13. wikoff, 1973 - review of marcuse - counterrevolution and revolt

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Review Author(s): Jerold Wikoff Review by: Jerold Wikoff Source: New German Critique, No. 1 (Winter, 1973), pp. 182-187Published by: Duke University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/487643Accessed: 28-07-2015 00:27 UTC

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182 / NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE

der kritischen zur historisch-materialistischen Literaturwissenschaft (Berlin: Oberbaumverlag 1971), Lethen closes the gap from a class-struggle-based insight to a class-struggle-based praxis, and announces that the idea of class struggle can only be concretized through attachment to the labor movement, that only in partisanship for the labor movement can standards for literature as well as perspectives for social practice become accessible.

Eva Kolinsky sets right the picture of expressionism created by previous scholarship and demythologizes expressionist ideology, so that the errors of the expressionist generation will not be committed anew. Helmut Lethen destroys the mask of the Neue Sachlichkeit, also created by scholarship, and in a counter-move draws up a progressive strategy in order to once and for all pierce the ruling class ideology of the 1920s as well as of today, and aid in the real class struggle. The books of both authors are therefore useful in the best sense of the word. Whether they remain true to their promise and lead towards a practical impact beyond all book wisdom must be left to the future.

Horst Denkler

Herbert Marcuse, Counter-Revolution and Revolt. Boston: Beacon Press, 1972. 138 pages.

Marcuse's recent book, Counter-Revolution and Revolt, is in one sense a supplement to his earlier book, One-Dimensional Man. Again the focus is on the nature and structure of western industrial capitalism; yet, whereas One-Dimensional Man offered simply a theoretical (and highly pessimistic) critique of capitalism, Counter-Revolution and Revolt continues the trend of An Essay in Liberation and attempts to develop a theoretical framework which will lead to practical expression. The title indicates what Marcuse views as basic antagonisms in the structure of contemporary western capitalism: on the one hand, the capitalist system presently requires the organization of preventive counterrevolution both at home and abroad in order to assure the necessary stability for production. At the same time, however, the inner dynamic of the capitalist mode of production has not reduced, but rather extended the potential mass base for revolution. And it is Marcuse's intention here to articulate what he considers to be the objective and subjective factors involved in the reemergence of revolutionary potential in western capitalism.

Marcuse's analysis begins with an examination of the base or infrastructure of western capitalism, in particular that of the United States. Central to his argument is the insistence that the conditions of twentieth-century capitalism have so signi- ficantly changed from those of the nineteenth that a future revolution "will have a base, strategy, and direction quite different from its predecessors" (p. 8). The



REVIE WS / 183

altered conditions which Marcuse sketches largely include the consolidation and stabilization of western capitalism as a global system. Whereas reproduction and expansion had previously been the task of individually owned enterprises which operated within a relative competitive national and international market, this process has now been replaced by a collective coordination on the part of mammoth international corporations. Former rivalries are thus minimized in the interests of the system as a whole. The consequence of this change is that "the mass base created by the relation between capital and labor in the 18th and 19th centuries no longer exists in the metropoles of monopoly capital"-"a new base is in the making" (p. 9).

In order to clarify what this new base is, Marcuse introduces the concepts of "collective capital" (Gesamtkapital) and "collective labor force" (Gesamtarbeiter) to replace those of "capitalist" and "proletariat." These terms are used to point to the fact that not only have the particular capitalist enterprises presently become subor- dinated to the requirements of capital as a whole, but that such coordination in the means of production has necessitated that an increasing number of the formerly independent middle classes be brought into the service and control of "collective capital." The number involved in the creation of surplus value is thus greatly expanded, including not only the "tertiary sector" (production of services), but also an ever larger functional intelligentsia which is needed for the increasingly technological character of material production. The final consequence of this is that "the base of exploitation is thus enlarged beyond the factories and shops, and far beyond the blue collar working class" (p. 10).

With the penetration of capital into new sectors, however, the traditional definition of the proletariat is rendered inadequate. For now, a coordinated mass of the population (no longer impoverished in the material sense), separated from control of the means of production, creates "global surplus value." Consequently, the concept of the blue collar worker as the sole or dominant revolutionary force in industrial capitalism no longer appears valid.

The conclusions which Marcuse draws from this analysis are varied. On a more polemical level, the challenge to the traditional conceptualization of capital and labor provides the opportunity for an argument in favor of the need for a reexam- ination and revitalization of theoretical discussions. As Marcuse points out, the New Left has weakened its own position by its "ritual" use of Marxian theory. The development of capitalism itself has not been examined; instead, terms like "proletariat," "exploitation," "impoverishment," have too often been used without translating them to correspond to changing conditions. Consequently, Marxian concepts have become petrified, thereby not only falsifying the analysis of the class structure in monopoly capitalism, but failing as well to locate the revolutionary potential within advanced capitalism. In the end, the New Left violates the very principle it proclaims: the unity of theory and practice. A ritualized use of Marxian categories cannot lead to effective practical action.

More significant, however, are Marcuse's conclusions concerning the development




of revolutionary consciousness. With the coordination of both capital and labor, the immediate needs of the worker are made to correspond with the interest of capital. Thus, a consciousness of alienation does not develop in the labor process itself; instead, the objective conditions serve to reinforce an alienated consciousness, thereby minimizing revolutionary potential. Necessary for the emergence of revolutionary consciousness is the perception of those vital needs which capitalism creates but cannot satisfy. Such a development, however, would not be confined to the industrial worker-for this would only set the laboring class against all other sectors of the working population. Instead, such consciousness must develop in all dependent classes in the struggle against capital.

Here certain weaknesses in Marcuse's argument begin to emerge. Although on an abstract level Marcuse is no doubt correct-the composition of the working class, and consequently the structure of the base, has changed-it is dubious whether every sector of labor, blue collar or white collar, can be viewed as potentially revolutionary. At this point, one would have hoped for an empirical analysis of present-day labor composition that would ascertain which sectors of labor are more susceptible to the development of a revolutionary consciousness, as well as how such sectors could be organized.

Similar abstraction is evident in Marcuse's argument that the Leninist belief in the necessity of a revolutionary party to assume the theoretical and practical leadership of the working class is no longer valid. Although Marcuse points to the difficulties of organizing a highly centralized and hierarchically structured revolutionary party in present day monopoly-state capitalism, his own alternative strategy -a shift to decentralized forms of organization which are less susceptible to repression-is not only inconclusive, but skirts the issue of who is to be organized, and how. Again, Marcuse relies on an abstraction-that the success of decentralized forms of organization can depend upon the fact that the technical and economic integration of capital is presently "so dense that its disruption at one key place can easily lead to a serious dysfunctioning of the whole" (p. 42). And, Marcuse stresses, such disruption is possible not only through the local centers of production and distribution, but also those of education, information, and transportation. Disruption thus becomes diffuse and largely "spontaneous," occurring at several places. However, such disruption can only be significant if it is guided by perception of those "vital" needs (not necessarily material) which remain unfulfilled by the capitalist mode of production.

In the second part, "Nature and Revolution," Marcuse briefly sketches a theory in which he attempts to provide a material and objective basis for the perception of these needs. Central here is the concept of the "new" or "radical sensibility," a category adopted from Kant (Sinnlichkeit), as are many of the substantive points in this second section. Whereas for Kant the senses (or sensibility) were only the mode through which objects are given to us, Marcuse defines the "radical sensibility" much more broadly, attributing to the senses not only the function of receiving sensual data, but also the ability (through experience) to discover alternate patterns



RE VIEWS / 185

of organization in nature. Through such a definition Marcuse hopes to eliminate any contradiction between the experience of reality (through the senses) and the perception of objective possibilities transcending those provided by a historically determined and reified actuality. Such perception is not a passive operation. Instead, "the new sensibility is the medium in which social change becomes an individual need, the mediation between the political practice of 'changing the world' and the drive for personal liberation" (p. 59). The "new sensibility" is thus made practical. And consequently, experience (or sensibility) would provide not only a perception of the given (the particular), but simultaneously through its own "practice" the means for discovering "new (more gratifying) possibilities and capabilities" (p. 71).

For Marcuse then, human freedom becomes rooted in human sensibility. Because of the "practical" aspect ascribed to the "new sensibility," the emancipation of man necessitates simultaneously the liberation of nature itself-for it is only through "practice," through the (re)organization of the external environment that man can attain freedom. In order to give an objective basis to such organization, however, nature must be conceived of as a subject, i.e., that its content reveals itself through an organization which has no purpose external to itself. Such a conception, however, does not imply intention in nature. Rather, the conception of nature as a dimension of social change views nature "as a cosmos with its own potentialities, necessities, and chances." And further, these potentialities can also be "bearers of objective values" (p. 69). Accordingly, it is thus seen as possible for man to intuit (through the senses) those "life-enhancing forces in nature, the sensuous aesthetic qualities which are foreign to a life wasted in unending competitive performance" (p. 60).

Marcuse's position at this point seems tenuous. For the intuition of nature as subject is only valid if it is presumed that such intuition is objective. And the possibility of an intuition of things-in-themselves provided by such a conception would seem to lead to a form of (objective) idealism. In order to avoid this, Marcuse draws on Marx's Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts to establish a connection between sensuous perception and dialectical materialism. For Marx (according to Marcuse), the senses do not correspond to the empiricist's conception as simply a passive medium for perceiving a static reality. This reality is itself historically conditioned; consequently the reflected object is not the real object of sensuous immediacy, but rather an expression of the alienated relationship man has to nature in the work process. Marx, however, provides the possibility for a perception into the true nature of things insofar as he insists that the "appropriation" (rather than exploitation) of nature by man can proceed in accordance to the "inherent measure" (inharentes Mass) in things, i.e., in accordance with the laws of beauty. For Marcuse, the inherent measure in things signifies the conception of nature as subject, and accordingly provides for a restructuring of man's relationship to nature through a reorganization of the means of production.

The emphasis Marcuse gives to the senses in the perception of nature and its potentialities has two important consequences: (1) it attempts to provide for




intuition into the form of things prior to their mediation through historically determined categories of understanding; (2) such a mode of intuition would offer a different means for the development of revolutionary consciousness-that is, through immediate alternate experience, rather than through ideological means. This latter point seems especially important, in that it indicates a new basis for the development of revolutionary consciousness. Yet, one crucial aspect remains absent from Marcuse's discussion: how is alternate experience to be provided and how is it to be guided (if it should be) so that it would achieve actual political significance? Again, Marcuse's conclusions are generally abstract, appearing to function more as the basis for a programmatic vision of the future, without giving substantive clues as to how such a transition is to be made.

The last major section is concerned with the nature of art and the idea of "cultural revolution." The focus here is on the disintegration of bourgeois culture and the simultaneous attempt to transform or replace it through a cultural revolution. As Marcuse points out, although the classical bourgeois culture has disappeared, the development of a post-bourgeois or socialist culture has never fully developed. The reasons for this are varied, but include the fact that the advances in the capitalist system have made the working class (temporarily) non-revolutionary. Consequently, the cultural revolution has been separated from its base in society (the working class itself). The cultural revolution thus seeks support in two different and contrary directions: "on the one side, it tries to give word, image, and tone to the feelings and needs of the 'masses' (which are not revolutionary); on the other side, it elaborates anti-forms which are constituted by the mere atomization and fragmentation of traditional forms" (pp. 93-94). Marcuse is critical of both these directions and asks whether the cultural revolution is not in actuality defeating its own purpose ("to prepare the soil for a qualitatively different, a radically anti- capitalist culture"), and whether it should not change its cultural "strategy" (p. 85).

According to Marcuse, although bourgeois culture indeed expressed the character of its class (and correspondingly, the views of the ruling class), this same culture contained an anti-bourgeois stance by indicting and rejecting the material basis of the bourgeoisie. Through such rejection, the bourgeois realm is thus negated. Yet, the negation never proceeds directly (in the form of a political or social work), but rather through an aesthetic form which "transfigures" and "transubstantiates" the given reality by creating its own closed universe. The class content is thus "idealized" (through its stylization) and consequently becomes a receptacle of a universal truth beyond that of any particular class content. For Marcuse, this "negation" of empirical reality through the aesthetic form corresponds to that quality in art which brings forth the universal through its depiction of the particular. Marcuse does not specify this conception of the universal, though he does insist that it is present in every work of art. Consequently, for Marcuse art is a realm permanently antagonistic to reality, a refuge for those possibilities not present in everyday life.



REVIEWS / 187

The value of this third section is strictly polemical. Although the criticism of contemporary art is no doubt justified, Marcuse's model for criticism remains vague and inadequate. The insistence on the antagonistic quality of art appears to have its basis in a specific conception of bourgeois art, rather than in the nature of art itself. And in the end, such a conception allows Marcuse to jump from Verdi to Bob Dylan as exmamples of successful art (p. 121) without any consideration of technological developments which would make Dylan's music qualitatively different from that of Verdi. Because Marcuse omits such considerations here, he is never able to come to an adequate analysis of the various forms of "mass culture," but merely selects various works or performers as good because of their apparent ability to preserve the antagonistic quality of art.

In conclusion, then, it can be said that the book has several problems. The failure to grapple with the questions of who is to be organized (if no longer the industrial worker) and how to organize, is perhaps the most significant of these. Nor does Marcuse offer anything new in the way of critical theory. Yet, despite its obvious weaknesses, he does fulfill his own intention to recapitulate the position of the New Left and to stress the continued need for an analysis of the present structure of capitalism.

Jerold Wikoff

Thomas Koebner, ed., Tendenzen der deutschen Literatur seit 1945. Stuttgart: Krltner, 1971. 559 pages.

Manfred Durzak, ed., Die deutsche Literatur der Gegenwart: Aspekte und Tendenzen. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1971. 468 pages.

References to the Koebner volume will be made with a K, to the Durzak with a D.

Is there something in the nature of Germanistics that prevqents its practitioners from being decisively contemporary, even when they are at their most modern? If one had only these two collections to go on, one would be tempted to draw that melancholy conclusion. Both strive pronouncedly, even self-consciously, toward the contemporary: "[Such a book], despite its efforts towards objectivity and definitive- ness, cannot deny its contemporary character" (K, VII); "the spectrum of what is dealt with here depends on the perspective of the present and does not deny that perspective" (D, 9). But the contemporaneity both editors refer to is largely a matter of compromise. One senses the agonies of a discipline arousing itself from a self-induced slumber and trying to orient itself to the harsh black-and-white of the present with eyes more accustomed to the browner tones of the past. The result is



13. wikoff, 1973 - review of marcuse - counterrevolution and revolt

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