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People v. Mendoza95 Phil. 645 September 28, 1954 C.J. Paras Nuez

petitioners

People of the Philippines

respondents Arturo Mendoza

summary Second wife charged accused with bigamy for contracting a third marriage. Turns out thatthe marriage to #2 was void as he already had a first wife. Because the second marriage was

void, there was no valid marriage to speak of and therefore the third marriage was notbigamous. According to the prevailing law at that time, there was no need for a court orderto establish the invalidity of marriages.

facts of the caseAugust 5, 1936 - Mendoza was married to Jovita de Asis in Marikina.

May 14, 1941 - while the first marriage was subsisting, Mendoza was married to Olga Lema in Manila.

February 2, 1943 - de Asis died.

August 19, 1949 - Mendoza married CarmencitaPanlilio in Laguna. This gave rise to prosecution forbigamy.

Mendoza - the marriage to Lema being void as the marriage to de Asis was subsisting, the marriage withPanlilio could not have been bigamous, the first marriage being void.

SolGen - the voidness of the marriage to Lema given, there should have been a court order declaring thenullity of the marriage before he can validly marry Panlilio.

issueWhether Mendoza was guilty of bigamy. NO

Should there have been a previous court order declaring the nullity of the first marriage? NO NEED, BUTTHE DISSENT SAYS YES.

ratioIt is admitted that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted during the existence of his

first marriage with Jovita de Asis. Section 29 of the marriage law (act 3613), in force at the time the appellantcontracted his second marriage in 1941, provides as follows:

Illegal marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime ofthe first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal andvoid from its performance, unless:

(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;

(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the secondmarriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee beinggenerally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contractingsuch subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid in either case until declared nulland void by a competent court.

This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetimeof his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish itsinvalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable marriages. There is here no pretence that appellant's second

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marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, has been absent forseven consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to render said marriage valid until declared nulland void by a competent court.

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People v. AragonG.R. No. L-10016 28 February 1957 J. Labrador Ortiz

petitioners

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

respondents PROCESO S. ARAGON, defendant-appellant.

summary Accused married Gorrea on 28 September 1925. He contracted a subsequent marriage on 27August 1934 with Faicol. Gorrea then died on 05 August 1939. The accused contracted a

third marriage on 03 October 1953 with Maglasang. Because of this, a case for bigamy wasfiled by Faicol against the accused. The court ruled that the 1953 marriage with Maglasangwas not bigamous since the first marriage with Gorrea was already extinguished because ofher death. The 1934 marriage with Faicol has not become valid upon the death of Gorrea.

facts of the case

On September 28, 1925, the accused, under the name of Proceso Rosima, contracted marriage with a certainMaria Gorrea in the Philippine Independent Church in Cebu. While his marriage with Maria Gorrea wassubsisting, the accused under the name of Proceso Aragon, contracted a canonical marriage with Maria Faicolon August 27, 1934, in the Santa Teresita Church in Iloilo City.

The accused maintained Maria Faicol in Iloiolo and Maria Gorrea in Cebu. Gorrea then died on August 5,1939. After her death, the accused brought Maria Faicol to Cebu City in 1940, where she worked as a teacher-nurse.

The accused and Faicol did not live a happy marital life. She was always being maltreated by the accused.The accused sent Maria Faicol to Iloilo, allegedly for the purpose of undergoing treatment of her eyesight.During her absence, the accused contracted a third marriage with a certain Jesusa C. Maglasang on October 3,1953, in Sibonga, Cebu.

A complaint was filed by Faicol with the CFICFI: The accused is guilty of the crime of bigamy. The defendant could not legally contract marriage with

Jesusa C. Maglasang without the dissolution of his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the latter orby the judicial declaration of the nullity of such marriage.

issue

WON the accused is guilty of bigamy. NO

ratio

The court reversed the ruling of the CFI. The action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife,whose marriage with the appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the thirdmarriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and appellant's prosecution forcontracting this marriage cannot prosper.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio, without prejudice to his prosecution for having contracted the secondbigamous marriage. So ordered.

Dissent by J. Reyes: There should be a judicial declaration of nullity before one can marry again. It is notfor the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts

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Tolentino v. ParasG.R. No. L-43905 May 30, 1983 MELENCIO-HERRERA Ramos

petitioners

SERAFIA G. TOLENTINO

respondents HON. EDGARDO L. PARAS, MARIA CLEMENTE and THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OFPAOMBONG, BULACAN

summary Husband was charged with a bigamy case by his wife. He admitted to the offense, served

his prison sentence, but once out of jail, continued to live with his second wife. Upon hisdeath, the name of the second wife was indicated in his death certificate as his wife. Firstwife now files a case for the rectification in the entry of the Local Civil Registrar.SC held that since Amado (the husband) himself admitted to the act, there is no better proofthat he had an existing marriage when he married his second wife. As such, the secondmarriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse isnull and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. Further, no judicial decree isnecessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage and rectification can be made in therecords of the LCR.

facts of the case

Amado Tolentino had contracted a second marriage with private respondent herein, Maria Clemente, atBulacan, on November 1, 1948, while his marriage with petitioner, Serafia G. Tolentino, celebrated on July 31,1943, was still subsisting.

Petitioner charged Amado with bigamy, where the latter pleaded guilty. He served his prison sentence, bucontinued to live with respondent until his death. In his death certificate, it noted that respondent was hiswife.

Petitioner filed a SpecProfor the Correction of Entry where she sought to correct the name of the survivingspouse in the death certificate from "Maria Clemente" to "Serafia G. Tolentino", her name.The lower Courtdismissed the petition "for lack of the proper requisites under the law" and indicated the need for a moredetailed proceeding. Conformably, she filed a case against respondent and the Local Civil Registrar ofPaomobong, Bulacan. The Court however dismissed her petition.

issueWho should be named as the wife of the deceased?(Serafia)

ratioConsidering that Amado, upon his own plea, was convicted for Bigamy, that sentence furnishes the

necessary proof of the marital status of petitioner and the deceased. There is no better proof of marriage thanthe admission by the accused of the existence of such marriage.The second marriage that he contracted withprivate respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of noforce and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage.Rectificationof the erroneous entry in the records of the Local Civil Registrar may, therefore, be validly made.

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Wiegel v. Sempio-DyG.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986 Paras Recto

petitioners

Lilia OlivaWiegel

respondents Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy (presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of CaloocanCity) and Karl Heinz Wiegel

summary Lilia contracted a first marriage with Eduardo. She contracted a second marriage with Karl.

Karl asked for a declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of the prior existingmarriage. Lilia wanted to present evidence that her first marriage was vitiated by force andthat at the time of the first marriage, her first husband was already married to someone else.There is no need to present evidence because assuming Marriage#1 was vitiated by force, itwould be merely VOIDABLE (valid until annulled) thus when she contracted Marriage #2,she was still validly married making Marriage #2 VOID.Assuming Husband#1 already had a wife at the time of celebration of their marriage, therewas no judicial declaration of nullity and therefore at the time of Marriage #2, Marriage #1was still valid making Marriage #2 VOID.

facts of the case

Karl Heinz Wiegel asked for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia OlivaWiegel. They weremarried on July 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church in Makati. He filed before the Juvenileand Domestic Relations Court with presiding judge Alicia Sempio-Dy on the ground of Lilias previousexisting marriage to Eduardo Maxion (ceremony was performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of LourdesChurch in QC).

Lilia admitted the existence of the prior marriage but claimed that it was null and void because they wereallegedly forced into marriage. At the pre-trial, the parties agreed that the issue was the status of the firstmarriage: assuming the presence of force, was the first marriage void or merely voidable?

Lilia asked the court to present evidence: (1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised uponboth parties; and (2) that the first husband was already married to someone else at the time of their marriage.

Judge Sempio-Dy ruled against presentation of evidence because the existence of force exerted on bothparties were already agreed upon.

issueWhether or not Lilia could present evidence on those facts NO(Real issue: status of Lilias marriage to her first husband (VOIDABLE) and to her second husband (VOID)

ratioNo need for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force because assuming it was true, her

first marriage is not void but merely VOIDABLE (CC 85), and therefore valid until annulled.Since no annulment has been made, she married her second husband while still validly married to the first.

Her second marriage is VOID (CC 80).No need for Lilia to introduce evidence about the first husbands existing prior marriage at the time they

married each other because their marriage although void, still needs a judicial declaration of such fact. At thetime she contracted her second marriage she was still considered as a married woman, therefore, the marriagewith the second husband is still regarded as VOID.

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Donato v. LunaG.R. No. 53642 April 15, 1988 Gancayco Reynes

petitioners

Leonilo C. Donato

respondents Artemon Luna, Presiding Judge of the Manila CFI; Jose Flaminiano, City Fiscal of Manila; PazAbayan

summary An information for bigamy was filed against Donato, based on a complaint filed by the wife

in the alleged bigamous marriage. Afterwards, the same wife filed a civil case for annulmentbased on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit. The court ruled that theissue raised in the civil case did not constitute a prejudicial question sufficient to forestallthe criminal proceedings.

facts of the case1. [Jan. 23, 1979] An Information for the crime of bigamywas filed by the City Fiscal of Manila

against petitioner DONATO. It was based on the complaint of Paz ABAYAN (the alleged secondwife).

2. [Sept. 28, 1979] Before arraignment, ABAYAN filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court(JDRC)of Manila a civil action for annulmentof her marriage with DONATO contracted on Sept

26, 1978, based on the ground that ABAYAN consented to marrying DONATO since she had noprevious knowledge that DONATO was already married to a certain Rosalinda MALUPING(celebrated June 30, 1978).

a. DONATO interposed the defense that his second marriage was void since it was solemnizedwithout a marriage license, and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence wereemployed by ABAYAN to obtain DONATOs consent.

b. [It was noted, however, that the marriage license was dispensed with due to a joint affidavitexecuted by the spouses on Sept. 26, 1978 stating that they had lived together and deportedthemselves as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for a period of at least fiveyears.]

3. Prior to the date set for trial in the criminal case, DONATO filed a motion to suspend theproceedings contending that the pending civil case raises a prejudicial question which must first bedetermined and decided before the criminal case can proceed.

a. This motion was denied by the judge, relying on the case of Landico v. Relova.b. DONATO filed a motion for reconsideration, relying on the later case of De la Cruz v.

Ejercito. This was also denied.

issueW/N the pending civil case for annulment raises a prejudicial question to merit the suspension of the criminalcase for bigamy NO, it does not.

ratio A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a

logical antecedent of the issue involved the said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to anothertribunal.

o It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate form the crime but so intimately connectedwith it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.

The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain here.o The issue before the JDRC touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not

determinative of DONATOs guilt or innocence in the criminal case for bigamy.

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o It was DONATOs second wife, ABAYAN, who filed the complaint for annulment of the secondmarriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit.

Landico v. Relova, and not De la Cruz v. Ejercito, applies in the case at bar.o The Court in Landicoruled that the mere fact that there are action to annul the marriages entered

into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that prejudicial questions are automaticallyraised to warrant the suspension of the criminal case. In order for the annulment case toforestall the criminal proceedings, it must be shown that petitioners consent was obtained bymeans of duress, force, and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage wasinvoluntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.

DONATO has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the second marriage hadbeen obtained by the use of threats, force, and intimidation.

o De la Cruzis markedly different. There, it was the accused who was charged with bigamy andwho was likewise the one who filed a civil case for annulment. Here, it was the ABAYANthesecond wifewho filed a complaint for annulment. Moreover, in De la Cruz, there was alreadya judgment in the civil case declaring the second marriage null and void; here, there is no such

judgment.

DONATO only raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade prosecution of the criminal case.o DONATOs averments of vitiated consent is belied by the fact that DONATO and ABAYAN

executed a joint affidavit mentioned in facts.2.b. above.o Also, it was only when the civil case was filed (or more than one year from the solemnization of

the second marriage) that DONATO came up with his vitiated consent angle.

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TERREv. TERREA.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992 PER CURIAM Villarroya

petitioners

Dorothy B. Terre

respondents Atty. Jordan Terre

summary Respondent Jordan Terre married complainant Dorothy Terre after he convinced her thather first marriage to MerlitoBercenilla was void ab initio and had no need for judicial

declaration. Thereafter, he abandoned her and married another woman. The SC declaredhim guilty of grossly immoral conduct and disbarred him.

facts of the caseComplainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar, with

"grossly immoral conduct," consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another woman, whilehis prior marriage with complainant subsisted.

She and respondent met for the first time in 1979 as fourth year high school classmates. She was thenmarried to MerlitoBercenilla, while respondent was single. Respondent was aware of her marital status butstill he persistently courted her. She decided nothing would come of it since she was married but herespondent explained to her that their marriage was void ab initiosince she and her first husband were first

cousins. Convinced by his explanation and having secured favorable advice from her mother andex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him. In their marriage license, respondent wrote "single" as her statusexplaining that since her marriage was void ab initio, there was no need to go to court to declare it as such.They were married in 1977. However, respondent disappeared in 1981. Complainant was unaware of thereason for his disappearance until she found out that respondent married a certain HelinaMalicdem.

Respondent sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in good faith that his prior marriagewith complainant was null and void ab initio and that no action for a judicial declaration of nullity wasnecessary.

issueWhether or not respondent is guilty of grossly immoral conduct. YES, respondent is disbarred!

ratioRespondents pretended defense is the same argument by which he had inveigled complainant into

believing that her prior marriage to MerlitoBercenilla, being incestuous and void ab initio, she was free tocontract a second marriage with the respondent. Respondent, being a lawyer, knew or should have known thatsuch an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this Court which holds that for purposes ofdetermining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the firstmarriage was null and void ab initio is essential.

Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that respondent held that mistaken belief in good faith, the sameresult will follow. For if we are to hold him to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant DorothyTerre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to HelinaMalicdem must be regarded as

bigamous and criminal in character.The conduct of respondent inveigling complainant to contract a second marriage with him; in abandoningcomplainant after she had cared for him and supported him through law school, leaving her without meansfor the safe delivery of his own child; in contracting a second marriage with HelinaMalicdem while his firstmarriage was subsisting, constituted "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules ofCourt, affording more than sufficient basis for disbarment. He was unworthy of admission to the Bar in thefirst place.

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REPUBLIC vs. GRANADAG.R. No. 187512 June 13, 2012 Sereno, J.

petitioners

Republic of the Philippines

respondents Yolanda Cadacio Granada

summary Yolanda and Cyrus were married. When the company where they worked closed down,Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. Nine years have passed and still no news from

him. Yolanda filed for petition to declare Cyrus presumptively dead. RTC declared Cyrus aspresumptively dead. OSG filed a notice of appeal. CA dismissed the case for appeal was notthe proper remedy. SC ruled that since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is asummary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final andexecutory and that the correct remedy was to file a petition for certiorari with the CA.

Facts of the case

In May 1991, Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda) met Cyrus Granada (Cyrus) at Sumida ElectricPhilippines, an electronics company in Paraaque where both were then working. They got married at the

Manila City Hall on March 3, 1993.

Their marriage resulted in the birth of their son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio Granada. On May 1994, Sumida Electric closed down, thus Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment.

After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead.o Yolanda now claims that since then, she has not received any communication from her husband,

notwithstanding efforts to locate him.

o Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latters whereabouts, to no

avail.

RTC: Declared Cyrus as presumptively dead.

OSG filed an MR alleging that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed toprove her well-founded belief that he was already dead.

RTC: Denied MR.

OSG appealed via Rule 41.

Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal for it was asummary judicial proceeding in which the judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not

appealable.

CA: Granted Motion to Dismiss

Issue

Whether or not CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the Decision of the RTC in a summary

proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and,hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal? - NO

CitingRepublic v. Bermudez-Lorino,the CA noted that a petition for declaration of presumptive death for the

purpose of remarriage is a summary judicial proceeding under the Family Code. Hence, the RTC Decision thereinis immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties, by express provision of Article 247 of the same

Code. The decision is therefore not subject to ordinary appeal, and the attempt to question it through a Notice ofAppeal is unavailing.

A petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent

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marriage under Art. 411of the Family Code is a summary proceeding as provided for under the Family Code.

Further, Title XI of the Family Code is entitled Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law. Subsumedthereunder are Articles 238 and 247, which provide:

o Art.238.Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all casesprovided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in anexpeditious manner without regard to technical rules.

o Art.247.The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.

Further, Article 253 of the Family Code reads:o ART.253.The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings

filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable.

Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration ofpresumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and

executory.

OSG: Bermudez- Lorinohas been superseded by the subsequent Decision of the Court inRepublic v. Jomoc

SC: We do not agree. The Supreme Court inJomocdid not expound on the characteristics of a summaryproceeding under the Family Code. In contrast, the Court inBermudez-Lorinoexpressly stated that its ruling onthe impropriety of an ordinary appeal as a vehicle for questioning the trial courts Decision in a summary

proceeding for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code was intended to set therecords straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar.

Furthermore, four years afterJomoc,the SC ruled in the case ofRepublic v. Tangothat:o By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately

final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial courtsjudgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse underArticle 41 of the Family Code.

In sum, under Article 41, the losing party in a summary proceeding may file a petition for certiorari with the CAon the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amountingto lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via a

petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Whether or not CA erred in affirming the RTC decision based on the evidence presented by Yolanda?

NO

OSG: Yolanda has not adduced evidence required to establish a well-founded belief that her absent spouse wasalready dead. It also cited Republic v. Nolasco, US v. Biasbas, andRepublic v. CA and Alegro.

InNolasco, SC ruled that Art. 41 imposes more stringent requirements than does Article 83 of the Civil Code.o Civil Code - merely requires either that there be no news that the absentee is still alive; or that the

absentee is generally considered to be dead and is believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumeddead under Articles 390 and 391.

o Family Code -prescribes a well-founded belief that the absentee is already dead before a petition fordeclaration of presumptive death can be granted.

o SC also gave the four requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under the Family Code1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the

disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article391, Civil Code;

1Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the c elebration of the subsequent

marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well- founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In caseof disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall

be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code

for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

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2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the

absentee.

InBiasbas, the SC ruled that Biasbas failed to exercise due diligence in ascertaining the whereabouts of his firstwife, considering his admission that that he only had a suspicion that she was dead, and that the only basis of that

suspicion was the fact of her absence.

InRP v. CA and Alegro, the SC provided the following criteria for determining the existence of a well-foundedbelief under Article 41. It ruled that:

o The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and effortsto ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is alreadydead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spousedepends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after thedisappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse

Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda did not initiatea diligent search to locate her absent husband.

o Relatives of Cyrus which Yolandas brother (Diosdado) inquired about where not presented as witnesses.o Yolanda failed to seek information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other

government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines

HOWEVER, although such arguments are well-taken, the judgment of the RTC is final and executory and couldno longer be modified or reversed, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be anerroneous conclusion of fact or law.

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Republic vs. Cantor

G.R. No. 184621 December 10, 2013 J.BRION

Petitioner REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Respondent MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR

Summary On Jan. 1998, the married couple, Maria & Jerry, fought and as a result Jerry left their conjugal dwelling. On May21, 2002, 4 yrs from Jerrys disappearance, Maria Fe filed a petition for her husbands declaration of presumptivedeath, allegedly, under a well-founded belief that Jerry is already dead. She allegedly inquired from her in laws

neighbors and friends, as to Jerrys whereabouts and made it a point to check the patients directory whenevershe went to a hospital but to no avail. RTC, affirmed by CA, declared Jerry presumptively dead. SC reversed andheld that Marias earnest efforts fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence required by

jurisprudence to form a well-founded belief that her husband was already dead. She merely engaged in a"passive search" where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries.She did not report Jerrys absence to the policenor did she seek their aid him. She did not present as witnesses (or even name) Jerrys relatives or theineighbors and friends, who can corroborate her efforts.

facts of the case

Sept. 20, 1997: Maria Fe and Jerry married and lived together in their conjugal dwelling in Koronadal City, South Cotabato.

Jan.1998: They quarreled bec. of: (1) Maria Fes inability to reach "sexual climax"; and (2) Jerrys animosity toward Maria Fesfather.

After their fight, Jerry left and this was the last time that Maria Fe ever saw him.

May 21, 2002 (>4 yrs from Jerrys disappearance): Maria Fe filed before the RTC a petition for her husbands declaration o

presum pt ive deatho She allegedly inquired from Jerrys family, neighbors and friends, as to his whereabouts but to no avail.o She also made it a point to check the patients directory whenever she went to a hospital.

RTC:Granted Marias petition and declared Jerry presumptively dead pursuant to FC 41.

CA :Dismissed the Republics petition for certiorari and affirmed the RTC.

The Republic thru the OSG now argues that Maria did not have a well-founded belief to justify the declaration of her husbandspresumptive death and failed to conduct the requisite diligent search for her missing husband.

issues(1) Whether Maria Fe had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already dead? (NO)(2) Whether certiorari lies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial courts in petitions for declaration of presumptivedeath of an absent spouse under FC 41? (YES)

ratioOn the Issue of the Existence of Well-Founded Belief

Marias earnest efforts fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence required by jurisprudence to form a wellfounded belief that her husband was already dead. She merely engaged in a "passive search" where she relied onuncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and friends.

o She did not actively look for her missing husband. She did not purposely undertake a diligent search for her husband asher hospital visits were not planned nor primarily directed to look for him; they were unintentional.

o She did not report Jerrys absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the authorities to look for him.o She did not present as witnesses Jerrys relatives or their neighbors and friends, who can corroborate her efforts to locate

Jerry. They were not even named.o There was no other corroborative evidence to support her claim that she conducted a diligent search.

Four Essent ial Requis i tes for the Declarat ion of Presum pt ive Death Under FC 41o That the absent spouse has been missing for 4 consecutive years, or 2 consecutive years if the disappearance occurred

where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in NCC 391;o That the present spouse wishes to remarry;o That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead;o That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.

Burden of proof:Present spouse to show that all the requisites under FC 41 are present.

FC 41, compared to NCC 83, imposes a stricter standardbefore a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted(Republic v. Nolasco)

FC 41 NCC 83

Time required for the presumption to arise 4 consec yrs 7 consec yrs

Need for a judicial declaration ofpresumptive death to enable the spousepresent to remarry

Yes No

Standard "well founded belief" that the absentee isalready dead

There be no news that such absentee isstill alive; or the absentee is generally

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considered to be dead and believed to beso by the spouse present, or is presumeddead under NCC 390 and 391

"Well-founded belief"depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. It requires exertion of active effort (not a merepassive one).

Criter ia for determining the existence of a " wel l - founded bel ief " u nder FC 41 (Republ ic v. CA): The belief of the presenspouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absentspouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well -foundedbelief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before

and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by [the] present spouse. Reason for Strict Standard Approach:

o States policy to protect and strengthen marriage (prevent collusion)o For the Present Spouses Benefit:to protect him/her from a criminal prosecution of bigamy under RPC 349 which migh

come into play if he/she would prematurely remarry sans the court's declaration. Upon the issuance of the courts decision declaring his/her absent spouse presumptively dead, the presen

spouse's good faithin contracting a second marriage is effectively established and his/her criminal intent incase of remarriage is effectively negated.

On the Issue of the Propriety of Certiorari as a Remedy

Republics resort to certiorariunder Rule 65 of the ROC to question the RTCs order declaring Jerry presumptively dead wasproper.

Pursuant to FC 41 in rel. to FC 247, the courts judgment in summary proceedings, such as the declaration of presumptive death oan absent spouse, shall be immediately final and executory; hence, unappealable.

However, an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such

petition should be filed in the CA in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts.Petition granted. CA reversed.

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JONES v. HORTIGUELAG.R. No. 43701 Mar 6, 1937 Concepcion, J. Casilapetitioner Angelita Jonesoppositor Felix Hortiguelasummary Jones, the daughter of the decedent from her first husband, contends that the marriage of her mother

and Hortiguela was void because her father A. Jones had only been judicially declared absent for 6

years and 14 days (not 7 years) at the time of the second marriage. SC held that for the purposes ofthe civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at thetime of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to beliving, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believe atthe time of the celebration of the marriage. The date shall be reckoned from the date on which thelast news was received.

facts of the caseMarciana Escano had died intestate. In an order, Jones, her daughter by her first marriage and Hortiguela,

her widower by second marriage were declared her only heirs. Hortiguela was appointed judicial administratorof the entire estate. (June 1933) The project of partition and final account were approved in an order and the

properties were turned over to the grantees.(May 1934) Jones filed a motion alleging that she was the only heir of her mother and there never was avalid marriage between her mother and Hortiguela. CFI denied the motion.

issueW/N Hortguelas alleged marriage to Escano was celebrated -YES

ratioImportant dates: Dec 1914: Escano married Arthur W. Jones Jan 10, 1918: A. Jones secured a passport to go abroad and nothing was ever heard of him Oct 1919: Escano instituted proceedings to judicially declare A. Jones an absentee.

Oct 25, 1919: CFI declared him an absentee from the Philippines Dec 1919-June 1920: The order was published in the Official Gazette and in the newspaper El Ideal April 23, 1921: CFI issued an order for the taking effect of the declaration of absence May 6, 1927: Hortiguela and Escano were married before the justice of peace of Malitbog, Leyte and

they signed the certificate of marriage

Jones contends that the declaration of absence must be understood to have been made when the CFI issed an orderfor the taking effect of the declaration of absence not when CFI declared A. Jones an absentee. From the latter date to thedate of marriage of Hortiguela and Escano, only 6 years and 14 days elapsed and in accordance with General Order 68the marriage is null and void.

The Court held that for the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former

spouse judicially declared an absentee.The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisionsof the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for theadministration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law onlyrequires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the secondmarriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that suchformer spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believe at the time of thecelebration of the marriage. The absence of A. Jones should be counted from January 10, 1918, the date onwhich the last news concerning Arthur W. Jones was received, and from said date to May 6, 1927, more thannine years elapsed. Said marriage is, therefore, valid and lawful.

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As regards the failure to record the marriage in the register of the municipality: General Order 68 does not provide that failure to transmit such certificate to the municipal secretary

annuls the marriage. Madridejo v. De Leon: It does not appear that in the celebration of marriage forwarding of a copy of the

marriage certificate is a requisite for the validity of the marriage. US v. De Vera: Certificates of marriages recorded in registrars are not the only ones that can attest and

prove such facts to such an extent that other proofs established by law may not be presented oradmitted at trial.

Further, according to the Code of Civil Procedure, a person not heard from in seven years is presumed to bedead.

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Petition for the presumption of death of Nicolai SzatrawG.R. No. L-1780 April 31, 1948 Padilla J ChuaPetitioners Counselo Sors

Respondents N/ASummary Consuelo married a Polish citizen named Nicolas. They had a son but almost 4 years

into the marriage, Nicolas left and took with him their sons. She had neither seen nor

heard of them since then. After her husbands absence for more than seven years,

Consuelo filed a petition to declare her husband presumptively dead. Court

dismissed her petition on the ground that independently of an action or special

proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the

subject of an action or special proceeding. A judicial pronouncement to this effect,

even if final and executory, would still be a prima faciepresumption only. Since it is

merely disputable, it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or

declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a

competent court has to pass.

Facts of the Case

Counselo Sors is the lawful wife of Nicolas Szatraw, a Polish citizen, to whom she was married inManila on November 1936 and whom she bore a child.

She lived with Nicolas from the time they were married until February, 1940, when her husband,

on the pretext that he would call on some friends, departed from their home with their child

and never returned,

She made inquiries and learned that her husband and child had left for Shanghai. However,

according to Polish citizens who had arrived from that place, he and the child had not been

seen and could not be found.

Because of her husband's absence for more than seven years during which there was no news

from him, she believes that he is dead, thus, Consuelo Sors prays that her husband be

declared dead and that her parental authority over her child, should the latter be alive and

later on appear, be preserved. TC: Dismiss. (1) It is not for the settlement of the estate of the absentee, and (2) The rule of

evidence establishing the presumption that a person unheard from in seven years is dead,

does not create a right upon which a judicial pronouncement of a decree may be

predicated.

Issue

Whether or not Consuelos petition for her husband to be declared presumptively dead may be

granted. NO.

Ratio

Petition is not for the settlement of estate. Nicolas neither possessed property brought to the

marriage nor had he acquired any property during his married life. The rule invoked by

Consuelo is merely one of evidence which permits the court to presume that a person is dead

after the fact that such person had been unheard from in seven years had been established.

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This presumption may arise and be invoked and made in a case, either in an action or in a

special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent

court. Independently of such an action or special proceeding, the presumption of death

cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or special proceeding.

In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner

against her absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final determination of his right or

status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact, for the petition does not pray for a

declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he bepresumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years.

The petition is for a declaration that Consuelo's husband is presumptively dead. But this

declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve her situation, because such a

presumption is already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if

final and executory, would still be a prima faciepresumption only. Since it is merely disputable,

it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or

matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass.

Once a Court decides a controversy by a final decree, the judgment upon the right or status

of a party or upon the existence of a particular fact becomesres judicata, subject to no

collateral attack, with a few exceptions.

It is therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, becausehe had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumptionjuris tantumonly, subject to

contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final.

A declaration such as the one prayed for by Consuelo, if granted, might lead her to believe

that the marital bonds which bind her to her husband are torn asunder and that for that

reason she is or may feel free to enter into a new marriage contract. The framers did not

intend and mean that a judicial declaration based solely upon that presumption may be

made. A petition for a declaration such as the one filed in this case may be made in collusion

with the other spouse. If that were the case, then a decree of divorce that cannot be

obtained under the Divorce Law (Act No. 2710) could easily be secured by means of a judicia

decree declaring a person unheard from in seven years to be presumptively dead.

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Republic v CA and MolinaG.R. No. 108763 Feb. 13, 1997 Panganiban, J. Cristobal

petitioners

Republic of the Philippines

respondents CA and Roridel Olaviano Molina (wife)

summary Annulment of Marriage case on the ground of psychological incapacity. The Court handeddown the Molina Doctrine:

1. Burden of proof on plaintiff, to be investigated for collusion by the OSG2.Root cause must be medically/clinically identified, alleged in the complaint and explainedin the decision3.Exists at the time of the marriage4.Incurable relative to spouse (ie nurse not caring for own children)5.Grave enough to bring about incapability to fulfill marital obligation (disabling factor)6.Essential marital obligations refer to: Art 68-71, 220-221 and 2257.Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of Catholic Church should beobserved (respected, persuasive)8.State participation to protect sanctity of marriage through the fiscal or prosecutingattorney - serve OSG a copy of the petition

facts of the caseRoridel married Reynaldo Molina on April 14, 1985 and they had a son. After a year, Reynaldo showed

signs of immaturity and irresponsibility, as he preferred to spend more time with friends on whom hesquandered his money, he depended on his parents for aid and was never honest with Roridel regardingfinances, resulting to frequent quarrels between them. Sometime in 1986, he was relieved of his job and Roridelbecame the sole breadwinner. In October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of whichtheirrelationship was estranged. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from herjob in Manila and went to live with herparents in Baguio City, and a few weekslater, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since thenabandoned them.

Roridel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage on the ground that Reynaldo was

psychologically incapable of complyingwith essential marital obligations.In his answer, Reynaldo alleged that their quarrels were due to Roridels refusal to perform some of hermarital duties such as cooking and running the household, and her failure to handle their finances.

TC declared the marriage void. CA affirmed, concluding that psychological incapacity as a ground forannulment is a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct which, considered as a whole, tends to cause theunion to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage. Thus, there is enough reason to leavethe spouses to their individual fates.

Hence this appeal by the Republic represented by the SolGen, contending that opposing and conflictingpersonalities is not equivalent to PI.

issue

WON the marriage should be declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity? NO

ratioThere is no clear showing that the psychological defect is an incapacity. It appears to be more of

adifficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of somemarital obligations. Mereshowing of irreconciliable differences and conflictingpersonalities in no wise constitutes psychologicalincapacity. It is not enough toprove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties asmarriedpersons it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, dueto some psychological(not physical) illness.

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The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husbandcould not get alongwith each other.The experttestimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder butonlyincompatibility, not psychological incapacity (she testified that the spouses are not unfit for other partnersor for their professions). There is no showing that Reynaldosalleged personality traits were constitutive ofpsychological incapacity existing at the time of marriagecelebration.

Through the help of amici curiae Oscar Cruz of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of theCatholic Church in the Philippines and Justice Ricardo Puno, member of the Family Code Revision Committee

the Court handed down the following guidelines: (Molina doctrine)(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs tothe plaintiff. Any doubt should

be resolved in favor of the existenceand continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution andnullity.(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)medically or clinically identified, (b)

alleged in the complaint, (c)sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of thecelebration of the marriage.(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinicallypermanent or incurable. Such

incurability may be absolute or evenrelative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutelyagainst everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity mustbe relevant to the assumption of marriageobligations, not necessarilyto those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a

job.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability ofthe party to assume the essentialobligations of marriage. The illness must beshown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglectordifficulty, much less ill will.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68-71, 220, 221 and 225 of theFamily Code.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate MatrimonialTribunal of the Catholic Church in thePhilippines, while not controllingor decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clearthat Article36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee fromCanon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, whichbecame effective in1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable toassume the essentialobligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal andthe Solicitor General to appear ascounsel for the state. No decisionshall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues acertification.

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CHOA v. CHOAG.R. No. 143376 Nov. 26, 2002 Panganiban Enad

petitioners

Leni Choa

respondents Alfonso Choa

summary Respondent-husband filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of his marriage withPetitioner-wife for the latters alleged psychological incapacity. The relevant issue here is

WoN respondent presented evidence to establish his wifes psych incapacity such that theRTC was correct in denying the wifes demurrer to evidence.Held: The RTC was in GAD when it denied the demurrer. The evidence presented by thehusband (docs showing charges filed against him by his wife; his oral testimony that hiswife was immature, lacked attention to children, and lacked the intention to procreate; theexpert testimony of Dr. Gauzon stating that they were incompatible) failed to show that thewifes incapacity was characterized by: (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)incurability.

facts of the casePetitioner and respondent were married on March 15, 1981. They have 2 children. In 1993, respondent filed

with the RTC of Negros Occidental a complaint for the annulment of their marriage. He subsequently filed anamended complaint for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner based on her allegedpsychological incapacity. After respondent finished presenting his evidence, petitioner filed a MTD (Demurrerto Evidence).

RTC: denied demurrer. Respondent established a quantum of evidence that petitioner must controvert.CA: denial of demurrer interlocutory = certiorari under Rule 65 not available. Remedy is for petitioner to

present evidence.

issueWoN the RTC was in GAD in denying the demurrer. YES. The evidence failed to establish petitionerspsychological incapacity.

WoN certiorari is available to correct and order denying a demurrer to evidence. YES.

ratioEvidence against petitioner is grossly insufficient to support any finding of psychological incapacity that

would warrant a declaration of nullity of the parties marriage.

Evidence presented by respondent:(1) He claims that petitioner filed a series of charges against him(perjury, false testimony concubinage, and

deportation). The filing and the prosecution of these cases clearly showed that his wife wanted not only to puthim behind bars, but also to banish him from the country.

SC: Docs presented by respondent do not show the alleged psych incapacity of petitioner. They merely

establish the prosecution of cases against him, not that his wife is psychologically incapacitated to fulfillher marital obligations.

(2) Respondents testimony that his wife wanted to have an abortion before they were even married, thatshe was immature, lacked attention to their children, and lacked the intention of procreative sexuality(ano daw).

SC: None of these traits, singly or collectively, constitutes psychological incapacity. Psych incapacity mustbe characterized by: (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.(Santos v CA)

Psych incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to betruly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the

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parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Art. 68 FC, include their mutual obligs to live together,observe love, respect, and fidelity, and render help and support. It must exist at the time the marriage iscelebrated. It must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal, or a neglect in the performance of maritalobligations. There should be a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integralelement in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and therebycomplying with the obligs essential to marriage.

Applied:Evidencemerely shows that he and his wife could not get along with each other . There was no

showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting their marital union. Itdid not show that the psych incapacity was grave enough to bring about the disability of a party to assume theessential obligs of marriage. Also, how could they have had 2 children if petitioner lacked the intention ofprocreative sexuality? Moreover, there was no proof that the defect already existed at the time of thecelebration of the marriage.

(3) Experttestimony of Dr. Gauzon.SC: The testimony utterly failed to identify and prove the root cause of the alleged psych incapacity. It did

not show that the incapacity, if true, was medically/clinically permanent or incurable. Nor did he testifythat it was grave enough to bring about disability of the party to assume the essential obligs of marriage

His testimony only establishes that the sps were incompatible, a defect that could possibly be treated or

alleviated through psychotherapy.Furthermore, the assessment made by the doctor was based merely on descriptions communicated to

him by respondentthere was no examination conducted on petitioner. Thus, he had no personal knowledgeof the facts he testified to, making his testimony unscientific and unreliable.

Thus, the ct was in GAD when it denied petitioners demurrer to evidence.

Re: certiorari availabilityGR: interlocutory orders are neither appealable nor subject to certiorari proceedings.EXC: certiorari allowed when lower ct acts with GAD in the issuance of an interlocutory order.

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Barcelona v. CA &BengzonG.R. No. 130087 24 September 2003 J. Carpio Espaola

petitioners

Diana M. Barcelona

respondents Court of Appeals and Tadeo R. Bengzon

summary TadeoBengzon filed a petition for Annulment of Marriage against his wife, Diana Barcelona,which he then moved to withdraw. He then filed a second petition for the same cause of

action based on Article 36 of the Family Code, alleging psychological incapacity thatrendered her unable to fulfill the essential obligations of their marriage. Diana moved todismiss the second petition on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action, primarilybecause the petition was unable to allege the root cause of the psychological incapacity.The Court disagreed, and held that under the 2, paragraph 6 of the Rules on Declarationof Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, expertopinion need not be alleged. The root cause of psychological incapacity would be a matterbest determined by experts in the fields of neurological or behavioral science; hence, itconstitutes expert opinion that need not be alleged in the petition. It suffices that the petitionallege the physical manifestations of the psychological incapacitya requisite that Tadeospetition complies with.

facts of the caseIn March 1995, respondent TadeoBengzon filed a petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner

Diana Barcelona, but later filed a Motion to Withdraw the petition, which was granted in June 1995.In July 1995, Tadeo filed a new Petition for Annulment of Marriage against Dianabased on Article 36 of

the Family Code. In the petition, Tadeo alleged that he and Diana were legally married after a whirlwindcourtship, established their home in Quezon City, and begot five children. However, petitioner Diana wasallegedly psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriage, rendering her unable tocomply with the essential obligations of the marriage, to wit:

(a) They frequently quarreled because of their varied upbringing; since Diana came from a rich family, shewas a disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house, playing tennis all day;

(b)Diana suffered several miscarriages, and one of their children fell ill, causing Diana to withdraw intoherself and refuse to speak to her husband;(c) During her pregnancy with their fifth child, Diana requested that Tadeo leave their conjugal dwelling,

and in spite of Tadeos attempts at compromise (i.e. occupying another room in the house), he wasforced to leave;

(d)The separation resulted in complete estrangement;(e) Dianas psychological incapacity, which subsisted up to the present, was conclusively found in a

psychological examination conducted between her and Tadeo.In response, Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was predicated on two grounds.The first isthat the

petition fails to state a cause of action, because the petition does not allege the following:(1) The root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity;(2) That the alleged psychological incapacity existed from the celebration of the marriage; and(3) That it is permanent and incurable.Second, the petition violates the rule against forum shopping.The trial court denied Dianas Motion to Dismiss on the ground that contrary to her claim, the allegations

in the second petition show a cause of action, and that the filing of the second petition did not amount toforum shopping since the first petition had already been dismissed without prejudice.

Diana assailed the trial courts ruling before the Court of Appeals, which sustained the finding that theallegations in Tadeos second petition state a cause of action sufficient to sustain a valid judgment if proven tobe true. Neither did Tadeo violate the rule against forum shopping: there is no litispendentiasince the first

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petition had been dismissed, and neither was thereres judicata because the dismissal was not a final decision onthe merits of the case. Hence, this petition.

issues(1) Whether the allegations of the second Petition for Annulment of Marriage sufficiently state a cause of

action. YES. The rules of procedure on absolute nullity and annulment of void and voidablemarriages provide that expert opinion need not be alleged. The root of the psychological incapacitywould constitute expert opinion. It thus need not be alleged in the petition.

(2) [Minor issue] Whether Tadeo violated the rule against forum shopping in filing the second Petition. NO. The dismissal of the first petition precluded litispendentia, and that dismissal, not being one onthe merits, does not constitute res judicata.

ratio(1) The second petition complies with the new procedural rules governing absolute nullity and annulmentof void and voidable marriages.

The case of Santos v. CAdefined psychological incapacity asmental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic maritalcovenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage

which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to livetogether, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.

Further, Santos states that the law refers to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearlydemonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Thepsychological condition must exist at the time of celebration of the marriage.

Subsequent to Santos and the case of Republic v. Molina, the Court adopted the Rules on Declaration ofAbsolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, where 2, paragraph (d) states:The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychologicalincapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.

These new Rules are applicable to the case at hand, given that procedural rules apply to actions pendingand unresolved at the time of their passage. The obvious effect of the new rules in providing that expert

opinion need not be alleged is that there is no need to allege the root cause of psychological incapacity, sinceonly experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are competent to determine such rootcause.

All that the new Rules require is that the petition allege the physical manifestations indicative ofpsychological incapacity; Tadeos second petition complies with this requirement.

Moreover, the second petition definitely states a cause of action since it states the legal right of respondentTadeo, the correlative legal obligation of petitioner Diana, and the act or omission of petitioner Diana inviolation of Tadeos legal right.

(2) There was neither litispendentianor res judicata.The Court upheld the CAs findings that there was no litispendentia, since the first petition had already

been dismissed. Neither does the dismissal of the first petition constitute res judicata, since the dismissal wasnot a decision on the merits, but was in fact a dismissal without prejudice.

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RP v. QUINTERO-HAMANOG.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004 Corona Fernandez

petitioners

REPUBLIC

respondents LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO

summary Lolita Quintero and Toshio Hamano started a common-law relationship while they were inJapan. They moved back to the Philippines and had a child. After their marriage, Toshio

went back to Japan and after some time, did no longer responded to the letters of Lolita.Lolita filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage. The trial court ruled thatToshio was psychologically incapacitated to fulfil his marital obligations as shown by hisirresponsibility and lack of concern to the needs of his family. The CA affirmed this ruling.The Court however ruled otherwise. CitingMolina, it ruled that the totality of evidencepresented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume hismarital responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but itwas never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness.

facts of the case In her complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage, Lolita Quintero-Hamano,alleged that in October

1986, she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. Later, they lived in the Philippines for amonth. In 1987, Toshio went back to Japan. In the same year, she gave birth to their child. In 1988,Lolitaand Toshio in MTC Cavite.

Lolita alleged that unknown to her, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his maritalresponsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage.

o One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by ChristmasToshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded.Sometime in 1991, Lolita learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did notbother to see her and their child.

The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer residing at his given address.o In 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication.

o Because Toshio failed to file a responsive pleading after the lapse of 60 days from publication,Lolita filed a to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation which was granted by the court.

The prosecutor filed a report finding that no collusion existed between the parties.o He prayed that the OCP to be allowed to intervene to ensure that the evidence submitted was not

fabricated.o The trial courtallowed Lolita to present her evidence ex parte. She then testified on how Toshio

abandoned his family. She thereafter offered documentary evidence to support her testimony.

Trial court rendered declaring the marriage between Lolita and Toshio null and void after finding thatToshio failed to fulfil his obligations as a husband and as a father. According to the court, Toshio remainedirresponsible and unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his family. Such indifference, to the mind ofthe Court, is a clear manifestation of insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child which

characterizes a very immature person. OSG appealed to the CA but the appellate court upheld the ruling of the trial court.

issue(1) Did Lolita successfully proved Toshios psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital responsibilities

?NO.

ratio

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In the ruling inMolina, the court provided guidance in the interpretation and application of FC 36:o [](2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified

(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in thedecision []

o The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos:psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c)incurability.

o The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declaredpsychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be medically or clinically identified.

o However, what is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partyspsychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain afinding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned neednot be resorted to.

Lolita showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support his family. Heabandoned them a month after his marriage to respondent. She sent him several letters but he neverreplied. He made a trip to the Philippines but did not care at all to see his family.

The totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated toassume his marital responsibilities.

o Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven tobe due to some kind of psychological illness. After Lolita testified on how Toshio abandoned hisfamily, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychologicaldisorder.

o Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatlyhelped respondents case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified hisillness. This could have been done through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.

Abandonment is also a ground for legal separation.There was no showing that the case at bar was not jusan instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot presume psychological defectfrom the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage.

o It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married

person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychologicalnot physical, illness.

According to the CA, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the present caseinvolves a mixed marriage, the husband being a Japanese national.

o In proving psychological incapacity, there is no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipinospouse.

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Republic v. EncelanJanuary 9, 2013BRION, J.

SUMMARY: Cesar filed a petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolitas psychological

incapacity, after learning that Lolita had been having an illicit affair and left the conjugal home. A psychological evaluation report was

presented by Cesar where it was found that Lolita was not suffering from any form of major psychiatric illnessbut had been unable to

provide the expectations expected of her for a good and lasting marital relationship. SC HELD that Cesar failed to prove Loli tas

psychological incapacity. To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are

manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marita

obligations.

FACTS:

1979: Cesar married Lolita and the union bore two children, Maricar and Manny. To support his family, Cesar went to work in

Saudi Arabia in 1984.

While still in Saudi, Cesar learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez.

Sometime in 1991, Lolita allegedly left the conjugal home with her children and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita

had been separated.

1995: Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on

Lolitas psychological incapacity.

Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin (he is an associate in her promotions business). She insisted that she is no

psychologically incapacitated and that she left their home because of irreconcilable differences with her mother-in-law.

At trial, Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores of the NationaCenter for Mental Health.

Dr. Flores report:

o Lolita was not suf fer ing from any form of major psych iat r ic i l lness[ , ]but had been unable to provide the

expectations expected of her for a good and lasting marital relationship;

o Her transferring from one job to the other depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as her

impatience in attaining her ambitions;

o Her refusal to go with her husband abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a good marital and family relationship.

RTC declared the marriage void. CA originally set aside the verdict of RTC but on MR, affirmed RTCs decision. CA found two

circumstances indicative of Lolitas serious psychological incapacity that resulted in her gross infidelity:

o (1) Lolitas unwarranted refusal to perform her marital obligations to Cesar; and

o (2) Lolitas willful and deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling.

OSG argues that Dr. Flores psychological evaluation report did not disclose that Lolita had been suffering from a

psychological illness nor did it establish its juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability; infidelity and abandonment do notconstitute psychological incapacity, but are merely grounds for legal separation.

ISSUE + RULING:Whether there is sufficient basis to nullify Cesars marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity (NO)

RATIO:

1. Applicable Law and Jurisprudence on Psychological Incapacity

Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage. It provides

that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with

the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its

solemnization."

Psychological incapacity contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic

marital obligations; not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. The

plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical antecedence ( i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of marriage)

gravity and incurability of the condition of the errant spouse.

2. Cesar failed to prove Lolitas psychological incapacity

Cesar testified on the dates when he learned of Lolitas alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment of their home,as wel

as his continued financial support to her and their children even after he learned of the affair,]but he merely mentioned in

passing Lolitas alleged affair with Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.

In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily constitute

psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation.To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be

shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely

prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations.

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The psychological evaluation, in fact, established that Lolita did not suffer from any major psychiatric illness. Lolitas

interpersonal problems with co-workers does not suffice as a consideration for the conclusion that she was at the time of he

marriagepsychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital union with Cesar.

o Aside from the time element involved, a wifes psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with her

professional/work relationship; workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apart from their marita

counterparts.

o Lolitas refusal to go with Cesar abroad signified a reluctance to work out a good marital relationship is a mere

generalization unsupported by factsand is, in fact, a rash conclusion that this Court cannot support.

DISPOSITION:Petition GRANTED. CA amended decision SET ASIDE.

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YAPTINCHAY v. TORRESG.R. No. L-26462 June 9 1969 Sanchez Hermosisima

petitioners

Teresita Yaptinchay (aka kabit)

respondents Judge Guillermo Torres (CFI Rizal)Virginia Yaptinchay (special administratrix) etc

summary Case of kabit versus the proper heirs. Teresita Yaptinchay filed an application forappointment as special administratrix of Isidro Yaptinchays estate, which included a house

and lot in Forbes, Makati. Josephina, Isidros legitimate wife, and his childrenobjected tothis, hence the probate court awarded the administration of the property to Isidrosdaughter, Virginia. After losing the administration of the estate, Teresita filed a civil case forreplevin with prayer for prelim injunction to prevent Virginia et al from forcing her out ofthe Forbes property. She wanted to dissolve the alleged partnership she had with Isidro inboth contributing to build the Forbes house. The court in the civil case denied said right andinstead ordered Teresita to deliver the Forbes house to Virginia. SC sided with the lowercourt. SC held that Teresita failed to show a clear right to the said house to grant her prayerfor injunction. First, she has not provided enough proof to rebut the presumption that ahouse built on Isidros land, and at his instance, during the existence of his marriage withJosephina is conjugal property. The loans she argued were used in building the house

didnt show that they were actually used for building the house in Forbes since some ofthem also showed that she used it for her own business and personal expenses.

Even if Teresita argues that there is a presumption of co-ownership as to propertypurchased by two people who are living together with the impediments to get married (CC144), court said Teresita failed to build the presumption in the 1stplace since she failed toshow that she contributed in building the house.

facts of the case1stcase (probate case)

- On July 1965, Teresita Yaptinchay filed with the CFI an application to be appointed as special

administratrix of Isidro Yaptinchays estate, claiming that:o She has lived with Isidro Yaptinchay continuously for 19 years 1946-65.o That Isidro died without a will and left an estate with an estimate value of around 500ko That in her knowledge, Isidro only had three daughters: Virgina, Mary and Asunciono That certain people have been stealing personalties from his estate, hence the need of a special

administatrix- Court issued an order appointing Teresita as special administatrix 4 days later. Such appointment was

shortlived since Josefina Yaptinchay and other children of Isidro filed an opposition to herappointment on the ground that Teresita was not an heir of Isidro, since Josefina was the legitimatewife. Add to this the fact that she has been living with Isidro for a number of years as her kabit,Josefina et al argued that Teresita cannot be appointed as special administratrix.

- The CFI granted such prayer and instead appointed Virginia Yaptinchay(Isidros daughter) as specialadministratrix. As special administratrix, Virginia conducted an inventory of Isidrosestate, whichincludes the subject property of this case, a house in North Forbes.2ndcase (civil case)

- Teresita, being defeated in the probate court, filed civil case 8873, a case for replevin and liquidation ofpartnership supposedly formed during her cohabitation with Isidro. By filing this separate civil case forreplevin, the court issued a preliminary injunction ordering Virginia et al from interfering withTeresitas right of possession of the Forbes property

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- Virgina et al opposed this saying the probate court had jurisdiction over the whole estate of Isidro andthat Teresitas title to the property was in doubt. This is why the court in the 2nd case issued apreliminary injunction, ordering Teresita to give the Forbes property to Virginia and ordered all of herrepresentatives to leave the premises.

- Since Teresitas MR was denied, she filed this case with the SC

issueIs Teresita entitled to the injunction she is praying for? No

Ratio- It is a principle in law that injunction is not be granted for the purpose of taking property out of

possession and/or control of a party and placing it in that of another whose title has not been clearlyestablished. Here, although Teresita was in possession of the lot, the probate court already acquiredjurisdiction not only over Isidros exclusive property but also over his conjugal property with hislegitimate wife (who is not Teresita) (and since the special administratrix is an agent of the court,any property under the jurisdiction of the probate court may be possessed and administered by saidspecial administratrix)

- Teresita keeps on arguing that she also contributed in the purchase and construction of the Forbes lot,

showing loans that she obtained while the house was under construction. The SC however found nodirect correlation between the loans and the construction of the house since the loans did not indicateits purpose. Some of the loans, on the other hand, listed several purposes for the money borrowed.

- With this lack of direct proof, Teresita was not able to override the presumption that the house, havingbeenconstructed on the lot of Isidro at his instance, and during the existence of his marriage withJosephina, is part of the estate that should be under the control of the special administratrix.

- Lastly, Teresita cannot rely on Article 144 of the Civil Code which states that When a man andwoman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from thebeginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or theirwages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership

o The creation of the civil relationship of co-ownership under Article 144 must 1stmeet the

conditions laid out in the law. One such condition is that there must be a clear showing thatthe petitioner, during cohabitation, really contributed to the acquisition of the propertyinvolved.

o Until such right to co-ownership is established, Teresitas right to the property cannot beconsidered as a present right or title that would give her the privilege of an injunction

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Fujiki vs. Marinay

G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013 CarpioJ.

petitioners MINORU FUJIKI

respondents MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND

THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE

summary Fujiki and Marinay were married but eventually lost contact with each other. Without the first marriage

being dissolved, Marinay married Maekara. Marinay suffered from physical abuse from Maekara and

thereafter sought the help of Fujiki. Marinay and Fujiki reestablished their relationship. Fujiki helpedMarinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay

and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. Afterwards, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC for the

recognition of such foreign judgement.

HELD: Fujiki has personality to file the petition. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void

Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to

recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a

foreign country. A direct action is not necessary and a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil

registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the

parties is a citizen of the foreign country would be sufficient.

facts of the case

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the

Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujikicould not bring his wife to

Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara).

Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines.

Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and

started to contact Fujiki.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship.

In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinayand Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.

On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of

Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous

marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the

Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court

judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the

Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).

RTC: dismissed the case and cited cited the provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and

Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)2

Fujikis argments: He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity andannulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply since a petition for recognition of fore