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South European Society and Politics

ISSN: 1360-8746 (Print) 1743-9612 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fses20

Attitudes of Greek Parliamentarians TowardsEuropean and National Identity, Representation,and Scope of Governance

Roula Nezi , Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos & Panayiota Toka

To cite this article: Roula Nezi , Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos & Panayiota Toka (2010) Attitudesof Greek Parliamentarians Towards European and National Identity, Representation,and Scope of Governance, South European Society and Politics, 15:1, 79-96, DOI:10.1080/13608746.2010.496930

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2010.496930

Published online: 26 Jul 2010.

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Attitudes of Greek ParliamentariansTowards European and NationalIdentity, Representation, andScope of GovernanceRoula Nezi, Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos & Panayiota Toka

This article analyses the attitudes of Greek political elites towards the European Union(EU) and compares them with the views of public opinion. Data were collected in 2007

through personal interviews with 90 MPs and a public opinion survey (IntUne project).The attitudes of MPs are discussed with regard to three dimensions of European

citizenship: identity, representation, and scope of governance. There are traditionalists,formalists, and liberals among the MPs. Their trust in EU institutions and their

perceptions of EU policy areas and levels of policymaking are strongly influenced bypolitical ideology and party affiliation.

Keywords: Political elites; Identity; Representation; Scope of Governance; Greece; IntUne

Survey

In Greece the salience of European Union (EU) issues has oscillated between relative

indifference and feverish debates. On the one hand, there is little debate on issues that

have shaken the EU, such as Eastern Enlargement. On the other hand, when EU

decisions affect national finances (e.g. financial sanctions for violating EU legislation)

or the incomes of certain population strata (e.g. the EU-based subsidies that farmers

enjoy), heated debates follow.

In all these cases, Greek political elites have played a major role. In the late 1970s the

centre-right governing elite steered the country towards the European Community

(EC) and in the late 1990s the centre-left governing elite actively pursued the aim of

entry to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). However, the opinions of Greek

elites on the EU have not been included in studies on Greece and the EU, which are

otherwise rich in analyses of the country’s European integration (Ioakimidis 1998;

2000; Mitsos & Mossialos 2000; Pagoulatos 2003; Dimitrakopoulos & Passas 2004;

Featherstone & Papadimitriou 2008). There is little research on post-authoritarian

ISSN 1360-8746 (print)/ISSN 1743-9612 (online) q 2010 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/13608746.2010.496930

South European Society and Politics

Vol. 15, No. 1, March 2010, pp. 79–96

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Greek elites (Sotiropoulos & Bourikos 2002) and comparative studies of European

political elites have also been rare (Schmitt & Thomassen 1999; Katz & Wessels 1999;

Best & Cotta 2000).

The few studies of attitudes of Greek MPs have shown that, in contrast to MPs of

other countries, Greek MPs understand the European project mainly as a vehicle for

economic development (Esaiasson 1999, p. 157, table 8.1, p. 161, table 8.3). The Greek

public is very pro-European (e.g. Scheuer 1999, pp. 32–34; Norris 1999, p. 79) and

Greek MPs take pride in being European (Scheuer 1999, p. 37, table 2.2). However, the

MPs have a rather instrumentalist view of EU institutions (the EU as a ‘milking cow’).Our research questions refer to the determinants of national and European identity

formation among Greek political elites, the extent to which elites believe EU

institutions to be representative, and whether they favour the deepening of European

integration through the adoption of additional EU common policies and the

assignment of policy-making to EU rather than national bodies. The determinants of

identity may be ascribed (e.g. being a Greek because one is born to Greek parents) or

achieved (e.g. becoming a Greek through mastering the Greek language). This

dichotomy, however, may not be fully satisfactory. Aspects of national identity actually

reflect patterns of national culture not fully represented by the distinction between

ascribed and achieved characteristics. Moreover, our data, drawing on field research in

Greece in 2007, show that the conceptual distinction between ethnic and civil

citizenship may not be adequate to capture the variation of attitudes towards

citizenship. A threefold typology may be more useful for our purposes.

First, in Greece there is traditionalism, emphasising the values of small

communities, the Greek Orthodox Church, and Greek nationalism. Second, there is

formalism, evident in the over-emphasis placed upon laws and formalities and the

legalism of Greek public life (Mouzelis 1978). There is a tendency to pay lip service to

formalities (e.g. fulfilling administrative requirements) without ensuring that the

purpose of the obeyed rule is indeed served. This attitude differs both from an

understanding of citizenship along ethnic criteria (e.g. having Greek parents) and

from civic criteria (e.g. respect for a country’s laws). What we have called ‘formalism’ is

a set of attitudes located somewhere in between traditionalism and respect for law and

institutions. Third, there is liberalism, associated with the era of Enlightenment,

equality before the law and respect for the law and institutions.In the remainder of this article, we will present our data and methods and briefly

discuss the stance of Greek parties towards the EU. Then we will discuss the responses

of MPs to questions on national and European identity and contrast their responses to

those of the sample of the Greek population included in the IntUne mass survey. (In

2007 the same questionnaire was administered to a public opinion sample of 1000

respondents.) We will analyse the MPs’ attachment to various levels of multi-level

governance with reference to the respondents’ political ideology and party affiliation.

We will discuss levels of trust of MPs in major EU institutions and the way MPs see

Greek interests being affected by the EU. Finally, we will turn to attitudes towards the

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deepening of European integration through the adoption of common policies andtowards the appropriate level of policy-making.

Measuring European Identity

This research is part of the IntUne project and presents new data on Greece. BetweenFebruary and June 2007 we conducted a sample survey of Greek parliamentarians,

using the common questionnaire employed in the cross-national IntUne surveyof elites. The Greek parliament has 300 seats, and our sample consisted of 90 MPs,

selected through quota sampling. In the same time period, we also conducted 30interviews with economic elites (business owners and managers). Owing to thereluctance of many further members of economic elites to grant us interviews,

we encountered a quota-sampling problem. Among those eventually interviewed,some left questions unanswered. For these reasons, our analysis does not include

economic elites.Our sample of parliamentarians was representative in terms of gender (14 per cent

of MPs in parliament and in our sample were female) and age (74 per cent of the MPsin parliament and in our sample were over 50 years old). In parliament, 33 per cent of

MPs were newly elected while this share was somewhat higher in our sample (40 percent). Our discussion refers to political elites in general (MPs and ministers), sinceamong the 90 parliamentarians interviewed, 32 had served at least once as minister or

junior minister.In the Greek parliament elected in April 2004 (and dissolved in August 2007) there

were four parties, namely New Democracy (ND), the Panhellenic Socialist Movement(PASOK), the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and the Coalition of the Left (SYN).

Since Greece’s transition to democracy (1974), ND has traditionally been a centre-rightparty, while PASOK, which in past decades used to be a populist/socialist party, is

currently considered a centre-left party. The 2004–7 Greek parliament included 166MPs of ND, 116 of PASOK, 12 of KKE and six of SYN. We obtained interviews with 43

parliamentarians of ND, 43 of PASOK, one of KKE and three of SYN. In our sample,ND, which in 2004 had obtained the parliamentary majority (55 per cent ofparliamentary seats), and KKE are under-represented. We were officially refused

interviews by the latter party, which allowed only one of its MPs to grant us aninterview. In the top party organs of SYN, there is a majority consisting of former KKE

cadres, who oppose what they perceive to be a neo-liberal direction taken by the EU.Even though there is also a more pro-EU minority faction within the same party, we

have not been granted enough interviews to explore intra-party variations of opinion.

Greek Parties and the EU

After almost 20 years as an associate member (since 1961), Greece gained accession tothe EC in 1981. However, at the time, Greece’s membership in the EC did not enjoy

support from all political parties. It was fully supported by ND and opposed by

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PASOK and KKE. The small Eurocommunist party (KKE Interior) accepted theprospect of Greece’s EC membership with some reservations. Under Constantine

Karamanlis, the ND government (1974–81) perceived the country’s membership asthe end of a period of political isolation. Karamanlis understood Greece’s EC

membership as an opportunity to stabilise the young Greek democracy and tostrengthen Greece’s independence and bargaining power in relation to other countries.

He saw EC membership as a vehicle useful to accomplish the modernisation andWesternisation of Greece. In contrast, PASOK, led by Andreas Papandreou, was

opposed to EC membership. PASOK claimed that the Mediterranean periphery, towhich Greece belonged, would become dependent on Western Europe and that the ECwould pose an obstacle to the country’s socialist transformation. After Greece’s

accession to the EC (1981), the anti-EC PASOK came to power with a commitment torenegotiate Greece’s entry terms, but, upon realising the difficulties of this enterprise

and the financial benefits of membership, PASOK softened its line.Gradually, in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, PASOK moved from an anti-

European stance to a pro-European one (Verney 2004). This shift became evident in1996 when Kostas Simitis, a social democrat, assumed the leadership of the party and

of the government. Under Simitis (1996–2004), Greece sought to achieve the so-called‘convergence criteria’ in order to join the Eurozone, an aim that it finally fulfilled in2001. Greece received generous funding, technical assistance in policy-making, and

diplomatic support in its relations with third countries.Greece’s integration into the EU gave rise to new types of political conflicts and

ideological cleavages. The old ideological conflict between right and left ran in parallelto a new pattern of conflict between pro-European modernisers on the one hand and

traditionalists on the other, a conflict that cut cross political parties. The moderniserswanted to accelerate domestic reforms through Europeanisation. Traditionalists

sought to contain the impact of the EU, which they understood as a force threateningthe country’s traditional cultural identity. They therefore resisted the country’s

adaptation to the logic and requirements of European integration (Diamandouros1994; Ioakimidis 2000). Aspects of these parallel cleavages underlie patterns ofnational and European identity to which we now turn.

Patterns of European and National Identity

The IntUne questionnaire included items that reflected ascribed and achieved aspectsof identity. The survey’s respondents were asked to select those items which, in their

opinion, formed national and, separately, European identity. As Tables 1 and 2 show,the ascribed aspects of identity included place of birth and nationality of the

respondent’s parents as well as religion, while the achieved aspects included sharingthe cultural traditions of Greece (and, in the case of European identity, European

traditions), ‘feeling’ Greek (or European), mastering the language of the country (orone European language), being a Greek citizen and respecting Greek (or, respectively,

European) laws and institutions.

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National Identity

Different aspects of Greek identity were reported as ‘very’ or ‘somewhat important’ by

more than 50 per cent of respondents. The vast majority of sampled MPs believe that

‘to feel Greek’ is the most important aspect of Greek identity. The vast majority of

respondents in the public opinion survey held the same belief. For our MPs, the

second most important aspect, with just one per cent difference from the first, was to

respect Greek laws and institutions. For the public opinion sample, the second most

important aspect was to share Greece’s cultural traditions. Even though at both the

elite and mass levels, religion is the least important aspect of Greek national identity,

for the public opinion sample this was a much more salient aspect than for the elite

sample. This may be attributed to the fact that religion was not an important element

Table 2 Aspects of European identity: importance of different items for public opinion andpolitical elites (per cent of respondents)

Very/somewhat Important Publicopinion

Politicalelites

Left Centre-left

Centre-right

To be a Christian 62.6 32.9 0 15 53.7To share Europe’s culturaltraditions

65.8 77.4 75 69.2 85.4

To be born in Europe 54.9 53.5 50 48.8 58.5To have European parents 49.1 50.6 50 50 51.2To feel European 67.9 98.8 100 97.6 100To master a European Language 85.5 90.7 100 82.9 97.6To respect European laws andinstitutions

86.5 96.5 75 95.1 100

Table 1 Aspects of national identity: importance of different items for public opinion andpolitical elites (per cent of respondents)

Very/somewhat importantPublicopinion

Politicalelites Left

Centre-left

Centre-right

To be a Christian 74.3 59.8 0 41.5 83.3To share Greece’s culturaltraditions

94.3 88.4 100 80.5 95.1

To be born in Greece 76.4 60.5 75 48.8 70.7To have Greek parents 84.8 69.8 50 58.5 82.9To feel Greek 95.6 97.7 100 97.6 97.6To master the Greek language 92.9 86.1 100 82.9 87.8To respect Greek laws andinstitutions

93.7 96.6 75 97.6 97.6

To be a Greek citizen 80.9 77.9 75 77.5 78.6

Note: In all the tables, the column headed ‘left’ includes the one MP of the KKE and three MPs of theSYN who were sampled in our survey; the centre-left concerns the sampled MPs of PASOK; and thecentre-right the sampled MPs of ND.

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of identity for the MPs of PASOK and the left (left and centre-left MPs form themajority of sampled MPs). By contrast, the vast majority of sampled MPs from ND

(83.3 per cent) reported that Christianity is an important aspect of Greek citizenship.Centre-left and centre-right parliamentarians believed respecting laws and

institutions and feeling Greek to be the two most important determinants of nationalidentity. As for the left, its MPs selected above all the items of cultural traditions,

feeling Greek and mastering the language.

European Identity

As Table 2 shows, for the public opinion sample, European identity was primarily

determined by mastering a European language and respecting European laws andinstitutions. MPs also gave high marks to these two aspects, but for them, in order tobe a ‘true’ European, the most important element is to ‘feel’ European. The second

most important aspect was to respect European laws and institutions. In contrast withnational identity, MPs did not consider that the place of birth is a very important

criterion of European identity. Half of the MPs (51 per cent) said that havingEuropean parents is an essential element of European citizenship, whereas almost 70

per cent of them believed that having Greek parents is a very important requisite forbeing Greek. Mastering a European language and feeling European were the items

chosen by left MPs. By contrast, MPs belonging to the centre-left and centre-rightselected other items: respect for laws and institutions and ‘feeling’ European.

It seems that MPs offered more or less similar answers to the questions about whatdistinguishes Greek and European identity. Respecting laws and institutions and‘feeling’ Greek and European were considered the most prominent aspects of national

and European identity, respectively. In the case of Greek national identity in particular,other highly preferred aspects were the sharing of Greek cultural values and the

mastering of the Greek language.Could the responses of Greek MPs be correlated with a set of implicit unobserved

variables contrasting a preference for ascribed characteristics to a preference forachieved characteristics of identity? Table 3 shows the findings of factor analysis for

national identity and European identity. In both cases, we used the standard criterionof retaining only those eigenvalues with scores greater than 1. Our analysis, with avarimax rotation pattern matrix, produces three factors, shown in Table 3 for both

national and European identities. Factor loadings represent how the variables wereweighted for each factor.

Overall, the three factors explained 61.8 per cent of the total variance in nationalidentity. The first factor, which we have called ‘traditionalism’, explains most of the

variance and includes the belief that for someone to be Greek he or she has to beChristian, to have Greek parents, to be born in Greece, to share Greece’s cultural

traditions and to ‘feel’ Greek. Two items show high loadings in this factor, i.e. to sharecultural traditions (0.77) and to have Greek parents (0.76). The second factor, which

we have labelled ‘formalism’, explains 19.71 per cent of the variance and includes two

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items with high loadings, i.e. the ability to speak Greek (0.83) and to be a Greek citizen(0.75). The third factor, which we have named ‘liberalism’, includes only one item,

namely that in order to be Greek one has to respect Greek laws and institutions. This

item scores very highly (0.91).The first factor suggests that within our sample there was a considerable group of

MPs who thought about national identity in the most traditional manner. Theiropinions clustered around three ascribed characteristics, which were Christianity,

parents’ national origin, and place of birth, plus two achieved characteristics (to ‘feel’Greek and to share the country’s traditions). All five items are familiar to Greeks

socialised in Greek schools, the Orthodox Church and the traditional family. These

socialisation agents have propagated ideas about Greek identity which have beenheavily nationalist (e.g. widely held opinions about the uniqueness and superiority

of Greeks).The factor of ‘formalism’ includes two formal criteria that, if fulfilled, constitute the

basis for including someone among the Greeks. The underlying assumption is that,regardless of whether one feels Greek or shares Greek values or respects the country’s

laws, it would be sufficient to master the country’s language and to fulfil the legal

requirements for obtaining Greek citizenship in order to be considered a Greek. Thecombined emergence of these two characteristics is not an odd phenomenon. As

hypothesised in the introduction of this article, it can be understood in the context of aculture of formalism, located in-between old-fashioned traditional and modern liberal

perceptions of identity.The final factor (‘liberalism’) consists of respect for the laws and institutions of the

country. This factor is based on a principle of political liberalism according to which

laws and institutions require equal respect by all.

Table 3 The dimensions of national and European identity among MPs (factor analysis)

Nationalidentity

Europeanidentity

Factor 1Traditionalism

Factor 2Formalism

Factor 3Liberalism

Factor 1EU traditionalism

Factor 2EU liberalism

To be a Christian 0.61 0.21 0.36 0.56 0.34To share Greece’s/Europe’scultural traditions

0.77 0.12 20.03 0.39 0.43

To be born in Greece/Europe 0.55 0.34 0.14 0.82 0.09To have Greek/Europeanparents

0.76 0.21 20.01 0.80 0.12

To feel Greek/European 0.62 20.27 20.28 0.18 0.76To master Greek/Europeanlanguage

0.06 0.83 0.01 0.69 20.10

To respect Greek/Europeanlaws and institutions

20.01 20.03 0.91 20.02 0.88

To be a Greek citizen 0.17 0.75 20.06 — —

Note: Factor analysis with varimax rotation pattern matrix.

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Turning to the factor analysis of responses on European identity, two underlyingfactors are revealed, which together account for almost 90 per cent of the observed

variance. Naturally, since there is no single European language, and supra-national

European citizenship is indirect (that is, it is not accompanied by formal requirementsto be fulfilled), a factor similar to ‘formalism’, discussed above with regard to Greek

nationality, has not emerged. Our analysis of European identity, then, does not containa factor similar to ‘formalism’, but contains factors reminiscent of the traditionalism

and liberalism discussed above: we will call them ‘EU traditionalism’ and ‘EUliberalism’ (Table 3).

In detail, the first factor, ‘EU traditionalism’, is composed of five elements. In orderto be a real European, someone has to be born in Europe, have European parents, be a

Christian, master a European language, and be a European citizen. Two items show

high loadings in this factor, i.e. to be born in Europe (0.82) and to have Europeanparents (0.80). The second factor, ‘EU liberalism’, contains the aforementioned aspect

of respect for European laws and institutions with a high factor loading (0.88), while‘feeling European’ is also loaded.

‘Feeling European’ is understood as a liberal stance because of the ‘elective affinity’between liberalism and the West in Greek political culture. Already in the early years of

the Greek War of Independence (1821–30), the ideas of liberalism were spread inGreece by intellectuals and merchants educated in Western Europe (Diamandouros

1994). In the nineteenth century, liberal political and market institutions were

imported from the West, while at the beginning of the twentieth century the ‘liberal’party of Venizelos advocated state-building along West European lines. By contrast,

‘feeling Greek’ has always meant being faithful to a tradition that was pure anduncontaminated by foreign (including liberal) ideas. Such tradition included

ahistorical ideas about the glory of ancient Hellenes, otherworldly beliefs in ChristianOrthodox dogma, and values akin to village life.

The traditionalist factor explains most of the variance in both models, i.e. 38.2 per

cent of the variance with regard to national and 33.1 per cent with regard to Europeanidentity. MPs do not use different sets of criteria to distinguish the content of national

identity from that of European identity. Barring the factor of ‘formalism’, the things onthe basis of which MPs define national and European identity are more or less the

same. For traditionalists, having Greek parents matters for Greek identity. For thesame respondents, to be born in Europe and to have European parents matter a lot for

European identity. For liberals, respecting laws and institutions is of primaryimportance for national and European identity.

However, we cannot conclude that for our MPs, the two identities were of equal

importance. In Greece, attachment to ‘Europe’ is traditionally weak and people do noteasily identify with the EU. In 1977, for example, even though the pro-European ND

was in power, about one-third of the Greek electorate voted for PASOK and the KKE,which were against the prospect of Greece joining the EC. It was only in the mid-1980s

that PASOK dropped its reservations about Greece’s European prospects (Verney1993). Today, Eurosceptic perceptions again came to the fore in the winter of 2009–10,

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when part of the Greek press and the trade unions attributed Greece’s grave fiscalproblems and the government’s austerity measures to the EU.

As Table 4 shows, in a question on the strength of their attachment to their village,region, country, and Europe, the majority in our public opinion sample was strongly

attached to the country and to their region and village. Only half of the respondents inthe public opinion survey declared a strong attachment to Europe. This trend was not

exactly replicated at the level of elites. The vast majority of sampled MPs claimed thatthey were ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ attached to Greece (98.9 per cent). A relatively lower

share of 80.7 per cent (but much higher than the corresponding share of the publicopinion sample) said the same about the EU (the question was not formed in an‘either–or’ fashion, so percentages do not add up to 100). TheMPs’ attachment to their

village and region was also much higher than their attachment to the EU and this wastrue regardless of party affiliation. It is not surprising that forMPs and the wider public,

European identity was supplementary to their national identity and that, comparedwith national citizenship, European citizenship was a second-order citizenship.

Explaining Variance in Identity

With regard to identity, was there any variation of responses of MPs which can beaccounted for by ideological self-placement on the left–right scale (0–10 where 0means extreme left and 10 extreme right)? We observed that in our sample, the MPs of

the two largest parties (ND and PASOK, which have alternated in power since 1974)did not necessarily abide by the ‘official’ political ideology of their party. Thus, the

interpretation of emerging patterns in the context of the ideological profile of theinterviewed MPs is more useful than an interpretation on the basis of their party

membership or government versus opposition membership. In what follows, we willattempt to explain variance on the basis of the left–right self-placement of the MPs.

Owing to the small N of our sample, we limit ourselves to exploratory bivariateassociations.

The first factor loads on the more traditionalist elements of national identity and is

correlated with self-placement on the left–right scale (Table 5). ‘Traditionalist’ MPs,namely those who considered that being Greek depends on having Greek parents,

Table 4 Attachment to different levels of community among public opinion and politicalelites (per cent of respondents)

Political elites

Very/somewhat attached Public opinion All Left Centre-left Centre-right

Attachment to village 85.7 96.6 100 95.1 97.6Attachment to region 86.5 95.5 100 90.5 100Attachment to Greece 93.6 98.9 100 97.6 100Attachment to Europe 50 80.7 50 73.8 90.5

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being born in Greece, sharing the country’s traditions, being a Christian, and ‘feeling’Greek, were most likely to place themselves closer to the right side of the scale. In

contrast, most of those who did not consider the aforementioned traditionalist aspectsimportant for national identity placed themselves closer to the left side of the scale.

Unsurprisingly, MPs who placed themselves on the right were more traditionalist asfar as national identity was concerned. The Greek right has always been associated with

Christianity and family values.Switching to the factor of ‘liberalism’, we find that, among those parliamentarians

who considered that being Greek depends on respecting Greek laws and institutions,most placed themselves closer to the centre of the scale, whereas few placed themselvescloser to the left. This is not surprising, given that a large proportion of the left

traditionally opposes laws and institutions that it regards as tools of the capitalist state.In Greece, part of the communist left has integrated disrespect for laws and

institutions into its discourse. In this context, the association between the factor of‘liberalism’ and left ideology is negative. ‘Formalism’ is not correlated with self-

placement on the left–right spectrum.Turning to European identity (Table 5), we observe that our two factors (EU

traditionalism, EU liberalism) were not correlated with left–right self-placement. Thismay be explained by the fact that MPs do not closely identify with Europe. As we have

seen in Table 4, Europe was less important to them than their own country or region,which means that they had not yet formed a strong European identity.

Representation

The problem of the EU’s democratic deficit is well known. Lack of politicalparticipation, transparency, and accountability are only a few aspects of the problem.

Another aspect is distrust of European institutions (European Parliament, EuropeanCouncil, and European Commission). We hypothesised that MPs would show

different levels of trust in European institutions, depending on the political party towhich they belonged and their self-placement on the left–right scale. One might

expect that MPs of the centre-left and the left would tend to show comparatively lower

Table 5 Correlations between national and European identity factors and self-placement ofMPs on the left–right scale

National identity European identity

Traditionalism Formalism Liberalism EU traditionalism EU liberalism

Left 20.35** 20.01 20.21* 20.20 20.19Centre 0.09 20.03 0.26* 0.03 0.11Right 0.29* 0.00 0.01 0.19 0.17

Note: 0–10 left–right scale where 0 means left and 10 means right.**Significant at the 0.01 level; *Significant at the 0.05 level.

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levels of trust to the extent that they understood EU organs as Western capitalist

institutions.

As Table 6 shows, themembers of themass sample trusted the EuropeanCommission

and the European Parliament almost equally. By contrast, as expected from their

familiarity with the legislative process,MPs trusted the European Parliamentmore than

the other EU institutions (as the higher score shows). MPs of the centre-right trusted

European institutions more than MPs of the left: the deputies of ND trusted the EU

institutions the most, whereas MPs of SYN as well as the only interviewed KKE deputy

trusted them the least. An explanation for this finding lies in the strong anti-Western

and anti-capitalist sentiments expressed at least up until the mid-1980s by Greek

communists and socialists alike. Such sentiments have probably surfaced in the form of

the mistrust towards EU institutions shown by MPs of PASOK, SYN, and KKE.Even though left and centre-left Greek MPs are sceptical towards EU institutions,

they appreciated the benefits stemming from their country’s participation in the EU.

This is shown in Table 7 by the fact that the majority of MPs (56.2 per cent) opposed

the statement that ‘Greece’s interests are not taken into account by those making

decisions at the EU level’. By contrast, the majority (two-thirds) of the public opinion

sample agreed with this statement. The ‘masses’ may have a more instrumentalist

and ethnocentric view of EU than the parliamentary elite. Of course, there were

Table 6 Level of trust in European Institutions (mean scores): responses of the Greekpublic opinion sample and 90 MPs

Public opinion Political elites Left Centre-left Centre-right

Trust in the EuropeanParliament

6.2 7.1 5.5 6.9 7.4

Trust in the EuropeanCommission

6.3 6.0 2.7 5.4 6.9

Trust in the EuropeanCouncil

n.a.* 6.3 2.5 5.8 7.2

Note: Trust is measured on a 0–10 scale where 0 indicates no trust.*The question was not included in the mass survey.

Table 7 The representation of Greece’s interests: percentage distribution of responses ofGreek public opinion sample and 90 MPs (by political party family)

Greece’s interests are not taken intoaccount by those making decisions atthe EU level

Publicopinion

Politicalelites Left

Centre-left

Centre-right

Strongly/somewhat agree 68.5 24.7 25 33.3 16.3Neither agree or disagree 5.0 19.1 0 21.4 18.6Somewhat/strongly disagree 25.1 56.2 75 45.2 65.1

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differentiations among parties. For example, MPs of PASOK disagreed less with theaforementioned statement than MPs of ND.

Despite the increased security in terms of foreign relations enjoyed by EU memberstates and the generous provision of EU funds to the poorer states, in Greece

Euroscepticism has remained strong among left-wing voters and their representatives.The criticism advanced by the Greek left against the EU and against any Greek

governments eager to actively participate in EU affairs is related to the EU’sdemocratic deficit and a perception, prevalent on the left, that the European project

primarily serves capitalist interests. Another argument of the left is that the EU doesnot really protect Greece’s foreign and defence interests and that it primarily serves theinterests of a closed club of old and powerful member states.

The results of bivariate correlations, associating trust in EU institutions with self-placement on the left–right scale of political ideology, suggest that there is a strong

correlation between MPs’ self-placement on the left and their distrust of both theEuropean Commission and the European Council. The coefficient of the correlation

between self-placement on the left and trusting the European Commission is20.35 atthe 0.01 significance level. For the European Council the corresponding coefficient

is 2 0.31 at the 0.05 significance level. Among MPs, trust in the EuropeanCommission was correlated with placing oneself on the right, with a coefficient scoring0.22 at the 0.05 significance level. There are no other statistically significant

relationships to report.1 The left in Greece, as in other EU member states, has beentraditionally more Eurosceptic than other political forces andmore critical towards the

executive branch of power in the EU. Since there was a very small share of MPs fromleft parties in our sample, the observed association may be accounted for by the

presence of left-leaning deputies of PASOK. Although across Europe the left hasmoved substantially toward a more pro-European stance over time (Gabel & Hix

2004), the legacy of populist Euroscepticism, dominant in this party in 1974–85, maystill negatively affect attitudes towards the Commission and the Council.

Scope of Governance

In the EU’s multi-level governance system, there is a recurrent debate about theappropriate level at which sectoral policies should be formulated. A similar debateoccurs on the issue of how deep European integration should become in the future.

Our research is relevant to both debates, as the IntUne questionnaire includesquestions on the respondents’ preferred level of decision-making with regard to several

policy areas (Table 8) and on how respondents project the role of EU in various policyareas in ten years’ time (Table 9).

In various policy areas, competences are gradually transferred from nationalauthorities to supra-national ones as well as to sub-national levels of decision-making

(e.g. to regional authorities). This is a process usually referred to as the ‘hollowingout’ of the state. MPs were asked to indicate their preferred level of policy-making,

choosing one out of the following options: European, national, or regional level

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or a combination of these levels. Predictably enough, the underdevelopment of

regional administration in Greece and the fact that decentralisation has not progressed

at the regional level as it has in Italy and Spain made the ‘regional option’ rather

irrelevant in the case of Greece (not shown in Table 8). The share of Greek MPs who

chose the region as the appropriate level for policy-making ranged, depending on the

policy in question, from zero (immigration) to 3.5 per cent (fight against crime).

Table 8 Preferred level for the formulation of EU policies: percentage distribution ofresponses of Greek public opinion sample and 90 MPs (by political party family)

ND PASOK SYN KKE Public opinion

ImmigrationNational level 20.9 9.3 0 100 56.1European level 25.6 20.9 33.3 — 37.1Both levels 53.5 69.7 66.7 — 6.3Environmental issuesNational level 16.3 11.6 0 100 50.0European level 18.6 18.6 0 — 37.7Both levels 65.1 69.8 100 — 11.5Fighting crimeNational level 25.6 34.9 66.7 100 67.2European level 9.3 7.0 0 — 22.5Both levels 65.1 58.1 33.3 — 9.4Health issuesNational level 51.2 51.2 33.3 100 73.9European level 4.6 2.3 0 — 19.7Both levels 44.2 46.5 66.7 — 6.1TaxationNational level 41.9 50 66.7 100 —European level 11.6 7.1 0 — —Both levels 46.5 42.9 33.3 — —

Table 9 The evolution of the EU over the next ten years: percentage distribution ofresponses of Greek public opinion and 90 MPs who are in favour of specific commonpolicies (by political party family)

Very/somewhat in favour Public opinion Political elites Left Centre-left Centre-right

Common tax system 63.4 76.1 75 66.7 85.7Social security system 80.2 88.6 75 85.7 92.8Common foreign policy 78.8 97.7 75 95.3 97.7Help for EU regionsin economic or socialdifficulties

92.7 100 100 100 100

Note: Left includes the MPof the KKE and the sampled MPs of the SYN; centre-left: the sampled MPsof PASOK, centre-right: the sampled MPs.Source: IntUne 2007 Elite and Mass Surveys in Greece.

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As far as decision-making on immigration and environmental protection isconcerned, a minority of MPs from various parties (ranging between 18.6 and 33.3 per

cent, Table 8) preferred the European over the national level. On the other hand, the

only interviewed MP of KKE, a party that has been consistently anti-European,invariably responded that all policies should be dealt with at the national level. The

MPs of SYN showed a more pro-European stance, claiming that the best level forformulating three of the suggested policies would be a combination of both the

European and the national. MPs of both ND and PASOK also followed this option(‘both levels’) with regard to immigration and environmental policies and fighting

organised crime. However, with regard to public health, MPs of ND and PASOK

mostly preferred to reply ‘at the national’ level instead of ‘at both levels’.The noted preference to resort to the ‘both levels’ option may be the result of

interviewee fatigue or a tendency on the part of MPs to avoid taking a position. MPsmay acknowledge that one day decision-making powers on some public policies might

be transferred from national to supra-national authorities. This prospect is probablyfeared more by the general public, as shown by the responses in the last column

of Table 8. The majority of the public opinion sample preferred that all policiesbe formulated at the national level. This tendency in our public opinion sample

was particularly strong in relation to health issues and the fight against organised

crime.With regard to the projected reach of European integration in ten years’ time,

respondents were asked to say whether they were in favour of a common tax system, acommon social security system, a common foreign policy, and further help for EU

regions encountering economic and social difficulties. Greece has been one of thelargest recipients of EU regional funds, particularly since 1988. This was reflected in

the overwhelming support among respondents from both the Greek samples (MPsand public opinion) for further regional aid (regardless of the political party affiliation

of the respondents). Many Greeks have been convinced that EU membership would

provide a shelter for their country in the midst of recurring tensions in southeasternEurope. This stance was reflected in the high scores of approval for a common foreign

policy: almost all sampled MPs (97.7 per cent) agree with such a common policy(Table 9). Respondents from the public opinion sample were also supportive of such a

policy (by 78.8 per cent).Members of the public opinion sample were also strongly in favour of a common

social security policy, in hopes that the major inefficiencies and inequalities of theGreek pension system could be taken care of by a common EU policy in this sector.

Also 63.4 per cent of the respondents of the same sample were in favour of a common

tax system. The chronic problems of the malfunctioning Greek tax system (corruption,tax evasion and frequent amendments in legislation) have taken their toll on public

opinion about the Greek state’s capacity to tax the population. The sampled MPs wereeven more enthusiastic about the prospect of a common tax system and social security

and—above all—a common foreign policy. In sum, we found a positive, albeitvariable, pro-European stance among Greek MPs and public opinion as far as the

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formulation of common European policies was concerned. In that respect, our Greekrespondents sided with those who believe in a much larger scope of government for

the EU in the future.

Conclusions

In this article, we have discussed how the Greek MPs sampled in 2007 understood the

notion of European and national identity, as well as how they reacted to issuesof representation and scope of governance. We have also contrasted the attitudes of

MPs with those of a sample of Greek public opinion, interviewed with the samequestionnaire, in early 2007. Overall, we found differences of limited intensity in the

way Greek MPs and public opinion understood the notion of European and nationalidentity.

In order to understand the elements underlying the achieved and ascribed items

that are associated by MPs with identity formation, we employed a factor analysis. Theresults of our analysis suggested that there were two factors underlying the notion of

national and European identity. We called these factors ‘traditionalism’ and‘liberalism’. The first factor, relevant to both identities, is composed of elements such

as religion, birthplace, and parents’ nationality, suggesting a traditionalist approachtowards identity. This factor encompasses both ascribed and achieved characteristics.

The second factor, relevant for both the national and European identity, is ‘liberalism’.According to the latter factor, the most important aspect of national identity is respect

for laws and institutions.There is also a third factor reflecting a formalist approach, stressing typically

verifiable requirements. This factor, which we have called ‘formalism’, emerges only in

relation to national identity. Adherents of ‘formalism’ would claim that individualswho were not born in Greece or did not have Greek parents could still be Greeks if they

mastered the Greek language and fulfilled the legal requirements for Greek citizenship.Our analysis suggests that there are limits to the use of conceptual dichotomies

(ascribed/achieved traits of identity, ethnic/civic citizenship).Greek MPs did not assign different characteristics to national and to European

identity, but defined them in similar terms. This does not mean that the twoidentities were of equal importance for the Greek MPs. Ethnocentrism was prevalentamong members of national parliaments, and the Greek case was no exception.

In the eyes of the MPs we sampled, European identity was supplementary to thenational one.

We have examined the impact of the MPs’ ideological position on identity,representation and scope of governance. Compared with MPs leaning towards the

centre and the left, MPs who placed themselves on the right side of the left–right scaleconceived of identity in terms of traditional aspects, such as family and traditional

values (e.g. to have Greek parents). Those at the centre of the scale had a more liberalunderstanding of national identity. As far as European identity was concerned, the

self-placement of MPs on the left–right scale was not significant.

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We discussed representation in relation to the trust MPs showed in Europeaninstitutions in comparison with the corresponding trust expressed by our public

opinion sample. On the average, the sampled Greek MPs trusted the EuropeanParliament more than the Greek public. MPs and the public trusted the European

Commission almost equally.We then analysed the scope of governance with reference to MPs’ preferences

concerning the appropriate level of formulation of public policies and thedeepening of European integration through the advancement of common EU

policies. In terms of the level of policy formulation, the respondents to our publicopinion survey were more ethnocentric than the sampled MPs. The vast majority ofrespondents believed that policy decisions about immigration, the environment,

organised crime, and health should be taken at the national level. By contrast, themajority of sampled MPs believed that decisions should be taken at both European

and national level.The self-placement of MPs on the left–right scale was shown to be a predictor of

attitudes. Generally speaking, compared with MPs who placed themselves on the right,left-leaning MPs showed little trust in EU institutions and particularly in the European

Commission. MPs of the left did not welcome the prospect of EU becoming moreactive in the formulation of organised crime or taxation policies.To conclude, despite the relative autonomy of EU issues (e.g. enlargement,

democratic deficit, balance of power among EU institutions, mix of EU policies,subsidiarity), political elites did not think about Europe on its own terms. Rather, their

views on Europe depended on political ideology and on party affiliation. Our researchin 2007 showed that in Greece centre-right politicians had pro-European attitudes and

that to a certain extent the same held for centre-left politicians. This article thereforecorroborates the conclusions of recent research (Conti 2008), according to which, in

contrast to the past, centre-left politicians have become more pro-European. However,Greece still shows a distinctive profile, as the centre-right tends in general to be more

pro-European than the centre-left. Therefore, even though the scope for partycompetition on the EU has narrowed remarkably over time, there are still signs ofsome persistence of a left–right divide in this country. This divide structures a pattern

that is different from the one observed for the other countries analysed by this specialissue, as well as from the broad cross-national pattern described in other works (Gabel

& Hix 2004; Hooghe et al. 2004) characterised by the greater Europhilia of the centre-left compared with the centre-right.

Acknowledgements

This research was funded by a grant from the IntUne project (Integrated and United: A Quest forCitizenship in an Ever Closer Europe) financed by the Sixth Framework Programme of the EU,Priority 7, Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge Based Society (CIT3-CT-2005-513421). Theauthors acknowledge the advice of Professors Elias Nicolakopoulos, Maurizio Cotta, Nicolo Conti,and Luca Verzichelli, the help of Manina Kakepaki, and the criticisms of two anonymous referees.

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Note

[1] The coefficient of the correlations among left, centre, and right and the European Parliament

are 20.13, 0.11, and 0.05, respectively. The score of correlation between self-placement on the

centre and trust in the European Commission is 0.14; and between such self-placement and

trust in the European Council, 0.11. Finally, the correlation between self-placement on the

right and trust in the European Council scores 0.23. None of these is a statistically significant

correlation.

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