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The Theology of Dis/similarity: Negation in Pseudo-DionysiusAuthor(s): Jeffrey FisherReviewed work(s):Source: The Journal of Religion, Vol. 81, No. 4 (Oct., 2001), pp. 529-548Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1206053 .

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The Theology of Dis/similarity:Negation in Pseudo-Dionysius*JeffreyFisher / Chicago,llinois

Medieval negative theology has been attracting a great deal of attentionin the last decade or so, both in historical and in constructive theologicalcircles.' The works of Pseudo-Dionysius have risen to take a central placein the post-Derridean debates over the radical possibilities of the Chris-tian tradition and of the Christian mystical tradition in particular.2Whilethe role of Pseudo-Dionysius in this debate has become increasingly im-portant, the readings of his work have not kept pace with that develop-ment. Consequently, one recent article can warn us, on the authority of acareful reading of the key Dionysian treatise, TheMysticalTheology, o "beconscious of the difference between how Dionysian theology may be re-

* I am grateful to John N. Jones, Dan Grau, and especially Cyril O'Regan for their patientand thoughtful responses to this work at various stages of its progress.1There is substantial literature, but here I will note, in the more historical vein, MichaelA. Sells's MysticalLanguagesof Unsaying (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994) andDeirdre Carabine's The UnknownGod:Negative Theology n the Platonic Tradition(Louvain:Peeters, 1995). On the more constructive side, note esp. Kevin Hart, TheTrespassf theSign

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) and, more recently, John D. Caputo, ThePrayersand TearsofJacquesDerrida(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997). The de-constructive mode of theological discourse arises not only out of Derrida but also from thework of Emmanuel Levinas, whose Totality nd Infinity,trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh:Duquesne University Press, 1969) and OtherwiseThan Being, trans. Alphonso Lingis (TheHague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981) contribute both directly and indirectly (through Derrida)to the current debate. Clearly, we do not wish to draw too fine a line between the historicalconsideration and the constructive projects that often accompany them (or vice-versa). In-deed, the present article is in many ways precisely an attempt to bring them together.2 All translated quotations are from Pseudo-Dionysius: heCompleteWorks,rans. Colm Luib-heid, notes and additional trans. Paul Rorem (New York: Paulist Press, 1987). All Greekquotations are from the recent edition in CorpusDionysiacum(Berlin and New York: deGruyter, 1990-91). Chapter and section numbers correspond to those used in this editionand this translation. References to the Migne edition, PatrologiaeCursusCompletus,SeriesGraeca II (Paris, 1857), have been included parenthetically for convenience.? 2001 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.0022-4189/2001/8104-0001$02.00

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The Journal of Religiontrieved and how it is to be interpreted in its own right."3 There is an oddcomplicity here between Derrida's own dismissal of negative theology andthe defense of Dionysius from "charges"that he engages in something likedeconstruction-a complicity enhanced by the lack of a strong reading ofDionysius by those who would take issue with both of the aforemen-tioned parties.Therefore, in the interests of adding some depth to the debate, I willoffer a comprehensive reading of Dionysian negativity, in and throughwhich I contend that Dionysius engages in an apophaticism of the mostradical kind, that it is radical in a quite particular semiotic fashion, andfinally that Dionysian negative theology is significantly compatible withcertain aspects of Derridean deconstruction. It is not my aim in the pres-ent article to defend per se the deconstructive mode of theology.4 Rather,I aim to show that precisely what theology has found useful in decon-struction is operative in the tradition of Dionysian negative theology.I. HIERARCHY: THE ARCHE AND ITS PROJECTIONDionysius writes of a non-entitative God, transcendent ontologically, be-yond substance, beyond being, even beyond God (nREppE6tirroq).is firsttwo treatises, TheDivine Names and TheMysticalTheology,address specifi-cally the nature of God.5 The first, in a highly original approach to affir-mative theology, applies the first hypothesis of Plato's Parmenides o God,and only to God.6 From the outset, then, Dionysius breaks the traditional

3John N. Jones, "Sculpting God: The Logic of Dionysian Negative Theology," HarvardTheologicalReview89, no. 4 (1996): 369. I will not dispute here Jones's quite ingenious, andin many ways necessary, reading, except to say that I wonder whether a distinction such ashe recommends is even possible, and, if so, to what extent. I hope to offer a more detailedcritique of Jones's arguments at another time, having established the basic reading putforth herein.4 See Hart; Mark C. Taylor,DeconstructingTheologyNew York:Crossroad, 1982) and Err-ing:A PostmodernA/theology Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); Charles Winquist,EpiphaniesofDarkness(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986); and Jean-Luc Marion, GodwithoutBeing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), whose reading is more radical than thetwelfth- and thirteenth-century domestications of Dionysius, while remaining (I would ar-gue) on the whole within the affective tradition represented most prominently by the Victo-rines. Nevertheless, my reading here may be understood as in many ways complementaryto Marion's, even if we do not go all the way down the road together. For more on theVictorine tradition, see my discussion of Chenu, below, or better yet, the treatment in Ber-nard McGinn, TheGrowthof Mysticism New York: Crossroad, 1996).5 Here I follow the ordering of the treatises according to Paul Rorem, "The Place of TheMysticalTheologyn the Pseudo-Dionysian Corpus," Dionysius4 (1980): 87-98.6 The Parmenidean hypotheses, so called according to their source in the Platonic dia-logue of the same name, classify speech about the divine. The key hypotheses are the first,or affirmative, which is generally taken to apply to those things below the One, such as life,goodness, etc. The second, or negative, hypothesis is applicable to the One because it makes

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Negation in Pseudo-Dionysiusrules of speculation about the First Principle, according to which only thesecond, or negative, hypothesis was directed toward the One. He searchesscripture for the names of God, and, having listed them and posited themall of God, he goes on to interpret a number of them in some depth; thelast, most essential, "most enduring of them all" is "One."7Every charac-teristic cataloged in TheDivineNames,which is to sayeverything in scriptureand more, is affirmed of God, effectively collapsing the second hyposta-sis of Neoplatonic cosmology into the first. Being, Life, and Intelligence,that is, are now also the One, the Good, and the Beautiful.8I do not think of the Good as one thing, Being as another,Life and Wisdomasyet other,and I do not claimthat there are numerouscauses and differentGod-heads, all differentlyranked,superiorand inferior,and all producingdifferenteffects. No. But I hold that there is one God for all these good processions,andthat he is the possessorof the divine names of which I speakand that the firstname tells of the universalprovidenceof the one God, while the other namesrevealgeneralor specificways n which he actsprovidentially.9No ontological intermediaries intrude between God and creation: no ar-chon, no demiurge, and the Logos is, as everything else, not a separateentity, but God itself. Dionysius here departs cosmologically, cosmogoni-cally, and ontologically from the Plotinian-Proclean Neoplatonic tradi-tion, according to which a procession of emanations mediates betweenthe transcendent unity of the One and the multiplicity of material real-ity.'0Dionysius may now use all names of previously disparate hypostasesto praise one and the same God. The epistemological aspect of affirmativetheology is fundamentally doxological: "Hence the songs of praise andthe names for it are fittingly derived from the sum total of creation.""Dionysius also employs a semiotic mode complementary to the doxo-logical. He offers a critique of the whole metaphysical and epistemologicalsystem according to which affirmative theology and praise are possible.no knowledge-claims, indicating the One's transcendence. The Parmenides,and this aspectin particular, are crucial to the Neoplatonist tradition stemming from Plotinus. See esp.Proclus's Commentaryn Parmenides.

7 TheDivine Names(hereafter DN) 13.1 (977B): r6iapcEpdTraTov, v.8 Compare Proclus's elaboration of the Plotinian system in the Elementsof Theology.9 DN 5.2 (816C-817A): O6ic ',o S Eivao r6ya4i6vov l ir V Kai o r6 6v00icai o' v odiv1 Tilyvotiav, oi5&ainoX' rx aifta icai aXXwovUag napaictuc;g OE6Tit0a; =EpeXooaa;cGaii4Cxteiva;, dh' v6; OEoi a;6ila;dyaoia; nopoSou; icatlraxnap'i'tJovKE4vouuva; OEoVu-gja; ical riV *V Eivat -i iavXoi;, roog) 6vb;Eo npovotag icavtutfiv, ra; &riov6Xu,ticrpovoi ij5roi KCaiEputYr~ip0Cv.10 Compare also Stephen Gersh, FromIamblichusoEriugena:An Investigation f thePrehistoryand Evolutionof thePseudo-DionysianTradition Leiden: Brill, 1978)." DN 1.7 (597A): ~iKcrv 6vrovnadv-rov evapjgovioc)gvetrat iai 6vo~iEcrxat.Note thepraise function, manifested in the singing of hymns. We shall have to address this moredirectly below.

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The Journal of ReligionThe following passage demonstrates clearly his ability to run the affirma-tive and negative (ultimately a semiotic approach) alongside each other.We know him from the arrangementof everything,because everything s, in asense, projectedout fromhim, and this orderpossessescertainimagesand sem-blances of his divineparadigms.We thereforeapproach hat whichis beyond allas far asourcapacitiesallowus and wepass bywayof the denialand the transcen-dence of all thingsand by wayof the cause of all things.God is thereforeknownin all thingsand as distinct from all things.He is knownthroughknowledgeandthrough unknowing.Of him there is conception,reason,understanding, ouch,perception, opinion, imagination,name, and manyother things. On the otherhand, he cannotbe understood,wordscannot containhim, and no namecan layhold of him. He is not one of the thingsthatare,and he cannot be known n anyof them.12

While it clearly has an emanationist ring to it, particularly taken to-gether with the hierarchies here implied and elsewhere explicit, Diony-sius's "projection"serves an epistemological-semiotic rather than ontolog-ical function. Close attention to the language of projection reveals anambiguity characteristic of Dionysius's methodology. The term "projec-tion" indicates at once "extension" or "promontory" and "shield" or "de-fense." In semiotic terms, we may understand projection (extension) assignifying the possible ontological and epistemological connection of thecreated world to its arche (thus the "causal approach") and projection(shield) as the semiotic interruption of semantic stability (thus denial, thenegative approach). The projection as the possibility of signification co-incides with projection as the necessity (or inescapability) of signification,that is, of the sign never reaching its ground. Because what seems toreveal in fact obscures, even deceives, Dionysius's God can never be thesemantic arche. He is clear about this elsewhere: "Someone beholdingGod and understanding what he saw has not actually seen God himselfbut rather something of his which has being and is knowable,"'"perhapsthe "paradigms" of the present passage. Thus, "God is known in all things[projection as symbol] and as distinct from all things [projection asshield]," the latter resulting in Dionysius's clear preference for the nega-tive way.12DN 7.3 (869D-872A): iE6v ytvvxnogEv ... iK l-ri iwVr6w v6wvowv itat6Esg 6;0avro-0i0npopE oevi;w KiaiEiKticva;g ivaigKca 6io)toara trov ihe5fovaroui napaSEtygituov X-o6oarlEt;b 6 iKEtova dwaov68i t6Et Iar~ 86vatv &jvtjiv v fivwvrcov d4atpt~al KniiUr-EpoXjfi ai v f nd1v-ovaitig. At0 Kra v nalowv6 i6; ytvd6c Tat KicaX(opi;gndvov. Kai 8th

yvmcEogo Eb ytvxcenxat Kai ta adyvaoxa;. Kai cautv alboi icai v6roat;icai X6yo; icaintofitlrlcatLinaIiailatarlonat;iati 6aiati avrazaacatvoglai i a'XXa adv-ra,catoiTrEvositat oitre X&yEatOiaEo6voi6raExat. Kai oKic~iat t -rciv vr(ov,olb&iv rtvt rcSv vrov ytvo6-'3 Epistles I (1065A): Kai Eit-i i86ovE6v oruvicEv, yvEl8Ev, oi5i)alrbyv &'pacKEV,daa6 it-rcvaurou T-rv6v-civ ical ytvoxcogevov.

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Negation in Pseudo-DionysiusA brief discussion of Dionysius's elation to the prior apophatictradi-tion is requiredat this point. The most useful exemplar is Gregoryof

Nyssa,who falls,H. A. Wolfsonargues,in the Aristotelian/Plotinianradi-tion with regardto negation.14 Aristotle's haracteristic lassificationsys-tems divide negative languageinto two types:"privation"arpriaot;)and"negation"(arn60aotq).rivationdenies a proposition the opposite ofwhichcan be affirmed;negationrefers to a proposition n which the op-posite of the predicatecan in no waybe affirmedof the subject.Plotinusused the term "remotion"d4azpeatg;)n such a waythat it correspondedto "negation,"uggestingthat this processremoves the subjectfrom therealmof discourse of the predicate n question,which is the only properway in which to speak of the One. Gregoryutilized both of the termsa6r64act; nd 6aa4cpEct;,negation" nd "removal,"withthe same exten-sion, avoidingoz(prlot;,"privation."'5 lpha privativenegationsare forhimvalid as negations; hatis, to say"God s incorruptible"s the sameasto say"God s notcorruptible."He alsoallowsaffirmationswith a negativemeaning; "unsusceptibleof evil"is equivalentto "good."Each of thesetechniques,Wolfsonargues,functions to remove the subject,God, fromthe realmof discourse of the predicate.He also maintains hat Dionysiusstayswithinthis tradition.However,whileDionysiusreliesheavilyon negativetheology,he movesdecisivelybeyond the Aristotelian/Plotinianradition,certainlyas we seeit in Gregory.'16Consider first the sheer scope of Dionysius'snegativity:"And he fact thatthe transcendentGodhead[inrp tdvra E6Tll;/quaestsuper omnia Deitas] is one and triune must not be understood in anyof our typicalsenses..... no unity or trinity,no number or oneness, nofruitfulness, ndeed, nothing that is or is known can proclaimthat hid-

'4 H. A. Wolfson, "Negative Attributes in the Church Fathers and the Gnostic Basilides,"in Studies n theHistoryof Philosophy nd Religion, vol. 1, ed. Isadore Twersky and George H.Williams (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), pp. 131-42.1' Compare ibid.16Compare ibid. See also Henri-Charles Puech, "La tenebre mystique chez le Pseudo-Denys l'Areopagite," in Puech's En quetede la Gnose(Paris: Gallimard, 1978). I am perhapsin the minority in thinking that Dionysius's discussion of the nature of evil belies his seriouslack of interest in the subject at all. I would say the same with regard to his treatment of theTrinity.His discussion of evil is all within the context of the stipulated principle of the Good,for which, see below. Also, Augustine's view of evil coincides with that described here and,to my mind, demonstrates nothing other than the commonplace nature of the position. Asfor the Trinity, Dionysius's presentation is standard at best and in no way informs thebroader arc of his theological program. In spite of certain (sets of) triadic structures, thereis little that is trinitarian about them. Rather, his emphasis is squarely on the One GoodGod. I wonder, however, whether his discussion of the Trinity in TheDivine Names, as adiscussion of the plurality within the divine unity-a distinction which introduces no differ-ence-is not a (semiotic) gesture toward the possibility of the transcendence of unity, or ofthat which transcends unity, as the transcendent unity similarly indicates that which tran-scends difference.533

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The Journal of Religiondenness beyond every mind and reason of the transcendent Godhead[inrepiOE6-rroqsuperdeitatis] which transcends every being.... we can-not even call it by the name of goodness."" He denies unity and trinity,even the principle of fecundity under the name of the Good. Gregory, forall his negativity and resistance to closure, as in the doctrine of epektasis,would not go so far. Dionysius's negation of unity does not reduce to tran-scendent trinity, nor his negation of trinity to transcendent unity. Notewell that the phrase, "of the transcendent Godhead," translates "'nrep-E6-rlTro;,"a resounding rejection of god-language.Dionysius's willingness to deploy such language relates to the semioticprinciple at work, a forceful elaboration of the second Parmenidean hy-

pothesis. Negations do not convert simply to affirmations, even of tran-scendent versions of the negated quality.'"Furthermore, Dionysius arguesthat, while there are more and less anagogically appropriate metaphors,and ultimately they are all equally (in)valid, neither are they really anymore or less valid than negations; they simply function in different capac-ities.19God's absolute transcendence defies even the apophatic way,whichprinciple Dionysius affirms as he denies his denials: "There is no speakingof it, nor name nor knowledge of it. Darkness and light, error and truth-it is none of these. It is beyond assertion and denial. We make assertionsand denials of what is next to it, but never of it, for it is both beyond everyassertion being the perfect and unique cause of all things, and, by virtueof its preeminently simple and absolute nature, free of every limitation,beyond every limitation; it is also beyond every denial."20Stephen Gershsuggests that the result is a synthesis of the two Parmenidean hypothesesin a third, which consists of a tension between the affirmative and nega-tive principles.21 This is perhaps the only practical way of understandingthe radicality of Dionysius's negativity, a negativity so absolute as to swal-

'7 DN 13.3 (980D-981A): At6bKaigov'; 1pvouLhviaiaipthi; i unp iadvra46F-gq; K0o1tnVot8A Lgovag, 68s%ptag snpg lavV -o tvo%;rv vryov8tvyv E ogX l,.... Oe. jifa 6Elgov~i; i pta;, o068 daptlag6;68% 9 v6r; i~yov6Trltg6 o68 6ikXocv9ov6vov i1vt iv 56vtovouvEyv(oaiV(OV Ea6yet rliv ocnp advra cai 6youcai vouv cpuit6qrra-~; 6untpadvra np-ouoiato ntepoionM snepse6Frro;,o98%6volaaa xfno- v o08%X6yo;, iXX'avdi6dcoti;Apralt.18 Compare MysticalTheology MT) 2 (1025A-B).'9CelestialHierarchy CH) 2.4, 5 (141C-145C), 15.8 (336D-337C); MT 2 (1025A-B).20 MT 5 (1048A-B): olre X6yo;a-~xqi;onv oure

6volIao re yvitxn;-ore or6cro; ativ oue

?6), orse 1EvrXav6re aOFieta- orspeoaiv ati~;ScaO6'XouOot; ooe Caipeati, daXXr& Et'atvriv tir;Ooetgcai dautpoet; notouvweg uriv o6Ee irEt-qv oJtEe&datpoi1v, i9Ejwcac6,pndeaavfotav ofiv 11navtell;g oai Svtafa tr&vEdv(ovcal onEp nioaavaaOaipeatv 1 nepoXilroua'dvy&ov doleX uoevoiU KcaiEsteva TrV6hcov.21 Stephen Gersh, StudiaPatristica,vol. 15 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1984), p. 300, n. 13.More to the point, however, is a remark he relegates to the footnotes, which is that "thissynthesis does not, of course, exclude the possibility of a higher mystical state in which theconflict of negative and affirmative loses its meaning."534

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Negation in Pseudo-Dionysiuslow even itself. If we take it seriously, the double- or hyper-negative moveleaves us at a theological impasse. Either we allow that God can neitherbe identified with nor distinguished from even such generic and funda-mental categories as being and nonbeing, or we begin to do theology allover again to rescue God from the threat of nonbeing, or to rescue cre-ation from the threat of losing its creator. Dionysius gambles with highstakes, risking nihilism on the one hand and the semantic reinscriptionof affirmative theology on the other. He engages in a deconstructive ma-neuver both daring and deft: opening the door to nihilism while at thesame time refuting even that form of closure to the mystical project.It is precisely the kind of wager one would expect Jacques Derrida torespect. However, in his early work, Derrida rejects negative theologyvirtually out of hand as still bound up in the ontotheology of the sign,that is, as determined by and to a transcendent signified which therebyprevents it from being ultimately anything other than affirmative. Der-rida later responds more extensively to those relating his work to negativetheology, and particularly to Pseudo-Dionysius.22 He contends that evenin Dionysius, negativity retains a commitment to meaning, that is, that itis still caught up in (affirmative) theology. In its rejection of an emptyformalism, by which rejection it manages to seem to risk and to deny thepossibility of a risk of nihilism, it ultimately returns to the hymnic/prayer-ful mode which once again relates effect (creation) to cause (creator/God).The prayer by which Dionysius inaugurates the Mystical Theology(andwhich works similarly in the fourth chapter of TheDivine Names) deter-mines as well its end, the iritorpoo4i, n fact, is its end. The whole move-ment of negative theology proves, according to Derrida, incapable of es-caping the general economy of (affirmative) theology, and on thecontrary, even supports it. The apophatic resolves itself prayerfully into(a mode of) the cataphatic. Derrida raises a crucial question in this re-gard: does Dionysius, in avoiding the Scylla of nihilism, fall prey to theCharybdis of a totalizing presence? In other words, does Dionysius trulyrisk nihilism, empty formalism, or is it a feint, a sleight of hand workingto (re)instate the truth of the presence of God? Or, as I shall attempt toshow, does Dionysius's profundity arise directly from his risk of both nihil-ism on the one hand and totality on the other? (Is it even possible to riskthe one without risking the other?) In other words, does Dionysius notsuccessfully navigate the unmarked route between Scylla and Charybdis?We can put this still another way: is the play of difference which consti-tutes negative theology subdued, silenced, by the activity of presencing

22 See esp. "How to Avoid Speaking: Denials" and "Postscriptum: Aporias, Ways andVoices,"both in Harold Coward and Toby Foshay,eds., DerridaandNegative Theology Albany:SUNY Press, 1992).535

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The Journal of Religionanalogy? The risk of nothingness is mitigated, prevented, guaranteed bya hyperessential Goodness which relates itself causally to beings and sonever in fact allows the possibility of nothingness, of saying nothing.23 Ineffect, the bet is not allowed to be placed. This problematic may be resolvedinto two concrete questions. First, what is the function of the prayer, theinaugural hymn? What discourse does it mark off, and what stability doesit provide? Second, what role does negation itself, and especially double-(or hyper-)negation, play in the dynamic of negative theology? And thenwhat impact does it have on, what ramifications for, (affirmative) theology,and language generally? These questions dissolve again, having been soformulated, into a broader question: what is the semiotics of negative the-ology?II. DIS/SIMILARITYThe principle of Dionysius's theological semiotics is his concept of "dis-similar similarity,"or simply "dis/similarity."24 He explains:Since the wayof negationappearsto be more suitableto the realmof the divineand since the positiveaffirmationsare alwaysunfittingto the hiddennessof theinexpressible,a manifestationthrough dissimilarshapes is more correctlyto beappliedto the invisible.So it is that scripturalwritings,far from demeaningtheranks of heaven actually pay them honor by describingthem with dissimilarshapes so completelyat variancewith what they reallyare that we come to dis-cover howthose ranks,so far removedfromus, transcendall materiality.... Ofcourse,one must be carefulto use the similaritiesas dissimilarities, s discussed,to avoid one-to-one correspondences,to make the appropriateadjustmentsasone remembers he greatdividebetweenthe intelligibleand the perceptible.25An unbridgeable gap persists between even the "most God-like" symboland God. Precisely the dissimilarity of everything to God enables every-thing to be similar to God.26 Anything can mean God because nothing

23 Compare above regarding evil as nothing and the nonexistence of evil; even Satan doesnot escape the goodness of the divine (economy).24 For my insistence on this rather postmodern way of combining these terms, please seen. 35 below.25CH 2.3, 4 (141A, 141C): Ei rotvvyat CJiv noa6oa0ts it ntrov Ev drlaiXE, ati ~ Kiaaad6-aOEtdvdpapoorot-cput6Otn trv danoppi~tov, iicEtolpa glhXX6vootv ~ini rtovdop6&ovI8th ov dvoiovol acvanaidowcv icavropia. TtiLa~t otyapoiv, oKnctoixog dCnon'lpoioitrg;o1)pavia; &aiaooafioet atitv Xoytovikpoypao~at ai; da9vogofotSidtS Jopoonootilat;Kicaivoi-oat Kai8tho6uovadnoVSetOv6loatOovOXtLCovavnavovnepCooio3ETDEP iag. .... dvoglofyO; Eltpjrat otv 61iotoriev ihXalipavoiVs Kicaiv abrcv o0 a6tQt9, vapgloviOo;e KaiOicEiOE; ntir ov vop&v re Kitataic roV8tovorijv 6ptiogVov.26 Nicholas of Cusa gives what is perhaps the most forceful elaboration of (this aspect of)this principle in his discussion of infinity. Contrary to A. H. Armstrong in the CambridgeHistory of Later Greekand EarlyMedieval Philosophy London: Cambridge University Press,1967), I believe that for Dionysius, the dissimilarity in dis/similarity amounts to the necessityof semiotic failure.

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Negation in Pseudo-Dionysiuscan mean God. This statement is also convertible to: everything simul-taneously both "means" God and does not mean God, "for the very samethings are both similar and dissimilar to God."" In any name of Godthere is an irreducible "something else," an other, which can never becaptured or delineated, making it finally indescribable. Theological lan-guage, in this sense, fails altogether.Dionysius simultaneously confirms and denies the emptiness of theo-logical language with his declaration that "human souls possess reasonand with it they circle in discourse around the truth of things."28Thereis in this phrase a heliotropic nuance we must later consider in moredetail, which suggests that the Other orders reality in spite (or because)of its alterity.29However, the clearly dominant theme of the metaphor isthe metaphorical indomitability of God. Human beings, attempting to"zero in" on God, multiply metaphor upon metaphor in an endless cycle.Why? Each symbol is of necessity derived from another symbol; in asense, there is nothing else for a sign to signify but another sign: "omnesymbolum de symbolo."30Marie-Dominique Chenu's essay in Nature,Man and Society n theTwelfthCenturytypifies the view of Dionysian symbolism among contemporarymedievalists, not to mention Dionysius's twelfth-century interpreters,with whom Chenu is primarily concerned.3 It also concurs strikingly withthe reading of Dionysius offered by Derrida.32Chenu discusses a distinc-tion between what he calls the Augustinian sign and the Dionysian sym-bol. The former is arbitrary and, therefore, Chenu argues, polysemous(i.e., signifying many things). Dionysius orients his semiotic iconically,coming out of, and feeding strongly into, the symbolism of the developingeastern orthodoxy; Chenu asserts that it is inherently semantic. In reality,however, Augustine's semiotic is strongly monosemic (i.e., signs signify

27 DN 9.7 (916A): T&i6p a~i Kcaiiaota E) icatidv6ogota.28 DN 7.2 (868B): ruXai 6lXotvoyt xov Eoot 8tEo&8tE COLVaiva i Kp itEpti -iv Ov5vrovdXi41eOtavnptlnopev6ooevat.29 For a detailed analysis of the heliotrope, the image of satellites revolving around a cen-tral body, usually planets around the sun (helios),see Jacques Derrida, "White Mythology,"in Margins of Philosophy,rans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).30 For the role of this phrase in the thought of C. S. Peirce and its place in Derrida's work,see below, and the PhilosophicalWritingsof Peirce, ed. Justus Buchler (New York: Dover,1955), p. 115 (from CollectedPapersofCharlesSandersPeirce,ed. Charles Hartshorne and PaulWeiss [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931-35], 2:274-302); and Derrida's treat-ment of Peirce in Of Grammatology,rans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1974).31 Marie-Dominique Chenu, esp. pp. 124-27, in Nature,Man and Societyn the TwelfthCen-tury(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 98-145.32 Chenu's essay had been available for some time when Derrida wrote the essay relevantto Dionysius. Derrida, however, never mentions Chenu, and it seems unlikely that he everread Chenu's essay, as "dissimilar similitude" figures prominently in Chenu's analysis andyet never appears in any of Derrida's writing, in spite of its similarity to his own reading.

537

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The Journal of Religiononly one thing, a true reality), as Derrida indirectly argues and we willsee in more detail below.33 Dionysius, on the other hand, is more radicalthan even mere polysemia in his theological language, and at a deeperlevel than Chenu appears to have apprehended. God is infinitely repre-sentable not because God is eminently present, but precisely because Godis un(re)presentable. In any symbol of God, God is merely a trace, a holein its semantic field in any given syntactical arrangement. The semanticsof divine anominability goes hand in hand with the syntax of divine omni-nominability.On the one hand, Chenu appears to understand the dynamic of Diony-sian semiotics, in terms of the function of the "symbol" to demonstrate(demonstrare,.e., to indicate) mystery. On the other hand, he misconstruesDionysian dis/similarity, which he takes to be founded on similarity, andwhich by moving through dissimilarity returns or moves forward to simi-larity. This is precisely the kind of Hegelian Aufhebungof absence intopresence criticized by Derrida. Dionysius's dissimilarity does not lead usto similarity, rather it indicates something beyond similarity and dissimi-larity. Dionysius clearly requires that all the way up to the highest possibil-ity of similarity there remains an aporetic dissimilarity that prevents thefinal presencing of God's logos.34The dissimilarity represents for us theinarticulability, the unre-presentability, of that which the similar attemptsto signify. That dissimilarity is irreducible to a similarity of any kind. Thesimilar could be said to signify as much the dissimilar (or even the dy-namic of dis/similarity) as much as it signifies its "primary" significate.There is no dissimilarity in God. The dissimilarity of the term "Good,"like the similarity of the term "stone,"indicates (demonstrat) n inability toname (denominare)God, shows God's indenominabilitas,God's "metaphori-cal indomitability,"which is still a metaphor. Dissimilarity is not impressedinto the service of similarity. On the contrary, dissimilarity and similaritydefine the limits of our theological discourse in their mutual dependence,a sort of "semiotic symbiosis."This symbiotic "circl[ing] in discourse around the truth of things" re-sembles in its effect Derrida's heliotropes, which, he says, are bad meta-phors yielding the best examples. The Areopagite's notion of dis/similar-ity is precisely the bad metaphor yielding the best example, consciously.35

3 See Derrida, Of Grammatology,hap. 4.4 The dissimilarity is the space within which movement takes place. In this respect,Chenu's location of the dynamic is near the mark. However, to interrupt the dis/similardynamic with(in) an enclosing similarity really only produces another dissimilarity.35 I say "dis/similarity"in order to indicate this conceptual inseparability. Insofar as simi-larity and dissimilarity imply each other, and insofar as there is no dissimilarity in God,neither is there any similarity (in God). "Augustinian retrievals" of Pseudo-Dionysius aside,the Areopagite rejects any semiotic subjugation of the divine; thus God resides for us in

538

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Negation in Pseudo-Dionysius"I doubt that anyone would refuse to acknowledge that incongruities aremore suitable for lifting our minds up into the domain of the spiritualthan similarities are ... Indeed the sheer crassness of the signs is a goadso that even the materially inclined cannot accept that it could be permit-ted or true that the celestial and divine sights could be conveyed by suchshameful things. And remember too that there is nothing which lacks itsown share of beauty, for as scripture rightly says, 'Everything is good.'"36Here is the full concept of dis/similarity. The same things are both similarand dissimilar, but even the most similar are infinitely dissimilar, and soit is clearer to simply use what is obviously and indisputably dissimilar,and so to emphasize the difference between God and all that we know orcan know with the mind. This emphasis even expresses itself in the denialof the names "goodness," "One,"and "Trinity."37Note also that Dionysius undercuts the absoluteness of negative meth-odologies with a line about all things being good-here gesturing to thesystem of which negative theology is still a part. That is, negative theologysuccumbs to (affirmative) theology precisely when it allows itself to takeaffirmative theology's place. A positive negativity, in other words a nega-tivity that never succumbs to its own negativity, ultimately yields to theaffirmative. A positive negativity is not a negativity; it is the positive underthe guise of the negative. In order for the negative to be negative, it mustdisappear into itself. On the other hand, negation demands a return toaffirmation in order to indefinitely defer an affirmative victory. Only inlosing does the negative win, because it is in/by losing that it indicates itsown vulnerability, its own risk of affirmation, and in that indication, indi-cates a beyond which is beyond its ability to indicate. Moreover, in itswillingness to negate itself, it risks absolute negation-a fall into noth-ingness.

Thus, the hypernegation at the end of the MysticalTheologys a negationnot only of negation but also of affirmation: "For it is both beyond everydarkness. With metaphysics, with reason, "human beings ... circle in discourse around thetruth of things." But the truth is darkness and unknowing, chaos. "Heliotropic metaphorsare always imperfect metaphors," argues Derrida; "as the best metaphor is never absolutelygood, without which it would not be a metaphor, does not the bad metaphor always yieldthe best example? Thus, metaphor means heliotrope, both a movement turned toward thesun and the turning movement of the sun" (Marginsof Philosophy,pp. 250-51).

36 CH 2.3 (141A-C): O t 8 ical6v i-rpov voiv dvayo-ootg6LXXovi dnegtatvo(oTat c0v6gotoirov, o)oicoiCjf rtva r&ve~4povo^3vrZowvrepeiv.... 6tavt(in6a a8'b 6vavoep'; rl4fif Icatil ovzTrzowIa Tit Topop4fa q v oauvbhIj4tOv; nle te vEtroij 4J78 da&'xkqoij;coov-tzo eivat grl76 zoi;~ yav 7poo?iXot;,6zrt oi; ot0o; alXpoi6 ;Eepi np6S d~hfiet16v rozrtznepo)pdvtavtai. ieia ~6edgara."AXXo a~,alroiro wvvojooat pr otgrl iv r v 6vrov eivaticai6ko-T ro icaXoogeroiafa;g areprCPvov,etiep ,i rTvXoyova1Xiet6rnot

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The Journal of Religionassertion [according to its perfection, simplicity and infinity, and] it isalso beyond every denial."38This final denial, of denial itself along withaffirmation, leads us nowhere but into the silence at the end of the Mysti-cal Theology.At this point, Dionysius simply will brook no speech, becausethat of which we were attempting to speak is outside any possibility ofspeech. The risk of nihilism in this passage beyond both affirmation andnegation is manifest, as is the risk of "empty formalism" described byDerrida. Nevertheless, "when we assert what is beyond every assertion,we must then proceed from what is most akin to it [according to affirma-tion-negation; not according to the hypernegation which itself disallowsany dis/similarity], and as we do so we make the affirmation on whicheverything else depends."" Yet, in proceeding "from what is most akin toit," we also necessarily proceed from what is different from it, in fact,infinitely different. The real sense of contingency in these assertionsstems from their grounding in infinite difference. In other words, Diony-sius avoids both nihilism and totalism (where he risks both) by invertingthe relationship between affirmation and negation, such that, whereasthe negative had been seen as relative to affirmation, affirmation is nowseen to rest on a hypernegation, which indeed provides the very possibil-ity of affirmation while simultaneously undercutting any final authorityit might have. Hypernegation both authorizes and resists any posthyper-negative affirmation. Thus, the diffiranceof God is played out by Diony-sius in the MysticalTheology, n which he asserts that we must affirm ourthoughts of God, deny those affirmations, and then deny the denials.That process does not bring us back to where we started; rather, it placesus prior to the beginning, before knowledge, before signs and symbols,before thought.40III. INFINITE DIS/SIMILARITY: DIONYSIAN ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGYDionysius's apparent epistemology and ontology are easily squared withthe interpretation offered above of his semiotics, providing at the sametime a viable solution to the transcendence/immanence difficulty encoun-

38 MT 5 (1048B): 1irpcpaav Ho-v ariv ... Kai,9p canaavd#afaipe-v.39 Ibid., 3 (1033C): "Ontco6~p Iaav ttwva;6 6av ad76 o- ,aXov auiwbosuyvetowpouqlv6noxotic'V icacarda'Xptv zpfyntvat.40 And yet that place is darkness, i.e., it is still not quite before; it is still thought. Thisdarkness is the thought possibility of thought, of thinking, of theologizing, and its end. Thedarkness is the possibility of reconceptualizing theology. The indeterminacy of that dark-ness threatens theology and allows for its spontaneous and always originary generation.Dionysius further elaborates that ultimate knowledge is unknowing; what greater deferralof epistemological totalitarianism and assimilation could there be? This is not to suggestthat knowledge is unimportant to Dionysius. Quite the contrary, it is crucial, for it is as onegrows in knowledge that one comes to recognize that one's knowledge is severely, infinitely,limited. Just as meaning is of the delineated, so is knowledge of the knowable.540

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Negation in Pseudo-Dionysiustered above. While Derrida may accuse Eckhart of allowing for only atemporary, essentially fake, deferral of presence, we may emphasize thedifferanceof God in Dionysius's theology.The dynamic concept of dis/similarity rules out categorically any possi-bility of final absolute presence. Whatever is dis/similar to God is infinitelydissimilar: "[Things] are dissimilar to him in that as effects they fall sovery far short of their Cause and are infinitely and incomparably subor-dinate to him."41 It is at precisely this point that dis/similarity renders itsde(con)structive possibilities, that is, the very dis/similarity of the Gooditself: "We cannot even call it by the name of goodness."42Not only is Godnot being, being beyond being, God is not even the gratuitous (gift-giving) cause of all. Yet, when we stipulate, when we move out of ourconceptual abyss, we posit first goodness: "When we assert what is beyondevery assertion [i.e., when we construct a theological system], we mustthen proceed from what is most akin to it, and as we do so, we make theaffirmation on which everything else depends."43We noted above Diony-sius's negation of goodness as a predicate. Here, he confirms the relativi-zation of the predicate fundamental to the Neoplatonic logic of fecundity.Even the causal relation of dependence, preeminent within the discourseof affirmative theology, falls short of denominating. The very basis of con-tinuity, and, therefore, of analogical predication, is disallowed.44 Thissimply reiterates the transcendence principle that has been maintainedthroughout the argument. Infinite difference simply can never be finallyovercome. The Areopagite's subversions of being and goodness/analogy/causality come together forcefully in his deployment of divine infinity. ForDionysius, God is both infinite and beyond finitude and infinity.45Godas infinite is infinitely giving and powerful (i.e., goodness coincides withinfinity), and unknowable.46 Infinity as a negative attribute of the divine

41 DN 9.7 (916A): tc6K8i aTa' b6dtoS Zvv c&vaitua co iatrio- aL xpot; d etpot; KaidoryicpQrot; iok)Et6I?Evov.42 Ibid., 13.3 (981A): Kai ot65 ai'r 6 i Ta;&ya166rro;0o4 apgo6`ovce;a?OrTxpooa0poleFv.43 MT 3 (1033C); cf. n. 39 above.44 Chenu and Derrida both emphasize the causally based analogous mode in Pseudo-Dionysius. See also John D. Jones, "The Ontological Difference according to St. Thomasand Pseudo-Dionysius," Dionysius4 (1980): 119: "While Dionysius understands be-ing ascause, he denies it to be a being."45 See esp. the concise, text-based analysis of Salvatore Lilla: "The Notion of Infinitudein Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite,"Journal of TheologicalStudies31 (1980): 93-103.46 Various passages make this plain, but note especially the following: "His power is infi-nite because all power comes from him and because he transcends all power, even absolutepower. He possesses a superabundance of power which endlessly produces an endless num-ber of other powers" (DN 8.2); "Their [the angels'] stability and their ceaseless desire forthe Good come from that infinitely good Power which itself bestows on them their ownpower and existence, inspiring in them the ceaseless desire for existence, giving them thevery power to long for unending power" (DN 8.4); and see also DN 1.2.

541

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The Journal of Religionworks in the same way as the name Good, that is, it embraces both God'sknowability (similarity/analogy), and God's unknowability (we cannotknow the infinite).47 In this context, God as beyond infinity representsthe hypernegation of divine infinity, which gestures beyond even God'sunknowability. We cannot even comprehend God's incomprehensibility.Moreover, the God beyond infinity is not only beyond unknowing (whichwill show the limits of mystical experience/knowledge) but also beyondthe positive/causal aspects of infinite goodness and power. The affirma-tive/negative dialectic is undercut in infinity as a negation of infinity itselfand opens up a space of radical possibility.48This space is both the annihi-lation of determination and the possibility of determining. With the con-struction of this space of infinite dis/similarity, Dionysius risks not onlynihilism, a risk Derrida denies he takes, but also totalism. Moreover, thisspace remains beyond us-Moses only reaches unknowing-we cannottranscend unknowing. Yet, our infinite reconception of the infinite God,as a result of unknowing, is a trace of that hyperinfinite beyond both thehierarchies and our (e.g., Moses') transcendence of the hierarchies.

IV. THE DIONYSIAN HIERARCHIESNevertheless, Dionysius does maintain that our object is "perfection" andthat a measure of perfection is attainable, as in the case of Moses. Butthat qualification is crucial. Even to the extent that we attain some sort ofperfection, it is a relative perfection, not perfection absolutely speaking:"Hierarchy causes its members to be images of God in all respects, to beclear and spotless mirrors reflecting the glow of primordial light and in-deed of God himself."49 Perfection, at least in terms of the hierarchy, isnot in union per se but, rather, in "a certain activity"-to be a perfectimage of God, and to continue to pass knowledge down through the hier-archies. The purpose of hierarchy is the orderly communication ofknowledge (irntoeTrfig).50ngels are angels (oi i yyE10ot,messengers") pre-cisely because they transmit their superior knowledge of the divine to theinferior orders: "[The angels] have a preeminent right to the title angelor messenger, since it is they who are first granted the divine enlighten-ment and it is they who pass on to us these revelations which are so far

47 Lilla traces the doctrine of the unknowability of infinity to Gregory of Nyssa and Aris-totle.48 Compare Derrida's analysis of the Timaean khora n "How to Avoid Speaking: Denials"(n. 22 above).49 CH 3.2 (165A): tobg ;auro 6taudora;g dy4tatara Meka&eXv ooinTpa tet8,arTTa KOadiqktiSYoa, eicuica' ?; dlpXtoonOu atEtapXtici; d'ictvo;.50 Regarding the distinction between etuTiigrland yv6not;,cf. esp. CH 3.1 (164D-168B)and MT 1.3 (1001A).

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Negation in Pseudo-Dionysiusbeyond us.""5Not only is perfection not obliterative either of the humanor the divine, as the divine remains transcendent (transcending even per-fection), neither is perfection simply static. Activity continues, and theprocess never quite reaches the end: "Nothing is completely free of theneed for perfection. Nothing, that is, except that Being truly perfect inhimself and truly preceding all perfection."52The hierarchical role in the anagogical process is clarified in terms ofa three-stage progression of purification, illumination, and perfection.Dionysius explains in the seventh chapter of The CelestialHierarchy:"Insummary, we can reasonably say that purification, illumination, and per-fection are all three the reception of an understanding of the Godhead,namely being completely purified of ignorance by the proportionatelygranted knowledge of the more perfect initiations, being illuminated bythis same divine knowledge (through which it also purifies whatever wasnot previously beheld but is now revealed through the more lofty enlight-enment), and being also perfected by this light in the understanding[i~ntiatgll] of the most lustrous initiations."53The progression here de-scribed is clearly epistemological, cognitive rather than affective, and mi-gratory rather than nomadic.54The pilgrim, or even the angel, acquiresknowledge according to a certain order. While itinerant in character,moving up a scale, it is not yet wandering.Affirmative theology and doxology coalesce in the liturgical function ofthe hierarchies, the means by which knowledge is transmitted. The pil-grim acquires knowledge of God by participation in and uplifting (ana-gogical) contemplation of the ritual praises contained in the liturgy. Nota-bly, the significance is not in the fact of the ritual, but in its contemplation,which precedes knowledge and prepares the soul to receive knowledge,that is, anagogical doxological interpretations of the liturgy.55This con-templation finally employs dis/similar theology: "So there is nothing ab-

51 CH 4.2 (180B): napha6vwa Ti;g yyeXtKiug ov-o{ag~Kp{xro; ij'ovat 8thxb ipr;e Sig;ai-rhg iyytve(oTat 'ilv%eapXtuijvXXaNfytv ic St'aird&viF ilga g tanopageoaat 'higi; pjgag Kicavwopiag.52 Ibid., 10.3 (273C): i dxipo(Teg a;ca6ov cEht6rog E; i)t i16 6vtox a~-owEh;gKatinpo-rixtov.35 bid., 7.3 (209C-D): IveXOv 8Eicalxtooooarv &voi5icdnetcox; 6 .t at dap~;ig oCstcai omut6g alateXacxot; i tij ;eapXtiuci; tcxii;n jEisrtX ta, dyvota;giv otovdioica-OaLpo'aoa Kcr?ta ~tv vSttoCv, yvxet t6v eh poyOv guiam~ov, om owa 8' asrjefiqt vxoet St' Sgcai Kaia(pet ~iv oi5Ip6xepov exox~teoacav 6oTaviv ecaaivecat 86thT~i1jn"XotrFpaq_'XXajn&oc,caireketo-3(aE6Xtv'i)Ti fifjMt i icaYFjtv e'nt(iTTng V&avo-TaTC~vR-07oy0(v.54 It should be noted that the rites described in TheEcclesiasticalHierarchydo have a dis-tinct moral tone.

55 Compare Rene Roques, L'universDionysien(Paris:Aubier, 1954), p. 30: "I't(rftij cor-responds logiquement a un etat plus parfait que celui de la w~Opaqui, au moins dans notrehierarchie humaine, le precede et le prepare."543

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The Journal of Religionsurd in rising up, as we do, from obscure images to the single Cause ofeverything, rising with eyes that see beyond the cosmos to contemplateall things, even things that are opposites, in a simple unity within theuniversal Cause."56We rise up from "obscure images" by way of dis/simi-larity: "Such a way guides the soul through all the divine notions, notionswhich are themselves transcended by that which is far beyond everyname, all reason and all knowledge."'' All names are applied to God, andthen God is removed from the names, as a process by which it is shownthat God is, in fact, beyond them all. The process of uplifting is ultimatelya movement toward union with God. Dionysius elaborates on this perfec-tion as follows: "The most divine knowledge of God, that which comesthrough unknowing, is achieved in a union far beyond mind, when mindturns away from all things, even from itself, and when it is made one withthe dazzling rays, being then and there enlightened by the inscrutabledepth of Wisdom."58This is the central paradox of Dionysian mysticism,that the ultimate knowledge is unknowing and that unknowing is themeans of mystical union with God.On the other hand, humanity does not achieve perfection properlyspeaking within the context of the hierarchies. In the end, the theoticprocess draws the contemplative up through the hierarchies of knowl-edge and thrusts him out the other side. His goal, theosis, is beyond therange of contemplation, however divinely inspired that contemplationmight be. The entire symbolic structure, the interpretant grid-that is tosay, the liturgy, the hierarchies, the scriptures-so crucial to the theoticprocess, must finally be shrugged off for that process's very consumma-tion. Certainly Moses' perfection in the MysticalTheology akes place be-yond the hierarchies, although not without them.59 Moses neverthelessreturns from his perfection and passes on some of what he learned in aform accessible to those who have not reached his degree of perfection.Conversely, the ritual structure also supports Moses in his abandonmentof it. It would appear that we can never absolutely divorce ourselves from

56DN 5.7 (821B):Oi5&voiv i tonovE ?8u6p&veib6vCoiv n z6 x6vicvT rittovdvaf3dvxa;eprcooafiot1a0,goi;g eopfcoatnd6vzra t^ indvova ito0cail t dX',iCot; vavia igo-voet6i icalti1v(Oivo);.57 Ibid., 13.3(981B):At6 ai a oliTq 68tht&v dxo4odoemvvo5ovnpoetuiRcactvWc;yd tcTr-iaav iiv iinilv t6ovehaoTru vcaio l 8th acvov betov voiuemov 86e-o'ta,avo 4p7trat icaatrdvra 6yov caiyv6otv.58 Ibid.,7.3 (872A-B):Ka'i Etv a16t ii etozdrl &eoof v~axn;&'ayvoxa; ytvoeicog~vrcara~ iv 6~i~p oovievoxtv,6tcav vo;gtxo6vwcovivo0v danooatd,et a icami wyr6veitevwtbf tait; )nep4a&ty1 &dicftyrivic6Ev icai KEtoidtveSepeivirt IPa6ietti; loofa; icacaXag-nogevo;.59 CompareMT 1 (1000C-1001A),whereinMosesproceedsto Mt.Sinaiwithinthe con-text of the hierarchies,withthe peopleof Israelassembledat the foot of the mountainandwithtrumpetsblaring,but then passesbeyondall of those things.

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Negation in Pseudo-Dionysiusthe divinizing order, either in terms of contributing to it or benefitingfrom it. Accordingly, the gap between ourselves and God is never closed.But God itself both supports and destroys the hierarchies. The hierar-chies are good and useful insofar as they lead us beyond themselves, thatis to say, insofar as they destroy themselves. This is not to say that theyare completely avoidable, but it is to say that insofar as the structure isreified it denies its purpose, it denies its own surreality, its own contin-gency. Dionysius calls the hierarchical order "symbolic"for precisely thisreason, that it undercuts itself in the face of the divine anarchy, whichtranscends all notions of order and disorder.It might nevertheless be argued that Dionysius hypostatizes his God bysuggesting that there is a God to be similar to. In other words, if, as Ihave been arguing, the God of Dionysius is not "there,"what does it meanto be similar to God? Must there not be a God, understandable, "real," owhich to be similar? The best support for such an argument would be theconcepts of eot , "divinization," and lvcootx, mystical "union." How-ever, Dionysius evades the accusation on two counts. First, Dionysius'spoint, stemming from Parmenides's equation of being and knowledge, isthat anything knowable is hypostatized, and knowable because it is hypos-tatized, as well as that anything hypostatized is knowable.60 Dionysiusnever confuses God's manifestations (npo6o00t) ith God, which should beclear from what we said above. Second, in what is this similarity said toconsist? One is divinized in unknowing, meaninglessness. By casting loosefrom the stability of reason, even thought, the mystic approaches God.God's alterity is inescapable, so much so that, as there is no dissimilarityin God, union is "being neither oneself nor someone else"61-neither thesame nor different; identity and difference, similarity and dissimilarityfall away. Even this union, whatever it is, cannot be conceptualized be-cause of the infinite alterity of God.One might say, then, that far from being hypostatized, God insteadcollapses into a kind of metaphorical black hole. This is still a metaphor,but one which illustrates performatively the way in which metaphors areundermined, and rendered meaningless, precisely by that which they at-tempt to represent. The very metaphor, "metaphorical black hole," like"dis/similarity,"always collapses in on itself, taking metaphysics with it.What, then, of the formidable hierarchies laid out by Dionysius in two ofhis treatises, and the elaborate systems and rituals? How are they justi-fied? What is their foundation, or are they completely arbitrary?A system

60 For Parmenides, see Fragment 3 in G. S. Kirk and S. G. Raven, The PresocraticPhiloso-phers:A CriticalHistorywith a Selectionof Texts(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1971).61 MT 1.3 (1001A): ot"zE a'uzoroT"E 'ripoO.545

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The Journal of Religionlike that of Dionysius can only be built around a stable center, or at leasta center taken to be stable. Suzanne Langer sums up the problem elo-quently: "[Man] can adapt himself to anything his imagination can copewith; but he cannot deal with Chaos."62Human beings simply are notequipped to handle raw meaninglessness, hence religion, physics, philos-ophy, biology. Only by ordering reality are we able to function on a day-to-day basis. How else, then, to approach the meaningless but throughstructure? Even deconstruction requires a victim. There must be some-thing to deconstruct. Dionysius builds, tears down and rebuilds in onefell swoop. The cataphatic is a stage on the way to the apophatic; thenthe apophatic is set aside in favor of meaninglessness. This is part of theerasure and reinscription with which this section opened. None of thesethree elements-writing, erasure, reinscription-can be abandoned; nei-ther can any be prioritized; nor does the process cease.V. UNLIMITED SEMIOSISThe center holds, then, but in a purely functional way. It is not the life-giving, metaphor-supplying structural foundation of traditional Westernmetaphysics. Rather, the center is precisely what threatens at any mo-ment, at every moment, to annihilate metaphysics altogether. God, evenas a~pl, cannot serve as a ground for ontotheology and is better under-stood negatively as an-arche (the bad metaphor yielding the best ex-ample). Thus, the radical possibility of hypernegation comes to fruitionin a tension, as Gersh puts it above, between hierarchies semantically in-scribed in an anarchic semiotic (i.e., affirmative theology, doxology, lit-urgy) and semantic hierarchies relativized by semiotic anarchy (negativetheology).

Dionysius certainly hierarchizes reality; that cannot be doubted. How-ever, he also makes it quite plain that God does not anywhere fit intothis hierarchy, thereby rendering the hierarchies themselves contingent(technically anarchic), and radically so, because God is not a res whichthey might therefore signify. There is an intelligible signified, but no In-telligible Signified; the intelligible signified is another signifier of the non-intelligible (omnesymbolum e symbolo). n the process of lining up Peirceagainst Saussure, an apparently unsuspecting Derrida describes Diony-sius's reality with surprising accuracy: "Peirce goes very far in the direc-tion that I have called the deconstruction of the transcendental signified,which, at one time or another, would place a reassuring end to the refer-ence from sign to sign. ... Whatbroacheshemovementof signification s what62 Suzanne Langer, Philosophyn a New Key(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,1960), p. 287.

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Negation in Pseudo-Dionysiusmakests nterruptionmpossible.he hing tselfs a sign."63 e havealreadydetailed he failure fanalogical redicationndthe usesto whichDiony-siusputsthelanguage fprojection. sDionysiusays,"Someone ehold-ingGodandunderstanding hathe sawhasnotactuallyeenGodhim-self,but rathersomethingof his whichhas beingand is knowable."64Thus,insofarassignssignify,hat s, insofarastheycommunicateome-thing(comprehensible),heycannotsignifyGod,theycan only signifyothersigns.Thus,God's ranscendencef Goodnesstselfsets n motionthenomadicprocess f unlimited emiosis.Dionysiusonceiveshisthoroughly umanactivity soneof "erring"or "wandering"inkdvr)asa planet),and as a "discursiveassage" r"orbit f thesun"(8teoIo8t-o)n a "circle"(K.iKX).65otonlydoes thisfitwith theheliotropiconsiderationsbove, t alsogesturesoward heParmenideannderstandingf significations a path 066;).66Dionysiusplayson this n hisinvocationf thetheologians' referenceor the"neg-ativeway" ti&ivtt6vdinoov4Ecovvo60v).67 Dionysius'sypernegativityshiftsthe migratory pistemologicalatternnoted aboveto a nomadicsemiotic ne.Thehymnorprayer,hen,as,forexample,hatwhichopens heMysti-calTheology,oes not bringnegation o ground n affirmation.On thecontrary,we bringto bearthe analysis ivenearlier n thischapterofhypernegationndsayrather hatthe hymnmarksoff theological is-course(broadly nderstood o include he hierarchies ndhierarchicalritual)as thatmost ikely o be grounded.Thisdelineation llowsDiony-sius to deconstructhatlanguage learlyandexplicitly,o that the ulti-mate ailure f thehymn n hypernegationsunmistakable.If we grantthat we aretalkingaboutthe significationf theologicallanguage,hen all of thislanguage"means"God.Thequestion henbe-comesin whatway things symbolizeGod.Interpretationonsequentlyinvolvesa certain ort of purificationf polysemia.Languages mono-semous nsofarasit all"refers"o God;yet polysemousnsofar sit can-not referto God eitherproperly r metaphorically.n the otherhand,languagemightmoreaccuratelye called"asemous,"nsofaras that to

65 Derrida, Of Grammatologyn. 33 above), p. 49.64 Ep. 1 (1065A); cf. n. 13 above.65 DN 7.1 (865B): ndoa davOponiv t6vota&6v

iX rigo; tcKptvogVT npo;, r aaOzaepbvKaltgt6vtov -rVtOqEtfVOcaZEtOTu6rVVOTOuEmV;N 7.2, cf. n. 28 above; contrast also the taxon-omy of spiritual motion in DN 4.9 (705A-B). It might be interesting to attempt a reconcilia-tion of these vocabularies according to a labyrinthine paradigm.66 This is an important theme throughout Parmenides, but see especially Fragment 1 inKirk and Raven. I should note for the sake of clarity that a geocentric cosmology in no waymitigates the essential aspect of the heliotrope for our purposes, that is, satellites orbiting acentral body.67 DN 13.3 (981B), cf. n. 57 above. Note the adjectival form of 6vo6og.

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The Journal of Religionwhich it nominally refers is, in the jargon of negative theology, a mystery.The "mystery"of Dionysius's God is utter impenetrability; it is that whichcannot be made sense of, that which cannot be ordered: "Language iswhat it is, language, only insofar as it can then master and analyze poly-semia..... Each time that polysemia is irreducible, when no unity ofmeaning is even promised to it, one is outside language. And conse-quently, outside humanity."68 Theological language works neither in thecataphatic nor the apophatic, nor even in the conjunction of the two, butin the transcendence of the conjunction. We step outside the syntactic/semantic dichotomy in the asemia of language. Each symbol is in realityless a symbol of God than it is a symbol of its own inability to symbolizeGod. The name Good, as we explained above, indicates a dis/similarity-not God, but a similarity and a concomitant and irreducible dissimilarity.In effect, it indicates its own failure to bring the Other, that is God, topresence. It misses its mark, and bound into the name and its semioticfunction is its signification of its own failure. Its failure is beyond simplyGod's alterity, as God is beyond difference, beyond the play of dis/similar-ity. The failure of hymnic discourse, even negative hymns, indicates atheological asemia and concomitant polysemia. In other words, contraryto Augustine, the surface polysemia of language is not homogenized bytheological discourse but radicalized by the necessary and incessant fail-ure of theological discourse.69Thus, while Derrida clearly emphasizes differance,he is also perfectlywilling to admit the following: "To prepare, beyond our logos, for a dif-firance so violent that it can be interpellated neither as the epochality ofbeing nor as ontological difference, is not in any way to dispense with thepassage through the truth of Being, or to 'criticize,' 'contest,' or miscon-strue its incessant necessity. On the contrary, we must stay within the dif-ficulty of this passage."70Given the sophistication of Dionysius's theology,does Derrida's "criticism" really amount to anything more than dissatis-faction at the apparent emphases in radical Christian negative theology?The negativity of Dionysius is complex and virtually unparalleled in itsradicality. In the end, Derrida cannot simply disregard negative theology,any more than negative theology can disregard him.

68 Derrida, Marginsof Philosophyn. 29 above), p. 248.69 Dionysius's theology, then, is built around a "determined moment in the total move-

ment of the trace,"with the clear awareness that (always)by the time that moment has beenbracketed, the edifice built upon it is a mummified marker of the passing of the trace. Thesun around which his system is built is really a tomb, and an empty one at that, alwaysalready empty. It cannot be overemphasized, however, that all of this is still more metaphor,the framework by which one might, according to Dionysius, dispense with frameworks.70 Derrida, Marginsof Philosophy,p. 32.

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