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Time to Listen: TrendsinU.S.SecurityAssistanceto LatinAmericaandtheCaribbean

Latin America

Working Group

Education Fund

SEPTEMBER 2

A joint publication o the

Center or International Policy,

Latin America Working Group

Education Fund, and Washington

Ofce on Latin America

By Adam Isacson, Lisa Haugaard, Abigail Poe, Sarah Kinosian, and George Withers

The list grows longer: sitting Latin Americanpresidents, including the United States principalallies; past presidents; the Organization oAmerican States; the Summit o the Americas; civilsociety leaders rom all nations. The clamor or drugpolicy reorm, including or a reormed U.S. drug policyin Latin America, is growing rapidly. But Washingtonisnt hearing it.

The Obama Administrations counternarcotics strategyhas continued largely unchanged. In act, over the pastew years the United States has expanded its military,intelligence, and law enorcement agencies directinvolvement in counternarcotics operations in theWestern Hemisphere. This has been particularly truein Central America, where it has had disturbing humanrights impacts.

Aid numbers do not tell the whole story. In dollarterms, assistance to most Latin American andCaribbean nations militaries and police orces hasdeclined since 2010, as Colombias and Mexicos largeaid packages wind down. Today, only aid to CentralAmerica is increasing signicantly. For its part, theDeense Department is acing cuts and turning most oits attention to other regions.

While the Pentagons current approach to LatinAmerica does not include major base constructionor new massive aid packages, however, the UnitedStates is still providing signicant amounts o aid andtraining to Latin Americas armed orces and police.In addition to large-scale counter-drug operations,the region is seeing an increase in training visits romU.S. Special Forces, a greater presence o intelligencepersonnel and drones (while countries are obtainingdrones, mostly not rom the United States), and rapidly

growing use o military and police trainers rom thirdcountries, especially Colombia.

Much o what takes place may not show up as largebudget amounts, but it is shrouded by secrecy, poorreporting to Congress and the public, and a migrationo programs management rom the State Departmentto the Deense Department. A lack o transparencyleads to a lack o debate about consequences andalternatives, or human rights, or civil-military relations,and or the United States standing in the region.

On human rights, the Obama Administration has beenoccasionally willing to raise tough issues with allies.It has encouraged trials in civilian, not military, courtsor soldiers accused o committing gross human rights

Escalating Calls to Rethink Drug Prohibition 2Direct US Involvement in

Counternarcotics Operations 6

Central American Regional Security

Initiative Expands 12

Human Rights & US Security Assistance 15

What Do the Aid Numbers Say? 19

Military Engagement at a Time of Reduced Aid 21

US Agencies Outsource Military &

Police Training to Colombia 22

Drones in Latin America 26

Recommendations for US Policy 28


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2 TimetoListen

abuses, especially in Mexico and Colombia. Ithas supported the Ros Montt genocide trial inGuatemala, and has sided with countries andhuman rights groups that seek to maintain,not weaken, the current Inter-American humanrights system.

But too oten, the human rights message isa negative one, as when the administrationdownplays drug-war allies abuses or promotesa greater Colombian role in oreign training. Thekilling o civilians during joint U.S.-Hondurancounternarcotics operations in 2012, as wellas the lack o transparent accountability andmechanisms to ensure such abuses are notrepeated, is deeply troubling. And o course,the United States ability to stand up or humanrights is undercut by its own fawed human

rights record: the ailure to close Guantanamo;the extensive surveillance programs; and a dronepolicy that justies extrajudicial executions.These do not pass unnoticed by Latin Americaspress, governments and civil societies.

One very positive development is that theObama Administration has welcomed andsupported Colombias peace process, the bestpossibility in decades or bringing Colombiaslong conct to an end. That commitment mustcontinue. But overall, looking over the last ewyears o U.S.-Latin American relations, we haveone overriding request o our government: Its

time to listen. Time to listen to the call or anew drug policy or ourselves and or the region.

Escalating Calls to Rethink Drug

Prohibition

Calls to rethink prohibitionist drug policies aregaining momentum throughout the WesternHemisphere. More than orty years ater the

war on drugs was declared, consumptiono illicit drugs continues to rise, cultivation ococa, marijuana, and opium poppies remainshigh, violence and organized crime continueto spread, and imprisonment rates haveskyrocketed. Since 2000, the United States

has spent approximately $12.5 billion in LatinAmerica to stop drugs at the source.1

Yet drugs continue to fow rom coca-producingcountries in South America into the UnitedStates, the regions number one consumer, andincreasingly into second-place consumer Brazil.This eort has had little eect on the prices orpurities o drugs on U.S. streets: cocaine priceshave risen, but only to early 1990s levels.2The estimated number o tons o cocaineproduced in the Andes has been reduced roma decade ago but only to levels seen in thelate 1990s (555 tons in 1998, 620 tons in2012, according to U.S. estimates3). And sincethe United States rst started estimating cocaproduction in the late 1980s, the number ohectares o coca under cultivation in Colombia,Peru and Bolivia has decreased by only 8percent (rom 176,000 hectares in 1987 to153,700 hectares in 20114).

This modest progress has come at a great cost.

Drug-related violence has killed thousandso security-orce personnel, and many timesmore young, poor men and women. Existingpolicies have denied drug users access totreatment programs, targeted armers withno other means o survival, caught citizensin the crossre o conrontations with violenttrackers, crowded prisons with non-violentoenders, tolerated or ostered abusive policeand military practices, and overwhelmedcriminal justice systems.

Faced with these actors, a new debateis brewing throughout Latin America andthe United States. The 2009 release o aLatin American Commission on Drugs andDemocracy report opened up space or a newdebate on drug policy in the region. Formerpresidents Cesar Gaviria (Colombia), FernandoHenrique Cardoso (Brazil), and Ernesto Zedillo(Mexico) called attention to the war on drugsdevastating consequences or Latin America.5

We have one overriding request o our

government: Its time to listen. Time to listen to

the call or a new drug policy or ourselves and

or the region.


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EscalatingCallstoRethinkDrugProhibition 3

Presidents rom across the regions politicalspectrum are now supporting calls to moveaway rom prohibition and eradication policies,and move towards a public health approachwhile regulating illicit crops or legal uses.Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay and Uruguay

have decriminalized possession o certain drugsor personal consumption; Uruguay is debatinga bill that would regulate the production anddistribution o marijuana; and two U.S. states,Colorado and Washington, voted in 2012 tolegalize and regulate marijuana.

In the past year and a hal, thanks to LatinAmerican initiatives, drug policy has beenon the agenda at the United Nations,Summit o the Americas and Organizationo American States (OAS). In October 2012,

three sitting presidentsJuan Manuel Santos(Colombia), Otto Prez Molina (Guatemala),and Felipe Caldern (Mexico)issued astatement to the United Nations calling ora meeting to debate global drug policy anddiscuss alternatives, saying an urgent reviewo the current approach was needed.6 Thepresidents o Honduras, Costa Rica and Belizelater added their support. The UN GeneralAssembly voted in avor o the proposal inNovember and plans to hold the debate in2016. Alternative Strategies or CombatingDrugs, meanwhile, was the theme o the OASannual General Assembly meeting in Antigua,Guatemala in June 2013, where the Secretary-General presented a report, commissionedat the Summit o the Americas meeting inApril 2012, on the results o drug policiesin the Americas, and possible scenarios orreorm. This cautious but thoughtul reportound it would be worthwhile to assessexisting signals and trends that lean towardthe decriminalization or legalization o the

production, sale, and use o marijuana.7

For its part, the Obama Administration hasreiterated that it does not support legalizationand will continue to oppose marijuanainitiatives at the national level. In response tothe OAS report, a spokesman or the WhiteHouses drug czar said, any suggestion thatnations legalize drugs like heroin, cocaine,marijuana, and methamphetamine runscounter to an evidenced-based, public health

approach to drug policy and are not viablealternatives.8

The Declaration o Antigua, issued by theoreign ministers assembled at the June 2013OAS meeting, while alling ar short o any

clarion call or reorm, urged governments toencourage broad and open debate on theworld drug problem so that all sectors o societyparticipate, emphasized that drug abuse isalso a public health problem and, thereore,it is necessary to strengthen public healthsystems, particularly in the areas o prevention,treatment, and rehabilitation, and underscoredthat drug policies must have a crosscuttinghuman rights perspective consistent with theobligations o parties under international law.The declaration also singled out the impact o

rearms tracking, declaring that to reducethe levels o violence associated with the worlddrug problem and related crimes it is essentialto implement and strengthen more-eectivemeasures to prevent the illicit manuacturingo and tracking in rearms, ammunition,explosives and related materials and their illicitdiversion to organized criminal groups.9

More vocal calls or drug policy reorm are alsocoming rom civil society. In summer 2012,110 victims o Mexicos violence drove in a

Caravan or Peace with Justice and Dignityrom Mexico through the United States, endingup in Washington, DC. They called or a newapproach to the tragic violence that has claimedover 60,000 lives in Mexico. They asked or theUnited States to take responsibility or stoppingthe fow o assault weapons that arm the cartels;to end a militarized approach to drug policy;to pass comprehensive immigration reorm;and to support policies that would protect theircommunities, not escalate the violence.

Over 100 victims o Mexicos violence drove in

a Caravan or Peace with Justice and Dignity

rom Mexico throughout the United States,

calling or a new approach to the violence that

has claimed over 60,000 lives in their country.


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Changes in Drug Policy in Latin America

Colombia

In early February 2013, the Colombian government proposed expanding the scope o existing

marijuana and cocaine decriminalization to include synthetic drugs like methamphetamineand ecstasy. Recent rhetoric signals a shit towards a public health-oriented approach andpossible regulation o illicit crops grown or legal purposes. Although Colombia has been hailedby Washington as the model in the war on drugs, President Santos says current policies arenot working adequately.10

Bolivia

Bolivian President Evo Morales has rejected ull-out legalization o drugs but has continuedand expanded an alternative model to combat the drug trade that was rst implemented inparts o the country in 2004. Under that approach, 20,000 hectares o coca may be grownacross the country or legal uses o the plant. The law has had measured success as coca

cultivation has dropped,11

but the country is still plagued by increasing quantities o cocaineproduced and tracked through the country rom Peru.12 In April 2013, President Moralesexpelled USAID rom the country, ending U.S. support or alternative development programs.U.S. support or Bolivias coca eradication program has dropped to near zero.

Uruguay

A bill that may pass this year would give the government regulatory control over productionand distribution o cannabis. It would permit adults to purchase up to 40 grams o marijuanaeach month, allow or domestic growing o up to six plants, and permit cooperatives o 15 to45 members to cultivate up to 99 plants.13 Those who purchase and/or grow marijuana wouldbe required to register with a government body that would monitor and limit consumption.Critics say that because organized crime in the country mostly stems rom cocaine and

crack, while marijuana is already decriminalized, the bill will have little impact. Proponentssay it would allow the government to channel resources into treatment or addicts and intocombating drug trackers by separating legal and illegal markets and distinguishing usersrom trackers, marijuana rom other drugs like heroin.14

Mexico

As a candidate, current President Enrique Pea Nieto pledged to change Mexicos unpopularwar against the drug cartels, which has led to over 70,000 deaths. He asserted he wouldprioritize going ater brutal crimes against ordinary citizens, rather than all-out war against thecartels, which he contended had led to unnecessary levels o violence. How much o a strategychange will actually take place has yet to be seen.

In 2009 Mexico decriminalized possession o small amounts o marijuana, cocaine, heroin,LSD and methamphetamine. While the law was in some ways an advance, the thresholdsor determining personal possession were set very low, and the Mexican government remainsocused on criminalization and incarceration as the main solutions to the countrys drugproblem. President Pea Nieto himsel is opposed to legalizing marijuana because it acts likea gateway drug.15 Yet he has said that the ballot initiative results in Colorado and Washingtonshould at least encourage a debate.16 The Mexican government is aced with trying to stopthe smuggling o a product in heavy demand and considered illicit within its own borders, butlegal in parts o the United States.


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EscalatingCallstoRethinkDrugProhibition 5

More than 160 civil society organizations acrossthe Americas, in a May 2013 open letter, calledon their governments to create more constructivepolicies to address violence, noting that whilewe recognize that transnational crime and drug-tracking play a role in this violence, we callon our governments to acknowledge that ailedsecurity policies that have militarized citizensecurity have only exacerbated the problem, andare directly contributing to increased humansuering in the region.23

Drug legalization, regulation, ordecriminalization is not a one-size-ts-allsolution to the many problems, including crimeand violence, associated with drug trackingin Latin America. Legalization or regulationwould likely bring new public health challenges.

It is clear, though, that the current strategy isnot working, and that the time has come oran international discussion that ocuses onimproving public health, reducing incarcerationo non-violent oenders, eliminating criminalgroups exorbitant prots, developingcommunity-based responses that reduceviolence, and nding alternatives to a ailing waron drugs. In the worldwide eort to spark thisdiscussion, Latin America has taken the lead.

Aerial Spraying in Colombia Reduced,

but Continues

Colombia is the only country in the world thatpermits aerial umigation [spraying drug cropsrom the air]. The Colombian government began

Latin American Presidents Call for Change on Drug Policy

Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos: I the world decides to legalize [drugs] and thinksthat that is how we reduce violence and crime, I could go along with that.17

Guatemalan President Otto Prez Molina: My government has called or an open dialogueon global drug policy based on a simple assumption: we cannot continue to expect dierentresults i we continue to do the same things. Something is wrong with our global strategy, andin order to know better what is wrong we need an evidence-based approach to drug policyand not an ideological one. Moving beyond ideology may involve discussing dierent policyalternatives. Some people (not my government) may call or ull-fedged liberalization o thedrug market, as opposed to the current ull-fedged prohibition scheme. I believe in a thirdway: drug regulation, which is a discrete and more nuanced approach that may allow orlegal access to drugs currently prohibited, but using institutional and market-based regulatoryrameworks.18

Uruguayan President Jos Mujica: This law being attempted is a regulation. Its not anythinggoes. Its to regulate something that already exists and thats in ront o our noses, right thereat the door o the schools, on the street corners. It attempts to snatch this market rom theunderground, identiy it and expose it to daylight.19

Bolivian President Evo Morales: We are not deenders o cocaine, nor do we support druglegalization although the so-called war on drugs has ailed.20 The antidrug policy in theUnited States is a ailure. Drugs are a double business or the United States; rst, theres thedrug business that moves money through the empire, and the other is the arms trackingbusiness: they provide us with the weapons and with the deaths.21

Costa Rican President Laura Chinchilla: I we continue doing the exact same thing, we willnever be able to claim victory.22


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aerial umigation in the 1990s and continuedthe practice with U.S. unding under PlanColombia. Crops are umigated with a powerulversion o glyphosate, a chemical produced inthe United States by Monsanto and marketed asRoundup. Since the outset, umigation has had

a negative impact on poor subsistence armers,whose licit and illicit cropsoten their onlysource o income and ood securityhave beendestroyed, sometimes resulting in populationdisplacement. Oten the umigation kills thelegal crops surrounding coca plants, withouteven aecting the target. Populations, and somescientists, also claim that it does damage to theenvironment and human health by poisoningwater supplies, livestock, and wildlie.

The amount o land cultivated with coca

diminished during the years o heaviestumigation (2000-2006), only to plateau at astill high level. Fumigation has proven to havelittle eect on cocaine production or the drugsprice and availability in the United States.According to the UN, Colombias Anti-NarcoticsDirectorate (DIRAN) sprayed a total o 100,549hectares in 2012, which is similar to aerialspraying levels in 2011 (103,302 hectares)and 2010 (101,940 hectares), but a signicantdrop rom 2006, when an all-time high o about170,000 hectares were sprayed.24

Although the practice has scaled back sinceits peak in the mid-2000s, it continues to beemployed, with devastating consequences. InJanuary 2013 there were several reports oumigation raids against legal crops, includingone against a womens pineapple cooperative inthe southern department o Putumayo, wherepineapple elds were destroyed in a region withno visible coca. The women lost their livelihoodand are now unable to pay back loans taken out

to rent the land. This is a common story o thoseaected by umigation, which oten leaves armerswith no crops, no livelihood and ew options.

Direct US Involvement in

Counternarcotics Operations

Over the past ew years the United Stateshas expanded its direct involvement in

counternarcotics operations in the WesternHemisphere. The increase is most obvious inCentral America, situated between Colombiaand Mexico, where increased enorcementhas pushed cocaine tracking and associatedviolence into the isthmus.

Most o this activity has taken place on thehigh seas or in coastal waters. Once drugsare on land, U.S. personnel cannot conronttrackers, make arrests, or seize contrabandon Central American countries territory. Thatis the job o each countrys security orces. Butmost o the regions coastal zones, especiallyalong the Caribbean, are sparsely populated andhave very little government presence, and insome cases the security orces that are presenthave been corrupted by trackers. A number

o U.S. counternarcotics operations in CentralAmerica in the past two years have been highlycontroversial.

Operation Martillo. In January 2012 U.S.Southern Command, the regional combatantcommand that manages U.S. military activitysouth o Mexico and the Bahamas, launchedOperation Martillo (Hammer), a surge omilitary, Coast Guard, law enorcement, andpartner nation vessels, aircrat, soldiers,sailors, and police along Central AmericasPacic and Caribbean coasts.

Deense ocials launched Martillo in responseto data showing that trackers were increasingtheir activity on Central American territory.The United States estimated that more than80 percent o the primary fow o the cocainetracked to the United States rst transitedthrough the Central American corridor in 2012,reads the State Departments 2013 InternationalNarcotics Control Strategy Report.25 Gen. JohnKelly, commander o U.S. Southern Command,provided a higher number: an estimated 92-94percent o cocaine destined or the U.S. stillfows through Central America.26

Starting in 2005 or so, drugs transiting romthe Andes to the United States began arrivingin Central America in ever-greater amounts.This owed in part to increased U.S. interdictionmaking it dicult to bring the illegal productdirectly to Mexico or the eastern Caribbean,


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DirectU.S.InvolvementinCounternarcoticsOperations 7

and in part to Mexican cartels increasing theirpresence in Central America. The growth intrac through Central America is evident inmaps o suspect planes and boats produced byJoint Inter-Agency Task Force South (JIATF-S), aKey West, Florida-based component o Southern

Command that gathers intelligence on drug andother tracking in the region.

The Southern Commands components mostinvolved are JIATF-S, the Honduras-basedJoint Task Force Bravo, Naval Forces South(also known as the 4th Fleet), and MarineForces South. Agencies rom the HomelandSecurity Department include the Coast Guard

and Customs and Border Protection (CBP).The Justice Departments Drug Enorcement

2005: Few Boats are Detected Landing in Central America

2011: Most Boats are Detected Landing in Central America

UnclassifedSource: Department o Deense, Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (JIATF) South

Suspect Maritime Activity

1 Jan 2005 20 Dec 2005

The majority o movement

toward the U.S. is at least a

two stage process

379 Events

153 Events

60% Go-Fasts

35% Fishing Vessels

5% Other

Maritime Drug Transit through the Caribbean and Central America (2011)

Source: Joint Inter-Agency Task Force South, April 2012

80% o the illicit fow is via

maritime conveyances

541 Events

405 Events


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Administration (DEA) plays an on-the-groundrole. The State Departments Bureau oInternational Narcotics and Law EnorcementAairs (INL) assists Central Americansecurity orces through its Central AmericanRegional Security Initiative (CARSI). Southern

Command portrays Operation Martillo asoperating in support o Department oStates Central American Regional SecurityInitiative.27

In addition to the seven Central Americancountries, Canada, Colombia, France, theNetherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdomhave participated in Operation Martillo. The costo the program is not public, though it is likelywell into the hundreds o millions o dollarsgiven the number o assets employed.28

In 2012, according to Southern Command,Operation Martillo contributed to the seizure ordisruption o 152 tons o cocaine.29 (The StateDepartment estimated that 765 tons o cocainewere produced in the Americas in 2011, thoughSouthern Command gave a gure o 1,086 tonsor that year.30) Southern Command also claimedto have disrupted 21.5 tons o marijuana andUS$7.2 million worth o bulk cash shipments.

Operation Martillo has no publicly announcedend date, but its intensity appears to be

declining. This is largely due to budgetcutbacks; the 2013 sequestration automaticspending cuts aected Southern Commandmore than any other regional U.S. combatantcommand.31 A January 2013 memo rom theChie o Naval Operations indicates that, due tocuts, the U.S. Navy is contemplating stoppingall naval deployments to the Caribbean andSouth America. In his March 2013 PostureStatement, Gen. Kelly presented to Congressa chart indicating that, due to cuts, Southern

Command would be likely to interdict 62 tonsless cocaine in 2013 than in 2012.32

Southern Commands data indicate thatOperation Martillo has decreased trackingalong Central Americas coastlines. But the data

also show increasing activity elsewhere. In thewestern Caribbean (near Central America) over2012, Southern Command ound the trackso suspect boats decreasing 36 percent alongthe coasts and 38 percent in the open ocean.In the eastern Caribbean, though, trac isincreasing. Known cocaine movement towardsHispaniolamainly the Dominican Republicappears to have increased by three percent to32 metric tons in 2012.33 In the Pacic, datashowed a 71 percent increase in suspect boattracks along the coasts in 2012, ollowed by

a 43 percent drop during the rst two monthso 2013. Further out in the Pacic, suspect boattracks jumped 12% in 2012 and 51% in therst two months o 2013.

As it appears to wind down, Operation Martillohas at least temporarily reduced trackingactivity around Central America. But theballoon eect that has bedeviled U.S. drugpolicy continues, and trackers are adjustingquickly by choosing other routes.

Elite, U.S.-Trained and Assisted Units. As theState Departments security assistance programsturn their ocus rom expensive equipmenttransers to security capacity-building programs,partnerships between U.S. agents and localU.S.-trained and vetted special units will likelyincrease. State Department InternationalNarcotics and Law Enorcement (INCLE) unds,military trainers, and DEA agents have helpedto set up specialized military and police unitsand other elite, vetted bodies that operate

in some isolation rom the rest o their orces.They are supported by at least hal a dozensmall Guatemalan, Honduran, Nicaraguan andPanamanian bases built, or renovated, withDeense Department unds.

These partnerships appeal to U.S. policymakersas a low-cost way to maintain U.S. presenceand infuence in the drug war. Yet incidentssuch as those in Honduras, discussed below,bring into question the true costs o increasing

Operation Martillo has at least temporarily

reduced trafcking activity around Central

America. But the balloon eect that has

bedeviled U.S. drug policy continues, and

trafckers are adjusting by choosing other routes.


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U.S. direct involvement in counternarcoticsoperations throughout Latin America and theCaribbean.

FASTs. The U.S. Drug EnorcementAdministration (DEA) has begun using Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Teams, or FASTs,working alongside elite, usually U.S.-trained,Latin American counternarcotics units. FAST isa tactical assault program that deploys squadso approximately 10 military-trained DEA agentsall over the world.

FASTs have been deployed at least 15 timesto Latin America and have been present inve countries: Haiti, Honduras, the DominicanRepublic, Guatemala and Belize.34 While theyresemble military commando units, FASTunits cannot make arrests, and may onlyopen re to protect themselves or partneringorces. However, as incidents in Hondurasdemonstrated, FAST agents can quickly go romoverseeing an operation to playing an active,and sometimes highly problematic, role.

U.S.-Trained Sensitive Investigative Units. TheDEAs Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) programalso has been increasing its reach in the region.SIUs are top-secret groups o elite agents,nearly always police, rom the region that areequipped, trained, and vetted by U.S. DEAagents. Their members undergo backgroundchecks and regular polygraph and drug testing.These units, sort o a police within a police,work more closely with U.S. counterpartsthan do agents o the rest o their countriespolice orces. SIUs have access to the DEAsintelligence database. They dier rom other

counternarcotics units in that they primarilyocus on dicult cases or targeting entire drug-tracking organizations.

Currently, the United States supports 11SIU programs worldwide. In the WesternHemisphere, they are known to operate inBelize, Panama, Guatemala, Mexico, Colombia,Ecuador, Peru, and the Dominican Republic.35Vetted police intelligence units, which dont getthe same standard o intelligence-sharing but

Source: JIATFS Interagency Case Data

(Graphic rom the June 19, 2012 testimony o Rear Adm. Charles Michel, director o JIATF-S, beore the House Homeland Security

Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security http://1.usa.gov/Yoe5Y.)

Impact on Flow of Cocaine

Operation MARTILLO 15 Jan 28 May 2012

Data Comparison (OP MARTILLO to CY2011)

Cases / Events / KGS per Day

ECAR

38%

CCAR

20%WCAR NON-LITTORAL

7%

WCAR LITTORAL

40%

EPAC LITTORAL

55%

EPAC NON-LITTORAL

45%


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still work with DEA, receive U.S. assistancein Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, andNicaragua.

The DEA has more ocials in Mexico than inany o its other oreign posts.36 Currently, six or

seven SIU units are backed by DEA, CIA and atleast one other U.S. law enorcement entity.37However, an April 2013 Washington Postreport revealed U.S. ocials would no longerbe welcome at intelligence usion centers inthe country.38 This includes all DEA agentsmeaning SIU teams as welland all ocialsat the DEA-sponsored intelligence center inMonterrey. All U.S.-Mexico law enorcementcontact will now go through a single door,Mexicos Interior Ministry. 39 U.S. governmentocials said they are still guring out what

the change will mean or security cooperation.Without knowing to whom intelligence will bedispersed, U.S. agents will likely be reluctant toshare sensitive inormation.

Congress continues to call or an expansion othe SIU program, especially in Central Americaand the Caribbean.40 U.S. Assistant Secretaryo State or INL William Browneld assertsthat, in many cases, vetted agents, such asSIUs, are U.S. counternarcotics orces onlyallies in the region.41

Yet as with any training program in the region,

i these highly trained units are to succeed,corrupt and weak institutions must be cleanedup and made unctional. Putting highly trainedand competent people in a corrupt system isnot a long-term solution. Moreover, the lack otransparency surrounding these programs makesit dicult to measure i any existing SIU agentsare themselves corrupt or abusive.

Controversies Mount in Honduras. Theresult o this more direct U.S. engagement in

counternarcotics activities in Central America hasbeen especially controversial in Honduras. FromMay through July 2012, three o the ve jointinterdiction operations carried out under OperationAnvil, a binational counternarcotics mission withthe DEA and Honduran Special Forces, resulted

in the shootings and deaths o tracking suspectsand innocent civilians by either DEA FAST agentsor Honduran ocers trained, equipped, andvetted by the United States.

A raid near the village o Ahuas by Honduranpolice accompanied by DEA agents on May11, 2012, resulted in the deaths o our peopledescribed by witnesses as innocent passengerson a river taxi.42 The victims were a ourteen-year-old boy, a twenty-one-year old manand two women, at least one o whom was

reportedly pregnant.43

On June 23rd, a DEA agent killed a suspecteddrug tracker during a raid, and on July3rd, the pilot o a downed plane suspectedo smuggling drugs was shot ater makinga threatening gesture, according to a DEAspokesperson. The pilot later died. Theseoperations in Honduras have been suspended,but FAST teams are still operating in othercountries throughout the region.

The New York Times determined that Hondurasnever achieved clarity over where DEA authorityended and that o Honduran soldiers and policebegan. While the DEA commandos were ociallytrainers and advisors, the Times reported,Members o the Honduran police teams toldgovernment investigators that they took theirorders rom the D.E.A. American ocials saidthat the FAST teams, deploying tactics honedin Aghanistan, did not eel condent in theHondurans abilities to take the lead.44

Controversy intensied in July 2012 whenHonduran Air Force personnel, acting onintelligence provided via JIATF-S, shot downtwo suspected drug-tracking planes, killingall on board. (About 20 percent o cocaineis estimated to leave the Andes by air; othese fights, nearly 80 percent have goneto Honduras in recent years.) The incidents,regarded as violations o both due processand international law governing civil aviation,

A raid near the village o Ahuas by Honduran

police accompanied by DEA agents resulted in

the deaths o our people described by witnesses

as innocent passengers on a river taxi.


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triggered a reeze in U.S. cooperation withHondurass air interdiction program. A weekater a late August visit rom the commander oSouthern Command, the chie o the HonduranAir Force resigned. Radar intelligence-sharingbegan again in November ater Honduras

pledged not to shoot down aircrat.

Smaller but signicant amounts o assistancecontinue to fow to the Honduran armed orces,principally through the Deense Departmentscounter-drug budget. Pentagon counter-drugaccounts have paid or the construction obases in Guanaja, Mocorn, El Aguacate, andPuerto Castilla.45 During the second hal o2012, U.S. Naval Special Forces helped theHonduran Navy create its rst Special Forcesunit, a 45-man body known as the Fuerzas

Especiales Navales or FEN.46

Every year, Congress requires the StateDepartment to report licenses granted orprivate companies arms sales to oreigncountries (licenses do not necessarily result insales). The report or 2011 includes an eye-popping entry or Honduras: US$1.388 billiontranserred that year or Military Electronics, acategory that includes radars, electronic combatequipment, radios, surveillance equipment,and similar items. This amount dwars anyother U.S. transer to Latin America, and isequivalent to one-thirteenth o Hondurassannual GDP, but we have not been able todetermine what it has unded. One explanationis that the report covers some transers oequipment to be used by U.S. personnel in therecipient countries, but even then the amountinvolved is still very large. The AssociatedPress ound in February that neither the StateDepartment nor the Pentagon could providedetails about the transer.

U.S. Skirts Military Aid Ban in Guatemala.

Southern Command helped to create a FEN unitin Guatemalas navy our years ago, to whichit continues to provide persistent, ocusedtraining.47 Much U.S. assistance throughCARSI has also gone to help reorm and equipGuatemalas National Police orce.

Due to human rights concerns dating backdecades, State Department-managed programs

in the oreign aid budget may not provideassistance to Guatemalas army. This restrictiondoes not apply, however, to money in theDeense Department budget. The Pentagonscounter-drug budget provided nearly $26million in aid to Guatemala in 2011 and 2012,

much o it to the army, whose personnel alsoparticipate requently in joint exercises.48 U.S.unds are also supporting a new Inter-AgencyBorder Unit, also known as Joint Task ForceTecn Umn. This is a battalion-sized elementcomprised o Guatemalan army soldiers whowill work alongside police and Ministry oJustice personnel to execute security operationsalong the Mexican-Guatemalan border tocounter transnational crimes and tracking.49With a 169-man army inantry battalionworking alongside 76 police and judicial-

branch ocials, the unit began operations insummer 2013.50

Along with the countrys navy, air orce andpolice, the Guatemalan Army has also been aull participant in Operation Martillo. BetweenAugust and October 2012, Guatemala hostedits largest contingent o U.S. military personnelin decades. One hundred seventy-one U.S.Marines few more than 250 detection andmonitoring missions in support o Guatemalanlaw enorcement agencies and naval orces,according to a Marine press article.51 Addedthe Southern Command-sponsored InoSurHoy,The U.S. military cant use its weapons unlessit is under re, so its ocusing on spotting

suspicious boats, submarines and individualsand relaying their locations to Guatemalanorces, which handle all conscations andarrests. The U.S. is keeping a close eye onGuatemalas coastlines and rivers.52 Aboardthe helicopters with the Marines were bilingualGuatemalan liaison ocers communicatingto the Guatemalan orces on the ground.U.S. Marines coordinated the two-monthdeployment rom operation centers at threePacic coastal bases.

The Pentagons counter-drug budget provided

nearly $26 million in aid to Guatemala in 2011

and 2012, much o it to the army.


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12 TimetoListen

The Central American Regional Security

Initiative Expands

Because o the same drug-tracking andsecurity concerns that brought about OperationMartillo, Central Americaalong with perhaps

Peruis the only part o the hemisphere whereU.S. security assistance is actually increasing,in dollar terms. We estimate that combined aidto Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama will totalUS$415 million in 2014, 34 percent (US$143million) o it or these countries security orces.That would be a 10 percent overall aid decreaserom 2012 levels, but a 6 percent increase in

security assistance.

The security increase owes to the CentralAmerica Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), thename given to a package o aid that the U.S.government has provided to the seven nationso the isthmus since 2008. Aid has not reachedthe levels that Central Americas militaries sawduring the 1980s, when its civil wars made theregion a cold war battleground. Nor has CARSIcome close to rivaling Plan Colombia or theMrida Initiative in size.

The aid package began in 2008 as part o theinitial appropriation or the Mrida Initiativeramework o aid to Mexico, and was intendedto provide a modest amount o assistanceor Mexicos Central American neighbors. In2010, as concerns mounted about violence,

gangs, and organized crimes displacement intoCentral America, the Obama Administrationand Congress split the region rom the Mridaramework and gave the CARSI label to aidprograms with the ollowing goals:

1. create sae streets or citizens;2. disrupt the movement o criminals and

contraband;3. support strong, capable, and accountable

Central American governments;

4. establish eective state presence andsecurity in communities at risk; and

5. oster coordination and cooperation betweencountries against security threats.

The Obama Administration does not consider

all assistance to Central America to be CARSIaid. Development and health programs areexcluded, as are military and police aidprograms in the Deense Departments budget.CARSI is expected to total about US$665.5million between 2008 and 2014.53 O this,we estimate that at least 60 percent has beendestined or the regions militaries and policeorces, with the vast majority o that going topolice. The administrations CARSI request or2014 is US$161.5 million, up rom US$107.5million in 2013.

Most CARSI aid comes rom the StateDepartments International Narcotics and LawEnorcement (INCLE) aid program, the biggestsource o assistance to all o Latin America.Much non-military aid comes rom the USAID-administered Economic Support Fund (ESF), amulti-purpose economic aid channel. In 2008-2010, smaller amounts came rom two military-police aid programs, Foreign Military Financing(FMF) and Nonprolieration, Antiterrorism,Demining and Related Programs (NADR).

CARSI has paid or a long list o initiatives,most o which appear small when measured indollars and spread across seven countries. Someo the principal military and police aid projectsinclude the ollowing:

In Guatemala, which has received the largestportion o CARSI unding, at least US$35million has supported an aviation program,established in 2009 and set to end in 2013,

that reurbished and maintained police andair orce helicopters and planes, while oeringtraining to air crews.

El Salvadors attorney generals oce hasreceived assistance or an Electronic MonitoringCenter, which allows investigators to perormsurveillance on the communications o gangsand organized crime groups. El Salvadoralso hosts the State Department-managedInternational Law Enorcement Academy, which

Central Americaalong with perhaps Peruis the only part o the hemisphere where U.S.

security assistance is increasing.


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TheCentralAmericanRegionalSecurityInitiativeExpands 13

trains hundreds o students per year on policingand investigative techniques.

In Honduras, CARSI has unded stumblingeorts to reorm the countrys national policeorce. It has supported commissions chargedwith guiding this reorm, and has paid or ateam o Colombian police experts to administerpolygraph tests and background checks aimed atweeding out corrupt ocers. So ar, this programhas ailed, as ew police have been dismissed

and abuses continue. In early June, the UnitedStates announced that it had stopped undingor the ailing reorm program in March.54The Obama Administration and congressionalappropriators have held up aid to Hondurasseveral times during the troubled CARSI period,due to human rights and other concerns. Aidreezes have occurred ater the June 2009 coupthat deposed President Manuel Zelaya; ater2012 incidents involving plane shootdowns,DEA involvement in hostilities, and the deaths

o civilians in counternarcotics operations; andater concerns emerged about the human rightsbackground o the countrys police chie.

Panamas national police orce has receivedassistance to maintain maritime druginterdiction vessels, to guard the border withColombia, and to improve its police academy.

Costa Rica has received boats to patrol itscoasts, as has Belize. Though aid has been

reduced due to concerns about the credibilityo election results, Nicaragua has receivedtraining, spare parts, and communicationsequipment, and continues to allow military andpolice to train regularly with U.S. counterparts.

Regional CARSI programs. The U.S.government has carried out some CARSIprojects in several countries simultaneously.With DEA support, the program has set up, ormaintained SIUs or other vetted units. As noted,

Source: Peter Meyer and Claire Ribando, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues or Congress,Congressional Research Service, May 7, 2013, http://just.org/les/primarydocs/R41731.pd.


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14 TimetoListen

these are less a police reorm measure than asmall, separate tool or carrying out intelligence-based operations against drug trackers.

With FBI assistance, CARSI supportsTransnational Anti-Gang Units (TAG teams),

police units in El Salvador, Guatemala andHonduras that share inormation with eachother on gang activity. Another project providesinspection equipment, and training orborder guards in each country, especially inPanama, Costa Rica and Guatemala. A prisonmanagement program has devoted at leastUS$22 million to eorts to improve correctionsprocessesand combat gang activityinthe regions troubled prisons, especially in ElSalvador, Guatemala and Honduras.

A pilot project unds community policingthrough the creation o model precincts inLourdes, El Salvador, Villa Nueva and Mixco,Guatemala, and San Miguel, Honduras. U.S.assistance to these precincts, mainly trainingand technical support, seeks to improve policerelations and coordination with the generalpublic, as well as with prosecutors. Measuresor community outreach, police accountability,and ways to obtain inormation (like tip lines)appear to be yielding some results, though theexpense has raised questions about whetherthis model can be replicated across dozens orhundreds o precincts.

In the non-military, non-police sphere, CARSIunds programs to provide economic opportunityor at-risk youth, and has invested heavily injudicial reorm. CARSI unding supports theInternational Commission Against Impunityin Guatemala (CICIG), a UN body withprosecutorial powers. CICIG has helped pavethe way or signicant, i still limited, progressin strengthening the judiciary and reducingimpunity in Guatemala.

For the rst ew years o the CARSI program,Congress attached human rights conditions tothe assistance. These held up 15 percent oINCLE and FMF aid until the Secretary o Statecertied that Central Americas governmentswere establishing commissions to receive

complaints about police behavior; implementingjudicial reorms; and prosecuting security-orce members alleged to have committedhuman rights violations. The State Departmentsubmitted these certications. In 2012, theseconditions disappeared rom appropriationslaw and were replaced by a provision that onlycovered Honduras.55

It is too early to call CARSI a success or aailure. Compared to Plan Colombia andthe Mrida Initiative, it is small and scattered

among seven countries and dozens o smallerprojects. Delivery o assistance has been slowedby bureaucracy and the absorptive capacityo the governments receiving the aid. In someCentral American countries, state institutionscorruption is an obstacle to aid delivery, dueto concerns that recipient institutions (suchas police or prosecutors) are penetrated byorganized crime. Aid has also been slowed byquestions about recipient governments politicalwill to conront corruption, undergo painulreorms, andin countries with some o theworlds lowest tax collection ratesto raisethe revenue necessary to sustain a proessionalsecurity sector.

CARSIs limited, but still visible, support or amilitary role in law enorcement in some CentralAmerican countries is another serious concern(see human rights section).

CARSI programs are set to increase modestly,at a time when Central Americas criminal

violence appears to be plateauing or evenbeginning to decrease. This is not due toinstitutional changes as much as to changesin the balance o power between trackingorganizations. In El Salvador and perhaps soonHonduras, a break in the relentless increase ocommon crime also owes to the brokering oragile pacts between governments and theprincipal networks o criminal gangs. The U.S.government has made clear it does not supportthese pacts, arguing that they may not last and

In some Central American countries, delivery

o CARSI aid is slowed due to concerns

that police or prosecutors are penetrated by

organized crime.


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HumanRightsandU.S.SecurityAssistance 15

that they weaken the rule o law, but it has notopposed them vocally.

In coming years, meanwhile, attention mayturn to the Caribbean as U.S. monitors arending more drugs fowing through Guyana

and Suriname, the small islands o the easternCaribbean, Puerto Rico, Jamaica, and Hispaniola.A smaller version o CARSI already exists or theCaribbean called the Caribbean Basin SecurityInitiative (CBSI). It is likely to get larger i evenminor success in Mexico and Central Americapushes the drug trades violent center o gravityback to the Caribbean once again.

Human Rights and US SecurityAssistance

The last three years have seen the ollowingcontradictory developments in how humanrights standards are applied to U.S. security andcounternarcotics assistance.

Country Human Rights Conditions. In FY2012,Congress added conditions on assistance toHonduras to the oreign operations appropriationslaw, which continued to include human rightsconditions or Mexico, Guatemala and Colombia.The conditions or Mexico, Colombia andHonduras require the State Department to certiythat certain human rights conditions are beingmet, or a percentage o security assistance willbe withheld. The conditions ocus primarily oninvestigating and prosecuting members o militaryand police orces against whom there are credibleallegations o gross human rights violations. TheGuatemala conditions, in contrast, bar assistanceto the army, with some exceptions, untilconditions are met in prosecuting human rights

violations and disclosing military records romthe armed confict. The House o Representativesin 2011 and 2012 stripped out or severelyweakened conditions, but the Senate prevailedand conditions were maintained. Nonetheless,these conditions continuation remainsprecarious, as they are renewed each year inlegislation, and the current chair o the HouseForeign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee,Representative Kay Granger (R-Texas), has notbeen a an o conditions.

While the conditions are rarely ully applied,they have a positive impact in encouragingthe State Department to engage on humanrights issues with these Latin Americangovernments. Although the State Departmentonly rarely decides not to certiy, it does

delay certication to apply pressure orhuman rights improvements. Moreover, theSenate Foreign Operations AppropriationsSubcommittee sometimes places a hold ona portion o military and/or police aid on thebasis o conditions, until the subcommitteeis satised that the State Department hasraised the issues and the government inquestion is making advances. Human rightsorganizations, including ours, provide analysisand evidence to the State Department andCongress on how the conditions are being

met. As shown below, this combination oSenate action and human rights advocacy canhave an impact, although it is not sucientand varies rom case to case.

For example, listening to objections raisedby human rights groups, the United Nations,members o Congress, and the StateDepartment raised strong concerns with theColombian government regarding a proposedconstitutional reorm that threatened toreturn cases o military human rightsabuse rom civilian jurisdiction to military

courts. The drat legislation was somewhatimproved, although the United Nations andhuman rights organizations ear that thenal reorm, passed at the end o 2012,may result in human rights cases, possiblyincluding those o the well over 3,000 alsepositive extrajudicial executions, returning toor initiating in military courts and remainingin impunity.56 The conditions continue to be apotential source o leverage over applicationo these highly problematic reorms.

While human rights conditions on security

assistance are rarely ully applied, they have

a positive impact in encouraging the State

Department to engage on human rights issues

with these Latin American governments.


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16 TimetoListen

On Mexico, the State Department took a steporward by withholding a portion o securityassistance pending a bilateral discussion ohuman rights priorities. In August 2012, theState Department issued its report to Congresson the human rights requirements. Unlike

past years, the reports cover letter stated thatthe State Department intended to withhold 15percent o FY2012 Mrida unds until U.S.and Mexican authorities had identied areas ocollaboration to promote rule o law and respector human rights. Examples o possible areaso collaboration provided in this letter includedenhancing civilian authorities capabilityto investigate and prosecute human rights

abuse cases, advancing measures to preventtorture, and strengthening eorts to protecthuman rights deenders, issues raised in jointmemos sent to the State Department by ourorganizations and other U.S. and Mexican NGOpartners. The State Department is still workingwith the Mexican government to identiy theseareas o collaboration that would allow it torelease the unds. As this State Departmentreport was issued in the nal months o theCaldern presidency, this served as a useulincentive to encourage the new Pea NietoAdministration to come to the table to discussthese key human rights issues.

On Honduras, the State Department issued a

perunctory report in August 2012 stating thatthe conditions had been met, despite scantevidence to support this conclusion.57 Indeed,in 2012 human rights groups and journalistsdocumented serious cases o excessive useo orce against demonstrators by memberso the police and army as well as evidence oextrajudicial executions by police, among othergrave violations, with little eective action toinvestigate, prosecute and punish abusers. InMarch 2013, the Associated Press reported that

Honduran prosecutors had received as manyas 150 ormal complaints about death-squadstyle killings in the capital o Tegucigalpa, andat least 50 more in the economic hub o SanPedro Sula.58 While the State Departmentwas reluctant to act, the Senate Foreign

Operations Appropriations Subcommittee placeda substantial portion o police assistance onhold during 2012 and 2013. The concernsunderpinning the hold on police aid includethe need to clariy the DEA and shootdownincidents, the slow pace o reorm in a policeorce riddled with corruption, and allegationsagainst Police Chie Juan Carlos Bonilla,who aced serious accusations (despite beingacquitted) o past participation in extrajudicialkillings. Congress is currently withholdingsubstantial unding to Honduras over these

concerns.

INL Assistant Secretary William Browneld hasemphasized the United States does not directlyund Bonilla, but will und those working twosteps below him, despite an Associated Pressreport nding that the Honduran Constitutionmandates that all units report to Bonilla.59 InJune 2013, 21 U.S. senators sent a letter toSecretary o State John Kerry indicating seriousquestions regarding the State Departmentscertication that Honduras met the humanrights conditions necessary to guarantee U.S.aid or FY2012.60

On Guatemala, the U.S. government supportedthe courageous actions o Guatemalas judiciary,led by Attorney General Claudia Paz y Paz,to tackle some o the landmark human rightscases o the armed confict. Notably, the U.S.ambassador to Guatemala attended the trial oormer President Rios Montt, the rst ormerhead o state to be tried domestically or

genocide. The U.S. ambassador-at-large or warcrimes visited Guatemala in April 2013 to meetwith the embassy, United Nations, and victimsregarding the trial, lauding it as historic.61Unortunately, while the court convicted RiosMontt, the constitutional court overturned theverdict on procedural grounds and the casewill reportedly be re-tried. The overwhelmingmajority o crimes committed during the armedconfict, in which 200,000 people were killed ordisappeared, remain in impunity.

While the State Department was reluctant to act,

the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee

placed a substantial portion o police assistance

to Honduras on hold.


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HumanRightsandU.S.SecurityAssistance 17

In terms o the human rights conditions, theU.S. government continued to skirt the existingban on U.S. assistance to the Guatemalan Armyby providing training and assistance throughthe Deense Appropriations law, as describedearlier. The ban only applies to assistance via

the State and Foreign Operations Appropriationslaw. The Pentagon counter-drug budget providednearly $26 million in aid to Guatemala in2011 and 2012, much o it to the GuatemalanArmy.62 A chie concern is the U.S. governmentsincreasing assistance, mainly through DeenseDepartment counter-drug unding channels,to the Guatemalan Armys notorious KaibilesSpecial Forces unit. The Kaibiles, responsibleor brutal abuses committed during the civil waryears, have received U.S. assistance or a shoothouse and improvements to its secretive base

in Poptn, in Petn department, where in late2012 the rst U.S. military student in 25 yearsgraduated rom its grueling training course.63

Improvements to the Leahy Law. There weresome important improvements in FY2012 tothe Leahy Law, which prohibits U.S. aid tospecic military and police units that violatehuman rights with impunity. This diersrom the country conditions in that it appliesworldwide but only relates to behavior byspecic units that receive U.S. training andassistance, rather than to the perormance othe countrys security orces as a whole. TheLeahy Law establishes a crucial principle, thatU.S. unding should not support security orceswhen abuses remain unpunished.

However, the law has been applied with varyingdegrees o rigor by U.S. embassies around theworld. (For example, LAWGEF sta met withembassy sta in Colombia and Honduras in2012 and ound that while the U.S. Embassy

in Colombia had a substantial system in place,the U.S. Embassy in Hondurass system wasar less developed.) It is challenging or humanrights groups to provide inormation or itsenorcement, as it has been applied with littletransparency and has been interpreted asrequiring a degree o evidence regarding theidentities o specic units that is hard to obtain.

Even in the Latin American country where it hasreceived most scrutiny and attention, Colombia,

and where the law has certainly been applied,the Leahy Law has ailed to block assistanceto many gross human rights violators. Militaryunits receiving U.S. aid and training committednumerous extrajudicial executions, although sotoo did units not receiving aid. A detailed study

by Fellowship o Reconciliation and U.S. Oceon Colombia reveals that geographic areaswhere brigades received substantial U.S. aidand training coincided with areas that saw highlevels o extrajudicial executions.64

The revisions to the Leahy Law attempt toaddress these concerns. The Secretary o Statenow needs credible inormation that a grosshuman rights violation was committed ratherthan credible evidence that gross violationso human rights were committed. Therevised legislation also aims to regularize andimprove Leahy Law enorcement by the StateDepartment and embassies by mandating thatthe Secretary o State:

shall establish, and periodically update, proceduresto

(1) ensure that or each country the Departmento State has a current list o all security orce unitsreceiving United States training, equipment, or othertypes o assistance;

(2) acilitate receipt by the Department o Stateand United States embassies o inormation romindividuals and organizations outside the UnitedStates Government about gross violations o humanrights by security orce units;

(3) routinely request and obtain such inormationrom the Department o Deense, the CentralIntelligence Agency, and other United StatesGovernment sources;

(4) ensure that such inormation is evaluated andpreserved;

(5) ensure that when vetting an individual oreligibility to receive United States training theindividuals unit is also vetted;

Revisions to the Leahy Law aim to improve

enorcement by the State Department and

embassies.


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18 TimetoListen

(6) seek to identiy the unit involved when credibleinormation o a gross violation exists but the identityo the unit is lacking; and

(7) make publicly available, to the maximum extentpracticable, the identity o those units or which noassistance shall be urnished.

The State Department has been meeting withU.S. human rights organizations to explain theLeahy Law changes and to encourage them tosubmit inormation that can be used in vetting.

Ultimately, the vetting system will only be asgood as the inormation placed in the databaserom each country. Some o the questionsthis raises are: Will U.S. embassies activelysolicit inormation rom in-country humanrights groups? Can those groups provide thatinormation condentially? Is the database tooreliant on scannable Internet sources, whilehuman rights groups cannot saely broadcast allinormation publicly?

Bilateral Human Rights Dialogues. In responseto concerns by human rights groups, the StateDepartment established high-level humanrights dialogues or human rights componentswithin broader high-level dialogues withColombia, Mexico, and Honduras. These areattempts by the Obama Administration to take

an approach intended to be more proactive andcollegial on human rights with key governmentpartners. This eort to be at once proactive andmore collegial can be contradictory, and theprocesses are not very transparent and thus arehard to evaluate. In our view, these dialoguesmust be supplemented by vigorous use ohuman rights conditions. However, it is indeedpositive that the U.S. government is visiblyplacing human rights as a major theme in thesebilateral relationships.

Direct U.S. Involvement in Human Rights

Abuses in Central America. A majordevelopment has been more direct U.S.involvement in human rights abuses duringcounternarcotics operations in Central America.As noted earlier, rom May through July 2012,

three o the ve joint interdiction operationscarried out under Operation Anvil, a binationalcounternarcotics mission with the DEA andHonduran Special Forces, resulted in theshootings and deaths o tracking suspectsand innocent civilians by either DEA agents orHonduran ocers trained, equipped, and vettedby the United States.

U.S. Support or Military Role in Law

Enorcement? Central American governmentsin recent years have expanded the role o their

military in domestic law enorcement. Severalo the regions governments have argued thatpolice reorm will not protect citizens in theshort term and have asked the U.S. governmentto provide more military aid in order torespond immediately to crime. Under PresidentFelipe Caldern, Mexico vastly expanded theuse o the military against drug trackingviolence and widespread human rights abusesollowed, including orced disappearancesand extrajudicial executions.65 Yet the ObamaAdministration, like the Bush Administrationbeore it, rarely objects to the use o the militaryor law enorcement in Central America orMexico and has even agreed to provide modestsupportmuch o it through Deense budgetprogramsor military units carrying outdomestic law enorcement, like the FENs orGuatemalas Tecn Umn task orce.

The use o the military to perorm civil lawenorcement cannot be a long-term solution,reads the Deense Departments October 2012

Western Hemisphere Deense Policy Statement.However, as other U.S. security cooperationeorts work to build the capacity o civilauthorities and partner nation law enorcement,DoD will continue to support deense partnersto give them the best opportunity to succeed inbridging these gaps.66

The practice o involving militaries in lawenorcement unctions has led in recent yearsto gross human rights violations. Yet while

In response to concerns by human rights

groups, the State Department established high-

level human rights dialogues or human rights

components within broader dialogues withColombia, Mexico, and Honduras.


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WhatDotheNumbersSay?TrendsinU.S.AssistancetoLatinAmerica 19

U.S. ocials contend they preer civilian policeassistance, the U.S. government continuesto und programs that draw the military intopolicing, sending a mixed message to the regionat best.

For example, speaking o Honduras in March2013, INL Assistant Secretary o StateBrowneld said, Although the national policemay have its deects at the moment, it is thelesser evil.67 However, the United Statesprovides training and assistance to the HonduranArmys 15th Battalion, which has establishedmilitary control over Bajo Agun, an area aectedby a rural land confict where well over 60 peopleassociated with campesino organizations, as wellas some private security guards and bystanders,have been killed in the last three years.

In Guatemala, the State Department has notraised public concerns about the increasing useo the military in law enorcement, includingthe growing establishment o Army CitizenSecurity Squadrons, through which at least1,500 soldiers have been deployed to ensurecitizen security.68 On October 4, 2012,Guatemalan soldiers shot into a crowd oindigenous protestors in Totonicapn, killing6 and injuring 34 people. The colonel andeight soldiers involved in the killing are beinginvestigated, though the original charges orextrajudicial executions have been reduced.The massacre oered a stark reminder o therisk o involving Guatemalas army, whichhas not been held accountable or tens othousands o abuses committed during thecountrys 1960-1996 civil war, in an expandedinternal security mission.

Promotion o Colombian Security Forces in

Training. A urther disturbing trend has been

the U.S. promotion o the role o the Colombiansecurity orces in exporting training, describedon page 22.

What Do the Numbers Say? Trends in

US Assistance to Latin America

From 2008-2010, U.S. aid to Latin Americaand the Caribbean hit its highest level since we

started our monitoring project in 1996, due tothe Mrida Initiative package o aid to Mexicoand Central America. A robust economic aidpackage to Haiti, ater the countrys devastatingearthquake, sharpened the spike in 2010.However, since that period, the region saw

a quick drop, ollowed by a gradual decline,in levels o both overall aid and securityassistance, putting aid back where it wasbetween 2004 and 2008.

The quick FY2011 drop in military and policeassistance can be attributed to a decrease inU.S. assistance to Colombia, alongside a shitingo unding priorities in Mexicoaway romlarge, expensive equipment and toward moreinstitution-building and rule o law programs.Both Plan Colombia and the Mrida Initiative are

winding down, and nothing has come along toreplace them at a time o budgetary austerity.

In 2013, military and police assistance toColombia is at its lowest point ($279 million)since beore the Plan Colombia aid packagewas implemented in 2000, despite Colombiascontinued position as the number one recipiento U.S. military and police aid in Latin Americaand the Caribbean. Military and police aid toMexico, while on the decline, is still the secondhighest in the region, at $154 million in 2013.

Since the 2008-2010 period, however,U.S. security assistance has placed greaterocus on Central America. While military and

police assistance to the rest o the regionwas declining or holding steady, assistanceto Central America was on the rise due tothe implementation o the Central AmericanRegional Security Initiative. A smaller program,the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, isongoing but has not brought a signicantincrease in aid to the Caribbean.

For many years, the division o military andpolice aid and economic/institution-building aid

The U.S. government continues to und

programs that draw the military into policing,

sending a mixed message to the region at best.


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U.S. Aid to Latin America and the Caribbean, All Sources

20 TimetoListen

5,000

4,500

4,000

3,500

3,000

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013,est

2014,req

MillionsofDollars

Economic and Institution-Building Aid

Military and Police Aid

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Colombia 64,468,000 86,562,950 115,161,000 309,712,877 771,540,855 223,940,217 388,550,141 605,627,707 610,824,588 596,121,73

Mexico 42,568,447 75,244,000 27,567,000 27,636,136 20,110,891 30,256,064 48,911,196 19,673,473 41,530,303 43,085,12

Western Hemisphere Regional 61,687,000 63,579,000 70,118,000 82,429,000 59,765,000 76,752,000 64,821,000 52,401,000 118,722,000 147,717,36Caribbean Regional 11,729,000 11,729,000 10,252,000 12,596,000 17,029,000 14,358,000 8,369,000 7,807,000 68,454,000 53,134,00

Peru 40,160,194 33,969,000 36,147,000 73,464,999 58,969,343 27,207,651 75,476,232 58,000,783 64,171,475 55,934,64

Bolivia 17,980,500 22,600,000 38,801,000 36,894,026 60,876,247 32,790,407 47,813,737 45,979,501 50,321,830 44,971,27

Ecuador 2,737,213 2,757,250 5,120,000 12,764,778 26,119,848 20,407,709 39,163,978 37,137,360 37,971,276 32,513,84

Central America Regional

Haiti 250,000 500,000 940,000 550,000 522,000 193,849 519,992 583,000 884,000 551,65

Netherlands Antilles 125,000 277,000 131,000 373,000 300,000 247,000 15,106,114 16,672,00

Chile 735,545 507,000 17,478,050 1,568,183 1,055,157 2,929,528 1,655,597 3,011,507 1,982,946 1,804,90

Guatemala 2,268,000 2,158,000 2,796,000 3,009,089 2,982,171 3,258,477 3,194,213 2,504,666 2,994,852 3,467,46

Panama 2,384,000 2,384,000 2,591,000 3,458,280 6,160,436 2,280,680 11,327,048 7,248,327 8,171,359 6,337,25

El Salvador 707,000 621,000 783,000 827,325 1,324,908 3,191,818 9,240,546 4,724,112 13,031,571 10,441,46

Brazil 3,088,000 3 ,460,000 3,075,000 1 ,129,443 5 ,093,299 20,358,528 6 ,556,178 6,504,039 10,307,738 9 ,280,76

All Others 46,183,746 19,166,158 30,039,062 28,682,992 24,304,137 25,960,783 30,438,168 26,999,460 31,392,315 29,199,21

U.S. Military and Police Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Colombia 589,374,053 619,484,593 402,104,615 441,505,261 434,177,248 336,830,537 280,454,537 279,465,805 257,678,917Mexico 44,846,915 56,046,844 437,011,270 422,804,999 507,794,694 117,217,892 165,751,892 154,432,797 126,951,621

Western Hemisphere Regional 121,084,000 72,509,000 107,036,000 97,949,000 138,643,000 135,022,000 70,435,000 70,435,000 70,435,000

Caribbean Regional 73,278,000 114,232,000 122,333,000 154,853,000 82,794,000 144,750,000 142,490,000 137,290,000 126,290,000

Peru 61,074,548 65,110,953 43,391,262 84,830,341 59,950,769 51,679,628 44,205,225 43,565,693 41,428,758

Bolivia 41,306,546 37,293,624 27,844,589 22,639,640 18,613,454 18,242,600 8,621,600 7,991,600 5,674,600

Ecuador 31,422,055 31,788,949 27,780,131 33,317,540 16,224,256 17,533,155 19,070,155 19,170,155 14,849,155

Central America Regional 2,225,000 51,825,000 51,618,000 64,248,000 73,655,556 76,526,984 90,031,746

Hait i 15,245,950 16,151,650 11,991,800 20,660,941 160,591,373 21,072,800 19,481,800 19,448,886 13,752,086

Netherlands Antilles 16,315,000 18,539,000 19,460,000 25,550,000 25,677,000 21,286,000 21,871,000 21,871,000 21,871,000

Chile 16,249,705 68,316,093 4 ,469,506 19,040,419 3 ,673,947 2,622,046 4 ,945,046 4 ,945,046 4 ,900,046

Guatemala 8,777,493 17,786,738 5,782,274 5,195,069 14,092,133 26,376,657 26,661,657 11,161,657 12,281,657

Panama 8,242,472 14,034,661 6,983,585 5,747,271 7,907,833 9,988,176 12,103,176 12,103,176 11,561,176

El Salvador 18,646,533 10,721,385 10,838,596 14,052,482 8,454,988 8,062,032 5,031,032 5,031,032 5,552,032

Brazil 7,496,439 6,173,235 2,998,824 3,672,536 3,312,558 3,159,833 5,654,833 5,832,333 3,021,833

All Others 37,609,015 68,883,958 73,758,065 57,173,748 69,274,248 49,336,708 50,030,708 50,155,708 54,589,708


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ALightFootprint:MilitaryEngagementataTimeofReducedAid 21

to the region was close to 50 percent. However,with passage o a large, multi-year aid packageto Haiti in 2010, that division shited towardseconomic and institution building assistance. In2013, military and police assistance makes uponly 37 percent o total aid to the region, which

shits to 43 percent i assistance to Haiti isremoved rom the equation.

The Obama Administrations FY2014 aidrequest continues the downward trend in U.S.assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean,with an almost 13 percent drop in requestedassistance to the region. Adjusted or infation,military and police aid to the region in 2013and 2014 is at its lowest level since 2001.Yet the upward trend in assistance to CentralAmerica continues.

A Light Footprint: Military

Engagement at a Time of Reduced Aid

Less aid does not necessarily mean less U.S.engagement with Latin Americas militariesand police orces. But the nature o thisengagement is changing. Instead o buildingbases, employing the Fourth Fleet, or launchingbig-ticket aid packages like Plan Colombia orthe Mrida Initiative, U.S. military engagementis becoming more nimble and fexible, but evenless transparent.

President Obamas deense guidance at thebeginning o last year set orth new prioritiesor the U.S. military. Partly in recognition obudget constraints, the overall mission o themilitary would downplay investment in large-scale interventions with ground orces. The ocuswould, in act, shit (or pivot) largely to Asia.

In Latin America, the Deense Department wouldinstead turn to using smaller, more quicklymobilized capabilities, or a lighter ootprintincluding the use o other tools such as drones,cyberattacks and Special Operations Forces.

This will probably aect Latin America in veways:

More Special Forces deployments to the

region. President Obama and his new

appointees at Deense, National SecurityCouncil, and State share a ondness or SpecialOperations Forces: elite, highly trained, mobilemilitary units used or non-traditional, otenclandestine missions ranging rom hostagerescues to hunting down wanted individuals to

intelligence-gathering and deense diplomacy.Special Forces are likely to see their numbersincrease despite upcoming deense budget cuts,and as the Aghanistan drawdown proceeds,there will be even more o them available tocarry out missions in Latin America.

This doesnt necessarily mean that Delta Force,SEAL Team 6, and other JSOC units will becarrying out clandestine mayhem in places likeVenezuela and Cuba. Instead they will carryout what Linda Robinson, in a recent Council

on Foreign Relations report, called the indirectapproach: training, advising, conducting civilaairs operations, and gathering inormationand intelligence. This is a political mission asmuch as a military one.69

Recent conversations with Deense Departmentocials conrm that, in the next ew years,we are likely to witness an increase in SpecialForces training missions in the region. However,considering the way inormation is beingclassied, we are not likely to learn muchabout them. More teams will be in countriesthroughout the Americas teaching courses aspart o Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), andorganizing exercises, some o them through

the Special Forces Joint Combined ExchangeTraining (JCET) program.

Such deployments ulll more than just trainingmissions. They allow Special Forces unitsto amiliarize themselves with the terrain,culture, and key ocers in countries where theymight someday operate. And they allow U.S.personnel to gather intelligence on their hostcountries, whether through active snooping orpassive observation.

In the next ew years, we are likely to witness

an increase in Special Forces training missions

in the region.


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A greater intelligence community presence isanother likely consequence o a light ootprintin Latin America. It is reasonable to expectewer CIA assets in Aghanistan to meanmore personnel ocused elsewhere, includingLatin America. Even more signicant may be

an increase in the presence o the DeenseIntelligence Agency (DIA), the DeenseDepartments spy agency. The Washington Postreported in December 2012 that DIA expectsto roughly double the number o clandestineoperatives that it deploys worldwide over the nextew years.70

Greater use o drones and robotics. The ObamaAdministration has expanded the CIA and DeenseDepartment use o armed unmanned aircratto hunt down suspected terrorist targets. JohnBrennan, the new CIA director, is known orbeing involved in this practice, which is extremelycontroversial because o reports that the droneprogram may have killed hundreds o innocentpeople in Aghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere.

More emphasis on cyber-security. While it isunclear how this will play out in U.S. nationalsecurity policy toward the Americas, it isreasonable to expect more resources devoted tocracking open the computer networks o countriesor organizations that the U.S. government viewsas a threat.

Funding other countries to carry out training on

our behal. This practice is expanding rapidly inColombia, as the next section explains.

A major concern or our organizations is that thesechanges may be very dicult to track due to theextent to which inormation is being classied.Reports to Congress on these topicseven lists ocountries, topics o training, and dollar amountsare either nonexistent, heavily classied, orsubmitted way past their deadlines. Where theyexist, they require an enormous eort to obtain.

As the light ootprint moves the U.S.-LatinAmerican military relationship to the shadows,our work as citizen monitors grows harder.

US Agencies Outsource Military and

Police Training to Colombia

The Obama Administration praises Colombiaas a security exporter.71 Once on the brinko alling to a powerul insurgency, reads theSouthern Commands 2013 Posture Statement,Colombia is now a leader in counterinsurgencytactics and provides training to West Arican andCentral American counterparts.72 Added a June2012 Deense Department release, Colombianow serves as a regional training base to helpother nations in their counterdrug eorts.73

Colombia is now, and has been or all but oneo the last 20 years, the Western Hemisphereslargest recipient o U.S. military and policeassistance. Its security orces are alsotraining and advising those o third countries.Colombia, oers capacity-building assistancein 16 countries inside and outside the region,including Arica, reads an April 2012 DeenseDepartment news release.74 Colombian Deense

Minister Juan Carlos Pinzn told the MiamiHerald in October 2012 that his orces hadtrained more than 13,000 individuals rom 40countries since 2005.75

An April 2013 PowerPoint slideshow romthe Colombian Ministry o Deense shows the9,983 recipients o Colombian training rom 45countries between 2010 and 2012.

This trend is accelerating. As part o an ongoingHigh Level Strategic Security Dialogue,

in early 2012 the U.S. and Colombiangovernments developed an Action Plan onRegional Security Cooperation, through whichthey intend to coordinate aid to third countries.According to the joint press release:

Both countries will develop complementary securityassistance programs and operational eorts tosupport hemispheric and international partner nationsaficted by eects o transnational organized crime.Increased coordination o U.S. and Colombia deense

Colombia is now, and has been or all but one o

the last 20 years, the Western Hemispheres largest

recipient o U.S. military and police assistance.


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U.S.AgenciesOutsourceMilitaryandPoliceTrainingtoColombia 23

,

,

, ,

,

,

,

,


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and security support activities . . . will support whole-o-government strategies and produce a greater eectthroughout the hemisphere and West Arica.76

We dont know the ull extent o these deenseand security support activities, or what

portion o them are unded by the UnitedStates. U.S. ocials praise them as a way tomultiply the impact o U.S. security assistanceprograms. At a time o U.S. budget cuts,Colombian trainers cost a raction o what U.S.trainers would cost.77

With unding rom CARSI, Colombias NationalPolice participate in a Central America RegionalPolice Reorm Project, unded mainly throughthe State Departments INCLE program.[T]he Colombian National Police provides

training and assistance in such topics ascommunity policing, police academy instructortraining, and curriculum development in

Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, CostaRica, and Panama, reads the April 2012joint press release. To complement this policetraining by Colombia, the United States trainsprosecutors in these countries.78 Colombianpolice personnel have played a prominent rolein this programs struggling eort to reormthe Honduran police orce; among other roles,they administer polygraph (lie-detector) testsdesigned to weed out corrupt cops.79

The practice o U.S.-supported Colombian

training personnel is now moving beyond StateDepartment-unded training o civilian police.The head o the U.S. Southern Command statedthat the Department o Deense would beginunding some capacity-building activities withColombian military personnel in Central Americastarting in April 2013.80

Colombias training relationship with Mexicois extensive. It has included the instructiono thousands o Mexican policemen, the

Washington Post reported in January 2011.81Colombian service members have trained morethan two dozen Mexican helicopter pilots aso April 2012, a U.S. deense ocial said in aPentagon news release.82

Sixteen Mexican students15 ederalpolice and one army soldierparticipatedin the grueling 19-week course given by theColombian National Polices (CNP) eliteJunglacommando unit between July and December2011.83 Also taking part in the course, at the

Jungla base in Tolima department, were about58 students rom ten other Latin Americancountries: Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica,the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala,Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and Paraguay.This Colombian initiative is supported by the

U.S. Embassy through its Narcotics AairsSection (NAS) and the DEA, read a U.S.Embassy press release. Since 2007, the NAS-nanced CNP National Training Center in Pijaoshas trained nearly 300 international students.NAS has allotted nearly 8 million dollars inthe construction o the training centers initialphase, inaugurated in 2008.84

The U.S. government has encouraged Peruto work more closely with Colombia. TheUnited States stands ready to work with Peruon joint planning, on inormation sharing,trilateral cooperation with Colombia to addressour shared security concerns, said outgoingDeense Secretary Leon Panetta during anOctober 2012 visit to Lima.85

Sources reveal several multi-country trainingevents. The Colombian Armys Lancero SpecialForces unit, similar to the U.S. Armys Rangers,now oers an international course at theTolemaida base. Colombias armed orces report

that 581 trainees rom 18 countries have takenthe Lancero course including, in December2012, 15 graduates rom Brazil, Canada,Ecuador, El Salvador, France, and Peru.86

In June 2012, Colombiawhich has moreSpecial Forces personnel than any otherLatin American militaryhosted FuerzasComando, an annual competition betweenLatin Americas Special Forces sponsored byU.S. Southern Command.87 Those competing

Colombias training relationship with Mexico

is extensive. It has included the instruction o

thousands o Mexican policemen.


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U.S.AgenciesOutsourceMilitaryandPoliceTrainingtoColombia 25

at the Colombian National Training Centerin Tolemaida included the Bahamas, Belize,Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, theDominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica,Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad

and Tobago, the United States, and Uruguay.Southern Command has canceled the 2013Fuerzas Comando exercise due to budgetuncertainty and possible sequestration cuts.88

Colombias security orces augmented trainingo other countries militaries and police wasa chie topic when top ocials rom bothcountries met in Bogot in November 2012to continue the U.S.-Colombia High LevelStrategic Security Dialogue. An unnamedDeense Department ocial said in October,

were building a detailed action plan where weand the Colombians will coordinate who doeswhat so we leverage the resources andcapabilities we have to eectively do capacitybuilding and training and other things in CentralAmerica and in other places.89

The human rights implications o exporting

the Colombian model. While Colombia has alot o experience with the type o operationsthat police around Latin America must carryout todayorganized crime investigations,drug interdiction, eorts to arrest kingpinstheexpansion o its training raises grave concerns,especially when the U.S. government is ootingthe bill.

The overall message the United States conveysby promoting Colombias role in securitytraining, especially by Colombias army orintelligence orces, is disturbing. Colombiasarmed orces were responsible or grave humanrights abuses, including as many as 4,716

alleged extrajudicial executions o civilians.90

Many o these were so-called alse positivecases in which soldiers detained or evenpurchased people, oten young men, romcriminal recruiters. They then killed them instaged battles, dressed them up in guerrillauniorms and claimed them as enemy dead. Thevast majority o these abuses, most committedbetween 2004 and 2008, have not yet beenbrought to justice. The International CriminalCourt prosecutors oce has expressed interest

in examining the pattern o extrajudicialexecutions in Colombia, as there is sucientreason to believe that [these acts] werecommitted due to a policy adopted at leastat the level o certain brigades o the armedorces which constitutes a policy by a state or

organization to commit such crimes.91

In addition, Colombias Department oAdministrative Security (DAS), the intelligenceagency under the presidency, conducted illegalsurveillance o national and internationalhuman rights organizations and activists,journalists, judges, and opposition partymembers. DAS ocials were also involved indirty tricks and threats against human rightsdeenders and journalists, and even targetedassassinations.92 While the DAS agency

was disbanded, it is likely some unpunishedabusers remain in Colombian intelligenceagencies.

At the same time, there are some lessonsrom the Colombian experience that couldhave a benecial human rights impact.For example, the U.S. government hasencouraged some exchanges regardingColombias innovative protection program orhuman rights deenders.

The ollowing are more specic concerns about

the impact o Colombian training.The human rights messages that Colombian

trainers might be conveying, inside and

outside the classroom. Both in private and inColombias press, the countrys military ocialsdo not conceal their disdain or, or outrightanger at, the judicial system and humanrights deenders, and their institution recentlypressed successully to reduce civilian courtsjurisdiction over them in human rights cases.

The overall message the United States conveys

by promoting Colombias role in security training,

especially by Colombias army or intelligence

orces, is disturbing.


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The inappropriate use o an armed orce

involved in war in training security orces

in countries at peace. It is problematic thatColombias armed orces, which have beeneng

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