13 capital structure concepts ©2006 thomson/south-western
TRANSCRIPT
13
Capital Structure Concepts
©2006 Thomson/South-Western
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Introduction
This chapter examines some of the basic concepts used in determining a firm’s optimal capital structure. It deals only with the total permanent sources of a firm’s financing.
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Capital Structure Vs Financial Structure Capital Structure
Permanent S-T
debt
L-T debt
P/S
C/S
Financial Structure
Total current
liabilities
L-T debt
P/S
C/S
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Capital Structure Terminology Optimal capital structure
Minimizes a firm’s weighted cost of capital Maximizes the value of the firm
Target capital structure Capital structure at which the firm plans to
operate Debt capacity
Amount of debt in the firm’s optimal capital structure
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What Determines the Optimal Capital Structure ? Business risk of the firm
Tax structure
Bankruptcy potential
Potential agency costs
Signaling effects
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Capital Structure Assumptions Firm’s investment policy is held constant. Capital structure changes the distribution
of the firm’s EBIT among the firm’s claimants. Debtholders Preferred stockholders Common stockholders
Constant investment policy leaving the debt capacity of the firm unchanged
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Factors Influencing a Firm’s Business Risk Variability of sales
volume
Variability of selling
price
Variability of cost
Amount of market
power
Extent of product
diversification
Firm’s growth rate
Degree of operating
leverage (DOL)
Both systematic and
unsystematic risk
Web site for more info: http://finance.yahoo.com/
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Financial Risk
Variability of EPS and increased probability of bankruptcy
Factors indicating financial risk Debt-to asset ratio Debt-to-equity ratio Fixed charge coverage ratio DFL Probability distribution of profits Times interest earned ratio EBIT-EPS analysis
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Capital Structure Theory
Studies the relationship between
Capital structure
Debt/assets
Cost of capital
Value of the firm
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Capital Structure Models
The simplest model considers only
Taxes
More complex models account for
Taxes
Financial distress costs
Agency costs
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Modigliani and Miller (MM) On Capital Structure Assumed perfect capital markets
including No taxes No bankruptcy (B) costs No agency (A) costs
If leverage increases, the cost of equity, ke, increases to exactly offset the benefits of more debt financing, kd, leaving the cost of capital, ka, constant. see model 1
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Cost ofCapital
kd
ka
ke
Model 1 (MM)
The overall cost of capital is independent of the capital structure. The firm’s value is independent of the capital structure.
Debt
Total Assets
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MM Arbitrage Proof
Value (V) of U = D/ke
Value (V) of L = D/ke + I/kd
D paid to L’s stockholders are reduced by the amount of I paid on the debt.
ke is higher for L because of the additional leverage-induced risk.
The values of U and L are identical due to arbitrage.
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What Happens with Taxes ? Same two equations VU = D/ke VL = D/ke + I/kd D distributed to U’s stockholders are
reduced by the taxes paid on operating income and the value of U drops.
Since I is tax deductible, L realizes a tax savings.
PV of tax shield = value of debt (B) tax rate (T).
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VL = VU + Value of Tax Shield
MktValue
of Firm
Debt $
VL
VU
PV of
Tax Shield
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Model 2 (MM with taxes)
DebtTotal Assets
ki = kd (1 – T)
ka
ke
Cost ofCapital
The cost of capital decreases with the amount of debt. The firm maximizes its value by choosing a capital structure that is all debt.
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What Happens With Taxes, Bankruptcy, and Agency Costs ? B&A costs increase with the amount of
leverage. Eventually offsets the marginal benefits
from the value of the tax shield Market value of leveraged firm
= Market value of unleveraged firm
+ PV of tax shield
– PV of bankruptcy costs– PV of agency costs See optimal debt ratio slide
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Bankruptcy Costs
Lenders may demand higher interest rates.
Lenders may decline to lend at all. Customers may shift their business to
other firms. Distress incurs extra accounting & legal
costs. If forced to liquidate, assets may have to
be sold for less than market value.
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Agency CostsStockholder-Bondholder Relationship
Investing in projects with high risk and high returns can shift wealth from bondholders to stockholders.
Stockholders may forgo some profitable investments in the presence of debt.
Stockholders might issue high quantities of new debt and diminish the protection afforded to earlier bondholders.
Bondholders will shift monitoring and bonding costs back to the stockholders by charging higher interest rates.
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Optimal Debt Ratio
DebtRatio
VU
PVof Tax
Shield
M
kt value of leveraged firm
PVB&A
Costs
VL
Optimal Debt Ratio
Market Value of the Firm
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Model 3Least Cost Capital Structure is Optimal
Cost of Capital
BB + E
ki
ke
ka
Optimal CapitalStructure
0
Optimal capital structureoccurs where weightedcost of capital is minimized
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Other Impacts on the Optimal Capital Structure Personal tax effects
Could reverse some tax benefits Industry effects
Profitability and bankruptcy patterns Signaling effects
Asymmetric information Managerial preferences
Pecking order theory
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Capital Structure Implications for Managers
A centrally important management decision
Benefits of the tax shield from debt provide an incentive to use debt financing. To the point that increasing A&B costs
offset the debt advantage Info on debt: http://www.thomsoninvest.net/
Optimal capital structure is heavily influenced by business risk.
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Capital Structure Implications for Managers
Changes in capital structure signal important
information to investors.
Pecking order theory
Internal equity First choice
Debt
External equity Least preferred by management
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LBO (Leveraged buyout) Can eliminate agency problems Increased operating efficiencies are often achieved.
Eliminating jobs Reducing other payroll expenses Closing inefficient plants
Bondholders typically realize a loss in the value of their bonds.
Ethical issues Is it in the long-run interest of employees? Are bondholders harmed in a LBO? Managers acting as both buyers and sellers
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Multinational Firms
Have more complex capital structure decisions Finance investments in host country funds Some countries use more financial leverage
than others. Some host countries restrict foreign investment. Risk of expropriation Some host countries provide low-cost financing.