1.4 - lamentowicz, wojtek - political culture and institution building. democratic evolution at work...

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Political Culture and Institution Building: Democratic Evolution at Workand the Case of Poland

Political Culture and Institution Building: Democratic Evolution at Work and the Caseof Poland

by Wojtek Lamentowicz

Source:

PRAXIS International (PRAXIS International), issue: 1+2 / 1990, pages: 64-73, on www.ceeol.com.
http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.dibido.eu/bookdetails.aspx?bookID=31132ed2-cee0-4ddb-9e51-11fc25f75341http://www.ceeol.com/


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POLITICAL CULTUREINSTITUTIODEMOC ATIC EVOLUTIO ATAND THE CASE OF POLA

Wojtek Lamentowicz

Some of the East European states (Poland and Hungary are the most pivotalcases) are amidst a process of transition from bureaucratic authoritarian rule. WhatI refer to as the "transition'" is a period when the rules of the game are not defined.They are in a constant flux because those in power are too weak to protect theold pattern and those who are pushing for change are too weak to impose the newcode. The rules and institutions which are at stake shall define which new collectiveactors will be permitted to enter the political arena and which means of influencecan legitimately be used by the competing political coalitions.Although international factors (dependence on the Soviet Union and detentebetween East and West)may condition or affect the course of the change, the majorparticipants and the dominant forces are basically domestic. They include

1. Historical circumstances unique to each country, domestic traditions shapinga given people's sense of freedom;2. The way in which Soviet-type rule was established and a previous regime brokendown;3. The means the authoritarian system used to obtain legitimacy and handle threatsto its grip on power;4. The initiative and timing of experimental moves toward liberalization - "toolittle and too late" - under the pressure from below seems to be the EastEuropean pattern of experiments);5. The degree of security and self-confidence of the regime's elites;6. The confidence and competence of leaders (and counter-elites) and of groupspushing for change.In this article I will develop the categories essential to understanding the transitions to democracy in East Europe. Then I will take a closer look at the uneasyand difficult conditions in contemporary Poland.

I. Modes of structural changes in Eastern EuropeDestalinization, launched in the thaw of 1955-1956, was never fully implemented.It brought about some changes as a result of revolutionary defeats as in Hungary in1956 and Poland in 1980-1981, as a result of the evolutionfrombelow (Poland after1955 and again after 1983) or as a resultof reformsfrom above (Yugoslaviaafter 1948,

Praxis International 10:1/2 April & July 1990 0260-8448 $2.00


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Praxis International 65Hungary after 1968, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Poland after 1981, and the SovietUnionafter 1985). These changes made the monopoly systems less totalitarian even thoughthey kept their basic authoritarian and monocentric characteristics intact.

1. Revolutions (or rather rebellions since they were not fully successful) wererapid and radical. What was most significant was that these changes were causedby the self-mobilization of despairing masses of people. They were almost totallyuncontrolled, or they were controlled from below by leaders who were fullyindependent of those in power. An essential precondition to systemic resistance- the synchronization of urban and rural discontent - was exactly what happenedin all cases. The society's resistance to the monopoly system was total and veryfew participants believed that the system could be corrected through the modificationof certain policies or the replacement of particular leaders. The aim was to bringdown the entire regime and to reconstruct the very foundations of authority. Theserevolutionary upheavals resulted from extreme frustration (Hungary 1956, Romania1989) or from relative deprivation (Poland 1980-81, GDR 1989, Czechoslovakia1989). The violence of the Hungarian resistance in 1956 and the nonviolence ofthe Polish August (1980) ended with violent reaction from the defenders of thestatus quo. The revolutions of Autumn 1989 (in GDR, Czechoslovakia, Romania)were in contrast accepted by Gorbachev.

2. Reforms were gradual, planned and implemented through the legislative processthat was exclusively controlled by the ruling group. These changes in economycould not destroy the foundation on which the dominance of the communist partyover the society was based. So the identity of the monocentric order was notchanged. The vested interests of local power elites and their dependence on theSoviet superpowers prevented reforms from becoming coherent and irreversible.In the end, these reforms proved to be the least reliable path to democratic, civilsociety. All economic reforms launched in the sixties and in the seventies (exceptthe Hungarian one) were effectively dismantled. Hungarian reform proved to betotally impotent as far as a viable market economy is concerned.

3. Evolution is similar to reform in its gradual, peaceful, and legal character.On the other hand, it is similar to revolution since the sources and scope of theevolution are not planned or controlled by the ruling elite. It grows from belowwhile the reform is controlled from above. Many changes proved, in the end, tocome from a long term peaceful evolution, that was unwanted by the rulers butwhich they, nevertheless, accepted ex post facto. Table 1 may be helpful inexplaining the categories which I have developed.It should be noted that even the lost revolutions were not useless. They revivedthe sense of moral and political rights among the dependent clients of the state.

The lost Hungarian revolution paved the way for the economic reforms of 1968and, perhaps, political reforms in the future. The Polish August revolution providedthe necessary conditions for a mix of reforms and democratic evolution in the 19808.The Polish experience, including the organized existence of a genuine politicalopposition, was so strong a challenge to the Soviet leaders that it pushed themto launch Gorbachev's perestroika.

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66Table 1

Praxis International

Modes ofchanges

Revolution

Evolution

Reform

Who controls?

no one, or controlfrom below

control from beloworganized bycounter-elites

from above by theruling elites

What is thespeed of achange?

rapid

slow

slow orvery slow

What happens to theidentity of the system?

identity openlyquestioned anddestroyedidentity may betranscended in thelonger run withoutopen questioning(peaceful devolution ofthe system's identity)no threat to theidentity of the system

11. Stages of learning from experienceThe policy outcomes in particular East European states vary considerably. Toassess these changes, three basic questions need to be asked about their contents:(a) what human needs are better satisfied? (b) what new rights are acquired by

the citizens? and (c) are these accomplishments reversible and, if so, what arethe costs of reversion?With these questions in mind we can distinguish four levels of changes in themonopoly regime. These changes may be perceived as steps leading to the decom,-

position ofmonocentric regimes, as well as the improvement of prospects for theemergence of civil society.1. Humanization is the least ambitious change. No new rights are won by thenon-ruling groups, but the style of ruling becomes more sensitive, more humaneand, sometimes, more responsive to basic needs. The improvement is mainly visible

in the field of consumption and in the conditions ofwork. The first efforts of postStalinist policy in the Soviet Union limited the scope and the level of the unpredictability of repressive measures. The numbers of deaths and imprisonments forpolitical reasons were smaller under Khrushchev than under Stalin. The very essenceof the system, however, was hardly changed. The monopoly systemwas humanizedmostly by reforms in the Soviet Union but, inmany countries, democratic revolution(Hungary and Poland in 1956) contributed a great deal to that limited success.

2. Rationalization of the monopoly systems means that bureaucratic andideological rationality in the party is supplemented by the influx of piecemeal socialengineering based on some meritocratic or technocratic principles. Many highlytrained professionals are recruited by coaptation from above. Their presence inthe inner party provides some constraints to the system's "ideological logic" .


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Praxis International 67The most wasteful projects may be stopped. The most exaggerated lies in statisticsor propaganda may be replaced by half-truths. These sorts of change, usuallyimplemented as minor and fully reversible economic reforms, allow for moreindependence of local managers. Thus, an economy more open to the marketsbut still centrally planned, becomes less wasteful but it hardly adequately satisfiesthe consumers' needs. The system is slightly less centralized and less rigid butit falls short of liberalization or democratization. No redefinition and extensionof civil rights has been accomplished. Polish reforms of the 1970s were tailoredin that manner. But the technocratic influences were too weak and could not replacethe bureaucratic anarchy of monocentrism.

3. Liberalization may be perceived as the process leading to some normativeor structural constraints in decision-making.The revolutionary emergence of Soviet rule in Russia and then the militaryimposition of that system in East European countries destroyed the normative constraints which might limit the political intervention into the social life. The emergentsystems destroyed not only the legal opposition (' 'oppositionless state" is anadequate term as coined by G. Ionescu) but all norms which could regulate thescope and intensity of power. Traditional culture and religion were perceived bythe new elites as the "remnants" of the prerevolutionary past that needed to befully eliminated. No wonder that they could not accept obligations flowing fromreligion, tradition and - last but not least - from old moral views. Destruction ofthe inherited laws and the use of new laws simply as a means for the perpetuationof the new order's political elite made impossible the rule of law. The fmal outcomeof this destruction was the lack of normative constraints in decision making; whatwas perceived by the rulers ~ s technically possible was simply put into practice.Liberalization means that:1. The authoritarian elites begin to modify their own rules in the direction of selflimiting their powers;2. The ruling parties promise to replace their unlimited power with a bit morepredictable rule within the framework of the due process of law;

3. The citizens' rights may be redefined, better protected and in some areas evenextended.Due process and the rule of law are not mere slogans but become reality in someareas ofpublic life. Morals and religious beliefs are not suppressed by force. TheCommunist elite becomes less faithful to its own ideology; a mix of cynicism andreflexive pragmatism makes the elite more concerned with legal and moral limits

to its power. Power is kept by the party without open competition, but the rulersrecognise that there are some non-technical limits to their power. They do nottry to dominate the private life of citizens: as 0 'Donne!l and Schmitt noted, " . . . thereacquisition of some individual rights generally precedes the granting of guaranteesfor collective action." More than that, some less important areas of public lifeare open to the independent action of individuals or informal groups of indivduals.Better protection of civil rights may be different on the level of individuals andon the level of groups. As far as individuals are concerned the newly acquiredguarantees include the classical heritage of the liberal tradition: habeas corpus,


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68 Praxis Internationalsanctity of the private home and correspondence, the right to be defended in afair trial according to preestablished laws, and freedom of movement, speech andpetition. On the level of groups, these '''new' rights may cover such things asfreedom from punishment for expressions of collective dissent from governmentpolicy, freedom to associate voluntarily with other citizens, and freedom fromcensorship.Liberalization in most East European states is advanced so far as to make thecollective dissent no longer punishable. Defection from the party - the lack ofparticipation in politics - is regarded by the majority of citizens as a basic humanright. Enforced and ritual participation that is not voluntary tends to be an exception.The regime gives more official toleration to religious beliefs but it fails to bringabout genuine improvement in the population's material condition and in the

efficiency of an unwieldy economic system. Liberalization is better for the soulthan for the body of the people, so far.Liberalized authoritarianism opens up certain spaces for individual and groupaction; they can obtain needed information and support without altering the structureof authority, that is without subjecting their claim to rule to fair and competitiveelections. The party competition and electoral choice, even if only in rudimentaryforms, goes beyond the horizon of liberalization.

4. Democratization refers to the processes whereby new collective and independent political actors are permitted to enter the political arena. We may distinguishbetween the two levels of political pluralism which opens up the road to a competitive and liberal democracy: the lame and the party pluralism. "Lame pluralism"denotes the existence of legally organized pressure groups such as trade unionsand associations if these are independent from the party-state and are able toprotect their own identity. Pressure-group-politics is based on two principles:Ca) pressure groups may legally seek political influence without questioning theCommunists' claims to power; (b) the Communist party mediates between competing demands and no opposition party is recognized as the legitimate form ofrepresentation.Party pluralism refers to a stage of development when the ruling party is readyto compete with the legally acting opposition party which claims it has the rightto state authority. Party politics becomes thus competitive and claims to rule aresubjected to free and fair elections.This final stage of political development was reached by 1990 in most countries

of the region.The most important institutional devices that contributed greatly to the democraticevolution in Poland were an innovative mixture of both mass mobilization anda wisely controlled demobilization. The innovations that were used as vehiclesfor democratic change include the following:

1. The strike movement was turned into a multifunctional and independent tradeunion. The basic characteristics of the Solidarity union in 1980-1981 werehorizontal and territorial and very fluid structures that successfully confrontedvertical, branch and the rather rigid structures of the one-party state.2. The underground civil society after imposition of martial law was conceived


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Praxis International 69as a step back and a sort of controlled demobilization in order to limit the costsof the confrontation with the state's repressive violence.3. The round table negotiations in Spring 1989 were invented in Poland (and lateron copied in Czechoslovakia and the GDR) as a means of peaceful search forcompromises with the old regime.

Ill. Electoral breakthrough and the new governmentParliamentary elections in Poland may be perceived as an earthquake thatdestroyed the old Communist myth of the oppositionless state. For the first time

in the history of the soviet-type systems the right to the legal existence of theopposition has been acknowledged and even formally recognized by the Communistparty. The way leading to the Round Table compromise has been stormy andextremely long if one takes into consideration its beginnings in August 1980 andthe drama of martial law.Not one but four extraordinary things happened in Poland in June 1989. First,the ruling coalition parties lost an election but they did not lose power becausethey still had the army, police, bureaucratic apparatus and the formal majority

of 65 per cent of seats in the lower house (Sejm) guaranteed by the Round Tableagreement. Everyday opinion saw that the real loser however was the authoritarianand monopoly power system rather than the candidates nominated by the threecoalition parties (the Polish United Workers Party, United Peasant Party,Democratic Party).Secondly, it was not a political party that won but rather a broad conglomerateof social forces artificially unified by the symbols and memories of a strong tradeunion movement. It would have been strange enough if it were the trade unionthat wins a parliamentary election. But what actually happened was more unusualthan that: it was the symbolic value of the Solidarity trade union that won the electionbecause the real strength of this trade union today is as small as 15-20 per centof its previous glory. Solidarity has had approximately 1.5 million members inindustrial and urban population and about 1 million members in the countryside.Thirdly, the opposition unified by the Citizens Committee deprived theCommunist party of all legitimacy, but not the opportunity for political control.Those who had a full right to govern were not in a position to take over the government and those who had no right to govern stayed in most powerful positions.That resulted in a new contradiction: there was power without authority confrontedwith authority without power. It made less efficient the efforts at the formationof the new government that was supposed to be strong enough to be able to combatthe structural crisis of the economy. That explains why the leaders of the Communists tried to persuade the opposition to join the government. They proposed abroad coalition government and the leaders of the opposition were very reluctantto accept this proposal.Fourthly, the losing Communists for the fITst time did not falsify the fmal outcomeof elections. They openly acknowledged that a democratic opposition won. Thiswas a sort of miracle and perhaps a genuine breakthrough in the postwar politicalculture. In spite of some dirty tricks during the campaign the Communists weretotally defeated and admitted the fact of their political failure. In the first round


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70 Praxis Internationalthe coalition candidates won no single seat in the new upper house (Senate), whileSolidarity won 92 out of 100 seats. In the second round on June 18 the oppositionwon seven seats more and the only seat in the Senate not taken by the oppositionwas won by an independent candidate, an extremely rich businessman who wassupported by neither the coalition nor the opposition. None of the coalition candidates for the Senate was able to win in a free competition.Elections to the lower house were not fully free. According to the Round Tableagreement 65% out of 460 seats were granted to the coalition parties; the PolishUnited Workers Party got 33%, United Peasant Party 15 %, Democratic Party 7%and three small Catholic or Christian associations loyal to the Communists got5%. Only 35% of the seats were distributed according to the majority of votesand it was only for these seats that the independents were allowed to stand.The opposition was allowed to win 35% of seats and 160 seats (out of 161) werewon in the first round by the average majority of 65-70% of the turn out. Thecoalition won only 3 seats out of 297 in the first round. The uncontested' 'national

list" comprising 33 notables from the coalition failed almost completely. All buttwo candidates were crossed out by the majority of voters; among those who lostwere Politbureau members, Prime Minister Rakowski, and leaders of both smallerparties. This happened in spite of the appeal by Solidarity leader Lech W a f ~ s awho tried to help his Round Table partners get into the parliament. What votersenjoyed most was just crossing out' ' the reds" even if they were known as pragmaticreformers.The turnout was relatively low: just over 62% in the first round and only 25%in the second round. The first round was more interesting to the voters becausethere was an open or semi-open competition between the two blocks of candidates.Most of the Solidarity candidates were elected in the first round. No wonder that297 lower house members from the coalition got altogether 9.7 million votes whilethe 161 opposition members have won 16.55 million votes. The above mentionedstatistics consider only those members of parliament who were elected in localconstituencies; the two successful runners for the ' 'national list ' , tickets are notincluded. The average support for the actually elected opposition candidate wasas high as 102,148 votes while for the average coalition representative only 32,696eligible voters voted. These figures show that the legitimacy that came from theballot box was distributed in a very unequal way.The importance of the second round is to be seen in that even among establishment party members the pragmatic reformers won and the hardline conservativeslost. The defeat of party functionaries was remarkable.Abstention of more than 38% of voters in the first round is dangerously high.There are many reasons for that turnout; it was the lowest in the postwar historyof parliamentary elections in Poland. Perhaps a few people - no more than 5% followed radical appeals to boycott even these semi-free elections. The secondgroup of abstentions was probably composed of those Communist and other coalitionparty supporters who felt so disgusted with their own parties that they stayed athome. Some of the eligible voters are totally alienated from politics for many variousreasons (alcoholism, drugs abuse, illiteracy etc.). But it is obvious that the mainreason was a deep tiredness and total disbelief in the capacity of any political force- establishment or opposition - to cure the country malaise and reverse the country


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Praxis International 71desperate material decline. There was indeed no enthusiasm either during thecampaign or after the unexpected victory of the opposition which had had only5 weeks to get ready for elections. The shock of victory may easily turn into theshock of the economic disaster.IV. Dilemmas of the transition and threats to uncertain democracyThe risk of an angry rebellion is higher because the decision-making proceduresactually adopted may put into question the democratic identity of the formeropposition. The ruling elite prefers to negotiate with a small elite of Solidarityleaders and intellectuals rather than to allow open debate and a secret vote basedon the majority principle. While dealing with problems behind the closed doorsthe two elites may lose touch with reality and decide by consensus something hardlyacceptable to the population as a whole.That particular mixture of corporatist top secret negotiations and a parliamentaryprocedure based on the principle of majority rule is unstable per se and for thatreason it may willy-nilly contribute to overall instability.Even the choice of the President - the new office introduced in order to stabilizethe transitory structure - was hazardous to both sides. The Communist party wasafraid of the failure of its candidate, and the opposition was afraid to support him

because it might endanger its independence and moral integrity. General Jaruzelskiwas elected after two tricks. First he resigned in order to persuade his own partytop officials that they have no better candidate for the presidency than Jaruzelskihimself. The second trick was made by the opposition during the voting in theNational Assembly.Jaruzelski "won" by 1 vote, the narrowest possible margin. His victory wasartificially produced by the opposition and not by his own three-party coalition.When the opposit ion leaders found out that many deputies from the Peasant Partyand from the Democratic Party were going to vote against Jaruzelski, they decidedto help him in an indirect way: 11 members of the opposition failed to come tothe parliament on that day, 18 persons abstained from voting, and 7 members ofSolidarity consciously made their votes invalid. As a result, none of the opposition members openly supported the candidacy of Jaruzelski but 36 membersconsciously refrained from the genuine opposition to him.This particular case showed one more time that the neocorporatist deals madebehind the scene were interfering with the principle of majority rule so essentialto parliamentary rule. If this peculiar mixture of corporatist negotiations and themajority principle is going to be continued, the disillusioned voters and frustratedconsumers may get an impression they are cheated and manipulated by both theold and the new political elite. The elite is obviously more interested in corporatistdecision-making than are the leaders of the opposition. That approach is moreconvenient to the Communist party because it is based on top secret negotiationsthrough which both sides decide by consensus and not by the decision of a majority.They may try to alienate the opposition leaders from their own constituencies.The old political elite may expect that the hopes pinned on Solidarity can be reducedby the close cooperation of the two elites. They know pretty well that the dualismof two elites is perhaps better than the monopoly of one elite, but most of the critical


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72 Praxis Internationalvoters are not willing to accept secret discourse. The voters who supportedopposition candidates expected that open debate and the procedure of secret votingwould replace the old ways based on secret debate between elites and on the obedientmechanical followers. Critical voters demand that political decision-making bemade transparent to the public.As W a ~ s a offerred a new coalition government in August 1989 he wanted tobreak the dominant position of the Communist party. His idea was very simpleand radical - he proposed a coalition government led by himself that would eliminatethe PUWP and strengthen both the Peasant Party and Democratic Party. His ideawas expressed in an arbitrary way and without the previous acceptance of theSolidarity parliamentary faction.Tadeusz Mazowieckiwas invited by W a l ' ~ s a to become deputy prime minister.Yet W a } ' ~ s a was persuaded by his closest advisers that his original idea ofgovernment without Communists would constitute a trap for Solidarity. Becauseof his natural flexibility he gave up his plan to become prime minister himselfand quickly suggested that TadeuszMazowiecki would be the best prime ministerin a broad coalition dominated by Solidarity ministers. Exclusion of the PUWPwas avoided and the strategic superiority of Solidarity established when PresidentJaruzelski nominated Mazowiecki and accepted the idea of a government in whichmost important economic positions were to be given to "Solidarity" politicians.In that paradoxical way the private move of W a Y ~ s a greatly contributed to ademocratic breakthrough in Polish postwar politics: not only the monopoly positionof the Communists but their dominant role within the coalition government was

broken. These dilemmas (parliamentary procedure vs. neocorporatist bargaining,the arbitrary will of a leader vs. trust in democratic institutions and processes)if not solved may lead exclusively to corporatist rule.The reemerging political parties (about 60 in January 1990) do not help very

much because most of them are unable to represent actual and future social andpolitical interests. They do not know their future constituencies and have noexperience in political mobilization. The weakness of the new parties has manyreasons:1. Symbolic representation: parties do not represent interests but appeal to thecollective memory of political traditions and symbols of the past that maymobilize emotion-based support;2. Resentment-driven policy options: parties do not provide fresh and innovativesolutions to the present problems but rather express negative emotions. Negative

propaganda is usually directed against persons of other political figures or againstother political organizations.3. Searching for the "bad guys" leads to emotional and negative articulation andthe lack of positive alternatives that might challenge and mobilize the presentgovernemnt.4. The personalization of the political arena and an overly personal style in policymaking has roots in the unstructured interests of reemerging civil society. Polishsociety is a moving configuration of forces in flux rather than any kind of

cohesive and well-ordered structure. Thus, the lack of confidence in publicinstitutions (like banks, enterprises, local authorities, schools) is compensated


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Praxis International 73for by trust in symbolic persons: prime minister Mazowiecki and other nationalleaders are perceived by many as the only Hoffnungstrager. Another explanation for this is perhaps the fact that liberal-democratic institutions and stylesof leadership have never firmly taken root in Polish political culture.Citizens' trust may be undermined by the unclear division of functions and rulesin the ever-changing mosaic of the new political order. This in turn leads to atroublesome situation in which everybody does everything they can, or at leastthey feel like they are doing everything they can, but no one is really responsiblefor anything. Faith in great personalities is a substitute for the trust in institutionalframeworks and in the new and democratic rules of the game. W a f ~ s a himselfis perceived as a charismatic-populist type of leader who claims the discretionary

authority of unlimited interference.The legitimacy of the new authorities is not based just on elections and parliamentary procedures but also on everyday, national and Roman Catholic traditions,and on shared beliefs on the validity of symbols (like the eagle with the crown).Obedience is based: (a) on the passive adjustment of citizens to the new rules ofthe game, Cb) shared negative emotions against the Soviet-dominated past, and(c) unclear hopes that a better future must come because a nation which sufferedso much must deserve it.If loyalty to specific political figures proves stronger than experience-based trustin institutional networks and in the rule of law and impersonal market competitionsome negative scenarios may threaten the transition to a stable democracy. Amongthe political and domestic threats to uncertain democracy the following seem tobe of primary importance:

1. A corporatist-style discourse between different groups of the ruling elite thatmay alienate citizens from public life or provoke their dissent;2. a populist rebellion fuelled by the marketization of the unbalanced economyand fostered by the old-regime-supporters hoping for destabilization of theemerging democracy through strikes and/or demonstrations;3. indifference and demobilization of voters who may abstain from political participation and thus may leave the space of public freedom unfilled with theirenergy;4. unrestrained pluralism of many relatively small and "sentimental" politicalparties being hardly able to form a stable coalition government and to safeguardthe peaceful course of the transition to stable democracy;5. a growing risk of self-protective nationalism (reinforced by German unificationand by Lithuanian and Ukrainian nationalisms) combined with paternalist andauthoritarian temptations.In order to avoid s\lch scenarios all economic recovery and the growing influence

of a democratic mainstream (of christian-, liberal- and socialdemocrats) are badlyneeded. Political cooperation ofWestern democracies and truly democratic forcesin the East, including the present Soviet Union, is one of the basic conditions forthe successful transition from an uncertain to a stable Polish democracy.


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ELITES AND SYSTEMATIC CHANGEIN HUNGARYErzsebet Szalai

Radical political changes have been launched essentially by a new elite whichemerged out of the Kadarist institutions in Hungary. They are the famous beatgeneration, the "great generation" - mostly those who are in their forties today- who already occupied the lower and medium levels of the different (state, partyand enterprise) bureaucracies before May 1988. After May 1988 they swiftlyinvaded the power positions in politics and economics. Important decision-makingpositions had already been in their hands; many of them already occupied significantbureaucratic, banking, financial and managerial positions. They have completedthe process of taking power by the removal of the old elite, the advocates of order.Let us call them subsequently traditional new elites.The traditional new elites are characterized by liberalism, especially by anattraction to the market, but their need for democracy does not go much beyond

the support of the freedom of entrepreneurs and managers. Yet as a result of theirsocialization during the Kadar era, the ability of informal bargaining has beeninternalized by them and it significantly weakens or at least may weaken the strengthof their market orientation. In this respect the members of the traditional new eliteare heroes of dual linkages.I. Struggle and movementThe traditional new elite can be regarded as the starter engine of the radicalpolitical movements in Hungary. Yet at the same time still other political eliteshave emerged from the "great generation", primarily through the mediation ofthe new parties, and they also demand their share of power.Those members of the traditional new elite who are in spectacular power position

for the time being have been mostly in their post for a short time. They are notsignificantly responsible for the present economic crisis. Yet probably part of themwill have to leave their post now after the recent elections. This is the directionof the effect of the power aspirations and victory of the new political elite, andalso of the sharpening struggle inside the traditional new elite whereby a scapegoatis sought because of growing economic tensions.The old party bureaucracy has disintegrated, and there have been significantchanges of personnel within the state bureaucracy. The exact direction of the

movement of "cadres" will only be possible to examine with precise empiricalresearch. My suspicion now however is that the individuals quitting the old partyand state bureaucracy orient themselves primarily towards the 'business sphere",and overwhelmingly towards the growing banking sphere within it. Though thePraxis International 10:1/2 April & July 1990 0260-8448 $2. 00

1.4 - lamentowicz, wojtek - political culture and institution building. democratic evolution at work...

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