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Polish Society: a Sociological Analysis

Polish Society: a Sociological Analysis

by Adam Podgrecki

Source:

PRAXIS International (PRAXIS International), issue: 1 / 1987, pages: 57-78, on www.ceeol.com.
http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.dibido.eu/bookdetails.aspx?bookID=81e7094f-4b22-4aa4-8124-0e322953a745http://www.ceeol.com/


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57

EASTERN EUROPE AND SOCIAL THEORY

POLISH SOCIETY:A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS*

Adam Podgrecki

Problem

The social history and life of the majority of European countries arecharacterized by considerable stability and continuity. Recent Polish historycontradicts sharply this general observation. World War II and the progress-

ive sovietization of Poland after 1945 introduced several importantprocesses which are still not well analyzed sociologically. The most significantamong them led to the disappearance of many segments of Polish society asthey existed throughout the centuries. The Polish-Jewish population (around3 million) has been annihilated. The Polish landed-gentry has been destroyed.Likewise, tradespeople have virtually disappeared. The big and middlebusiness classes have ceased to exist. Independent cooperatives have disap-peared. Several influential minorities including Germans, Ukrainians andLithuanians have vanished. Independent political parties and organizationshave been outlawed and crushed. The traditional intelligentsia, those whoregarded service for their own society as a duty and mission, has lost itsprevious decisive influence. Likewise, the number and skills of artisans havedramatically declined.1 Therefore, the existence and functioning of aninformal social structure, which developed in a very complicated way, has aspecial significance for the understanding of the complexity of contemporaryPoland. This informal structure is additional to the infrastructure which wasoriginated by the nobility. It was especially elaborated when the country lostits independence, i.e., when Polish society was deprived of its statehood(1795-1918). In carrying out a global analysis of a society of this type, it is

therefore advisable to pay special attention to the historically determinedinformal system of relations between the social structure, on the one hand,and the type of personality characteristics which function within theframework of this structure on the other. For it might appear that the type ofpersonality historically formed in a given society reflects its current socialstructure, or it might appear that its current social structure is shaped by thosepersonality characteristics. So, in order to be certain about these assumptionsone should attempt to present, first a global analysis of the structure of thesociety in question, and secondly to consider in what way the basic elements ofits structure are linked with the basic personality features of its societal

members. In other words, this kind of approach means that one has to* I would like to add that my opportunities to study the subject in a direct way ended in 1977 which reflects

the fact that sources used data from the mid-1970s or earlier. Nevertheless, I would like to note that the

nature of the subject tends to grasp some long-term developments and therefore the newest studies on the

matter are not of the primary importance.


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Praxis International58

compare the existing empirical knowledge concerning social structure withthe knowledge concerning the various ethoses of different social groups in thesociety in question.

Social Composition

One may say that the numerous studies of Polands social structureconducted after 1945 present, in effect, a rather complex and obscure picture.

On the one hand, it is claimed in the relevant literature that the countryssocial structure is relatively homogenous; on the other hand, various processesof social decomposition and recomposition are stressed. Some researchersclaim that Polish society is characterized by a relatively low differentiation ofincomes. Nevertheless, it was shown that the factor of individual subsidiaryearnings is an important variable component of secondary economic differ-entiation (hidden economy). This component constitutes an essential, butquite often overlooked or unrecognised, element of social life. Some writersclaim that in Poland social mobility affects individuals, classes, and strata,whereas in capitalist countries upward and downward mobility basicallyaffects only individuals. These general observations concerning Poland arebased on research by Adam Sarapata. A study of Stefan Nowak (published in 1966but carried out in 1961) confirms Sarapatas initial findings. According to Nowak,

If we accept that the transition from country-side to town, movement from theranks of unskilled to skilled, from those of manual to non-manual workers,

and for the children of administrative employees, entry into the category ofintelligentsia with higher education all constitute social advancement, then42% of the population . . . occupies [after the Second World War A.P.]positions higher than the occupations of their fathers.2*

Generalizing from the above data, Jan Szczepanski goes even further,repeating and modifying the earlier idea of Stanislaw Ossowski, and declaresthat whole social classes may be mobile when, for example, they take powerafter a revolution.3

Research on the hierarchy of occupation and positions present as consider-able amount of interesting data on social stratification in Poland. The alreadyclassic in this respect research of Wesolowski and Sarapata (carried out in1958) specified three crucial features relating to social position: its stability,the material benefits derived from it, and the prestige attached to it. Theresearch showed that in Polish society the factors which are most highlyesteemed fell under the category knowledge and skills. These findingsexplain to some extent the unusually high position occupied by qualifiedworkers during the Solidarity period. This was indicated by the high positionin prestige ratings accorded to the learned professions and skilled workers andby the low position of unskilled workers. This generalization was also

supported by the decline in the prestige of the private sector, regardless ofthe relativily good financial situation of the people in this category. Anotherresult of this research was the assertion that the changes which took place inPoland before 1958,

* All quotations, unless indicated to the contrary, have been translated by the author.

aCEEOL NL Germany


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Praxis International 59

did not lead to particular demographic and social categories forming differentways of assigning social prestige to occupations and positions. To a certainextent, at least, a system of common values emerged.4

This research also makes a start towards establishing a comparativeframework for the analysis of similar hierarchies of various groups andsocio-occupational positions in a number of societies. For example, in WestGermany in the late fifties, the first four positions on the social prestige scalewere occupied by the following social groups: (1) capitalists, managers, higheradministrators (members of the government), university rector, land owner;(2) intelligentsia (university professor, opera singer, teacher); (3) non-manualemployees, (accountant, draughtsman); (4) small capitalists, handicraftsman.However, in Poland the first four positions were occupied by: (1) intelligentsia

(university professor, doctor, teacher, mechanical engineer, lawyer, agri-cultural engineer, journalist); (2) skilled workers (iron and steel worker, latheoperator, foreman); (3) non-manual workers, (accountant, head of adminis-trative unit); (4) small capitalists and handicraftsmen.5

Research carried out during 1964 - 67 in Lodz by Szczecin and Koszalin,based on a relatively complex technique, led to the conclusion that

in terms of earnings, skilled workers have overtaken clerical-manual workers andin terms of prestige office workers in comparison with the pre-war period.Foremen and brigade leaders have a higher average income and higher averageprestige than office workers and differ little from them with regard to generalevaluation of their position. Although these can be considered new phenomena,the substantial difference in the position of the intelligentsia and technicians inrelation to that of blue collar workers also indicated the persistence of old formsof allocating rewards.

Another general conclusion of this inquiry states:

. . . the difference between manual workers and other social categories is probablysmaller than during the pre-war period. Nevertheless, the distance separatingnon-manual employees from working class is still sufficiently great to be consideredan inheritance from capitalist society which has not yet been eliminated.6

Other research suggests that in Poland the social structure is, to a considerableextent, perceived as open, and it suggests that the level of openness is veryclose to the model of equal opportunity. These conclusions are based on dataderived from a series of studies on social stratification (Janicka, 1973, pp. 61and 91 - 100). Nevertheless, other research interestingly reveals that theabove mentioned openness of the Polish social system mainly concernsaccess to political and social positions but does not necessarily concern sociallife as such. It has been shown that

although we do not find the emergence of impassable barriers or great distancesin social interactions, we can observe visible tendencies to restrictions of sociallife. Such characteristics as the nature of ones work, ones socio-occupationalposition and education play a key role in this instance.7

Indeed, people may be pressed to work together in various places and


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institutions, but they would not necessarily associate themselves easily withthose whom they ideologically reject (for example Party Members).

Despite its intriguing results, the work of Ryszard Dyoniziak has beenvirtually unnoticed in the realm of the generally unrevealing literature onsocial stratification. Dyoniziak asserts that a clear relationship exists betweensocial position and attitudes concerning egalitarianism, consumption andsocial needs as well as so-called false consciousness.

We can see that the strength of egalitarian demands is inversely proportional toperceived consumption needs . . . Thus, as consumption needs increase,demands for egalitarianism within individual occupational groups decline.8

Consequently it could be said that Appetite comes not only with the eating

but tends also to restrict the eating of the others. Does it mean, inconsequence, that if in some areas Polish socialism seems to be successfullyspreading the idea of equality, it simultaneously starts to work against itself?Some generalizations concerning social stratification in Poland can be found ina work edited by Jan Szczepanski who tried unsuccessfully to present asynthesis of the social structure of the socialist society. He presents insteadvarious abstract observations which nevertheless rarely provide someconcrete assertions. One of these concerns the position of manual workers:

The contradiction in their position consists of the fact that, according to theideology and the legal principles of the system, they are the co-owners of the

means of production, while at the same time, they are hired workers subject tothe technological constraints resulting from their relationship to machinery,which constraints also find their repercussions in legal work regulations.9

Another observation of this type concerns administrative personnel:

On the one hand there is a contradiction between the importance of this categoryand its qualifications, and on the other, between the significance of its functionsand its work, and between its responsibility and its prestige.10

According to the same author, the processes concerning the social structure

are, on the whole, planned and designed in advance.Here also we come to the conclusion that the role of spontaneous processes islimited, although they cannot be completely eliminated or regulated. Neverthe-less, their effects are channelled by plans, laws and regulations. It seems thatprecisely this channelling of spontaneous processes, processes of change andsocial transformation, this mutual interaction between spontaneous tendenciesand processes of planned changes in the social structure through the planning ofeducation, employment, wages policy, etc., is sociologically the most fascinatingaspect of the development of industrial society in our country.

The same problem is also treated, if somewhat differently, by Narojek.

Having analyzed various processes of social change and various, more or lessconsciously conceived, social-techniques of economic and social transform-ation, Narojek comes to the conclusion that

. . . in socialist society two kinds of dynamics coexist with each other: on the onehand, the dynamic of socio-systemic transformation and on the other, the


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dynamic of adaption and praxeological thinking. This results from the fact that(this society) is simultaneously a political movement which promotes social goalson the basis of a given scale of values and a system or organized activity, aplanned society.12

This interesting problem is treated more thorougly by Staniszkis, who claimsthat under special conditions which are inherent to the system, the spontan-eous social processes take the upper hand over the general and centrallyplanned socio-economic strategy. Subsequent strategy is designed to over-come these conditions, transferring itself after a while into a normal one.Consequently, strategies which are designed to deal with extraordinarysituations (conflicts, tensions, riots, etc.), in fact, regulate ordinary sociallife.13

The picture of Polish society which deals mainly with industrialization andurbanisation would be doubly crippling if it were not supplemented with dataon the social structure of the countryside. It is generally estimated that justunder half of Polands society lives in rural areas. Its structure is complex anddifferentiated. According to Galeski, (the only existing but still based on theobsolete date synthetic attempt), one can distinguish such kinds of farms:(1) farms which constitute an additional or marginal source of maintenance forthe family (there are about one million of such farms); (2) farms whichconstitute the main but insufficient source of livelihood (less than 20% oftotal); (3) farms which are the sole source of family support (less than 80% of

total); (4) farms based on hired labour (not more than 50,000); (5) agriculturalcooperatives, i.e. multi-family peasant farms (in 1962 these numbered 1,342and contained 26,000 families); (6) large-scale farms, nearly all of them statefarms (over 8,000 employing 370,000 people).14 Because of its normativecontext (contradictory values which weaken traditional social bonds) andbecause of the influence of modernization processes (especially the impact ofthe mass media which is orientated mainly towards urban areas), thiscomplicated agricultural structure is predominantly influenced by culturalmodels originated in the towns. Indeed according to research carried out byMakarczyk and Szpakowski in 1959 and 1969, about one-third of the ruralpopulation would like to change their place of residence, from the country-side to towns, other things being equal. This research is all the more valuableand unique for being a follow-up study (1969) to previous research (1959).Analyzing this former inquiry, Makarczyk writes

Trends towards stabilisation in the countryside and in the occupation of a farmerare stronger the higher the economic status of the farm, the higher the socialposition of the owners of the farm, and the higher the subjective evaluation oftheir own social position in terms of prestige, income and security.

This excellent study gives several indicators that the impact of urban culture

on the countryside has produced and continues to produce a considerableamount of uniformization of the culture of town and country.

The task of presenting a global synthesis of Polish social structure thenbased on the results of existing studies is still an open-ended one. The presentattempt to furnish this kind of preliminary synthesis is only able to produce a


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global picture full of contradictions. On the one hand, Polish society appearsto be homogeneous (this is due to the relative similarity in the basic centrallydistributed earnings of the population), but on the other hand, this society isvery strongly affected by the functioning of the secondary unofficial system ofeconomic differentiation and secondary adjustment (second economy).Although the decomposition of previous class distinctions has resulted in thelessening of differences between town and country and between manual andnon-manual work, the gap which still divides non-manual from manualworkers is substantial enough to constitute an inheritance from capitalistsociety. Although downward social mobility is perceived as insignificantand upward mobility is perceived as vivid, the mobility to level downindividuals leads to a systematic destruction of traditional reference groupsand to the weakening, or even elimination, of the previously existingnatural agents of social control. The processes of social and economicgrowth leading to urbanization, and to the relative increase of the standard ofliving in the seventies and rapid decline of these processes in the eighties, alsocall into existence various processes and phenomena of social pathology. InPolish research on social stratification, however, these processes andphenomena are amazingly and paradoxically absent. Although decompositionof traditional class structures leads, from one point of view, to a lessening ofsocial and economic differences, from another it also frequently generates analienation from traditional norms without at the same time creating sufficient

premises for the emergence of positive mechanisms such as to help theregeneration of the previously disrupted social bonds. These processes lead tothe formation of new individual and social life patterns which have then atendency to carry out this recomposition on a lower level, on the level ofmass culture. However, when mass culture starts to act as a catalyst ofrecomposition processes by providing ready-made stereotyped models ofattitudes and behaviour, it simultaneously blocks the processes which lead toaffiliation with the higher social values and deprives traditionally approvedvalues of the respect previously accorded to them. The new homogeneity ofvalue does not lead to the cementing of traditional local ties disrupted by

vertical mobility. Moreover, the peasantisation of the towns, although it hasrecently (in seventies and eighties) lost some of its previous momentum andintensity, can still be felt in another form. The old traditional and neighbourlyways of life of the peasant community where business and service weremutually rendered, has now been taken over (at least in principle) by therational, pragmatic, and impersonal state administration. These processesgive rise to the tendency to achieve success on the basis of other criteria. Oneof them may be the utilization of privileges which can be achieved through theoccupation of a particular social and political position. This is why we can alsoobserve a move towards a situation in which social positions are considered

attractive in so far as they constitute a means to obtain an access to socialstations which give easy access to attractive social rewards.

Nevertheless a peculiar scheme of pyramidal trinity, as the diagnosticalpicture of Polish society, emerges. At the top is placed a powerful andeconomically relatively well equipped social stratum (but not well recognized


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sociologically despite the fact that some politically oriented sociologists, asmembers of the power elite, belong to it). The bulk of the population issituated in the middle (those average members of the society constitute themain target of existing sociological inquiries). And finally a relatively largeproportion of Polish society seems to be composed of those who are on thelevel (or rather below it) of the social minimum. This social structure is alsoalmost exotic sociologically but there are a few economic studies which givereliable insight into this social stratum. (Tymowski, 1973). Sinceeconomically significant private property was liquidated in Poland in 1945, itseems to be clear that not financial power but political power and the politicalnetwork of connections constitute the main factors which determine thecomposition of Polish society. Thus, a preliminary consideration of the socialstructure leads one to assume that an analysis of political structure and ofvarious personality patterns, and not of the means of production, isdecisive since only they possess the real potential to cope with the new typeof social reality.

In this respect it may appear that the values imposed on society, by basicnotions of the legitimacy of its social structure, could be regarded as essentiallinks between social stratification and the cluster of accepted schemes of lifestyles.

In order to fully understand the functioning and legitimacy of the Polishlegal system, it is necessary to take account of the traditional background

against which respect for the law was formed. During the period when thecountry was deprived of independence (1795-1918) law, and especially thatpart of the legal system which was connected to the state, was treated as asymbol of the invaders power. Lack of respect for this sector of public lawwas then often seen as an act of patriotism. The national rampageous uprisings(the most important being in 1830 and 1861) which were intended to regainindependence were based on an armed, underground struggle and at the sametime contained elements of contempt for organic work, based on proceduralsystematic and legal achievements. The short period of pre-war independence(1918-1939), oriented towards consolidating the country, constructing a new

industrialised base and a state administration, and additionally torn by socialand political contradictions of a reborn state, could not constitute a goodsocio-legal school, above all because of the lack of the above mentionedtraditionally accepted and sufficiently prestigious structures which couldstrengthen or generate acceptable types of legal attitudes. The specific periodof German occupation (1939-1945) characterized by Wyka as pretenseliving (limbo life) depended on the suspension of social, moral, and legalnorms with such a strength that this relatively short period accumulated aconsiderable potential. The negative psychological characteristics which aroseon the basis of constant bribery, black market activities, as well as strategies

originated by the biological necessity to survive maintained their value longafter the condition which created them disappeared. Additionally, the Jewishpopulation which had fulfilled an effective role in Poland in trade (as a suigeneris middle class since Polish knightly tradition forbade its members toengage in business) was liquidated by the Germans. In consequence, some


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segments of the population which were not equipped with organizational andtrade abilities of this type emerged to undertake this task of conductingtrade.17 The post-war (after 1945) struggle between various old and newauthorities, traditional values and newly imposed institutions, in many areasof social life led to such far-reaching mutual refutation of their prestige that analmost complete social nihilism emerged as a result.

Life Styles the Polish Intelligentsia

All these and other processes should be taken into account when one wantsto consider the actual, rather than the normative, model of the functioning ofthe life style of the Polish intelligentsia. In a classical work concerning thenormative profile of the pre-war Polish intelligentsia which was the generalprocreator of the Polish social ethos Chalasinski presented the followingcharacteristics of this social stratum*: (1) an essential feature of the intel-ligentsia is fear of being declassed again (the previously downgraded gentry uprooted from its land fears further downgrading); (2) the code of correctbehaviour constitutes a barrier separating the intelligentsia from the lowerstrata, thus safeguarding its shaky social position; (3) the intelligentsia ischaracterized by a feeling of superiority which has only spurious socialjustification. Therefore it displays constant concern for a so-called good

reputation and for social respect; (4) the intelligentsia is characterized by itsown ghetto sub-culture (the ghetto does not like outstanding individuality:the ghetto is especially negativistic towards young people of talents); (5) afurther specific characteristic of the intelligentsia is its unproductivenesselevated to the status of virtue, its orientation towards consumption and itsdependence upon those in authority; (6) although the intelligentsia should beconsidered the main creator of Polish culture, it is basically an amateurcreator; (7) the education achieved by members of the intelligentsia possessesa largely decorative character.18

Presently the analysis of Chalasinski has primarily historical value and it

cannot be due to the rapid recent social changes taken as a comprehensivepicture of the contemporary Polish intelligentsia (mainly due to the rise of thehalf-intelligentsia, technical-intelligentsia, middle-level intelligentsia, or so-called string intelligentsia.) Nevertheless, it should be stressed that theintelligentsia, as a successor of the Polish gentry, imposed the main matrix forthe models and patterns of behaviour of other strata and social classes. This isanother reason why the moulding of the newly propagated ethos undersocialism is so turbulent in Poland.

In the context of the previous analysis, it seems interesting to make anattempt to present a synthetic picture of the ethos of Polish society.

* Ossowska disagreed with Chalasinskis characterization (Ossowska, 1969). Although Ossowska was

right to question some of his arguments (particularly where she showed that the picture drawn by

Chalasinski is not only specific to the Polish inteligentsia), sill the general tenor of his analysis seems

to be well substantiated by historical and sociological data.


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Polish Ethos

In investigating problems relating to the ethos of a society or nation, at least

three approaches are possible. The phenomenological approach attempts topenetrate into the so-called spirit of a nation or society. It aims to reveal itscharacteristic feature and essence. This kind of approach is used quite oftenand is usually the most attractive and sometimes seems justified (Barzini,1983) but, by its very nature, may produce jumping into a wrong track as itcould happen a false picture. The method which seems more reliable inanalyzing the national character of a society is the historical method. Thismethod consists of collecting various facts and historical data which aresubsequently used for generalizations derived from this material. Onesuspects, though, that the methodological procedure for preparing this type of

historical generalizations is basically misleading. A priori accepted politicalopinions, ideological values, and subjective factors, are contained by a certain,usually unrevealed framework, according to which historical data and facts arelater collected as convenient illustrations.

Another approach is also possible. Anthropological and sociological methodsprovide, at the present stage of the development of the social sciences, quitereliable empirical data on the basis of which one may attempt to construct aninitial global synthesis of the given society or nation. The latter approach hasthe advantage over the others of being based on data collected in a systematicand inductive way. However, it does have a certain weakness: generalizationsbased on these data often far exceed their legitimate scope, reliability ofrecorded answers depends on many circumstances, several problems areregarded as tabu for questioning, etc.*

There exist several studies dealing with the basic attitudes of the Polishpopulation. For example, we can mention research into the moral and legalattitudes of society five national surveys carried out between 1962 and 1970(material published in: A. Podgorecki, 1964; A. Podgorecki, 1966; A.Podgorecki, J. Kurczewski, J. Kwasniewski, M. Los, 1970); into the ethics ofyoung people (Kicinski, Kurczewski, 1975); and into socio-political attitudes

(Nowak, 1976). It is worthwhile remembering that some of the abovementioned studies took into consideration representative samples of the wholesociety and have been systematically repeated during more than one decade(196275).

In order to introduce some systemization into this material, one maypropose some conceptual differentiations. They deal mainly with differenttypes of attitudes. Declared attitudes are generally those attitudes which arethe results of installation into individuals social values by various educationalmethods, socialization processes, idealistic appeals, etc. Nevertheless declaredattitudes are not always identical with approved attitudes. Past and present

experiences have taught the Poles to find numerous ways of concealing anypossible divergence between declared and approved attitudes. Approvedattitudes (attitudes internally accepted) are not always those which are

* Therefore the following reconstruction which utilizes this type of method of ethos of Poles is not free

from this limitation.


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externally declared, and they do not always constitute the basis of actualbehaviour. They might be suspended under pressure of some kind of adhoc need or under stress of long and intensive constraints.

Attitudes which constitute the basis of actual behaviour (motivational attitudes)are from a sociological point of view the most interesting ones. In fact,they trigger social interactions.

Nevertheless, collected material suggests the existence of attitudes of aneven more complicated structure. They are meta-attitudes. Four basic kinds ofmeta-attitude can be identified. They are: fiddling attitude oriented towardssurvival, instrumental attitude, attitude of spectacular principledness and theall thumbs attitude as being especially characteristic for the Polish ethos.These meta-attitudes do not find direct expression in behaviour. However,they influence other attitudes. Attitudes of this kind operate as hidden forceswhich exist outside the sphere of perceived opinions and values and whichdetermine how the latter are to be manifested externally. A meta-attitude canthus be defined as a kind of disposition towards a certain type of stablereaction which does not manifest itself externally, but from inside structuresexternally expressed and identifiable motivations. So we can say that meta-attitudes are hidden and petrified attitudes.

The most important of these attitudes is the fiddling attitude of survival.*This meta-attitude, which constantly intervenes in the individual and collectivelife of the Poles, is incredibly flexible. It is constantly tested. Lech Walesa said:

A communique was issued on the subject of my meeting with the Holy Father. Ican add only one thing to it. I noticed at one point that the Holy Father lookedtired, troubled. I decided to cheer him up, since I saw that he wanted to cheer meup. So I said to him, Holy Father, I think Poland is a chosen nation, the mostfortunate nation in the world. The Holy Father looked at me and asked why Ithought so. I told him that every day, many times a day, we can define ourselves.We live helplessly, things which are evident are not evident here, black is whitefor us. We are constantly testing ourselves. That is why we are able to go back tothe basics. At the same time we look at rich Americans and ask, What tests dothey measure themselves by? Well, they can pick up a new girl, get a newcar . . . , . 19

It aims also at accumulating material possessions in order to have security(rather psychological than economic) in the face of uncertainty. The attitude ofsurvival in the particular version worked out by the Poles has an autoteliccharacter (value to itself.) Thus the tendency to acquire relationships (thatenlarges the association of equals) loses its teleological origin as a mean toensure the conditions for survival. Envy then becomes envy for its own sake

* Perhaps an anecdote will be a better indication of the meaning of the meta-attitude oriented towards

survival. An American millionaire of Polish origin once told this writer how he had achieved his

remarkable success. The owner of several helicopter factories, he maintained that his helicopters werebetter than any others because they were tested by Polish pilots. They had a gift to find minor defects

in the helicopters design which might in certain conditions lead to tragedy. These pilots equipped

with the incredible drive to survival were psychologically able to withstand tests and individual strain,

which other nationalities were not capable of. Thus, in his opinion, this national characteristic which

he had used in combination with American technology, had built his impressive success and wealth.


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losing its original force as a negative regulator generated by the attitude ofsurvival which in an anticipatory way peeps into and undermines the skillsand strategies of others, in order to prevent them from threatening ones ownoptions.

The Polish strategy of survival at present seems to be based on twocontradictory factors. The first factor relies on strong links with the family(mainly nuclear) and carefully selected friends. Quite sophisticated studiesindicate that at the forefront of the values respected by the contemporaryPolish population is the welfare of their own children and marital success(quite often understood as mutual defence union). Acceptance by others andones good health are also highly placed (Podgorecki, 1964; Kocowski, 1975).The situations in which the children in Polish families are coming to betreated as idols, symbolizing the closeness of the small group, are cha-racterized by the kind of emotional humanism specific to the world of valuesconfined within the framework of narrow communities. In situations ofuncertainty related to the external threat, this internal asylum is treated asboth a heterotelic (teleological) and an autotelic value; autotelic because of therewards which it directly provides, and heterotelic because of the possibility ofcutting oneself off from disturbing external events.

It is well known that the Polish ethos is characterized by individualism in itstraditional and modern versions, as well as by a tendency to cultivatefriendship ties. Yet it is not always recognized that in Poland the focus on

friendship is an expression of the tendency to associate, by mutually bindingdecision, with equal individuals. Associating with someone on the basis ofability to make ones own decisions, often marked by Brderschaft, is itselfa manifestation of sui generis, arbitrarily established elitarianism. Thisequality holds for those in the same status category, although notautomatically. A voluntary act of internal and selective acceptance is necessaryif the potential informal possibilities are to be ritualistically transformed intoconcrete and stable ties. These mutual ties constitute the unusually strong andvital fabric of the inner life of Polish society. This particular type of socialrelationship may transfer or degenerate itself into the phenomenon of dirty

togetherness. Presently dirty togetherness may be regarded as the secondfactor of the Polish strategy of survival.

Dirty togetherness means that elements of traditional social control,plucked from ethical emotions, are so saturated by various erosive influencesthat they eventually lose their character as agents of social control and assumenew traits of specific perverse loyalty. This loyalty is additionally cementedby family ties, mutual fiddling services, private transactions. These transac-tions open the possibility of mutual blackmail in case of violations of thereciprocal code of collaboration when the behaviour known to the hithertotested partners is disclosed. All these ties, manipulative and instrumental in

their character, serve to establish stronger links than the impersonal, rationalrelationships, and in turn create their own superstructure which dominatesthe social system in which they prosper.

Indeed, the fact that dirty togetherness usually is perceived as aninfluential superstructure by the public at large and the uncertainty where its


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decision-making centre is located, evokes various attitudes of socialinsecurity. It also induces the strong conviction that only those publicprogrammes have a chance to be materialized which will not be confrontedwith counteraction by the superstructure of the community of dirty inter-ests. When there is a reason to expect counteraction, or even retaliation, theagents of that community will extinguish any attempts of actions threateningthem.

Various clusters of dirty togetherness, when they link themselves (or areperceived by the public as interrelated) into a developed frame or superstruc-ture, may have a very important additional effect. They may bond the socialsystem together as a whole.

In order to make this point clearer let us connect the notion of dirtytogetherness with a short analysis of the concept of legitimacy:(a) Legitimacy which is based on the normative grounds: According to this type

of legitimacy, only those regulations and institutions have legal validitywhich are properly deduced from the legal norms of the higher order. Atthe top of the hierarchy of all norms exists the ultimate norm (Kelsenian-Grundnorm) which is regarded as the final source of normative power;

(b) Legitimacy which is based on the democratic support of the population:legitimacy which is normatively valid but nevertheless rejected asunjust, reactionary, oppressive by the majority of the populationis regarded, according to this understanding, as devoid of legal authority;

(c) Legitimacy which takes its validity from the rejection of all other possibleoptions (negative legitimacy): a certain type of legal system which does nothave the support of the majority of the population nor is deduced from alegally valid constitution may still be regarded as legitimate if all otheroptions (e.g., lack of sovereignty, war, total destruction) are consideredeven worse alternatives;

(d) Legitimacy which is based on the existence of the superstructure of dirtytogetherness: if behind the given legal system (which is rejected by thepopulation at large as unjust, undemocratic, etc.) there operates acomplicated infrastructure of mutually interdependent interests, then

this legal system may become accepted, not on the basis of its ownmerits, but because it creates a convenient cover-system for the flour-ishing phenomenon of dirty togetherness. Then each institution,factory and organization serves, independently from its own productiontasks, as a formal network which gives a stable frame of reference for anenormous amount of mutual semi-private services, reciprocal arrange-ments. For example: the acceptance into a medical school of a daughterof a highly placed person in return for the possibility of buying theunaccessible cement for building a house; the privilege of immediatelybuying a car in exchange for admission to a well-equipped, specialized

hospital for an elderly aunt, etc. In this situation the formal legalnetwork, irrespective of its own questionable productive efficiency,becomes a very precious cover-scheme. It is clear that individuals whooperate inside this system will, after a while, start to support this legalmatrix not because they accept it (as a system which has a normitive


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validity, or a system which is supported on the basis of its own inherentvirtues), but because they become familiar with it, with the rules of its game,with its whos who background and with its conditions of efficiency.

It is not difficult to notice that the community of dirty togetherness isdefensively directed. It tries to defend itself against the official hostilesystem in which it operates and which it supports perversely.

By spectacular principledness one means the attitude which not only approvesof a given norm or value for their own sake, irrespective of the circumstances,but which also celebrates certain norms or values because they are consideredsacred and symbolically significant. A clear tendency of the Poles is to accordparticular respect to everything connected with the fatherland, politicalindependence, the suffering of the nation throughout its history (mar-tyrology). Also impressive is their organic scepticism regarding everydaysystematic work, the apotheosis of such historical events as the GallantRescue of Vienna (1683), the Charge at Samosierra (1808) or the Polishparticipation in the Air Battle of England (1941), the tendency to be theMessiah of the World, and also the celebration of even the least importantminor social, religious and state holidays, and so forth. Ordinary, commonsense in everyday use, principledness is alien to this attitude.

These virtues are treated as autotelic values. The Poles are unable to profitfrom their heroic accomplishments. Practically nobody knows that Enigma(code machine) was captured and decoded by Polish mathematicians. But

practically everybody competent in this matter knows that the ability tointercept German messages sent by this device was crucial for the AlliedForces in winning the Second World War. Practically nobody knows that oneof the German V-missiles was captured by the Polish Underground Army andsent to England. This operation too had tremendous value for the Alliedmilitary forces. Polish martyrology has autotelic value. The Poles, as opposedto other nations, are unable to translate their own sufferings into political oreven economic advantage. Their spectacular principledness has almostbecome a sacred value. There are data which suggest that spectacularprincipledness has been maintained in Polish society through traditional

attachment to its religion. Survey data from 1964 show that about 86% of theurban and 90.01% of the rural population define themselves as believers.20

Subsequent research carried out in 1966 (both studies based on representativesamples of the Polish adult population) show that 72.5% of the urban and82.8% or the rural population claim to be believers. On the other hand,research carried out in 1971 dealing with what might be called the middle-level intelligentsia (young people undergoing occupational training in instit-utions of supplemental education, teachers and local governmentemployees a total of 1,115 people), shows that 64.8% of those investigateddefined themselves as believers. Women claim a religious view more often

than men. A lower level of education is more frequently associated withdeclared religious faith. Rural respondents more often than urban ones definethemselves as religious. This is also true of older people as compared to youngones. This kind of residue of religious belief may support attitudes ofspectacular principledness. It may also constitute the basis for the strength-


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ening of status traditionally ascribed. Thus, religious attitude may constitutean element in a chain linking the attitude of spectacular principledness and thetraditional acceptance of ascribed status presently challenged by socialist

thought.In order to present more adequately the essential features of the attitude of

spectacular principledness, it should be noticed that in Polish society, thevalue of a gesture is more important than the value of the relevant actionwhich is supposed to solve a given task. To be more specific, in Polish culture,an attempt to do something which has the form of a spectacular demeanour, aform which confronts the problem impressively, is valued higher than apragmatic, logistic, practical or economic solution. In Poland, the socialposition of a given person is not determined in fact by its real potential(qualifications) but is established by the social show which a given persondelivers when approaching the problem. Symbolic values certainly overpassreal ones. Informal evaluations are more significant than tangible, socially andobjectively recognized effects of acts and tasks in question. Legends andmyths become the most critical factors. The subjective aura of an intendedsocial action and the capacity to transmit it into a social performance visiblefor relevant audience seems to be more important than the consequences ofthe actual action.

In relation to moral norms and legal norms, this meta-attitude expressesitself as a rigoristic posture. This rigour is, above all, manifest in relation to

others, as it seems to be a characteristic of human nature in general. However,this rigour does not remain only at the level of expression. Research showsthat the sanctions of the Polish legal system are applied in social life in amanner matching these general attitudes.21 This tendency towards socialpunitiveness can be explained in a number of ways. One may suppose that it isthe expression of a certain kind of ambivalence regarding the law. On the onehand, it may express respect for the law (this is linked to the demand for itswidespread application); on the other hand, it may reflect the fact that the lawis not adequately applied and followed (so, consequently demands for thestrengthening of the law through the utilization of its own sanctions). More

convincing seems to be the supposition that social punitiveness constitutes anexpression of certain elements of accumulated social frustration. (It should benoted for comparison, that Finnish society, supposedly because of itshistorical frustrations comparable to those of Poland, also demands andapplies the sanctions of criminal law in the large scope). This problem is anextremely complex one. All in all, one may state that when social informalrigour produces expected results, it manifests a genuine respect for the law. Ingeneral, an informal legal rigour seems to be more socially effective the greaterthe extent to which the law is perceived as just and fair.

Another meta-attitude common among Poles is instrumentality. Just as the

principled attitude accepts or rejects certain norms for their own sake, theinstrumental attitude is selective and calculating. On the basis of subjectivecalculation of profit and loss, it accepts those norms which appear to beconvenient for the attainment of desired goals and rejects all others. It would bea fundamental mistake to think that this attitude is as a rule socially


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destructive. It may form the basis for carrying out various tasks going beyondones individual interest. But, in fact, this attitude is predominantly orientedtowards private goals. Research shows that the present younger generation inPoland is characterized by this attitude to a greater extent than the previousgeneration. We can discern various kinds of instrumental attitudes in thesphere of financial activities, in sex life, in personal relationships, in politicaloptions, in institutional arrangements, etc. These different kinds of instru-mental attitudes may appear isolated from each other in certain patterns, orthey may constitute a whole instrumental personality.

A summary of the research done in 1964, 1966 and 1970 on the principledand instrumental attitudes suggested the following:

1. The principled attitude rises respectively with increases with age;2. The pool of instrumental attitudes rises with the educational level but

respondents with higher education (completed or not) are neverthelessdisposed to a compromise position;

3. Private farmers are more disposed to the principled attitude than aremembers of other occupational groups;

4. The principled attitude is associated with living in a big city;5. The principled attitude is linked more with the lack of an insecurity

feeling than with symptoms of insecurity, while the instrumentalattitude is associated with a strong feeling of insecurity;

6. Proper adaption to life is essentially linked with the principled attitude,

while maladjustment is associated with an instrumental one.A comparison of the above findings with previous ones leads to somemodification of earlier formulated generalizations. Among those particularlyreinforced by the most detailed 1970 research is the hypothesis regarding therelationship between age and acceptance of a principled or instrumentalattitude (rise in frequency of the principled attitude with age) and the relationsassociated with subjective social straits. The instrumental attitude is thuslinked in the previous and 1970 research with insecurity and maladjustment,while the principled attitude is associated in both with proper adaption to lifeand a security feeling. (The 1970 findings were presented in A. Podgorecki

and A. Kojder, 1972.)It is easy to notice that the instrumental attitude may be regarded as a sui

generis consequence of the fiddling-survival attitude. It should also berecorded that this attitude is contradictory to all those attitudes which stressthe principled approach to interpersonal relationships. So, while instru-mentality has some roots in the Polish national character (even if fiddling wasdirected mainly against governance imposed by foreign powers whichoccupied Poland through more than one century), it certainly is a calculative,ideological life perspective (even if the traditional spectacular principlednessgives a certain type of rationalization in cases of the common, everyday breach

of the law). But nothing besides socialism carried on instrumental attitudes totheir full blossom. The tension between contradictory hierarchies of values,the constant tendency to suppress the traditional attachments to institutionsand organizations generated by Polish society through its history, everydayinefficiency that necessitates marked departures from norms otherwise


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regarded as healthy and valid, erosion of trust among close friends, evenamong members of the family, the distribution of rewards linked withpolitical flexibility caused by changeable ideological programmes, all combineto introduce, wave after wave, new floods of privately oriented instrumentalattitudes or even social nihilism.

The all-thumbs meta-attitude is characterized by the imminent imposs-ibility to achieve the desired goal. Thus a meta-attitude of this type leads tothe partial realization of the goal (realization of this part of the goal which isnot necessarily the most essential one), or produces some additional by-products which undermine (or even ridicule) the goal itself. It may also create,during the process of the realization of the goal, some side effects turningattention to details which change the whole task-oriented process into a farce.

There are many factors which generate this type of meta-attitude. Theseinclude the inability to work in a disciplined way, disinclination towardscooperation, the disproportionate pressure of antagonistic circumstancesworking against the established plan, the bifurcation of contradictorycurrents which whimsically escape control. In general, one may say that theunexpected but structurally designed dissonance between rational expecta-tions and the results obtained constitute the essential factor of the all-thumbs meta-attitude. Although this attitude has always been an ingredientof tragedy, still a substantial element of inadvertent folly is inseparablyconnected with it.

As everybody knows KOR (the Workers Defence Committee) had adecisive influence on the triumphant emergence of Solidarity. Neverthelessthe end of KOR seemed to be designed by the spirit of the all-thumbsmeta-attitude.

Even after this final act (the dissolution of KOR A. P.) another small chapter inthe history of KOR occurred. In itself it was rather minor, but it was widelynoticed and variously interpreted, and affected both nerves and health.

On the day of Lipinskis speech (Sept. 28, 1981) A. P.), the delegation from theRadom Region of NSZZ Solidarity introduced a motion to the effect that thecongress should pass a resolution thanking Kor. The chairman of the Radomregion explained why it was this particular region that was introducing themotion, which given the events of 1976 and the enormous work which KORhad accomplisheed in Radom was rather obvious. Late in the evening, after theconclusion of the plenary meetings, Pawel Niezgodzki suggested that thedelegation of Mazowsze should introduce a countermotion. This was a long andaffected statement containing a number of formulations from the preface to theproject of the program of Solidarity, as well as many other statements, such asthat Poland has been Christian for a thousand years, that the Church and thepope have played an enormous role in creating the situation that made thiscongress possible, and so on. The motion also contained a single sentence

positive about the democratic opposition, without any specific mention of KOR(though it was not the democratic opposition, but KOR that was dissolving) . . .The motion was withdrawn.

And is this silly episode to serve as a conclusion to the history of KOR ? It must,


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since the Social Self-Defense Committee KOR no longer existed. Much wasleft behind, and much will survive for a long time to come: in the people whoparticipated in its work, or those who benefitted from it, in Solidarity, in several

important years of Polish history, in the effects that will last for many years, andalso in the books and periodicals that constitute a material proof that all this wasnot just a dream.22

The writings of W. Gombrowicz present quite a picturesque kaleidoscope ofthe meta-attitude in question. Social roots of this attitude are the following: ifone is unable to solve the problems at hand, he might, consciously orunconsciously, transform the solving-task-attitude into a theatrical show.Then gratification does not come from the desired effects, but it comes fromthe spectacle involved.

Conclusion

Although the existing elements of the research on the Polish society are,despite the relative sophistication of some of them, scattered, selective andfragmentary, they show very clearly that this society is undergoing funda-mental changes.

These transformations consist, on the one hand, of the tendency towards aflattening of the social structure through an increase in its homogeneity (theplanned decomposition of the classes and strata of the pre-socialist social

structure), and, on the other hand, of the emergence of new, unplannedheterogenous strata based on the secondary distribution of incomes whichdrastically change the officially proclaimed equality. These kinds of processesgive rise firstly to a planned social composition in accordance with theideological measures undertaken to implement the principle of egalitarianism,and secondly, to a recomposition which is contrary to the expectations of theplanners. Therefore it would be useful in the Polish case which is adeliberately designed societal laboratory, to distinguish between functionalrecomposition (consistent with expectations) and dysfunctional recomposition(giving rise to unexpected side-effects negative to the planners point of view),

and also to distinguish between spontaneous recomposition processes andthose which are guided ones.

One of the crucial problems concerning society as a whole is the distancebetween functional and dysfunctional changes inside this society and theextent to which these processes have so far ignored the question of a generalpsycho-social deviance, namely the special type of societal schizophrenia.These processes lead, as was mentioned before, to a pyramidal reversedtriptych: on top we have the purely instrumentally oriented stratum ofoperators; in the middle is the mixture of those corroded by the instru-mentality as well as the mass of those escaping into principal orientation; and

on the bottom there is a large stratum of less successful fiddling-survivalstrategists.

The above-mentioned dualism of the processess taking place in the heart ofthe present Polish society has its equivalence in the life style of the Poleswhich is expressed in sui generis social ambivalence, kept under control by,


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among other things, the most excessive vodka-alcoholism in the world (theUSSR does not publish the relevant data). It is maintained by the constantpressures created, on the one hand, by the fear of authority which comes frompragmatic and practical sources (if a given government possesses the total legaland factual power, it seems to be conformistically well advised to comply withits regulations) and the mission type of attitude of the traditional Polishintelligentsia. The latters watch-dog pressure constantly reinterprets allregulations issued by the government. Thus, a member of the Polish societyis according to these contradictory pressures, always under the scrutiny of anofficial control and the stress of an invisible peer-group force. In short, bothgive him contradictory guidance. It is not difficult to see that these two sets offactors (official and informal) reinforce the continuous growth of a schizo-phrenic personality based on ambivalence.*

The assertion that the ethos of the Poles is an outcome of this nations pasthistory would be merely banal if it were not for the fact that the modernstructure and stratification of Polish society seems to be molded by theabove-elaborated personality patterns. More concretely, the specific type ofthe underdevelopment of Polish society (due to lack of a developed middleclass) shifted the trends of its societal development towards the ethos ofhigher social classes, thus giving these classes almost direct access to theprocess of designing basic patterns of life for the lower social strata. Thus inthe historic progress of amalgamating the structure of Polish society, the

positive economic motivation did not have enough momentum for developmentcomparable to that in Western Europe. This, in effect, led to a situation inwhich the socially established patterns of behaviour (meta-attitudes) becamedecisive. If these generalizations are correct, then Polish society illustrates acase which directly contradicts the Marxist way of thinking. It presents asituation in which the Marxist superstructure is more influential than thebase.

In any case, the explanatory potential of the above-presented ideas ofmeta-attitudes seems not to be exhausted. The functioning of the socio-political elite may be explained through the shift of instrumentally oriented

members of this society towards the top positions of power. The perseveranceof these institutions which, being hated by the overwhelming majority,continue to exist may be explained not only by the use of force but also, to alarge extent, by the phenomenon of dirty togetherness and by the func-tioning of this part of the instrumentally greedy half-intelligentsia which ismotivated by the drive to compensate for its low social origin. Therefore, thevast sector of public economy and administration operates as a consequence ofthe perverse support which it gains from the fiddling-survival and instru-mental attitudes. For fiddling-survival attitudes seem to be responsible for themiraculous transformation of the existing institutions and organizations

* It is interesting to notice that in Poland those who possess the power are, of course, not eager to reveal

that the very basis of their existence is not supported by the public at large. And this is precisely why

those who occupy official positions curtail studies which try to enter into this area. As a result, there

are research blanks and spots. In consequence, the existing diagnostic and synthetic picture of the

Polish society, based on the systematically collected data, becomes dangerously crippled.


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into a hidden second life (second economy) system which supports them.The very simple rationale for this is that, when official institutions andorganizations give the shelter for second life activities which blossom underits cover, practically all who participate in it have some vested interests inkeeping this formal system going.

All in all, one may say that, on the grounds of repeated negative historic andcollective experiences, the described meta-attitudes have been, by trial anderror, singled out and selected as the most suitable. In consequence,meta-attitudes such as fiddling survival, instrumentalism, spectacular princip-ledness, all thumbs, represent the unique historic resultants of the life ofPolish society. Since recent Polish history was shaped by foreign regimes andupheavals to regain independence, wars and more or less open dissidentmovements, those attitudes may be regarded as the most crucial elements ofPolish social life. They structure the social structure.

Independently of all changes in the social structure and independently of allclashes of old and new values taking place in Poland after the Second WorldWar, the real picture of this society remains a dark enigma. So, why have theseemingly dynamic and semi-independent Polish social sciences been, andwhy are they now, unable to render a diagnosis which might resolve themystery of this society?

Social sciences in Poland recently underwent a rapid transformation. Twocategories of scholars started to play a dominant role there: instrumental and

spectacular. Instrumental scholars using science as a means to achieve arelatively stable and traditionally respectable career are not concerned withthe truth; they are worried about whether they may secure for themselves aprofitable life by tailoring the factual data and their interpretations accordingto the demands of those who are influential. Neither are spectacular scholars,despite their continuous and desperate fights with the rules, able to approachreliably the existing social reality. Obsessed with the competition amongthemselves in their desire to capture the highest value, the informally bindinggovernance of souls, they are engaged in the self-myth creating processes,since nothing else but a large social visibility may grant them the security and

possibility of spreading their ideas.This is why the Solidarity Movement, as a worldwide experiment in

social-psychology and politics, did not find, until now, an adequate explan-ation. What, then, is the uniqueness of this Movement in the light of previousconsiderations?

The skilled workers (with their instrumental orientation) rapid rise tonational prominence, and their union (principled in character and the first inPolish history) with the Polish intelligentsia have been, paradoxically enough,directed against the workers-state. Traditional, spectacular drives of thePolish intelligentsia have been reinforced by the encouraging and theatrical

role of the Polish Church as well as by the superstar performance of the PolishPope. Being unable to fight with the arrogant and shrewd neighbouringsuperpower, the ingenious survival strategy of the Polish people manifesteditself through the Gandhi-like attitude of nonviolence. The youthful dominantcharacter of the Solidarity Movement, being in sharp contrast with the


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pragmatism of the experienced older generation, based its values on therespect for the pluralistically and horizontally comprehended values. Thispluralistic (respect for various life and political philosophies) and horizontalperspective was not only favourable for democratic renewal; it triggered aswell, a strong and accelerating process of the decomposition of discipline andmembership in the Communist Party. But when martial law was declared, thesame ingenious survival strategy of the Poles did not opt for, as might bedictated by the traditionally Polish belligerent flavor of principledspectacularness, open war with the puppet army or forces from the outside,but unexpectedly called for the social posture of a spurious failure: the allthumbs attitude. This attitude pushed, still boiling, spectacular princip-ledness into the cool and conspiratorial style of the life of the underground (sowell developed during the Second World War).

This underground life, through its legends, martyrs and subculture, isgoing to accumulate, crystalize and preserve those values on which theprincipled spectacularness of future generations will rest. Thus, the develop-ment of Solidarity should be regarded not only as a dramatic, pluralistic andnonviolent protest directed against the overgrowth of the inner society ofdirty togetherness but also as the further preservation of the specificity of thesacred Polish values contained in a counter-culture.

Finally, it is possible to show several interconnections between the varioustypes of ethos of the Polish nation and its social structure.

Instrumentality is, obviously, not only a result of the defiant attitudes of thePolish people toward different kinds of foreign powers, which occupiedPoland during the last two centuries. Instrumentality is also a result of anacceleration of socio-political (vertical as well as horizontal) mobility whichtook place in the 20th century and after the Second World War in Poland.Then, several conflicting authorities connected with the various ruling socialstrata, losing their legitimacies and being officially and forcibly replaced bythe competing, although not necessarily socially accepted, power centers,produced as the result of these value struggles a growing skepticism.Thus, socio-political and legal authorities, mutually cancelling each others

prestige, generated as the net result, the general attitude of private instru-mentality, if not nihilism.

Spectacular principledness bound (and binds) together many features ofPolish history; especially its grandiose medieval heritage as one of the mostpowerful and peaceful European states established in the 10th century; apowerful nobility, which in the 16th century constituted around one-eighth ofthe entire Polish population and had the right to elect its kings democratically;the nobilitys highly treasured and, the earliest in Europe, inter-class democ-racy, as well as, when Poland lost her independence in the second part of the18th century, the heroic national resistance against various types of external

oppression. Survival strategy contributed much to the preservation of nationalvalues (which were mainly of a societal, show-nature, potlatch typecharacter) during the long period of German and Russian occupation.

The all thumbs attitude, being strongly connected with the amateurishethos of the Polish nobility and its product, the intelligentsia, manifested itself


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not only by the inherent inability to achieve something tangible and to apply itto reality task-oriented patterns of social behavior. It also manifested itself bythe lasting domination of these patterns of behavior, not only over the weakPolish bourgeoisie (since the task-oriented Jewish middle class was, to a largeextent, alienated from Polish society), but domination over the weak Polishworking class as well (which was rather inclined to regard national indepen-dence as a more important issue than the problem of class revolution).Self-oriented irony plays, in the case of this attitude, the role of a mechanismwhich tries to screen individual and societal dignity behind ones ownmockery.

NOTES

1. W. Wyrwa, Historia lat siedemnastu, Aneks, 1986, pp. 41-2.2. St. Nowak, Psychologiczne aspekty przemian struktury spolecznej i ruchliwosci spolecznej, Studia

Socjologiciczne(Studies in Sociology), No. 2/21, 1966, p. 89.3. J. Szczepanski, Elementarne pojecia socjolgii (Elementary Notions of Sociology) (Warszawa: P. W. N ,

1970), p. 497.

4. W. Wesolowski, A. Sarapata, Hierarchie Zawodow i Stanowisk (Hierarchies of Professions and

Positions), Studia Sociologiczne (Sociological Studies) No. 2, 1961, pp. 107108.5. Ibid., p. 116.

6. K. Slomczynski, Zroznicawanie spoleczno-zawodowe i jego korelaty (Socio-Professional Differentiationand its Correlation), Wroclaw, Ossolineum, 1972, pp. 268269.

7. W. Warzywoda-Kruszunska, Zbieznosc Cech Spolecznych Wspolmalzonkow (Congruency of SocialCharacteristics of Spouses) in: Struktura i Ruchliwosc Spoleczna (Structure and Social Mobility), K.

Slomczynski, W. Wesolowski, eds. (1973), p. 24.

8. E. Dyoniziak, Potrzeby konsumpcyjne a problem Falszywej swiadomosci (Consumptive Needs

and the Problem of False Consciousness,), Kultura i spoleczenstwo(Culture and Society), no. 2, IV,XI, 1967, pp. 211212.

9. J. Szczepanski, Przemysl i Spoleczenstwo w Polsce Ludowej (Industry and Society in Peoples Poland)(Wroclaw: Ossolineum, 1969), pp. 446488.

10. Ibid., p. 480.

11. Ibid., p. 492.

12. W. Narojek, Spoleczenstwo planujace (Planning Society) (Warszawa: P. W. N., 1973).

13. J. Staniszkis, Patologia struktur organizacyjnych, (Pathology of Organizational Structure) (Wroclaw:

Ossolineum, 1972), pp. 145146.

14. B. Galeski, Socjologia wsi (Rural Sociology) (Warszawa: P. W. N., 1966).

15. W. Makarczyk, Z. Szpakowski, Przemiany zycia spoleczno-kulturalnego ludnosci wiejskiej (Changes in

Social Life of Peasant Population), Warszawa, Usrodek Badania Opinii Publicznej i Studiow

Programowych (Centre of Public Opinion Studies), 1972, p. 59, table 48.

16. W. Makirczyk, Czynniki slabilizacji w zawodzie rolnika, i motywy migracji do miast (Elements of

Stabilization in Farmers Occupation and Motives of Migration) (Wroclaw: Ossolineum, 1964), p.

161.

17. K. Wyka, Zycie na Niby (Limbo Life), PIW, 1957.

18. J. Chalasinski, Spoleczna genealogia inteligencji polskiej. (Social Genealogy of Polish Intelligentsia.)

(Warszawa, 1946), pp. 3795.19. Committee in Support of Solidarity Reports, No. 20, Dec. 10, 1983, p. 8.

20. A. Podgorecki, Prestiz Prawa (Prestige of the Law), Warszawa, Ksiazka i Wiedza, pp. 197209.

21. J. Jasinski, Punitywnosc Systemow Prawnych (Punitiveness of Legal Systems) in Studia

Prawnicze, No. 35, 1963.

22. J. J. Lipski, KOR, (Berkeley: California University Press, 1985), pp. 454-456.


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