11 the gathering storm michael j. bayer january 20, 2010
TRANSCRIPT
11
The Gathering Storm
Michael J. Bayer
January 20, 2010
22
2009 AUSA Exhibit Floor
33
France2.3%
Spain1.2%
UK2.3%
North Korea30.2%
Iraq14.4%
Jordan11.0%
Saudi Arabia8.1%
Israel9.3%
China3.0%
Russia3.8%
Japan1.0% Australia
3.1%
U.S.4.3%
NATO Combined
(Excluding US)
1.6%
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 25.0%
U.S. Investment In DoD Compared to Defense Spending of Other Industrial Nations
5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 30.0% 40.0%
$100
$650
% of Country’s GDP
2008 Defense Spending -- Billions
$50
$150
$600
* FY08 Total National Defense Outlays (includes Non-DoD defense), October 2009Source: Defense Intelligence Agency; The Military Balance 2009
9.3% 8.1%4.3% 3.8% 3.0% 2.2% 1.6%0%
6%
12%
Israel SaudiArabia
U.S. Russia China U.K. NATO
2008 Defense Spending as a % of Country’s GDP
SouthKorea2.3%
$320.3 $38.2$60.5$63.0$66.2$134.0$616.1
$0
$200
$400
$600
$800
U.S. NATO China France Russia U.K. SaudiArabia
2008 Defense Spending(Billion $)
$320.3
(Excluding US)
(Excluding US)
The U.S. invested more in Defense in 2008 than the combined national defense investments of China, France, the UK, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Germany, Japan, & Australia.
$200
Germany Italy
Canada 1.3%
44
SECRETARY GATES, “Even as we consider the future, I am prepared to respond to urgent needs and will keep pushing to get troops the equipment they need.” (October 2009 AUSA Speech)
GENERAL MCCHRYSTAL – When asked whether he would support scaling back the American military presence in Afghanistan: “The short answer is: no.” (London interview, 2009)
Government Accountability Office: Iraq withdrawal would be a "massive and expensive effort" that would likely increase war costs by billions. Estimated an additional $12 billion to $13 billion a year for two years following the withdrawal needed for maintenance, repairs, and replacement of returned equipment.
Defense Spending Predictions
5
Defense Spending Changes from FY2009 to FY 2010
Total % Change
• DoD Top Line $534 billion +4.0%• Procurement $107.4 billion +5.6%• Uniform Headcount* 2.249 million +2.0%• MilCon $21.0 billion -4.1%
5
66
Gathering Storm??
7
Briefing Agenda
• Long term trends in defense spending
• Erosion from within the DoD budget
• Pressure from competing demands
• Concluding thoughts
7
88
DoD Budget Top Line Trends
297 328365 377 400 411 432
480530 542 551 561 575 589
72
116166
187146 130
50 50 50 50 50
513
7
83
6
3
1317
91 76
639625611601592
660667667
601
535
479468437
345316
$0
$250
$500
$750
FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15
316
73% Growth
36%Real Growth
Department of Defense Topline ForecastFY 2001 – FY 2015
Base Budget War Funding PositionBase Budget Position
Note: FY 2010 – 2015 reflects the FY 2010 President’s Request, May 2009; FY 2009 Non-War Supplemental is appropriated through American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
Source: Defense Appropriation Acts FY 2001 – 2010; OMB Historical Tables FY 2009
Base Topline in FY 2009 Constant Dollars
Non-War SupplementalWar Funding
(Current Dollars in Billions)
Numbers may not add due to rounding
1010
1111
Cyclicality of DoD BudgetU.S. DoD Budget Authority
(Including Supplementals and OCO)Constant $FY10 (billions)
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
1948
1950
1952
1954
1956
1958
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
Source: DoD FY2010 Greenbook
1212
DoD’s Approach to Building Budgets:
Korea
Billi
ons
FY0
7$
Vietnam Drawdown
Reagan Buildup
Procurement HolidayBush
Transformation
$-
$50,000
$100,000
$150,000
$200,000
$250,000
$300,000
19471949
19511953
19551957
19591961
19631965
19671969
19711973
19751977
19791981
19831985
19871989
19911993
19951997
19992001
20032005
20072009
2011
RDT&E
Procurement
Source: DoD, Jane’s Analysis
John Kenkel – Gersen Lerman Group
1313
Budget Cuts by Secretary Gates• Generation Guided Missile Cruiser – CG(X) was deferred beyond the FYDP
• Future Combat System (FCS) Manned Ground Vehicle (MGV) – terminated
• FCS Non-Line of Sight - Cannon (NLOS-C) – terminated
• FCS basic program – restructured
• Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) – terminated
• Airborne Laser (ABL) aircraft – truncated to one aircraft
• Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR-X) helicopter – terminated
• VH-71 presidential helicopter program – terminated
• Transformational Satellite Communications (TSAT) – terminated
• F-22 was ended, not terminated – reached the inventory objective of 187 aircraft
• DDG-1000 was truncated from 7 ships to 3 ships
• Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) stopped buying additional interceptors for deployment in Alaska
• FCS - Class IV unmanned aircraft system program and two variants of the Multifunction Utility/Logistics and Equipment unmanned ground vehicle program terminated
1414
Erosion from Inside the Budget
The Growing Cost of Hardware
15
1616
Major Defense Acquisition Program Portfolio1978 - 2007
2007 Year $ (B)
1979-1986:245% Spending Growth
Source: OUSD(C) Study, DoD Selected Acquisition Reports,1978 – 2007 (2nd Quarter)
Overall 30 year MDAP Growth Rate*: 4%
Recent buildup is characterized by fewer new programs, increases in existing baseline budgets, and increases in engineering and estimating costs
Reagan Buildup
Recent Buildup
2000-2007:170% Spending Growth
‘79-’86 ‘00-’073% 13%
21% –
– 7%
13% 5%
Total 14% 8%
Program Cost
Changes
Program Baseline
Baseline Changes**
(2007 Constant Dollars in Billions)
Numbers may not add due to rounding
** Includes all changes between a program’s initial ‘baseline estimate’ and its current ‘baseline estimate’ (as of 2Q 2007 SAR); BMDS engineering cost changes were reclassified as ‘baseline changes’ due to unique program budgeting process
* Figures reflect Compound Annual Growth Rates (CAGRs)
Annual Growth Rates*
1717
91 Additional MDAPs ($195B)
Future Combat Systems
$69.7
Joint Strike Fighter (F-35)$66.8
SSN 774 Attack Submarine$27.3
Chemical Demilitarization**$23.4
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)$18.5
$401B
$328B
$190B
Program Cost Growth
Baseline Changes*
New Programs
$401B
Including:• C-17A ($17.6B)• EFV ($7.2B)• DDG 51 ($6.9B)• C-5 RERP ($6.4B)• SBIRS ($5.8B)
Numbers may not add due to roundingSource: DoD Selected Acquisition Reports, 2000 – 2007 (2nd Quarter)
* Includes all changes between a program’s initial ‘baseline estimate’ and its current ‘baseline estimate’ (as of 2Q 2007 SAR); BMDS engineering cost changes were reclassified as ‘baseline changes’ due to unique program budgeting process:
** Combines 3 Chemical Demilitarization programs into 1 to match earlier SARs
Cost growth in Only Five Programs accounted for $206B or 51% of the total
Major Defense Acquisition Program Portfolio Cost Growth by Program
2000 - 2007 (Dollars in Billions)
1818
Generational Cost Growth in Major
Weapons Programs
“In the year 2054, the entire defense
budget will purchase just one aircraft. This
aircraft will have to be shared by the Air
Force and Navy 3-1/2 days each per week
except for leap year, when it will be made
available to the Marines for the extra day.”
Norman Augustine
The Growing Cost of People
19
2020
NDAA Authorized End Strength Levels for Active Components
(FYs 2004-2010)
Service FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10
ARMY 482,400 512,400 512,400 532,400 532,400 547,400 569,400*
USMC 175,000 184,000 184,000 184,000 189,000 202,000 202,100
*ARMY FY10 level based on July 09 SecDef Memo
ARMY authorized 592,400 for FY11-FY12Source: OUSD/P&R/MPP
2121
DoD Labor Costs are Substantial…
* Source: OSD(PA&E), OUSD(C) and WHS, excludes costs not on the DoD budget (e.g., VA)** Source: WHS, which categorizes contracts as Procurement, RDT&E, or Services*** Retirement, DHP, Family Housing
$0
$100
$200
$300
$400
$500
1963 1973 1983 1993 2003
Th
en Y
ear
$ B
illio
ns
0
1
2
3
4
5
Act
ive
Du
ty E
nd
stre
ng
th (
Mill
ion
s)
Contracts for Services**
DoD Topline
Military Benefits***
MilPers
CivPay
Active Duty Endstrength
2222
Projected Growth through FY 2015 in the DoD Unified Medical Budget
(No GWOT)Increase
over FY2000 $46.7B 168%
($M)
Source: OUSD/Health Affairs--Chart does not reflect DoD’s unfunded liability for TRICARE-for-Life
* Increase over FY2000 is $46.7B and ultimately 12% of the DoD budget
$0
$10,000
$20,000
$30,000
$40,000
$50,000
$60,000
$70,000
FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15
FY2000 Unified Medical Program Price Inflation Volume/Intensity/Cost Share Creep, etc.
New Users <65 Explicit Benefit Changes to <65 Explicit Benefit Changes to 65+
$18.0B – 39%
$9.0B – 19%
$5.2B – 11%
$2.5B – 5%
$12.1B – 26%
FY2000 Baseline $17.4B
___________
100%
2323
Congressional Actions Shape the Compensation Bill
Billions $
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10
TRICARE for Life Healthcare for Non-Activated Reservists
Increased Family Separation Allowance Survivor Benefit Enhancements
Redux Repeal Concurrent Receipt
$22.8B
$17.4B
$12.7B
$21.3B$20.0B
$18.9B
$16.0B
$8.9B
$0.3B
2424
Generational Cost Growth of Uniformed Personnel
“In the year 2054, the entire defense
budget will be able to afford just one war fighter. This
war fighter will have to be shared by the Army, Air
Force and Navy 2 days each per week, only available
to the Marines on Sunday.”
Michael Bayer
2525
The Costs from the
Economic Crisis
26
Trends in Federal Spending FY1980 – 2019
Outlays in billions of current dollars
Defense Discretionary
Nondefense Discretionary
Mandatory
Net Interest
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Source: Historical data from Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2010 (February 2009) and projections from Mid-Session Review, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2010 (August 2009).
2727
National Defense
Nondefense
Net Interest
Mandatory
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Year
% C
ha
ng
e
NOTE: Graph shows the ever increasing percentage of mandatory spending (including interest on the debt)—another leading indicator of a declining Federal addressable market.
Federal Government Mandatory vs. Discretionary Spending Over Time
28
Low rates have helped keep debt service costs in check
29
2009 Federal BudgetNet Interest – 3.347%
(In Millions of Dollars)
$339,830.00 8.50%
$2,138,130.40 53.48%
$863,568.00 21.60%
$656,471.60 16.42%
Net Interest Payment
Non Discretionary
Defense
Other
Int Rate: 3.347%
Debt Net Int
2009 12,867,455 339,830
30
Administration forecasts anticipate significant increases in debt
31
Gross Federal Debt (as of October 2009)
YEAR In millions of dollars
2008 9,985,757
2009* 12,867,455
2010* 14,456,303
2011* 15,673,873
2012* 16,565,716
2013* 17,440,160
2014* 18,350,010
2015* 19,000,000
2016* 20,004,000
2017* 20,990,000
2018* 21,990,000
2019* 23,132,000Source: OMB Historical Tables of the President's Budget Request. * - Estimated debt amounts
32
0.0001.0002.0003.0004.0005.0006.0007.0008.0009.000
10.00011.00012.00013.000
1960
1963
1966
1969
1972
1975
1978
1981
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2005
2008
Source: US Dept. of Treasury
Average Rate1993 – 2009
5.899%
Average Rate September 2009
3.347%
Interest Bearing Debt
33
Projected Net Interest on the Gross Federal Debt
(In Millions of Dollars)
$339,830.00 8.50%
$2,138,130.40 53.48%
$863,568.00 21.60%
$656,471.60 16.42%
Net Interest Payment
Non Discretionary
Defense
Other
Int Rate: 5.8997%Debt Net Int
2009 12,867,455 598,941.49
2013 17,440,160 811,787.212017 20,990,000 977,021.63
2009: 3.347%
34
Comparison of Current Net Interest vs Projected Net Interest
2013 - Projected Net Interest, at 5.899%(in Millions of Dollars)
$811,787.21 20%
$3,186,212.79 80%
Net Interest Payment Other
2017 Projected Net Interest, at 5.899%(in Millions of Dollars)
$977,021.63 24%
$3,020,978.37 76%
Net Interest Payment Other
2009 Net Interest at 3.347%(in Millions of Dollars)
$339,830.00 9%
$2,138,130.40 53%
$863,568.00 22%
$656,471.60 16%
Net Interest Payment Non Discretionary Defense Other
3535
What Does it all Mean?
3636
THE HARD REALITIES
• Growing people related expenses are the heart of the purchasing power challenge
• Acquisition accounts are always the first source of funds to fill the gaps
• The service of the growing mountain of debt will soon eat away at Defense
• A real recovery will only accelerate this
3737
LEADERSHIP• Nine straight years of defense budget increases
• Few “flag officers” were “flags” at the $340 billion pre-9/11 defense budget
• Four or five rotations of staff officers since
• Systems and processes that worked poorly in up budgets are worse in flat or down budgets
• The skills needed for up budgets are distinct from those in flat or down budgets
3838
BOTTOM LINES • The “bad guys” are just getting started
• Thus, Gates' transformation will outlive him
• US defense budget is under real pressure
• “Big” is no longer an inherent advantage
• Advantage will be to the lean, smart, and fast
• High value people will matter most
3939
“If the Department of Defense can’t figure out a way to defend the United States on a budget of more than half a trillion dollars a year, then our problems are much bigger than anything that can be cured by buying a few more ships and planes.” -- Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
It’s Already Been Said:
4040
Questions?
Backups
41
4242
NDAA Authorized End Strength Levels for Active Components
(FYs 2004-2010)
Service FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10
AIR FORCE
359,300 359,700 357,400 334,200 329,563 317,050 331,700
NAVY 373,800 365,900 352,700 340,700 329,098 326,323 328,800
Actual end strength as of 30 Sept 09:
Air Force = 333,408
Navy = 329,044 Source: OUSD/P&R/MPP
USAF Strategic ChoicesUSAF Strategic Choices
These forces are driving us to change—status quo is not an option These forces are driving us to change—status quo is not an option These forces are driving us to change—status quo is not an option These forces are driving us to change—status quo is not an option
Resources Active Duty end strength down 7%,
but Personnel spending up 16% AF inventory down 10%, but O&M
spending up 19% Approx 40,000 personnel deployed
Strategic Challenges Current conflicts Nuclear proliferation by state and
non-state actors
New Technologies Cyber Unmanned aircraft
Personnel Costs Personnel Costs vs vs End StrengthEnd Strength
O&M Costs O&M Costs vs vs InventoryInventory
April 19, 2023
297 328365 377 400 411 432
480530
72
116166
187146 130
513
7
83
6
3
1317
91 76
660667667
601
535
479468437
345316
$0
$250
$500
$750
FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10
316
80% Growth
38%Real Growth
Department of Defense ToplineFY 2001 – FY 2010
Base Budget War Funding RequestBase Budget Request
Note: FY 2009 Non-War Supplemental is appropriated through American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
Source: Defense Appropriation Acts FY 2001 – 2010; OMB Historical Tables FY 2009
FY 2009 – FY 2010Base Growth
Nominal Growth 4%
Real Growth 2%
Base Topline in FY 2009 Constant Dollars
Non-War SupplementalsWar Funding
Numbers may not add due to rounding
(Dollars in Billions)
April 19, 2023
FY 2010 Base Budget(Enacted)
(Dollars in Billions)
Military Construction: $21.0
Procurement: $104.8
$530.7B
Military Personnel: $135.0
RDT&E: $80.1
Revolving Funds: $3.1
Family Housing: $2.3
Numbers may not add due to rounding
Operation & Maintenance: $184.5
April 19, 2023
46
FY 2010 Overseas Contingency Operations(Enacted)
(Dollars in Billions)
IED Defeat: $1.8
Coalition Support: $1.9
Force Protection: $8.7
$129.6B
Reconstitution: $15.5B
Continuing the Fight: $109.9B
Operations $70.9 MRAP: $11.3
CERP: $1.2
Military Construction: $1.4
Military Intelligence: $4.7Non-DoD Classified: $4.2B
Numbers may not add due to rounding
Afghan National Security Forces: $6.6
Temporary ArmyEnd Strength: $1.0
Navy IAs: $0.4
47
Entitlements Squeezing Out Defense Spending
% Distribution of Total Federal Outlays: FY1962 – FY 2014
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1962 1970 1980 1990 2000 20092014
National Defense, 16%
Discretionary, 15%
Net Interest, 11%
Entitlements, 58%• Income Security• Medicaid• Medicare• Social Security
Share of spending in 2014
Source: Historical data and projections from Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2010 (February 2009).
48
Source: DoD FY2010 Budget Request, USD (Comptroller), May 2009
49
Estimated Net Interest Payment Calculations
1. Baseline Scenario
2009 2013 2017
Current Avg Int Rate 3.3470% 3.3470% 3.3470%
Est Gross Fed Debt $ 12,867,455,000,000.00 $ 17,440,160,000,000.00 $ 20,990,000,000,000.00
Net interest payment $ 339,830,000,000.00 $ 460,595,321,514.63 $ 554,346,737,563.88
"Discount Rate" 0.789066 0.789066 0.789066
2. Projected Hist Int Rate
2009 2013 2017
Hist Avg Int Rate 5.8990% 5.8990% 5.8990%
Est Gross Fed Debt $ 12,867,455,000,000.00 $ 17,440,160,000,000.00 $ 20,990,000,000,000.00
Net interest payment $ 598,941,490,887.36 $ 811,787,212,911.50 $ 977,021,632,772.43
Discount Rate 0.789066 0.789066 0.789066
5050
Fiscal Year 2009 Budget by Category
Source: Office of
Management and Budget
5151
Impact on industry
• The downturn will be harder on the larger than small companies
• Easier on those who can create genuinely new technology
• Easier still on those who can think an idea through to fully operational integration
• Those who can add leverage to the inventory of legacy gear
5252
$400
$101
$411
$116
$433
$165
$480
$192
$513
$147
$534
130*
$-
$100
$200
$300
$400
$500
$600
$700
Bill
ion
s
GFY05 GFY06 GFY07 GFY08 GFY09 GFY10
Year
Supplemental*
Baseline
Defense Budget Account Spending Over Time Graph profiles baseline and recent supplemental budget spending. *Referenced as, “Overseas Contingency Operations,” in GFY10 budgetSource: Current year budget requests and emergency funding appropriations Budget Authority, Current dollars, military functions only (051)
5353
We Emphasize “Non-Cash” Compensation
Current In-Kind12%
Current Cash59%
Deferred Cash14%
Deferred In-Kind
15%
Deferred Cash7%
Current Cash84%
Current In-Kind
9%
Military Personnel Benefits*(including both DoD & Treasury Costs**)
National Average (Source: BLS, March 2005)
* Source: OUSD(PA&E) – Includes current and former active duty, national guard and reserve personnel. ** Include outlays from Dept of Treasury of $4 B, excluding unfunded liabilities
FY 05
Often Driven byUnsolicited Inputs
“Default” strategy DOES NOT always “incentivize” desired behavior or provide return on investment – not getting better
5454
Potential Fiscal Outcomes Under GAO’s Alternative Simulation: Revenues and
Composition of Spending
0
10
20
30
40
50
2009 2019 2030 2040Fiscal year
Net interest Social Security Medicare & Medicaid All other spending
Percent of GDP
Source: GAO’s Fall 2009 analysis based on the Trustees’ assumptions for Social Security and Medicare.
55
Potential Fiscal Outcomes UnderGAO’s Baseline Extended Simulation:
Revenues and Composition of Spendingas Shares of GDP
0
10
20
30
40
50
2008 2018 2030 2040Fiscal year
Percent of GDP
Net interest Social Security Medicare & Medicaid All other spending
Revenue
Source: U.S. Governmental Accountability Office’s Fall 2009 Baseline Extended simulation.
56
Potential Fiscal Outcomes Under GAO’s Alternative Simulation:
Revenues and Composition of Spending as Shares of GDP
0
10
20
30
40
50
2009 2019 2030 2040Fiscal year
Percent of GDP
Net interest Social Security Medicare & Medicaid All other spending
Revenue
Source: U.S. Governmental Accountability Office’s Fall 2009 Alternative simulation.
57
II. Experience in the 1990s
A. The 1990s Budget drawdown – top line down 25%1. Procurement funding down 50%
2. S&T funding declined slightly
B. Major industrial companies (GE, IBM, Ford, Westinghouse, Texas Instruments, etc.) divested their defense businesses
58
II. ExperienceC. Defense focused companies responded using various
strategies1. Commercial Diversification (limited success)
2. International Markets (Middle East)
3. Other Government Markets (State, Local and non-DoD Federal)
4. Divestiture (General Dynamics was the leader)
D. Consolidation emerged as the primary strategy (per “last supper”)1. A handful of large Primes were created with a broad range of
lines of business, and deep resources to weather the downturn
2. The number of mid-sized firms declined sharply
3. Independent Systems Engineering firms were acquired by major primes
59
II. ExperienceE. Financial Conditions of Major Companies in late 1990s
1. Limited opportunity for organic top line growth
2. Acquisitions caused high levels of debt and sharply lower credit ratings
3. Reduced cash flow and profitability
4. Sharply lower stock prices
5. Result – access to capital was limited
F. DoD’s response (senior leadership focused on the issue)1. Policy changes (e.g. Profit Policy)
2. Enhanced cash flow measures (e.g. progress payments)
3. Consolidation costs made allowable
4. Centers of excellence were rejected in favor of trying to maintain competition
60
III. Industrial Base TodayB. Current financial condition of the Industrial Base
1. Low debt/solid credit ratings
2. With few new program starts, companies are maximizing profits and cash flow
3. Stable profitability and good margins
4. Regular dividend increases are the norm for primes
5. Despite this, stock prices are down 30 to 40% due to “street” doubts about the future
C. Increased presence of U.S. based, Foreign-owned companies1. BAE Systems, Cobham, Thales, QinetiQ, Fijnmechanica, etc.
2. Use SSAs, Proxy Boards to protect U.S.-only technology
3. Rules discourage access to foreign technology
6161
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
$K /
Act
ive
En
dst
ren
gth
[F
Y10
Co
nst
ant $
]
DoD Operations & Maintenance Per Capita(Excludes Supplemental Funding)
~3% growth per yearFY81 – FY01
Why the growth?• Medical• Quality-of-Life initiatives• Environmental• Equipment complexity• Aging equipment
Smoothed FY03 end-of-yearSupplemental appropriation