11 may 2015 letter to us senate ctee on energy & natural resources
TRANSCRIPT
8/9/2019 11 May 2015 Letter to US Senate Ctee on Energy & Natural Resources
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/11-may-2015-letter-to-us-senate-ctee-on-energy-natural-resources 1/22
Douglas A. GrandtPO Box 6603
Lincoln, NE 68506 (510) 432-1452
May 11, 2015
Senator Lisa Murkowski709 Hart Senate Office BuildingWashington, D.C. 20510
Re: Oil Refining - Considering future eventualities versus the myopia of the present (letter #10)
Dear ENR Chairman Murkowski,
This is my tenth letter to you expressing my deep concern about an imminent conflict between1) Corporate Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty in the face of insolvency, indeedtheir termination of unprofitable refining operations, and 2) national interest or public interest.
In view of expected continuing depressed petroleum prices, I fear that oil refining corporations
will soon face severely declining earnings, dividends, and share value, all of which will bringtheir Officers and Boards of Directors to decisions to curtail production and refining operations.
My fear, which has been growing over several month, is that decisions by those with the bestintentions to fulfill their legal obligations could lead us into territory that nobody is anticipating.
Read the ABA’s August 6, 2010, document “Insolvency and Fiduciary Duties: Advising Directorsand Officers When the Company Cannot Pay Its Bills.” (http://bit.ly/ABA6Aug10)
Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty to companies like Chevron, ConocoPhillips,ExxonMobil, Marathon, Occidental, etc. and their investors, will likely have dire consequencesfor other businesses and the public unless we prepare to take preventative, controlling actions.
This is what one industry expert has to say, and we can all surmise the disastrous implications:
Prolonged low oil prices will prove that tight oil plays need at least $75 per barrel to breakeven. When oil prices recover to that level, only the best parts of the tight oil core areas willbe competitive in the global market. As production declines from expensive tight oil, oil sandand ultra-deep-water plays, inexpensive Saudi oil will gain market share.
Saudi Arabia is not trying to crush tight oil plays, just the stupid money that funded theover-production of tight oil. Too much supply combined with weak demand created thepresent oil-price collapse. Saudi Arabia hopes to prolong low prices to benefit theirlong-term needs for market share and higher demand. ( http://bit.ly/OilPrice20Apr15 )
Demand the petroleum industry CEOs tell the American public how they will respond when theybecome insolvent. Will they continue to supply fuels when earnings and dividends fall to criticallevels where share price plummets and they are no longer financially viable in the marketplace?
They have the best and brightest working on the problem. Make them reveal the results of theireconomic models. Let’s critique their assumptions, especially the “worst case” scenarios.
Sincerely yours,
Doug Grandt
8/9/2019 11 May 2015 Letter to US Senate Ctee on Energy & Natural Resources
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/11-may-2015-letter-to-us-senate-ctee-on-energy-natural-resources 2/22
Douglas A. GrandtPO Box 6603
Lincoln, NE 68506 (510) 432-1452
May 11, 2015
Senator Lamar Alexander455 Dirksen Senate O!ce Building Washington, D.C. 20510
Re: Oil Refining - Considering future eventualities versus the myopia of the present (letter #10)
Dear Senator Alexander,
This is my tenth letter to you expressing my deep concern about an imminent conflict between1) Corporate Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty in the face of insolvency, indeedtheir termination of unprofitable refining operations, and 2) national interest or public interest.
In view of expected continuing depressed petroleum prices, I fear that oil refining corporationswill soon face severely declining earnings, dividends, and share value, all of which will bringtheir Officers and Boards of Directors to decisions to curtail production and refining operations.
My fear, which has been growing over several month, is that decisions by those with the bestintentions to fulfill their legal obligations could lead us into territory that nobody is anticipating.
Read the ABA’s August 6, 2010, document “Insolvency and Fiduciary Duties: Advising Directorsand Officers When the Company Cannot Pay Its Bills.” (http://bit.ly/ABA6Aug10)
Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty to companies like Chevron, ConocoPhillips,ExxonMobil, Marathon, Occidental, etc. and their investors, will likely have dire consequencesfor other businesses and the public unless we prepare to take preventative, controlling actions.
This is what one industry expert has to say, and we can all surmise the disastrous implications:Prolonged low oil prices will prove that tight oil plays need at least $75 per barrel to breakeven. When oil prices recover to that level, only the best parts of the tight oil core areas willbe competitive in the global market. As production declines from expensive tight oil, oil sandand ultra-deep-water plays, inexpensive Saudi oil will gain market share.
Saudi Arabia is not trying to crush tight oil plays, just the stupid money that funded theover-production of tight oil. Too much supply combined with weak demand created thepresent oil-price collapse. Saudi Arabia hopes to prolong low prices to benefit theirlong-term needs for market share and higher demand. ( http://bit.ly/OilPrice20Apr15 )
Demand the petroleum industry CEOs tell the American public how they will respond when theybecome insolvent. Will they continue to supply fuels when earnings and dividends fall to criticallevels where share price plummets and they are no longer financially viable in the marketplace?
They have the best and brightest working on the problem. Make them reveal the results of theireconomic models. Let’s critique their assumptions, especially the “worst case” scenarios.
Sincerely yours,
Doug Grandt
8/9/2019 11 May 2015 Letter to US Senate Ctee on Energy & Natural Resources
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/11-may-2015-letter-to-us-senate-ctee-on-energy-natural-resources 3/22
Douglas A. GrandtPO Box 6603
Lincoln, NE 68506 (510) 432-1452
May 11, 2015
Senator John Barrasso307 Dirksen Senate O!ce Building Washington, D.C. 20510
Re: Oil Refining - Considering future eventualities versus the myopia of the present (letter #10)
Dear Senator Barrasso,
This is my tenth letter to you expressing my deep concern about an imminent conflict between1) Corporate Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty in the face of insolvency, indeedtheir termination of unprofitable refining operations, and 2) national interest or public interest.
In view of expected continuing depressed petroleum prices, I fear that oil refining corporationswill soon face severely declining earnings, dividends, and share value, all of which will bringtheir Officers and Boards of Directors to decisions to curtail production and refining operations.
My fear, which has been growing over several month, is that decisions by those with the bestintentions to fulfill their legal obligations could lead us into territory that nobody is anticipating.
Read the ABA’s August 6, 2010, document “Insolvency and Fiduciary Duties: Advising Directorsand Officers When the Company Cannot Pay Its Bills.” (http://bit.ly/ABA6Aug10)
Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty to companies like Chevron, ConocoPhillips,ExxonMobil, Marathon, Occidental, etc. and their investors, will likely have dire consequencesfor other businesses and the public unless we prepare to take preventative, controlling actions.
This is what one industry expert has to say, and we can all surmise the disastrous implications:Prolonged low oil prices will prove that tight oil plays need at least $75 per barrel to breakeven. When oil prices recover to that level, only the best parts of the tight oil core areas willbe competitive in the global market. As production declines from expensive tight oil, oil sandand ultra-deep-water plays, inexpensive Saudi oil will gain market share.
Saudi Arabia is not trying to crush tight oil plays, just the stupid money that funded theover-production of tight oil. Too much supply combined with weak demand created thepresent oil-price collapse. Saudi Arabia hopes to prolong low prices to benefit theirlong-term needs for market share and higher demand. ( http://bit.ly/OilPrice20Apr15 )
Demand the petroleum industry CEOs tell the American public how they will respond when theybecome insolvent. Will they continue to supply fuels when earnings and dividends fall to criticallevels where share price plummets and they are no longer financially viable in the marketplace?
They have the best and brightest working on the problem. Make them reveal the results of theireconomic models. Let’s critique their assumptions, especially the “worst case” scenarios.
Sincerely yours,
Doug Grandt
8/9/2019 11 May 2015 Letter to US Senate Ctee on Energy & Natural Resources
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/11-may-2015-letter-to-us-senate-ctee-on-energy-natural-resources 4/22
Douglas A. GrandtPO Box 6603
Lincoln, NE 68506 (510) 432-1452
May 11, 2015
Senator Shelley Capito5 Russell Senate O!ce Building Courtyard Washington, D.C. 20510
Re: Oil Refining - Considering future eventualities versus the myopia of the present (letter #10)
Dear Senator Capito,
This is my tenth letter to you expressing my deep concern about an imminent conflict between1) Corporate Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty in the face of insolvency, indeedtheir termination of unprofitable refining operations, and 2) national interest or public interest.
In view of expected continuing depressed petroleum prices, I fear that oil refining corporationswill soon face severely declining earnings, dividends, and share value, all of which will bringtheir Officers and Boards of Directors to decisions to curtail production and refining operations.
My fear, which has been growing over several month, is that decisions by those with the bestintentions to fulfill their legal obligations could lead us into territory that nobody is anticipating.
Read the ABA’s August 6, 2010, document “Insolvency and Fiduciary Duties: Advising Directorsand Officers When the Company Cannot Pay Its Bills.” (http://bit.ly/ABA6Aug10)
Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty to companies like Chevron, ConocoPhillips,ExxonMobil, Marathon, Occidental, etc. and their investors, will likely have dire consequencesfor other businesses and the public unless we prepare to take preventative, controlling actions.
This is what one industry expert has to say, and we can all surmise the disastrous implications:Prolonged low oil prices will prove that tight oil plays need at least $75 per barrel to breakeven. When oil prices recover to that level, only the best parts of the tight oil core areas willbe competitive in the global market. As production declines from expensive tight oil, oil sandand ultra-deep-water plays, inexpensive Saudi oil will gain market share.
Saudi Arabia is not trying to crush tight oil plays, just the stupid money that funded theover-production of tight oil. Too much supply combined with weak demand created thepresent oil-price collapse. Saudi Arabia hopes to prolong low prices to benefit theirlong-term needs for market share and higher demand. ( http://bit.ly/OilPrice20Apr15 )
Demand the petroleum industry CEOs tell the American public how they will respond when theybecome insolvent. Will they continue to supply fuels when earnings and dividends fall to criticallevels where share price plummets and they are no longer financially viable in the marketplace?
They have the best and brightest working on the problem. Make them reveal the results of theireconomic models. Let’s critique their assumptions, especially the “worst case” scenarios.
Sincerely yours,
Doug Grandt
8/9/2019 11 May 2015 Letter to US Senate Ctee on Energy & Natural Resources
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/11-may-2015-letter-to-us-senate-ctee-on-energy-natural-resources 5/22
Douglas A. GrandtPO Box 6603
Lincoln, NE 68506 (510) 432-1452
May 11, 2015
Senator Bill Cassidy703 Hart Senate O!ce Building Washington, D.C. 20510
Re: Oil Refining - Considering future eventualities versus the myopia of the present (letter #10)
Dear Senator Cassidy,
This is my tenth letter to you expressing my deep concern about an imminent conflict between1) Corporate Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty in the face of insolvency, indeedtheir termination of unprofitable refining operations, and 2) national interest or public interest.
In view of expected continuing depressed petroleum prices, I fear that oil refining corporationswill soon face severely declining earnings, dividends, and share value, all of which will bringtheir Officers and Boards of Directors to decisions to curtail production and refining operations.
My fear, which has been growing over several month, is that decisions by those with the bestintentions to fulfill their legal obligations could lead us into territory that nobody is anticipating.
Read the ABA’s August 6, 2010, document “Insolvency and Fiduciary Duties: Advising Directorsand Officers When the Company Cannot Pay Its Bills.” (http://bit.ly/ABA6Aug10)
Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty to companies like Chevron, ConocoPhillips,ExxonMobil, Marathon, Occidental, etc. and their investors, will likely have dire consequencesfor other businesses and the public unless we prepare to take preventative, controlling actions.
This is what one industry expert has to say, and we can all surmise the disastrous implications:Prolonged low oil prices will prove that tight oil plays need at least $75 per barrel to breakeven. When oil prices recover to that level, only the best parts of the tight oil core areas willbe competitive in the global market. As production declines from expensive tight oil, oil sandand ultra-deep-water plays, inexpensive Saudi oil will gain market share.
Saudi Arabia is not trying to crush tight oil plays, just the stupid money that funded theover-production of tight oil. Too much supply combined with weak demand created thepresent oil-price collapse. Saudi Arabia hopes to prolong low prices to benefit theirlong-term needs for market share and higher demand. ( http://bit.ly/OilPrice20Apr15 )
Demand the petroleum industry CEOs tell the American public how they will respond when theybecome insolvent. Will they continue to supply fuels when earnings and dividends fall to criticallevels where share price plummets and they are no longer financially viable in the marketplace?
They have the best and brightest working on the problem. Make them reveal the results of theireconomic models. Let’s critique their assumptions, especially the “worst case” scenarios.
Sincerely yours,
Doug Grandt
8/9/2019 11 May 2015 Letter to US Senate Ctee on Energy & Natural Resources
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/11-may-2015-letter-to-us-senate-ctee-on-energy-natural-resources 6/22
Douglas A. GrandtPO Box 6603
Lincoln, NE 68506 (510) 432-1452
May 11, 2015
Senator Steve Daines1 Russell Senate O!ce Building Courtyard Washington, D.C. 20510
Re: Oil Refining - Considering future eventualities versus the myopia of the present (letter #10)
Dear Senator Daines,
This is my tenth letter to you expressing my deep concern about an imminent conflict between1) Corporate Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty in the face of insolvency, indeedtheir termination of unprofitable refining operations, and 2) national interest or public interest.
In view of expected continuing depressed petroleum prices, I fear that oil refining corporationswill soon face severely declining earnings, dividends, and share value, all of which will bringtheir Officers and Boards of Directors to decisions to curtail production and refining operations.
My fear, which has been growing over several month, is that decisions by those with the bestintentions to fulfill their legal obligations could lead us into territory that nobody is anticipating.
Read the ABA’s August 6, 2010, document “Insolvency and Fiduciary Duties: Advising Directorsand Officers When the Company Cannot Pay Its Bills.” (http://bit.ly/ABA6Aug10)
Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty to companies like Chevron, ConocoPhillips,ExxonMobil, Marathon, Occidental, etc. and their investors, will likely have dire consequencesfor other businesses and the public unless we prepare to take preventative, controlling actions.
This is what one industry expert has to say, and we can all surmise the disastrous implications:Prolonged low oil prices will prove that tight oil plays need at least $75 per barrel to breakeven. When oil prices recover to that level, only the best parts of the tight oil core areas willbe competitive in the global market. As production declines from expensive tight oil, oil sandand ultra-deep-water plays, inexpensive Saudi oil will gain market share.
Saudi Arabia is not trying to crush tight oil plays, just the stupid money that funded theover-production of tight oil. Too much supply combined with weak demand created thepresent oil-price collapse. Saudi Arabia hopes to prolong low prices to benefit theirlong-term needs for market share and higher demand. ( http://bit.ly/OilPrice20Apr15 )
Demand the petroleum industry CEOs tell the American public how they will respond when theybecome insolvent. Will they continue to supply fuels when earnings and dividends fall to criticallevels where share price plummets and they are no longer financially viable in the marketplace?
They have the best and brightest working on the problem. Make them reveal the results of theireconomic models. Let’s critique their assumptions, especially the “worst case” scenarios.
Sincerely yours,
Doug Grandt
8/9/2019 11 May 2015 Letter to US Senate Ctee on Energy & Natural Resources
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/11-may-2015-letter-to-us-senate-ctee-on-energy-natural-resources 7/22
Douglas A. GrandtPO Box 6603
Lincoln, NE 68506 (510) 432-1452
May 11, 2015
Senator Jeff Flake368 Russell Senate O!ce Building Washington, D.C. 20510
Re: Oil Refining - Considering future eventualities versus the myopia of the present (letter #10)
Dear Senator Flake,
This is my tenth letter to you expressing my deep concern about an imminent conflict between1) Corporate Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty in the face of insolvency, indeedtheir termination of unprofitable refining operations, and 2) national interest or public interest.
In view of expected continuing depressed petroleum prices, I fear that oil refining corporationswill soon face severely declining earnings, dividends, and share value, all of which will bringtheir Officers and Boards of Directors to decisions to curtail production and refining operations.
My fear, which has been growing over several month, is that decisions by those with the bestintentions to fulfill their legal obligations could lead us into territory that nobody is anticipating.
Read the ABA’s August 6, 2010, document “Insolvency and Fiduciary Duties: Advising Directorsand Officers When the Company Cannot Pay Its Bills.” (http://bit.ly/ABA6Aug10)
Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty to companies like Chevron, ConocoPhillips,ExxonMobil, Marathon, Occidental, etc. and their investors, will likely have dire consequencesfor other businesses and the public unless we prepare to take preventative, controlling actions.
This is what one industry expert has to say, and we can all surmise the disastrous implications:Prolonged low oil prices will prove that tight oil plays need at least $75 per barrel to breakeven. When oil prices recover to that level, only the best parts of the tight oil core areas willbe competitive in the global market. As production declines from expensive tight oil, oil sandand ultra-deep-water plays, inexpensive Saudi oil will gain market share.
Saudi Arabia is not trying to crush tight oil plays, just the stupid money that funded theover-production of tight oil. Too much supply combined with weak demand created thepresent oil-price collapse. Saudi Arabia hopes to prolong low prices to benefit theirlong-term needs for market share and higher demand. ( http://bit.ly/OilPrice20Apr15 )
Demand the petroleum industry CEOs tell the American public how they will respond when theybecome insolvent. Will they continue to supply fuels when earnings and dividends fall to criticallevels where share price plummets and they are no longer financially viable in the marketplace?
They have the best and brightest working on the problem. Make them reveal the results of theireconomic models. Let’s critique their assumptions, especially the “worst case” scenarios.
Sincerely yours,
Doug Grandt
8/9/2019 11 May 2015 Letter to US Senate Ctee on Energy & Natural Resources
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/11-may-2015-letter-to-us-senate-ctee-on-energy-natural-resources 8/22
Douglas A. GrandtPO Box 6603
Lincoln, NE 68506 (510) 432-1452
May 11, 2015
Senator Cory GardinerB40B Dirksen Senate O!ce Building Washington, D.C. 20510
Re: Oil Refining - Considering future eventualities versus the myopia of the present (letter #10)
Dear Senator Gardiner,
This is my tenth letter to you expressing my deep concern about an imminent conflict between1) Corporate Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty in the face of insolvency, indeedtheir termination of unprofitable refining operations, and 2) national interest or public interest.
In view of expected continuing depressed petroleum prices, I fear that oil refining corporationswill soon face severely declining earnings, dividends, and share value, all of which will bringtheir Officers and Boards of Directors to decisions to curtail production and refining operations.
My fear, which has been growing over several month, is that decisions by those with the bestintentions to fulfill their legal obligations could lead us into territory that nobody is anticipating.
Read the ABA’s August 6, 2010, document “Insolvency and Fiduciary Duties: Advising Directorsand Officers When the Company Cannot Pay Its Bills.” (http://bit.ly/ABA6Aug10)
Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty to companies like Chevron, ConocoPhillips,ExxonMobil, Marathon, Occidental, etc. and their investors, will likely have dire consequencesfor other businesses and the public unless we prepare to take preventative, controlling actions.
This is what one industry expert has to say, and we can all surmise the disastrous implications:Prolonged low oil prices will prove that tight oil plays need at least $75 per barrel to breakeven. When oil prices recover to that level, only the best parts of the tight oil core areas willbe competitive in the global market. As production declines from expensive tight oil, oil sandand ultra-deep-water plays, inexpensive Saudi oil will gain market share.
Saudi Arabia is not trying to crush tight oil plays, just the stupid money that funded theover-production of tight oil. Too much supply combined with weak demand created thepresent oil-price collapse. Saudi Arabia hopes to prolong low prices to benefit theirlong-term needs for market share and higher demand. ( http://bit.ly/OilPrice20Apr15 )
Demand the petroleum industry CEOs tell the American public how they will respond when theybecome insolvent. Will they continue to supply fuels when earnings and dividends fall to criticallevels where share price plummets and they are no longer financially viable in the marketplace?
They have the best and brightest working on the problem. Make them reveal the results of theireconomic models. Let’s critique their assumptions, especially the “worst case” scenarios.
Sincerely yours,
Doug Grandt
8/9/2019 11 May 2015 Letter to US Senate Ctee on Energy & Natural Resources
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/11-may-2015-letter-to-us-senate-ctee-on-energy-natural-resources 9/22
Douglas A. GrandtPO Box 6603
Lincoln, NE 68506 (510) 432-1452
May 11, 2015
Senator John Hoeven338 Russell Senate O!ce Building Washington, D.C. 20510
Re: Oil Refining - Considering future eventualities versus the myopia of the present (letter #10)
Dear Senator Hoeven,
This is my tenth letter to you expressing my deep concern about an imminent conflict between1) Corporate Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty in the face of insolvency, indeedtheir termination of unprofitable refining operations, and 2) national interest or public interest.
In view of expected continuing depressed petroleum prices, I fear that oil refining corporationswill soon face severely declining earnings, dividends, and share value, all of which will bringtheir Officers and Boards of Directors to decisions to curtail production and refining operations.
My fear, which has been growing over several month, is that decisions by those with the bestintentions to fulfill their legal obligations could lead us into territory that nobody is anticipating.
Read the ABA’s August 6, 2010, document “Insolvency and Fiduciary Duties: Advising Directorsand Officers When the Company Cannot Pay Its Bills.” (http://bit.ly/ABA6Aug10)
Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty to companies like Chevron, ConocoPhillips,ExxonMobil, Marathon, Occidental, etc. and their investors, will likely have dire consequencesfor other businesses and the public unless we prepare to take preventative, controlling actions.
This is what one industry expert has to say, and we can all surmise the disastrous implications:Prolonged low oil prices will prove that tight oil plays need at least $75 per barrel to breakeven. When oil prices recover to that level, only the best parts of the tight oil core areas willbe competitive in the global market. As production declines from expensive tight oil, oil sandand ultra-deep-water plays, inexpensive Saudi oil will gain market share.
Saudi Arabia is not trying to crush tight oil plays, just the stupid money that funded theover-production of tight oil. Too much supply combined with weak demand created thepresent oil-price collapse. Saudi Arabia hopes to prolong low prices to benefit theirlong-term needs for market share and higher demand. ( http://bit.ly/OilPrice20Apr15 )
Demand the petroleum industry CEOs tell the American public how they will respond when theybecome insolvent. Will they continue to supply fuels when earnings and dividends fall to criticallevels where share price plummets and they are no longer financially viable in the marketplace?
They have the best and brightest working on the problem. Make them reveal the results of theireconomic models. Let’s critique their assumptions, especially the “worst case” scenarios.
Sincerely yours,
Doug Grandt
8/9/2019 11 May 2015 Letter to US Senate Ctee on Energy & Natural Resources
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/11-may-2015-letter-to-us-senate-ctee-on-energy-natural-resources 10/22
Douglas A. GrandtPO Box 6603
Lincoln, NE 68506 (510) 432-1452
May 11, 2015
Senator Mike Lee316 Hart Senate O!ce Building Washington, D.C. 20510
Re: Oil Refining - Considering future eventualities versus the myopia of the present (letter #10)
Dear Senator Lee,
This is my tenth letter to you expressing my deep concern about an imminent conflict between1) Corporate Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty in the face of insolvency, indeedtheir termination of unprofitable refining operations, and 2) national interest or public interest.
In view of expected continuing depressed petroleum prices, I fear that oil refining corporationswill soon face severely declining earnings, dividends, and share value, all of which will bringtheir Officers and Boards of Directors to decisions to curtail production and refining operations.
My fear, which has been growing over several month, is that decisions by those with the bestintentions to fulfill their legal obligations could lead us into territory that nobody is anticipating.
Read the ABA’s August 6, 2010, document “Insolvency and Fiduciary Duties: Advising Directorsand Officers When the Company Cannot Pay Its Bills.” (http://bit.ly/ABA6Aug10)
Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty to companies like Chevron, ConocoPhillips,ExxonMobil, Marathon, Occidental, etc. and their investors, will likely have dire consequencesfor other businesses and the public unless we prepare to take preventative, controlling actions.
This is what one industry expert has to say, and we can all surmise the disastrous implications:Prolonged low oil prices will prove that tight oil plays need at least $75 per barrel to breakeven. When oil prices recover to that level, only the best parts of the tight oil core areas willbe competitive in the global market. As production declines from expensive tight oil, oil sandand ultra-deep-water plays, inexpensive Saudi oil will gain market share.
Saudi Arabia is not trying to crush tight oil plays, just the stupid money that funded theover-production of tight oil. Too much supply combined with weak demand created thepresent oil-price collapse. Saudi Arabia hopes to prolong low prices to benefit theirlong-term needs for market share and higher demand. ( http://bit.ly/OilPrice20Apr15 )
Demand the petroleum industry CEOs tell the American public how they will respond when theybecome insolvent. Will they continue to supply fuels when earnings and dividends fall to criticallevels where share price plummets and they are no longer financially viable in the marketplace?
They have the best and brightest working on the problem. Make them reveal the results of theireconomic models. Let’s critique their assumptions, especially the “worst case” scenarios.
Sincerely yours,
Doug Grandt
8/9/2019 11 May 2015 Letter to US Senate Ctee on Energy & Natural Resources
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/11-may-2015-letter-to-us-senate-ctee-on-energy-natural-resources 11/22
Douglas A. GrandtPO Box 6603
Lincoln, NE 68506 (510) 432-1452
May 11, 2015
Senator Rob Portman448 Russell Senate O!ce Building Washington, D.C. 20510
Re: Oil Refining - Considering future eventualities versus the myopia of the present (letter #10)
Dear Senator Portman,
This is my tenth letter to you expressing my deep concern about an imminent conflict between1) Corporate Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty in the face of insolvency, indeedtheir termination of unprofitable refining operations, and 2) national interest or public interest.
In view of expected continuing depressed petroleum prices, I fear that oil refining corporationswill soon face severely declining earnings, dividends, and share value, all of which will bringtheir Officers and Boards of Directors to decisions to curtail production and refining operations.
My fear, which has been growing over several month, is that decisions by those with the bestintentions to fulfill their legal obligations could lead us into territory that nobody is anticipating.
Read the ABA’s August 6, 2010, document “Insolvency and Fiduciary Duties: Advising Directorsand Officers When the Company Cannot Pay Its Bills.” (http://bit.ly/ABA6Aug10)
Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty to companies like Chevron, ConocoPhillips,ExxonMobil, Marathon, Occidental, etc. and their investors, will likely have dire consequencesfor other businesses and the public unless we prepare to take preventative, controlling actions.
This is what one industry expert has to say, and we can all surmise the disastrous implications:Prolonged low oil prices will prove that tight oil plays need at least $75 per barrel to breakeven. When oil prices recover to that level, only the best parts of the tight oil core areas willbe competitive in the global market. As production declines from expensive tight oil, oil sandand ultra-deep-water plays, inexpensive Saudi oil will gain market share.
Saudi Arabia is not trying to crush tight oil plays, just the stupid money that funded theover-production of tight oil. Too much supply combined with weak demand created thepresent oil-price collapse. Saudi Arabia hopes to prolong low prices to benefit theirlong-term needs for market share and higher demand. ( http://bit.ly/OilPrice20Apr15 )
Demand the petroleum industry CEOs tell the American public how they will respond when theybecome insolvent. Will they continue to supply fuels when earnings and dividends fall to criticallevels where share price plummets and they are no longer financially viable in the marketplace?
They have the best and brightest working on the problem. Make them reveal the results of theireconomic models. Let’s critique their assumptions, especially the “worst case” scenarios.
Sincerely yours,
Doug Grandt
8/9/2019 11 May 2015 Letter to US Senate Ctee on Energy & Natural Resources
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/11-may-2015-letter-to-us-senate-ctee-on-energy-natural-resources 12/22
Douglas A. GrandtPO Box 6603
Lincoln, NE 68506 (510) 432-1452
May 11, 2015
Senator James E. Risch483 Russell Senate O!ce Building Washington, D.C. 20510
Re: Oil Refining - Considering future eventualities versus the myopia of the present (letter #10)
Dear Senator Risch,
This is my tenth letter to you expressing my deep concern about an imminent conflict between1) Corporate Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty in the face of insolvency, indeedtheir termination of unprofitable refining operations, and 2) national interest or public interest.
In view of expected continuing depressed petroleum prices, I fear that oil refining corporationswill soon face severely declining earnings, dividends, and share value, all of which will bringtheir Officers and Boards of Directors to decisions to curtail production and refining operations.
My fear, which has been growing over several month, is that decisions by those with the bestintentions to fulfill their legal obligations could lead us into territory that nobody is anticipating.
Read the ABA’s August 6, 2010, document “Insolvency and Fiduciary Duties: Advising Directorsand Officers When the Company Cannot Pay Its Bills.” (http://bit.ly/ABA6Aug10)
Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty to companies like Chevron, ConocoPhillips,ExxonMobil, Marathon, Occidental, etc. and their investors, will likely have dire consequencesfor other businesses and the public unless we prepare to take preventative, controlling actions.
This is what one industry expert has to say, and we can all surmise the disastrous implications:Prolonged low oil prices will prove that tight oil plays need at least $75 per barrel to breakeven. When oil prices recover to that level, only the best parts of the tight oil core areas willbe competitive in the global market. As production declines from expensive tight oil, oil sandand ultra-deep-water plays, inexpensive Saudi oil will gain market share.
Saudi Arabia is not trying to crush tight oil plays, just the stupid money that funded theover-production of tight oil. Too much supply combined with weak demand created thepresent oil-price collapse. Saudi Arabia hopes to prolong low prices to benefit theirlong-term needs for market share and higher demand. ( http://bit.ly/OilPrice20Apr15 )
Demand the petroleum industry CEOs tell the American public how they will respond when theybecome insolvent. Will they continue to supply fuels when earnings and dividends fall to criticallevels where share price plummets and they are no longer financially viable in the marketplace?
They have the best and brightest working on the problem. Make them reveal the results of theireconomic models. Let’s critique their assumptions, especially the “worst case” scenarios.
Sincerely yours,
Doug Grandt
8/9/2019 11 May 2015 Letter to US Senate Ctee on Energy & Natural Resources
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/11-may-2015-letter-to-us-senate-ctee-on-energy-natural-resources 13/22
Douglas A. GrandtPO Box 6603
Lincoln, NE 68506 (510) 432-1452
May 11, 2015
Senator Maria Cantwell511 Hart Senate O!ce Building Washington, D.C. 20510
Re: Oil Refining - Considering future eventualities versus the myopia of the present (letter #10)
Dear Senator Cantwell,
This is my tenth letter to you expressing my deep concern about an imminent conflict between1) Corporate Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty in the face of insolvency, indeedtheir termination of unprofitable refining operations, and 2) national interest or public interest.
In view of expected continuing depressed petroleum prices, I fear that oil refining corporationswill soon face severely declining earnings, dividends, and share value, all of which will bringtheir Officers and Boards of Directors to decisions to curtail production and refining operations.
My fear, which has been growing over several month, is that decisions by those with the bestintentions to fulfill their legal obligations could lead us into territory that nobody is anticipating.
Read the ABA’s August 6, 2010, document “Insolvency and Fiduciary Duties: Advising Directorsand Officers When the Company Cannot Pay Its Bills.” (http://bit.ly/ABA6Aug10)
Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty to companies like Chevron, ConocoPhillips,ExxonMobil, Marathon, Occidental, etc. and their investors, will likely have dire consequencesfor other businesses and the public unless we prepare to take preventative, controlling actions.
This is what one industry expert has to say, and we can all surmise the disastrous implications:Prolonged low oil prices will prove that tight oil plays need at least $75 per barrel to breakeven. When oil prices recover to that level, only the best parts of the tight oil core areas willbe competitive in the global market. As production declines from expensive tight oil, oil sandand ultra-deep-water plays, inexpensive Saudi oil will gain market share.
Saudi Arabia is not trying to crush tight oil plays, just the stupid money that funded theover-production of tight oil. Too much supply combined with weak demand created thepresent oil-price collapse. Saudi Arabia hopes to prolong low prices to benefit theirlong-term needs for market share and higher demand. ( http://bit.ly/OilPrice20Apr15 )
Demand the petroleum industry CEOs tell the American public how they will respond when theybecome insolvent. Will they continue to supply fuels when earnings and dividends fall to criticallevels where share price plummets and they are no longer financially viable in the marketplace?
They have the best and brightest working on the problem. Make them reveal the results of theireconomic models. Let’s critique their assumptions, especially the “worst case” scenarios.
Sincerely yours,
Doug Grandt
8/9/2019 11 May 2015 Letter to US Senate Ctee on Energy & Natural Resources
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/11-may-2015-letter-to-us-senate-ctee-on-energy-natural-resources 14/22
Douglas A. GrandtPO Box 6603
Lincoln, NE 68506 (510) 432-1452
May 11, 2015
Senator Al Franken309 Hart Senate O!ce Building Washington, D.C. 20510
Re: Oil Refining - Considering future eventualities versus the myopia of the present (letter #10)
Dear Senator Franken,
This is my tenth letter to you expressing my deep concern about an imminent conflict between1) Corporate Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty in the face of insolvency, indeedtheir termination of unprofitable refining operations, and 2) national interest or public interest.
In view of expected continuing depressed petroleum prices, I fear that oil refining corporationswill soon face severely declining earnings, dividends, and share value, all of which will bringtheir Officers and Boards of Directors to decisions to curtail production and refining operations.
My fear, which has been growing over several month, is that decisions by those with the bestintentions to fulfill their legal obligations could lead us into territory that nobody is anticipating.
Read the ABA’s August 6, 2010, document “Insolvency and Fiduciary Duties: Advising Directorsand Officers When the Company Cannot Pay Its Bills.” (http://bit.ly/ABA6Aug10)
Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty to companies like Chevron, ConocoPhillips,ExxonMobil, Marathon, Occidental, etc. and their investors, will likely have dire consequencesfor other businesses and the public unless we prepare to take preventative, controlling actions.
This is what one industry expert has to say, and we can all surmise the disastrous implications:Prolonged low oil prices will prove that tight oil plays need at least $75 per barrel to breakeven. When oil prices recover to that level, only the best parts of the tight oil core areas willbe competitive in the global market. As production declines from expensive tight oil, oil sandand ultra-deep-water plays, inexpensive Saudi oil will gain market share.
Saudi Arabia is not trying to crush tight oil plays, just the stupid money that funded theover-production of tight oil. Too much supply combined with weak demand created thepresent oil-price collapse. Saudi Arabia hopes to prolong low prices to benefit theirlong-term needs for market share and higher demand. ( http://bit.ly/OilPrice20Apr15 )
Demand the petroleum industry CEOs tell the American public how they will respond when theybecome insolvent. Will they continue to supply fuels when earnings and dividends fall to criticallevels where share price plummets and they are no longer financially viable in the marketplace?
They have the best and brightest working on the problem. Make them reveal the results of theireconomic models. Let’s critique their assumptions, especially the “worst case” scenarios.
Sincerely yours,
Doug Grandt
8/9/2019 11 May 2015 Letter to US Senate Ctee on Energy & Natural Resources
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/11-may-2015-letter-to-us-senate-ctee-on-energy-natural-resources 15/22
Douglas A. GrandtPO Box 6603
Lincoln, NE 68506 (510) 432-1452
May 11, 2015
Senator Martin Heinrich702 Hart Senate O!ce Building Washington, D.C. 20510
Re: Oil Refining - Considering future eventualities versus the myopia of the present (letter #10)
Dear Senator Heinrich,
This is my tenth letter to you expressing my deep concern about an imminent conflict between1) Corporate Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty in the face of insolvency, indeedtheir termination of unprofitable refining operations, and 2) national interest or public interest.
In view of expected continuing depressed petroleum prices, I fear that oil refining corporationswill soon face severely declining earnings, dividends, and share value, all of which will bringtheir Officers and Boards of Directors to decisions to curtail production and refining operations.
My fear, which has been growing over several month, is that decisions by those with the bestintentions to fulfill their legal obligations could lead us into territory that nobody is anticipating.
Read the ABA’s August 6, 2010, document “Insolvency and Fiduciary Duties: Advising Directorsand Officers When the Company Cannot Pay Its Bills.” (http://bit.ly/ABA6Aug10)
Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty to companies like Chevron, ConocoPhillips,ExxonMobil, Marathon, Occidental, etc. and their investors, will likely have dire consequencesfor other businesses and the public unless we prepare to take preventative, controlling actions.
This is what one industry expert has to say, and we can all surmise the disastrous implications:Prolonged low oil prices will prove that tight oil plays need at least $75 per barrel to breakeven. When oil prices recover to that level, only the best parts of the tight oil core areas willbe competitive in the global market. As production declines from expensive tight oil, oil sandand ultra-deep-water plays, inexpensive Saudi oil will gain market share.
Saudi Arabia is not trying to crush tight oil plays, just the stupid money that funded theover-production of tight oil. Too much supply combined with weak demand created thepresent oil-price collapse. Saudi Arabia hopes to prolong low prices to benefit theirlong-term needs for market share and higher demand. ( http://bit.ly/OilPrice20Apr15 )
Demand the petroleum industry CEOs tell the American public how they will respond when theybecome insolvent. Will they continue to supply fuels when earnings and dividends fall to criticallevels where share price plummets and they are no longer financially viable in the marketplace?
They have the best and brightest working on the problem. Make them reveal the results of theireconomic models. Let’s critique their assumptions, especially the “worst case” scenarios.
Sincerely yours,
Doug Grandt
8/9/2019 11 May 2015 Letter to US Senate Ctee on Energy & Natural Resources
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/11-may-2015-letter-to-us-senate-ctee-on-energy-natural-resources 16/22
Douglas A. GrandtPO Box 6603
Lincoln, NE 68506 (510) 432-1452
May 11, 2015
Senator Mazie Hirono330 Hart Senate O!ce Building Washington, D.C. 20510
Re: Oil Refining - Considering future eventualities versus the myopia of the present (letter #10)
Dear Senator Hirono,
This is my tenth letter to you expressing my deep concern about an imminent conflict between1) Corporate Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty in the face of insolvency, indeedtheir termination of unprofitable refining operations, and 2) national interest or public interest.
In view of expected continuing depressed petroleum prices, I fear that oil refining corporationswill soon face severely declining earnings, dividends, and share value, all of which will bringtheir Officers and Boards of Directors to decisions to curtail production and refining operations.
My fear, which has been growing over several month, is that decisions by those with the bestintentions to fulfill their legal obligations could lead us into territory that nobody is anticipating.
Read the ABA’s August 6, 2010, document “Insolvency and Fiduciary Duties: Advising Directorsand Officers When the Company Cannot Pay Its Bills.” (http://bit.ly/ABA6Aug10)
Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty to companies like Chevron, ConocoPhillips,ExxonMobil, Marathon, Occidental, etc. and their investors, will likely have dire consequencesfor other businesses and the public unless we prepare to take preventative, controlling actions.
This is what one industry expert has to say, and we can all surmise the disastrous implications:Prolonged low oil prices will prove that tight oil plays need at least $75 per barrel to breakeven. When oil prices recover to that level, only the best parts of the tight oil core areas willbe competitive in the global market. As production declines from expensive tight oil, oil sandand ultra-deep-water plays, inexpensive Saudi oil will gain market share.
Saudi Arabia is not trying to crush tight oil plays, just the stupid money that funded theover-production of tight oil. Too much supply combined with weak demand created thepresent oil-price collapse. Saudi Arabia hopes to prolong low prices to benefit theirlong-term needs for market share and higher demand. ( http://bit.ly/OilPrice20Apr15 )
Demand the petroleum industry CEOs tell the American public how they will respond when theybecome insolvent. Will they continue to supply fuels when earnings and dividends fall to criticallevels where share price plummets and they are no longer financially viable in the marketplace?
They have the best and brightest working on the problem. Make them reveal the results of theireconomic models. Let’s critique their assumptions, especially the “worst case” scenarios.
Sincerely yours,
Doug Grandt
8/9/2019 11 May 2015 Letter to US Senate Ctee on Energy & Natural Resources
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/11-may-2015-letter-to-us-senate-ctee-on-energy-natural-resources 17/22
Douglas A. GrandtPO Box 6603
Lincoln, NE 68506 (510) 432-1452
May 11, 2015
Senator Joe Manchin306 Hart Senate O!ce Building Washington, D.C. 20510
Re: Oil Refining - Considering future eventualities versus the myopia of the present (letter #10)
Dear Senator Manchin,
This is my tenth letter to you expressing my deep concern about an imminent conflict between1) Corporate Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty in the face of insolvency, indeedtheir termination of unprofitable refining operations, and 2) national interest or public interest.
In view of expected continuing depressed petroleum prices, I fear that oil refining corporationswill soon face severely declining earnings, dividends, and share value, all of which will bringtheir Officers and Boards of Directors to decisions to curtail production and refining operations.
My fear, which has been growing over several month, is that decisions by those with the bestintentions to fulfill their legal obligations could lead us into territory that nobody is anticipating.
Read the ABA’s August 6, 2010, document “Insolvency and Fiduciary Duties: Advising Directorsand Officers When the Company Cannot Pay Its Bills.” (http://bit.ly/ABA6Aug10)
Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty to companies like Chevron, ConocoPhillips,ExxonMobil, Marathon, Occidental, etc. and their investors, will likely have dire consequencesfor other businesses and the public unless we prepare to take preventative, controlling actions.
This is what one industry expert has to say, and we can all surmise the disastrous implications:Prolonged low oil prices will prove that tight oil plays need at least $75 per barrel to breakeven. When oil prices recover to that level, only the best parts of the tight oil core areas willbe competitive in the global market. As production declines from expensive tight oil, oil sandand ultra-deep-water plays, inexpensive Saudi oil will gain market share.
Saudi Arabia is not trying to crush tight oil plays, just the stupid money that funded theover-production of tight oil. Too much supply combined with weak demand created thepresent oil-price collapse. Saudi Arabia hopes to prolong low prices to benefit theirlong-term needs for market share and higher demand. ( http://bit.ly/OilPrice20Apr15 )
Demand the petroleum industry CEOs tell the American public how they will respond when theybecome insolvent. Will they continue to supply fuels when earnings and dividends fall to criticallevels where share price plummets and they are no longer financially viable in the marketplace?
They have the best and brightest working on the problem. Make them reveal the results of theireconomic models. Let’s critique their assumptions, especially the “worst case” scenarios.
Sincerely yours,
Doug Grandt
8/9/2019 11 May 2015 Letter to US Senate Ctee on Energy & Natural Resources
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/11-may-2015-letter-to-us-senate-ctee-on-energy-natural-resources 18/22
Douglas A. GrandtPO Box 6603
Lincoln, NE 68506 (510) 432-1452
May 11, 2015
Senator Debbie Stabenow731 Hart Senate O!ce Building Washington, D.C. 20510
Re: Oil Refining - Considering future eventualities versus the myopia of the present (letter #10)
Dear Senator Stabenow,
This is my tenth letter to you expressing my deep concern about an imminent conflict between1) Corporate Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty in the face of insolvency, indeedtheir termination of unprofitable refining operations, and 2) national interest or public interest.
In view of expected continuing depressed petroleum prices, I fear that oil refining corporationswill soon face severely declining earnings, dividends, and share value, all of which will bringtheir Officers and Boards of Directors to decisions to curtail production and refining operations.
My fear, which has been growing over several month, is that decisions by those with the bestintentions to fulfill their legal obligations could lead us into territory that nobody is anticipating.
Read the ABA’s August 6, 2010, document “Insolvency and Fiduciary Duties: Advising Directorsand Officers When the Company Cannot Pay Its Bills.” (http://bit.ly/ABA6Aug10)
Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty to companies like Chevron, ConocoPhillips,ExxonMobil, Marathon, Occidental, etc. and their investors, will likely have dire consequencesfor other businesses and the public unless we prepare to take preventative, controlling actions.
This is what one industry expert has to say, and we can all surmise the disastrous implications:Prolonged low oil prices will prove that tight oil plays need at least $75 per barrel to breakeven. When oil prices recover to that level, only the best parts of the tight oil core areas willbe competitive in the global market. As production declines from expensive tight oil, oil sandand ultra-deep-water plays, inexpensive Saudi oil will gain market share.
Saudi Arabia is not trying to crush tight oil plays, just the stupid money that funded theover-production of tight oil. Too much supply combined with weak demand created thepresent oil-price collapse. Saudi Arabia hopes to prolong low prices to benefit theirlong-term needs for market share and higher demand. ( http://bit.ly/OilPrice20Apr15 )
Demand the petroleum industry CEOs tell the American public how they will respond when theybecome insolvent. Will they continue to supply fuels when earnings and dividends fall to criticallevels where share price plummets and they are no longer financially viable in the marketplace?
They have the best and brightest working on the problem. Make them reveal the results of theireconomic models. Let’s critique their assumptions, especially the “worst case” scenarios.
Sincerely yours,
Doug Grandt
8/9/2019 11 May 2015 Letter to US Senate Ctee on Energy & Natural Resources
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/11-may-2015-letter-to-us-senate-ctee-on-energy-natural-resources 19/22
Douglas A. GrandtPO Box 6603
Lincoln, NE 68506 (510) 432-1452
May 11, 2015
Senator Elizabeth Warren317 Hart Senate O!ce Building Washington, D.C. 20510
Re: Oil Refining - Considering future eventualities versus the myopia of the present (letter #10)
Dear Senator Warren,
This is my tenth letter to you expressing my deep concern about an imminent conflict between1) Corporate Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty in the face of insolvency, indeedtheir termination of unprofitable refining operations, and 2) national interest or public interest.
In view of expected continuing depressed petroleum prices, I fear that oil refining corporationswill soon face severely declining earnings, dividends, and share value, all of which will bringtheir Officers and Boards of Directors to decisions to curtail production and refining operations.
My fear, which has been growing over several month, is that decisions by those with the bestintentions to fulfill their legal obligations could lead us into territory that nobody is anticipating.
Read the ABA’s August 6, 2010, document “Insolvency and Fiduciary Duties: Advising Directorsand Officers When the Company Cannot Pay Its Bills.” (http://bit.ly/ABA6Aug10)
Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty to companies like Chevron, ConocoPhillips,ExxonMobil, Marathon, Occidental, etc. and their investors, will likely have dire consequencesfor other businesses and the public unless we prepare to take preventative, controlling actions.
This is what one industry expert has to say, and we can all surmise the disastrous implications:Prolonged low oil prices will prove that tight oil plays need at least $75 per barrel to breakeven. When oil prices recover to that level, only the best parts of the tight oil core areas willbe competitive in the global market. As production declines from expensive tight oil, oil sandand ultra-deep-water plays, inexpensive Saudi oil will gain market share.
Saudi Arabia is not trying to crush tight oil plays, just the stupid money that funded theover-production of tight oil. Too much supply combined with weak demand created thepresent oil-price collapse. Saudi Arabia hopes to prolong low prices to benefit theirlong-term needs for market share and higher demand. ( http://bit.ly/OilPrice20Apr15 )
Demand the petroleum industry CEOs tell the American public how they will respond when theybecome insolvent. Will they continue to supply fuels when earnings and dividends fall to criticallevels where share price plummets and they are no longer financially viable in the marketplace?
They have the best and brightest working on the problem. Make them reveal the results of theireconomic models. Let’s critique their assumptions, especially the “worst case” scenarios.
Sincerely yours,
Doug Grandt
8/9/2019 11 May 2015 Letter to US Senate Ctee on Energy & Natural Resources
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/11-may-2015-letter-to-us-senate-ctee-on-energy-natural-resources 20/22
Douglas A. GrandtPO Box 6603
Lincoln, NE 68506 (510) 432-1452
May 11, 2015
Senator Ron Wyden221 Dirksen Senate O!ce Building Washington, D.C. 20510
Re: Oil Refining - Considering future eventualities versus the myopia of the present (letter #10)
Dear Senator Wyden,
This is my tenth letter to you expressing my deep concern about an imminent conflict between1) Corporate Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty in the face of insolvency, indeedtheir termination of unprofitable refining operations, and 2) national interest or public interest.
In view of expected continuing depressed petroleum prices, I fear that oil refining corporationswill soon face severely declining earnings, dividends, and share value, all of which will bringtheir Officers and Boards of Directors to decisions to curtail production and refining operations.
My fear, which has been growing over several month, is that decisions by those with the bestintentions to fulfill their legal obligations could lead us into territory that nobody is anticipating.
Read the ABA’s August 6, 2010, document “Insolvency and Fiduciary Duties: Advising Directorsand Officers When the Company Cannot Pay Its Bills.” (http://bit.ly/ABA6Aug10)
Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty to companies like Chevron, ConocoPhillips,ExxonMobil, Marathon, Occidental, etc. and their investors, will likely have dire consequencesfor other businesses and the public unless we prepare to take preventative, controlling actions.
This is what one industry expert has to say, and we can all surmise the disastrous implications:Prolonged low oil prices will prove that tight oil plays need at least $75 per barrel to breakeven. When oil prices recover to that level, only the best parts of the tight oil core areas willbe competitive in the global market. As production declines from expensive tight oil, oil sandand ultra-deep-water plays, inexpensive Saudi oil will gain market share.
Saudi Arabia is not trying to crush tight oil plays, just the stupid money that funded theover-production of tight oil. Too much supply combined with weak demand created thepresent oil-price collapse. Saudi Arabia hopes to prolong low prices to benefit theirlong-term needs for market share and higher demand. ( http://bit.ly/OilPrice20Apr15 )
Demand the petroleum industry CEOs tell the American public how they will respond when theybecome insolvent. Will they continue to supply fuels when earnings and dividends fall to criticallevels where share price plummets and they are no longer financially viable in the marketplace?
They have the best and brightest working on the problem. Make them reveal the results of theireconomic models. Let’s critique their assumptions, especially the “worst case” scenarios.
Sincerely yours,
Doug Grandt
8/9/2019 11 May 2015 Letter to US Senate Ctee on Energy & Natural Resources
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/11-may-2015-letter-to-us-senate-ctee-on-energy-natural-resources 21/22
Douglas A. GrandtPO Box 6603
Lincoln, NE 68506 (510) 432-1452
May 11, 2015
Senator Bernie Sanders332 Dirksen Senate O!ce Building Washington, D.C. 20510
Re: Oil Refining - Considering future eventualities versus the myopia of the present (letter #10)
Dear Senator Sanders,
This is my tenth letter to you expressing my deep concern about an imminent conflict between1) Corporate Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty in the face of insolvency, indeedtheir termination of unprofitable refining operations, and 2) national interest or public interest.
In view of expected continuing depressed petroleum prices, I fear that oil refining corporationswill soon face severely declining earnings, dividends, and share value, all of which will bringtheir Officers and Boards of Directors to decisions to curtail production and refining operations.
My fear, which has been growing over several month, is that decisions by those with the bestintentions to fulfill their legal obligations could lead us into territory that nobody is anticipating.
Read the ABA’s August 6, 2010, document “Insolvency and Fiduciary Duties: Advising Directorsand Officers When the Company Cannot Pay Its Bills.” (http://bit.ly/ABA6Aug10)
Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty to companies like Chevron, ConocoPhillips,ExxonMobil, Marathon, Occidental, etc. and their investors, will likely have dire consequencesfor other businesses and the public unless we prepare to take preventative, controlling actions.
This is what one industry expert has to say, and we can all surmise the disastrous implications:Prolonged low oil prices will prove that tight oil plays need at least $75 per barrel to breakeven. When oil prices recover to that level, only the best parts of the tight oil core areas willbe competitive in the global market. As production declines from expensive tight oil, oil sandand ultra-deep-water plays, inexpensive Saudi oil will gain market share.
Saudi Arabia is not trying to crush tight oil plays, just the stupid money that funded theover-production of tight oil. Too much supply combined with weak demand created thepresent oil-price collapse. Saudi Arabia hopes to prolong low prices to benefit theirlong-term needs for market share and higher demand. ( http://bit.ly/OilPrice20Apr15 )
Demand the petroleum industry CEOs tell the American public how they will respond when theybecome insolvent. Will they continue to supply fuels when earnings and dividends fall to criticallevels where share price plummets and they are no longer financially viable in the marketplace?
They have the best and brightest working on the problem. Make them reveal the results of theireconomic models. Let’s critique their assumptions, especially the “worst case” scenarios.
Sincerely yours,
Doug Grandt
8/9/2019 11 May 2015 Letter to US Senate Ctee on Energy & Natural Resources
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/11-may-2015-letter-to-us-senate-ctee-on-energy-natural-resources 22/22
Douglas A. GrandtPO Box 6603
Lincoln, NE 68506 (510) 432-1452
May 11, 2015
Senator Angus King359 Dirksen Senate O!ce Building Washington, D.C. 20510
Re: Oil Refining - Considering future eventualities versus the myopia of the present (letter #10)
Dear Senator King,
This is my tenth letter to you expressing my deep concern about an imminent conflict between1) Corporate Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty in the face of insolvency, indeedtheir termination of unprofitable refining operations, and 2) national interest or public interest.
In view of expected continuing depressed petroleum prices, I fear that oil refining corporationswill soon face severely declining earnings, dividends, and share value, all of which will bringtheir Officers and Boards of Directors to decisions to curtail production and refining operations.
My fear, which has been growing over several month, is that decisions by those with the bestintentions to fulfill their legal obligations could lead us into territory that nobody is anticipating.
Read the ABA’s August 6, 2010, document “Insolvency and Fiduciary Duties: Advising Directorsand Officers When the Company Cannot Pay Its Bills.” (http://bit.ly/ABA6Aug10)
Officers’ and Boards of Directors’ fiduciary duty to companies like Chevron, ConocoPhillips,ExxonMobil, Marathon, Occidental, etc. and their investors, will likely have dire consequencesfor other businesses and the public unless we prepare to take preventative, controlling actions.
This is what one industry expert has to say, and we can all surmise the disastrous implications:Prolonged low oil prices will prove that tight oil plays need at least $75 per barrel to breakeven. When oil prices recover to that level, only the best parts of the tight oil core areas willbe competitive in the global market. As production declines from expensive tight oil, oil sandand ultra-deep-water plays, inexpensive Saudi oil will gain market share.
Saudi Arabia is not trying to crush tight oil plays, just the stupid money that funded theover-production of tight oil. Too much supply combined with weak demand created thepresent oil-price collapse. Saudi Arabia hopes to prolong low prices to benefit theirlong-term needs for market share and higher demand. ( http://bit.ly/OilPrice20Apr15 )
Demand the petroleum industry CEOs tell the American public how they will respond when theybecome insolvent. Will they continue to supply fuels when earnings and dividends fall to criticallevels where share price plummets and they are no longer financially viable in the marketplace?
They have the best and brightest working on the problem. Make them reveal the results of theireconomic models. Let’s critique their assumptions, especially the “worst case” scenarios.
Sincerely yours,
Doug Grandt