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Goal Setting and Goal Striving in Consumer BehaviorAuthor(s): Richard P. Bagozzi and Utpal DholakiaReviewed work(s):Source: The Journal of Marketing, Vol. 63, Fundamental Issues and Directions for Marketing(1999), pp. 19-32Published by: American Marketing Association

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RichardP.Bagozzi &UtpalDholakia

G o a l Setting a n d G o a l Striving i nConsumer Behavior

Goals play an essential role in the purposive behavior of consumers, but scholars only recently have begun to ex-amine the motivation for goals, their selection and modification, and their pursuit and attainment. One purpose ofthis article is to outline a conceptual framework for thinking about how goals emerge, influence decision making,and guide consumer choice and action. Another purpose is to integrate classic ideas proposed by consumer re-searchers with emerging concepts and models proposed by cognitive psychologists, social psychologists, and oth-er social scientists. Finally,the authors' aim is to present several new ideas on goal setting and goal striving andpoint out how they can enrich the study and practice of consumer behavior.

M uch of consumerbehavior s goal-directed.Thiscanbe found in the marketingof durables e.g., buyinga computerfor the purposeof managingfinances),nondurablese.g., searching or a detergent hat will be gen-tle, easy to use, andeffective),services(e.g.,joininga healthclub to keep body weight undercontrol),and ideas or per-sons (e.g., decidingto vote for a candidatewho will promotethe voter's personalwelfare).Even buyersin organizationspursue specific goals in theiractivities,such as whenhospi-tal pharmacy and therapeutics committees search for,choose, and prescribedrugs that will be safe, efficacious,and inexpensive.All these goals sharea focus on a specific outcome(oroutcomes) that consumptioncan produce.A desired out-come (e.g., ease of use)enters themind of the decisionmak-er and can be defined as a specific type of goal, namely,"amental image or other end point representationassociatedwith affect toward which action may be directed" Pervin1989, p. 474, emphasisadded;see also Austin andVancou-ver 1996*, p. 338). Consumersmake purchases o produceor yield one or more end-stategoals.Consumptiongoals arenot limited to end states butalsoencompass experiences, sequences of interconnectedhap-penings,andongoing processes.Forexample,a person'sva-cation goal might not be limited to a particularocationandtime periodperse but rathermightreside in anticipated d-ucational,recreational,andinterpersonalxperiences.A tripdown theAmazon,anarcheologicalexcursion,or a religiouspilgrimageall constituteexperientialgoals of one sortor an-other.Note, too, thatgoals need not be closed-ended(e.g.,taking a white-waterrafting trip next summer)but can be

*Authorswere limitedin the numberof referencesused in text,therefore, hose referencesmarkedwith an * are availableat www.ama.org/pubs/jm ndat www.msi.org.Richard .Bagozzi s the Dwight .BentonProfessor f Behavioral ci-ence inManagement, niversityfMichigan. tpalDholakias anexecu-tive associateat M&T ankCorporation,uffalo,NewYork. he authorsthank heeditorsandthreeanonymous pecialIssuereviewersor heirinsightfulndconstructiveomments n thisarticle.

open-ended and loosely defined (e.g., maintaininga com-fortable, ong-termrelationshipwith a bank).Despite the relevance and prevalenceof goals in con-sumption, ittle scholarlyresearchexists (cf. Bettman1979;Howard and Sheth 1969*; Huffman and Houston 1993;Lawson 1997; Ratneshwar,Pechmann,and Shocker 1996;Sjoberg,Bagozzi, and Ingvar 1998). We know little aboutwhat consumptiongoals are, how they are representedinmemory,how they come aboutandchange,or how they arepursuedandachieved.Webegin with an organizingmodel for goal concepts inconsumption o providea framework orthinkingaboutcur-rent knowledge and what areas are in need of furtherre-search.Next, we examineresearchon how goals are chosenandrepresented.Then, we turnto an analysisof how goals,when chosen, are implemented.Although consumer re-searchers have begun to address goals, the contributionshave been fragmented.Weattempt o bringtogetherthis re-search and integratenew ideas on goal-directedbehaviorfromworkperformedon humanmemoryandthe psycholo-gy of action.Finally,we close withexamplesandsuggestedresearchagendas.The Role of Goals in Consumption:An Organizing ModelThe formationof goal conceptsandthe enactmentof purpo-sive action in relationto goals takeplace complexly and atvariousstages in decision makingand consumer behavior.Multiplementalactivitiesand actionsoccuren routeto goalachievement.To providean organizingmodel for thinkingaboutkey research ssues, we begin with the distinctionbe-tween goal setting and goal striving (e.g., Bagozzi 1992;Heckhausenand Gollwitzer 1987). In Figure 1, we summa-rize the stages characteristic f goal-directeddecision mak-ing andgoal pursuit ormanyconsumptionproblemsin thisregard.We can conceive of goal-directedconsumerbehaviorasbeginningwith goal setting.Goal setting involves decision-making processes in which, figuratively,the consumerad-dressestwo broadquestions:"Whatarethe goals I can pur-sue, andwhy do I wantor not want to pursuethem?"As we

Journalof MarketingVol. 63 (Special Issue 1999), 19-32 ConsumerBehavior19

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FIGURE 1Goal Setting and Goal Pursuit in Consumer Behavior

Feedback 4reactions"Howdo I feel aboutachieving/not chievingmy goal?"

Action Goalinitiation * attainment/andcontrol failure"What rethe "Whats itgoalsI can forwhichIpursue,and strive?"whydoIwant opursue hem?"

"HowcanIachievemygoal?"("When,where,how,andhowlongshouldact?")

"Howwell haveI enactedmyplans?""AmI makingprogressowardmy goal?""Are hereadjust-ments hatneedtobe made?""Isthegoalstill importantto me?"

"TowhatdegreehaveI achieved/failedto achievemy goal?"

demonstrate n the next section, goals are activated eitherexternally,such as when the context presentsopportunitiesor imposesimperatives,or internally, uch as when the con-sumer constructs a goal schema or chooses from amongself-generatedalternatives.Given a sufficientlystrongdesire to pursuea goal, actu-al goal pursuitwill commence in one of three conditions.Sometimesfor frequentlyperformed onsumptionactivitiesgoal pursuitis activated more or less automaticallyby re-sponses to learnedcues, and little conscious processingisinvolved (e.g., runninga credit cardthrough he scanneratthe supermarket heckout counter).This might be labeled"habitualgoal-directedconsumer behavior."Habitualbe-havior mustbegin somewhere,of course.In general,its ori-gins reside in prior deliberative processing or learningshapedby eitherclassicaloroperant onditioningor in somecombination of deliberative processing and conditioning.When acquired,however,habitualbehavior s initiatedandperformedwith little conscious self-regulationof the sortonwhich we focus herein.Anotherway that goal pursuitoc-curs, at least in a minimal way, is with impulsiveacts. Bydefinition, impulsiveacts do not entailpriordeliberationorplanning,butthey do involve some awakeningof a need or

desire thatquickly becomes a goal to be achieved throughminimalgoal-directedactivities.The final class of actualgoal-pursuitactivities,and theones we emphasizein this article,are those thatareclearlyvolitionalin nature.As we show in Figure 1, goal pursuit sinitiatedvolitionallywith the formationof a goal intention,which answersthe question,"What s it for which I strive?"Goal intentionsaretargetedat eitherspecific acts as endper-formances (e.g., "I intend to buy a Sony DVD playertonight")or particular utcomesto be achievedthrough heexecution of instrumentalacts (e.g., "I intend to lose twopoundsby exercisingvigorouslywithmy ProFormreadmillduringthe next week").Goal intentionsdirectedat end per-formanceshave been studied extensively in consumer be-haviorwith the theoryof reasonedaction, in whichthey aretermed"behavioralntentions"becausethe targetsof the in-tentions are actions. Goal intentions directed at outcomessometimeshave been studiedwiththetheoryof reasonedac-tion, but as the authorsof thattheoryhave emphasized,thetheory s notapplicable o outcomeorend-stategoals (AjzenandFishbein1980,pp. 29-30, 111).The presentframeworkis designed in partto apply to such decision-makingcon-texts, as well as contexts in which actionsaregoals.

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Anothertype of volition that has not been studiedsys-tematically by consumer behavior researchers is the so-called implementationntention,which is a person'sinten-tion to performa goal-directedbehavior(e.g., execute aninstrumentalact) given that futurecontingenciesoccur: "Iintendto do X when situationY is encountered"Gollwitzer1996, p. 292). Forexample,an implementationntention operforma future act in the service of goal achievementmight read: "I intend to withdraw$60 from an automatedtellermachine(ATM)every time my cash on hand s $10 orless." An exampleof animplementationntention o achievea futuregoal might read: "I intend to balancemy portfolioof investments next year by adding new growthstocks inhigh-techAsian industriesas they become available."Thethirdstageshownin Figure1,actionplanning, s al-so volitional and elaboratesfurtheron implementationn-tentions.Here,focus is on the general question,"Howcan Iachieve my goal?"and the specific amplificationsaddress-ing "when,where,how,and how long shouldI act in this re-gard?" Gollwitzer1996).The choice of meansis an impor-tantpartof planning(Bagozzi 1992).Following planning, actual implementation steps aretaken in a fourthstage, labeled "actioninitiation and con-trol"in Figure 1. Here,delayed intentions areenacted,andgoal-directedbehaviorsare guided. Fourquestionsare ad-dressed: "Am I making progresstowardmy goal?" "Howwell have I enactedmy plans?""Arethereadjustmentshatneed to be made?"and "Is the goal still importanto me?"Implementationntentionsarerealized in this stage.The fifth stage, goal attainment/failure,nvolves a finalcomparisonof the outcome achieved with a standard r ref-erence value and determination f whether o maintainor in-crease efforts at goal pursuitor disengage from furtheref-forts (e.g., Carver and Scheier 1996). Figuratively, the

consumer asks: "To what degree have I achieved/failed toachievemy ends, and shouldI continueon withorterminategoal striving?"Finally,for feedbackreactions, hediscrepancybetweena person'sgoal and its achievement s appraised,and emo-tional responsesare generated, ncludingreactionsof satis-faction or dissatisfaction,amongothers.The questioncon-sidered here is: "How do I feel about achieving/notachieving my goal?" Emotional and rationalreactions togoal attainment/failure ultimately update the person'sknowledge structure about goals, motivation to pursuegoals, and other learningwith regardto planning,means,and implementation Bagozzi, Gopinath,and Nyer 1999*).We turn now to a detailedanalysisof goal settingandgoalstriving.

Goal SettingHow do consumersform or arrive at their goals? How dothey realizethatthey have a goal, and how are the motiva-tionalaspectsof a goal representedn the mind or languageof the consumer? Can consumershave goals and not beaware of them?We focus primarilyon consciousaspectsof goal settingandgoal striving.But beforewe considerhow goals ariseinthis sense, we acknowledgethatgoal-directedbehaviorscan

occur unconsciously. Bargh's (1990) auto-motive modelmaintains hatgoalscanbe activatedby environmental tim-uli, andcognitive and behavioralprocesses operateto initi-ate andguide actionautomaticallyand unconsciously.Thiscan be foundin suchhabituated ctions as drivinga car,typ-ing, or playing tennis and, perhaps,occurs in some rou-tinized purchasesituations. Bargh and Barndollar(1996)summarizeexperimentalresearch that supportsthe auto-motive model (see also Wyer 1997*).Conscious goals seem to arise in one of three ways.First,goals can be forced on people, throughcoercionor re-wardpoweror,moresubtly, by virtueof theirpositionin anorganization, amily, or other social unit, whereby they areobligatedto worktowardpredefinedends. Forexample,thebuyer n a firmmustfollow certainstandards r procedures;the birthof a child opens new consumption mperatives orparents n theareasof specialfoods, medicine,andclothing.Second, people often simply "have"a goal, in the sensethat it arisesautomaticallybecauseof biological,emotional,moral,or ethical forces (e.g., Le Doux 1996*).These goalsare nonconscious,but unlike Bargh's (1990) auto-motives,they are not necessarily producedby habitually earned re-sponsesto environmental timuli.Rather, hey are activatedunconsciously by internalcriteriabut pursued consciously.Whenpeople feel ill, for example,theirgoal is to get better,andthey purchaseproductsorservicesto accomplishthis,aswell as engage in otherhealingactivities.Whenpeople ex-periencean unexpectedreward, hey seek to sharethe goodnews withothers,perhapsby celebratingwith a dinner n anexpensive restaurant.Third,the goal on which we concentrateherein is thetype that arises from reasoned reactionsto either externalstimuli (e.g., the presentationof a new product,an alluringpackage,a provocativeadvertisement,a persuasiveappealby a salesperson) or internal stimuli (e.g., a conclusiondrawnat the end of problemsolving; the mere thoughtthatthe person has a need). Huffman, Ratneshwar,and Mick(1997*) presenta similar consideration of goal activationandattribute t to contextualfactorsin the socioculturalen-vironment,usage situation,and immediate choice context.Exposureto possible goals in these senses leads to evalua-tions of theirpersonalrelevance. Goals are eitherobjects toacquire,own, ordisplay(i.e., products,brands)or targetac-tionsdirectedat objectsor outcomes(e.g., serviceadoption,productchoice).Perhaps he simplest andmost frequentlyusedapproachto capturingconsumer evaluationsof productsor serviceshas beenthe use of constructsdesignedto measureeither at-titudesandtheirspecific product/service ntecedentsoratti-tudes and their general antecedent value orientations. Inboth Howard and Sheth's (1969*, p. 30) andEngel, Black-well, and Miniard's(1986*, p. 35) models, for example, at-titude towarda particularbrandis regardedas a directde-terminantof purchase ntention.Attitude n turn s modeledas a functionof specific beliefs and otherreactionsto prod-uct/serviceattributesor consequencesof purchase.In con-trast,otherresearchershave focused not on evaluationsofproductor service attributes,butratheron general ife goalsas antecedents o purchase ntentionorchoice. Forexample,the values and lifestyles (VALS)model attemptsto predict

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consumerbehavioras a functionof 34 or more proprietarylifestyle values (e.g., Novak, de Leeuw, and MacEvoy1992), whereasthe list of values (LOV) approachrelies on9 social values (e.g., excitement,self-fulfillment,security)to explain consumer attitudes (e.g., Beatty, Kahle, andHomer 1991*; Homerand Kahle 1988*) or segment mar-kets (e.g., Kamakura ndNovak 1992*).Attitudemodels such as the theory of reasonedaction(e.g., Ajzen and Fishbein 1980) and value approaches uchas the VALS or LOV models provide implicit representa-tions of goal setting.Theiradvantages ie in theirsimplicity,ease of operationalization,and usefulness in prediction.Theirprimarydisadvantage estsin the limitedway they ac-complish explanationand understandingof consumer be-havior.Otherthan postulatingthat beliefs and evaluationscombineas multiplicativesumsin thetheoryof reasonedac-tion and values functionas additivepredictors n the VALSand LOV models, the approachesare silent abouthow in-formation s processedandorganized.Related o this is theirneglect of the underlying structureof information andwhetherbeliefs or values are relatedin hierarchical, unc-tional,or inferentialmanners.It is useful to distinguishbetweengoal settingfollowinga decision to pursuea goal and goal settingconductedbe-fore a decision has been madeto pursuea goal. The formeris exemplified in brandchoice when the consumerhas de-cided to make a purchasefrom a productclass. The latterpertainsto the motivationto make a purchasein the firstplace. Howardand Sheth(1969*) werepioneersin the con-siderationof goals, thoughtheyprovideonly a limited treat-ment of goal hierarchies.They consider the use of plans,however, in that they conceive of an intentionas the un-completedportionof a plan.Subsequently,Howard 1989*,pp. 55-59) elaboratedon the stages in consumerbehavior,particularlyor whathe termed"extensiveproblem-solving"situations, and presented the process as a "two-levelchoice":choice of product lass followedby choiceof brandwithintheproductclass. Choiceof productclass is believedto be initiatedby terminalvalues(e.g., "a comfortable ife"),which provide choice criteriafor a productclass. Beliefsabouteach of a set of productclasses thenare evaluatedtoarriveat attitudestowardthe productclasses, which lead toa decision to make a purchasefrom a particularproductclass. The actual choice of a brandin the chosen productclass is hypothesizedto be determinedby attitudes owardthe known brands;these attitudesare, in turn,functionsofbeliefs aboutthe brandsaccordingto criteria hatarebasedon instrumental alues (e.g., "ambition").Despite featuringterminaland instrumentalvalues as initial motivationsforproduct and brand choice, respectively, Howard (1989*)does not specify how these values are organizedand howthey functionto influenceattitudes,decisions,andchoice.Bettman(1979) providesthe first extensive treatmentofgoals in consumerchoice. A centralconceptin his theoryisthe notion of a goal hierarchyand its instrumental ole inachievingan end state.Forexample,he shows thatthe goalto purchasea washing machinecan be brokendown intothree subgoals: determinationof which productattributesareimportant, valuationof alternativebrandson the attrib-utes, and choice of the best brand(Bettman 1979, p. 21).

Eachsubgoalcan be brokendown further nto actionsteps,and so on. Notice thatthis conceptualizationof a goal hier-archystartswith a goal and then specifies steps needed toaccomplishthegoal.AlthoughBettman 1979, p. 45) devel-ops a comprehensive heoryof consumerchoice, definedas"a process of moving from some initial state to a desiredstate,"his emphasis is primarilyon the complex decisionprocessesthat ead upto productorbrandchoice rather hanon the goal ormotivationto make a choice perse.How might the motivational foundation for a con-sumer's goal be ascertained?One way this has been ap-proached s with the ladderingtechnique,in which a con-sumer is asked to identify concrete attributesof a productandthen, in sequencefor each concreteattribute, ink con-crete attributes o abstractattributes,abstractattributes ofunctionalconsequences, functional consequences to psy-chosocial consequences,psychosocial consequencesto in-strumental alues,and,finally, instrumental aluesto termi-nal values (e.g., Reynolds and Gutman 1988*). Themeans-ends chains derived from qualitative adderingpro-cedures have been found to yield intuitive descriptionsofthe hierarchicalvalue structuresbelieved to motivatecon-sumersto seek a product/serviceor brandand have provid-ed guidance in managerialdecisions such as advertisingcopy and strategic advertising design decisions (e.g.,Reynoldsand Craddock1988*).Themaindisadvantagewiththe ladderingprocedure ndthe means-endschains it producesis twofold.First,the ap-proachhas been limited to a descriptionof whatpurported-ly occurs in goal setting,but the way thatvalue hierarchiesfunction n consumerchoice hasnot been specifiedor testedto a greatextent.Second, the theoretical oundation or andvalidityof measures n a means-ends chain, from the pointof view of cognitive psychology, can be challenged. The

linkagesamongvalues in the hierarchyareespecially opento question if we accept the argument that (1) mentalprocesses(e.g., thepresumedpersonal nferencesunderlyingmeans-ends connections) are not open to self-explication(e.g., NisbettandWilson 1977*) or (2) self-knowledgeis in-complete (e.g., Quattrone1985*) but insteadthat the link-ages constitutesubjective,post hoc interpretationsf previ-ously generatedresponses(e.g., Dennett 1987*).New Approaches to Goal SettingThereareat leasttwo fundamentallydifferentapproaches othe problem of representinga consumer's motivation forchoosing a goal: one from cognitive psychology and onefromdiscursivepsychology and relatedperspectivesin an-thropology.Webrieflydescribethesepointsof view becausethey mightapplyto consumergoal-directedbehavior.A useful starting point is how goals are represented nmemory. Barsalou (1991) argues that knowledge in thecognitive system is represented n categories,and therearetwo fundamentalways categoriesoriginate:throughexem-plar earningorconceptualcombination.Exemplar earningis central to acquiring taxonomic knowledge about theworldas it exists andis a relatively passive, bottom-up,andautomaticprocess.Goal-derivedcategories,in contrast,arebelieved to arise throughconceptual combinationby ma-nipulation of existing knowledge in memory. Barsalou

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(1991, p. 4) summarizes aspects of categorizationin thissense as follows:conceptual ombinationppearso be relatively ctive,top-down,and effortful.By deliberatelymanipulatingknowledgehrougheasoning, eopleproduce ewcate-gories hat erve heirgoals ..conceptualombinationf-ten producesdealizedknowledge bouthow the worldshould be ... rather han ... abouthow it is.Barsalou(1991, p. 27) furtherproposesthat goals andtheirattributesare representednframes, which he definesas "flexible, loosely organizedbodies of knowledge."Forexample,the framefor a vacationgoal mightconsist of thevacationcategoryand its connections to five attributes: o-cations, temporalparameters, ctivities,objects,andactors.Each attribute, n turn, might be connected to clusters ofmore specific attributes; or example, departure,duration,return,and scheduleare types of temporalparameters, ndpreparations,ravel, and entertainmentare types of activi-ties. The specific attributes urthermight be composed ofsubtypes; orexample, major ravel(flying transcontinental-ly), minor travel (taxi from airportto hotel), and arrange-ments at location (reservinga seat on a tourbus) are sub-types of travel.Barsalou 1991) shows how suchframesareuseful in planninggoals and how othergoals andconstraintspromoteplanning.Forexample,in planninga vacation,suchbackgroundgoals as "maximizerelaxationandeducationalvalue"guidethe selection of exemplarsfora frame nstanti-ation. Withina particularrame,certainattributesalso con-strainthe range of otherattributes; or example, a neededdepartureof July for a snow-skiing vacationrequiresa skiresort n the southernhemisphere.Muchremains o be donein the studyof the representation f consumergoals, but re-cent researchand insightsin memoryfor brandsand attrib-utes promises to deepen our understanding f goals (e.g.,

Alba, Hutchinson,andLynch 1991;Luce 1998).Given a particulargoal, the next issue in goal settingpertains o how the goal is related to reasonsfor acting.Toaddress his issue, we considergoals as organized n a three-tieredhierarchy.The focal goal can be located at the centerof the hierarchyand answers the question:"What is it forwhich I strive?"Subordinategoals constitute the means ofachievingthe focal goal andanswer thequestion:"HowcanI achievethat for which I strive?"At thetopof thehierarchyare superordinate oals, which answer the question:"Whydo I wantto achieve that for which I strive?"Psychologistsand consumer researchersrecently have proposedsimilarframeworks or the hierarchical epresentation f goals andinstrumentalacts in the self-regulationof behavior (e.g.,Carverand Scheier 1996;Pieters 1993;VallacherandWeg-ner 1987*). Lawson (1997) shows how brandchoice can beconceived of as a functionof a hierarchyof goals, beginningwith abstract values that influence programgoals targetedtowardproductcategories.InFigure2, we summarizeourgeneralrepresentationfgoal hierarchiesandprovidean abbreviated xampleof thehierarchyappliedto the focal goal of weightcontrol.The fo-cal goal can be represented n a cognitive frame; losingweight mightbe represented hrough ts connectionsto suchattributesas amount of weight, location on body, and timeperiodforremoval.Each of thesubordinate oals also might

be represented n frames.For example, a partialframeforexercisingmightconsist of two attributes ndcorrespondingtypes as possiblemeans for weight loss: individualexercis-ing (aerobics,calisthenics, ogging, weight lifting) andpar-ticipation in sports (tennis, basketball, handball, racquet-ball). A partial frame for dieting might consist of suchmeans as avoiding snacks between meals, cuttingdown onfatty or starchyfoods, eating lightermeals, and takingdietmedications.The primarymotivation for engaging in a focal goalcomes about throughthe superordinategoals it serves. Totake an example, Figure3 representsa hierarchyof superor-dinate goals for the focal goal "losing or maintainingmybody weight" as expressed by a sample of 125 women(Bagozzi andEdwards1998). We can imaginethese super-ordinategoals as ends or standardsby which the focal goalis rationalized.The superordinateoals arearrangedby lev-el of abstractnessrom the lowest ("fit into my clothes")tothe highest ("enjoylife") and are shown as interconnectedthrough inferencelike relationships.For example, a con-sumer might believe or conclude that losing body weightwill help him or her fit better nto a desiredwardrobe,andthis in turnwould makehim or her look and feel good, savemoney,and increaseself-esteem and social acceptance(seeFigure 3). Likewise, losing weight would lead to betterhealth,longevity, enjoymentof life, and so on.The hierarchicalrepresentationof superordinategoalsshown in Figure3 was generated by an interview methoddesignedto circumventcertainproblems nherent n the tra-ditional ladderingprocedure. t can be arguedthat the stan-dard addering echnique s too directiveandnarrow, n thatit imposes on respondentsa specific structureand the se-quence of responsesit attempts o elicit from them. Thatis,respondentsare asked to generateproductattributesfirst,

then psychosocialconsequencesof the attributes,andfinal-ly values coming from the psychosocial consequences.However,thepatternandsequenceof relationshipsmay notreflecthow consumersactuallyset goals or how these goalsareorganized n memory.Insteadof being based on the laddering procedure,thestructureof hierarchical oals shown in Figure3 was elicit-ed throughuse of a proceduregrounded n the philosopherToulmin's (1958*) ideas on argumentationand rhetoric.Briefly,Toulminconceives of argumentsas a series of per-sonalclaimsthatanarguerprovides n theirdefense.Any ar-gumentcan be supporteddirectly by multipleclaims as evi-dence. Each claim, in turn,can be challenged on the basesof its justification.Thejustificationsoffered in supportreston evidence andalso can be challengedor explained.A par-ticularargumentypicallywill rely on some finite sequenceof claims, dependingon the reasoningof the arguer.Antaki(1989*) uses similar deas to generatenetworksof causalat-tributions,and a somewhat similarapproachhas been takenby Pieters,Baumgartner,ndAllen (1995) in theirstudy ofgoal hierarchies see also Antaki 1988*). In a parallelman-ner,the superordinate oal structure hown in Figure3 wasgeneratedby asking respondentsto provide reasons theychose the focal goal and thenprovideajustificationforeachreasonand an explanation or eachjustification.Next, prin-ciples fromnetworkanalysiswere used to mapthe reasons,

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FIGURE2The Three-Tiered Goal Hierarchy

GeneralRepresentationof GoalHierarchy Exampleof GoalHierarchy(abbreviated)

"Whydo I wanttoachieve hatforwhich I strive?"

"Whats it forwhich I strive?"

"HowcanIachieve hatforwhich I strive?"

justifications,andexplanations nto the goal hierarchy.Thisprocedureavoids the a priori imposition of the structurecharacteristicof the laddering echniqueand is less subjectto demand characteristics.Unlike Barsalou's(1991) approachand otherpoints ofview peculiarto cognitive psychology,the hierarchical oalstructuredepictedin Figure3 need not rest on the assump-tion that it representsinternal mental processes (Bagozziand Dabholkar2000). To the contrary,t is possibleto thinkof the goal structureas an expressionof a person'sreasonsfor choosing a goal in terms of how the reasonsreflectandconform to the sharedlanguageand largersocial conven-tions within which people unconsciouslyfunction. In thissense, the hierarchical oal structuremightbe interpreted sa cognitive structure romthe perspectiveof Wittgenstein's(1953*) philosophy of psychology. That is, Wittgensteinconceives of cognitionas a discursiveprocessrootedin theuse of a grammar,either in actual or imagined conversa-tions, and contingenton standardsof usage and correctnesspeculiar to a particular ocial context. From this point ofview, mentalprocessesare not intrapsychicperse but ratherare manifest in the use or practiceof languageand in rela-tion tojustifying a person'sactions or evaluations.Psychol-ogists following the discursive paradigmconstrue mentalprocesses in the following way:

Mental states, according to this point of view, are pro-ducedad hoc in the course of people acting,and are noth-ing but attributesof the stream of action. There are nomental entities other than the public and privateactionspeople engage in (Harre1998, p. 3).The methodused to generatethe hierarchical oal struc-ture shown in Figure 3 is compatiblewith discursive psy-chology,to theextentthat theargumentationndrhetoricof-fered by respondentsexpresses their self-concept and thepublic self to which they wish to conform or with whichtheywish to influence others.We can imaginethe hierarchi-cal goal structure s ajoint productof a person'scognitions(in Wittgenstein's1953 sense of cognition)and his or herin-tent to managehis or her presentationof self. These ideasfind furtherdevelopmentin cultural(Cole 1996*) and cog-nitive (D'Andrade 1995*) anthropology.Zaltman's(1997)metaphor licitationtechniqueseems to follow a similarra-tionale(see also Bagozzi, Bergami,andLeone 1999).It is not our purposehere to arguethe meritsof the in-trapsychicversus discursive paradigmsor to express ourpersonalpreferencesfor one or the other.Both are recog-nized, if fundamentally ncompatible,approachesn philos-ophy and psychology. Rather,we wish to make the pointthatgoal settingcan be approached rom two fundamental-

ly differentpoints of view: one rooted in traditional ogni-24 / Journalof Marketing,pecialIssue 1999

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FIGURE 3Hierarchical Goal Structure for Reasons for Losing or Maintaining Body Weight

Reprintedwithpermission romRichardP.Bagozziand ElizabethA.Edwards 1998),"GoalSettingand Goal Pursuit nthe Regulationof BodyWeight," sychologyand Health,13, 613.

tive psychologyandclaimingto representmentalprocesses(e.g., Barsalou1991) and one basedon discursivepsychol-ogy and claiming to representthe grammarof intentionalpracticesand its relation o self (e.g., Harre1998;McAdams1996*).Whatever he ontologicalandmetaphysicalassumptionswe makewithregard o hierarchical oal structures,t is im-portantnot to stop with the representation f goals. As wenoted previously,a weakness with the ladderingprocedureis that it stops with a descriptionof values and does not re-late these formallyto decisions or choice. To go beyondde-scription, t is necessaryto relategoal hierarchies o prefer-ences, choices, and behavior.Bettman 1979) was a pioneerin this regard.He showed how a desired end stateis relatedto goals andsubgoalsand how these, in turn, nterfacewithdecision processesthrough heirlinkagewith attentionandchoice processes.To show the influence of goal settingon decision mak-ing, we attempted o ascertainthe dependenceof attitudes,felt normativepressure, ntentions,and othersummarypsy-chological reactions on the superordinategoal structureshown in Figure3 (Bagozzi and Edwards1998). By use ofhierarchicalmultiple regression,attitudesand othersumma-ryreactionswereregressedon both individual uperordinategoals and linkages betweengoals as espousedby a sampleof consumers.To take one dependentvariableas an exam-ple, felt normativepressure o lose or maintainbody weight

was found to be a functionof one goal ("socialacceptance")and I1 linkagesbetweengoals ("lookgood"-> "happiness,""achievement"-> "health,""energy" -> "social accep-tance,""energy" > "endurance," energy" > "feel good,""energy" -> "achievement,""fit in clothes" -> "social ac-ceptance,""fit in clothes"-> "save money,""fit in clothes"-> "lookgood,""fit in clothes"-> "self-esteem,"and "feelgood" -> "achievement").By identifyingwhich goals andlinkagesactuallypredict uchdependentvariablesas prefer-ences or intentions,managerscan learnwhich goals or in-ferencesto emphasizein advertisingcopy or personalsell-ing. Expectancy value models do not provide suchdiagnosticinformation,n thatthey fail to model the struc-tureandinterdependenciesmongbeliefs.At the same time,expectancy value models pose statistical limitationsbasedon indeterminanciesn the analysis of producttermswhenthe constituentsof the terms are not ratio-scaled (Evans1991*).Goal Setting, Prefactuals, and the Activation ofIntentionsAnalogous to value hierarchies,superordinategoals andtheirorganizationprovidea basis for decision making,butsomethingmore is needed to activateintentions.Emotionalor affective processescan performthis role when coupledwith decision makingwith regardto anticipatedoutcomesthatarecontingenton alternative oursesof action.

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To demonstrate this, we begin with the notion of acounterfactual. A counterfactual is a conditional state-ment thatcontains both an antecedentexpressed as a hy-pothetical (e.g., "if X happens") and a consequence ex-pressedas an implication ("thenY will occur").The mostcommonly researched counterfactual addresses a previ-ously experienced negative outcome and speculates onhow the outcomes could have been less negative or evenbetter; for example, "If only I had invested in bonds, Iwould not have lost as much money as I did throughstock purchases." An emotional consequence of suchcounterfactuals is regret (e.g., Landman 1987*). Al-though less commonly researched,there can be counter-factuals with positive emotional consequences that arephrasedsomewhat differently; for example, "I am disap-pointed by my losses in the stock market,but they wouldhave been even worse if I had, as originally planned, in-vested in futures." Here, a positive emotion of relief oreven enhancement of self-esteem could occur (e.g.,Roese and Olson 1995*).Fordecisionmakingwithregard o a futureevent,antic-ipatedoutcomesarecentral,andthe notionof a counterfac-tual must be reworked.Gleicher and colleagues (1995*)propose that counterfactuals an be phrasedin relationtoimagined events and their alternatives,and the thoughtprocesses then produceaffective responses that influencesubsequentattitudesandintentions.They suggestthe use ofthe term "prefactuals" to differentiate these thinkingprocesses from those involved in counterfactual hinking,which referto priorhappenings.Similar to researchers n counterfactual hinking,Gle-icherandcolleagues (1995*, p. 294) focus on imaginedal-ternatives that run counter to an anticipatedundesirableevent: "when a persongeneratesa counterfactual prefactu-al] that reversesa negative outcome, he or she is likely tomake the attribution that]there is an effective action thatcan be taken in the future."Considerationof the negativeconsequences of acting one way and the possibility of amore satisfyingalternativeprovidesthe impetusfor the ef-fects of prefactualthinking on decision making, that is,"when an individual thinks about a counterfactual n ad-vance, the motivation to avoid this negative affect influ-ences behavioralchoices"(Gleicheret al. 1995*,p. 295; seealso Roese andOlson 1995*,p. 21). Two studiessupport hefunctioningof prefactualsn decision making.Boningerandcolleagues (1994) find that prefactuals,with regardto thepurchaseof insurance n a laboratory ame, influencedsub-sequent action to take insurance.Likewise, Gleicher andcolleagues (1995*) find thatprefactualsregardingcondomuse affected positive attitudes;however, intentionsto usecondomswerenot influencedby prefactuals, houghthedif-ference in means betweenexperimentalandcontrolgroupswere in the predicteddirection.For many consumption decisions, it seems plausiblethat prefactualsshould not be limited to anticipatednega-tive consequencesof a possible act and its more favorablealternativebut rather,or in addition,might pertainto ap-praisals of the contingent positive affect if the decisionmakerwere to make a purchaseplus the contingentnega-tive affect that would result if he or she were not to make

the purchase.The greaterthe felt positive affect from theformerappraisaland the greaterthe negative affect fromthe latter,the strongeris the motivation to make the pur-chase. Bagozzi and Warshaw's(1990) so-called theory oftrying could be reinterpretedas a prefactual decisionprocess if we think of attitude owardsuccess (weightedbyexpectations of success) and attitude toward failure(weighted by expectations of failure) as prefactualjudg-ments,whichtheydidnot. Insteadof attitudesperse, it maycarrymore explanatoryforce to specify multiple positiveand negativeemotions as instigatorsof decisions or choic-es in prefactual udgments.Analogous to regretas a moti-vationalmechanismfor the effect of prefactualson choices(e.g., Johnson 1986*), we might posit thatcertainpositiveand negative emotions motivate decisions, depending onthe appraisalconditionsand fit of the emotions to the con-text at hand.Forexample, the decision to engage in a com-mercialweight-controlprogrammight be a functionof theintegrationof the following prefactual udgmentsand theiremotionalconsequences:anticipatedregretfromnotspend-ing money on a "noncomparable"lternative e.g., Johnson1984*); imagined oy, pride,andhappinessaboutengagingin and experiencingthe success of weight loss; and envis-aged shame, guilt, and frustration hould the personfail tolose weight.Researchersonly recentlyhave begun to study the roleof anticipated emotions in decision making. Parker,Manstead,and Stradling(1995) find that anticipatednega-tive affect (measuredwith two regretitems) influencedtheintention to commit driving violations. Richard, van derPligt, andde Vries(1995) find thatanticipatedreactionsto-ward performanceof safe sexual behaviors significantlypredicted ntentionsto performthese practices.Theirstudywas limitedto negativeemotionsmeasuredwith only threeitems: worried/notworried,regret/noregret,and tense/re-laxed. A fuller study of the effects of anticipatedemotionsshows thatpositive and negativeemotions influencedvoli-tions (intentions,plans, and anticipatedeffort) to exerciseanddiet, as well as subsequentachievementof body weightgoals (Bagozzi, Baumgartner, nd Pieters 1998). The posi-tive emotions includeexcitement,delight, happiness,glad-ness, satisfaction, pride, and self-assurance as a conse-quence of prefactual judgments; the complementarynegativeemotionsstemmingfromprefactualudgmentsen-compass frustration,guilt, shame, anger, sadness, disap-pointment,depressivethoughts,worry,discomfort,and fear(see also Luce 1998;PeruginiandBagozzi 1999*).

In summary,goal settingcan be thought o consist of (1)the formationof subgoalsneededto achieve an end stateorinitiateandguideexperientialaims(e.g., Bettman1979); (2)the representation f goals throughconceptualcombinationandtheirorganizationn frames(e.g., Barsalou1991)or,al-ternatively, hrough he superordinatends they serve in theexpressionof self, which areorganizedhierarchically e.g.,Bagozzi andEdwards1998);and(3) thethinking(e.g., pref-actualthought)andmotivational(e.g., anticipatedemotion)processes that translategoal framesor hierarchicallyorga-nizedsuperordinate oals into intentions,decisions,or plans(e.g., Bagozzi, Baumgartner,and Pieters 1998). We turnnow to goal implementationprocesses.


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Goal StrivingIntentions are much more than uncompleted portions of(predecision)plans whose execution has begun. They pro-vide the psychologicalmechanismor bridgebetween goalsettingand goal striving,as well as serve control andexec-utivefunctions n goal pursuit. nthissection,we beginwitha discussion of new researchon intentionsand then consid-er such issues as the choice of means needed to pursueagoal, planning,monitoring,guidance,andself-regulationofinstrumental ctionsnecessaryfor goal attainment.Less at-tention has been devoted to goal striving in consumerre-search,and research n psychology in this regard s still inits early stagesand in need of integration.Intentions and MemoryIntentionsare formed at multiple stagesof decision making(i.e., during goal settingandgoal pursuit),exist in differentforms,and have differentfunctions.As we mentionedpre-viously,when goal settingresults in the decision to pursueagoal, the intentionis referred o as a goal intention.A con-sumerwith a goal intention s committed n principleto theexecution of actions needed to achieve the goal. The per-sonal commitment inherent in the intention is one of thedefining qualities that differentiateit from other mentalstates or processes such as beliefs, attitudes,or emotions.The commitmententailedby a goal intention s madeto thegoal as an end andto the self-realization hat actions will berequiredto achieve the goal. But the particularactions re-quiredfor goal achievementare not specified in or referredto by the goal intention.Additional nformationprocessingand decision makingare needed to transforma goal inten-tion into action and action into goal attainment. mplemen-tation intentionsalso imply a commitment,but unlikegoalintentions, they have specific actions as their referents(Gollwitzerand Schaal 1998*).Both goal and implementationntentionsare stored ab-stractly n declarativememoryandmust be retrievedbeforefurtherprogress in goal pursuitcan occur (Goschke andKuhl 1996).Torealizea goal intention, heremust be enact-ment of a choice of means to pursue hegoal and otherplan-ning activities. To realize an implementationintention,recognitionof executionconditions must occur.The memo-ryprocessesforbothtypesof intentions nvolve internalizedverbal instructions e.g., Diaz and Berk 1992*).Because many consumptiondecisions are fulfilled at atime quite remote from the point when an intention firstwas formed, two basic memory processes come into playwith delayed intentions. One refersto remembering o per-form an action at a futurepoint in time and hascome to beknown as "prospectivememory"(Brandimonte,Einstein,and McDaniel 1996*).The otherrequiresrememberinghecontent of the action to performand the conditions for itsexecution. This is sometimes called "retrospectivememo-ry"in the literature.Before we considerprospectiveandretrospectivemem-ory in the functioningof intentions, et us consider an ex-ampleto describethe natureof theprocesses:Onawakeningthismorning,I find thatI am out of breakfast erealand de-cide to replenish my supplies,as well as purchase ngredi-

ents formakingmy lunchesfor the rest of the week. I intendto do this later n the afternoon.For this decision to be trans-formed nto action,I mustrememberat the appropriateime(as I drive home after work andpass the supermarket)hatIhad formed an intentionearlier n the day.This is the recallof my goal intentionand is anexampleof prospectivemem-ory.Next, I must recall the content of my decision;thatis, Imust rememberwhere in the store to go (dairysection, pro-duce area,cannedgoods shelves, and so forth),what to buy(breakfastcereal, sourdoughbread, canned tuna, mayon-naise, freshfruit),andso on. This is my retrospectivemem-ory and,amongotherthings, involves the execution of im-plementation intentions.My prospectivememory requires hatmy intentionper-sists, thatI am vigilantfor externalcues, such as the super-marketmarquee,or that the intentionbecomes activatedbyunplanned timuli or spontaneously.My retrospectivemem-ory requiresdeliberativeand directivecognitive processingor automaticretrievalof plansor executive functionswhenthe prospectivememorybecomes activated.Psychologistshave begun to uncoverimportantaspectsof prospectivememory.Goschkeand Kuhl (1996), for ex-ample, find in their experiments that the contents ofprospectivememoryhave strongerand more sustained ev-els of activation than other nonintentionmemory content(see also Marsh,Hicks, and Bink 1998*). They also showthatintentions acilitatesubsequentprocessingof intention-relatedinformation,even when the episodic representationof the intention is not consciously recollected. Finally,Goschke and Kuhl (1996) find that state- versus action-orientedsubjectsshowed strongerpersistenceof intentions.Ruminationsby the former(e.g., intrusions nto memoryofprevious goal failures) contributed to the persistence,whereasthe latter,who tend to act automaticallyand notbe-come distractedor dwell on failures,deactivatedintention-relatedmaterial o a greaterextent.KvavilashviliandEllis (1996) discuss the distinctionbe-tween prospectivememory failures and absentmindeder-rors. The formeris the inabilityto retrieve an intendedac-tion, whereas the latter addressesfailuresthat occur duringthe performance f an intendedaction. In addition o failingto remember o act, errors n delayedintentions ncludepar-tial or completeloss of the content of the intentionandfail-ures in output monitoring.Likewise, errorscan result evenfor intentionsa person begins to fulfill immediatelyafterformingthem.Kvavilashviliand Ellis (1996) discuss substi-tutionerrors, oss of intention,errors n repetition,and omis-sions for such "immediate"ntentions.Researchshows that several retrievalcontexts promptdelayed intentions:events, activities, times, persons, ob-jects, and locations (e.g., Einstein and McDaniel 1990*,1996*; Marsh and Hicks 1998*). Kvavilashvili and Ellis(1996) develop a framework or observinghow retrievalofdelayed intentionsoccursand the research o date conduct-ed in the area. One distinction they make is betweenevent-, time-, and activity-basedintentions. Kvavilashviliand Ellis show thatthese intentionsdiffer to the extent thatexternalcues are absent(time-based)or present(event- andactivity-based)and to the extent that ongoing behaviorre-quiresinterruptionevent- and time-based)or not (activity-

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based). With regardto encoding, activity-basedintentionsarelikely to be theeasiest to rememberbecauseof theircon-tingencyon cues andtheirdecouplingfromongoingbehav-ior. Kvavilashviliand Ellis furtherpoint out that intentionsthat combineevent-, time-, and/oractivity-basedcontingen-cies (e.g., "I intend o placean order or a productadvertisedduringa television programat 9:00 P.M.after the programends")may be rememberedmoreeasily laterbecause of themultipleretrievalcues thatoccur at the plannedoccasion.Appraisal of MeansAfter a goal has been chosen and a goal intentionformed,the next task thatthe consumerfaces is the problemof howto reach the goal. For a goal thathasbeen pursued requent-ly in the past,a decision makermightactivatea storedruleor scriptsuch as "usethe meansthatI used last time,"sim-ilar to Howard's 1989*) routinizedproblem-solvingmodel.For a chosen goal that is low in salience or simple toachieve, the personmight apply a storedrule such as "usethe easiest means" or "use the means that comes to mindfirst." However, for new goals or goals that are high insalience or difficult to achieve, the next step in the goal-attainmentprocess is the evaluationof alternativemeanstodetermine he best courseof action.Bagozzi (1992) isolatesthree distinctappraisal asks thatareperformedo select thebest means. These processes involve self-reactions andjudgments about the possible means needed to realize agoal.The first appraisalprocess involves assessmentsof theperson's capabilities to exercise control over the meansneeded to achieve a goal. Bandura(1997) termsthis self-efficacyand defines it as the belief orself-confidencea per-son has that he or she can performa particularbehavior.Self-efficacy can be extended in a straightforwardway todecision making with respect to the possible means avail-able for goal pursuit,such thateach instrumental ct underconsiderationcan be appraisedin terms of the person'sjudged self-efficacy to performit. Self-efficacy appraisalsare importantespecially for difficult-to-use productcate-gories such as new softwarepackagesor home gyms or forsuch effortfulconsumption asksas findinga new doctor orpurchasing a car. Among other effects, recent researchshows thatself-efficacy influencesgoal setting,goal perse-verance, intentions, and behavioral implementation Ban-dura 1997;Locke andLatham1990).The second appraisal process consists of action-outcomeexpectancies.Whereasself-efficacies addressper-sonal appraisalsof a person's internalcapabilitieswith re-lation to performanceof an act, action-outcomeexpectan-cies refer to assessmentsof the likelihoodthatthe initiationof goal-directedbehaviorsas means to an end will lead togoal achievement.To takeanexample,imaginea consumerwho desiresto lose weight andis consideringone of two al-ternatives:an all-purposeexercise machinethatthe adver-tiser claims requiresonly 15 minutes use a day to lead toweight loss versus a year's membership in a local healthclub, includingsign-upwith thedaily aerobicsclass.A con-sumercanjudge the subjectivelikelihoodthateach alterna-tive, if adopted,would produceweight loss and might, for

example, opt for the healthclub and aerobicsclass optionbecause he or she believes that it is much more likely tolead to weight loss for him or her personally.In general,consumerswill not select a course of action as a means forachieving their goals unless a positive connection is per-ceived between performance of the means and goalachievement.Some goal-directedbehaviorshave affective or evalua-tive consequencesthatare independentof the value of thegoal per se but thatneverthelesscan inhibitor promotethedecisionto use themin goal pursuit.We termthis thirdtypeof appraisalaffect towardmeans. Some instrumentalactswill be intrinsicallyenjoyable or lead to pleasant conse-quences.Othersmay be so noxious or unpleasantas to leadto avoidance.In a sense, this thirdtype of appraisalrepre-sents a motivationalcomponentof volition. Whereasself-efficacies and action-outcome expectancies are primarilycognitiveappraisalsof linkagesbetweenthe self as decisionmakerandpossible instrumental cts andbetweenthese in-strumentalacts and goal attainment,respectively,affect to-wardmeans supplies informationaboutthe emotionalcon-sequencesof engaging in goal pursuit tself. Dependingonthepolarityandmagnitudeof thesereactions, hedecisiontouse one meansor anotherwill be perceivedfavorablyor un-favorably n and of itself.A choice amongmeansis likely to involvean integrationof a person's self-efficacies and instrumentalbeliefs withevaluationsof the affectivesignificanceof each means to anend. In a study of coupon usage, women appraisedeach ofsix sources of coupons as means to fulfill their shoppinggoals: direct mail, newspapers,magazines, in or on pack-ages, store displays or fliers, and from relativesor friends(Bagozzi, Baumgartner, nd Yi 1992a).The findings showthat the extent of actualcoupon usage was a functionof athree-way interaction among self-efficacies, action-outcomeexpectancies,andaffect towardmeans.Moregen-erally, it has been argued and found in a study of bodyweight maintenancethat the integrationof the three ap-praisalsof meanswill be additiveormultiplicative,depend-ing on the degree of task difficulty (Bagozzi and Edwards1999). Forrelativelyeasy tasks,for which internalor exter-nal impedimentswere weak, the threeappraisalsof meansfunctionedadditivelyas maineffects to influencethechoiceof goal-directedbehaviors. For more difficult tasks, forwhich internaland external impedimentswere strong, thethreeappraisalsof means combinedmultiplicativelyto in-fluencechoice.

Froma managerial tandpoint,a related ssue is the abil-ity notonly to influencethechoice of means(e.g., makingacustomeruse an ATM to withdrawcash insteadof walkingto the tellerwindow)at one point in time, butalso to devel-op cumulative,sustainedaffinities for particular ombina-tions of means in customers(e.g., usingelectronicchannelssuch as ATMs, personal computers, and automatedtele-phone responseunits to make financial transactionsratherthanusing moreexpensive service personnel, n the case ofa retailbank).In some cases, the task for the business maybe to reducethe frequencyof using any meansat all (trans-acting fewer times a month using any channel) without


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droppingthe original goal (maintaininga profitablerela-tionshipwiththe bank).Action PlanningAfter an intention o seek a goal is formedanda decision touse a particularmeansis made,themeansappraisalprocess-es culminate n the formationof an implementationplan ofactionthatspecifieswhen,where,how,and how longeachofthe actionsnecessaryforgoalattainmentwill be carriedout.Such plans have a strongcognitive component(cf. Miller,Galanter, ndPribram1960)and arehierarchical epresenta-tions thatcontrolthe order n which the behaviorwill be se-quencedforgoal attainment, s well as specifyobjectsin theenvironmentas cues for initiatingaction. By linking situa-tional cues to goal-directedbehaviors, mplementation lans,in a sense, pass on the controlof goal-directedbehaviorstothe environment Gollwitzer1996). Empiricalresearchhasshown that the mentalrepresentationf the situationalcuesspecifiedby theplanbecomeshighlyactivated,making hesecues easily accessibleandfacilitatingactioninitiationat theappropriateime (GollwitzerandBrandstatter 997).

Other researchhas shown that, even when people arehighly absorbedin some ongoing activity, planningfacili-tatesthedisruptionof focusedattention,whichallows trans-fer to behaviorspecifiedby theplan,atthe appropriateime.Planningalso facilitates the initiationof goal-directedbe-haviors in the presenceof the specified opportunity,whichenables people to respondto good opportunities,even ifthey presentthemselves for only a shortmoment. Finally,planningprovidesdistinctvolitionalbenefitsby facilitatingself-regulatoryprocesseswhen impediments o plan imple-mentationoccurortemptations rise(GollwitzerandSchaal1998*).Implementationplans for consumertasks are likely tovary along severaldimensions,dependingon the natureanddifficultyof the task,as well as the effortanticipated or in-tentionrealization.We pointout some of the importantdi-mensions,but becauselittle is knownaboutconsumerplans,further esearchmust address his issueof plantypologies ingreaterdetail.In examiningthe influenceof planningon social behav-ior, social psychologists make the distinction between thecontentof plans on the one hand and theirstructureon theother (e.g., Mischel and Patterson1976). This provides aconvenientdistinctionto begin to develop a plan typologyfor consumer tasks. Whereascontent refers to the mattercontainedin the plan,structurepertains o the level of hier-archical organizationof the plan. Mischel and Patterson(1976) find thatthe efficacyof plansdependedon boththeircontent and their structure. In their empirical study,temptation-inhibitinglans,whichwere elaborated n detail,were moresuccessful thantask-facilitating laboratedplansin the accomplishmentof the goal of self-control.Furthermore,plan structurecan be viewed as havingseveral subdimensions. One importantsubdimension ofconsumerplans is completeness,which refers to how fullyeach individual ink in the courseof action is specified.Weexpect that for consumertasks thatare high in salience ordifficult to achieve, more complete plans are likely to be

formed.A planto buy a dress for an importantpartyshouldbe formedmore completelythan one to buy ordinaryworkclothes.Closely related to completenessis the subdimensionofplan specificity, which pertainsto the variousanticipatedsituationalcontexts and the specificityof actions to be exe-cuted in each context. Specific plans are more likely to beformedin cases in whichthereis greatercertaintyaboutthemeansto achieve goals, such as purchasing roma store.Incases in which the goal is more difficultand the means un-certain,as in the case of losing weight or quittingsmoking,less specific plans are likely to be formed.Highly specificplans are more likely to facilitate intentionrealizationbyprovidinga mechanismto facilitate the retrievalof inten-tions frommemory(Orbell,Hodgkins,andSheeran1997).Yet another mportantdimensionalong which consumerplans vary is novelty, which depends on whetherthe cuesandsequencesspecifiedarewell practiced, amiliar,andre-liable for the individual.Novel plans are likely to be espe-cially useful for intentionrealization.Implementationplansset the stagefor intermediary ctsneeded to implementa contingentor noncontingent nten-tion. When the instrumentalacts have been set in motion,theymust be scrutinized o ascertainwhether hey beginandend when they are supposedto, whetherthey achieve theirobjectives,andwhethernew contingencies,impediments,orfacilitating actorsmustbe incorporatedntothegoal-settingprocess.These processesaretermed"monitoringactivities"(Bagozzi 1992).Maintenance and Protection of IntentionsIn manycases, especially when thereis a time gap betweenintention ormationand actioninitiation, mpediments o theenactmentof the actionsnecessaryfor goal attainmentmayoccur after the implementationplan has been formed. Forexample,a store may be stocked out of a favorite brand,amore appealingmovie may be discovered playing in themultiplextheaterafterthe arrivalandplanto attenda differ-ent movie, or other goal alternativesmay be perceived onthe surfaceas more attractive n everydayshoppingactivi-ties becauseof new information. n suchcases, if the goal isto be achieved,the originallyformedgoal intentionmust bemaintainedand protectedfrom these competinggoal alter-natives, and implementationplans must be facilitated in abroaderprocesstermed"guidanceand control."Of course,a decision may be madeto abandon he goal in favorof an-other. Processes of self-regulation(or what Kuhl [1984]termsthe"mechanisms f actioncontrol")playan importantrole in this intentionmaintenanceprocess(see also KuhlandBeckmann 1994).Kuhl (1984) identifies seven volitional self-regulatoryprocesses (i.e., those driven by willpower) that, throughstrategiessuch as inhibitingthe processingof informationthat supportscompeting intentions,controlling emotionalreactions,andmaintaininghigh levels of motivation,protectthe chosen intentionand implementationplan from beingabandonedduring the period between intentionformationandactioninitiation.Inaddition, ailureto achieve subgoalsand actual or anticipatedextraneousevents that threaten

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plans or goal commitmentmay result in volitional mecha-nisms of plan modification.These volitional strategiesofself-regulationsupportand maintain he level of activationof the goal and the plan elements in memory, facilitatingsubsequentretrievalat the appropriateime. In a study ofcoupon usage, the relative impactof attitudeson decisionmaking became more importantas people became action-oriented,whereas therelative mpactof subjectivenormsondecision makingbecame more importantas people becamestate-oriented Bagozzi, Baumgartner,ndYi 1992b).Otherindividualdifference variablesrecentlyfoundto affect per-sistence in goal pursuit ncludevolitionalcompetence(e.g.,Kuhl and Beckmann 1994) and goal orientations (e.g.,Dweck 1991).Initiation of ActionIf the elements of the implementationplan in memory areactivatedat the appropriateime (duringwhat is called the"performancenterval"),actionwill be initiatedandexecut-ed as specified by the plan.As action unfolds, monitoringand control processes help retrieve plan elements frommemory,comparethemwith progressandthe realityof thesituation, and make continuous correctionsto the subse-quentplanelementsbeforetranslatinghemintoaction.Thisresults in the dampeningof the motivationalprocessesthatprovidethe impetusfor action,or whathas been called the"goal consummationpoint" in psychological literature.Incontrast, f the execution is not terminated uccessfully,anattempt s made to abandon heplan.If this is successful,themotivationalelementsaredampened, eavingthe consumerfree to processanotherplan.If the attemptat planabandon-ment fails, the plan remainsactivated in memory, whichleads to processessuch as ruminating.

ConclusionRelation of Framework to Consumer ResearchPrioritiesGoal concepts and the role of goals in consumerbehaviorhaverelevanceformanyareasof marketing.We discuss twohere as examples:reallynew productsandtheroleof brand-ing in consumerchoice decisions.Goal-setting processes are especially important n theadoption of new products(Bagozzi and Lee 1999). Thegreater hedegreeof "newness," he moredifficultit is for aconsumerto evaluatethe productand relate it to his or herneedsbecause,by definition,no priorexperienceexists withthe product.To elicit consumerresponsesto new products,marketersoften presentconsumerswith conceptstatementsor prototypesand ask themto provideevaluationsand otherreactions.A shortcomingwith this approach s that it maylead to ill- or partiallyformedpsychologicalresponsesbe-cause consumers cannot relate the new productsto theirdeeperneeds andvalueseasily.They may lack the personalandproduct nformationneededto initiategoal-directedde-cision making.Whenfaced with a reallynew product,a consumercon-frontsthe problemof determiningwhetherthe productpo-tentiallysatisfieshis orher needsandis worthyof furthern-

formation processing. Psychologists recently have givenemphasis to the role of desires in initiating goal setting(Gollwitzer 1996, p. 289; Malle and Knobe 1997), but forreallynewproducts,manyconsumersmayfind it difficulttouncoverandexpress their realdesiresbecausetheirknowl-edge of theproduct s lacking.Also, desiresmay requireex-tensive and effortfulprocessingto be ascertained Bagozzi1992).Thecognitive structuresunderlyingconsumervaluesand goals may be uncoveredin focus groupsor other newproductdevelopmentresearchby eliciting goal-derivedcat-egories (Barsalou1991), hierarchicalmapsof superordinategoals (Bagozzi and Dabholkar 2000), or consumermetaphors(Zaltman 1997) and relating these at multiplepointsin time in an interviewto espouseddesires,attitudes,inclinationsto trya product,and so forthas these reactionsevolve and become well formed.Goal-striving processes seem particularlypertinenttobrand oyalty.Much is knownaboutloyalty andpatternsofswitching at aggregatelevels, but less seems known aboutwhereandwhen, in the post-decision-makingperiod, oyal-ty must be sustained psychologically or breaks down.Knowledge here can provide guidance to managersaboutthetimingand contentof persuasivecommunications,deals,pricing,anddistributiondecisions. Forexample,a firststepon the roadto loyaltybeginswith thestimulationof trial,butunlessa goal intention s transformedntoaction,trial is un-likely to occur.Following a campaignto build desire, spe-cial marketingcommunicationsmay be neededto focus theconsumer's attentionon where to inspect the product,aswell as to overcome resistance to undergoingthe effortneededto plancomparisonshopping.Segmentsof the samepotentialmarketmay requireunique communicationstar-geted at maintainingan intentionover time, because of thelow involvementstatusof the productor forgetfulness,and

at arousing implementation intentions when activities,events,or othertimingissues must be anticipatedor orches-trated.Still other consumers loyal to a brandmay requiredistinct marketingefforts to protect plans and intentionsfromthreats romcompetitors,bad word-of-mouthcommu-nication,or indifference.Exceptionaldefensive maneuversmay be called for in advertising, pricing, and couponing,say, because a loyal segment comes underattack. Unlesstheymapthe postdecisionstagesof goal strivingandidenti-fy and measure marketsegments at each stage, marketerswill notbe ableto addresseffectively thevarious hreatsandopportunities hat occur differentiallyacross the phases ofgoal pursuit.In other words, marketersmust go beyondmodeling intentionsor even recentconsiderationsof "con-sumer trying"(Bagozzi and Warshaw1990; Mathur1998)to treatpostdecisiongoal strivingfromthe pointof view ofcontrol process theory (Carverand Scheier 1996; Lawson1997) or the models of action phases(Bagozzi 1992;Goll-witzer 1996).Basic Research DirectionsWithregard o goal setting,we knowa greatdeal, basedonresearchon attitudesand behavioraldecision making,abouthow goal desirability labeledas "value"or "valence"by at-titude researchers) and goal feasibility (labeled as "ex-pectancy"by attituderesearchers)affect goal setting.How-


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ever, we know much less about a third factorthatplays anequally,if notmore, important ole in goal setting: goal rel-evance. Although desirabilityand feasibility pertainto theevaluationof a single goal, completeassessment of the goalrequires t to be regardedn relation o othercompetingandnoncompeting goals. For example, a goal associated withmanydesirableand feasibleconsequencesmaysuddenlyap-pear less attractivewhen scrutinized in the context of acompetinggoal. The goal of takinga Caribbeancruise, forexample, though affordable and fun, may suddenly losesome of its luster when it is evaluatedin light of the long-term goal of buying a new house and saving for a downpaymentto make such a purchasepossible. Goal-relevanceprocesses examine each goal in the context of othercom-peting and noncompeting goals of different levels of ab-stractionand incorporate ituationalelements not directlyrelatedto the goal thatmay make it moreor less feasibleordesirable.Researchersmaybenefit frompayingattention othe role of goal relevance in the goal-setting process andidentifyingconditions n which it is moreimportanthantheother evaluative criteria.Research is needed, for example,into how one or moregoals compete againstothergoals forattention,especially as commitmentsaremade.With regardto goal striving,we discussed several di-mensions of consumerplans, such as completeness, speci-ficity, and novelty. Little researchhas been devoted to de-veloping an exhaustive catalog of plan dimensions orexamined conditions that accentuate the importanceof aparticularplan dimension.These gaps providea naturalav-enue to build on the frameworkwe have proposed.More-over,examiningthe issue of persistence s likely to be fruit-ful if problematicbehavior, n which smoothactiontowardgoal attainment s impededin some manner, s consideredexplicitly. Both internal(such as perceived importanceofthe goal, the degreeof commitment,and the detail of plan-ning) and external(such as difficulty of attainingthe goaland the numberand attractivenessof competing goal alter-natives) factors are likely to play importantroles in deter-mining whether the consumerpersistsin pursuing he goalwhen thereareimpediments o its attainment.Developinga

theoretical understandingof the psychological processesthat affect persistence s likely to be beneficial,becausefewreal-world consumer goals are attained without the occur-rence of impediments, competitive advertising, or newbrandor productalternativesarising.In addition, examining consumer goals in the mannerdiscussed in this article is likely to serve as a bridge thatlinks the study of predecisionalprocessesto postdecisionalprocesses. Until now, these research streams have beenlargely divergentand have failed to recognize completelythe linkages between the two stages of the decision enact-ment process. For example, the intensityof investmentofcognitive resourcesin makingthe decision, in andof itself,may lead to greater commitment and plan making and,therefore, o greaterpersistence n the face of difficulties.Astudyof this andother such researchhypotheses providesafruitful avenue for additional research.Finally, though wefocused on the conscious aspectsof theseprocesses,extend-ing the ideas discussed herein to habitual,impulsive, andnonconsciousconsumerprocessesis likely to be fruitful.Forexample,an examinationof the differencesbetween rationaland impulsivegoal settingandgoal pursuit s likely to pro-vide severalpractical nsightsto marketers, uch as optimaldesign of store displays and the formulationof successfulpromotional trategies.In summary, an understandingof the role played bygoals in consumerbehavior,as well as the processesof goalsetting and goal pursuit,is critical to the advancement ofknowledgein the field. It is likely to be rewarding or acad-emics to develop a theoreticalunderstanding f morerealis-tic and real-worldconsumptionprocesses,which, more of-ten thannot, are fraughtwith impedimentsof one form oranother.This in turn is likely to provide insightsto market-ing practitioners n many ways, from developing richer,morerepresentative, nd more accuratemodels of purchaseforecasting o designing optimalcommunication timuli andstoredisplays and trainingof salespeople.We believe thattheexaminationof consumergoals representsa topic of im-mense potential for marketing researchers in the 21stcentury.

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