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Plaintiffs in the above-captioned Action move pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 54(b) for reconsideration of this Courts sua sponte Order dated August 27, 2014,

staying all proceedings in this action until such time as the Supreme Court lifts the stay imposed in

McQuiggv. Bostic, No. 14A196, ____ S. Ct. ____, 2014 WL 4096232 (Mem) (Aug. 20, 2014)

(Fourth Circuit Case No. 14-1167), either by the denial of the petition for a writ of certiorari or the

sending down of the judgment of the Supreme Court. (Dkt. No. 108 at 3).1 Plaintiffs have

submitted facts and authority supporting Plaintiffs entitlement to immediate relief in this Court.

Although the Supreme Courts stay in Bostic prevents that casefrom moving to judgment, the

Fourth Circuits holding in Bosticcontrols this Court and other district courts in the Fourth Circuit

immediately, and Plaintiffs respectfully suggest that justice can only be served by having their

long-pending claims decided by this Court. As another district court in this Circuit has recognized,

a stay of the Fourth Circuits mandate does not prevent the Fourth Circuit decision from having

precedential value and binding authority on the undersigned in the matter sub judice. Friel

Prosthetics, Inc.v. Bank of America, 2005 WL 348263, at *1 n.4 (D. Md. Feb. 9, 2005); see also

Doev. Chao, 511 F.3d 461, 465 (4th Cir. 2007) ([I]n our judicial hierarchy, the decisions of the

circuit courts of appeals bind the district courts just as decisions of the Supreme Court bind the

circuit courts.).2

1 Citations to the docket, unless otherwise indicated, refer to the docket in Fisher-Bornev. Smith,1:12-cv-00589.2 SeealsoChambersv. United States, 22 F.3d 939, 942 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (We reject thegovernments argument thatX-Citement Videois not binding precedent until the mandate issues in thatcase. In this circuit, once a published opinion is filed, it becomes the law of the circuit until withdrawn orreversed by the Supreme Court or an en banc court.), vacated on other grounds, 47 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir.1995); Martinv. Singletary, 965 F.2d 944, 945 n.1 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that [t]he stay of the mandate . .. in no way affects the duty of this panel and the courts in this circuit to apply now the precedentestablished); McClellanv. Young, 421 F.2d 690, 691 (6th Cir. 1970); S.E.C.v.Amerindo Inv. Advisors,

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As Plaintiffs disclosed on August 14, 2014, Plaintiffs are prepared to file a

dispositive motion seeking summary judgment on their claims pertaining to marriage. A copy of

Plaintiffs anticipated motion is attached hereto as Exhibit A. No party has suggested that Plaintiffs

should not prevail on the merits of their claims because, as the Court observed in its July 30, 2014

Order, this court is bound by directly controlling Fourth Circuit authority. (Dkt. No. 102 (quoting

Alexanderv. City of Greensboro, 2011 WL 13857, at *5 n.5 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 4, 2011)). Where this

Court cannot distinguish [the Fourth Circuits] firm language from the facts of th[e] case, the Court

must follow the Fourth Circuits guidance. Baldwinv. City of Winston-Salem, 544 F. Supp. 123,

124 (M.D.N.C. 1982) aff'd, 710 F.2d 132 (4th Cir. 1983). Here, as set forth in greater detail in

Plaintiffs anticipated motion for summary judgment, there is no dispute about Plaintiffs factual

allegations, and all parties agree that Bosticcontrols the legal analysis of the North Carolina laws

at issue.

Indeed, since the Supreme Courts decision in Windsor, fifteen district courts (as

well as the Fourth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits) have struck down a same-sex marriage law without

awaiting guidance from the Supreme Court before rendering a decision.3 As one court recently

Inc., 2014 WL 405339, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2014). The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure alsosupport this conclusion by clearly distinguishing between the issuance of an opinion and judgment, and theissuance of a mandate. Rule 36(a) requires that a judgment is entered when it is noted on the docket,which must be prepared after receiving the courts opinion, and Rule 41(b) expressly provides that amandate issues after the entry of judgment. Moreover, although the Fourth Circuits local rules expresslystate that [g]ranting of rehearing en banc vacates the previous panel judgment and opinion, 4th Cir. L.R.35(c), the Fourth Circuits local rules governing the issuance of the mandate do not contain a similarprovision suspending a panel judgment and opinion if a mandate is stayed. See4th Cir. L.R. 41.3 SeeBrenner v.Scott, 2014 WL 4113100 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2014); Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp.2d 982 (W.D. Wis. 2014);Whitewood v.Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410 (M.D. Pa. 2014); Geigerv. Kitzhaber,994 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Or. 2014); Lattav. Otter, 2014 WL 1909999 (D. Idaho May 13, 2014); Baskinv.Bogan, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (S.D. Ind. 2014); Henryv. Himes, 2014 WL 1418395 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 14,2014); DeBoerv. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014); Tancov. Haslam, 2014 WL 997525


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stated, a district court may not abstain from deciding a case because of a possibility that the

issues raised in the case could be resolved in some other way at some other time. Wolf v.

Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1027-28 (W.D. Wis. 2014).

While a judgment rendered by this Court might be stayed, a ruling granting

Plaintiffs anticipated motion for summary judgment will restore to Plaintiffs at least some measure

of the dignity that North Carolinas unconstitutional laws have taken away. Moreover, as explained

in Plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunctive relief, failing to adjudicate Plaintiffs anticipated motion

for summary judgment in a timely manner could permanently prejudice Plaintiffs who might be

denied government benefits if their marriages continue to be unrecognized in North Carolina at the

time that either of them passes away. On the other hand, if this Court permits briefing, adjudicates

Plaintiffs anticipated motion, and awards a judgment in favor for Plaintiffs but elects to stay its

own judgment that stay could be lifted at a moments notice upon an appropriate application to

this Court for emergency relief. For example, Plaintiffs Ellen W. Gerber and Pearl Berlin are elderly

and worry that Ms. Berlins health might decline at any moment. If that were to happen, Mmes.

Gerber and Berlin could apply to have the stay lifted only as to them, and to have their marriage

recognized in North Carolina, so as to remove any doubt that they were validly married at the time

. . . such insured individual . . . died for purposes ofreceiving Social Security survivors benefits.

42 U.S.C. 416(h)(1)(A)(i) (noting also that the marriage must be recognized by the State in

(M.D. Tenn. Mar. 14, 2014); De Leonv. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632 (W.D. Tex. 2014); Leev. Orr, 2014 WL683680 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2014); Bosticv. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456 (E.D. Va. 2014); Bourkev.Beshear, 2014 WL 556729 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2014); Bishopv. United States, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D.Okla. 2014); Obergefellv. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968 (S.D. Ohio 2013); Kitchenv. Herbert, 961 F.Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013).


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which [she] was domiciled at that time); see also42 U.S.C. 402(b)(1), (e)(1) (survivors

insurance benefit).

Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court reconsider its August 27, 2014 Order,

lift the stay it has imposed in this action, and permit Plaintiffs to seek the summary judgment to

which they are entitled under the current law of the Fourth Circuit.


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Dated: September 10, 2014Raleigh, North Carolina

Rose A. Saxe

James D. EsseksAMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNIONFOUNDATION125 Broad StreetNew York, New York 10004-2400Telephone: (212) 549-2500Facsimile: (212) [email protected]

[email protected]

Elizabeth O. GillAMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNIONFOUNDATION39 Drumm StreetSan Francisco, California 94111-4805Telephone: (415) 343-1237Facsimile: (415) [email protected]

Christopher Brook

N.C. State Bar No. 33838ACLU OF NORTH CAROLINAP.O. Box 28004Raleigh, North Carolina 27611-8004Telephone: (919) 834-3466Facsimile: (866) [email protected]

Amy E. Richardson

N.C. State Bar No. 287682009 Fairview Road#6220Raleigh, NC 27628Telephone: (919) 429-7386Facsimile: (202) [email protected]

Jonathan D. SasserN.C. State Bar No. 10028

Jeremy M. FalconeN.C. State Bar No. 36182P.O. Box 33550Raleigh, North Carolina 27636Telephone Number: (919) 865-7000Facsimile Number: (919) 865-7010

[email protected]@aclunc.org

Garrard R. Beeney

David A. CastlemanC. Megan BradleyW. Rudolph Kleysteuber IVSULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP125 Broad StreetNew York, New York 10004-2498Telephone: (212) 558-4000Facsimile: (212) [email protected]@[email protected]@sullcrom.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing has been filed electronically

with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to

all counsel of record.

This the 10th day of September, 2014.

HARRIS WILTSHIRE & GRANNIS LLP

/s/ Amy E. RichardsonAmy E. RichardsonN.C. State Bar No. 287682009 Fairview Rd. #6220Raleigh, NC 27628Telephone Number: (919) 429-7386Facsimile: (202) [email protected]

Attorney for Plaintiffs

mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]

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EXHIBIT A

Case 1:12-cv-00589-WO-JEP Document 110-1 Filed 09/10/14 Pa e 1 of 24

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .......................................................................................................... 1

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ........................................................................................................ 3

A. Procedural History ................................................................................................... 3

B. North Carolinas Unconstitutional Laws ................................................................... 3

C. North Carolinas Adoption Laws............................................................................... 4

D. The Plaintiffs ............................................................................................................ 5

ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 10

I. Legal Standard .................................................................................................................. 10

II. In Light of the Controlling Legal Principles Enumerated In Bostic v. Schaefer,North Carolinas Marriage Ban Is Unconstitutional............................................................. 11

A. BosticControls Because North Carolinas Marriage Ban IsIndistinguishable from Virginias Marriage Ban...................................................... 11

B. Strict Scrutiny Applies to Plaintiffs Claims............................................................. 12

C. North Carolinas Marriage Ban Impinges on Plaintiffs Fundamental Rightto Marry ................................................................................................................. 13

D. None of the Justifications for the Marriage Ban Has Merit ..................................... 14

III. BosticControls Even Though the Mandate is Stayed ........................................................ 15

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................... 16


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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Alexanderv. City of Greensboro,2011 WL 13857 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 4, 2011) .................................................................................. 10

Baldwinv. City of Winston-Salem,544 F. Supp. 123 (M.D.N.C. 1982) ..................................................................................... 10, 14

Baskin v.Bogan2014 WL 4359059 (7th Cir. Sept. 4, 2014)................................................................................ 11

Baskin v. Bogan,

983 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (S.D. Ind. 2014) ..................................................................................... 11

Bishopv. United States,962 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Okla. 2014) ................................................................................... 11

Bosemanv. Jarrell,704 S.E.2d 494 (N.C. 2010) ........................................................................................................ 4

Bosticv. Rainey,970 F. Supp. 2d 456 (E.D. Va. 2014) ........................................................................................ 11

Bosticv. Rainey,No. 2:13-cv-00395, Judgment (E.D. Va. Feb. 24, 2014) ............................................................ 2

Bosticv. Schaefer,No. 14-1167, __ F.3d __, 2014 WL 3702493 (4th Cir. July 28, 2014) ............................... passim

Bourkev. Beshear,2014 WL 556729 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2014) .............................................................................. 11

Brenner v.Scott,2014 WL 4113100 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2014) ............................................................................ 11

Chambersv. United States,22 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 1994) ....................................................................................................... 16

De Leonv. Perry,975 F. Supp. 2d 632 (W.D. Tex. 2014) ..................................................................................... 11


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DeBoerv. Snyder,973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014) ..................................................................................... 11

Doev. Chao,511 F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 2007) .................................................................................................... 15

Friel Prosthetics, Inc.v. Bank of America,2005 WL 348263 (D. Md. Feb. 9, 2005) ................................................................................ 2, 15

Geigerv. Kitzhaber,994 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Or. 2014) .......................................................................................... 11

Gonzalezv.Arizona,677 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2012) ..................................................................................................... 15

Griswoldv. Connecticut,

381 U.S. 479 (1965).................................................................................................................. 12

Henryv. Himes,2014 WL 1418395 (S.D. Ohio, Apr. 14, 2014) .......................................................................... 11

Kitchenv. Herbert,2014 WL 2868044 (10th Cir. June 25, 2014) ............................................................................ 11

Kitchenv. Herbert,961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013) ....................................................................................... 11

Lattav. Otter,2014 WL 1909999 (D. Idaho May 13, 2014) ............................................................................. 11

Leev. Orr,2014 WL 683680 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2014)................................................................................. 11

Libertarian Party of Va. v.Judd,718 F.3d 308 (4th Cir. 2013) ..................................................................................................... 10

Lovingv. Virginia,388 U.S. 1 (1967) ..................................................................................................................... 12

Martinv. Singletary,965 F.2d 944 (11th Cir. 1992) ................................................................................................... 16

Masonv. Dwinnell,660 S.E.2d 58 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) ............................................................................................ 5


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McClellanv. Young,421 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1970) ..................................................................................................... 16

McKinneyv. Bd. of Trustees,955 F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1992) ..................................................................................................... 10

McQuiggv. Bostic,Order on Petition No. 14A196 (U.S. Aug. 20, 2014).............................................................. 2, 15

Obergefellv. Kasich,2013 WL 3814262 (S.D. Ohio July 22, 2013) ............................................................................ 13

Obergefellv. Wymyslo,962 F. Supp. 2d 968 (S.D. Ohio 2013) ...................................................................................... 11

Parkerv. Parker,

46 N.C. App. 254 (1980) ............................................................................................................. 4

S.E.C.v.Amerindo Investment Advisors, Inc.,2014 WL 405339 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2014) ................................................................................ 16

Tancov. Haslam,2014 WL 997525 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 14, 2014) ........................................................................... 11

UnitedStatesv. Windsor,133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) ...................................................................................................... 1-4, 11

Whitewoodv. Wolf,992 F. Supp. 2d 410 (M.D. Pa. 2014) ....................................................................................... 11

Wilson Group, Inc. v. Quorum Health Resources, Inc.,880 F. Supp. 416 (D.S.C. 1995).................................................................................................. 9

Wolfv. Walker,986 F. Supp. 2d 982 (W.D. Wis. 2014) ..................................................................................... 11

Zablockiv. Redhail,434 U.S. 374 (1978).................................................................................................................. 12

Constitution, Statutes and Rules

U.S. Const. amend. XIV ........................................................................................................ 1, 11, 14

N.C. Const. art. XIV .......................................................................................................... 3, 4, 11, 12

Va. Const. art. I, 15-A .................................................................................................................. 12


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42 U.S.C. 416 .......................................................................................................................... 9-10

29 C.F.R. 825.122.......................................................................................................................... 9

N.C. Gen. Stat. 48-2-301 ............................................................................................................... 4

N.C. Gen. Stat. 48-4-101 ............................................................................................................... 4

N.C. Gen. Stat. 51-1 .......................................................................................................... 4, 11, 12

N.C. Gen. Stat. 51-1.2 ....................................................................................................... 4, 11, 12

N.C. Gen. Stat. 51-2 .................................................................................................................... 12

Va. Code Ann. 20-45.2 ................................................................................................................ 12

Va. Code Ann. 20-45.3 ................................................................................................................ 12

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 ............................................................................................................................. 9


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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

More than two years ago, on June 13, 2012, six families headed by lesbian or gay

parents filed this action challenging North Carolinas ban on second parent adoptions by unmarried

couples which, when combined with North Carolinas categorical exclusion of lesbian and gay

couples from marrying (or having their out of state marriages recognized), created a blanket ban on

both parents in gay or lesbian couples forming a legal relationship with the children they are

raising. The harms to these families from such ban have repeatedly been briefed and never

contested by defendants. After the Supreme Courts decision in UnitedStatesv. Windsor, 133 S.

Ct. 2675 (2013), on June 26, 2013, Plaintiffs amended their complaint on July 19, 2013 to

challenge North Carolinas ban on marriage for same-sex couples. (Dkt. No. 40 (Compl.).)

As the State Defendants1conceded in their Brief on Future Proceedings, filed on

August 13, 2014 (Dkt. No. 104, (the State Defs. Br.)), application here of the Fourth Circuits

decision in Bosticv. Schaefer, Case No. 14-1167, __ F.3d __, 2014 WL 3702493 (4th Cir. July 28,

2014), conclusively establishes that North Carolinas ban on marriage for same-sex couples

violates the Fourteenth Amendment and must, like the Virginias ban, be declared unconstitutional.2

1 David L. Churchill, in his official capacity as Clerk of the Superior Court for Guilford County;Archie L. Smith III, in his official capacity as Clerk of the Superior Court for Durham County; AlJean Bogle, in her official capacity as Clerk of the Superior Court for Catawba County; and Roy A.Cooper, in his official capacity as the North Carolina Attorney General.

2 In North Carolina, if a child has one legal, unmarried parent, a second parent may notadopt the child without the first parent relinquishing legal parental rights. If the parents are married,however, the second parent may obtain a stepparent adoption without causing the first parent torelinquish parental rights. If the Court strikes down the North Carolina marriage ban asunconstitutional, thereby allowing the plaintiff couples to marry, their claims regarding secondparent adoption will also be resolved as they will be able to take advantage of North Carolinas lawrecognizing stepparent adoption.


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(State Defs. Br. at 4-5.)3 The Supreme Courts recent decision to stay the mandate in Bostic,

McQuiggv. Bostic, No. 14A196, Order in Pending Case (U.S. Aug. 20, 2014), does not undermine

the precedential value of the Fourth Circuits decision, because, as one district court in this Circuit

has recognized, a stay of the mandate does not prevent the Fourth Circuit decision from having

precedential value and binding authority on the undersigned in the matter sub judice. Friel

Prosthetics, Inc.v. Bank of America, 2005 WL 348263, at *1 n.4 (D. Md. Feb. 9, 2005). As

mandated by Bostic, Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment should be granted, and the effect of

that order and whether it should be stayed can be addressed in the event of an appropriate motion

to stay. Even if stayed, summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs would be a step towards

addressing Plaintiffs harms, and would expedite ultimate relief when and if the Supreme Court

grants certiorari and rules same-sex marriage bans unconstitutional.

In Bostic, on a motion for summary judgment, the district court entered a final

judgment enjoining any officers, agents or employees of the Commonwealth of Virginia from

enforcing the unconstitutional state law prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying and refusing to

recognize their lawful out-of-state marriages. Bosticv. Rainey, No. 2:13-cv-00395, Judgment (E.D.

Va. Feb. 24, 2014) (Dkt. No. 139), affd sub nom. Bosticv. Schaefer, 2014 WL 3702493. Plaintiffs

therefore move this Court to find, as mandated by Bostic, that North Carolinas virtually identical

marriage laws are unconstitutional and to enter into a judgment, modeled after the Bosticjudgment

3 The Fourth Circuits ruling follows astring of eighteenfederal courts holding marriage bansfor same-sex couples unconstitutional following the Supreme Courts opinion in Windsor. See infran.5.


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that was upheld by the Fourth Circuit, enjoining enforcement of the North Carolina laws prohibiting

same-sex couples from marrying and refusing to recognize their lawful out-of-state marriages.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

A. Procedural History

After Plaintiffs amended their complaint in light of Windsor and while Defendants

motions to dismiss were pending, several Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on

April 9, 2014, detailing the increasing and irreparable harm they were suffering as time passed. On

April 11, 2014, in part responding to a request from the Magistrate Judge for briefing on whether a

stay was warranted, several defendants moved for a stay of the proceedings pending the Fourth

Circuits decision in Bostic, and on June 2, 2014, the Magistrate Judge recommended a stay of all

proceedings pending the decision in Bostic. Plaintiffs filed objections to the Recommendation, to

which Defendants responded. On July 28, 2014, before this Court had an opportunity to rule on

the Recommendation, the Fourth Circuit issued its decision in Bostic, holding that Virginias ban on

marriage for same-sex couples is unconstitutional.

On July 30, 2014, this Court issued an order requesting briefing on the applicability

of Bosticto North Carolinas marriage laws and on how this case should proceed in light of Bostic.

On August 13, 2014, Plaintiffs and the State Defendants filed their respective responses to the

Courts Order. On August 20, 2014, the Supreme Court granted a stay of issuance of the mandate

of the Fourth Circuits decision but did not disturb the decision itself.

B. North Carolinas Unconstitutional Laws

On May 8, 2012, section 6 of Article XIV of the North Carolina Constitution was

amended to exclude same-sex couples from the freedom to marry in North Carolina and to bar


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recognition of valid marriages of same-sex couples from other jurisdictions (Amendment One).

N.C. Const. art. XIV, 6 (as amended); see alsoN.C. Gen. Stat. 51-1, 51-1.2 (Marriages,

whether created by common law, contracted, or performed outside of North Carolina, between

individuals of the same gender are not valid in North Carolina.). The effect of Amendment One

and North Carolinas marriage statutes is identical to the effectof the numerous state marriage

bans declared unconstitutional and enjoined by courts following the Supreme Courts decision in

Windsor, including Virginias marriage ban, the invalidation of which was upheld by the Fourth

Circuit in Bostic.

Amendment One and the North Carolina marriage statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. 51-1

(together, the marriage ban), deny Plaintiffs the ability to marry in North Carolina and deny

recognition and respect to Plaintiffs lawful marriages conferred by other jurisdictions. SeeN.C.

Gen. Stat. 51-1.2. In contrast, North Carolina permits opposite-sex couples to marry and

recognizes marriages of opposite-sex spouses from other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Parkerv. Parker,

46 N.C. App. 254, 258 (1980).

C. North Carolinas Adoption Laws

North Carolinas adoption statute, authoritatively construed by the North Carolina

Supreme Court in Bosemanv. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494 (N.C. 2010), categorically prohibits

unmarried couples to secure legal parent-child relationships for both partners through joint or

second parent adoption. N.C. Gen. Stat. 48-2-301(c). Married couples may jointly adopt. And

an individual may adopt his or her spouses child through a stepparent adoption. SeeN.C. Gen.

Stat. 48-4-101. Because North Carolina does not permit lesbian and gay couples to marry, or


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recognize their marriages performed elsewhere, the adult Plaintiffs are perpetually classified as

unmarried and are thus unable to take advantage of this stepparent provision.

Despite North Carolinas prohibition on second parent adoption, the North Carolina

Court of Appeals has awarded joint custody to parents from same-sex couples because such

custody is in the best interests of the child. See Masonv. Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d 58, 63 (N.C. Ct.

App. 2008). This decision indicates there is no rational basis to deny legal recognition of second

parent adoption in same-sex couples.

D. The Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs are six North Carolina families challenging the constitutionality of North

Carolinas marriage and adoption laws that discriminate against Plaintiffs on the basis of the adult

Plaintiffs sex and sexual orientation and prevent Plaintiffs from being treated as equal families.

Under North Carolina law, only one parent in each family is recognized as a legal parent; the other

is made a legal stranger to the child because North Carolina does not recognize their marriage or

permit the parents to marry, and it does not permit a parents partner to adopt her children unless

the couple is married. (See, e.g., Affidavit of Leslie Zanaglio, dated September 3, 2014 (Zanaglio

Aff.) 4, 9-10; Affidavit of Leigh Smith, dated August 25, 2014 (Smith Aff.) 2 -3, 5; see also

Compl. 24-34.)

Marcie Fisher-Borne, Chantelle Fisher-Borne, M.F.-B. and E.F.-B. Marcie

Fisher-Borne and Chantelle Fisher-Borne have been committed to each other for seventeen years

and were legally married in the District of Columbia on June 18, 2011. (Affidavit of Marcie Fisher-

Borne (Marcie Aff.) 2, 9-10; Affidavit of Chantelle Fisher-Borne (Chantelle Aff.) 2, 9-10;

see alsoCompl. 108.) Marcie gave birth to M.F.-B., now six years old, and Chantelle gave birth


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seek a stepparent adoption of J.H.-S. (Smith Aff. 5; Hendrix Aff. 5; see alsoCompl. 356,

358.)

Dana Draa, Leigh Knight Caffrey, M.M.C.-D and M.L.C.-D. Dana Draa and Leigh

Knight Caffrey have been committed to each other for nine years and had a formal commitment

ceremony on May 19, 2007. (Affidavit of Dana Draa, dated August 25, 2014 (Draa Aff.) 2;

Affidavit of Leigh Knight Caffrey, dated August 21, 2014 (Caffrey Aff.) 2; see alsoCompl.

222.) Ms. Draa and Ms. Caffrey wish to marry in their home state of North Carolina. (Draa Aff.

3.) Ms. Caffrey gave birth to M.M.C.-D. and M.L.C.-D, now five years old and two years old,

respectively. (Caffrey Aff. 5.) Although both parents planned for children together and share

equally in all of their parental responsibilities, only Ms. Caffrey is legally recognized as the parent of

M.M.C.-D. and M.L.C.-D under North Carolina law. (Draa Aff. 5, 10-11; Caffrey Aff. 5, 10-11;

see alsoCompl. 226-31.) If marriage for same-sex couples is permitted in North Carolina, Ms.

Caffrey and Ms. Draa intend to marry and intend for Ms. Draa to seek stepparent adoptions of

M.M.C.-D and M.L.C.-D. (Draa Aff. 5; Caffrey Aff. 5;see alsoCompl. 356, 358.)

Shawn Long, Craig Johnson and I.J.-L. Shawn Long and Craig Johnson have

been committed to each other for twenty years. (Affidavit of Shawn Long, dated August 20, 2014

(Long Aff.) 2; Affidavit of Craig Johnson, dated August 20, 2014 (Johnson Aff.) 2; see also

Compl. 244.) Mr. Long and Mr. Johnson wish to marry in their home state of North Carolina.

(Long Aff. 2-3.) They welcomed I.J.-L, now twelve years old, into their family in 2007, after both

underwent careful scrutiny to become foster parents. Mr. Johnson adopted I.J.-L in 2008.

(Johnson Aff. 5.) Although both parents planned for children together and share equally in all of

their parental responsibilities, only Mr. Johnson is legally recognized as I.J.-Ls parent under North


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Carolina law. (Long Aff. 5, 9-10; Johnson Aff. 5, 9-10;see alsoCompl. 255-65.) If

marriage for same-sex couples is permitted in North Carolina, Mr. Long and Mr. Johnson intend to

marry and intend for Mr. Long to seek a stepparent adoption of I.J.-L. (Long Aff. 5; Johnson Aff.

5;see alsoCompl. 356, 358.)

The inability to marry prevents Plaintiffs from establishing legal parent-child

relationships for both partners through joint or second parent adoption. This harms these families

in numerous ways, including causing them to constantly fear that the non-legal parent will be

denied access and decision-making ability during a childs medical emergency. (See Smith Aff.

6; Beck Aff. 5; Marcie Aff. 5; Carignan 5; Draa Aff. 6; see alsoCompl. 290-92.) The

inability to marry or have their marriages recognized also causes Plaintiffs and their children

multiple other serious psychological and economic harms including the following:

Plaintiffs constantly fear being denied access to one another and the ability to makemedical decisions for one another during a medical emergency. (SeeHendrix Aff. 6; Beck Aff. 5; Marcie Aff. 5; Carignan 5; Draa Aff. 6; Johnson Aff. 6; see

alsoCompl. 322(b).)

Plaintiffs would not be entitled to the default protections of North Carolinasinheritance laws if a spouse or partner dies. (SeeBeck Aff. 9-10; Marcie Aff. 9-10; Draa Aff. 10-11; see also Compl. 322(j).)

Plaintiffs are unable to file joint tax returns with their spouses or partners or availthemselves of the tax benefits that North Carolina confers on married couples.(See Beck Aff. 9-10; Marcie Aff. 9-10; Draa Aff. 10-11; see also Compl. 322(p), 324.)

Plaintiffs are ineligible for important federal protections that are available only tocouples whose marriages are legally recognized by their home state, including theability to take time off of work to care for a sick spouse under the Family & MedicalLeave Act (FMLA) (29 C.F.R. 825.122(b)), access to a spouses Social Securitybenefits, 42 U.S.C. 416(h)(1)(A)(i), and access to a spouses veterans benefits,N.C. Gen. Stat. 105-277.1C.


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In their Complaint, affidavits and motion for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs have demonstrated

the other harms they faceserious harms that no litigant has contestedfrom North Carolinas

unconstitutional laws.

ARGUMENT

I. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Libertarian Party of Va. v.

Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 313-14 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). [S]ummary judgment

should be granted in those cases in which it is perfectly clear that no genuine issue of material fact

remains unresolved and inquiry into the facts is unnecessary to clarify the application of the law.

Wilson Grp., Inc. v. Quorum Health Res., Inc., 880 F. Supp. 416, 420 (D.S.C. 1995) (citing

McKinneyv. Bd. of Trustees, 955 F.2d 924, 928 (4th Cir. 1992)).

As the Court observed in its July 30, 2014 Order, this court is bound by directly

controlling Fourth Circuit authority. Alexanderv. City of Greensboro, 2011 WL 13857, at *5 n.5

(M.D.N.C. Jan. 4, 2011). Where this Court cannot distinguish [the Fourth Circuits] firm language

from the facts of th[e] case, the Court must follow the Fourth Circuits guidance. Baldwinv. City of

Winston-Salem, 544 F. Supp. 123, 124 (M.D.N.C. 1982) affd, 710 F.2d 132 (4th Cir. 1983). Here,

there is no dispute about Plaintiffs factual allegations and all parties agree that Bosticcontrols the

legal analysis of the North Carolina laws at issue.


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II. In Light of the Controlling Legal Principles Enumerated in Bosticv. Schaefer, NorthCarolinas Marriage Ban is Unconstitutional

A. BosticControls Because North Carolinas Marriage Ban Is Indistinguishablefrom Virginias Marriage Ban

In Bostic, the 4thCircuit unequivocally held that Virginias statutory and

constitutional prohibition of same-sex marriage in Virginia and recognition of such marriages legally

performed in other states violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth

Amendment of the United States Constitution. 2014 WL 3702493, at *17.5 This holding is

dispositive here because, in all relevant respects, the North Carolina marriage ban challenged in

this action is identical to the Virginia marriage laws struck down in Bostic. Indeed, the Fourth

Circuit specifically noted in its opinion that [t]hree other states in this Circuit have similar bans[,

including] North Carolina. Bostic, 2014 WL 3702493, at *1 n.1 (citing N.C. Const. art. XIV, 6;

N.C. Gen. Stat. 51-1, 51-1.2).

Virginias and North Carolinas statutory and constitutional schemes are materially

identical because they operate to prevent same-sex couples from marrying and prohibit [the State]

from recognizing same-sex couples lawful out-of-state marriages. Id.at *17. A side-by-side

5 Bosticfollows eighteen federal district and circuit courts ruling on same-sex marriage bansfollowing the Supreme Courts Windsor opinion. SeeBaskinv. Bogan, 2014 WL 4359059 (7th Cir.Sept. 4, 2014); Kitchenv. Herbert, 2014 WL 2868044 (10th Cir. June 25, 2014); Brenner v.Scott,2014 WL 4113100 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2014); Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982 (W.D. Wis.2014);Whitewood v.Wolf,992 F. Supp. 2d 410 (M.D. Pa. 2014); Geigerv. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp.2d 1128 (D. Or. 2014); Lattav. Otter, 2014 WL 1909999 (D. Idaho May 13, 2014); Baskinv.

Bogan, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (S.D. Ind. 2014); Henryv. Himes, 2014 WL 1418395 (S.D. Ohio Apr.14, 2014); DeBoerv. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014); Tancov. Haslam, 2014 WL997525 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 14, 2014); De Leonv. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632 (W.D. Tex. 2014);Leev. Orr, 2014 WL 683680 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2014); Bosticv. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456 (E.D.Va. 2014); Bourkev. Beshear, 2014 WL 556729 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2014); Bishopv. United States,962 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Okla. 2014); Obergefellv. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968 (S.D. Ohio2013); Kitchenv. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013).


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comparison of the relevant portion of each states laws demonstrates that they are identical in all

material respects, and the holding of Bosticcontrols any constitutional analysis of the North

Carolina bans.6

Virginia North Carolina

[O]nlya union between one man and onewoman may be a marriage valid in orrecognized by this Commonwealth and itspolitical subdivisions. Va. Const. art. I, 15-A.

Marriage between one man and one woman isthe only domestic legal union that shall be validor recognized in this State. N.C. Const. art.XIV, 6.

A marriage between persons of the same sexis prohibited. Any marriage entered into by

persons of the same sex in another state orjurisdiction shall be void in all respects inVirginia and any contractual rights created bysuch marriage shall be void and unenforceable.Va. Code Ann. 20-45.2; see alsoVa. Code

Ann. 20-45.3 (extending same prohibition tocivil unions and similar arrangements).

A valid and sufficient marriage is created by theconsent of a male and female person who may

lawfully marry, presently to take each other ashusband and wife . . . . N.C. Gen. Stat. 51-1.

Marriages, whether createdby common law,contracted, or performed outside of NorthCarolina, between individuals of the samegender are not valid in North Carolina. N.C.Gen. Stat. 51-2.

B. Strict Scrutiny Applies to Plaintiffs Claims

The Fourth Circuit conclusively determined that because marriage is a fundamental

right, a categorical denial of that right to lesbian and gay couples must be analyzed under strict

scrutiny, requiring that the state justify the marriage ban with a compelling government interest and

that the ban is narrowly tailored to that interest. Bostic, 2014 WL 3702493, at *8 (citing Zablockiv.

Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978); Lovingv. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Griswoldv.

Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965)). The court in Bosticrejected the arguments of the

6 The State Defendants acknowledged in their response to the Courts July 30 Order that, inthe extensive briefing filed to date, the State Defendants herein have consistently represented tothis Court that the Fourth Circuits holding in Bosticwould likely control the analysis of NorthCarolinas marriage laws. (State Defs. Br. at 5.) There can be no doubt that Bosticcontrols.


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proponents of the law that marriage for same-sex couples is a new right being asserted. Id.at *9-

10. Supreme Court precedent defining the right to marry speak[s] of a broad right to marry that is

not circumscribed based on the characteristics of the individuals seeking to exercise that right. Id.

(quoting Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 387). Finding no reason to suspect that the Supreme Court would

accord the choice to marry someone of the same sex any less respect than the choice to marry an

opposite-sex individual who is of a different race, owes child support, or is imprisoned, the court

determined that the fundamental right to marry encompasses the right to same-sex marriage. Id.

at *9-10. Because a fundamental right is at stake, the court applied strict scrutiny to Virginias

marriage ban. Id.

C. North Carolinas Marriage Ban Impinges on Plaintiffs Fundamental Right toMarry

For Plaintiffs here, like the plaintiffs in Bostic, the inability to marry or have their

relationship recognized by [North Carolina] with the dignity and respect accorded to married

opposite-sex couples has caused them significant hardship . . . and severe humiliation, emotional

distress, pain, suffering, psychological harm, and stigma. Bostic, 2014 WL 3702493, at *2. As

described supra, Plaintiffs, like the plaintiffs in Bostic, suffer a host of daily harms in being denied

the benefits attendant to marriage. Seeid.at *2 (listing daily hardships suffered by plaintiffs

because of lack of legal marriage). Like Virginias marriage ban, North Carolinas marriage ban

impinges on Plaintiffs and other North Carolina citizens fundamental right to marry, causing

significant, tangible harms. See id.at *9-10; see alsoObergefellv. Kasich, 2013 WL 3814262 at

*5-7 (S.D. Ohio July 22, 2013).


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D. None of the Justifications for the Marriage Ban Has Merit

Like those advanced in favor of Virginias marriage ban, the justifications offered for

North Carolinas marriage ban fail to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Defendants have proposed

such interests as protecting the democratic interests of voters, (Dkt. No. 88 at 4, 8), federalism, ( id.

at 6), preserving the historical definition of marriage and stability of the law, (Dkt. No. 66 at 16 -

17), and advancing responsible procreation and ensuring the best interests of minors, (id. at 16).

As the State Defendants acknowledged in their response to the Courts July 30 Order, each of

these state interests were rejected in Bostic. (State Defs. Br. at 3 n.3).

In sum, North Carolinas marriage banlike Virginias banlacks any compelling

justification for the infringement on Plaintiffs fundamental rights, and therefore fails strict scrutiny.

In the aggregate, Virginias marriage laws and constitutional amendment prohibit same-sex

marriage, ban other legally recognized same-sex relationships, and render same-sex marriages

performed elsewhere legally meaningless under Virginia state law. 2014 WL 3702493, at *1. This

is precisely what the North Carolina legal scheme provides and is exactly the reason for the

challenge Plaintiffs advance here. North Carolinas marriage ban, like Virginias, therefore

impermissibly infringe on its citizens fundamental right to marry in violation of the Equal

Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bostic, 2014 WL 3702493,

at *1. Because there is nothing to distinguish [the Fourth Circuits] firm language from the facts of

this case, the Court must follow the Fourth Circuits guidance and rule that North Carolinas

marriage ban is unconstitutional. Baldwin, 544 F. Supp. at 124.


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III. BosticControls Even Though the Mandate is Stayed

On August 20, 2014, the Supreme Court stayed issuance of the mandate in Bostic

pending the outcome of a petition for a writ of certiorari. McQuiggv. Bostic, No. 14A196, Order in

Pending Case (U.S. Aug. 20, 2014). If certiorari is not granted, under the Supreme Court order

there will be no impediment to the issuance of the mandate. And the Courts stay does not deprive

the Fourth Circuits decision in Bosticof any of its precedential authority. At least one court within

the Fourth Circuit has directly held the failure of the mandate to issue does not prevent the Fourth

Circuit decision from having precedential value and binding authority over the district courts. Friel

Prosthetics, 2005 WL 348263, at *1 n.4; see also Doev. Chao, 511 F.3d 461, 465 (4th Cir. 2007)

([I]n our judicial hierarchy, the decisions of the circuit courts of appeals bind the district courts just

as decisions of the Supreme Court bind the circuit courts.). This ruling is also consistent with the

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which clearly distinguish between the issuance of an

opinion and judgment, and the issuance of a mandate. Rule 36(a) requires that a judgment is

entered when it is noted on the docket, which must be prepared after receiving the courts

opinion, and Rule 41(b) expressly provides that a mandate issues after the entry of judgment.7

Judgment has been entered; the Fourth Circuits opinion is precedent; and it is binding law unless

later overturned.

Frielalso is consistent with authority from outside the Fourth Circuit. SeeGonzalez

v.Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 389 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2012) ([A] published decision of this court constitutes

7 Moreover, although the Fourth Circuits local rules expressly state that [g]ranting ofrehearing en banc vacates the previous panel judgment and opinion, 4th Cir. L.R. 35(c), theFourth Circuits local rules governing the issuance of the mandate do not contain a similar provisionsuspending a panel judgment and opinion if a mandate is stayed. See4th Cir. L.R. 41.


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binding authority which must be followed unless and until overruled by a body competent to do

so.); Chambersv. United States, 22 F.3d 939, 942 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1994) (We reject the

governments argument thatX-Citement Videois not binding precedent until the mandate issues in

that case. In this circuit, once a published opinion is filed, it becomes the law of the circuit until

withdrawn or reversed by the Supreme Court or an en banc court.), vacated on other grounds, 47

F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 1995); Martinv. Singletary, 965 F.2d 944, 945 n.1 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that

[t]he stay of the mandate . . . in no way affects the duty of this panel and the courts in this circuit to

apply now the precedent established.); McClellanv. Young, 421 F.2d 690, 691 (6th Cir. 1970);

S.E.C.v.Amerindo Inv. Advisors, Inc., 2014 WL 405339, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2014).

Indeed, Plaintiffs are unaware of any federal case holding that a stay of the

mandate deprives a published opinion of its precedential value, nor did the State Defendants point

to such authority in their recent submissions. As explained above, the weight of authority and logic

dictates that the stay of the mandate does not diminish the precedential value of Bostic, which

remains binding on this Court. Once the Court rules on Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment

Defendants will have the opportunity to make any appropriate motion regarding the effect of that

order.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant

Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, and deny all remaining outstanding motions as moot.


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This the __th day of September 2014.

Of Counsel:Amy E. RichardsonN.C. State Bar No. 287682009 Fairview Road#6220Raleigh, NC 27628Telephone: (919) 429-7386Facsimile: (202) [email protected]

Jonathan D. SasserN.C. State Bar No. 10028Jeremy M. Falcone

N.C. State Bar No. 36182P.O. Box 33550Raleigh, North Carolina 27636Telephone Number: (919) 865-7000Facsimile Number: (919) 865-7010

[email protected]@aclunc.org

Rose A. SaxeJames D. Esseks

American Civil Liberties Union Foundation125 Broad StreetNew York, New York 10004-2400Telephone: (212) 549-2500Facsimile: (212) [email protected]

[email protected]

Elizabeth O. Gill

American Civil Liberties Union Foundation39 Drumm StreetSan Francisco, California 94111-4805Telephone: (415) 343-1237Facsimile: (415) [email protected]

Christopher BrookN.C. State Bar No. 33838

ACLU of North Carolina

P.O. Box 28004Raleigh, North Carolina 27611-8004Telephone: (919) 834-3466Facsimile: (866) [email protected]

Garrard R. BeeneyDavid A. Castleman

C. Megan BradleyWilliam R.A. KleysteuberSULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP125 Broad StreetNew York, New York 10004-2498Telephone: (212) 558-4000Facsimile: (212) [email protected]@[email protected]

[email protected]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]

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