحد حممد أمحد، )اليت اعتمد على التوقعات.) املال لرأس

(واانجتماعيةف ي نردوث األزمات اانقتصادية، و من اانقتصاد اإلسالمي " على أتمني الزكاةوهنا اعمل "

؛ ويساعدها على حتقي اللكحن مسار مستقر متوازناة الدورات اانقتصادية، وضمد ر لالستهالم، مما ي دي الات امليل املرا ع إعادة اوزيع الدال لصاحل ال ةقاتما اقوم به من •

.اإلنتاج مع ارا ا مستوايت التش يل إىل زايدة ال ل ال على على السلع اانستهالكية وزايدة


98

اإلسالميالنظام القتصادي يف الزكاة دور (1)يف م ثر دورريث اقوم ب ،للنظام املايل واانقتصادي يف اإلسالماملتني اعترب الزكاة األساس

من االل عدة نقا ويظهر هذا األثر النشا اانقتصادي من االل حتصيلها واوزيعها،عملية منهاح

اانست مارح و أثر الزكاة على اإلنتاج أ( منهاح اانست مار أييت من أك ر من زاويةااننتاج و أتثر الزكاة على

حتصيل الزكاة من أصحاهبا من شأنه دفع ه انن وحت يزهم إىل است مار أمواهلم رىت ان ل أن 1 ى رىت ان أتكلها الصدقة يقول أبن يتجروا يف أموال اليتام ملسو هيلع هللا ىلصأتيت عليها الصدقة، وهلذا أمر الرسول

، م( 1975الرتمذيح ) رواه )." ا له مال فليتجر به حىت ل أتكله الصدقةمن توىل يتيما " ملسو هيلع هللا ىلصفال جمال أمام ي"الراب" يف النظام اانقتصادي اإلسالمبلويساعد على اللك حترمي التعامل (،السنن

سعيد فررانح مدال لل كر )أصحاب رؤوس األموال إان ابلتوجه إىل املشروعات اإلنتاجية. (اانقتصادي يف اإلسالم

ل إن إن اق ال قران للزكاة يف شران ارتياجاعم من السلع وا دمات يزيد من ايار اانستهالم 2املشروعات إىل التوسع يف است ماراعم وهذا معناه زايدة ال ل الكلي وهذا بدوره يدفع أصحاب

.استمر دورة اإلنتاج وان اتكدس السلع يف املخازن من مثو ،لت ية الزايدة يف ال ل ا ملةدأ اإلغنان وإقامة مشروعات إنتاجية لل قران من أفضل ال رق وأجداها ل اوزيع الزكاة وفق 3

لتشجيع اانست مار .زمة لعملية التنمية اانقتصادية عوامل اانجتماعية والسياسية الال الراوفا ساهم يف أن الزكاة ل 4

حممود شلتوتح اإلسالم " اوج مصرف "يف سةيل هللا")واهلياكل األساسية ،إقامة الةنية التحتيةكل" يشجع أصحاب رؤوس األموال على اانست مار.مما (عقيدة وشريعة

مهيتهاأالزكاة قيمتها و : املبحث األول

: أ حقيقة الزكاةولاسوان أكان هذا -رال عليه احلول و اقت ا من مال بلغ نصااب عةارة عن الزكاة ىف رقيقتها

و عند أ ،ا واست اد صارةه عند رصادها كالزرو وال مارا ونقد عين - و عاطال أ ،ااملال مست مر ة ويتم اوزيع هذا املال املقت ع بنص اآلية على مثاني ،و ما ىف ركمهاأوالركاز، ،املعدنكاستخراجه ها والمؤلمفة ق لوبم ويف الر قاب ﴿ مصارف ا الصمدقات للفقراء والمساكني والعاملني علي إنم

عليم حكيم والغارمني ويف سبيل اللم وابن السمبيل فريضةا من (60)سورة التوبةح اآلية ﴾اللم واللم

قيمتها وأمهيتهااثنياا: ودورها يف ،أحيتها من ريثة اإلسالمية ان يدرم الصورة احلقيقية للزكاة م من أبنان األ اك ر إن

شخصية يتكرم صدقة أو ،عةادة فرديةجمرد اوحيسةون أهنوهنضته على كل األصعدة، بنان اجملتمع .تشكل ملساعدة احملتاجنييصندوق اري أو غين على فقر، اهب

واملالية يف املنهج ،واانجتماعية ،أركان اإلسالم انةين عليه اجلوان اانقتصاديةركن من لزكاة فا جماانت ظر يف املقاصد املتعددة اليت حتققها الزكاة يف ك ر من عن الن الذي ه و ،اإلسالمي املتكامل

ها يف حتقي اانستقرار واانستمرار للمجتمع على كل املستوايت ودور تهااحلياة يدرم مدى أحيومن هنا الكرها املصن ون لكت السياسة الشرعية ضمن نظم انسيما اانقتصادية واانجتماعية،

ربز دورها، (، وهكن عرو بعضا من املزااي اليت اأسرار الزكاة ،م(1982)ال زايل ) السياسة واملال وقيمتها على النحو التايلح



99

اإلسالميالنظام القتصادي يف الزكاة دور (1)يف م ثر دورريث اقوم ب ،للنظام املايل واانقتصادي يف اإلسالماملتني اعترب الزكاة األساس

من االل عدة نقا ويظهر هذا األثر النشا اانقتصادي من االل حتصيلها واوزيعها،عملية منهاح

اانست مارح و أثر الزكاة على اإلنتاج أ( منهاح اانست مار أييت من أك ر من زاويةااننتاج و أتثر الزكاة على

حتصيل الزكاة من أصحاهبا من شأنه دفع ه انن وحت يزهم إىل است مار أمواهلم رىت ان ل أن 1 ى رىت ان أتكلها الصدقة يقول أبن يتجروا يف أموال اليتام ملسو هيلع هللا ىلصأتيت عليها الصدقة، وهلذا أمر الرسول

، م( 1975الرتمذيح ) رواه )." ا له مال فليتجر به حىت ل أتكله الصدقةمن توىل يتيما " ملسو هيلع هللا ىلصفال جمال أمام ي"الراب" يف النظام اانقتصادي اإلسالمبلويساعد على اللك حترمي التعامل (،السنن

سعيد فررانح مدال لل كر )أصحاب رؤوس األموال إان ابلتوجه إىل املشروعات اإلنتاجية. (اانقتصادي يف اإلسالم

ل إن إن اق ال قران للزكاة يف شران ارتياجاعم من السلع وا دمات يزيد من ايار اانستهالم 2املشروعات إىل التوسع يف است ماراعم وهذا معناه زايدة ال ل الكلي وهذا بدوره يدفع أصحاب

.استمر دورة اإلنتاج وان اتكدس السلع يف املخازن من مثو ،لت ية الزايدة يف ال ل ا ملةدأ اإلغنان وإقامة مشروعات إنتاجية لل قران من أفضل ال رق وأجداها ل اوزيع الزكاة وفق 3

لتشجيع اانست مار .زمة لعملية التنمية اانقتصادية عوامل اانجتماعية والسياسية الال الراوفا ساهم يف أن الزكاة ل 4

حممود شلتوتح اإلسالم " اوج مصرف "يف سةيل هللا")واهلياكل األساسية ،إقامة الةنية التحتيةكل" يشجع أصحاب رؤوس األموال على اانست مار.مما (عقيدة وشريعة

مهيتهاأالزكاة قيمتها و : املبحث األول

: أ حقيقة الزكاةولاسوان أكان هذا -رال عليه احلول و اقت ا من مال بلغ نصااب عةارة عن الزكاة ىف رقيقتها

و عند أ ،ا واست اد صارةه عند رصادها كالزرو وال مارا ونقد عين - و عاطال أ ،ااملال مست مر ة ويتم اوزيع هذا املال املقت ع بنص اآلية على مثاني ،و ما ىف ركمهاأوالركاز، ،املعدنكاستخراجه ها والمؤلمفة ق لوبم ويف الر قاب ﴿ مصارف ا الصمدقات للفقراء والمساكني والعاملني علي إنم

عليم حكيم والغارمني ويف سبيل اللم وابن السمبيل فريضةا من (60)سورة التوبةح اآلية ﴾اللم واللم

قيمتها وأمهيتهااثنياا: ودورها يف ،أحيتها من ريثة اإلسالمية ان يدرم الصورة احلقيقية للزكاة م من أبنان األ اك ر إن

شخصية يتكرم صدقة أو ،عةادة فرديةجمرد اوحيسةون أهنوهنضته على كل األصعدة، بنان اجملتمع .تشكل ملساعدة احملتاجنييصندوق اري أو غين على فقر، اهب

واملالية يف املنهج ،واانجتماعية ،أركان اإلسالم انةين عليه اجلوان اانقتصاديةركن من لزكاة فا جماانت ظر يف املقاصد املتعددة اليت حتققها الزكاة يف ك ر من عن الن الذي ه و ،اإلسالمي املتكامل

ها يف حتقي اانستقرار واانستمرار للمجتمع على كل املستوايت ودور تهااحلياة يدرم مدى أحيومن هنا الكرها املصن ون لكت السياسة الشرعية ضمن نظم انسيما اانقتصادية واانجتماعية،

ربز دورها، (، وهكن عرو بعضا من املزااي اليت اأسرار الزكاة ،م(1982)ال زايل ) السياسة واملال وقيمتها على النحو التايلح


100

األمر الذي سللاهم يف و علم اانقتصللاد اإلسللالمي، واوسلليع آفاقه واعميقها، واكتشللاف وهووم شلللللرات فيه الات دانلة كةرة األحية؛ ريث قامت راجة ال رد، وراجة امل سلللللسلللللات، ،م ثرات

ما يف أيدي األطراف األارى، فأنشلللللللللأت الك احلاجة صلللللللللورا عديدة، وصلللللللللي ا وراجة الدول إىل املايل بني الك األطراف مل اكن معروفة، أو م صلة من قةل. دلمتنوعة للتةا، مث أفرز هذا الواقع مجلة من النوازل، واملسللتجدات يف املعامالت املالية كللللللللللللللللل"اانسللتصللنا ومن

وغرها.. ، والتأمني، والشركات، والضراو واألوراق التجاريةالتوريد، واألوراق املالية، و اليت مت ل الزكاة صللللللللللمام أمانه املادي –فاراسللللللللللمت اوجةها يف دان اانقتصللللللللللاد اإلسللللللللللالمي

عالمة است هام عريضة اتسأل عنح -واملعنويماهية هذه النوازل؟ وطريقة التعامل معها؟ وضلللللللللللوابس نراها، واسلللللللللللتنةا أركامها؟ ومدى

أتثرها على استحقاق الزكاة فيها ؟ وإن كان هنام االج ا ةيقة على اللك؟

ح النوازل، األوراق املالية، األوراق التجاريةالكلمات األساسية

بني النظرية والتطبيق ختريج النوازل املالية وأثرها يف الزكاة

الشحات مصيلحي إبراهيمالسيد الدكتور جامعة املالديف اإلسالميةالقرآن والسنة عضو هيئة التدريس كلية

ملخص البحث

احلمد هلل رب العاملني محدا يوايف نعمه ويكافئ مزيده، وأصلللللللي وأسلللللللم على الن املصلللللل ى، وبعد.. والرسول اجملتىب حممد صلى هللا عليه وسلم.

والن وس؛ ألموال لطهرة إليه، و قربة هلالج لجفرضه هللا ركن من أركان اإلسالم األساسية "الزكاةإن " وطهرة لن وس"، وعلللدم املةلللاانة اعلللاانة ال ر ،معوال ،األاننيلللة" آفلللات طهرة لن وس األغنيلللان من

من آفات طهرة للمجتمع"، و والكراهية ألصللللللللللللحاب ال روات ،واحلسللللللللللللد آفات "احلقد،من ال قران"ال ةقية، والعنصلللللللللللللرية، وأمراو األاالق والسللللللللللللللوم" القاالة لوردة اجملتمع، وأمانه، واسلللللللللللللتقراره،

واستمراره. والعدالة اانجتماعية بني أفراد ،عايةل نظام عرفته الةشللللللللللللللرية لتحقي الر أو بذلكالزكاة فكانت

ران.ال قو احملتاجني على طةقاتاوزيع جزن من ثروات األغنيان اوجةها عاد ريث ي ؛اجملتمع، لكل عناصللللللللللر -املادي واملعنوي -ومن مث ابات "الزكاة" مت ل صللللللللللمام األمان، واانسللللللللللتقرار

اجملتمع اإلسالمي انسيما عنصره اانقتصادي.أقام هذا الكون على سلللللللللنن، ونواميس منهاح اةدل األروال، وا ر قد هلالج لجن هللا ومن املعلوم أ

أدوااه ووسلللللاوله، ولكل أهل زمان عاداعم وأعرافهم ا اصلللللة، وقد متيز الظروف، فكان لكل عصلللللر هذا العصلر عن العصلور السلابقة ابلت ور التكنولوجي الكةر يف وسلاول ااناصلال السلريع بني أق ار

لع ان هكن اصللللورها يف املاضللللي القري ا دي ة،العامل املتناوي واانبتكارات الصللللناعية ألنوا من السلللل افع كةرة، وا سه ل له ادمات ضرورية كانت شاقة عليه عمال، وك ل ة، ووقتا. لإلنسان من



101

األمر الذي سللاهم يف و علم اانقتصللاد اإلسللالمي، واوسلليع آفاقه واعميقها، واكتشللاف وهووم شلللللرات فيه الات دانلة كةرة األحية؛ ريث قامت راجة ال رد، وراجة امل سلللللسلللللات، ،م ثرات

ما يف أيدي األطراف األارى، فأنشلللللللللأت الك احلاجة صلللللللللورا عديدة، وصلللللللللي ا وراجة الدول إىل املايل بني الك األطراف مل اكن معروفة، أو م صلة من قةل. دلمتنوعة للتةا، مث أفرز هذا الواقع مجلة من النوازل، واملسللتجدات يف املعامالت املالية كللللللللللللللللل"اانسللتصللنا ومن

وغرها.. ، والتأمني، والشركات، والضراو واألوراق التجاريةالتوريد، واألوراق املالية، و اليت مت ل الزكاة صللللللللللمام أمانه املادي –فاراسللللللللللمت اوجةها يف دان اانقتصللللللللللاد اإلسللللللللللالمي

عالمة است هام عريضة اتسأل عنح -واملعنويماهية هذه النوازل؟ وطريقة التعامل معها؟ وضلللللللللللوابس نراها، واسلللللللللللتنةا أركامها؟ ومدى

أتثرها على استحقاق الزكاة فيها ؟ وإن كان هنام االج ا ةيقة على اللك؟

ح النوازل، األوراق املالية، األوراق التجاريةالكلمات األساسية

بني النظرية والتطبيق ختريج النوازل املالية وأثرها يف الزكاة

الشحات مصيلحي إبراهيمالسيد الدكتور جامعة املالديف اإلسالميةالقرآن والسنة عضو هيئة التدريس كلية

ملخص البحث

احلمد هلل رب العاملني محدا يوايف نعمه ويكافئ مزيده، وأصلللللللي وأسلللللللم على الن املصلللللل ى، وبعد.. والرسول اجملتىب حممد صلى هللا عليه وسلم.

والن وس؛ ألموال لطهرة إليه، و قربة هلالج لجفرضه هللا ركن من أركان اإلسالم األساسية "الزكاةإن " وطهرة لن وس"، وعلللدم املةلللاانة اعلللاانة ال ر ،معوال ،األاننيلللة" آفلللات طهرة لن وس األغنيلللان من

من آفات طهرة للمجتمع"، و والكراهية ألصللللللللللللحاب ال روات ،واحلسللللللللللللد آفات "احلقد،من ال قران"ال ةقية، والعنصلللللللللللللرية، وأمراو األاالق والسللللللللللللللوم" القاالة لوردة اجملتمع، وأمانه، واسلللللللللللللتقراره،

واستمراره. والعدالة اانجتماعية بني أفراد ،عايةل نظام عرفته الةشللللللللللللللرية لتحقي الر أو بذلكالزكاة فكانت

ران.ال قو احملتاجني على طةقاتاوزيع جزن من ثروات األغنيان اوجةها عاد ريث ي ؛اجملتمع، لكل عناصللللللللللر -املادي واملعنوي -ومن مث ابات "الزكاة" مت ل صللللللللللمام األمان، واانسللللللللللتقرار

اجملتمع اإلسالمي انسيما عنصره اانقتصادي.أقام هذا الكون على سلللللللللنن، ونواميس منهاح اةدل األروال، وا ر قد هلالج لجن هللا ومن املعلوم أ

أدوااه ووسلللللاوله، ولكل أهل زمان عاداعم وأعرافهم ا اصلللللة، وقد متيز الظروف، فكان لكل عصلللللر هذا العصلر عن العصلور السلابقة ابلت ور التكنولوجي الكةر يف وسلاول ااناصلال السلريع بني أق ار

لع ان هكن اصللللورها يف املاضللللي القري ا دي ة،العامل املتناوي واانبتكارات الصللللناعية ألنوا من السلللل افع كةرة، وا سه ل له ادمات ضرورية كانت شاقة عليه عمال، وك ل ة، ووقتا. لإلنسان من


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نظرية الدعوى واإلثبات يف الفقه اإلسالمي والقانون الوضعي م( 1979حممد.)واصل، نصر )د.ط( مصر: دار النهضة العربية.وقانون اإلثبات اليمين اجلديد.

)د.ط( كتاب املرافعات القضائية يف احملاكم م(1994وزارة العدل جبمهورية املالديف.) .املالديفية

)د.ط( كتاب املرافعات القضائية يف احملاكم م(2003وزارة العدل جبمهورية املالديف.) .املالديفية

نظرية الدعوى بني الشريعة اإلسالمية وقانون املرافعات املدنية م( 2005ايسني، حممد نعيم.) ( عمان: دار النفائس.2.)طوالتجارية

Ministry of Information, Arts and Culture. (1997). Constitution of the Republic of Maldives, Maldives.

Republic of Maldives, Maldives. (2001). Maldives Judicial Bench book.

================================================================



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)د.ط( دمشق: مطبعة جامعة الفقه اإلسالمي يف أسلوبه اجلديد.م( 1968الزحيلي، وهبة.) دمشق.

( عمنان: مكتبة 1)طنظام القضاء يف الشريعة اإلسالمية.م( 1989زيدان، عبد الكرمي.) البصائر.

روضة القضاة م( 1970سمناين، علي بن أمحد الرحيب. حتقيق: الناهي، صالح الدين.)ال )د.ط( بغداد: مطبعة أسعد.وطريق النجاة.

)د.ط( فتح الباري بشرح صحيح اإلمام البخاري.م( 1981العسقالين، احلافظ ابن حجر.) ابكستان: دار نشر الكتب اإلسالمية.

. عون املعبود شرح سنن أيب داودم( 2002احلق،)العظيم آابدي، أبو الطيب حممد مشس ( بريوت: دار الكتب العلمية.2)ط

( بريوت: دار 6)طنظام احلكم يف الشريعة والتاريخ اإلسالمي.م( 1990القامسي، ظافر.) النفائس.

األحكام يف متييز الفتاوى من األحكام م( 1928القرايف، شهاب الدين أمحد بن إدريس.) ( القاهرة: مطبعة األنوار.1)طإلمام.وتصرفات القاضي وا

)د.ط( بغداد: كتاب أدب القاضي.ه( 1391املاوردي، أبو احلسن علي بن حممد بن حبيب.) مطبعة اإلرشاد.

. اإلقرتاحات الرائسية حول إصالحات النظام الدستوريم( 2005مكتب رائسة اجلمهورية.) )د.ط( مجهورية املالديف: مكتب املدعي العام.

)د.ط( إستانبول: دار الدعوة.املعجم الوسيط.م( 1972إبراهيم وأصحابه.)مصطفى، ( بريوت: دار 5)طالسنن الكربى.م( 1999النسائي، أبو عبد الرمحن أمحد بن شعيب.)

الكتب.( مصر: مطبعة 2.)طالسلطة القضائية ونظام القضاء يف اإلسالمم( 1983واصل، نصر فريد.)

األمانة.


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بشيء من التفصيل، والتنظيم حبيث يستوعب كل التقاضي املتداولة يف دائرة القضاء املالديفي من له عالقة ابلدعوى جبميع االجراءات القضائية. كما جيب على من له شأن يف القضاء االعتماد على األسس الشرعية يف التحقيق والتفتيش والبحث، والكشف ويف رفع الدعوى،

ية التقاضي. والنظر فيها واختاذ كافة االجراءات الالزمة لضمان حسن سري عملوختاما أقدم اعتذاري عما يف هذا البحث من قصور وتقصري. فقد بذلت ما وسعي من جهد ووقت، وما توفيقي إال ابهلل عليه توكلت وإليه أنيب. وحسيب أين ألتمس علما، ولن يبلغ إمرؤ

والرسالة فيه كماال، فاحلمد هلل يف اآلخرة واألوىل، والصالة والسالم على من ختم به النبوة وعلى آله وأصحابه ومن تبعهم إبحسان إىل يوم الدين.

فهرس املراجع واملصادر -12 القرآن الكرمي

كتاب أدب القضاء أو الدرر م( 1987ابن أيب الدم، شهاب الدين إبراهيم بن عبدهللا.) بريوت: دار الكتب العلمية. (1)طاملنظومات يف األقضية واحلكومات.

تبصرة احلكام يف أصول األقضية ومناهج م( 1958يم بن علي.) ابن فرحون، إبراه القاهرة: مطبعة مصطفى البايب احلليب. (د.طاألحكام.)

ابن قيم اجلوزية، حممد بن أيب بكر بن أيوب بن سعد بن حريز الزرعي.حتقيق: الصبابطي، عصام الدين.)د.ط( القاهرة: إعالم املوقعني عن رب العاملني.م( 2004)

احلديث.دار ( بريوت: دار إحياء الرتاث العريب.3)طلسان العرب.ابن منظور، مجال الدين حممد بن مكرم.

( 1.)طنظرية احلكم القضائي يف الشريعة والقانونم( 2000أبو البصل، عبد الناصر موسى.) عمان: دار النفائس.

دار ابن ( بريوت:3)طصحيح البخاري.م( 1987البخاري، حممد بن إمساعيل اجلعفي.) كثري.

دعوى التناقض والدفع يف الشريعة م( 1991الدغمي، حممد راكان ضيف هللا.)



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االجراءات القضائية اليت مل ينص عليها الشرع، ومل يتفق عليها الفقهاء تندرج حتت املسائل -4االجتهادية، فلويل األمر أن يرتبها وينظمها حسب مقتضيات العصر مراعاة مع ظروف الناس

ة العدل بني الناس.وأوضاع البيئة اليت يعيش فيها بشرط أن يضمن من خالهلا إقامإن الدعوى املرفوعة إىل القضاء جيب أن تكون صحيحة حبيث يتوفر فيه شروط معينة -5

صاحلة لالستماع لدى القاضي. وال جيوز رد الدعاوى بسبب خمالفتها للعرف والعادة.ال إن التمييز بني املدعي واملدعى عليه من أهم ما بنيت عليه االجراءات القضائية يلزم ك -6

منهما ما عليه من تقدمي البينة، واليمني أمام القضاء، وأن املعيار الذي وضعه يف املذهب احلنفي للتمييز بني املدعي واملدعى عليه يبدو أقل كلفة ومشقة ابلنسبة إىل التطبيق العملي.

مل العدالة يف القضاء ال تكمن يف إصدار احلكم العادل النهائي يف القضية، بل إهنا تش -7مجيع مراحل التقاضي بدءا من رفع الدعوى إىل إصدار احلكم مع االلتزام مببدأ املساواة جلميع

أطراف الدعوى حىت يف اللحظ واجللوس واإلشارة.خيتلف املعىن القانوين للغياب عن املعىن الفقهي له، حيث إن املعىن القانوين هو عدم -8

هتا القانونية، وال ينيب أحدا بينما مفهوم الغياب حضور شخص يف دعواه اليت استوفيت إجراءايف االصطالح الفقهي ينطبق على املسافة بني املدعى عليه وبني جملس القضاء، أو على عدم

معرفة حاله أو مكانه أو االمتناع عن احلضور.عيار الزمين إن نظام املرافعات املالديفي مل حيدد مفهوم الغياب بناء على معيار املسافة أو امل -9

مثل ما حدده الفقهاء.وجوب استجابة دعوة القاضي من قبل املطلوب إىل جملس القضاء، ويف حالة امتناعه -10

عن احلضور جيوز للقاضي إحضاره قهرا وله أتديبه مبا يراه مناسبا بسبب إتيانه ملنكر. توصيات البحث ومقرتحاته -11

لبحث املتواضع أبن نظام املرافعات املالديفي وإن هذا وقد تبني من خالل رحليت مع هذا اكان يتفق مع املرافعات الشرعية فيما يتعلق بقواعدها الكلية إىل حد ما، إال أنه حباجة إىل إعادة صياغته يف بعض املسائل على أساس أصول احملاكمات اليت تناوهلا الفقهاء وأصول


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تنظيم عرض الدعاوى مبا يناسب مع متغريات كل عصر، وترتيب النظر يف الدعوى حبيث -2، احلسام الشهيد، 1987بن أيب الدم،يتجنب التزاحم والتأخري يف إهناء اخلصومة )ا

ه(.1391املاورديالتمسك مببدأ املساواة بدءا من مساع الدعوى إىل أن يصدر احلكم ابلعدل يف القضية -3

(.1987)ابن أيب الدم، السرعة يف فصل القضااي دون أتخري، حىت ال يؤدي أتخري القاضي احلكم من اإلضرار -4

عابدين ابنجنيم، د.ت، ابنه، 1203قاضي، ابن)ياع حقوقهم ابلناس وتعطيل مصاحلهم وض د.ت(.

هذا وإن آاثر تطبيق نظام املرافعات املالديفي ال خيتلف كثريا عن آاثر املرافعات الشرعية يف األمور اليت يستمد نظام املرافعات املالديفي أصول التقاضي من املرافعات الشرعية، وذلك ما

مع ما ورد يف الفقه اإلسالمي يف املسائل اليت تتعلق مبوضوعات رفع تبني لنا من مقارنته الدعوى، وآداهبا، وترتيب النظر فيها، وغياب اخلصوم عن جملس القضاء وغري ذلك من

املوضوعات اليت مت مقارنتها يف هذا البحث. اخلامتة وأهم النتائج -10

نتائج اليت انتهيت إليه يف النقاط التالية:بعون هللا تعاىل وتوفيقه أختم هذا البحث ببيان أهم الاملرافعات الشرعية هي عملية إجرائية يف تنظيم رفع الدعوى إىل القاضي وإصدار احلكم -1

العادل فيها وتتعدى إىل تشكيل احملاكم وبيان اختصاصها، وما يلزم للقاضي من السلوك من رفع الدعوى ومرحلة حضور األخالقي حنو مهمته القضائية، وما يتعلق مبراحل التقاضي

املدعى عليه ومساع الدعوى وترتيبها وتنظيمها والفصل فيها وإصدار احلكم النهائي يف القضية.إن أصول احملاكمات الشرعية اليت ثبتت ابلنص هي أصول اثبتة وصاحلة للتقاضي يف كل -2

زمان ومكان. دعى عليه، واملدعى به، والقاضي.االجراءات القضائية هلا أركاهنا وهي املدعي، وامل -3



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(، مع 2003اخلصم الغائب وكيال يدافع عن حقه يف حالة غيابه لعذر مقبول )وزارة العدل،العلم أبن الفقه اإلسالمي أجاز ملن عرض له عذر عن حضور جملس القضاء بسبب مرض أن

(.1970ين)السمنايوكل عنه وكيال ومن وجوه االختالف جند أن نظام املرافعات املالديفي عاجل فكرة غياب املدعي املتخلف عن

(. وأما 2003حضور جملس القضاء بغري عذر مقبول بفرض عقوبة تعزيرية عليه )وزارة العدل،املرافعات يف الشريعة فلم يعاجل تلك الفكرة على أساس أن املدعي هو الذي ال جيرب على

صومة. ويف حالة إصدار احلكم على الغائب، فإن الفقه اإلسالمي ال يشرتط إعالنه به اخلخبالف نظام املرافعات املالديفي الذي حيتم إعالن احلكم (،1997خالل فرتة حمددة )الشرعي،

(.2003خالل فرتة حمددة )وزارة العدل،ال خيتلف عن املرافعات الشرعية وقد تبني من خالل هذه املقارنة أبن نظام املرافعات املالديفي

يف األمور األساسية اليت اتفق عليها فقهاء املذاهب مع العلم أبن نظام املرافعات املالديفي كثريا ما مييل إىل املذهب الشافعي يف املسائل املختلفة بني املذاهب. وأما عن املسائل اليت تندرج

يتخذ موقفا مناسبا مع الظروف واألوضاع يف حتت األمور االجتهادية فإن النظام املالديفي البالد، مثل ترتيب النظر يف الدعوى ورفعها إىل احملكمة املختصة، وغريها من االجراءات

القضائية. املطلب الثاين: آاثر تطبيق املرافعات يف الفقه اإلسالمي ونظام املرافعات املالديفي

العدل بني الناس وفصل اخلصومات مبا ال يدع إن آاثر تطبيق تلك األصول تتجلى يف حتقيق جماال للتظلم ألي طرف من أطراف الدعوى. ومبا أهنا تعترب مبثابة الوسائل اليت تكفل إيصال احلقوق إىل أصحاهبا فإن تطبيقها ال حمالة تؤثر على نتائج احلكم القضائي يف الدعوى من

حيث العدالة. -الشرعية ميكن تلخيص القول فيما يلي:وابلتأمل يف آاثر تطبيق املرافعات

حتقيق العدالة أبيسر السبل بعيدا عن التعقيد والتشابك وتزايد املشاكل واخلصومات -1 (.2004)املرزوقي،


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ة ابسم السلوك الشرعية حيث ورد يف املذكرة القضائية املالديفية تعميمات وإرشادات للقضا القضائي حسبما يلي:

االستماع إىل كل خصم يف القضية واالهتمام جبميع أطراف الدعوى. -1 التعامل مع مجيع أطراف القضية ابلتساوي حبيث يثق عامة الناس بنزاهة القضاء. -2 االمتثال للقانون يف حياته املهنية والشخصية. -3ة الناس من خالله، مع عدم جعل عالقته األسرية يلتزم بسلوك أخالقي ميكن اكتساب ثق -4

) Maldives Judicial Benchواالجتماعية واالقتصادية معارضة لطريق العدالة واإلنصاف)2003Mark,

فهذه املبادي ابلتأكيد حياكي مبا ورد يف الشريعة اإلسالمية ابلتزام أصول النزاهة يف جمال إقامة الصدد فإن نظام املرافعات املالديفي يتفق مع الفقه اإلسالمي يف العدالة بني الناس. ويف هذا

ممارسة مبدأ املساواة مع اخلصوم بداية من رفع الدعوى إىل أن ينتهي من احلكم.ومما يالحظ هو أن نظام املرافعات املالديفي من حيث التنظيم والتفصيل ينقصه جوانب عديدة

ل املثال، فإنه ال يوجد أي إشارة إىل الشروط اليت ابملقارنة مع الفقه اإلسالمي. وعلى سبي جيب توفرها لصحة الدعوى، كما هو مفصل يف كتب املذاهب الفقهية.

وأما خبصوص فكرة دعوة القاضي للخصوم وإحضارهم جمللس القضاء وغياهبم عنه، واحلكم فعات املالديفي. إذ بني الشريعة ونظام املرا واالختالف لالتفاقابلغيبة يتضح أبن هناك أوجها

يتفق نظام املرافعات املالديفي مع املرافعات يف الشريعة يف جمال القضاء على غائب عن جملس القضاء بعد ما يتم إشعاره ابحلضور إىل جملس القضاء، وختلف عنه بدون عذر مقبول، كما

ت أنه يتفق مع املرافعات يف الشريعة يف أن غياب اخلصم اليغري من عبء اإلثبام(. وكذلك يوافق نظام املرافعات املالديفي مبا ورد يف الفقه اإلسالمي الذي 1997)الشرعي،

يوجب على القاضي التعاون مع السلطات إلحضار اخلصوم أبية طرق تيسرت حىت ولو أدى ذلك إىل إخبار اخلصوم ابلقوة خبالف ما ذهب إليه بعض النظم الوضعية الذي ال جييز إجبار

جملس القضاء رغما عنه إذا امتنع. ويوافق أيضا الفقه اإلسالمي يف جواز تكليف اخلصوم إىل



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افعات املالديفي، وآاثر تطبيقها.املبحث الرابع: مقارنة املرافعات الشرعية بنظام املر ويف هذا املبحث يقوم الباحث ابملقارنة بني املرافعات الشرعية ونظام املرافعات املالديفي يف إطار املوضوعات اليت نوقشت يف املباحث السابقة مع بيان مواضع االتفاق واالختالف بينهما

هذا املبحث منحصرا يف مطلبني وآاثر تطبيقها. ومن هذا املنطلق، جيعل الباحث الكالم يف ومها:

املطلب األول: مقارنة املرافعات الشرعية بنظام املرافعات املالديفي.جاءت الشريعة اإلسالمية برمتها لنشر العدالة يف حياة الناس مجيعا من غري تفريق بني جنس

ن ذكر وأنثى وجعلناكم شعواب وق بائال اي أي ها الناس إاان خلقناكم ﴿:ونوع مصداقا لقوله تعاىل منا( وقد طبقت 13)احلجرات: ﴾إان الل علايم خباري إان أكرمكم عاند اللا أت قاكم لات عارفوا

بني الشريعة اإلسالمية يف العصور اإلسالمية كنظام شامل جلميع شئون احلياة من غري تفريق يستظلذكر وأنثى وبني أسود وأبيض وبني مسلم وكافر يف جمال العدالة واإلنصاف. فلكل

بظالل الشريعة الغراء بصورة متساوية كأسنان املشط.ومل تكفل الشريعة إبيصال احلقوق إىل أصحاهبا فقط بل جعل كافة الوسائل والطرق مهيئة

وضوابطا متينة يستنري هبا القضاة للوصول لتحقيق هذا اهلدف السامي، فوضعت أصوال اثبتة إىل احلكم الصحيح العادل يف الدعوى. فأجب على القضاة االستماع جلميع أطراف الدعوى

املساواة بني اخلصوم حىت يف حلظتهم واوجبتاخلصومة إبصدار احلكم ويقطعقبل حسم النزاع نبه القضاة على احلاالت اليت قد وإشارهتم وجلوسهم بني أيديهم يف جملس القضاء. كما أهنا ت

تؤثر على نفوسهم آاثرا سلبيا مما قد يسبب فقدان ثقة الناس هبم يف خصوص القضاء.أما ابلنسبة لنظام املرافعات املالديفي، فإنه مل يرد ذلك التفصيل الذي ورد يف الشريعة ملا جيب

االهتم معتدلة من الناحية على القضاة اتباعه من االستعداد النفسي للقضاء حبيث تكون حاجلسمية والنفسية والفكرية وجتنبهم القضاء يف حالة الغضب واجلوع والعطش كما هي واضحة يف الفقه اإلسالمي إال أنه حتدث عن بعض السلوك القضائي الذي حياكي أصول احملاكمات


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كل اجلوانب يف سبيل استظهار العدالة املكنونة فيها، فإنه ابت من الضروري حتديد املفهوم الصحيح للغياب، وماذا يعين به من منظور الشريعة اإلسالمية؟

ال يقصد ابلغياب أن يكون املدعى عليه غائبا عن جملس القضاء فحسب، فهذه املسألة جملس القضاء احلاضر يف البلد، فال يصح احلكم حسمها الفقهاء، إذ قرروا أن الغائب عن

ه، إبن 1424م، الكاساين،2001، والسرخسي، 1970)السمناين،عليه إال بعد إحضاره وإمنا يقصد بغيابه أن تكون املسافة بينه وبني جملس القضاء اهلمام،د.ت، إبن عابدين،د.ت(.

احلضور. تلك هي احلاالت اليت يعترب بعيدة. أو أنه ال يعرف حاله، وال مبكانه أو أنه ممتنع عن )إبن حجر اهليثمي،د.ت(.فيها املدعى عليه غائبا يف نظر الفقهاء

املطلب الثالث: مفهوم الغياب يف نظام املرافعات املالديفيالتزاما مببدأ املساواة بني أطراف الدعوى فال تبدأ احملاكمة إال حبضور اخلصوم، ويعترب مبدأ

م من أهم املبادئ املميزة للخصومة. وطبقا هلذا املبدأ ال جيوز احلكم على خصم املواجهة بينهدون مساع ما يريد أن يقول يف دفاعه أو دعوته إىل جملس القضاء للدفاع عن نفسه على األقل. ولذلك أوجب أصول املرافعات املالديفية تبليغ نسخة من عريضة الدعوى اليت يقدمها املدعي

م(.1997)إبن احلجر اهليثمي،د.ت، الشرعي،يه إىل املدعى علوابلنظر إىل نظام املرافعات املالديفي يتبني أبنه مل يراع حتديد مفهوم واضح ملسألة الغياب، وإن كان يهتم حبضور اخلصوم أمام احملكمة خبالف ما عرفنا يف الفقه اإلسالمي. والذي يتعامل

املدعى عليه ابحلضور إىل جملس القضاء، فإذا ختلف عليه احملاكم ابملالديف هو أنه يتم إشعار عن احلضور، فإن احملكمة تسري ابلدعوى، وإن كان غائبا ويعترب احلكم الصادر غيابيا )وزارة

(.2003العدل،وقد استظهر للباحث من خالل مراجعة أصول املرافعات اليت تتخذها احملاكم يف مجهورية

غياب بناء على معيار املسافة أو املعيار الزمين مثل ما حدده املالديف أبنه مل حيدد مفهوم الالفقهاء، بل جعل كل من ختلف عن احلضور إىل جملس احلكم غائبا إال بعذر مقبول حيدده

النظام بغض النظر عما إذا كان املطلوب موجود يف مسافة قصرية أم بعيدة.



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أمواله الغياب، وإذا مل حيضر ضمن املهلة ابلرغم من إبالغه فيسمى متمردا على العدالة فتوضع (.2002حتت احلراسة القضائية )خنلة،

لقد تبني مما سبق ذكره أبن مفهوم الغياب يف االصطالح القانوين خيتلف من حالة إىل حالة، فليس كل من غاب عن جملس القضاء يعترب غائبا مبفهومه الضيق، وإال فقد يتساوى الذي

لده ملدة معينة. وهذا مما قد يؤدني (، ومن توارى يف ب1986انقطع عنه اخلرب غائبا )معوض،إىل ضياع احلقوق من غري إيصاهلا إىل مستحقيها. وعليه فإنه من ابب إجراء التقاضي يف طريقها الصحيحة جيب التفريق بني الغياب وعدم احلضور كما مر تفصيله. وأما يف اصطالح

ذلك ألن اخلصومة يف األصل الفقه اإلسالمي فإن مسألة الغياب قد عين به عناية ابلغ األمهية و ال ميكن انعقادها إال حبضور اخلصمني أمام القاضي، لدى الفقه اإلسالمي مفهوم خاص

للغياب. وسنعاجل ذلك يف املطلب اآليت إن شاء هللا تعاىل. املطلب الثاين: مفهوم الغياب يف الفقه اإلسالميإطار القانون ال يعين به جمرد الغياب عن لقد سبق البيان يف املطلب السابق أبن الغياب يف

جملس القضاء وإمنا هناك حاالت ينطبق عليها الغياب مبفهومه الواسع وحاالت أخرى ينطبق عليها الغياب مبفهومه الضيق. فماذا يعين الغياب عن جملس القضاء من منظور الفقه

اإلسالمي؟لس القضاء أنه يتناول موضوع مما يالحظ يف الفقه اإلسالمي حول موضوع الغياب عن جم

غياب املدعى عليه فحسب. أما املدعي فلم جند له ذكر حول غيابه إال اندرا. والسبب يف ذلك يرجع إىل أن األصل يف الدعوى هو أن ال جيرب املدعي على الدعوى، فإذا ترك الدعوى

ملدعى عليه يف وإمنا ركز الفقهاء على مسألة غياب ام(. 1997)الشرعي،فإنه خيلي وشأنه خصوص القضاء على الغائب، وذلك ملا يرتتب على غيابه عن جملس القضاء عدم متكنه من التمتع حبق الدفاع عن نفسه واالستماع إىل حججه كما هو مقرر يف أحكام الشريعة اإلسالمية. وحيث إن مسألة الغياب عن جملس القضاء هلا أثر سليب على سري الدعوى والنظر فيها من


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كل منهما حقا متساواي يف عرض حججه حبيث يتاح لكل منهما فرصة معقولة لعرض دعواهلكي ال يضع أي منهما يف موقف ضعيف. وعليه فإن حضور اخلصوم يساعد على مناقشة أقوال الشهود وتوجيه اخلرباء يف الدعوى األمر الذي خيدم العدالة بطريقة قد ال حتققها وسيلة

ومهما يتطلب من األمر من ضرورة حضور اخلصمني أمام القاضي م(. 1994)راغب،أخرى ضية املعروضة أمامه بعد استماع إىل كل من املدعي واملدعى عليه، فإن لتمكينه الفصل يف الق

األمور ال جتري حسب هذا املنوال يف بعض األحيان، فبعض اخلصوم قد يكونون بعيدين عن جملس احلكم والبعض اآلخر ميتنع عن احلضور، أو يتعذر عنه. هذا ما يعرف مبسألة القضاء

هذا ما سوف نناقشه إبذن هللا تعاىل يف هذا املبحث حتت على الغائب يف الفقه اإلسالمي. املطالب اآلتية:

هوم الغياب يف االصطالح القانويناملطلب األول: مفالغياب مشتق من "غاب" ويعين بذلك املعىن الشائع وهو عدم الوجود يف مكان معني، وضده

غيابه وتناظر اليوم قرينة احلضور. وأما حسب املعىن الضيق فرياد به حالة شخص جرى إعالن ( معىن "الغياب" من املنظور 1989(. وذكر الدكتور أمحد بدوي )1988الوفاة )كورنو،

القانوين أبنه عدم حضور أحد اخلصوم يف دعوى قد استوفيت إجراءاهتا القانونية، وال ينيب وجاهيا(.أحد عنه إما قصدا أو دون قصد. وعلى هذا، ال ميكن احلكم فيها حضوراي )أو

وقد تبني مما تقدم ذكره أبن الغياب يراد به عدم احلضور شخصيا أو نيابة يف مكان معني من غري متييز بني الغياب وعدم احلضور سوى املعىن املرتادف لكل منهما. فكل من اتصف ابلغياب

ن اتصف بعدم احلضور. وأما عند من يفرق بني الغياب وعدم احلضور، فالغياب يطلق على مابتعد عن حمل إقامته العادي، وانقطعت أخباره منذ وقت طويل حىت إن وجوده أصبح مشكوكا فيه، بينما عدم حضور الشخص يعين أنه ليس حاضرا يف حمل إقامته أو حمل سكنه بينما

(. ويسمى املتهم غائبا متواراي يف حالة هروبه من العدالة 2002وجوده غري مشكوك به )خنلة، ب جناية ارتكبها إما ألنه مل يقبض عليه أو ألنه قبض عليه وفر قبل اجللسة أو قبل مداولة بسب

احملكمة أو احمللفني فيحكم عليه غيابيا. وإذا حضر أمام احملكمة بعد احلكم فإنه يرفع عنه هتمة



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على كل من توىل منصب القضاء وذلك ألن إقامة العدل وإيصال احلق إىل أصحابه ورفع الظلم من األمور اليت يستوجب على القاضي أداؤها حاال من غري تراخي إذ إن الغرض من نصب القضاء إنصاف املظلومني من الظاملني وتوفري احلقوق على املستحقني

وملا م(. 1997م، اخلرسي،1997، إبن عبد السالم،1958، إبن فرحون،2001رخسي،)السكان القاضي ميثل طرفا مهما يف عملية التقاضي فيجب أن تكون هذه العملية يف وقت صفاء ذهنه ونفسه وأن ال يقوم ابلقضاء يف الظروف اليت تعكر صفو نفسه. ولذلك قالوا:ينبغي

للقضاء أن خيرج وهو على أعدل األحوال ال جائع وال عطشان وال للقاضي إذا أراد اجللوس كسالن وال غضبان )القنوجي،د.ت(.

املطلب الثالث: كيفية نظر الدعوى يف القانون املالديفيترفع الدعوى إىل احملاكم املختصة مع االلتزام إبجراءات وشروط وقيود حددها أصول التقاضي

الديفية، وحتقيقا لسهولة النظر يف الدعوى فإن أصول احملاكمة املتعارفة يف دائرة القضائية املتتطلب تقدمي الدعوى إىل القاضي عن طريق تعبئة استمارة خاصة لكل قضية. وليس هناك أي ذكر حول االجراءات اليت تتخذها احملاكم املالديفية خبصوص الرتتيب يف رؤية الدعاوى،

ب عرائض الدعاوى لسماعها حسب املصلحة العامة. وإذا فلعله مرتوك إلدارة احملكمة يف ترتيكان ترتيب مساع الدعوى مرتوك يف اختيار إدارة احملكمة، فإن ذلك قد جيلب هتمة القضاء ابإلحنياز وفقدان صفة النزاهة. فتفاداي ملثل هذه اإلشكاليات يستحسن التمسك أبساس

يف منتهى العدالة بدءا من مساع الدعوى اثبت يبىن عليه ترتيب مساع الدعوى ليكون القضاء إىل إصدار احلكم العادل يف سبيل إهناء النزاع واخلصومة. ويف غياهبم يف الشريعة والقانون ، املبحث الثالث: إجراءات املرافعة يف حضور اخلصوم

املالديفييف الدعوى. من بني املعايري األساسية للنظر املنصف للدعاوى هو مبدأ تكافؤ الفرص بني طر

وهذا املبدأ جيب مراعاته يف مجيع مراحل الدعوى. فمن هذا املنطلق جيب أن يعامل كل من املدعي واملدعى عليه على قدم املساواة من انحية إجراءات املرافعة طوال احملاكمة، مع إعطاء


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على ضماانت املساواة يف سياق مراحل احملاكمة على عديد من اجلوانب اليت سوف نتحدث لية:عن بعض منها يف املطالب التا

املطلب األول: مرحلة رفع الدعوىإن مرحلة رفع الدعوى هي مرحلة االلتجاء إىل القضاء للمطالبة ابحلق، ومن املعلوم أنه ليس هناك إجراءات شكلية معينة يف البداية تلزم هبا من يرغب الدعوى، وال على القاضي أبي

حلقه إىل القاضي أينما وجده، إجراء شكلي معني، مكان بوسع املتقاضي أن يتقدم ابملطالبة ويعرض عليه قضيته شفاهة بدون أية وساطة من حاجب، أو التزام بطريق معني يف رفع دعواه. هكذا كانت إجراءات رفع الدعوى يف الصدر األول يف أبسط وضعها مما كانت حتقق العدالة

التعامل حنو أبيسر السبل يف أسرع وقت ممكن. وملا كانت األمور قد بدأت تتعقد ويتجهالتعقيد والتشابك وتزايد املشاكل واخلصومات اقتضت تلك األوضاع وضع االجراءات اليت

تسهل التقاضي وتنظم عرض الدعوى مبا يتناسب مع متغريات كل عصر.وقد أكدت التجارب البشرية يف ميادين التعامل بني الناس على مر العصور أبن الرتتيب

ع ميادين احلياة، وال سيما يف دائرة القضاء اليت ترجى منها العدالة والتنظيم أمر ضروري يف مجييف كل صغري وكبري. وقد بدأ ابلفعل تنظيم رفع اخلصومات إىل القضاء يف خمتلف العصور ويؤكد ذلك إبن أيب الدم بقوله: "قال الشافعي رمحه هللا:ينبغي للحاكم أن ال يتخذ حاجبا.

يكون الناس وخريهم واجتماعهم على التقوى، فأما إذا كثر ومن أصحابنا من قال: هذا حال (.1971اهلرج والسفهاء واستئصال األغيناء استحب له أن يتخذ حاجبا" )املاوردي،

و ابلتأمل فيما جيري يف دائرة القضاء يف املالديف يتبني وجود مثل هذه االجراءات الالزمة يف عرض دعاواهم ومنع تزامحهم يف رفعها وما جتاه رفع الدعوى وحتقيق املساواة بني الناس

ينظم به نظر الدعوى ومنع تقدمي بعضها على بعض. املطلب الثاين: آداب نظر الدعوى

وأما عن النظر يف الدعوى من حني رفعها إىل القاضي فليزم القيام ابلفصل بني اخلصوم من دل بني الناس مما أوجبه الشرع غري أن يكون له اخليار يف االمتناع عن ذلك ألن القضاء ابلع



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عليه دائرة القضاء أو على املتبادر إىل الذهن من معىن املدعي واملدعى عليه عرفا. وتؤكد ذلك ن رفع الدعوى والقضااي )وزارة املادة الرابعة يف كتاب أصول التقاضي املالديفي بعنوا

(.2003العدل،ويف حقيقة األمر فإن قضية متييز املدعي واملدعى عليه حسب اإلجراءات املتبعة إىل السنة

م يف دوائر احملاكم املالديفية غري واضحة وغري دقيقة مما قد يشكل على القاضي التمييز 2003 بينهما.

ي واملدعى عليه:رأينا حول املعايري للتمييز بني املدعإن املعايري اليت اختذها فقهائنا يف التمييز بني املدعي واملدعى عليه ال ميكن اإلعتماد

على واحد منها مع اإلمهال بقية املعايري، إذ أن مجيع املعايري جيب للقاضي استعانتها لتحقيق ابلنظر إىل تعريفات اهلدف املنشود يف سبيل إقامة العدالة واإلنصاف. وذلك ملا هو واضح

اليت وضعها الفقهاء التمييز بني املدعي و املدعى عليه متقارية ومكملة بعضها ببعض وإن كانت عبارهتا خمتلفة يف حتديد كل من املدعي واملدعى عليه.

وبناء على ذلك، فإن على القاضي من خالل إجراء احملاكمات جيب أن يقوم ابلتمييز مستعينا على ذلك مجيع املعيارات اليت وضعها فقهائنا مراعاة بني املدعي واملدعى عليه

ابلضوابط اليت وضعها الفقهاء املسلمون من خمتلف املذاهب على التمييز بني طريف الدعوى كما صرحه الدكتور حممد نعيم ايسني بقوله:"هذا ونرى أنه ما دام الوصول إىل العدل بني

ال مانع أبدا من اإلعتماد على مجيع ما ذكر من اخلصائص املتنازعني هو اهلدف من القضاء فإنه (.2005لكال الطرفني يف الدعوى" )ايسني،

املبحث الثاين: إجراءات رفع الدعوى يف الشريعة والقانون املالديفيإذا كان القضاء هو امللجأ لكل من يسعى وراء طلب اإلنصاف والعدالة، فإنه صار من

تكون يف منتهى النزاهة والعدالة اليت تؤدي إىل إنشاء الثقة يف قلوب املستلزمات األساسية أن الناس جتاهها و يطمئنون للحكم منه يف قطع النزاع بني الناس. وإن املرافعات الشرعية تنطوى


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م(. والشافعية واحلنابلة ال يشرتطون كمال األهلية 1995وال يشرتطون إذن الويل )إبن فرحون، م(.1997لصحة الدعوى )أمحد،

وأما يف القانون املالديفي فإنه يشرتط أهلية التقاضي لصحة الدعوى، وأن املسئولية املدنية عشرة سنة، وذلك ألن كل من مل يبلغ عمره مثان يتحملها الويل نيابة عمن مل يبلغ عمره مثان

م(.2003عشرة سنة يعترب صغريا يف نظر القانون املالديفي )وزارة العدل،اثنيا: أن يكون املدعى به شيئا معلوما. فال ميكن الشهادة والقضاء ابجملهول وال يتحصل

م(.1991مقصود الدعوى بدون معلومية املدعى به )العمي، (.1991ن يكون املدعى عليه معينا معروفا )الدغمي،اثلثا: أ

(.2001رابعا: أن تكون الدعوى يف جملس القضاء )إبن رشد،ويقصد أبطراف الدعوى أولئك األشخاص الذين يكون بينهم النزاع، وهم املدعي، واملدعى

يكون عليه. وكل منهما قد ينفرد وقد يتعدد، ولكن يشرتط يف حالة تعدد أطراف الدعوى أن(. وملا كانت الدعوى بطبيعتها تقتضي اإلثبات، فال بد من 2005املتعدد حمصورا )ايسني،

حتمل عبء اإلثبات من قبل أحد أطراف الدعوى، ومن مث جيب حتديد الطرف الذي يتحمل مسئولية إقامته. من هو الطالب به؟ أ هو املدعي؟ أم املدعى عليه؟ أم مها معا؟ وتتفق معظم

القضائية املختلفة مع الفقه اإلسالمي يف خصوص جعل عبء إثبات الدعوى ابلبينة األنظمة (. 1988يقع على عاتق املدعي )هاشم،

إن متييز املدعي واملدعى عليه من أهم األمور اليت تعني القاضي على إصابة احلق يف األحكام القاضي، ومن قبل اخلصوم اليت يصدرها، كما أنه من األمور الضرورية الواجب معرفتها من قبل

يف الدعوى.وبعد االستقراء واالطالع على كثري من التعليمات والتعميمات الواردة يف الكتب املتناولة اليت فيها أصول املرافعات القضائية يف احملاكم الشرعية ابملالديف، فإن الباحث مل يتمكن من

ي من أجل التمييز بني أطراف الوقوف على أي معيار أو ضابط قانوين يستعني به القاضالدعوى يف القانون املالديفي. والظاهر أن احملاكم تعتمد يف التمييز بينهما على ما هو متعارف



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فأما املدعي هو طالب احلق واملدعى عليه هو املطلوب منه احلق واملدعى به هو احلق (، والقاضي هو الذي يقوم إبيصال 1989الذي يطلبه املدعي من املدعى عليه )زيدان،

أهلها مصداقا لقوله تعاىل:)) إن هللا أيمركم أن تؤدوا األماانت إىل أهلها وإذا األماانت إىلوقال العالمة ابن (58حكمتم بني الناس أن حتكموا ابلعدل(( )سورة النساء، اآلية:

:"واستقر منصب القضاء آخر األمر على أنه جيمع مع الفصل بني اخلصوم (2003)خلدونة للمسلمني ابلنظر يف أموال احملجور عليهم من اجملانني واليتامى استيفاء بعض احلقوق العام

واملفلسني وأهل السفه، ويف وصااي املسلمني وأوقافهم وتزويج األايمى عند فقد األولياء على رأي من راه، والنظر يف مصاحل الطرقات واألبنية وتصفح الشهود واألمناء والنواب، واستيفاء

دالة واجلرح ليحصل له الوثوق هبم، وصارت هذه كلها من تعلقات العلم واخلربة فيهم ابلعوظيفته وتوابع واليته". فال بد من هذه األركان إلختاذ اإلجراءات القضائية اليت تسميها بعض

(.1405الشرعية أبركان الدعوى )الطريفي،علماء املرافعات املطلب الرابع: شروط الدعوى وأطرافها

اليت حتققت فيها شروط الصحة، وأهم هذه الشروط هي:والدعوى الصحيحة هي أوال: أن يكون املدعي واملدعى عليه ممن هلم أهلية األداء، حيث اشرتط مجهور الفقهاء أن يكون كل من املدعي واملدعى عليه أهال للقيام ابلتصرفات الشرعية، وذلك أبن يكوان عاقلني

شرط لصحة الدعوى.ومن الفقهاء من م(. ألن التكليف 2000م، ونظام،1984)مفلح،يقولون بقبول الدعوى من الصيب املميز إذا كان قادرا على املرافعة واملدافعة وخباصة إذا اعتدي عليه أو على ماله وخيف فرار املدعى عليه، وتفويت احلق على الصيب )إبن عبد

فون ابألهلية الناقصة وفقهاء احلنفية يكتم(. 1995م، والزين،1966م، ومغنية،1989الرفيع،م(، وأما املالكية فيكتفون ابألهلية الناقصة يف 2000يف حق املدعي واملدعى عليه)نظام،

املدعي مع اشرتاط األهلية الكاملة يف املدعى عليه. وكذلك يشرتطون الرشد يف حق املدعى ن كان حمجورا، عليه، وال يشرطون الرشد يف املدعي، بل يقبلون الدعوى من السفيه والصيب وإ


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أركان الدعوىاملطلب الثالث:إن الوظيفة األساسية للقضاء هي فصل اخلصومات وحل الن زاعات، وهي

ة فحسب، بل إهنا تتناول كل غري منحصرة على خصومات املعامالت أو األحوال الشخصي (. 2004أنواع اخلصومات من جناايت وحدود ومعامالت وغريها )إبن القيم،

وإن كانت األعمال القضائية أساسا هي الفصل يف اخلصومات، فإنه هناك أعماال أخرى أضيفت للقضاء، وأصبحت من اختصاصه، مثل أعمال التوثيق وبعض اإلجراءات

تية اليت تتخذها احملاكم بناء على طلب طرف واحد وأعماال أخرى إدارية حبتة اإلحرتازية أو الوق (.2004هدفها تنظيم العمل يف القضاء )ابن القيم،

وإذا كان هدف القضاء هو إصدار حكم عادل يكفل به صيانة احلقوق حىت وضماانت العدالة لكل من يطرق ابب القضاء، فإنه يتطلب إىل إجراءات مضمونة واثبتة

يتحقق اإلنصاف وتقوم العدالة. وأصول املرافعات الشرعية يف نظران ال تدور حول األعمال القضائية فحسب، بل إن األعمال الوالئية اليت تدخل يف اختصاص القضاء واألعمال اإلدارية املسمى ابلقرارات اإلدارية اليت تستهدف من تنظيم العمل يف القضاء مرهونة أبصول املرافعات

الشرعية أيضا.يف جمموعة من الطرق والوسائل (2005)وتتمثل املرافعات القضائية يف نظر ايسني

اليت تلجأ إليها هيئة القضاء إىل كشف احلقائق عن القضية املعروضة أمام القضاء، مثل طلب البينة من املدعي أو طلب اليمني من املدعى عليه وعرض أدلة اإلثبات وطلب املدعي احلكم،

وغري ذلك من اإلجراءات القضائية واليت ال ميكن هلا وجود بدون أركاهنا إذ إن الركن حسب اصطالح اجلمهور هو ما ال بد منه لتصور الشيء ووجوده سواء أكان جزءا منه أم خمتصا به،

(.2000أو هو ما يتوقف عليه أساسا وجود الشيء وإن كان خارجا عن ماهيته )أبو البصل،( 3( املدعى عليه )2( املدعي )1)-ءات القضائية تعتمد على أركاهنا اآلتية:وإجرا

( القاضي.4املدعى به )



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عيينة: حدثنا إدريس أبو عبد هللا بن إدريس قال: أتيت سعيد بن أيب بردة فسألته عن رسل أبو موسى قد أوصى إىل عمر بن اخلطاب اليت كان يكتب هبا إىل أيب موسى األشعري، وكان

أيب بردة، فأخرج إليه كتااب، فرأيت يف كتاب منها، رجعنا إىل حديث أيب العوام، قال: كتب عمر إىل أيب موسى: )) أما بعد، فإن القضاء فريضة حمكمة، وسنة متبعة، فافهم إذا أدىل

ضائك، حىت إليك، فإنه ال ينفع تكلم حبق ال نفاذ له، آس الناس يف جملسك ويف وجهك وقال يطمع شريف يف حيفك، وال ييأس ضعيف من عدلك، البينة على املدعي، واليمني على من أنكر، والصلح جائز بني املسلمني، إال صلحا أحل حراما أو حرم حالال، ومن ادعى حقا غائبا أو بينة فاضرب له أمدا ينتهي إليه، فإن بينه أعطتيته حبقه وإن أعجزه ذلك استحلت

ليه القضية، فإن ذلك هو أبلغ يف العذر وأجلى للعماء، وال مينعك قضاء قضيت فيه اليوم عفراجعت فيه رأيك فهديت فيه لرشدك أن تراجع فيه احلق، فإن احلق قدمي ال يبطله شيء، ومراجعة احلق خري من التمادي يف الباطل، واملسلمون عدول بعضهم على بعض، إال جمراب

أو جملودا يف حد، أو ظنينا يف والء أو قرابة، فإن هللا تعاىل توىل من العباد عليه شهادة زور، السرائر، وسرت عليهم احلدود إال ابلبينات واألميان، مث الفهم الفهم فيما أدىل إليك مما ورد عليك مما ليس يف قرآن وال سنة، مث قايس األمور عند ذلك واعرف األمثال، مث اعمد فيما

ها إىل هللا وأشبهها ابحلق، وإايك والغضب والقلق والضجر، والتأذى ابلناس والتنكر ترى إىل أحبفإن القضاء يف مواطن احلق مما يوجب هللا به -عند اخلصومة أو اخلصوم، شك أبو عبيد

األجر، وحيسن به الذكر، فمن خلصت نيته يف احلق ولو على نفسه كفاه هللا ما بينه وبني ليس يف نفسه شانه هللا، فإن هللا تعاىل ال يقبل من العباد إال ما كان الناس، ومن تزين مبا

خالصا، فما ظنك بثواب عند هللا يف عاجل رزقه وخزائن رمحته، والسالم عليك ورمحة هللا(( قال أبو عبيد: فقلت لكثري: هل أسنده جعفر؟ قال: ال. وقال ابن قيم اجلوزية:"وهذا كتاب

لقبول، وبنوا عليه أصول احلكم والشهادة، واحلاكم واملفيت أحوج شيء جليل تلقاه العلماء اب إليه وإىل أتمله والتفقه فيه.


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وطرق إثباهتا، وأن حيكم بني الناس مبا يتوصل إليه من أدلة شرعا وفقا ألصول استماع الدعوى تطمئنن نفسه إليه.

وال شك أن الدعاوى واملرافعات القضائية هي أمور هتمها القضاء، فال وجود للمرافعات بدون الدعاوى اليت ترفع إىل احملاكم، وال معىن لرفع الدعاوى إىل القضاء إال إذا

ا السري يف جمريها إلقامة العدل واإلنصاف بني الناس. وهذا كانت هناك إجراءات تضمن هله( بقوله: "املرافعات والدعاوى هي أهم أركان 1405ما يؤكده الدكتور انصر بن عقيل )

القضاء ولذلك حبثها علماؤان وتناولوها ابلدراسة يف كتب الفقه حتت عنوان الدعاوى والبينات والشهادات".

اكمات الشرعيةأصول احملاملطلب الثاين: ويراد هبا ما يلزم القاضي مراعاته حني ترفع القضية إليه واحلكم بني الناس. وقد وردت

هذه األصول يف عدة أحاديث ويف إشارات نبوية ووصااي الرسول صلى هللا عليه وسلم إىل عنه أصحابه الكرام يف كيفية احلكم بني الناس، منها قوله صلى هللا عليه وسلم لعلي رضي هللا

حني واله قضاء اليمن: }إن هللا سيهدي قلبك ويثبت لسانك، فإذا جلس بني يديك اخلصمان فال تقضني حىت تسمع من اآلخر كما مسعت من األول فإنه أحرى أن يتبني لك القضاء. قال: فما زلت قاضيا أو شككت يف قضاء بعد{)رواه أبو داود، واحلاكم، وأمحد، والبيهقي،

ويف وجوب املساواة بني اخلصمني، قال صلى هللا عليه وسلم: }من ابتلى ابلقضاء وابن حبان(. فليعدل بينهم يف حلظه وإشارته ومقعده{)رواه الدار قطين(. وحديث أيب بكرة يف الصحيحني وغريمها قال: فإين مسعت رسول هللا صلى هللا عليه وسلم يقول: }ال حيكم أحد بني اثنني وهو

(. وقوله صلى هللا عليه وسلم:}شاهداك أو ميينه{)رواه البخاري(.غضبان{)رواه مسلموقد اعترب كتاب عمر إىل أيب موسى األشعري مصدر أصلي من مصادر أصول

(. وقد أورد ابن قيم 2001احملاكمات مما أدى إىل ترمجتها إىل أكثر لغات العامل )القامسي،: حدثنا كثري بن هشام عن جعفر بن م( هذا الكتاب بقوله: قال أبو عبيد2004اجلوزية )

برقان، وقال أبو نعيم: عن جعفر بن برقان عن معمر البصري عن أيب العوام، وقال سفيان بن



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وحسب اإلجراءات اليت تتبعها احملاكم يف مجهورية املالديف، فإنه ورد يف كتاب م 2003 املرافعات القضائية يف احملاكم املالديفية الصادر من وزارة العدل جبمهورية املالديف عام

حتت عنوان "رفع الدعوى والقضية" أبن كل من يتقدم بدعوى إىل القضاء غري الدعاوى املرفوعة من قبل الدولة، أن يوضح القضية املقصودة رفعها ابلكتابة وجيب التسجيل فيها مجيع

بياانت احملتاجة إليها من قبل هيئة القضاء.كما أنه ميكن رفع الدعوى بعد توضيح القضية الجلهة القضاء حبضور املدعي شخصيا إىل احملكمة. ومن مث فإن كل من حيضر إىل القضاء طالبا حقه، فإن على هيئة القضاء أخذ مجيع املعلومات املطلوبة للقضاء والتوقيع عليها من قبل

وإجراء الدعوى وفق تلك املعلومات. وقد تبني من تلك املرافعات القضائية أبن احملاكم املدعي يف املالديف ال تتقيد برفع الدعوى إليها ابلقول فقط، بل فإهنا تفتح اجملال برفع الدعوى إليها

مبا يقوم مقام القول حسب املعىن االصطالحي الفقهي للدعوى. املرافعات القضائية ضمنيا، غري أن الذي يظهر فإن رفع الدعوى وإن كان يدخل يف

لنا مما أورده الفقهاء واملتخصصني يف جمال أصول املرافعات القضائية، أبهنا تشتمل على األمور واملسائل اليت تساعد القاضي للسري يف استماع الدعوى وتدقيقها ومعرفة مطلب املدعي وأبعاد

ور اليت تؤدي إىل حتقيق العدالة يف القضاء واإلجراءات دفع املدعى عليه، وما إىل ذلك من األماليت هتدف إىل حفظ احلقوق وحسم اخلالف وحتقيق العدالة اليت حفظتها الشريعة اإلسالمية لألفراد واجلماعات. وهذا فإنه يبدو لنا أبن مجيع األسس والتشريعات املستخدمة يف احملاكم

واسرتداد احلقوق إىل أهلها تندرج حتت املرافعات واليت تتكفل بتحقيق العدل وضبط اجملتمع القضائية يف الشريعة اإلسالمية.

والقضاء اإلسالمي بطبيعة احلال له شقني أساسيني، ومها العلم بكيفية املطالبة ابحلق على الوجه الشرعي وهو ما يسمى رفع الدعوى أمام جملس القضاء، والشق الثاين من القضاء

فصول اخلصومة بني املتخاصمني وإعطاء كل حق حقه. ومن هنا جاءت هو العلم بكيفية أمهية القضاء اإلسالمي يف فصل اخلصومات وقطع املنازعات بني الناس، حيث أمرت الشريعة اإلسالمية القاضي أن ينظر الدعاوى املقدمة إليه إذا كانت صحيحة موافقة للشروط املعتربة


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وتسمى يف مصر "املرافعات" ويراد منها الطرائق اليت ينبغي أن تتبع منذ بداية احملاكمة ه(. وأصول احملاكمات هي جمموع القواعد واملراسم الواجب 1400حىت هنايتها )القطان،

على القضاة واخلصوم اتباعها يف اإلدعاء والتقاضي، ألجل فصل اخلصومة، وإيصال احلق إىل عن تعريف املرافعات الشرعية: تعين مادة ه(1400)به. ويقول الشيخ مناع القطان صاح

املرافعات الشرعية، االجراءات اليت تتعلق ابلدعوى وما يتبعها من بينات إلثبات احلق أو إبطاله وما يرتتب على ذلك من حكم قضائي يتم تنفيذه.

"هو جمموعة (1982)عمروقانون املرافعات حسب ما عرفه الدكتور حممد الشيخ القواعد اليت تبني اإلجراءات الواجبة اإلتباع للوصول على احلقوق قضاء". وهذا يعين أبن قواعد اإلجراءات تعمل يف حتديد طرق اإللتجاء إىل القضاء وبيان اإلجراءات اليت جيب العمل

هبا كما أهنا تقوم بتوضيح كيفية الفصل يف اخلصومات.م ذكره يبدو يل أبن املرافعات القضائية هي عملية إجرائية تبدأ فبناء على ما تقد

إجراءاهتا يف الدوائر القضائية بداية من رفع الدعوى إليها إىل إصدار احلكم املناسب يف القضية. وموضوعاهتا ال تنحصر يف تشكيل احملاكم وبيان اختصاصها فحسب، بل إهنا تتعلق ببيان

يفية رفع الدعوى إىل احملاكم حىت صدور احلكم مع حتديد مواعيد إجراءات التقاضي بداية يف كالطعن ورسم طرقه مع بيان القواعد اخلاصة بتنفيذ األحكام. وهكذا "تتجلى الصورة العملية

:وهي الدعوى وطرق اإلثبات واحلكم (1989) للتقاضي يف مراحل ثالث يف نظر الزحيليلن زاع واستقرار األوضاع احلقوقية وإهناء العدوان". النهائي، فبها ميكن التوصل للحقوق وحسم ا

( " إن رفع الدعوى إىل القاضي ونظره فيها والرتافع 1989ويقول الدكتور عبد الكرمي زيدان )أمامه بشأهنا إىل أن يصدر احلكم املناسب فيها، كل ذلك جيري حسب قواعد وضوابط معينة

هبا القاضي نفسه. وعليه فإن الدعوى كما يلتزم هبا أصحاب الشأن يف الدعوى كما يلتزمهي الطلب أو املطالبة قوال مقبوال أو ما يقوم مقام القول املقبول يف ه("1405) ذكره الطريفي

جملس القضاء يقصد به إنسان طلب حق له أو ملن ينوب عنه".



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املبحث األول: مفهوم املرافعات القضائية وأركان الدعوى وشروطها وأطرافهارافعات القضائية هي جمموعة قوانني اإلجراءات القضائية تتخذ يف دائرة القضاء كوسيلة إن امل

حلماية احلقوق جلميع أطراف الدعوى، فيتعني مبعرفة مفهوم املرافعات وأصوهلا، وأركان الدعوى، فيتضمن هذا املبحث ثالثة مطالب، وهي:

املطلب األول: مفهوم املرافعات لغة وشرعا غة:املرافعات ل

املرافعات، مفردها مرافعة وهي كلمة عربية مستخرجة من مادة "ر ف ع"، ومن بني معانيها محل الشيء ونقله مثل أن يقال: رفع احلجر من مكانه، ومن معانيها القبول، مثل أن

احملاكمة، فمثال، وفقا مبا ورد يف املعجم العريب يقال: رفع هللا الدعاء والعمل يعين قبله، ومنهااألساسي يقال: رفع الشخص إىل احملاكم يعين رفع إليه ليحاكمه، ورفع عليه قضية، يعين شكله يف احملكمة، و"رافع يرافع مرافعة"كقوله: رافع احملامي عن املتهم، أي دافع عنه وحتدث

(.1988مبا فيه مصلحته )أمحد العايد، عات حسب اإلصطالح القانوين:املراف

و"مرافعات" هي إجراءات معينة لتصحيح الدعوى والسري فيها، وحق املرافعة يعين هبا حق تقدمي أوجه الدفاع عن املتهم وقانون املرافعات معناه حسب املعجم الوسيط، قانون

ويقصد بيوم م(،1989تنظيم اإلجراءات اليت تتبع يف رفع الدعوى أمام احملاكم )جممع اللغة، املرافعة أبنه اليوم املخصص لدفاع احملامي عن املتهم.

ويف شرح كلمة "املرافعة": ذكر حارث سليمان الفاروقي يف معجمه، أبن املرافعة أمام حمكمة تعين بذلك تقدمي الئحة جوابية على إدعاء املدعي أو التهمة املوجهة إليه، وأما عن

فيعين به إجراءات قانونية املشتملة على كل إجراء (1988)انقانون املرافعات كما يذكر سليمم(. 1988خيول القانون اختاذه لدى أي حمكمة للحصول على حق أو تدبري قانوين )الفاروقي،

ابملرافعة، رفع حكم القاضي إلعادة النظر فيه إىل القاضي (2001)وقد تعين يف نظر القامسي املرافعة.نفسه أو إىل قاض له والية


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يف الشريعة والقانون املالديفي، مث يليه املبحث الرابع الذي يشكل صلب الدراسة يتناول فيه اخلامتة اليت مقارنة املرافعات الشرعية بنظام املرافعات اليت تتبعها احملاكم جبمهورية املالديف. مث

ستجمل أبرز نتائج البحث وتوصياته. . الدراسات السابقة:9

مل أطلع بعد البحث على دراسة شاملة هلذا املوضوع من مجيع جوانبه، ومل يعثر على كتاب خاص تناول موضوع املرافعات الشرعية مقارنة ابلقانون املالديفي. وال شك أن الكالم عن

حملاكمات ال يكاد كتاب فقهي خيلو منها، فاألسس موجودة والبناء املرافعات الشرعية وأصول امشيد، ولكن توجد حبوث ودراسات تناولت املوضوع من بعض جوانب متفرقة ومن زوااي

خمتلفة، وهي كاآليت:كتاب أدب القاضي للماوردي يتحدث عن جمال القضاء واملرافعات وفض اخلصومات، -1

ملذهب الشافعي املقارن ابملذاهب األخرى، ويتصور هذا ويتحدث عن الفقه القضائي يف االكتاب حالة القضاء وتشكيالته اإلدارية يف القرن اخلامس اهلجري. وحياول الباحث األخذ

ابلقول الراجح يف كل قضية وأيسرها تطبيقا يف بيئة املالديف.العدل جبمهورية املالديف كتاب املرافعات القضائية يف احملاكم املالديفية الصادر من وزارة -2

م ويذكر فيه اخلصوصيات واملسئوليات املخولة إىل كل حمكمة، والشئون اإلدارية 1994عام املتبعة يف احملاكم، ومل يتعرض اجلوانب الشرعية فيما يتعلق ابملرافعات، لذا فإن الباحث يف

دراسته سيقوم ابستكمال هذا اجلانبلكتابة يف هذا املوضوع الذي يتعلق ابملسائل املتعلقة مبا يتبع وقد رجوت هللا تعاىل أن يوفقين ل

يف احملاكم الشرعية املالديفية ابملراعاة مع املسائل املستجدة يف اجملتمع املالديفي، وإين أسأل هللا تعاىل القبول واإلخالص.



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كل من يلجأ إليه طالبا رفع مستوى القضاء يف مجهورية املالديف ليستوثقه -3 حقه.

:حدود البحث .6يتحدد يف إطار بيان أصول احملاكمات الشرعية فيما يتعلق برفع الدعوى أمام القاضي مقارنة ابلقانون املالديفي مع الرتكيز على اجلانب الفقهي حول رفع الدعوى وكيفية تطبيق أصول

املرافعات الشرعية يف احملاكم جبمهورية املالديف. :. منهج البحث7

يسعى هذا البحث للمقارنة بني املرافعات الشرعية يف الفقه اإلسالمي وبني التشريعات املالديفية تركيزا على اجلانب الفقهي واجلانب التطبيقي يف املالديف، وحياول الباحث أيضا

فاء احلقوق أن يربز حماسن أصول املرافعات الشرعية وإهنا تضمن استي من خالل هذا البحثحبثا فقهيا قانونيا مقاران معتمد على أصول احملاكمات للجميع، وسوف يكون هذا البحث

الشرعية وما جيري عليها العمل يف مجهورية املالديف، وعلى هذا فإن هذا البحث يعتمد على -املناهج اآلتية:

هاء حول املسائل املتعلقة أوال: املنهج االستقرائي والتحليلي، ابستقراء وحتليل آراء الفق ابملوضوع.

اثنيا: املنهج النقدي لبعض االجتهادات يف املرافعات الشرعية.اثلثا: املنهج املقارن، يسعى البحث معتمدا على املنهج املقارن مبقارنة آراء الفقهاء وعلماء

أجل بيان أوجه القانون حول أصول املرافعات يف احملاكم مع استخدام منهج الفقه املقارن من االختالف والتشابه بني آراء العلماء والراجح يف أقواهلم.

. خطة البحث:8يشتمل البحث على أربعة مباحث وخامتة: يف املبحث األول مفهوم املرافعات القضائية وأركان الدعوى وشروطها وأطرافها، ويليه املبحث الثاين إجراءات وآداب رفع الدعوى يف الشريعة والقانون املالديفي مث يليه املبحث الثالث عن إجراءات املرافعات يف حضور اخلصوم ويف غياهبم


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:. أسئلة البحث3يسعى هذا البحث إىل اإلجابة على عدد من األسئلة ذات العالقة مبوضوع البحث

-منها: أوال: ما مفهوم املرافعات القضائية وما أركاهنا وأطرافها؟

الشرعية اثنيا: ما دور املرافعات الشرعية يف احملاكم املالديفية وكيف ميكن تطبيق أصول املرافعات يف إجراءات وآداب رفع الدعوى أمام القاضي يف حضور اخلصوم ويف غياهبم؟

اثلثا: ما أوجه االتفاق واالختالف فيما بني املرافعات الشرعية والقانون املالديفي؟ رابعا: ما مفهوم الغياب يف الفقه اإلسالمي ويف نظام املرافعات املالديفي؟

رافعات يف الفقه اإلسالمي والقانون املالديفي؟خامسا: وما آاثر تطبيق امل :. أهداف البحث4

معرفة أنظمة حكومة املالديف وقوانينها فيما يتعلق ابملرافعات من منظور -1 الشرعية.

القضائية يف املالديف والتعرف على للشؤونمعرفة اهليكل التنظيمي اإلداري -2 أوضاعها يف ربوع البالد.

املرافعات الشرعية يف احملاكم املالديفية.معرفة مدى تطبيق أصول -3املرافعات املالديفية على منوال أصول احملاكمات الشرعية مع نظامحماولة لصياغة -4

إدخال التعديالت الالزمة اليت يتطلبها تطور الزمن والتطور احلضاري املعاصر يف ات.إطار كليات الشريعة اإلسالمية وإيراد آراء الفقهاء يف أصول املرافع

:. أمهية البحث5حاجة املالديف إىل البحوث العلمية اليت تقوم بدراسة مقارنة فيها بني الشريعة -1

اإلسالمية والقوانني املالديفية.تطوير احملاكم جبمهورية املالديف وفق نظام شامل ال يتعارض مع أصول -2

احملاكمات الشريعة.



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وهكذا أرشد رسول هذه األمة عليه أفضل الصالة وأمت التسليم إىل استخدام الوسائل والطرق اليت توصل إىل التقاضي بني اخلصمني إليصال احلقوق إىل مستحقيها.

يف منذ أن أسلم مجيع أهلها حكومة وشعبا ومبا أن مجهورية املالديف بلد إسالمي لذا رأى الباحث أنن من واجبه الديين بظل اإلسالم، ه إىل يومنا هذا يستظل شعبها986سنة

يديل دلوه لبيان رفع اخلصومات وفق الشريعة اإلسالمية إلقامة العدل على أرجائها ورفع أناملرافعات وع هذا البحث عن"مستوى ثقة الناس بنظام القضاء، لذلك عزم أن جيعل موض

" معتمدا على األدلة من القرآن الكرمي واحلديث الشرعية: دراسة مقارنة ابلقانون املالديفيالشريف والكتب الفقهية املعتمدة، ودراسة الدستور املالديفي وبعض املصادر اليت أصدرت

القضائية يف احملاكم املالديفية من قبل وزارة العدل املالديفية واليت تناولت فيها أصول املرافعات .م2008 م إىل1990 ما بني السنة

:. إشكالية البحث2وحيث إن الدستور املالديفي يصرح يف مادته األوىل أبن مبادىء الشريعة اإلسالمية هي جزء الينفك عن الدستور، وكذلك يف املادة السابعة منه يؤكد أبن اإلسالم هو دين الدولة، فمعىن ذلك أنه جيب على مجيع اهليئات واجلهات اليت هلا صالحية صنع األنظمة واللوائح وإصدار

ر والقرارات مبا يف ذلك املرافعات الشرعية يف حماكم البالد أن يلتزموا ابملبادىء اإلسالمية األوامم(. وإذا كان األمر كذلك، فهل تلتزم احملاكم 1998وال جيوز خمالفتها)الدستور املالديفي،

لديفي ابلفعل هبذه األمور؟ وما هي أوجه االختالف واالتفاق بني املرافعات الشرعية والقانون املااملتعلقة ابملرافعات يف احملاكم؟ وما مدى متكن املرافعات الشرعية من حيازة مكاهنا يف نظام املرافعات املالديفي؟ فبناء على هذه اإلشكاليات يود الباحث من خالل هذا البحث اكتشاف

رعية أوضاع احملاكم يف مجهورية املالديف يف رفع الدعوى إليها ومدى استخدام املرافعات الش فيها.


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:. املقدمة1احلمد هلل رب العاملني، والصالة والسالم على سيد املرسلني، وعلى آله وأصحابه

أمجعني. الكون لعمارته سعيا فإن هللا سبحانه وتعاىل خلق اإلنسان يف أحسن تقومي، وسخر له ما يف

إىل سعادة الدارين، وحتقيق التوازن والعدالة يف كل شيء، ويف مجيع األمور. وال شك أن من أهم األسس اليت يسعى اإلسالم إىل أتسيسها هو العدالة يف مجيع ميادين احلياة، فجعل الظلم

وتعاىل. حمرما بني عباد هللا سبحانه وتعاىل بل جعله حمرما على نفسه سبحانهوإذا كان الظلم هو وضع الشيء يف غري حمله، فال ضمان لبقاء كل شيء يف حمله يف إطار تصرفات بين آدم إذ يبغي بعضهم على بعض ويتصرفون تصرفات تصل يف آخر مطافها إىل ظلم وعدوان بعضهم على بعض، فأرسل هللا سبحانه وتعاىل هلم رسلهم ابلبينات ليهذب هذا

لب يناناتا وأنزلنا معهم الكاتاب ﴿عهم الكتب، كما قال عز وجلن:الطبع وأنزل م لقد أرسلنا رسلنا اباسطا لقا يزان لاي قوم الناس ابا .[25﴾ ]احلديد: والما

ومن هنا جاءت أمهية القضاء اإلسالمي يف فصل اخلصومات وقطع املنازعات بني الناس حيثأمرت الشريعة اإلسالمية القاضي أن ينظر يف الدعوى املقدمة إليه إذا كانت صحيحة موافقة للشروط املعتربة شرعا ووفقا ألصول استماع الدعوى وطرق إثباهتا، وأن حيكم بني الناس مبا

يتوصل إليه من أدلة تطمئن نفسه إليها.زالة الظلم فحسب، بل أوضح السبل ومن حماسن اإلسالم أنه مل أيمر إبقامة العدل وإ

والوسائل اليت توصل إىل اهلدف املنشود، فبنين حقوق املتقاضني والقضاة. روى مسلم يف صحيحه عن ابن عباس قال: قال رسول هللا صلى هللا عليه وسلم: }لو يعطى الناس بدعواهم

عي{)حممد ب ن خليفة، صحيح مسلم الدنعى انس دماء رجال وأمواهلم ولكن اليمني على املدن م(. 1994مع شرحه املسمى إكمال املعلم،



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املرافعات الشرعية: دراسة مقارنة ابلقانون املالديفي

إبراهيم زكراي موسى مركز الدرسات العليا، جامعة املالديف اإلسالميةعميد

:ملخصحاول الباحث يف هذه الدراسة بيان مفهوم املرافعات الشرعية ابملقارنة مع نظام املرافعات

الدعوى، مع بيان معىن الدعوى يف االصطالح الشرعي. وقد املالديفي، مع الرتكيز على إجراءات جانب انقش قضية التمييز بني املدعي واملدعى عليه كأهم أساس يف نظر الدعوى يف ضوء آراء الفقهاء مع بيان املعايري اليت حددوها ملعىن الدعوى لدى كل مذهب مع بيان ضرورة منح حق الدفاع للمدعى عليه، كما

اءات املرافعة يف حضور اخلصوم ويف غياهبم، وانقش موضوع احملاكمة يف حالة غياب أحد تناول البحث إجر اخلصوم، وضرورة تلبية دعوة القاضي للحضور إىل احملكمة، والطرق املستخدمة يف إحضار املتقاضني إىل

ستقرائي مث مكان الدعوى يف نظر الفقهاء والقانون املالديفي. واعتمد الباحث على املنهج الوصفي وااللبيان حماسن املرافعات الشرعية كوسيلة اثبتة يف احملاكمة. وقد بنين الباحث خالل التحليلي واالستنباطي

هذه الدراسة أصول احملاكمات يف دائرة القضاء املالديفية ومدى حماكاهتا أصول املرافعات الشرعية من الشريعة اإلسالمية الغراء. عدمها مستهدفا تقومي أصول احملاكمات املالديفية على ضوء

: املرافعات، املدعي، املدعى عليه، الغياب، التقاضي.الكلمات املفتاحية

[email protected]


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8ނގ ސޕޓނބރ . 17،236،އއ.ޕ.އ.ޑ.އރ .އނސޓޓއޝނ ފ ސސޓއނބލ އކނމކ ޑވލޕމނޓ

< އނ.//:../%202011-17/44-.10057> 2017

. 2017 ޙއޖ ޕލސ އނޑ ޕލނ(. 2017މނސޓރ އފ ރލޖސ އފއޒ އނޑ އނޓރފއތ ހމނ، )

2017 1 ސޕޓނބރ ނގ

އނ. //:..///2017%20.



2017 2 ސޕޓނބރ)ތ.ނ(. ނގ .ދވހރއޖނ ޙއޖއ ޢމރއށ މހނ ގނދއމ ބހ ގވއދ

<:// . . . / / / އނ. < .2/


132

ދ ނގނ ހއޓވއ ހޔ އގއގއ ރނގޅ ފނވރގ ޚދމތތކއ ފއ ލނ އމއލ ފރތތކނ ނޖއޒސއ

ލމތށ ބލއރ ޢދރސއނ ލބނ މފރކށދނމގއ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނނ މހއމ ދއރއ އދކރވދނކމވ.

ނޒމ ހރދނކށ ބއޓނ ކރވނ ދނޔގ އ ނ ޙއޖ އނތޒމކރމގ ނޒމގއ ހރ ގނޖހނތކނ އރއގ

އދ ބރނއ ފދއނ ޙއޖ ގޅނހރ ދއލތގ ހއސ އނނ ރކމޔބ މޑލތއ ކމގއވ މލޝއ، ސނގޕ

ތޒމއ ކރވއޖނމ މ މފދ އނޓރސޓ ފނޑއގ ތރއނ އ މސއކތ ރވ އނތޒމކރވގނނވ.

ލތނ މސމހނގ އތނ ފއސ އތރށ ނގމއ ކޓ ހނޒމގ މއޗށ ރއޔތނގ އތބރ ބޑވ މކރއ

އވ.ދކރމގ ކނތއކގއ މހރ ދމވ މއސލތކށ ކނމވސ ވރއގ ލޔއ ލބގނ ދނކމށ ޤބލކރވ

ދވހރއޖއކ ސތކ ޕސނޓ މސލމ ޤއމކށ ވހނދ، ޙއޖށ ދޔމށ އކފރތތކނ އފލ ތކލފއ

އޖއށ ލބ ހރހ މއސލތއ ޙއލކރވނ ރކރ ހދ ކޑކށ، ޙއޖ ކޓ ދނމއ އތރށ ފއސ ނގނފދ

ކޕރޝނގ ރޝނ ޙވލކށ ކޕރޝނގ ދށނ އ މސއކތ އނތޒމކރވގނނވ. އދ ކޓ ޙއޖ ކޕ

ދއރތކނ ޙލލ އނވސޓމނޓ އކއކ އ ވޔފރގ ޓރޒމއސލމކ ލތ ރނގޅކރމށޓކއ ޙމލ

ފހކށދނމކ ޙއޖގ އގ މހރށވރ ކޑކރމށ އހތރވދނ ފރޞތތއ ރއޖއއ ރއޖއނ ބރނ

ގޅ އ ދމއތމށޓކއ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނކމކވ. އގތނ، މނވނކމއކ މސއކތކރ ހރދނ ކޕރޝނ

ގ އނތޒމތކ ގޅ މސއކތތކގއ އހމލވ ޙއޖ، ކމކވ. މގ އތރނ ޤނނއ ވޖދވމކ ވރށ މހއމ

އ ފރތތކމދ ފޔވޅ އޅމށއ ޖވބދރ ކރމށޓކއ ޙއޖގ އނތޒމތއ ރގއލޓކރނ ޤނނ ފރމވރކ

އތމކވސ ބނނތރކމއކނ ދރސއނ ފހގކރވނވ.

ކރމގ ނޒމ އތރށ ދރސކށ މ ނޒމގއ ހރ މއސލތއ އވސގތއގއ ޙއޖ އނތޒމ

ނޒމއ ފނނ ދފށ އތބރކރވ ކރމގއ އނތޒމތއ ޙއޖގ"ޙއލކރނޖހފއވކނ ފހގކރމވ.

މޝނނ ކރ ދރސގއ ބއވރވ އހތރކމއ އއބރލނ ގ މއޗށ ކޢ" މ މއޟމހއމކނ ޤއމކރމގ

ދއވފއވ ހރހ ފރތތކށ އޚލޞތރކމއކ ޝކރ ދނނވމވ.

ޅވލއގނ ފއސ ޙއޖ ޖމޢތތކނ އތރށ ފއސ ނގނ ދކޅ ނޖއސގނ ކމށވނމ އނގމގ ބދލގއ ދކޅ ޖއސނ އދ އކށގނވ ޚދމތއ ފރކށދވނ މނވރކށ ފއސ ނގ

ޢދދށ ބދލ ގނއނ. އދ މފދ ކނކމކ މކރއ ޙލތ ހދނ އތ ފރޞތކށ ނވގތށ ކނކނ ބއޓނކރނ.

.ކނމ އހރކވސ ޙއޖ މޝނ ދރލ އކލވލއ މޝނގ މސއކތ ފށނ ރބއޔގ ރގއލޓރ އދރތކށ ރމތވ މއސލތއ ސޢދ ޢމޠއވފނގ ފރތނ ކ

ރސމކށ ހށހޅނ. އވފނ ހމޖއސމގއ ތޖރބހރ މޠއވފނ ނގމގއ މނސޓރގ ދއރ ފޅކށ، މޠ

.މހނނށ އސކނދނނ ޤއމކރނ އދ މކނ ޑޓބސއއ ލބނ އއތނކނ މޢލމތ ޙއޖވރނގ ހރހ ރއޖގ

އސލމކ މނސޓރނ ބލހއޓނ. ރވއ ހނގނ ޕރގރމތއ އނނގޓރ ހރދނ ތމރނކރމށ އހތރނ ޙޖނނއ. ޙއޖގ ކނކމގއ ހލސބހށ މސއކތކރ ފރތތކށ ލއގތތއ ހމޖއސއ ކޔވއގނތބ

ޒވނނނށ އ މސއކތގއ ޙރކތތރވމގ ފރޞތ ފހކށދނނ.

ދރސގ ލމޓޝނ .8

މގއ ދމވ ބއއ ގނޖހނތކގ ތރގއ ދރސއށ ބނނވ ބއއ މޢލމތ ޔށ ގނދޔމ ދރސ ކރ

، ދރސ ހނގނ މއދތކ ޙއޖ މސނކމގއވމގ ސބބނހދމގއ ދމވ ދތތއ ފހގކށލވއވ. މގތނ

މބހ މއއސސތކގ އސފރތތކ ބއދލކށ މޢލމތ ހދމގއ ގނ އމއލ ޖމޢތތކއ ދއލތގ ކ

މ ދރސ ފރހމކރމގއ ދމވ ގނޖހނތއ ކޑކށ، މ ދރސ އތރށ ގނޖހނތކއ ކރމތވއވ.

ތނ ތފޞލ ދރސއއ ކރމގގއ ކރމކ ފރހމކރމގ ގތނ ޙއޖގ ދވސތއ ފށނރނ ގތއގމ

ފހގކރވނ މއސލތއ އތރށ ދނގތމށ މހއމ ކމކވ.

ނނމނ .9

ނ ދވހރއޖއނ މހނ ޙއޖށ ކރވފއވ ގތ ދނގއނތޒމ އޅކމގޅކނކނމ ދރސއކ ޙއޖގ

މ ދރސއނ ހމވ ޙއޖށ މހނ ޓ ދރސއކވ. ކރވނ ޕއލ ދމވ މއސލތއ ދނގތމށފނވމގއ

އލކރމގއއ ރއޔތނގ ފއސ ރއކތރކމއކ ބލހއޓއ ވޔފރގ ޙމގއ ދމވ މއސލތއ ޔގނދ



133

ދ ނގނ ހއޓވއ ހޔ އގއގއ ރނގޅ ފނވރގ ޚދމތތކއ ފއ ލނ އމއލ ފރތތކނ ނޖއޒސއ

ލމތށ ބލއރ ޢދރސއނ ލބނ މފރކށދނމގއ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނނ މހއމ ދއރއ އދކރވދނކމވ.

ނޒމ ހރދނކށ ބއޓނ ކރވނ ދނޔގ އ ނ ޙއޖ އނތޒމކރމގ ނޒމގއ ހރ ގނޖހނތކނ އރއގ

އދ ބރނއ ފދއނ ޙއޖ ގޅނހރ ދއލތގ ހއސ އނނ ރކމޔބ މޑލތއ ކމގއވ މލޝއ، ސނގޕ

ތޒމއ ކރވއޖނމ މ މފދ އނޓރސޓ ފނޑއގ ތރއނ އ މސއކތ ރވ އނތޒމކރވގނނވ.

ލތނ މސމހނގ އތނ ފއސ އތރށ ނގމއ ކޓ ހނޒމގ މއޗށ ރއޔތނގ އތބރ ބޑވ މކރއ

އވ.ދކރމގ ކނތއކގއ މހރ ދމވ މއސލތކށ ކނމވސ ވރއގ ލޔއ ލބގނ ދނކމށ ޤބލކރވ

ދވހރއޖއކ ސތކ ޕސނޓ މސލމ ޤއމކށ ވހނދ، ޙއޖށ ދޔމށ އކފރތތކނ އފލ ތކލފއ

އޖއށ ލބ ހރހ މއސލތއ ޙއލކރވނ ރކރ ހދ ކޑކށ، ޙއޖ ކޓ ދނމއ އތރށ ފއސ ނގނފދ

ކޕރޝނގ ރޝނ ޙވލކށ ކޕރޝނގ ދށނ އ މސއކތ އނތޒމކރވގނނވ. އދ ކޓ ޙއޖ ކޕ

ދއރތކނ ޙލލ އނވސޓމނޓ އކއކ އ ވޔފރގ ޓރޒމއސލމކ ލތ ރނގޅކރމށޓކއ ޙމލ

ފހކށދނމކ ޙއޖގ އގ މހރށވރ ކޑކރމށ އހތރވދނ ފރޞތތއ ރއޖއއ ރއޖއނ ބރނ

ގޅ އ ދމއތމށޓކއ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނކމކވ. އގތނ، މނވނކމއކ މސއކތކރ ހރދނ ކޕރޝނ

ގ އނތޒމތކ ގޅ މސއކތތކގއ އހމލވ ޙއޖ، ކމކވ. މގ އތރނ ޤނނއ ވޖދވމކ ވރށ މހއމ

އ ފރތތކމދ ފޔވޅ އޅމށއ ޖވބދރ ކރމށޓކއ ޙއޖގ އނތޒމތއ ރގއލޓކރނ ޤނނ ފރމވރކ

އތމކވސ ބނނތރކމއކނ ދރސއނ ފހގކރވނވ.

ކރމގ ނޒމ އތރށ ދރސކށ މ ނޒމގއ ހރ މއސލތއ އވސގތއގއ ޙއޖ އނތޒމ

ނޒމއ ފނނ ދފށ އތބރކރވ ކރމގއ އނތޒމތއ ޙއޖގ"ޙއލކރނޖހފއވކނ ފހގކރމވ.

މޝނނ ކރ ދރސގއ ބއވރވ އހތރކމއ އއބރލނ ގ މއޗށ ކޢ" މ މއޟމހއމކނ ޤއމކރމގ

ދއވފއވ ހރހ ފރތތކށ އޚލޞތރކމއކ ޝކރ ދނނވމވ.

ޅވލއގނ ފއސ ޙއޖ ޖމޢތތކނ އތރށ ފއސ ނގނ ދކޅ ނޖއސގނ ކމށވނމ އނގމގ ބދލގއ ދކޅ ޖއސނ އދ އކށގނވ ޚދމތއ ފރކށދވނ މނވރކށ ފއސ ނގ

ޢދދށ ބދލ ގނއނ. އދ މފދ ކނކމކ މކރއ ޙލތ ހދނ އތ ފރޞތކށ ނވގތށ ކނކނ ބއޓނކރނ.

.ކނމ އހރކވސ ޙއޖ މޝނ ދރލ އކލވލއ މޝނގ މސއކތ ފށނ ރބއޔގ ރގއލޓރ އދރތކށ ރމތވ މއސލތއ ސޢދ ޢމޠއވފނގ ފރތނ ކ

ރސމކށ ހށހޅނ. އވފނ ހމޖއސމގއ ތޖރބހރ މޠއވފނ ނގމގއ މނސޓރގ ދއރ ފޅކށ، މޠ

.މހނނށ އސކނދނނ ޤއމކރނ އދ މކނ ޑޓބސއއ ލބނ އއތނކނ މޢލމތ ޙއޖވރނގ ހރހ ރއޖގ

އސލމކ މނސޓރނ ބލހއޓނ. ރވއ ހނގނ ޕރގރމތއ އނނގޓރ ހރދނ ތމރނކރމށ އހތރނ ޙޖނނއ. ޙއޖގ ކނކމގއ ހލސބހށ މސއކތކރ ފރތތކށ ލއގތތއ ހމޖއސއ ކޔވއގނތބ

ޒވނނނށ އ މސއކތގއ ޙރކތތރވމގ ފރޞތ ފހކށދނނ.

ދރސގ ލމޓޝނ .8

މގއ ދމވ ބއއ ގނޖހނތކގ ތރގއ ދރސއށ ބނނވ ބއއ މޢލމތ ޔށ ގނދޔމ ދރސ ކރ

، ދރސ ހނގނ މއދތކ ޙއޖ މސނކމގއވމގ ސބބނހދމގއ ދމވ ދތތއ ފހގކށލވއވ. މގތނ

މބހ މއއސސތކގ އސފރތތކ ބއދލކށ މޢލމތ ހދމގއ ގނ އމއލ ޖމޢތތކއ ދއލތގ ކ

މ ދރސ ފރހމކރމގއ ދމވ ގނޖހނތއ ކޑކށ، މ ދރސ އތރށ ގނޖހނތކއ ކރމތވއވ.

ތނ ތފޞލ ދރސއއ ކރމގގއ ކރމކ ފރހމކރމގ ގތނ ޙއޖގ ދވސތއ ފށނރނ ގތއގމ

ފހގކރވނ މއސލތއ އތރށ ދނގތމށ މހއމ ކމކވ.

ނނމނ .9

ނ ދވހރއޖއނ މހނ ޙއޖށ ކރވފއވ ގތ ދނގއނތޒމ އޅކމގޅކނކނމ ދރސއކ ޙއޖގ

މ ދރސއނ ހމވ ޙއޖށ މހނ ޓ ދރސއކވ. ކރވނ ޕއލ ދމވ މއސލތއ ދނގތމށފނވމގއ

އލކރމގއއ ރއޔތނގ ފއސ ރއކތރކމއކ ބލހއޓއ ވޔފރގ ޙމގއ ދމވ މއސލތއ ޔގނދ


134

ސރކރގ ބނމށ ރޒވކރ ކޓއށ އނމ މދނ ބނނވނ މނވރއ ދރލ ކނޑއޅމއ، އ ކޓއނ

ނ ފރތތކއ ގތ ކނޑއޅމށ ހރދނ އސލއ އކލވލއ މފދ އސލތކކ ފރޞތ ދދނ. ދފށ ފނނ ނޒމއގ ދށނ ހމކރވ އސލތކށ ހ

ޙއޖށ މހނ ގނދޔމށ އދ ޕރޕސލ ހށހޅމށ ކރ އޢލނ ގޅގނ، ޕރޕސލތކށ

ގނޑއ އކލވލއ ބޑ ހށހޅ ފރތތކ ހއސކރނ. އދ އ ޕއނޓ ދނމށ ބނނކރނ ހރދނ މނމނއ ދފށ މނގނޑގއ ސބކޓގރތކކ ކބއކމއ، އބއތކށ މކސދވނ ގތތކގ ތފސލ ހ

ދއ ބޑ ހށހޅ ފރތތކ ހއސކރނ. ނގނޑކށ ހ ފނނ މމވސ ރސމކށ ލބ 1000 ނ ލހނ ކމގއވނ ޖއށ ލބ އތރ ކޓ ކށވރވ ދވހރއ

އގ ކރކޅގއ ކޓއކ ޔޤނ ކޓ ކމށވއރ، ކޓއށ އދ ޕރޕސލ ހށހޅމށ ދރލ ކނމ އހރއ ޢއމކރނ. އޢލނކށ އވލއޝނ ޕރސސ ނނމ

ގއ ރގއލޓރ އތރޓއއގ ދއރ އސލމކ މނސޓރގ ދއރކ ޙއޖގ ކނކމ

ވއޒފނ އކއކ ޙއޖ ޖމޢތތކ ގޅގނ ށވއރ އސލމކ މނސޓރގ އސފރތތކއ މ އދކރނކމގއލނފދ ގތކށ ޔތނގ އތބރ މނސޓރގ މއޗށ ނ ވ ޢމލތކނ ދރވ ޢއމ ރއ ކރ ނދ

އ ހމނނ. ކނކނ އނތޒމކރނ. މގތނ ކމބހ ގވއދތކއ އސލތކގއ އބ ބޑ އވލއޝނ ކރއޓރއތކށ ބދލތއ ގނނނ ނޖހނ ގތކށ އދ ފސހކމއކ

ކރއޓރއގއ ބނ އއޗއ މނ ކރވނ ގތކށ ހރދނ އވލއޝނކށ މހއމވނ ބއތއ ސފކށ ހމނއގނ ދރ މސތޤބލށ އމޒކރވ ބޑނގ ޑކއމނޓއ އކލވލނ.

ނޑއޅފއވ އސލތކ އ ހދއ އފދ ފރތތކމދ ކވއދ ޚލފށ ފއސ ނގ ފރތތގ .ފޔވޅ އޅނއއގތށ

ރޖސޓރކރ ޙއޖށ ގނދޔމށ ވކވކ ޖމޢތތކށ ފރޞތ ދނނމވސ، ޙއޖށ ދނ ޒ ށ، މރކރ ކރމށއ ފއސ ދއކމށ ދއލތގ އއ ވއގއއ ބނނކހރހ ފރތތއ ރޖސޓ

އކއނޓކށ ފއސ ދއކނ ނޒމއ ޤއމކރނ. ޖމޢތތކނ އތރށ ފއސ ނގނމ ކމބހ ފރތތކށ އކނ ރޕޓ ކރމށ ޢއމނ

ތނނށރއޔ ހލނތރކރމށ ޤއމ ފނވރގއ ހލނތރކރމގ ޕރގރމއ ހނގނ. މގތނ، ޢއމފޅ މދވރކށ ވސލތތއ އހނހނ މޑއއއ ސޝލ ޕރގރމތއ ހލނތރކރމގ އމޒކށ

ގނދޔނ. ކރޔށ ދމހއޓނވ ގތކށ ދއރއއގއ ކޓ ،ކރމއށ ޝރޠހށހޅމ އއއމއލ ފރތތކށ ކޓ ދކރއރ ޕރފމނސ ގރނޓ

ޙއޖށ ގނދޔމގއ ގވއދ ޚލފވއޖނމ އ މއސލއއގއ ޒނމވ ފރތނ ދކރވ ފރތތކނ .ޕރފމނސ ގރނޓނ އނކރނހށހޅފއވ

ބސއކނ ފސހއނ ލބނ ނތނޓޑ ދވހ ހރހ ޙޖނގ މޢލމތ އއ 3.36.

ކނމ އހރކ ޙއޖށ ދ ފރތތކގ މޢލމތ ޙއޖ ރޕޓތއ މދވރކށ މނސޓރއށ ލބނކމގއވޔސ،

މޢލމތ އއ ޑޓބސއކނ ތފސހސބއ ނގ މހމށ ހމޖހފއވ ޔހރހ ޖމޢތކނ ޙއޖށ ދ

މގތނ، ބއއ ޖމޢތތކނ މނސޓރއށ ހށހޅފއވ ލސޓތއ އވއވ. ފހގކރވފ ކނލބނނތ

އނގފއނވމނ ގއލފއވކނވސ ފހގކރވފއވއވ. ދވހރއޖއނ ޙއޖށ ދ ފރތތކގ ތފސހސބ

ޙއޖގ ކނކނ ރވ ސޔސތތއ ކނޑއޅމއ، ނނވބ ޙއލކރމށ ޙއޖވރނނށ ދމވ މއސލތއ

ފހގކރވފއވއވ. ހނގމގއ ދތތކ ކރމތވފއވކނ

އހތރނ ތމރނކރމށ ހރދނ ޓރއނނގ ޕރގރމތއ ނތނ ޙޖނގ 6.3.4

ކމކވ. މގ އމހދނމކ މ ނގ އހތރނނށޙޖނނށއ ޙޖ ޙއޖ ގޅނހރ ދނ ގނ މޢލމތތކއ

ފދ ބއއ ރބ، އރދ އދ އނގރސޢއތރނ، ޢއމކށ ކނކމގއ މޢމލތ ކރމށ ބނނކރމށ

ނކމށ ހލނތރކރވމކ ބސތއ އސސ މނވރށ އނގމއ، ބސކ ފސޓ އއޑ ސކލސ ފދ ކ

މގތނ، ޙއޖގ ކނކމގއ ހލސބހށ މސއކތކރ ފރތތކށ ލއގތތއ ހމޖއސއ ކމކވ. ބނނތރ

ކޔވއގނތބ ޒވނނނށ އ މސއކތގއ ޙރކތތރވމގ ފރޞތ ދނމކ މހއމ ކމކވ.

އސލތއ ޙއލ ކރމށ ހށއޅ ލފމ .7

ދވހރއޖއށ ލބ ކޓގ އދދ އތރކރމށ ސޢދ އރބއޔގއ ކނމ އހރކ އނނ އނއލ ޙއޖ ކނފރނސ ފދ ބއދލވނތކގއ ބއވރވ އކމށ ވކލތކރނ.

ޙއޖ ކޓ ދއރ މނސޓރ ކނޑއޅ މނވރއ މލޑވސ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނށ ދގތށއސލގއ ބޔނކށފއ އތ އތމގ ބދލގއ ލބ ކޓގ ވކ މނވރއ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނށ ދނމށ

ދރލ ކނޑއޅނ. ނމ އ ޢދދކ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނށ ލބ ކޓގ ތރއށ މނސޓރގ ބނމށ ކޓ ރޒވކރ

އތރކށދވ ޢދދއ ކމގއ ހމޖއސނ.



135

ސރކރގ ބނމށ ރޒވކރ ކޓއށ އނމ މދނ ބނނވނ މނވރއ ދރލ ކނޑއޅމއ، އ ކޓއނ

ނ ފރތތކއ ގތ ކނޑއޅމށ ހރދނ އސލއ އކލވލއ މފދ އސލތކކ ފރޞތ ދދނ. ދފށ ފނނ ނޒމއގ ދށނ ހމކރވ އސލތކށ ހ

ޙއޖށ މހނ ގނދޔމށ އދ ޕރޕސލ ހށހޅމށ ކރ އޢލނ ގޅގނ، ޕރޕސލތކށ

ގނޑއ އކލވލއ ބޑ ހށހޅ ފރތތކ ހއސކރނ. އދ އ ޕއނޓ ދނމށ ބނނކރނ ހރދނ މނމނއ ދފށ ބކޓގރތކކ ކބއކމއ، އބއތކށ މކސދވނ ގތތކގ ތފސލ ހ މނގނޑގއ ސ

ދއ ބޑ ހށހޅ ފރތތކ ހއސކރނ. ނގނޑކށ ހ ފނނ މމވސ ރސމކށ ލބ 1000 ނ ލހނ ކމގއވނ ޖއށ ލބ އތރ ކޓ ކށވރވ ދވހރއ

އގ ކރކޅގއ ކޓއކ ޔޤނ ކޓ ކމށވއރ، ކޓއށ އދ ޕރޕސލ ހށހޅމށ ދރލ ކނމ އހރއ ޢއމކރނ. އޢލނކށ އވލއޝނ ޕރސސ ނނމ

ގއ ރގއލޓރ އތރޓއއގ ދއރ އސލމކ މނސޓރގ ދއރކ ޙއޖގ ކނކމ

ވއޒފނ އކއކ ޙއޖ ޖމޢތތކ ގޅގނ ށވއރ އސލމކ މނސޓރގ އސފރތތކއ މ އދކރނކމގއލނފދ ގތކށ ޔތނގ އތބރ މނސޓރގ މއޗށ ނ ވ ޢމލތކނ ދރވ ޢއމ ރއ ކރ ނދ

އ ހމނނ. ކނކނ އނތޒމކރނ. މގތނ ކމބހ ގވއދތކއ އސލތކގއ އބ ބޑ އވލއޝނ ކރއޓރއތކށ ބދލތއ ގނނނ ނޖހނ ގތކށ އދ ފސހކމއކ

ކރއޓރއގއ ބނ އއޗއ މނ ކރވނ ގތކށ ހރދނ އވލއޝނކށ މހއމވނ ބއތއ ސފކށ ހމނއގނ ދރ މސތޤބލށ އމޒކރވ ބޑނގ ޑކއމނޓއ އކލވލނ.

ނޑއޅފއވ އސލތކ އ ހދއ އފދ ފރތތކމދ ކވއދ ޚލފށ ފއސ ނގ ފރތތގ .ފޔވޅ އޅނއއގތށ

ރޖސޓރކރ ޙއޖށ ގނދޔމށ ވކވކ ޖމޢތތކށ ފރޞތ ދނނމވސ، ޙއޖށ ދނ ޒ ށ، މރކރ ކރމށއ ފއސ ދއކމށ ދއލތގ އއ ވއގއއ ބނނކހރހ ފރތތއ ރޖސޓ

އކއނޓކށ ފއސ ދއކނ ނޒމއ ޤއމކރނ. ޖމޢތތކނ އތރށ ފއސ ނގނމ ކމބހ ފރތތކށ އކނ ރޕޓ ކރމށ ޢއމނ

ތނނށރއޔ ހލނތރކރމށ ޤއމ ފނވރގއ ހލނތރކރމގ ޕރގރމއ ހނގނ. މގތނ، ޢއމފޅ މދވރކށ ވސލތތއ އހނހނ މޑއއއ ސޝލ ޕރގރމތއ ހލނތރކރމގ އމޒކށ

ގނދޔނ. ކރޔށ ދމހއޓނވ ގތކށ ދއރއއގއ ކޓ ،ކރމއށ ޝރޠހށހޅމ އއއމއލ ފރތތކށ ކޓ ދކރއރ ޕރފމނސ ގރނޓ

ޙއޖށ ގނދޔމގއ ގވއދ ޚލފވއޖނމ އ މއސލއއގއ ޒނމވ ފރތނ ދކރވ ފރތތކނ .ޕރފމނސ ގރނޓނ އނކރނހށހޅފއވ

ބސއކނ ފސހއނ ލބނ ނތނޓޑ ދވހ ހރހ ޙޖނގ މޢލމތ އއ 3.36.

ކނމ އހރކ ޙއޖށ ދ ފރތތކގ މޢލމތ ޙއޖ ރޕޓތއ މދވރކށ މނސޓރއށ ލބނކމގއވޔސ،

މޢލމތ އއ ޑޓބސއކނ ތފސހސބއ ނގ މހމށ ހމޖހފއވ ޔހރހ ޖމޢތކނ ޙއޖށ ދ

މގތނ، ބއއ ޖމޢތތކނ މނސޓރއށ ހށހޅފއވ ލސޓތއ އވއވ. ފހގކރވފ ކނލބނނތ

އނގފއނވމނ ގއލފއވކނވސ ފހގކރވފއވއވ. ދވހރއޖއނ ޙއޖށ ދ ފރތތކގ ތފސހސބ

ޙއޖގ ކނކނ ރވ ސޔސތތއ ކނޑއޅމއ، ނނވބ ޙއލކރމށ ޙއޖވރނނށ ދމވ މއސލތއ

ފހގކރވފއވއވ. ހނގމގއ ދތތކ ކރމތވފއވކނ

އހތރނ ތމރނކރމށ ހރދނ ޓރއނނގ ޕރގރމތއ ނތނ ޙޖނގ 6.3.4

ކމކވ. މގ އމހދނމކ މ ނގ އހތރނނށޙޖނނށއ ޙޖ ޙއޖ ގޅނހރ ދނ ގނ މޢލމތތކއ

ފދ ބއއ ރބ، އރދ އދ އނގރސޢއތރނ، ޢއމކށ ކނކމގއ މޢމލތ ކރމށ ބނނކރމށ

ނކމށ ހލނތރކރވމކ ބސތއ އސސ މނވރށ އނގމއ، ބސކ ފސޓ އއޑ ސކލސ ފދ ކ

މގތނ، ޙއޖގ ކނކމގއ ހލސބހށ މސއކތކރ ފރތތކށ ލއގތތއ ހމޖއސއ ކމކވ. ބނނތރ

ކޔވއގނތބ ޒވނނނށ އ މސއކތގއ ޙރކތތރވމގ ފރޞތ ދނމކ މހއމ ކމކވ.

އސލތއ ޙއލ ކރމށ ހށއޅ ލފމ .7

ދވހރއޖއށ ލބ ކޓގ އދދ އތރކރމށ ސޢދ އރބއޔގއ ކނމ އހރކ އނނ އނއލ ޙއޖ ކނފރނސ ފދ ބއދލވނތކގއ ބއވރވ އކމށ ވކލތކރނ.

ޙއޖ ކޓ ދއރ މނސޓރ ކނޑއޅ މނވރއ މލޑވސ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނށ ދގތށއސލގއ ބޔނކށފއ އތ އތމގ ބދލގއ ލބ ކޓގ ވކ މނވރއ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނށ ދނމށ

ދރލ ކނޑއޅނ. ނމ އ ޢދދކ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނށ ލބ ކޓގ ތރއށ މނސޓރގ ބނމށ ކޓ ރޒވކރ

އތރކށދވ ޢދދއ ކމގއ ހމޖއސނ.


136

ޙއޖށ މހނ ގނދ ތކނ ފހގ ކރވނވ. ބނނވނމ އތރށ ފއސ ދއކނނނ އތރ ގތއ ނނނ

އމއލ ޖމޢތތކނ ޕރޕސލގއ ބޔނކށފއވ އގށވރ އތރށ އތއހސ ރފޔއއ އކ ނނނމގއ

އ އދ އކނ ޘޤފތކށ މހރހ ކމއ މގތށ ހނގ ،މގތނ ނގ ފއސ ނގނ ރސދއ ނދކމއ ،ނގކމއ

ބދލވމނދއރ އކމމދ ކމބހ ފރތތކނ އއވސ ވރކށ އޅލއ އކނ ޙއލކރނ މސއކތ ނކރކނ

ފހގކރވފއވއވ.

ޙއޖގ އހނހނ ޚދމތތކ ގޅނހރ މއސލތކއ ޙއލ6.3

އކލވލނ ލސވނ ޙއޖ މޝނ 6.3.1

ޙއޖގ އގތނ، އޖ މޝނ އކލވލނ ލސވމކ ޙއޖގ ކނކނ ލސވމށ މދވރވ އއ ސބބވ. ޙ

ކށ ގ ކމބހ ފރތތކނ ފނވ ސޓތއރބއޔ ށ ސޢދއގރމނޓގއ ސއކރމށޓކއ ޙއޖ މޝނ

ޙއޖ ގޅގނ އކލވލވ އ ،ޖވބދރވ، އ ފރތތކނ އނގ އނގނތކއ ސރކއލރތކށ ޢމލކރމށއ

ލތކގ މޢލމތ ހދނ ލސވމގ ސބބނ ޙއޖ ގޅނހރ އހނހނ އނތޒމތއވސ ސވއދތކއ އގ

ށ ވނމގ ފސ ހއދނ ޙއޖ މޝނގ ޙރކތތއ ލސވމގ ސބބނ ޙއޖ ޓމނލވ. ގނދއލސވ

ފހގކރވއވ. ވސލސވނފދ ދތތކ ކރމތވފއވކނ

ގ މއޗށވ. ޙއޖވރނނށ ސޢދ އރބއޔގއ ލބ ގނ ޚދމތތކގ އގއ ފނވރ ބނވނ މޠއވފނ

ދވހ ޙއޖވރނގ ގރޕތކ އކ މޠއވފނ އކ އގގއ ހވލވމގ ސބބނ، ބއއ މޠއވފނގ

އއބސވފއވ ޚދމތތއ ނލބމނ އކނކނ ރނގޅކރމށ އތރށ ބޑތ ، ޚދމތތކގއ ތފތވމއ

ބޑ ގއލމއއޖވރނނށއ ގރޕތކށޙއސ ދއކނމވސ ޚދމތ ލބފއނވމނ، އދދތކނ ފ

ޖހފއވއވ. ތޙއމލކރނ

ގޅގނ ޕރޕސލގރޕނ ނވތ އއށވރ ގނ ގރޕ ދ ގނދޔމށ މހނ ޙއޖށ ދވހރއޖއނ

ހށހޅފއވނ.

ކށހއސ އފރތތކ މޢލމތ ބއއ ފރތނ މނސޓރގ ތއޔރކރމގއ ޕރޕސލތއ ބއއ،

އހތރވފއވނ. މވއޒފނތކއ މނސޓރގ ތއޔރކރމގއ ޕރޕސލތއ

ބދލ މނގނޑތކށ އވލއޓކރނ ގތނ ޕރޕސލތއ ހދއދނމގ މނފ ނޖއޒ ބޔކށ ވކ

ގނސފއވނ.

ހމނކރނ. ކނފނތކށ ދވނގތ މކސ ނމމނ އވލއޓކށ ޕރޕސލތއ

ގއލގތށ ވރކނއދ ހމހމކމއ އނސފ ،ގވއދ ޚލފށ ކނތއތއ މރޙލގ އވލއޝނގ

ކރޔށ ގނދޔނ.

ކރމށ ދ ލފޙއޖ ފއސ ނގމގއ ދމވ މއސލތކއ ޙއލ 6.2

ކނޑއޅފއވ އގށވރ އތރށ ފއސ ނގނ 6.2.1

ޖށ މހނ ގނދޔމށ ހއދ ދފއވ ކނފނތކއ މނސޓރ އފ އސލމކ އފއޒ ދމދ ވވ ޙއ

އސލމކ މނސޓރނ އގށވރ އތރށ ކނފނތކނ ފއސ ނނގމށހއދ ދފއވ ،އއބސވމގއ

މހނ މކނ ނގކނ ދރސއނ ފހގކރވފއވއވ.ވނމވސ އއށވރ އތރށ ފއސ ޝރޠކށފއ

ދމވނ މދވރވ ސބބކ ދވހރއޖއނ މހނ ޙއޖށ ގނދޔމށ ސރކރނ މހރ ކނޑއޅފއވ އގކ

ޕރޕސލގއ ކނޑއޅ އގށވރ އތރށ ފއސ ނގނ އކތށ އކށގނވ އގއކމގއ ނވމވ. އ މސ

ފޔވޅއގ އ ޚލފށ ޢމލކށފއވނމއ ލނކރމށ ފހގއވ. އދޢއމކށ އމނސޓރގ ހއދއއކ ޢ

އ ކނފނޏއ ސސޕނޑ ކރމގ އޚތޔރ މނސޓރއށ ލބގނވއވކނޑއޅ ވކ މއދތކށ ގތގއ

އތރށ ފއސ ނގ ހނނމވސ، އތ.ނ(. .ދވހރއޖނ ޙއޖއ ޢމރއށ މހނ ގނދއމ ބހ ގވއދ)

އމނގ ޢމކމގއ އދ ރޕޓކރނމވސ އފރތކމދ ފޔވޅނޅމއ ،ނކރކމއ މއސލތއ ރޕޓ

ގނ ފރތތކނ އތރށ ފއސ ދއކނ ޙއޖށދނ ހލނތރކނ ކޑކނ ދރސއނ ވނ ފހގކރވފއވ.



137

ޙއޖށ މހނ ގނދ ތކނ ފހގ ކރވނވ. ބނނވނމ އތރށ ފއސ ދއކނނނ އތރ ގތއ ނނނ

އމއލ ޖމޢތތކނ ޕރޕސލގއ ބޔނކށފއވ އގށވރ އތރށ އތއހސ ރފޔއއ އކ ނނނމގއ

އ އދ އކނ ޘޤފތކށ މހރހ ކމއ މގތށ ހނގ ،މގތނ ނގ ފއސ ނގނ ރސދއ ނދކމއ ،ނގކމއ

ބދލވމނދއރ އކމމދ ކމބހ ފރތތކނ އއވސ ވރކށ އޅލއ އކނ ޙއލކރނ މސއކތ ނކރކނ

ފހގކރވފއވއވ.

ޙއޖގ އހނހނ ޚދމތތކ ގޅނހރ މއސލތކއ ޙއލ6.3

އކލވލނ ލސވނ ޙއޖ މޝނ 6.3.1

ޙއޖގ އގތނ، އޖ މޝނ އކލވލނ ލސވމކ ޙއޖގ ކނކނ ލސވމށ މދވރވ އއ ސބބވ. ޙ

ކށ ގ ކމބހ ފރތތކނ ފނވ ސޓތއރބއޔ ށ ސޢދއގރމނޓގއ ސއކރމށޓކއ ޙއޖ މޝނ

ޙއޖ ގޅގނ އކލވލވ އ ،ޖވބދރވ، އ ފރތތކނ އނގ އނގނތކއ ސރކއލރތކށ ޢމލކރމށއ

ލތކގ މޢލމތ ހދނ ލސވމގ ސބބނ ޙއޖ ގޅނހރ އހނހނ އނތޒމތއވސ ސވއދތކއ އގ

ށ ވނމގ ފސ ހއދނ ޙއޖ މޝނގ ޙރކތތއ ލސވމގ ސބބނ ޙއޖ ޓމނލވ. ގނދއލސވ

ފހގކރވއވ. ވސލސވނފދ ދތތކ ކރމތވފއވކނ

ގ މއޗށވ. ޙއޖވރނނށ ސޢދ އރބއޔގއ ލބ ގނ ޚދމތތކގ އގއ ފނވރ ބނވނ މޠއވފނ

ދވހ ޙއޖވރނގ ގރޕތކ އކ މޠއވފނ އކ އގގއ ހވލވމގ ސބބނ، ބއއ މޠއވފނގ

އއބސވފއވ ޚދމތތއ ނލބމނ އކނކނ ރނގޅކރމށ އތރށ ބޑތ ، ޚދމތތކގއ ތފތވމއ

ބޑ ގއލމއއޖވރނނށއ ގރޕތކށޙއސ ދއކނމވސ ޚދމތ ލބފއނވމނ، އދދތކނ ފ

ޖހފއވއވ. ތޙއމލކރނ

ގޅގނ ޕރޕސލގރޕނ ނވތ އއށވރ ގނ ގރޕ ދ ގނދޔމށ މހނ ޙއޖށ ދވހރއޖއނ

ހށހޅފއވނ.

ކށހއސ އފރތތކ މޢލމތ ބއއ ފރތނ މނސޓރގ ތއޔރކރމގއ ޕރޕސލތއ ބއއ،

އހތރވފއވނ. މވއޒފނތކއ މނސޓރގ ތއޔރކރމގއ ޕރޕސލތއ

ބދލ މނގނޑތކށ އވލއޓކރނ ގތނ ޕރޕސލތއ ހދއދނމގ މނފ ނޖއޒ ބޔކށ ވކ

ގނސފއވނ.

ހމނކރނ. ކނފނތކށ ދވނގތ މކސ ނމމނ އވލއޓކށ ޕރޕސލތއ

ގއލގތށ ވރކނއދ ހމހމކމއ އނސފ ،ގވއދ ޚލފށ ކނތއތއ މރޙލގ އވލއޝނގ

ކރޔށ ގނދޔނ.

ކރމށ ދ ލފޙއޖ ފއސ ނގމގއ ދމވ މއސލތކއ ޙއލ 6.2

ކނޑއޅފއވ އގށވރ އތރށ ފއސ ނގނ 6.2.1

ޖށ މހނ ގނދޔމށ ހއދ ދފއވ ކނފނތކއ މނސޓރ އފ އސލމކ އފއޒ ދމދ ވވ ޙއ

އސލމކ މނސޓރނ އގށވރ އތރށ ކނފނތކނ ފއސ ނނގމށހއދ ދފއވ ،އއބސވމގއ

މހނ މކނ ނގކނ ދރސއނ ފހގކރވފއވއވ.ވނމވސ އއށވރ އތރށ ފއސ ޝރޠކށފއ

ދމވނ މދވރވ ސބބކ ދވހރއޖއނ މހނ ޙއޖށ ގނދޔމށ ސރކރނ މހރ ކނޑއޅފއވ އގކ

ޕރޕސލގއ ކނޑއޅ އގށވރ އތރށ ފއސ ނގނ އކތށ އކށގނވ އގއކމގއ ނވމވ. އ މސ

ފޔވޅއގ އ ޚލފށ ޢމލކށފއވނމއ ލނކރމށ ފހގއވ. އދޢއމކށ އމނސޓރގ ހއދއއކ ޢ

އ ކނފނޏއ ސސޕނޑ ކރމގ އޚތޔރ މނސޓރއށ ލބގނވއވކނޑއޅ ވކ މއދތކށ ގތގއ

އތރށ ފއސ ނގ ހނނމވސ، އތ.ނ(. .ދވހރއޖނ ޙއޖއ ޢމރއށ މހނ ގނދއމ ބހ ގވއދ)

އމނގ ޢމކމގއ އދ ރޕޓކރނމވސ އފރތކމދ ފޔވޅނޅމއ ،ނކރކމއ މއސލތއ ރޕޓ

ގނ ފރތތކނ އތރށ ފއސ ދއކނ ޙއޖށދނ ހލނތރކނ ކޑކނ ދރސއނ ވނ ފހގކރވފއވ.


138

ތރއނ ޙއޖގ އޅކނ އދކރވނ މގއ ހދއދނމކ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނގ މޤޞދ ކމގއވއރ، އ މޤޞދ

ކރމށ ހރސއޅގނދނއވ.ހސލ

ލއ އކލވލއ ސކނފނތކނ ޙއޖ ކޓއށ އދ ހށހޅ ޕރޕސލތއ އވލއޓ ކރމގ ހރދނ އ6.1.2

.އމކރވފއ ނތނޢ

ލނ ޢކރ އމނސޓރ އފ އސލމކ އފއޒނ މށ އދ ޕރޕސލ ހށހޅމށ ޔޙއޖށ މހނ ގނދ

ނ ކރއޓރއގ ތފޞލ ޕރބޑ މޓނގގއ ޕރޕސލތއ އވލއޓކރހށހޅ ގޅގނ، ކނފނތކނ

ހއސކށފއނވމކ ޕރޕސލ ހށހޅމގއ ކނފނތކށ ދމވ ގނޖހމކވ. އދ އނމ އނސފވރކމއކ

ގތކށ ކރއޓރއ އކލވލފއވމގ ސބބނ ބޑ ހށހޅ ފރތތކގ މދގއ މކސ ނދވދނފދ

ވދވރކމއ ހމހމ ފރޞތތކއ ނތމނ ވރށ ބޑ ނތނވސކމއ އފދމނދއވ.

މޢލމތ ޕރބޑ މޓނގއ ނނކށފއވނ ވނ އހރގ ޙއޖ ޕރޕސލ އވލއޓ ކރމގއ ބ 1438 އގތނ،

އ މނގނޑގއ ތފތ މނގނޑއކނ އސސގ ތޙޤޤނ ފހގކރވފއވއވ. އދ މނގނޑދފއވ

ށހޅ ފރތތކ ބޑ ހސބކޓގރތކކ ކބއކމއ، އބއތކށ މކސދވނ މނގނޑތކ ގޅނހރ ތފޞލ

ކރއޓރއ ހދފއވ ގތނ ވކވކ ބއތކށ މގ އތރނ، ނވކނވސ ފހގކރވފއވއވ.ހއސކށފއ

ކށ ޙއޖށ މކސ ދނގތ ނނމމށ ކމޓއށ އޚތޔރ ދފއވމނ ބޑތކގ ވދވރކނ ގއލ، ބޑ އވޑ

މގ ހއދ ދނމގއ ވކ ފރތކށ މނފ ލބނގތށ ނނމމގ ފރޞތ އތކނ ފހގކރވއވ. ޔގނދމހނ

ޕރޕސލތއ ހދމގޔއ ބއއ ގރޕތކގ ،އދ އސލމކ މނސޓރގ އސމވއޒފނގ ބއވރވނ

މސއކތގއ އނނކނ ފހގކރވފއވއވ. މކމގ ސބބނ ރގއލޓރ އތރޓއއގ ގތގއ ހރދނކމއކ

ގ ކނކނ ހނގމގ ތރއށ އސލމކ މނސޓރނ ކރނޖހ މސއކތ ކރމގ ބދލގއ ޢމލގތނ ޙއޖ

އވލއޝނ ގޅ ތކހރސބބއސލމކ މނސޓރނ ވރށބޑށ ވނނމނދކނ ފހގކރވއވ. އދ މފދ

ނކނ އތއ ޝކވއއ ކނމ އހރކ އސސއށ ހށހޅމނ ދއވ. މގތނ ހށހޅ ޝކވތކގއ ހމނ ކ

ތރގއ އވނއވ.

މހނ އއ އގއގއ ، ރޢޔތނކށއހރނ އހރށ ޚދމތއ ތކތގ އގށ އނނމނދ ބދލތކށ

ދތތކ ކރމތލނޖހނ.ސބބނ ކޕރޝނށ މލ ގތނ ގނދއމގ ޚދމތދމނ ޙއޖއ ގނދއމގ

ނތމގ ނޓ ފރޞތތއ ދވހރއޖގއ އކށގނވ މނވރށ އސލމ ޝރޢ ހއދކރ އނވސޓމ

އ އނވސޓމނޓތކނ ލބ ފއދ ކޕރޝނގ މމބރނގ މދގއ ކށ، ސބބނ އނވސޓމނޓތއ

މށ އސމށ ބނނވ ފއސ ކރމއދތއގއ ލބނ ފދ އނތޒމތއ ހމޖޔބހލއގނ، ޙއޖށ ދ

.ވސ އކނ ކރމގއ ދތތކ ކރމތވނވނމ ކޕރޝނނ ނނމފއ

ކރމބހ ނޒމގއ ހރ މއގނޑ މއސލތއޙއޖ އނތޒމ .6

ކޓ ދނމގއ ދމވ މއސލތކއ ޙއލ 6.1

ދވހރއޖއށ ލބ ޙއޖ ކޓ ބހމގއ ހރދނ ނޒމއ ނތނ 6.1.1

ދނ މނވރ ކނޑއޅނ މނސޓރކމށއ ށކޓގ ތރއނ މލޑވސ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނދވހރއޖއށ ލބ

ވކށދނވނކމށނ ޖގ ރޒކށ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނމނވރމނސޓރނ ބނނވ އ އދދގ ތރއނ

އގތގ މތނ، ބޔނކށފއވއވ. ވނ މއދގއ 20ދވހރއޖއނ މހނ ޙއޖށ ގނދޔމބހ އޞލގ

ފހގ މނސޓރއށ ރޒވކށދވނ ކޓގ އދދ އއ އހރނ އނއ އހރށ އތރވމނ އނނކނ ދރސއނ

މނސޓރނ ޙއޖށ ފނވނ ކނ ބއއކމއ، މ ރޒވކރވ އދދގއ ހމނއގނ ނމވސ، ކރވނވ.

ލއ ސޢމލކރނ އ މނސޓރއށ ލބ ޚއޞ ކޓތކމދ ،އކނޑއޅމފރތތއ ދނ ތއވކރ ޖގރޒ

ލއނތ މނސޓރނ ބނނވ ސއމގތށ . އވވނ ފއއފހގކރވމ ދރސއށ ފއވކނ އކލވލ

ފރޞތ ދވމކ ކރޕޝނށ މގފހވ ކމކށވތ މފދ ކނކމނ ޙއޖއ މހނ ގނދއމގ ކށ ކފރތތ

ފއސ ށޙއޖ ކޕރޝނމ، އކނ އހނ ދމވނހމހމކމއ އނސފވރކނ ޤއމކރމށ ހރސއޅއވ.

ކ ޑކރނޖހމމދގމއދތކށ ،ޙއޖށ ނދވ ،ލބ ފރޞތ މދވފރތތކށ އނތޒރގއ ތބ އދއކ

އދ ޙއޖށ ދނ ގސދކރ ފރތތކށ ލއފސހކމއކ، އތބރހފ ހރދނ ނޒމއގ ކމކވ.ނ ވދމ



139

ތރއނ ޙއޖގ އޅކނ އދކރވނ މގއ ހދއދނމކ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނގ މޤޞދ ކމގއވއރ، އ މޤޞދ

ކރމށ ހރސއޅގނދނއވ.ހސލ

ލއ އކލވލއ ސކނފނތކނ ޙއޖ ކޓއށ އދ ހށހޅ ޕރޕސލތއ އވލއޓ ކރމގ ހރދނ އ6.1.2

.އމކރވފއ ނތނޢ

ލނ ޢކރ އމނސޓރ އފ އސލމކ އފއޒނ މށ އދ ޕރޕސލ ހށހޅމށ ޔޙއޖށ މހނ ގނދ

ނ ކރއޓރއގ ތފޞލ ޕރބޑ މޓނގގއ ޕރޕސލތއ އވލއޓކރހށހޅ ގޅގނ، ކނފނތކނ

ހއސކށފއނވމކ ޕރޕސލ ހށހޅމގއ ކނފނތކށ ދމވ ގނޖހމކވ. އދ އނމ އނސފވރކމއކ

ގތކށ ކރއޓރއ އކލވލފއވމގ ސބބނ ބޑ ހށހޅ ފރތތކގ މދގއ މކސ ނދވދނފދ

ވދވރކމއ ހމހމ ފރޞތތކއ ނތމނ ވރށ ބޑ ނތނވސކމއ އފދމނދއވ.

މޢލމތ ޕރބޑ މޓނގއ ނނކށފއވނ ވނ އހރގ ޙއޖ ޕރޕސލ އވލއޓ ކރމގއ ބ 1438 އގތނ،

އ މނގނޑގއ ތފތ މނގނޑއކނ އސސގ ތޙޤޤނ ފހގކރވފއވއވ. އދ މނގނޑދފއވ

ށހޅ ފރތތކ ބޑ ހސބކޓގރތކކ ކބއކމއ، އބއތކށ މކސދވނ މނގނޑތކ ގޅނހރ ތފޞލ

ކރއޓރއ ހދފއވ ގތނ ވކވކ ބއތކށ މގ އތރނ، ނވކނވސ ފހގކރވފއވއވ.ހއސކށފއ

ކށ ޙއޖށ މކސ ދނގތ ނނމމށ ކމޓއށ އޚތޔރ ދފއވމނ ބޑތކގ ވދވރކނ ގއލ، ބޑ އވޑ

މގ ހއދ ދނމގއ ވކ ފރތކށ މނފ ލބނގތށ ނނމމގ ފރޞތ އތކނ ފހގކރވއވ. ޔގނދމހނ

ޕރޕސލތއ ހދމގޔއ ބއއ ގރޕތކގ ،އދ އސލމކ މނސޓރގ އސމވއޒފނގ ބއވރވނ

މސއކތގއ އނނކނ ފހގކރވފއވއވ. މކމގ ސބބނ ރގއލޓރ އތރޓއއގ ގތގއ ހރދނކމއކ

ގ ކނކނ ހނގމގ ތރއށ އސލމކ މނސޓރނ ކރނޖހ މސއކތ ކރމގ ބދލގއ ޢމލގތނ ޙއޖ

އވލއޝނ ގޅ ތކހރސބބއސލމކ މނސޓރނ ވރށބޑށ ވނނމނދކނ ފހގކރވއވ. އދ މފދ

ނކނ އތއ ޝކވއއ ކނމ އހރކ އސސއށ ހށހޅމނ ދއވ. މގތނ ހށހޅ ޝކވތކގއ ހމނ ކ

ތރގއ އވނއވ.

މހނ އއ އގއގއ ، ރޢޔތނކށއހރނ އހރށ ޚދމތއ ތކތގ އގށ އނނމނދ ބދލތކށ

ދތތކ ކރމތލނޖހނ.ސބބނ ކޕރޝނށ މލ ގތނ ގނދއމގ ޚދމތދމނ ޙއޖއ ގނދއމގ

ނތމގ ނޓ ފރޞތތއ ދވހރއޖގއ އކށގނވ މނވރށ އސލމ ޝރޢ ހއދކރ އނވސޓމ

އ އނވސޓމނޓތކނ ލބ ފއދ ކޕރޝނގ މމބރނގ މދގއ ކށ، ސބބނ އނވސޓމނޓތއ

މށ އސމށ ބނނވ ފއސ ކރމއދތއގއ ލބނ ފދ އނތޒމތއ ހމޖޔބހލއގނ، ޙއޖށ ދ

.ވސ އކނ ކރމގއ ދތތކ ކރމތވނވނމ ކޕރޝނނ ނނމފއ

ކރމބހ ނޒމގއ ހރ މއގނޑ މއސލތއޙއޖ އނތޒމ .6

ކޓ ދނމގއ ދމވ މއސލތކއ ޙއލ 6.1

ދވހރއޖއށ ލބ ޙއޖ ކޓ ބހމގއ ހރދނ ނޒމއ ނތނ 6.1.1

ދނ މނވރ ކނޑއޅނ މނސޓރކމށއ ށކޓގ ތރއނ މލޑވސ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނދވހރއޖއށ ލބ

ވކށދނވނކމށނ ޖގ ރޒކށ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނމނވރމނސޓރނ ބނނވ އ އދދގ ތރއނ

އގތގ މތނ، ބޔނކށފއވއވ. ވނ މއދގއ 20ދވހރއޖއނ މހނ ޙއޖށ ގނދޔމބހ އޞލގ

ފހގ މނސޓރއށ ރޒވކށދވނ ކޓގ އދދ އއ އހރނ އނއ އހރށ އތރވމނ އނނކނ ދރސއނ

މނސޓރނ ޙއޖށ ފނވނ ކނ ބއއކމއ، މ ރޒވކރވ އދދގއ ހމނއގނ ނމވސ، ކރވނވ.

ލއ ސޢމލކރނ އ މނސޓރއށ ލބ ޚއޞ ކޓތކމދ ،އކނޑއޅމފރތތއ ދނ ތއވކރ ޖގރޒ

ލއނތ މނސޓރނ ބނނވ ސއމގތށ . އވވނ ފއއފހގކރވމ ދރސއށ ފއވކނ އކލވލ

ފރޞތ ދވމކ ކރޕޝނށ މގފހވ ކމކށވތ މފދ ކނކމނ ޙއޖއ މހނ ގނދއމގ ކށ ކފރތތ

ފއސ ށޙއޖ ކޕރޝނމ، އކނ އހނ ދމވނހމހމކމއ އނސފވރކނ ޤއމކރމށ ހރސއޅއވ.

ކ ޑކރނޖހމމދގމއދތކށ ،ޙއޖށ ނދވ ،ލބ ފރޞތ މދވފރތތކށ އނތޒރގއ ތބ އދއކ

އދ ޙއޖށ ދނ ގސދކރ ފރތތކށ ލއފސހކމއކ، އތބރހފ ހރދނ ނޒމއގ ކމކވ.ނ ވދމ


140

ކރމގއ ދމވ ގނޖހނތއ ޞދ ހސލމލޑވސ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނގ މޤ 5.3

މލޑވސ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނގ މއގނޑ މޤޞދކ ޙއޖއ ޢމރއށ ދނ ގސދކރ ފރތތކގ ފއސ

މރޗ 2އޅކނ އދކރވނ މގފހކރމވ. ލއފސހ ގތކށ ،އއމނތތރކމއ ރއކތރކމއކ ބލހއޓ

ދ ފރތތކގ ފއސއށ އމނތތރކމއ ރއކތރކނ ޙއޖށ ޚދމތ ދނ ފށމނ،ނ ގއ ކޕރޝނ 2014

ރވ މމބރނގ އދދ ކނފނގއ ރޖސޓ ގނގސފއވއވ. އހނކމނ،ލބނކމގ ޔޤނކނ ލބ

ޕރޝނގއ ހށވރ ގނ ޑޕސޓރނ ކއގތނ، ފސހއތރވމނދކނ ފހގކށލވއވ.

ރޖސޓރވފއވއވ.

މށ މމބރނ ޖމކރ ޔޙއޖށ ދ، ފކށތއ ތޢރތހސލކރމށޓކއ ތފތ ޚދމ ތއކނފނގ މޤޞދ

އށ ތފތ އކ 2016ނ 2014ނ، ވފއވއވ. އގތ ފއސއނ ޙލލ އނވސޓމނޓތކގއ ބއވރ

)މލޑވސ ޙއޖ ވއރފޔ އނވސޓކށފއވ މލއނ )ސތކ އގރ(111އނވސޓމނޓތކގއ ޖމލ

ސރކރގ ހރހ ވޒރތކއ މއއސސތކއ ކށގނ ޞނނނށ ޚއމގ އތރނ، ޒވ (.2016 ކޕރޝނ ،

ބލގއ ޤސރކރގ ކނފނތކއ އމއލ ކނފނތކށ ބއވރވވ "މވއޒފނގ ސކމ" އއ ދރމސތ

ފކށފއވއވ. މގ އތރނ، އނލއނކށ ތޢރ ”ފސހ ސކމ“ ޞއޚއޖށ ދނ ޕލނކރ ފރތތކށ ޙ

މހނ ކށފއވ. ހމއއއކ، ފއވސ ވނ ތޢރނމގއ އނލއނ ޕޓލ” ފހލ“ފއސ ދއކމށޓކއ

ޑވސ ނޝނލ ޑފނސ ފސ އދ އނދރގނދ މގ ގތނ މލމގ ކނކނ ހރދނކރޔޙއޖށ ގނދ

ވ. އއވއކ ފހމނމތކގއ ސއކށފމމރއލ ހސޕޓލ

ކރމގއ ވރށ ގނ ގނޖހނތކއ ކރމތވފއވއވ. އގތނ ޞދ ހސލމލޑވސ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނގ މޤ

ފހގކރވނ ކނކނ ތރގއއވނއވ.

އނގނޑއ ނތނޤނނ ބނނވ ކޕރޝނގ މސއކތތއ މނވނކމއކ ބއޓނކރމށ.

ޤނނ، އދ މނޖމނޓ ދއރގ ، ނސފއނޙއޖ ކޕރޝނގ ބޑގ މމބރނގ ގތގއ އސލމކ

މދވނ.ފރތތއ ލބފއވ ތޖރބ އރނގނ ތޢލމ

ދނނ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނ އފއދމއ ޙއޖ ކޓ 5.2

ޢމލތއ ތރއނ ފއސނގމއ އހނހނ އޅވލމގ ގނދޔމގއ އޅވލމއ މކރ ހލތގޙއޖށ މހނ

ޙއޖށ ދޔމށ ފއސ ޖމކރ ފރތތކގ ފއސ، މޔތކރމށއޙދވހ ރއޔތނ ހނގ ފރތތކގ ކބއނ

އމނތތރކމއކ ބލހއޓއ، ޙއޖގ އޅކނ އދކރމގއ ލއފސހ އދ އތބރހރ މގއ ރއކތރކމއ

މލޑވސ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނ އފއދފއވ. ސރކރނ ވނ ގއ 2013ނވނބރ 7ތނވސކރމގ ގތނ

ނ ހއދ ދ އމއލ ޖމޢތތކށވސ ޙއޖށ އސލމކ އފއޒޙއޖ ކޕރޝނގ އތރނ، މނސޓރ އފ

ދއވ. މގ ފރޞތޔމހނ ގނދ

އބދގ މސލމޤއމއގ ޙއޖށ މހނ ގނދ އނ ޢއމކށ ޙއޖ ކޓ ދމނ އނނނ އޔސޢދ އރބ

ޤއމކށވމއ، ޒމނއސރ ދ ޤއމ ދވހރއޖއކ ސއތއނ ސއތ މސލމކމގއވޔސ ބތނނސ

ކޓ 1,000 ކނމ އހރކވސ މށ ދވހރއޖއށޔދތރގއ އނނ ގޅމގ ސބބނ، ޙއޖށ މހނ ގނދ

2,000ކޓއއކ ޖމލ 1,000އތރ ޔތގ ދށނ ދނޢ ޚއޞސޢދ ރސގފނގ ރސމކށ ލބއވ. އދ

ކޓ ވތވދޔ ހތރ އހރގއވސ ރއޖއށ ލބފއވއވ. މގ އތރނ ކނމ އހރކވސ، ސޢދ ރސގފނގ

ށ ރއޖއށވސ ޙއޖގ ސރކރނ ކނޑއޅ އދދކއރބއޔގ މހމނދރގ ދށނ އ އހރކ ސޢދ

ފރޞތދއވ.

ވނ މއދގ 95ގ ( ކނފނޏބހ ޤނނ)ދވހރއޖގ 96/10ޤނނ ނނބރ ކމލޑވސ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނ

ސރކރގ އފއދވފއވ ދވހ އނ ( 05/2013 ދށނ ދވހރއޖގ ރއސލޖމހރއޔ )ޤރރ ނނބރ:

ވތވދޔ ދވހރއޖއށ ލބ ކޓގ ފނސސ އނސއތ .ސތކ ޕސނޓ ހއސ އނނ ކނފނޏކވ

3,600އހރ ޖމލ 4ށ ލބފއވއވ. ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނގ ހވލގއ ވތވދޔ ހތރއހރވސ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނ

ބނނތކށ ޚއޞށ ލބ ކޓގ ތރއނ ދއލތގ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނ ސފއވއވ.މހނ ޙއޖށ ގނގ

ވކރއވ. މނސޓރނ ޖގ ރޒ



141

ކރމގއ ދމވ ގނޖހނތއ ޞދ ހސލމލޑވސ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނގ މޤ 5.3

މލޑވސ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނގ މއގނޑ މޤޞދކ ޙއޖއ ޢމރއށ ދނ ގސދކރ ފރތތކގ ފއސ

މރޗ 2އޅކނ އދކރވނ މގފހކރމވ. ލއފސހ ގތކށ ،އއމނތތރކމއ ރއކތރކމއކ ބލހއޓ

ދ ފރތތކގ ފއސއށ އމނތތރކމއ ރއކތރކނ ޙއޖށ ޚދމތ ދނ ފށމނ،ނ ގއ ކޕރޝނ 2014

ރވ މމބރނގ އދދ ކނފނގއ ރޖސޓ ގނގސފއވއވ. އހނކމނ،ލބނކމގ ޔޤނކނ ލބ

ޕރޝނގއ ހށވރ ގނ ޑޕސޓރނ ކއގތނ، ފސހއތރވމނދކނ ފހގކށލވއވ.

ރޖސޓރވފއވއވ.

މށ މމބރނ ޖމކރ ޔޙއޖށ ދ، ފކށތއ ތޢރތހސލކރމށޓކއ ތފތ ޚދމ ތއކނފނގ މޤޞދ

އށ ތފތ އކ 2016ނ 2014ނ، ވފއވއވ. އގތ ފއސއނ ޙލލ އނވސޓމނޓތކގއ ބއވރ

)މލޑވސ ޙއޖ ވއރފޔ އނވސޓކށފއވ މލއނ )ސތކ އގރ(111އނވސޓމނޓތކގއ ޖމލ

ސރކރގ ހރހ ވޒރތކއ މއއސސތކއ ކށގނ ޞނނނށ ޚއމގ އތރނ، ޒވ (.2016 ކޕރޝނ ،

ބލގއ ޤސރކރގ ކނފނތކއ އމއލ ކނފނތކށ ބއވރވވ "މވއޒފނގ ސކމ" އއ ދރމސތ

ފކށފއވއވ. މގ އތރނ، އނލއނކށ ތޢރ ”ފސހ ސކމ“ ޞއޚއޖށ ދނ ޕލނކރ ފރތތކށ ޙ

މހނ ކށފއވ. ހމއއއކ، ފއވސ ވނ ތޢރނމގއ އނލއނ ޕޓލ” ފހލ“ފއސ ދއކމށޓކއ

ޑވސ ނޝނލ ޑފނސ ފސ އދ އނދރގނދ މގ ގތނ މލމގ ކނކނ ހރދނކރޔޙއޖށ ގނދ

ވ. އއވއކ ފހމނމތކގއ ސއކށފމމރއލ ހސޕޓލ

ކރމގއ ވރށ ގނ ގނޖހނތކއ ކރމތވފއވއވ. އގތނ ޞދ ހސލމލޑވސ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނގ މޤ

ފހގކރވނ ކނކނ ތރގއއވނއވ.

އނގނޑއ ނތނޤނނ ބނނވ ކޕރޝނގ މސއކތތއ މނވނކމއކ ބއޓނކރމށ.

ޤނނ، އދ މނޖމނޓ ދއރގ ، ނސފއނޙއޖ ކޕރޝނގ ބޑގ މމބރނގ ގތގއ އސލމކ

މދވނ.ފރތތއ ލބފއވ ތޖރބ އރނގނ ތޢލމ

ދނނ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނ އފއދމއ ޙއޖ ކޓ 5.2

ޢމލތއ ތރއނ ފއސނގމއ އހނހނ އޅވލމގ ގނދޔމގއ އޅވލމއ މކރ ހލތގޙއޖށ މހނ

ޙއޖށ ދޔމށ ފއސ ޖމކރ ފރތތކގ ފއސ، މޔތކރމށއޙދވހ ރއޔތނ ހނގ ފރތތކގ ކބއނ

އމނތތރކމއކ ބލހއޓއ، ޙއޖގ އޅކނ އދކރމގއ ލއފސހ އދ އތބރހރ މގއ ރއކތރކމއ

މލޑވސ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނ އފއދފއވ. ސރކރނ ވނ ގއ 2013ނވނބރ 7ތނވސކރމގ ގތނ

ނ ހއދ ދ އމއލ ޖމޢތތކށވސ ޙއޖށ އސލމކ އފއޒޙއޖ ކޕރޝނގ އތރނ، މނސޓރ އފ

ދއވ. މގ ފރޞތޔމހނ ގނދ

އބދގ މސލމޤއމއގ ޙއޖށ މހނ ގނދ އނ ޢއމކށ ޙއޖ ކޓ ދމނ އނނނ އޔސޢދ އރބ

ޤއމކށވމއ، ޒމނއސރ ދ ޤއމ ދވހރއޖއކ ސއތއނ ސއތ މސލމކމގއވޔސ ބތނނސ

ކޓ 1,000 ކނމ އހރކވސ މށ ދވހރއޖއށޔދތރގއ އނނ ގޅމގ ސބބނ، ޙއޖށ މހނ ގނދ

2,000ކޓއއކ ޖމލ 1,000އތރ ޔތގ ދށނ ދނޢ ޚއޞސޢދ ރސގފނގ ރސމކށ ލބއވ. އދ

ކޓ ވތވދޔ ހތރ އހރގއވސ ރއޖއށ ލބފއވއވ. މގ އތރނ ކނމ އހރކވސ، ސޢދ ރސގފނގ

ށ ރއޖއށވސ ޙއޖގ ސރކރނ ކނޑއޅ އދދކއރބއޔގ މހމނދރގ ދށނ އ އހރކ ސޢދ

ފރޞތދއވ.

ވނ މއދގ 95ގ ( ކނފނޏބހ ޤނނ)ދވހރއޖގ 96/10ޤނނ ނނބރ ކމލޑވސ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނ

ސރކރގ އފއދވފއވ ދވހ އނ ( 05/2013 ދށނ ދވހރއޖގ ރއސލޖމހރއޔ )ޤރރ ނނބރ:

ވތވދޔ ދވހރއޖއށ ލބ ކޓގ ފނސސ އނސއތ .ސތކ ޕސނޓ ހއސ އނނ ކނފނޏކވ

3,600އހރ ޖމލ 4ށ ލބފއވއވ. ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނގ ހވލގއ ވތވދޔ ހތރއހރވސ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނ

ބނނތކށ ޚއޞށ ލބ ކޓގ ތރއނ ދއލތގ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނ ސފއވއވ.މހނ ޙއޖށ ގނގ

ވކރއވ. މނސޓރނ ޖގ ރޒ


142

ގ އނތޒމތއ ކރމގއ ވރށ ޙއޖވނމވސ، އކލވލފއ ތ.ނ( .ޢމރއށ މހނ ގނދއމ ބހ ގވއދ

ގނ ދތތކ ކރމތވފއވއވ. މގތނ؛

ވގތ މދވނ.އނތޒމތއ ކރމށ ލބ ޙއޖގ

ޔނ.މތވމނދއއ އހރނ އނއ އހރށ ށ މހނ ގނދޔމގ އގއޖޙ

މށ ފއސ ޔއޖށ ގނދޙދކށފއވ ކޓއށވރ އތރށ މހނ އފ އސލމކ އފއޒނ މނސޓރ

ނ.ނގ

ގ ސބބނ ޙއޖށ ދޔމށ ފއސ ދއކފއވ ފރތތކށ ބނގރޓވމތއ ށ މހނ ގނދ ޖމޢތޙއޖ

ޙއޖށ ނދވނ.

ނ.ނވގތ މގ ނމގއ އޅވލއގނ އކ މނވރށ ފއސ ނގއ ޙއޖށ ދވޔޙއޖށ ގނދ

ބއއ ހދސތއ 5.1

2000 ސރކރ މދވރވގނ މނ،ފއސ ދއކ މހނނށ ޙއޖށ ނދވވނ އހރ އމއލ ފރތކށ

ނ.އޖށ ގނގސފއވޙއ މހނ

2009 ނ.އޖށ ނދވޙފއސ ދއކ އތއ ބޔކށ ވނ އހރ އމއލ ފރތކށ

2012 ،2013 ޒމތ )ޢ ޔއނށވރ ގނ ރފލމ 8މހއގ އތނ 132ތކނ ފރ އމއލ ގއ

ކށދނ ޖހނރހލގއޖހނ ފރތތކށ ދވހ ސރކރނ އހތރކނ ފނދވ ޙއޖށ ،އނގ (2013، ބޝރ

.(2015 ،މނސޓރ އފ އސލމކ އފއޒ)

2017 ފރތކނ ހތރ މހކ ޙއޖށ ފނވމނ، މގ ހއދނތ ޔޙއޖށ ގނދއ ވނ އހރގ

އޒ ޢމ) އވނއމހނނ ހވލވފ ނހވލވނ އއވސ ފރތއ ނތ މއކގއ ހލގއ ޖހމނ، ސރކރ

(.2017،މހއބރ

2013ތއ މނޓރކރމށ އލކޓރނކ މނޓރނގ ސސޓމއ ޙއޖގ އނތޒމޕކސތނނ .(2017 ،ހމނ

ޚދމތތކ ގޅ ޝކވ ހދމއ ލމތޢދށނ ޙއޖ ގޅނހރ މވނ އހރގއ ޤއމކށފއވއވ. މ ނޒމގ

އލއ ހމށ ފރޞތ ދނމގއ ވދވރ މޔޙއޖށ ގނދމގތނ، ހށހޅމގ ފރޞތ ލބދފއވއވ.

ކނބޑވނ ފޅކށފއވއވ. ، ތތކނތތކށ ނސބތވ ފރޢނތކމށ ބނ ވޔފރވރނނއ އމއލ ޖމ

ބރނއ 4.3

ވނ 1986ބރނއގ މނސޓރ އފ ރލޖސ އފއޒގއ ޙއޖ މނޖމނޓ ޑޕޓމނޓއ އފއދފއވނ

އހރގއ ބރނއ އސލމކ ވނ 1991މގ މލ ޤބލކނ ހދއދނމގ ގތނ، ޔ. އދ ޙއޖށ ދއހރގއވ

ވނ ކނފނޏއ ގ ނމގއ ސރކރނ ޠއބ(، ޓރސޓ ފނޑ ކޕރޝނ )ތބނގ އމނ އސލމ ބރނއ

ގއ ދރއސލމ ހލޑނގސ 1993އބގ ދށނ ޠހމއއއކ، (. 2014 ،ބރނއ ދރއސލމ) އވއފއދފ

މގ ޔ)ޑ.އޗ.އސ.ބ( އފއދއ އއ ޤއމ ޙއޖ އޖނޓކމގއ ކނޑއޅއ ޙއޖށ ގނދ ސނޑރއނ ބރހދ

މގ ކރނ ޔހރހ އނތޒމތކއ ޑ.އޗ.އސ.ބއ ސރކރނ ވނ ހވލކށފއވ. އހނކމނ، ޙއޖށ ދ

ދ ސލސލ ކސތއ ޑ.އޗ.އސ.ބ އނ އނތޒމކރއވ. އދ މ ތމރނ މތޙޖނނށ މޢލ

މށ ހމޖހފއވ ތނތނއ ދތރފތރއ ޞއޙ ޚދމތ ގޅނހރ ބއތއ ތބޙޖނ ،ޕރގރމތކގއ

ޙއޖ - މޢލމތއ ޕރސސ ކރވނ އޙޖނގ ހރހ ވނ އހރނ ފށގނ، ބރނއ 2014ހމނއވ.

ސސޓމ މދވރކށކމނ ވސ ހދމގ ކނކނ އވސވފއވކނ ފހގކރވފއވއވ.

ދވހރއޖގ ޙއޖގ އނތޒމތއ ހމޖހފއވ ގތ .5

ރޖސޓރ ބލހއޓމއ، މހނގ ޙއޖށ ދޙއޖށ މހނ ގނދ ޖމޢތތކށ ހއދ ދނމއ، އނ ދވހރއޖ

ގތނ ބލހއޓނޖހ ކނތއތއ ބލހއޓމކ މނސޓރ އފ އސލމކ ދވހރއޖއނ ޙއޖށ ދ މހނނ ގޅ

އ މނސޓރގ ބލމގ .(2015 ،މނސޓރ އފ އސލމކ އފއޒ) ވތކލއޔއއފއޒގ މއގނޑ މސ

ނނވ. ކރމނ އއ އމއލ ފރތތކ ޢމލގތނ މސއކތ، ޒމނއސރމގޔދށނ ޙއޖށ މހނ ގނދ

ދވހރއޖނ ޙއޖއ ) މށ ސރކރނ ގވއދއޔމރއށ މހނ ގނދޢވނ އހރނ ފށގނ ޙއޖއ 2008



143

ގ އނތޒމތއ ކރމގއ ވރށ ޙއޖވނމވސ، އކލވލފއ ތ.ނ( .ޢމރއށ މހނ ގނދއމ ބހ ގވއދ

ގނ ދތތކ ކރމތވފއވއވ. މގތނ؛

ވގތ މދވނ.އނތޒމތއ ކރމށ ލބ ޙއޖގ

ޔނ.މތވމނދއއ އހރނ އނއ އހރށ ށ މހނ ގނދޔމގ އގއޖޙ

މށ ފއސ ޔއޖށ ގނދޙދކށފއވ ކޓއށވރ އތރށ މހނ އފ އސލމކ އފއޒނ މނސޓރ

ނ.ނގ

ގ ސބބނ ޙއޖށ ދޔމށ ފއސ ދއކފއވ ފރތތކށ ބނގރޓވމތއ ށ މހނ ގނދ ޖމޢތޙއޖ

ޙއޖށ ނދވނ.

ނ.ނވގތ މގ ނމގއ އޅވލއގނ އކ މނވރށ ފއސ ނގއ ޙއޖށ ދވޔޙއޖށ ގނދ

ބއއ ހދސތއ 5.1

2000 ސރކރ މދވރވގނ މނ،ފއސ ދއކ މހނނށ ޙއޖށ ނދވވނ އހރ އމއލ ފރތކށ

ނ.އޖށ ގނގސފއވޙއ މހނ

2009 ނ.އޖށ ނދވޙފއސ ދއކ އތއ ބޔކށ ވނ އހރ އމއލ ފރތކށ

2012 ،2013 ޒމތ )ޢ ޔއނށވރ ގނ ރފލމ 8މހއގ އތނ 132ތކނ ފރ އމއލ ގއ

ކށދނ ޖހނރހލގއޖހނ ފރތތކށ ދވހ ސރކރނ އހތރކނ ފނދވ ޙއޖށ ،އނގ (2013، ބޝރ

.(2015 ،މނސޓރ އފ އސލމކ އފއޒ)

2017 ފރތކނ ހތރ މހކ ޙއޖށ ފނވމނ، މގ ހއދނތ ޔޙއޖށ ގނދއ ވނ އހރގ

އޒ ޢމ) އވނއމހނނ ހވލވފ ނހވލވނ އއވސ ފރތއ ނތ މއކގއ ހލގއ ޖހމނ، ސރކރ

(.2017،މހއބރ

2013ތއ މނޓރކރމށ އލކޓރނކ މނޓރނގ ސސޓމއ ޙއޖގ އނތޒމޕކސތނނ .(2017 ،ހމނ

ޚދމތތކ ގޅ ޝކވ ހދމއ ލމތޢދށނ ޙއޖ ގޅނހރ މވނ އހރގއ ޤއމކށފއވއވ. މ ނޒމގ

އލއ ހމށ ފރޞތ ދނމގއ ވދވރ މޔޙއޖށ ގނދމގތނ، ހށހޅމގ ފރޞތ ލބދފއވއވ.

ކނބޑވނ ފޅކށފއވއވ. ، ތތކނތތކށ ނސބތވ ފރޢނތކމށ ބނ ވޔފރވރނނއ އމއލ ޖމ

ބރނއ 4.3

ވނ 1986ބރނއގ މނސޓރ އފ ރލޖސ އފއޒގއ ޙއޖ މނޖމނޓ ޑޕޓމނޓއ އފއދފއވނ

އހރގއ ބރނއ އސލމކ ވނ 1991މގ މލ ޤބލކނ ހދއދނމގ ގތނ، ޔ. އދ ޙއޖށ ދއހރގއވ

ވނ ކނފނޏއ ގ ނމގއ ސރކރނ ޠއބ(، ޓރސޓ ފނޑ ކޕރޝނ )ތބނގ އމނ އސލމ ބރނއ

ގއ ދރއސލމ ހލޑނގސ 1993އބގ ދށނ ޠހމއއއކ، (. 2014 ،ބރނއ ދރއސލމ) އވއފއދފ

މގ ޔ)ޑ.އޗ.އސ.ބ( އފއދއ އއ ޤއމ ޙއޖ އޖނޓކމގއ ކނޑއޅއ ޙއޖށ ގނދ ސނޑރއނ ބރހދ

މގ ކރނ ޔހރހ އނތޒމތކއ ޑ.އޗ.އސ.ބއ ސރކރނ ވނ ހވލކށފއވ. އހނކމނ، ޙއޖށ ދ

ދ ސލސލ ކސތއ ޑ.އޗ.އސ.ބ އނ އނތޒމކރއވ. އދ މ ތމރނ މތޙޖނނށ މޢލ

މށ ހމޖހފއވ ތނތނއ ދތރފތރއ ޞއޙ ޚދމތ ގޅނހރ ބއތއ ތބޙޖނ ،ޕރގރމތކގއ

ޙއޖ - މޢލމތއ ޕރސސ ކރވނ އޙޖނގ ހރހ ވނ އހރނ ފށގނ، ބރނއ 2014ހމނއވ.

ސސޓމ މދވރކށކމނ ވސ ހދމގ ކނކނ އވސވފއވކނ ފހގކރވފއވއވ.

ދވހރއޖގ ޙއޖގ އނތޒމތއ ހމޖހފއވ ގތ .5

ރޖސޓރ ބލހއޓމއ، މހނގ ޙއޖށ ދޙއޖށ މހނ ގނދ ޖމޢތތކށ ހއދ ދނމއ، އނ ދވހރއޖ

ގތނ ބލހއޓނޖހ ކނތއތއ ބލހއޓމކ މނސޓރ އފ އސލމކ ދވހރއޖއނ ޙއޖށ ދ މހނނ ގޅ

އ މނސޓރގ ބލމގ .(2015 ،މނސޓރ އފ އސލމކ އފއޒ) ވތކލއޔއއފއޒގ މއގނޑ މސ

ނނވ. ކރމނ އއ އމއލ ފރތތކ ޢމލގތނ މސއކތ، ޒމނއސރމގޔދށނ ޙއޖށ މހނ ގނދ

ދވހރއޖނ ޙއޖއ ) މށ ސރކރނ ގވއދއޔމރއށ މހނ ގނދޢވނ އހރނ ފށގނ ޙއޖއ 2008


144

އ ،އހނކމނ (.2016، މރ އޙމދ ތލތ، މޙއމދ ޒއދ ޒލކފލ އދ ނރ ޝއޒ މރ އޙމދ ތލތ

މލއނ 8.85ގއ އފދނ އ ކނފނގއ މހރ 1962ޖހނވސ ސރކރށވ. ނމއއސސ ޖވބދރވ

" އށ ގނވނ 1969ޑޕސޓރނ ބއވރވފއވއވ. މލޝއގ "ދ ޕލގރމސ ފނޑ ބޑ އކޓ

ވމ ފރތތކ ގޅގނ މލޝއގ އތރނ ބއނލއޤމނޓއ ވޔފރ، ޓލޙތކއކ އސލމ މލ އނވސޞއ

ޓ.އޗގ ކމޔބތކގ ސބބނ، މލޝއގ ޙއޖ އނތޒމ ކރމގ ކރމގ ފރޞތ ޓ.އޗއށ ދފއވއވ.

ފށފއވ.ނޒމ އއގތށ ޙއޖގ މސއކތތއ ބއޓނ ކރމށ ސނގޕރނވސ ވނ

ފއސގ ކނކމއ، ދތރފތރއ ވސ އދ މޑކލއ ގޅނހރ ކނކނ ހމނހނ ޙއޖ ގޅނހރ ދނ އދ

ސޢދ ޢރބއޔގ މ ކނފނގ އފހއ ،މގތނ ހރހ ޚދމތތކއވސ ފރކށދނ ޓ.އޗ އނނވ. ޢއޖތމ

ޚދމތދ ސނޓރތއ މއކ، ޙމއލ ހސޕޓލއ، ޞއވނ ޤއމކށފއވ. އދ ޓ.އޗގ އ ވސއޖއދގ

(.2011، މޙއމދ ޝހއމ ބނ ހޖ އއސކ) ރފތއ މނގއ ޤއމކށފއވއވޢމދނ އދ

އހރށ ކއޔށ 100ކލމޓރ ދރގއވ ހސބމއ 1މގ އތރނ، ޙއޖގ އގ ކޑކރމގ ގތނ، ގފޅއ

ސރކރއކ އއބސވމއ ޤއމކރމގ އރބއޔގ ޑޝނ ކމޕލކސއއ ތރއޤކރމށ ސޢދ މހފއ އކ

ނވ. ނމމސއކތ ދނ ކރ

ޕކސތނ 4.2

މނސޓރ އފ ރލޖސ އދރއކ ޕކސތނގ ޙއޖށ ދ މހނގ ކނކނ ހނގމއ ބލހއޓމށ ޒނމވ

ޙއޖވރނނށ ޚދމތތއ ދނމގ ކނކނ ގއޔހމނއވ. އދ ސޢދ އރބއ އފއޒ އނޑ އނޓރފއތ

ހވލވފއވނ ޕކސތނގ ސރކރގ ފރތނ އފސ އފ ޕލގރމސ އފއޒ )އޕޕ(، ޕކސތނގ

ދވއވ. އޖށކނސއލޓ ޖނރލއނނވ. ޕކސތނނ ޙއޖށ ދނ ބނނވ މހނނށ ދ ސކމއގ ދށނ ޙ

ޙއޖށ ލބ "ސރކރގ ބލމގ ދށނ ޙއޖށ ދނ ބނނވ ފރތތކއ" އނސއތ 60އޖ ކޓގ ޙއއ

ފއވ "އމއލ ހމނނ ހއދދ ތމށ މނސޓރ އފ ރލޖސ އފއޒ އނޑ އނޓރފއޔމހނ ގނދ

މނސޓރ އފ ރލޖސ އފއޒ އނޑ އނޓރފއތ ) ސކމވ( އނސއތ 40)ޙއޖ ކޓގ ތތކގ" ޢޖމ

ދރސގ މތޑ .3

ނޔލށވ. ގ 2017ސޕޓނބރ 20އނ ފށގނ 2017އގސޓ 13ގނގސފއވނ ށއމ ދރސ ކރ

ގއ މޢލމތ ހދފއވނ އނޓވއ މދވރކށވ. ދރސއކ ކލޓޓވ ދރސއކށވމނ މއގނޑ ގތއ

ޙއޖ އނތޒމކރމގ މސއކތގއ ޙރކތތރވ ބއއ ޕރޕސވ ސމޕލނގ މދވރކށ، މގތނ،

5މ ދރސގ ބނމށ ޕރޝނގ އސފރތތކ ސވލކށ މޢލމތ ހދފއވނއވ.ފރތތކއ ޙއޖ ކ

ހމއއއކ، ވ.ފއވއޚޔލހދފރތކ ބއދލކށ މޢލމތއ 23ސޓރކޗރޑ އނޓވއ ހނގއ -ސމ

ތޙޤގތކނ ފހގކރވނ ކނތއތކއ އމއލ ފރތތކނ ކމޝނ ބއދލކށ އސސ އނ ހނގފއވ

ހށހޅފއވ ޝކވތކ ގޅ މޢލމތ ހމނފއވނއވ. މގ އތރނ ޙއޖ އނތޒމކރމގޅ ބއއ

މކރ ގތގ ޑސކ ރވއއއ ޖގ މސއކތ އނތޒއސލތކއ ލޔކޔނތކއ އހނ ޤއމތކގއ ޙއ

މޢލމތ ހދފއވނއވ. ހދ މ ދރސއށ

ޙއޖ އނތޒމކރމބހ ނޒމ ރވފއވ ގތ އމތކގޤއ އހނ .4

އނނ ގތތއ ކރމނޙއޖގ އނތޒމތއ އމތކގއ ބއއ ޤ ،ވމއކ މ ކރދހކ ޢލމ ދރސއކށ

މކމގ ސބބނ އފދ ނޒމތކގއ ހރ ރނގޅ ކނތއތއ ދނގތމކ މހއމ ކމކވ. އދ ދރސކށ

ނޒމ ހރދނ ކރމށ އ ޤއމތކގ ކމޔބތކށ ރޢޔތކށ ދވހރއޖގއ ޙއޖ އނތޒމކރމބހ

ދރސކރވނ ބއއ ޤއމތކ ގޅނހރ ،ގނނނޖހ ބދލތއ ދނގތމށ މގފހވގނދނއވ. އގތނ

މޢލމތ ތރގއ އވނއވ.

މލޝއ 4.1

ކޔނ ތބނގ ޙޖ )ޓ.އޗ( އވ. އ ބޑށމލޝއގ ހރހ ޙޖނގ އނތޒމތކއ ފނޑ ބލހއޓ

ނނކނނވ. އދ އއ ޤ ޞފއވނ މލޝއގ ޤނނ ހދ މޖލހނ ފސކށފއވ ޚއއދމއއސސ އފ

ފނ މލޝއގ ނއބ ރއސގ އފހގ ސދ ބލމގ ދށގއވ ތނއކމނ ބޑ މމބރނނއ އސމވއޒ

ޙބބ ޔހޔލ، މޙއމދ ޝހއނ ޢބދލ މޖދ، އއޑ ޒރއނ ) އއޔނކރނ ނއބ ރއސގ އފހނނވ



145

އ ،އހނކމނ (.2016، މރ އޙމދ ތލތ، މޙއމދ ޒއދ ޒލކފލ އދ ނރ ޝއޒ މރ އޙމދ ތލތ

މލއނ 8.85ގއ އފދނ އ ކނފނގއ މހރ 1962ޖހނވސ ސރކރށވ. ނމއއސސ ޖވބދރވ

" އށ ގނވނ 1969ޑޕސޓރނ ބއވރވފއވއވ. މލޝއގ "ދ ޕލގރމސ ފނޑ ބޑ އކޓ

ވމ ފރތތކ ގޅގނ މލޝއގ އތރނ ބއނލއޤމނޓއ ވޔފރ، ޓލޙތކއކ އސލމ މލ އނވސޞއ

ޓ.އޗގ ކމޔބތކގ ސބބނ، މލޝއގ ޙއޖ އނތޒމ ކރމގ ކރމގ ފރޞތ ޓ.އޗއށ ދފއވއވ.

ފށފއވ.ނޒމ އއގތށ ޙއޖގ މސއކތތއ ބއޓނ ކރމށ ސނގޕރނވސ ވނ

ފއސގ ކނކމއ، ދތރފތރއ ވސ އދ މޑކލއ ގޅނހރ ކނކނ ހމނހނ ޙއޖ ގޅނހރ ދނ އދ

ސޢދ ޢރބއޔގ މ ކނފނގ އފހއ ،މގތނ ހރހ ޚދމތތކއވސ ފރކށދނ ޓ.އޗ އނނވ. ޢއޖތމ

ޚދމތދ ސނޓރތއ މއކ، ޙމއލ ހސޕޓލއ، ޞއވނ ޤއމކށފއވ. އދ ޓ.އޗގ އ ވސއޖއދގ

(.2011، މޙއމދ ޝހއމ ބނ ހޖ އއސކ) ރފތއ މނގއ ޤއމކށފއވއވޢމދނ އދ

އހރށ ކއޔށ 100ކލމޓރ ދރގއވ ހސބމއ 1މގ އތރނ، ޙއޖގ އގ ކޑކރމގ ގތނ، ގފޅއ

ސރކރއކ އއބސވމއ ޤއމކރމގ އރބއޔގ ޑޝނ ކމޕލކސއއ ތރއޤކރމށ ސޢދ މހފއ އކ

ނވ. ނމމސއކތ ދނ ކރ

ޕކސތނ 4.2

މނސޓރ އފ ރލޖސ އދރއކ ޕކސތނގ ޙއޖށ ދ މހނގ ކނކނ ހނގމއ ބލހއޓމށ ޒނމވ

ޙއޖވރނނށ ޚދމތތއ ދނމގ ކނކނ ގއޔހމނއވ. އދ ސޢދ އރބއ އފއޒ އނޑ އނޓރފއތ

ހވލވފއވނ ޕކސތނގ ސރކރގ ފރތނ އފސ އފ ޕލގރމސ އފއޒ )އޕޕ(، ޕކސތނގ

ދވއވ. އޖށކނސއލޓ ޖނރލއނނވ. ޕކސތނނ ޙއޖށ ދނ ބނނވ މހނނށ ދ ސކމއގ ދށނ ޙ

ޙއޖށ ލބ "ސރކރގ ބލމގ ދށނ ޙއޖށ ދނ ބނނވ ފރތތކއ" އނސއތ 60އޖ ކޓގ ޙއއ

ފއވ "އމއލ ހމނނ ހއދދ ތމށ މނސޓރ އފ ރލޖސ އފއޒ އނޑ އނޓރފއޔމހނ ގނދ

މނސޓރ އފ ރލޖސ އފއޒ އނޑ އނޓރފއތ ) ސކމވ( އނސއތ 40)ޙއޖ ކޓގ ތތކގ" ޢޖމ

ދރސގ މތޑ .3

ނޔލށވ. ގ 2017ސޕޓނބރ 20އނ ފށގނ 2017އގސޓ 13ގނގސފއވނ ށއމ ދރސ ކރ

ގއ މޢލމތ ހދފއވނ އނޓވއ މދވރކށވ. ދރސއކ ކލޓޓވ ދރސއކށވމނ މއގނޑ ގތއ

ޙއޖ އނތޒމކރމގ މސއކތގއ ޙރކތތރވ ބއއ ޕރޕސވ ސމޕލނގ މދވރކށ، މގތނ،

5މ ދރސގ ބނމށ ޕރޝނގ އސފރތތކ ސވލކށ މޢލމތ ހދފއވނއވ.ފރތތކއ ޙއޖ ކ

ހމއއއކ، ވ.ފއވއޚޔލހދފރތކ ބއދލކށ މޢލމތއ 23ސޓރކޗރޑ އނޓވއ ހނގއ -ސމ

ތޙޤގތކނ ފހގކރވނ ކނތއތކއ އމއލ ފރތތކނ ކމޝނ ބއދލކށ އސސ އނ ހނގފއވ

ހށހޅފއވ ޝކވތކ ގޅ މޢލމތ ހމނފއވނއވ. މގ އތރނ ޙއޖ އނތޒމކރމގޅ ބއއ

މކރ ގތގ ޑސކ ރވއއއ ޖގ މސއކތ އނތޒއސލތކއ ލޔކޔނތކއ އހނ ޤއމތކގއ ޙއ

މޢލމތ ހދފއވނއވ. ހދ މ ދރސއށ

ޙއޖ އނތޒމކރމބހ ނޒމ ރވފއވ ގތ އމތކގޤއ އހނ .4

އނނ ގތތއ ކރމނޙއޖގ އނތޒމތއ އމތކގއ ބއއ ޤ ،ވމއކ މ ކރދހކ ޢލމ ދރސއކށ

މކމގ ސބބނ އފދ ނޒމތކގއ ހރ ރނގޅ ކނތއތއ ދނގތމކ މހއމ ކމކވ. އދ ދރސކށ

ނޒމ ހރދނ ކރމށ އ ޤއމތކގ ކމޔބތކށ ރޢޔތކށ ދވހރއޖގއ ޙއޖ އނތޒމކރމބހ

ދރސކރވނ ބއއ ޤއމތކ ގޅނހރ ،ގނނނޖހ ބދލތއ ދނގތމށ މގފހވގނދނއވ. އގތނ

މޢލމތ ތރގއ އވނއވ.

މލޝއ 4.1

ކޔނ ތބނގ ޙޖ )ޓ.އޗ( އވ. އ ބޑށމލޝއގ ހރހ ޙޖނގ އނތޒމތކއ ފނޑ ބލހއޓ

ނނކނނވ. އދ އއ ޤ ޞފއވނ މލޝއގ ޤނނ ހދ މޖލހނ ފސކށފއވ ޚއއދމއއސސ އފ

ފނ މލޝއގ ނއބ ރއސގ އފހގ ސދ ބލމގ ދށގއވ ތނއކމނ ބޑ މމބރނނއ އސމވއޒ

ޙބބ ޔހޔލ، މޙއމދ ޝހއނ ޢބދލ މޖދ، އއޑ ޒރއނ ) އއޔނކރނ ނއބ ރއސގ އފހނނވ


146

ފށނ .1

ވރށ އޖތމޢ އދ އޤތޞދ ދއރއ އނތޒމތއ ކރމކވ. ޙއޖގ ޙއޖކ އސލމދނގ ފސވނ ރކނ

ދމވ މއސލތއ ދނގތމގ ގތނ އނތޒމތއ ކރމގއއކ ޙއޖގ ގޅފއވ ކމކވ. މ ދރސބޑށ

ބލއ، ދވހރއޖއނ އމޒކރވފއވނ ޙއޖ އނތޒމ ކރމބހ ނޒމ ކރވ ޕއލޓ ދރސއކވ. މ ދރސ

މ ދރސގ މހނ ޙއޖށ ގނދޔމ ގޅގތނ ކރމތވ މއގނޑ މއސލތއ ދނގތމށވ. މގތނ،

އލކރވ ޙމއސލތއ ދނގނ އ މއސލތއ ދމވ ގ އނތޒމތއ ކރމގއމއގނޑ މޤޞދކ ޙއޖ

އކނ ކރމށ ބރއޅމވ. ކނދފށ ފނނ ނޒމނގ ތރގއ އތބރ ކރވފދ ދވހ

:މ ކރދހގއ މއގނޑ ގތއގއ ބލފއވނ

ޙއޖ ކޓ ދކރމގއ ދމވ މއސލތއ

އނގމގއ ދމވ މއސލތ ފއސ އތނ ޙޖނގ

އނވ ގތއގއ ހސލކރމށ ހރ ގނޖހނތޓޞދ ދމހއކޕރޝނގ މޤޙއޖ

އއލކރވދނ ގތތޙމގއ ދމވ މއސލތއ ޔޙއޖށ މހނ ގނދ

ދރސގ މހނމކނ .2

ދރސތއ ނތމއކ މފދ ދރސއއކށ އ ނޒމގއ ގޅނހރ ނޒމ އނތޒމކރމގ ޙއޖދވހރއޖގ

ތކރރކށ މ ދއރއ ގޅނހރ ކރޕޝނގ ތހމތތއ ހރ މއސލތއ ދނގތމކ މހނމ ކމކވ.

ބލއ ދރސކރމކ ސބބތއ ހނގގތއ ކމޝނށ ލބމކ ކނބޑވނޖހ ކމކށ ވހނދ އފދ މއސލތއ

ދވހރއޖގއ މހނ ކރޕޝނ ހއޓވމށޓކއ ކރވދނ މހނމ ކމކވ. މ ދރސގ ނތޖއށ ރޢޔތކށ

ކނޑއޅފއވ ސޔސތތކއ އޞލތއ ހރދނގތއގއ ރވއ ތނފޒކރމށ ޙއޖށ ގނދޔމށ

ގތ ދރސކރވމކ މ ނޒމ އނތޒމކރމގ ނޒމއތއދ ޢލމ ގތއގއ ޙއޖ މގފހވގނދނއވ.

ނނމނތކއ 'އވޑނސ ބސޑ' ހނގމގއ ކރމގ ނޒމއނތޒމއޅމގޔއ ޙއޖ ގޅގތނ ސޔސތ ކނޑ

ނނމއ ސޔސތތއ ހރދނގތއގއ އކށއޅމށ އހތރވނ ކމކވ.

މލކރމނގނދ އސލތއ އސލމ އހނހނ ޤއމތކގއ މހނ ޙއޖށ ގނދޔމ ގޅގތނ ޢ

އ އސލތކގ ތރއނ ދވހރއޖގއ މހނ ޙއޖށ ގނދޔމގތރއނ ކޓ ދނމގއ ،ދރސކރވ

އސލތއ ދނގނވ އސލހ ކރނ ފނނ ކނތއތކގ ގތގއ ޢމލކރމށ އނމ އކށނ

މ ދރސ ކރވފއވނ ދވހރއޖގ މނސޓރ އފ އސލމކ އފއޒ އއ ޙއޖ ވ.ހށހޅފއވނއ

ކޕރޝނގ އތރނ ޙއޖގ ޚދމތތއ ފރކށދނމގއ ހރކތތރވ ބއއ ފރތތކ މޝވރކރވ

ފނނ މޢލމތ ހދއގނނވ.

ލޓޓވކ ،ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނށ، ޖޖނނށ ފރކށދ ޚދމތތޙއ، ޙއޖ :މހއމ ބސ ތށ

[email protected]*



147

ފށނ .1

ވރށ އޖތމޢ އދ އޤތޞދ ދއރއ އނތޒމތއ ކރމކވ. ޙއޖގ ޙއޖކ އސލމދނގ ފސވނ ރކނ

ދމވ މއސލތއ ދނގތމގ ގތނ އނތޒމތއ ކރމގއއކ ޙއޖގ ގޅފއވ ކމކވ. މ ދރސބޑށ

ބލއ، ދވހރއޖއނ އމޒކރވފއވނ ޙއޖ އނތޒމ ކރމބހ ނޒމ ކރވ ޕއލޓ ދރސއކވ. މ ދރސ

މ ދރސގ މހނ ޙއޖށ ގނދޔމ ގޅގތނ ކރމތވ މއގނޑ މއސލތއ ދނގތމށވ. މގތނ،

އލކރވ ޙމއސލތއ ދނގނ އ މއސލތއ ދމވ ގ އނތޒމތއ ކރމގއމއގނޑ މޤޞދކ ޙއޖ

އކނ ކރމށ ބރއޅމވ. ކނދފށ ފނނ ނޒމނގ ތރގއ އތބރ ކރވފދ ދވހ

:މ ކރދހގއ މއގނޑ ގތއގއ ބލފއވނ

ޙއޖ ކޓ ދކރމގއ ދމވ މއސލތއ

އނގމގއ ދމވ މއސލތ ފއސ އތނ ޙޖނގ

އނވ ގތއގއ ހސލކރމށ ހރ ގނޖހނތޓޞދ ދމހއކޕރޝނގ މޤޙއޖ

އއލކރވދނ ގތތޙމގއ ދމވ މއސލތއ ޔޙއޖށ މހނ ގނދ

ދރސގ މހނމކނ .2

ދރސތއ ނތމއކ މފދ ދރސއއކށ އ ނޒމގއ ގޅނހރ ނޒމ އނތޒމކރމގ ޙއޖދވހރއޖގ

ތކރރކށ މ ދއރއ ގޅނހރ ކރޕޝނގ ތހމތތއ ހރ މއސލތއ ދނގތމކ މހނމ ކމކވ.

ބލއ ދރސކރމކ ސބބތއ ހނގގތއ ކމޝނށ ލބމކ ކނބޑވނޖހ ކމކށ ވހނދ އފދ މއސލތއ

ދވހރއޖގއ މހނ ކރޕޝނ ހއޓވމށޓކއ ކރވދނ މހނމ ކމކވ. މ ދރސގ ނތޖއށ ރޢޔތކށ

ކނޑއޅފއވ ސޔސތތކއ އޞލތއ ހރދނގތއގއ ރވއ ތނފޒކރމށ ޙއޖށ ގނދޔމށ

ގތ ދރސކރވމކ މ ނޒމ އނތޒމކރމގ ނޒމއތއދ ޢލމ ގތއގއ ޙއޖ މގފހވގނދނއވ.

ނނމނތކއ 'އވޑނސ ބސޑ' ހނގމގއ ކރމގ ނޒމއނތޒމއޅމގޔއ ޙއޖ ގޅގތނ ސޔސތ ކނޑ

ނނމއ ސޔސތތއ ހރދނގތއގއ އކށއޅމށ އހތރވނ ކމކވ.

މލކރމނގނދ އސލތއ އސލމ އހނހނ ޤއމތކގއ މހނ ޙއޖށ ގނދޔމ ގޅގތނ ޢ

އ އސލތކގ ތރއނ ދވހރއޖގއ މހނ ޙއޖށ ގނދޔމގތރއނ ކޓ ދނމގއ ،ދރސކރވ

އސލތއ ދނގނވ އސލހ ކރނ ފނނ ކނތއތކގ ގތގއ ޢމލކރމށ އނމ އކށނ

މ ދރސ ކރވފއވނ ދވހރއޖގ މނސޓރ އފ އސލމކ އފއޒ އއ ޙއޖ ވ.ހށހޅފއވނއ

ކޕރޝނގ އތރނ ޙއޖގ ޚދމތތއ ފރކށދނމގއ ހރކތތރވ ބއއ ފރތތކ މޝވރކރވ

ފނނ މޢލމތ ހދއގނނވ.

ލޓޓވކ ،ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނށ، ޖޖނނށ ފރކށދ ޚދމތތޙއ، ޙއޖ :މހއމ ބސ ތށ

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148

ށފނނ ނޒމއ ދވހރއޖގއ ޙއޖގ އނތޒމތއ ކރމގއ އތބރކރވ ދފ

މއސލތކއ ޙއލތއ :ޤއމކރނ

ޢލއކލލ އސމޢލ، މރޔމ ލއޝ، *ފތމތ އބނ، އލ އދމ، އބރހމ

، މލ، ދވހރއޖ. ކރޕޝނ ކމޝނ-އނޓ

އބސޓރކޓ

މ ދރސގ މއގނޑ މޤޞދކ ދވހރއޖއނ މހނ ޙއޖށ ގނދޔމގއ މދވރވ މއސލތއ ދނގނ

ހ ޖނށ ފނނ ނޒމއގއ ހނނއ މއސލތއ ހއލކރވ ދވހނގ ތރގއ އތބރ ކރވފދ ދފ

ކނތއތއ ދނގތމވ. މ ކރދހގއ މއގނޑ ގތއގއ ބލފއވނ ފހގކރވ ހތރކމއގ މއޗށވ.

އ ދނމގއ ދމވ މއސލތކ . ދވހރއޖނ މހނ ޙއޖށ ގނދޔމގއ އމއލ ކނފނތކށ ކޓ1އއ

. ޙއޖޖނނށ ފރކށދ އހނހނ 3 ވ މއސލތކއއތނ ފއސ ނގމގއ ދމ. ޙއޖޖނގ 2

. ޙއޖށ މހނ ގނދޔމގއ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނށ އ ކނފނގ 4ޚދމތތކގއ ދމވ މއސލތކއ

ނތކއ މހރ ޙއޖށ މހނ ގނދޔމގއ ދމވ މޤޞދ ދމހއޓނވ ގތއގއ ހސލކރމށ ހރ ގނޖހ

މއސލތއ ހއލކރމގއ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނށ އދކރވދނ ދއރގ މއޗށވ. އގތނ، ދވހރއޖއށ

އދ ހށހޅ ޕރޕސލތއ ލބ ޙއޖ ކޓ ބހމގއ ހރދނ ނޒމއ ނތކމއ ކނފނތކނ ޙއޖ ކޓއށ

ކނޑއޅފއވ އގށ ވރ އތރށ އވލއޓ ކރމގ ހރދނ އޞލއ އކލވލއ އއމކރވފއ ނތމއ

ޙއޖ މޝނ އކލވލނ ލސވމއ ޙއޖވރނނށ ޒނމވ ބއއ އޖނޓނ )މޠއވފނ( ފއސ ނގމއ

ގ މޢމލތތކއ ދނމށ އއބސވފއވ ޚދމތތއ ފރކށނދނމނ ޙއޖވރނގ އޅކނ

ފރހމކރމގއ ދތތކ ކރމތވމއ ދވހ ހރހ ޙޖނގ މޢލމތ އއ ޑޓބސއކނ ފސހއނ ލބނ

ދރސއނ ރވ ނހނގކނ މ ރމށ ޓރއނނނގ ޕރގރމތއނތމއ ޙޖނގ އހތރނ ތމރނކ

ލޓޓވ ދރސއކވ. އހނކމނ މ ދރސ ކރދސ އކލވލމގއ ފއވއވ. މ ދރސ އކ ކފހގކރވ

ކރވފއވ ދރސއކ، ރއޖއށ ނހނ ބނނތރ ތމށޓކއޙޞލވމނދ މނވރ ދނގ

ދރސއކވ.

]މނހޖ[ގ މ އދދގއ ކމގއވ ޒކތ ބހގތނދނގ ވރށ މހނމ ރކނއހމއހނމ،

ޝއކރވފއވ ދރސއކ، ޒކތބހގތނ މޒމނގއ ދމވ މއސލތކއ އ މއސލތއ

ނމ ދރސއކވ. އދހޢމލގތނ ޙއލކރވދނ ގތތކއ ހށހޅއދފއވ ވރށ މ

ނނ ކރވ އޖރއތތއ، އސލމ ފޤހ ނޒރކނ ބ ނޒމގއ،ދވހރއޖގ ޝރޢ

ބނނތރ ދރސއއކމމދ އއވސ ޝއކއނތވ. ،ވސއޅއކޔގނ ކރވފއވ ދރސއކ

ގ ޢނޔތއ هللاޢލމ ދރސތކއކ ]އލމނހޖ[ އނއކވސ ވޖދވގނ މއއ، މތ

މނނވ. މ މޖއލއށ ދރސތއ ޙއޞކށދއވ ހރހ ބފޅނނށ ޝކރވރ މދދވރކ

]އލމނހޖ[ގ މގނ، ދވހބހނނއ ގ ޖމލއއ ހދޔކށލމއކ، އނމދކރނ،ތރޙބ

ތތކށ ހރހ ފރ ފޤޔ ތއޢރބ ބހނނއ އގރސ ބހނ ޢލމ ޚޒނތކށ ވނމގ ހ

މނވރކރއވމވ.

ޑރ. އބރހމ ޒކރއޔ މސ

ޑނ، ސނޓރ ފރ ޕސޓގރޖއޓ ސޓޑސ



149

ށފނނ ނޒމއ ދވހރއޖގއ ޙއޖގ އނތޒމތއ ކރމގއ އތބރކރވ ދފ

މއސލތކއ ޙއލތއ :ޤއމކރނ

ޢލއކލލ އސމޢލ، މރޔމ ލއޝ، *ފތމތ އބނ، އލ އދމ، އބރހމ

، މލ، ދވހރއޖ. ކރޕޝނ ކމޝނ-އނޓ

އބސޓރކޓ

މ ދރސގ މއގނޑ މޤޞދކ ދވހރއޖއނ މހނ ޙއޖށ ގނދޔމގއ މދވރވ މއސލތއ ދނގނ

ހ ޖނށ ފނނ ނޒމއގއ ހނނއ މއސލތއ ހއލކރވ ދވހނގ ތރގއ އތބރ ކރވފދ ދފ

ކނތއތއ ދނގތމވ. މ ކރދހގއ މއގނޑ ގތއގއ ބލފއވނ ފހގކރވ ހތރކމއގ މއޗށވ.

އ ދނމގއ ދމވ މއސލތކ . ދވހރއޖނ މހނ ޙއޖށ ގނދޔމގއ އމއލ ކނފނތކށ ކޓ1އއ

. ޙއޖޖނނށ ފރކށދ އހނހނ 3 ވ މއސލތކއއތނ ފއސ ނގމގއ ދމ. ޙއޖޖނގ 2

. ޙއޖށ މހނ ގނދޔމގއ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނށ އ ކނފނގ 4ޚދމތތކގއ ދމވ މއސލތކއ

ނތކއ މހރ ޙއޖށ މހނ ގނދޔމގއ ދމވ މޤޞދ ދމހއޓނވ ގތއގއ ހސލކރމށ ހރ ގނޖހ

މއސލތއ ހއލކރމގއ ޙއޖ ކޕރޝނށ އދކރވދނ ދއރގ މއޗށވ. އގތނ، ދވހރއޖއށ

އދ ހށހޅ ޕރޕސލތއ ލބ ޙއޖ ކޓ ބހމގއ ހރދނ ނޒމއ ނތކމއ ކނފނތކނ ޙއޖ ކޓއށ

ކނޑއޅފއވ އގށ ވރ އތރށ އވލއޓ ކރމގ ހރދނ އޞލއ އކލވލއ އއމކރވފއ ނތމއ

ޙއޖ މޝނ އކލވލނ ލސވމއ ޙއޖވރނނށ ޒނމވ ބއއ އޖނޓނ )މޠއވފނ( ފއސ ނގމއ

ގ މޢމލތތކއ ދނމށ އއބސވފއވ ޚދމތތއ ފރކށނދނމނ ޙއޖވރނގ އޅކނ

ފރހމކރމގއ ދތތކ ކރމތވމއ ދވހ ހރހ ޙޖނގ މޢލމތ އއ ޑޓބސއކނ ފސހއނ ލބނ

ދރސއނ ރވ ނހނގކނ މ ރމށ ޓރއނނނގ ޕރގރމތއނތމއ ޙޖނގ އހތރނ ތމރނކ

ލޓޓވ ދރސއކވ. އހނކމނ މ ދރސ ކރދސ އކލވލމގއ ފއވއވ. މ ދރސ އކ ކފހގކރވ

ކރވފއވ ދރސއކ، ރއޖއށ ނހނ ބނނތރ ތމށޓކއޙޞލވމނދ މނވރ ދނގ

ދރސއކވ.

]މނހޖ[ގ މ އދދގއ ކމގއވ ޒކތ ބހގތނދނގ ވރށ މހނމ ރކނއހމއހނމ،

ޝއކރވފއވ ދރސއކ، ޒކތބހގތނ މޒމނގއ ދމވ މއސލތކއ އ މއސލތއ

ނމ ދރސއކވ. އދހޢމލގތނ ޙއލކރވދނ ގތތކއ ހށހޅއދފއވ ވރށ މ

ނނ ކރވ އޖރއތތއ، އސލމ ފޤހ ނޒރކނ ބ ނޒމގއ،ދވހރއޖގ ޝރޢ

ބނނތރ ދރސއއކމމދ އއވސ ޝއކއނތވ. ،ވސއޅއކޔގނ ކރވފއވ ދރސއކ

ގ ޢނޔތއ هللاޢލމ ދރސތކއކ ]އލމނހޖ[ އނއކވސ ވޖދވގނ މއއ، މތ

މނނވ. މ މޖއލއށ ދރސތއ ޙއޞކށދއވ ހރހ ބފޅނނށ ޝކރވރ މދދވރކ

]އލމނހޖ[ގ މގނ، ދވހބހނނއ ގ ޖމލއއ ހދޔކށލމއކ، އނމދކރނ،ތރޙބ

ތތކށ ހރހ ފރ ފޤޔ ތއޢރބ ބހނނއ އގރސ ބހނ ޢލމ ޚޒނތކށ ވނމގ ހ

މނވރކރއވމވ.

ޑރ. އބރހމ ޒކރއޔ މސ

ޑނ، ސނޓރ ފރ ޕސޓގރޖއޓ ސޓޑސ


150

الرحيم الرمحن اهلل باسم

منريا منهاجا اإلسالم أثبت من على والسالم والصالة ونورا برهانا السليم املنهج نزل يالذ هلل احلمد

أبرارا العاملني وأصحابه آله علىو

މޖއލ، ]އލމނހޖ[ގ އފހރ ނރ ޢލމދވހރއޖގ އސލމ ޔނވރސޓނ އހރކ އ

މ ، ދރސތކކއކ ޝއޢކރވގނ މދނ،ޢލމ ސ، ވރށ މހނމ މ ފހރގ އދދގއވ

އއ ދރސތކއ ޢލމ މޖއލ ނރމގ މޤޞދ ޙޞލވމނދކމގ ހތހމޖހމއ،

ޝއޢކރވގނދނކމގ މތވރ އނމދއކގއވ. ކރމގގއވސ

ޝއޢކރމގ މފހރގ އދދގއވސ، ދވހރއޖއށ ބނނތރ މހނމ ދރސތކއ

ފރޞތ ތނވސވގނ ދޔކމ، ދރސކރމގ ޝއޤވރކނ ހރ، ޢލމވރނގ އރހގއ

މ އދދގއވސ މއހނމ، އދ ހ .ހޔފލކވތރވމނ ދކމގ ގ މޤބލކނ އމ މޖއލ

ހމނއލމގ ފރޞތ ކޔނތރނނށޓކއ،މއސދ ދރސތކނ ޖރވގނވ އގހރ ހދޔ

މކވ. ލބގނ ދޔމކ، މޖއލގ އޑޓރއލ ބރޑށ ލބނ ހތހމޖހ

ތނ އތބރކރ،މ އދދގއ ދވހރއޖގއ ޙއޖށ ދޔމގ އނތޒމތއކރމއ، ރއޔ

ދވހ ޖމޢތތކށ މކރމގ މހނމކމއ، ޙއޖށ މހނ ގނދނޒމއ ޤއ ދފނ ފނނ

ޖށ ދޔމށ ޤޞދކރ މހނގ އތނ އކ ހމޖއސމގއ ދމވ މއސލތކއ، ޙއ ކޓ

މނވރ އނމދކރވއ، އކ ޖމޢތތކނ ނގ ފއސގ އދދ ބޑކރމގ މއސލއ

މޤޞދ ނދވ މއސލތކއ، ޙއޖ ކރޕރޝނގޚދމތ ޙއޖވރނނށ ގތށވސ

أهليتها لتقرير ختضع مجيع البحوث املرسلة إىل اجمللة لفحص أويل، يقوم به رئيس التحرير، وذلك -11 عتذر عن قبول البحث دون ذكر األسباب. يأن للتحكيم، وحيق له

تعرب مجيع األفكار الواردة يف البحوث اليت تنشرها اجمللة عن آراء أصحاهبا، وال تعرب ابلضرورة عن -12 وجهة نظر اجمللة.

[email protected] : ترسل مجيع املراسالت واألحباث للنشر إىل -13

خطوات التحكيم: كل حبث سيخضع إىل تصحيح وتدقيق لغوي ومن مث خيضع لتحكيم أكثر من أستاذ متخصص يف جمال

البحث.

: املنظور والرأي والتعليق واألفكارالذي مقاالت متضمنة على مناقشات علمية وحملات عامة ومالحظات فيما يتعلق ابملفاهيم املنظور:

خمتلفة. العلم واملعرفة أكثر انتشارا يف جماالت هو ختلفة. العلمية املاالت اجمل: تقدم فيها النقد البناء لتعزيز النقاش بشأن القضااي الراهنة يف مقاالت الرأي

هي مقاالت قصرية اليت جتلب االنتباه إىل نقد مقالة نشرت من قبل أو تتناول فيها نقد ملقالة قدمت :التعليقا سابقا، أو كتاب، أو تقرير، تشرح فيه أمهيته وكيف يكون مفيدا للقراء. ينبغي أن تكون مقاالت املنظور نشره

وامللخص غري مطلوب يف املقاالت املقدمة إىل قسم ، كلمة يف الطول 1500إىل 1000والرأي والتعليق بني .التعليقو الرأيو املنظور

: أسلوب املراجع

معية األمريكية لعلم النفس. اجلوجملة "املنهج" تستخدم املراجع حسب اتفاقيات وأسلوب : حقوق الطبع والنشر

يف اجمللة تعرب عن آراء أصحاهبا، وليس شرطا أن يكون هو رأي جلنة حترير اجمللة، وحقوق البحوث اليت تنشر الطبع حمفوظة جلامعة املالديف اإلسالمية.



151

الرحيم الرمحن اهلل باسم

منريا منهاجا اإلسالم أثبت من على والسالم والصالة ونورا برهانا السليم املنهج نزل يالذ هلل احلمد

أبرارا العاملني وأصحابه آله علىو

މޖއލ، ]އލމނހޖ[ގ އފހރ ނރ ޢލމދވހރއޖގ އސލމ ޔނވރސޓނ އހރކ އ

މ ، ދރސތކކއކ ޝއޢކރވގނ މދނ،ޢލމ ސ، ވރށ މހނމ މ ފހރގ އދދގއވ

އއ ދރސތކއ ޢލމ މޖއލ ނރމގ މޤޞދ ޙޞލވމނދކމގ ހތހމޖހމއ،

ޝއޢކރވގނދނކމގ މތވރ އނމދއކގއވ. ކރމގގއވސ

ޝއޢކރމގ މފހރގ އދދގއވސ، ދވހރއޖއށ ބނނތރ މހނމ ދރސތކއ

ފރޞތ ތނވސވގނ ދޔކމ، ދރސކރމގ ޝއޤވރކނ ހރ، ޢލމވރނގ އރހގއ

މ އދދގއވސ މއހނމ، އދ ހ .ހޔފލކވތރވމނ ދކމގ ގ މޤބލކނ އމ މޖއލ

ހމނއލމގ ފރޞތ ކޔނތރނނށޓކއ،މއސދ ދރސތކނ ޖރވގނވ އގހރ ހދޔ

މކވ. ލބގނ ދޔމކ، މޖއލގ އޑޓރއލ ބރޑށ ލބނ ހތހމޖހ

ތނ އތބރކރ،މ އދދގއ ދވހރއޖގއ ޙއޖށ ދޔމގ އނތޒމތއކރމއ، ރއޔ

ދވހ ޖމޢތތކށ މކރމގ މހނމކމއ، ޙއޖށ މހނ ގނދނޒމއ ޤއ ދފނ ފނނ

ޖށ ދޔމށ ޤޞދކރ މހނގ އތނ އކ ހމޖއސމގއ ދމވ މއސލތކއ، ޙއ ކޓ

މނވރ އނމދކރވއ، އކ ޖމޢތތކނ ނގ ފއސގ އދދ ބޑކރމގ މއސލއ

މޤޞދ ނދވ މއސލތކއ، ޙއޖ ކރޕރޝނގޚދމތ ޙއޖވރނނށ ގތށވސ

أهليتها لتقرير ختضع مجيع البحوث املرسلة إىل اجمللة لفحص أويل، يقوم به رئيس التحرير، وذلك -11 عتذر عن قبول البحث دون ذكر األسباب. يأن للتحكيم، وحيق له

تعرب مجيع األفكار الواردة يف البحوث اليت تنشرها اجمللة عن آراء أصحاهبا، وال تعرب ابلضرورة عن -12 وجهة نظر اجمللة.

[email protected] : ترسل مجيع املراسالت واألحباث للنشر إىل -13

خطوات التحكيم: كل حبث سيخضع إىل تصحيح وتدقيق لغوي ومن مث خيضع لتحكيم أكثر من أستاذ متخصص يف جمال

البحث.

: املنظور والرأي والتعليق واألفكارالذي مقاالت متضمنة على مناقشات علمية وحملات عامة ومالحظات فيما يتعلق ابملفاهيم املنظور:

خمتلفة. العلم واملعرفة أكثر انتشارا يف جماالت هو ختلفة. العلمية املاالت اجمل: تقدم فيها النقد البناء لتعزيز النقاش بشأن القضااي الراهنة يف مقاالت الرأي

هي مقاالت قصرية اليت جتلب االنتباه إىل نقد مقالة نشرت من قبل أو تتناول فيها نقد ملقالة قدمت :التعليقا سابقا، أو كتاب، أو تقرير، تشرح فيه أمهيته وكيف يكون مفيدا للقراء. ينبغي أن تكون مقاالت املنظور نشره

وامللخص غري مطلوب يف املقاالت املقدمة إىل قسم ، كلمة يف الطول 1500إىل 1000والرأي والتعليق بني .التعليقو الرأيو املنظور

: أسلوب املراجع

معية األمريكية لعلم النفس. اجلوجملة "املنهج" تستخدم املراجع حسب اتفاقيات وأسلوب : حقوق الطبع والنشر

يف اجمللة تعرب عن آراء أصحاهبا، وليس شرطا أن يكون هو رأي جلنة حترير اجمللة، وحقوق البحوث اليت تنشر الطبع حمفوظة جلامعة املالديف اإلسالمية.


152

.رواية أواألفكاراألصلية ➢ .جيب أن تكون ذات أمهية عالية يف اجملال احملدد ➢ اجملال.هتمام للباحثني اآلخرين يف التكون مثرية ➢ .فهم متقدم للتأثريعلى التفكري يف امليدان ➢

شروط النشر:ة املعاصرة: ) يسات واألحباث الفكر دراالتنشر جملة املنهج الصادرة عن جامعة املالديف اإلسالمية يف جمال

األدبية ( اليت التزمت منهجية البحث العلمي –االقتصادية –الفكرية –ة بويالرت –الدراسات: اإلسالمية العاملية، وذلك وفق الشروط التالية:

.الديفهية –االجنليزية –أن يكتب البحث إبحدى اللغات: العربية -1 ومل ينشر من قبل. أن يتم البحث ابجلدة األصالة، -2أن يكتب عنوان البحث، واسم الباحث وصفته األكادميية والعلمية، واجلهة اليت يعمل لديها مع -3

بياانت التواصل كاملة )رقم اهلاتف/ الربيد االلكرتوين(.إبحدى اللغتني االجنليزية أو الديفهية ، وأن ال يتجاوز أو أن يكتب ملخص للبحث ابللغة العربية -4

لكل منها. كلمة 150منضدة على احلاسوب ومرقمة، ( A4)واحد من الورق ية مطبوعة على وجهأن يرسل نسخة ورق -5

16وحبجم Traditional Arabicأعلى وأسفل وعلى جانيب الصفحة وخبط 2.5وحبواش (. Boldللنص )العنوان الفرعي 14للعناوين األساسية و

Times Newخبط Microsoft Wordإن كان البحث ابللغة االجنليزية فإنه يكتب خبط -6

Roman. وكذلك (، Word – Pdf )أن يرفق مع النسخة األصلية للبحث املطبوعة امللفية الرقمية بصيغيت -7

السرية الذاتية للباحث. كلمة. 150أقصى كلمة مبا يف ذلك اخلالصة كحد 9000أن ال يتجاوز عدد كلمات البحث -8 تيب األلف ابئي ألمساء املؤلفني.توضع قائمة ابملراجع يف آخر البحث على ورقة مستقلة وفق الرت -9 يشار يف منت البحث إىل املراجع ) االسم املشهور، عام النشر، الصفحة ( . -10

قواعد النشر

نظرة عامة:حمكمة تصدر عن مركز البحوث والنشر جبامعة املالديف اإلسالمية. هدفها نشر األحباث علمية"املنهج" جملة

املنهج تنشر بعدة لغات؛ . جملةاإلسالمية واإلنسانيةاملعرفة احملكمة، والنهوض ابملعرفة يف خمتلف جماالت .الديفيهيةو ، اإلجنليزية، العربية

أهداف اجمللة:

هلذه اجمللة أهداف عديدة من أمهها: األكادمييني ومساعدهتم على نشر أحباثهم العلمية. نيتشجيع الباحث .1 .للجميعالعلمية احملكمة توفري األحباث .2 فة املختلفة.جماالت املعر التواصل بني الباحث والقارئ يف .3ومراكز البحوث واجلهات املختصة، العاملية واجلامعات ،توطيد العالقات العلمية والفكرية بني اجلامعة .4

ينها.بفيما وتبادل اإلصدارات العلمية ، من خالل الوقوف على النتائج العلمية لكل البحوث املعاصر رصد ومتابعة اجتاهات البحث العلمي .5

اليت تصدرها اجمللة. .والتحكيم العلميتوفري فرصة التقومي العلمي للبحوث من خالل إخضاع البحوث للرأي .6 .لإلفادة منهارسائل املاجستري والدكتوراه وملخصات نشر عناوين .7 نشر دليل علمي للمؤمترات حىت يستطيع الباحث املشاركة هبذه املؤمترات ويتم تنقيح األفكار. .8 ث العلمية األصيلة واملبتكرة يف اجملاالت العلمية املختلفة.و نشر البح .9

.واإلفادة منها ميدانيا وتقدمه من خالل نشر البحوث العلميةوضع لبنة يف تطوير اجملتمع .10 دورية اجمللة:

اجمللة دورية تصدر يف شهر مارس من كل سنة ميالدية. معايريالنشر:

ابملعايري العامة التالية: يكون ملتزما يف جملة "املنهج"، يشرتط أبن حبثا لتنشر .اليت وصلت إليهاتقدمي أدلة قوية للنتائج ➢



153

.رواية أواألفكاراألصلية ➢ .جيب أن تكون ذات أمهية عالية يف اجملال احملدد ➢ اجملال.هتمام للباحثني اآلخرين يف التكون مثرية ➢ .فهم متقدم للتأثريعلى التفكري يف امليدان ➢

شروط النشر:ة املعاصرة: ) يسات واألحباث الفكر دراالتنشر جملة املنهج الصادرة عن جامعة املالديف اإلسالمية يف جمال

األدبية ( اليت التزمت منهجية البحث العلمي –االقتصادية –الفكرية –ة بويالرت –الدراسات: اإلسالمية العاملية، وذلك وفق الشروط التالية:

.الديفهية –االجنليزية –أن يكتب البحث إبحدى اللغات: العربية -1 ومل ينشر من قبل. أن يتم البحث ابجلدة األصالة، -2أن يكتب عنوان البحث، واسم الباحث وصفته األكادميية والعلمية، واجلهة اليت يعمل لديها مع -3

بياانت التواصل كاملة )رقم اهلاتف/ الربيد االلكرتوين(.إبحدى اللغتني االجنليزية أو الديفهية ، وأن ال يتجاوز أو أن يكتب ملخص للبحث ابللغة العربية -4

لكل منها. كلمة 150منضدة على احلاسوب ومرقمة، ( A4)واحد من الورق ية مطبوعة على وجهأن يرسل نسخة ورق -5

16وحبجم Traditional Arabicأعلى وأسفل وعلى جانيب الصفحة وخبط 2.5وحبواش (. Boldللنص )العنوان الفرعي 14للعناوين األساسية و

Times Newخبط Microsoft Wordإن كان البحث ابللغة االجنليزية فإنه يكتب خبط -6

Roman. وكذلك (، Word – Pdf )أن يرفق مع النسخة األصلية للبحث املطبوعة امللفية الرقمية بصيغيت -7

السرية الذاتية للباحث. كلمة. 150أقصى كلمة مبا يف ذلك اخلالصة كحد 9000أن ال يتجاوز عدد كلمات البحث -8 تيب األلف ابئي ألمساء املؤلفني.توضع قائمة ابملراجع يف آخر البحث على ورقة مستقلة وفق الرت -9 يشار يف منت البحث إىل املراجع ) االسم املشهور، عام النشر، الصفحة ( . -10

قواعد النشر

نظرة عامة:حمكمة تصدر عن مركز البحوث والنشر جبامعة املالديف اإلسالمية. هدفها نشر األحباث علمية"املنهج" جملة

املنهج تنشر بعدة لغات؛ . جملةاإلسالمية واإلنسانيةاملعرفة احملكمة، والنهوض ابملعرفة يف خمتلف جماالت .الديفيهيةو ، اإلجنليزية، العربية

أهداف اجمللة:

هلذه اجمللة أهداف عديدة من أمهها: األكادمييني ومساعدهتم على نشر أحباثهم العلمية. نيتشجيع الباحث .1 .للجميعالعلمية احملكمة توفري األحباث .2 فة املختلفة.جماالت املعر التواصل بني الباحث والقارئ يف .3ومراكز البحوث واجلهات املختصة، العاملية واجلامعات ،توطيد العالقات العلمية والفكرية بني اجلامعة .4

ينها.بفيما وتبادل اإلصدارات العلمية ، من خالل الوقوف على النتائج العلمية لكل البحوث املعاصر رصد ومتابعة اجتاهات البحث العلمي .5

اليت تصدرها اجمللة. .والتحكيم العلميتوفري فرصة التقومي العلمي للبحوث من خالل إخضاع البحوث للرأي .6 .لإلفادة منهارسائل املاجستري والدكتوراه وملخصات نشر عناوين .7 نشر دليل علمي للمؤمترات حىت يستطيع الباحث املشاركة هبذه املؤمترات ويتم تنقيح األفكار. .8 ث العلمية األصيلة واملبتكرة يف اجملاالت العلمية املختلفة.و نشر البح .9

.واإلفادة منها ميدانيا وتقدمه من خالل نشر البحوث العلميةوضع لبنة يف تطوير اجملتمع .10 دورية اجمللة:

اجمللة دورية تصدر يف شهر مارس من كل سنة ميالدية. معايريالنشر:

ابملعايري العامة التالية: يكون ملتزما يف جملة "املنهج"، يشرتط أبن حبثا لتنشر .اليت وصلت إليهاتقدمي أدلة قوية للنتائج ➢


154

އލމނހޖގއ ޝއޢ ކރވ ލޔނތއ ހނނނ ވނ އމރކނ ސއކލޖކލ ލޔނތކށ ހވލދނނ:

އސސއޝނގ ޕބލކޝނ މނއލ އ އއގތށވ.

ޑބލ ބލއނޑ" ޕއ ރވޔ އނ ކމނ އލމނހޖގއ ޝއޢކރ ލޔމއވސ ބލނ " ޕއރ ރވޔ:މޙއރރ ހވލކރ ދރސ ކރދސ މދވގނ ދ ރފރނ ބލނއވ. މޝވރ ކރދސ ފދ ކރދސ ޝއޢކރމގ ބރ މޙއރރށ ލބގނ ވއވ. އހނ ނމވސ ރފރނނށ މޝވރ ކރދސ ހށއޅމކ

ނލއވސ އކށގނވ ލޔމއ ކމގއ ވނ ނމ އލމނހޖގއ ޝއޢ ކރވދނއވ.

މޞއނފނ ޝއޢކރ ލޔނތއ، އބސޓރކޓ ހމނ ގތށ ކޕ ރއޓ ބނނކރމގ ކޕ ރއޓ:ހނ ކމނ އއވސ މސއނފކ އލމނހޖގއ އޚތޔރ އލމނހޖށ ލބފއ އނނނވނއވ. އ

ހމނފއވ ލޔނކޅއ އހނ ތނއގއ ބނނކރނ އދ ނމ އލމނހޖގ ކބއނ ހއދ ލބގނނނ ށ ބދލކރނ ޖހނއވ. އދ އލމނހޖގއ ހމނފއވ ލޔމއ ބދލ ތކކއކ ނވތ އ ނނ ގތކ

އދ ނމ ވސ ހއދ ލބގނނނ ޖހނއވ.

މނސކރޕޓ ހށއޅމގ ކރނ ބހގ މއސލތއ ރނގޅ ކރނ ޖހނއވ. އއ :ބހގ ކއފލވނއނ ދނގތމށޓކއވ. ކރދހގ ޢލމ އއޓރ ޖނލގ އޑޓރނނއ މރޖޢކރ ބފޅނނށ ފސހ

ނމވސ ބހގ މއސލތއ ރނގޅ ކރމކނ ކރދސ ޝއޢ ކރވނކމގ ޔޤނކމއ ނލބނއވ.

ނނ ށފއވ. ރވޔ ކރ ފރތތކށއގނ ހމނހނނ ވރށ ދރގއ ލޔ އއ އނޗގ ހވސއއ ވލޔނތކގއ މޞއނފގ ނމއ އހނހނ މޢލމތ ހމނފއވ ތނތނ އނގނ ، ނކރމށޓކޢހމކ

ރވޔ ކރ ފރތތކގ ފދ ގތކށ ފހގކށލނ ވނއވ. މޞއނފނގ ޢދދ އކކށވރ ގނ ވނމ ބސ އދ ޕރފ ލބގނނނ މސއނފކ ކނޑއޅނ ވނއވ. ހރހ ޞފޙއއގއ ހނނނވނ ޞފޙ

ނހމނނ ޢދވގނވޢވ. ނމބރ ޖހފއވ. އދ ލޔމގއ ފޓނޓސ

ގ އމޒކ ފޅ ދއރއއގ ޢލމ ދރސތއ ޕބލޝކރމވ. އލ މނހޖ :އލ މނހޖގ ހދދ މގތރގއ ހމނނ:

މއ ކނޑއޅފއވ ދއރގ ވސނނ ކރއރވމށ ހދނޖހ އމއލ ދރސ ރޕޓކވ. ރސރޗ ރޕޓ:ބހ ދމދގ އބސޓރކޓ ތޅދނޑލފޒތކ ފޓނޓސއ ރފރނސ އދ މގ 150-100ދރސގ

ބހށ ވރ ދގވގނ ނވނއވ. 9000އތރނ ބނނވ ތވލތއ ހމނއގނ ލޔވ މ ރޕޓ އލމނހޖގއ ޝއޢކރމށ ފނވ ލޔނ، މގކރނ އހނ އއވސ ތނއގއ ޝއޢކށފއވ ލޔމކށ

ވގނ ނވނއވ.

ތނ އވ ވއ އއ މއ މދއރގއ މހރވސ ޝއއ ކރވފއހރ ލޔނތކ ބހގ :ކރދސރވއ ހމނ ގތށ ލޔވފއވ ލޔމކވ. މއ އއމގތއގއ ޝއޢ ކރވފއވ ލއމއގއ ހރ މއސލތއ

ފހގކށ، އލޔމނ ލބނ ހރ މޢލމތގ އލގއ ތހލލ ކރމވ.

ޕކޓވ އޓކލސއނ ތފތ ދއރތކނ އނމ އއމ ޕސޕސޕކޓވ، އޕނއނ އދ ކމނޓރ: ޚޔލތކ ބހގތނ ޢލމ މޝވރތއ ފރކށދއވ. އޕނއނ އޓކލސ އނ ބނކރނވ ފޑކޔނ

ބހގތނ ވހކދކވނ ފރކށދނމގ ސބބނ އކއކ ދއރތކނ ފހގ ކރވ އނމ ފހގ މއސލތކ އތރކށދއވ. ކމނޓރ އކ ޝއއ ކރވފއވ ލޔމއ، ފތއ، ނވތ ރޕޓއ ޚއޞކށ އގއވ ޝޢޤވރ ކރނވ ކނތއތއ ބޔނކރމށފހ ކޔ މހނނށ މޢލމތ ލއބއދނ ގތތކމދ

ލފޒގ 1500 - 1000ޕސޕކޓވ، އޕނއނ އދ ކމނޓރ އޓކލގ ދގމނ ވހކދއކމވ.ދތރއށ ފތނ ޖހނއވ. ޕސޕކޓވ، އޕނއނ އދ ކމނޓރ ސކޝނށ ހށހޅ ލޔނތކށ

އއއވސ ނކރވނއވ.އބސޓރކޓއ ބނމއ ނވނއވ. އދ މ މލޔނތއ ޕއރ ރވ



155

އލމނހޖގއ ޝއޢ ކރވ ލޔނތއ ހނނނ ވނ އމރކނ ސއކލޖކލ ލޔނތކށ ހވލދނނ:

އސސއޝނގ ޕބލކޝނ މނއލ އ އއގތށވ.

ޑބލ ބލއނޑ" ޕއ ރވޔ އނ ކމނ އލމނހޖގއ ޝއޢކރ ލޔމއވސ ބލނ " ޕއރ ރވޔ:މޙއރރ ހވލކރ ދރސ ކރދސ މދވގނ ދ ރފރނ ބލނއވ. މޝވރ ކރދސ ފދ ކރދސ ޝއޢކރމގ ބރ މޙއރރށ ލބގނ ވއވ. އހނ ނމވސ ރފރނނށ މޝވރ ކރދސ ހށއޅމކ

ނލއވސ އކށގނވ ލޔމއ ކމގއ ވނ ނމ އލމނހޖގއ ޝއޢ ކރވދނއވ.

މޞއނފނ ޝއޢކރ ލޔނތއ، އބސޓރކޓ ހމނ ގތށ ކޕ ރއޓ ބނނކރމގ ކޕ ރއޓ:ހނ ކމނ އއވސ މސއނފކ އލމނހޖގއ އޚތޔރ އލމނހޖށ ލބފއ އނނނވނއވ. އ

ހމނފއވ ލޔނކޅއ އހނ ތނއގއ ބނނކރނ އދ ނމ އލމނހޖގ ކބއނ ހއދ ލބގނނނ ށ ބދލކރނ ޖހނއވ. އދ އލމނހޖގއ ހމނފއވ ލޔމއ ބދލ ތކކއކ ނވތ އ ނނ ގތކ

އދ ނމ ވސ ހއދ ލބގނނނ ޖހނއވ.

މނސކރޕޓ ހށއޅމގ ކރނ ބހގ މއސލތއ ރނގޅ ކރނ ޖހނއވ. އއ :ބހގ ކއފލވނއނ ދނގތމށޓކއވ. ކރދހގ ޢލމ އއޓރ ޖނލގ އޑޓރނނއ މރޖޢކރ ބފޅނނށ ފސހ

ނމވސ ބހގ މއސލތއ ރނގޅ ކރމކނ ކރދސ ޝއޢ ކރވނކމގ ޔޤނކމއ ނލބނއވ.

ނނ ށފއވ. ރވޔ ކރ ފރތތކށއގނ ހމނހނނ ވރށ ދރގއ ލޔ އއ އނޗގ ހވސއއ ވލޔނތކގއ މޞއނފގ ނމއ އހނހނ މޢލމތ ހމނފއވ ތނތނ އނގނ ، ނކރމށޓކޢހމކ

ރވޔ ކރ ފރތތކގ ފދ ގތކށ ފހގކށލނ ވނއވ. މޞއނފނގ ޢދދ އކކށވރ ގނ ވނމ ބސ އދ ޕރފ ލބގނނނ މސއނފކ ކނޑއޅނ ވނއވ. ހރހ ޞފޙއއގއ ހނނނވނ ޞފޙ

ނހމނނ ޢދވގނވޢވ. ނމބރ ޖހފއވ. އދ ލޔމގއ ފޓނޓސ

ގ އމޒކ ފޅ ދއރއއގ ޢލމ ދރސތއ ޕބލޝކރމވ. އލ މނހޖ :އލ މނހޖގ ހދދ މގތރގއ ހމނނ:

މއ ކނޑއޅފއވ ދއރގ ވސނނ ކރއރވމށ ހދނޖހ އމއލ ދރސ ރޕޓކވ. ރސރޗ ރޕޓ:ބހ ދމދގ އބސޓރކޓ ތޅދނޑލފޒތކ ފޓނޓސއ ރފރނސ އދ މގ 150-100ދރސގ

ބހށ ވރ ދގވގނ ނވނއވ. 9000އތރނ ބނނވ ތވލތއ ހމނއގނ ލޔވ މ ރޕޓ އލމނހޖގއ ޝއޢކރމށ ފނވ ލޔނ، މގކރނ އހނ އއވސ ތނއގއ ޝއޢކށފއވ ލޔމކށ

ވގނ ނވނއވ.

ތނ އވ ވއ އއ މއ މދއރގއ މހރވސ ޝއއ ކރވފއހރ ލޔނތކ ބހގ :ކރދސރވއ ހމނ ގތށ ލޔވފއވ ލޔމކވ. މއ އއމގތއގއ ޝއޢ ކރވފއވ ލއމއގއ ހރ މއސލތއ

ފހގކށ، އލޔމނ ލބނ ހރ މޢލމތގ އލގއ ތހލލ ކރމވ.

ޕކޓވ އޓކލސއނ ތފތ ދއރތކނ އނމ އއމ ޕސޕސޕކޓވ، އޕނއނ އދ ކމނޓރ: ޚޔލތކ ބހގތނ ޢލމ މޝވރތއ ފރކށދއވ. އޕނއނ އޓކލސ އނ ބނކރނވ ފޑކޔނ

ބހގތނ ވހކދކވނ ފރކށދނމގ ސބބނ އކއކ ދއރތކނ ފހގ ކރވ އނމ ފހގ މއސލތކ އތރކށދއވ. ކމނޓރ އކ ޝއއ ކރވފއވ ލޔމއ، ފތއ، ނވތ ރޕޓއ ޚއޞކށ އގއވ ޝޢޤވރ ކރނވ ކނތއތއ ބޔނކރމށފހ ކޔ މހނނށ މޢލމތ ލއބއދނ ގތތކމދ

ލފޒގ 1500 - 1000ޕސޕކޓވ، އޕނއނ އދ ކމނޓރ އޓކލގ ދގމނ ވހކދއކމވ.ދތރއށ ފތނ ޖހނއވ. ޕސޕކޓވ، އޕނއނ އދ ކމނޓރ ސކޝނށ ހށހޅ ލޔނތކށ

އއއވސ ނކރވނއވ.އބސޓރކޓއ ބނމއ ނވނއވ. އދ މ މލޔނތއ ޕއރ ރވ


156

އރޝދ އސލއ ކރމގ ޝއޢ ލޔނތއ

"އލމނހޖ" އކ ދވހ ރއޖގ އސލމ ޔނވރސޓގ ސނޓރ ފރ ރސރޗ އނޑ :ތޢރފޕބލކޝނ ގ ފރތނ ޝއއ ކރ، ޑބލ ބލއނޑ ޕއ ރވއޑ ޢލމ ޖނލ އކވ. އލމނހޖ ގ

ކގ މތނ އކ އކ ދއރތކ ބހ މއގނޑ މޤސދކ ދނޔ ޤބލ ކރ މތ ފނވރގ ހމ ތދރސތއކށ ޝއޢ ކރމވ. ޤއމ އދ ބއނލ އޤވމ މޖތމޢތކށ އކށނ ގތށ ޝއޢކރމގ

ވ. ގތނ މ ޖނލ އށ ދވހ، އނގރސ އދ ޢރބ ބހނ ދރސ ހށއޅމގ ފރސތ ވނ ހޅވލވފއ

އލމނހޖގ މޤޞދކ، ވގތއ ހލތ ގޅ، ތޢލމ ދއރއއ ޝރޢތއ ޤނނއ އސލމކ :ޤޞދމބނކނގ އދ ފއނނސގ ދއރ ފދ ފޅ ދއރތކށ ނސބތވ ދރސތއކށ އކމ ބހ ޢލމ

ދރސ ކރމށ ހޅވއލމގ ބނމކ ޔނވރސޓގ ޕސޓގރޖއޓ ފތރމވ. މހ ފޅ ދއރއއގއ ދރވރނނއ މވއޒފނނށ ތޢލމ މޝވރތކގއ ބއވރވ، މޖތމޢށ ފއދކރނވ ޤއމ އދ

އހނމ ގނ އދދއގ މހނނށ ބއނލއޤވމ ދރސތއ ޝއޢކރމގ މގ ފހކށދނމވ. އދ ހމ ދރސތއ ފރކށދނމވސ އއމ ގތކށ ދރސ ކރމގ ފރސތ ހޅވއލމގ އމޒކވ.

މ ޖނލގ ޗޕ ކޕ ކނމ އހރއގ މރޗ މހގއ ޝއޢ ކރވނއވ. :މނވރ ޝއޢކރމގ

އލމނހޖގއ ދރސ ކރދސ ޝއޢކރވނ އނނނވ ޝރތތއ :މނގޑޝއޢކރމގ ހމނނމއވ.

ނނމނތކށ ބރދ ހކ ހމނފއވނ • އމއލ ޚޔލއ ފކރ ހމނފއވނ • ދއރ އ ބހ މހއމ މޢލމތ ހމނ ދރސއކށވނ • ސ ކރ އހނ މހނ ޝއޤވރވފދ ދރސއކށ ވނދއރ އ ބހ ދރ • ވސނމއ ފކރ ކރއރވނ ފދ ޤބލކނ ހރނ •

ޝއއ ކރނޖހ ކރދސ ނވތ މނސކރޕޓ ހށއޅނޖހނ ސނޓރ ފ ހވލކރނ: ކރދސއށވ. ޝއޢކރނ އދ ހށއޅ [email protected]މގއވ ރސރޗ އނޑ ޕބލކޝނގ އ.މއލ ކ

1.5ލޔނތއ ހނނނވނ މއކރސފޓ ވރޑ ނވތ ރޗ ޓކސޓ ފމޓގއ ދ ފޅވތ ދމދގއ

އރޝދ އސލއ ކރމގ ޝއޢ ލޔނތއ

"އލމނހޖ" އކ ދވހ ރއޖގ އސލމ ޔނވރސޓގ ސނޓރ ފރ ރސރޗ އނޑ :ތޢރފޕބލކޝނ ގ ފރތނ ޝއއ ކރ، ޑބލ ބލއނޑ ޕއ ރވއޑ ޢލމ ޖނލ އކވ. އލމނހޖ ގ

ކގ މތނ އކ އކ ދއރތކ ބހ މއގނޑ މޤސދކ ދނޔ ޤބލ ކރ މތ ފނވރގ ހމ ތދރސތއކށ ޝއޢ ކރމވ. ޤއމ އދ ބއނލ އޤވމ މޖތމޢތކށ އކށނ ގތށ ޝއޢކރމގ

ވ. ގތނ މ ޖނލ އށ ދވހ، އނގރސ އދ ޢރބ ބހނ ދރސ ހށއޅމގ ފރސތ ވނ ހޅވލވފއ

އލމނހޖގ މޤޞދކ، ވގތއ ހލތ ގޅ، ތޢލމ ދއރއއ ޝރޢތއ ޤނނއ އސލމކ :ޤޞދމބނކނގ އދ ފއނނސގ ދއރ ފދ ފޅ ދއރތކށ ނސބތވ ދރސތއކށ އކމ ބހ ޢލމ

ދރސ ކރމށ ހޅވއލމގ ބނމކ ޔނވރސޓގ ޕސޓގރޖއޓ ފތރމވ. މހ ފޅ ދއރއއގއ ދރވރނނއ މވއޒފނނށ ތޢލމ މޝވރތކގއ ބއވރވ، މޖތމޢށ ފއދކރނވ ޤއމ އދ

އހނމ ގނ އދދއގ މހނނށ ބއނލއޤވމ ދރސތއ ޝއޢކރމގ މގ ފހކށދނމވ. އދ ހމ ދރސތއ ފރކށދނމވސ އއމ ގތކށ ދރސ ކރމގ ފރސތ ހޅވއލމގ އމޒކވ.

މ ޖނލގ ޗޕ ކޕ ކނމ އހރއގ މރޗ މހގއ ޝއޢ ކރވނއވ. :މނވރ ޝއޢކރމގ

އލމނހޖގއ ދރސ ކރދސ ޝއޢކރވނ އނނނވ ޝރތތއ :މނގޑޝއޢކރމގ ހމނނމއވ.

ނނމނތކށ ބރދ ހކ ހމނފއވނ • އމއލ ޚޔލއ ފކރ ހމނފއވނ • ދއރ އ ބހ މހއމ މޢލމތ ހމނ ދރސއކށވނ • ސ ކރ އހނ މހނ ޝއޤވރވފދ ދރސއކށ ވނދއރ އ ބހ ދރ • ވސނމއ ފކރ ކރއރވނ ފދ ޤބލކނ ހރނ •

ޝއއ ކރނޖހ ކރދސ ނވތ މނސކރޕޓ ހށއޅނޖހނ ސނޓރ ފ ހވލކރނ: ކރދސއށވ. ޝއޢކރނ އދ ހށއޅ [email protected]މގއވ ރސރޗ އނޑ ޕބލކޝނގ އ.މއލ ކ

1.5ލޔނތއ ހނނނވނ މއކރސފޓ ވރޑ ނވތ ރޗ ޓކސޓ ފމޓގއ ދ ފޅވތ ދމދގއ


160

Al-ManhajA Journal of Multidisciplinary Research

Volume 2 Number 1

September 2018

Center for Research and PublicationIslamic University of Maldives

King Fahd BuildingViolet Magu, HenveiruMale’, Maldives

Fax:+(960) 3317660Phone: +(960) 3022150Email: [email protected]

· 1.1 introduction to put into perspective, the effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies (...

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